With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.
Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.
User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2105
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.
Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.
The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()
i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.
The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.
Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.
It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.
CVE-2016-2106
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f3582139fbb259a1c3cbb0a25236500a409bf26)
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9b08619cb45e75541809b1154c90e1a00450e537)
Conflicts:
crypto/x509/x509.h
crypto/x509/x509_err.c
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b33d1141b6dcce947708b984c5e9e91dad3d675d)
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 295f3a24919157e2f9021d0b1709353710ad63db)
The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function
properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers
(e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption
anyway.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d78df5dfd650e6de159a19a033513481064644f5)
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.
Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 446ba8de9af9aa4fa3debc7c76a38f4efed47a62)
This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2
and 1.0.1
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ca67644ddedfd656d43a6639d89a6236ff64652)
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 79356a83b78a2d936dcd022847465d9ebf6c67b1)
Backport of commits:
79c7f74d6cefd5d32fa20e69195ad3de834ce065
bdcd660e33710079b495cf5cc6a1aaa5d2dcd317
from master.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in
chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents
small files allocating excessive amounts of data.
CVE-2016-2109
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c62981390d6cf9e3d612c489b8b77c2913b25807)
Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message
contains excess data.
The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side
only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would
be needed to have a significant impact.
This was found by libFuzzer.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec66c8c98881186abbb4a7ddd6617970f1ee27a7)
no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code,
although it was suppressing its use.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a6406c95984a1009f5676bbcf60cc0d6db107af4)
If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur.
Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed
to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it
anyway.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffe9150b1508a0ffc9e724f975691f24eb045c05)
Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit adc4f1fc25b2cac90076f1e1695b05b7aeeae501)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an
integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption.
However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not
normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not
significant.
Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be
more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5f57abe2b150139b8b057313d52b1fe8f126c952)
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%.
CVE-2016-0702
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not
configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if
"enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the
version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either
of:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
or
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client
or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search
key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit
EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
Mitigation for CVE-2016-0800
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using
an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|.
For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This leaves ret->d as NULL leading
to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this
case memory is allocated to ret->d, but it is insufficiently sized
leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn.
This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever
called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is
anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
All OpenSSL internal usage of this function uses data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be a rare.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-0797
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c175308407858afff3fc8c2e5e085d94d12edc7d)
This reverts commit 23a58779f53a9060c823d00d76b3070cad61d9a3.
This broke existing engines that didn't properly implement the sign and verify
functions.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
MR: #2077
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string
in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length
of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to
an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of
a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also
occur.
These issues will only occur on certain platforms where sizeof(size_t) >
sizeof(int). E.g. many 64 bit systems. The first issue may mask the second
issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
as command line arguments.
Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
CVE-2016-0799
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 578b956fe741bf8e84055547b1e83c28dd902c73)
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
way of distinguishing these two cases.
Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
300 bytes per connection.
Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure
a seed are not vulnerable.
In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.
To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.
Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However,
note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the
indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular,
computations are currently not carried out in constant time.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Fix double free bug when parsing malformed DSA private keys.
Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.
CVE-2016-0705
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6c88c71b4e4825c7bc0489306d062d017634eb88)
It's never problem if CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt is called from EVP, because
buffer in question is always aligned within EVP_CIPHER_CTX structure.
RT#4218
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e4bbeb49fb6522d858703201b5adee9611e7b7b)
Trouble is that LINK variable assignment in make-file interferes with
LINK environment variable, which can be used to modify Microsoft's
LINK.EXE behaviour.
RT#4289
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d44bb1c31ca00f4359090daa15659c0dd1a08f0d)
Resolved conflicts:
util/pl/VC-32.pl
(cherry picked from commit 0fffd522426c7fc022894c8dd079dc2625c04096)
Based on patch by: Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>
CVE-2015-3197
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.
This is a follow on from CVE-2016-0701. This branch is not impacted by
that CVE because it does not support X9.42 style parameters. It is still
possible to generate parameters based on primes that are not "safe",
although by default OpenSSL does not do this. The documentation does
sign post that using such parameters is unsafe if the private DH key is
reused. However to avoid accidental problems or future attacks this commit
has been backported to this branch.
Issue reported by Antonio Sanso
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
For BSD systems, Configure adds a shared_ldflags including a reference
to the Makefile variable LIBRPATH, but since it must be passed down to
Makefile.shared, care must be taken so the value of LIBRPATH doesn't
get expanded too early, or it ends up giving an empty string.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c64879d3f3cc4c7f1c436a9fe3bd109847a23629)
Describe the usage of the OCSP callback functions on both the client and
the server side.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c52c3b5e11253afabaa62739a8ee1c4c4bddcd53)
It makes no sense to call the OCSP status callback if we are resuming a
session because no certificates will be sent.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ac6239955965f58f9dddb4229e8cd58e0dba20d)
If a server sends the status_request extension then it may choose
to send the CertificateStatus message. However this is optional.
We were treating it as mandatory and the connection was failing.
Thanks to BoringSSL for reporting this issue.
RT#4120
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 905943af3b43116b64ae815db1a6b9c2f15e0356)
Found by clang scan-build.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
RT: #4184, MR: #1496
(cherry picked from commit 679d87515d23ca31491effdc264edc81c695a72a)
BIO_int_ctrl isn't made for the purpose BIO_get_conn_int_port used it
for.
This also changes BIO_C_GET_CONNECT to actually return the port
instead of assigning it to a pointer that was never returned back to
the caller.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2a60fccdd9b696e01fddaa268e92ea210beb0e8f)
Fix some more URLs mangled by indent in the reformat. These ones don't exist
in master so we have a separate commit. Based on a patch supplied by Arnaud
Lacombe <al@aerilon.ca>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Some URLs in the source code ended up getting mangled by indent. This fixes
it. Based on a patch supplied by Arnaud Lacombe <al@aerilon.ca>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Commit 2b0180c37fa6ffc48ee40caa831ca398b828e680 attempted to do this but
only hit one of many BN_mod_exp codepaths. Fix remaining variants and add
a test for each method.
Thanks to Hanno Boeck for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d911097d7c93e4cfeab624b34d73fe51da158b69)
(cherry picked from commit 44e4f5b04b43054571e278381662cebd3f3555e6)
A BIO_flush call in the DTLS code was not correctly setting the |rwstate|
variable to SSL_WRITING. This means that SSL_get_error() will not return
SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE in the event of an IO retry.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67f60be8c9ae5ff3129fcd6238baf124385a41d8)
If using DTLS and NBIO then if a second or subsequent handshake message
fragment hits a retry, then the retry attempt uses the wrong fragment
offset value. This commit restores the fragment offset from the last
attempt.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ad226e88bee97847496e542d63c67997d5beda6)
As part of this, move release creation to a script to be called from
.travis.yml. That makes it much easier to test outside of travis.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 382af61f6213e975b4c2a50fd8b9fedd23d86ab5)
Introducing DISTTARVARS to propagate changed variables down to the
tar-making target.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4d3c30a1799bf7b4dc7223b84417c4de992a6b9c)
It seems like some tar versions don't like the name:id form for
--owner and --group. The closest known anonymous user being 0 (root),
that seems to be the most appropriate user/group to assign ownership
to. It matters very little when unpacking either way.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b91dd150d2b9b5ddca37722e7f52ea59ba7f80da)
Make TARFILE include ../ instead of having that hard coded all over the place.
When transforming file names in TAR_COMMAND, use $(NAME) instead of openssl-$(VERSION)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a544810f08539f1549eea9be36bd878c67c8e26)
Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.
CVE-2015-3194
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
this will leak any additional components in the parent.
This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.
CVE-2015-3195.
Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.
PR#4131
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The feature_test_macros(7) manual tells us that _BSD_SOURCE is
deprecated since glibc 2.20 and that the compiler will warn about it
being used, unless _DEFAULT_SOURCE is defined as well.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f9fd35248c9a3b1125d9ab82ffb19d62e86533ac)
In the DTLS ClientHello processing the return value is stored in |ret| which
by default is -1. We wish to return 1 on success or 2 on success *and* we
have validated the DTLS cookie. Previously on successful validation of the
cookie we were setting |ret| to 2. Unfortunately if we later encounter an
error then we can end up returning a successful (positive) return code from
the function because we already set |ret| to a positive value.
This does not appear to have a security consequence because the handshake
just fails at a later point.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
If somewhere in SSL_new() there is a memory allocation failure, ssl3_free() can
get called with s->s3 still being NULL.
Patch also provided by Willy Tarreau <wtarreau@haproxy.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3e7bd2ce0b16f8611298175d6dc7cb35ee06ea6d)
Thanks to Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com> for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 158e5207a794603f5d64ffa95e0247c7808ab445)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
Strict ISO confirming C compilers only define __sun
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
RT #4144, MR #1353
(cherry picked from commit 3d32218812e87221344f2985512e42e4aaa88745)
Original patch by Frank Morgner.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
GH: #456
(cherry picked from commit 68db80e2d1accdd4c4a6b4763559c6cfe9663820)
There are lots of calls to EVP functions from within libssl There were
various places where we should probably check the return value but don't.
This adds these checks.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56d913467541506572f908a34c32ca7071f77a94)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_enc.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
If a DTLS client that does not support secure renegotiation connects to an
OpenSSL DTLS server then, by default, renegotiation is disabled. If a
server application attempts to initiate a renegotiation then OpenSSL is
supposed to prevent this. However due to a discrepancy between the TLS and
DTLS code, the server sends a HelloRequest anyway in DTLS.
This is not a security concern because the handshake will still fail later
in the process when the client responds with a ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d40ec4ab8e7c0ff39bf4f9918fbb9dfdca4c5221)
In DTLS if an IO retry occurs during writing of a fragmented ClientHello
then we can end up reseting the finish mac variables on the retry, which
causes a handshake failure. We should only reset on the first attempt not
on retries.
Thanks to BoringSSL for reporting this issue.
RT#4119
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 15a7164eb7d4d031608fcec2801d7f7b11b16923)
During work on a larger change in master a number of locations were
identified where return value checks were missing. This backports the
relevant fixes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 903738ac63e60c10552741e2d6de9753c67e0ff3)
Conflicts:
crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
./Configure [target] --strict-warnings -Wno-pedantic-ms-format
would not add '-pedantic' because it matches '-Wno-pedantic-ms-format',
which was added first.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6703c4ea87b30554283deaa5df1f8d68725d3ee4)
EVP_SignInit_ex was missing from the NAME section of its man page so
typing "man EVP_SignInit_ex" failed to load the page.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3d866ea67e8b19777e88ac2a78ee4188e0983168)
Clarify that git format-patch output is preferred for creating patch files.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f89ee71bc81017e04ac50f570d8aed87f495bcf2)
Close GH Issue 69
Close GH PR 457/RT4113
Some other updates
By Rich Salz, Alessandro Ghedini, Steve Marquess, Collin Anderson
(manual cherry-pick of a2aaf8be7e3c22a61ef89f273aa85f482b955336 and
b06935f439af7150d3ae566922353c3f210e63ed)
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
0 is a valid file descriptor.
RT#4068
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4428c7dba8f6f407d915c1226f4e0f673e8be241)
Previous language was unclear. New language isn't pretty but I believe
it is more accurate.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8cbb048c3ea416f2bd8a3706d027f3aa26ef08d9)
In X509_cmp, if cert digest is equal, look at DER of the
signed part. This is what master and 1.0.2 already do.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The function int_rsa_verify is an internal function used for verifying an
RSA signature. It takes an argument |dtype| which indicates the digest type
that was used. Dependant on that digest type the processing of the
signature data will vary. In particular if |dtype == NID_mdc2| and the
signature data is a bare OCTETSTRING then it is treated differently to the
default case where the signature data is treated as a DigestInfo (X509_SIG).
Due to a missing "else" keyword the logic actually correctly processes the
OCTETSTRING format signature first, and then attempts to continue and
process it as DigestInfo. This will invariably fail because we already know
that it is a bare OCTETSTRING.
This failure doesn't actualy make a real difference because it ends up at
the |err| label regardless and still returns a "success" result. This patch
just cleans things up to make it look a bit more sane.
RT#4076
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dffe51091f412dcbc18f6641132f0b4f0def6bce)
BN_with_flags() will read the dest->flags to keep the BN_FLG_MALLOCED but
overwrites everything else.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #1231
(cherry picked from commit f92768e6f5259069bd21dbed2b98b3423c1dfca4)
Some extension handling functions were passing in a pointer to the start
of the data, plus the length in order to calculate the end, rather than
just passing in the end to start with. This change makes things a little
more readable.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for pointing them out.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
MR #1198
(cherry picked from commit 605236f6a8fe0743af2f63d93239a74c69dae137)
the alias supported by OpenSSL 1.0.1 is "EECDH" not "EECDHE"
(GH PR 405)
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
RFC 5077 section 3.3 says: If the server determines that it does not
want to include a ticket after it has included the SessionTicket
extension in the ServerHello, then it sends a zero-length ticket in the
NewSessionTicket handshake message.
Previously the client would fail upon attempting to allocate a
zero-length buffer. Now, we have the client ignore the empty ticket and
keep the existing session.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 21b538d616b388fa0ce64ef54da3504253895cf8)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 58e3457a82e8940ff36b36949f9c7a60e7614b2c)
(cherry picked from commit be250ee2d353a9c8ed858bf8ca274d3107ae2f64)
BUF_strndup was calling strlen through BUF_strlcpy, and ended up reading
past the input if the input was not a C string.
Make it explicitly part of BUF_strndup's contract to never read more
than |siz| input bytes. This augments the standard strndup contract to
be safer.
The commit also adds a check for siz overflow and some brief documentation
for BUF_strndup().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 110f7b37de9feecfb64950601cc7cec77cf6130b)
(cherry picked from commit f61216ba9d17430fb5eb3e2b202a209960b9d51b)
For all release branches. It adds travis build support. If you don't
have a config file it uses the default (because we enabled travis for the
project), which uses ruby/rake/rakefiles, and you get confusing "build
still failing" messages.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit db9defdfe306e1adf0af7188b187d535eb0268da)
If we use BIO_new_file(), on Windows it'll jump through hoops to work
around their unusual charset/Unicode handling. it'll convert a UTF-8
filename to UCS-16LE and attempt to use _wfopen().
If you use BIO_read_filename(), it doesn't do this. Shouldn't it be
consistent?
It would certainly be nice if SSL_use_certificate_chain_file() worked.
Also made BIO_C_SET_FILENAME work (rsalz)
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ff03599a2f518dbdf13bca0bb0208e431b892fe9)
There are a couple of minor fixes here:
1) Handle the case when RegisterEventSource() fails (which it may for
various reasons) and do the work of logging the event only if it succeeds.
2) Handle the case when ReportEvent() fails and do our best in debug builds
to at least attempt somehow indicate that something has gone wrong. The
typical situation would be someone running tools like DbMon, DBWin32,
DebugView or just having the debugger attached. The intent is to make sure
that at least some data will be captured so that we can save hours and days
of debugging time.
3) Minor fix to change the MessageBox() flag to MB_ICONERROR. Though the
value of MB_ICONERROR is the same value as MB_ICONSTOP, the intent is
better conveyed by using MB_ICONERROR.
Testing performed:
1) Clean compilation for debug-VC-WIN32 and VC-WIN32.
2) Good test results (nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak test) for debug-VC-WIN32 and
VC-WIN32.
3) Stepped through relevant changes using WinDBG and exercised the impacted
code paths.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4cd94416a452c3a3e0df24c297f7d2f0e6d5bb5f)
There were some memory leaks in the creation of an SRP verifier (both on
successful completion and also on some error paths).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bf95cde28712cfcad90cb3975cdcb8e5c0f20fde)
Was only approved for master, to avoid compatibility issues on
previous releases.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6be18a22199de4d114b53686c31ba02723fc2c18)
In master we have the function OPENSSL_clear_free(x,y), which immediately
returns if x == NULL. In <=1.0.2 this function does not exist so we have to
do:
OPENSSL_cleanse(x, y);
OPENSSL_free(x);
However, previously, OPENSSL_cleanse did not check that if x == NULL, so
the real equivalent check would have to be:
if (x != NULL)
OPENSSL_cleanse(x, y);
OPENSSL_free(x);
It would be easy to get this wrong during cherry-picking to other branches
and therefore, for safety, it is best to just ensure OPENSSL_cleanse also
checks for NULL.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 020d8fc83fe1a94232db1ee1166309e2458a8a18)
Previously, the conversion would silently coerce to ASCII. Now, we error
out.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b785504a10310cb2872270eb409b70971be5e76e)
(cherry picked from commit cb71f17dc786c72ec74c0ebb983b3ccfde484271)
Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate.
In particular: reject extra trailing padding, and padding in the middle
of the content. Don't limit line length. Add tests.
Previously, the behaviour was ill-defined, and depended on the position
of the padding within the input.
In addition, this appears to fix a possible two-byte oob read.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3cdd1e94b1d71f2ce3002738f9506da91fe2af45)
(cherry picked from commit 37faf117965de181f4de0b4032eecac2566de5f6)
If the field separator isn't specified through -nameopt then use
XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC instead of printing nothing and returing an error.
PR#2397
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 03706afa30aeb4407287171a9d6f9a765395d0a2)
Fix both the caller to error out on malloc failure, as well as the
eventual callee to handle a NULL gracefully.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Commit f0348c842e7 introduced a problem with session resumption. The
version for the session is fixed when the session is created. By moving
the creation of the session earlier in the process the version is fixed
*before* version negotiation has completed when processing the ServerHello
on the client side. This fix updates the session version after version neg
has completed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dc0c888811cebfa2d21c844be0d81335fb2361da)
Builds using no-tlsext in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8 are broken. This commit fixes the
issue. The same commit is applied to 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 branches for code
consistency. However this commit will not fix no-tlsext in those branches
which have always been broken for other reasons. The commit is not applied
to master at all, because no-tlsext has been completely removed from that
branch.
Based on a patch by Marc Branchaud <marcnarc@xiplink.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9a931208d7fc8a3596dda005cdbd6439938f01b0)
The |z| value should be 0x04 not 0x02
RT#3838
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 91d2728b38b1df930f337e163816a0fc9580b6a6)
The NULL cipher case can't actually happen because we have no
EVP_PBE_CTL combinations where cipher_nid is -1 and keygen is
PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen. But make the code more obviously correct.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 394f7b6fcc38132b8ccff0a3253b9dd15640cfc0)
- Pass in the right ciphertext length to ensure we're indeed testing
ciphertext corruption (and not truncation).
- Only test one mutation per byte to not make the test too slow.
- Add a separate test for truncated ciphertexts.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 25d6b3401ca40c9a2cbe5080449c1c2a37037777)
Because we recently encourage people to have a .dir-locals.el, it's a good
idea to ignore it on a git level.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d7c02691a5e6f2716759eacb6f48c39f15ee57c8)
Slightly modified from the original PR.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a7e974c7be90e2c9673e2ce6215a70f734eb8ad4)
Don't dereference |d| when |top| is zero. Also test that various BIGNUM methods behave correctly on zero/even inputs.
Follow-up to b11980d79a52ec08844f08bea0e66c04b691840b
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Apparently, emacs sees changes to auto-fill-mode as insecure
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6dc08048d93ff35de882878f190ae49aa698b5d2)
This file, when copied to .dir-locals.el in the OpenSSL source top,
will make sure that the CC mode style "OpenSSL-II" will be used for
all C files.
Additionally, I makes sure that tabs are never used as indentation
character, regardless of the emacs mode, and that the fill column is
78.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0927f0d822b1e0f55cb7d8bacf9004ad3495514b)
This hopefully conforms closely enough to the current code style.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d9b3554b2d9724bc2d1621a026ddaf0223e2d191)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4d04226c2ec7e7f69f6234def63631648e35e828)
(cherry picked from commit 9c989aaa749d88b63bef5d5beeb3046eae62d836)
If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error. Also update the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f00a10b89734e84fe80f98ad9e2e77b557c701ae)
A DTLS client will abort a handshake if the server attempts to renew the
session ticket. This is caused by a state machine discrepancy between DTLS
and TLS discovered during the state machine rewrite work.
The bug can be demonstrated as follows:
Start a DTLS s_server instance:
openssl s_server -dtls
Start a client and obtain a session but no ticket:
openssl s_client -dtls -sess_out session.pem -no_ticket
Now start a client reusing the session, but allow a ticket:
openssl s_client -dtls -sess_in session.pem
The client will abort the handshake.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ee4ffd6fccd169775ba74afb1dbfecff48ee413d)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_clnt.c
Clarify and update documention for extra chain certificates.
PR#3878.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2fd7fb99dba9f56fbcb7ee1686bef30c7aef4754)
When config'd with "sctp" running "make test" causes a seg fault. This is
actually due to the way ssltest works - it dives under the covers and frees
up BIOs manually and so some BIOs are NULL when the SCTP code does not
expect it. The simplest fix is just to add some sanity checks to make sure
the BIOs aren't NULL before we use them.
This problem occurs in master and 1.0.2. The fix has also been applied to
1.0.1 to keep the code in sync.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f75d5171be0b3b5419c8974133e1573cf976a8bb)
There are some missing return value checks in the SCTP code. In master this
was causing a compilation failure when config'd with
"--strict-warnings sctp".
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d8e8590ed90eba6ef651d09d77befb14f980de2c)
The function BN_MONT_CTX_set was assuming that the modulus was non-zero
and therefore that |mod->top| > 0. In an error situation that may not be
the case and could cause a seg fault.
This is a follow on from CVE-2015-1794.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)
The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.
CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates was using some variables that only
apply if OPENSSL_NO_EC2M is not defined.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8d11b7c7ee84ad0aa243476088285d15b22c5470)
The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext can be used to set custom session
ticket data passed in the initial ClientHello. This can be particularly
useful for EAP-FAST. However, when using SSLv23_method, the session does
not get created until the ServerHello has been received. The extension code
will only add the SessionTicket data to the ClientHello if a session already
exists. Therefore SSL_set_session_ticket_ext has no impact when used in
conjunction with SSLv23_method. The solution is to simply create the session
during creation of the ClientHello instead of waiting for the ServerHello.
This commit fixes the test failure introduced by the previous commit.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext sets the ticket data to be sent in
the ClientHello. This is useful for EAP-FAST. This commit adds a test to
ensure that when this function is called the expected ticket data actually
appears in the ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'. These
should be safe to remove. If something went wrong when re-encoding,
there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This requires 'iconv' and that 'file' can take the options '-b' and '-i'.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f608b4064d58ca4dfdfdfc921308b51cb96205e2)
Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
already expect that tar variant).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
This is a follow up to the alternate chains certificate forgery issue
(CVE-2015-1793). That issue is exacerbated in 1.0.1 by a related bug which
means that we *always* check for an alternative chain, even if we have
already found a chain. The code is supposed to stop as soon as it has found
one (and does do in master and 1.0.2).
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
verification tests.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
test/Makefile
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.
Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.
CVE-2015-1793
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4)
The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c)
Typo in local variable name; introduced by previous fix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc3f3fc2b1c94d65824ab8d69595b6d89b17cf8d)
Construct bio_err and bio_stdout from file handles instead of FILE
pointers, since the latter might not be implemented (when OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
is defined).
Convert all output to use BIO_printf.
Change lh_foo to lh_SSL_SESSION_foo.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb8abd6735e198de36c1eb9098a7f1516d156220)
Conflicts:
crypto/threads/mttest.c
Backport to 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 to fix RT 3905
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8e6bb99979b95ee8b878e22e043ceb78d79c32a1)
It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Recent HMAC changes broke ABI compatibility due to a new field in HMAC_CTX.
This backs that change out, and does it a different way.
Thanks to Timo Teras for the concept.
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Fix loop in do_free_upto if cmsbio is NULL: this will happen when attempting
to verify and a digest is not recognised. Reported by Johannes Bauer.
CVE-2015-1792
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
$(PROGS) was mistakenly removed, adding it back.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5ef5b9ffa91ad6061c42291564a1dc786300ebdd)
Fix error handling in ssl_session_dup, as well as incorrect setting up of
the session ticket. Follow on from CVE-2015-1791.
Thanks to LibreSSL project for reporting these issues.
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_sess.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
It should not be possible for DTLS message fragments to span multiple
packets. However previously if the message header fitted exactly into one
packet, and the fragment body was in the next packet then this would work.
Obviously this would fail if packets get re-ordered mid-flight.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In the event of an error in the HMAC function, leaks can occur because the
HMAC_CTX does not get cleaned up.
Thanks to the BoringSSL project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e43a13c807e42688c72c4f3d001112bf0a110464)
The function EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean value.
It returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if it is not, and -1
on error. Many usages within OpenSSL were incorrectly using this
function and therefore not correctly handling error conditions.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68886be7e2cd395a759fcd41d2cede461b68843d)
This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
This fixes a memory leak that can occur whilst duplicating a BIO chain if
the call to CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() fails. It also fixes a second memory leak
where if a failure occurs after successfully creating the first BIO in the
chain, then the beginning of the new chain was not freed.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
BUF_MEM_free() attempts to cleanse memory using memset immediately prior
to a free. This is at risk of being optimised away by the compiler, so
replace with a call to OPENSSL_cleanse() instead.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The fix for CVE-2015-1791 introduced an error in ssl_session_dup for
Kerberos.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dcad51bc13c9b716d9a66248bcc4038c071ff158)
For librypto to be complete, the stuff in both crypto/ and engines/
have to be built. Doing 'make test' or 'make apps' from a clean
source tree failed to do so.
Corrected by using the new 'build_libcrypto' in the top Makefile.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit acaff3b797f50a0a0e17a0be45b7fafad962004e)
There's a need for a target that will build all of libcrypto, so let's
add 'build_libcrypto' that does this. For ortogonality, let's also
add 'build_libssl'. Have both also depend on 'libcrypto.pc' and
'libssl.pc' so those get built together with the libraries.
This makes 'all' depend on fewer things directly.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 177b5f9c82e1152d6ce20a83556db629697fff65)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e4a355dcabe2f75df5bb8b41b394d37037169d2)
(cherry picked from commit ac32a77cd69784568090e934a31622ddfee49ca7)
Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f3d889523ee84f1e87e4da0d59e2702a4bee7907)
Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7ee4815f2452c854cc859e8dda88f2673cdddea)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Ensure the Kerberos pre-master secret has OPENSSL_cleanse called on it.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4e3dbe37ca39fa68b6949fbde62f3ec0f0584f7e)
A BIGNUM can have the value of -0. The function BN_bn2hex fails to account
for this and can allocate a buffer one byte too short in the event of -0
being used, leading to a one byte buffer overrun. All usage within the
OpenSSL library is considered safe. Any security risk is considered
negligible.
With thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and
Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c56353071d9849220714d8a556806703771b9269)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_print.c
objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be
used as a C identifier. Improve the test to match the real C
rules.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 591b7aef05b22cba09b179e5787a9bf40dfc9508)
This is for consistency.
Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f131556d6678bc3754f1e6d98a9a5bfc24e368c)
Conflicts:
e_os2.h
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 27c76b9b8010b536687318739c6f631ce4194688)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_err.c
This is a backport of commit e83ee04bb7de800cdb71d522fa562e99328003a3 from
the master branch (and this has also been applied to 1.0.2). In 1.0.2 this
was CVE-2015-0207. For other branches there is no known security issue, but
this is being backported as a precautionary measure.
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes
the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to
loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received
with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen
means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invokation to the
next.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c2b1d872b25f3ec78e04f5cd2de8f21e853c4a6)
The size of the SRP extension can never be negative (the variable
|size| is unsigned). Therefore don't check if it is less than zero.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c89d290834f3ed9146eeb8b64fe5de817679a0b)
The return value of i2d functions can be negative if an error occurs.
Therefore don't assign the return value to an unsigned type and *then*
check if it is negative.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 90e7cdff3aa66779486914f88333f6601f0c1cf4)
The members of struct timeval on OpenVMS are unsigned. The logic for
calculating timeouts needs adjusting to deal with this.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fc52ac9028b9492fb086ba35a3352ea46e03ecfc)
If the record received is for a version that we don't support, previously we
were sending an alert back. However if the incoming record already looks
like an alert then probably we shouldn't do that. So suppress an outgoing
alert if it looks like we've got one incoming.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The update: target in engines/ didn't recurse into engines/ccgost.
The update: and depend: targets in engines/ccgost needed a fixup.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b822d2566853ee5e313c37529f71336209b28ab)
We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the
Makefile in the directory the header file lived in. This is error
prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually
just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was
done.
This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds
an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or
local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a
double run through the whole file tree.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f539dc1a2f45580435c39dada44dd276e79cb88)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
apps/Makefile
test/Makefile
If BN_rand is called with |bits| set to 1 and |top| set to 1 then a 1 byte
buffer overflow can occur. There are no such instances within the OpenSSL at
the moment.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke, Filip Palian for
discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The functions BN_rshift and BN_lshift shift their arguments to the right or
left by a specified number of bits. Unpredicatable results (including
crashes) can occur if a negative number is supplied for the shift value.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and Filip Palian
for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7cc18d8158b5fc2676393d99b51c30c135502107)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/bn/bn_err.c
If a client receives a bad hello request in DTLS then the alert is not
sent correctly.
RT#2801
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4dc1aa0436fdb8af50960db676b739c8ef81f38c)
When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.
RT3637
RT3621
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
40 bit ciphers are limited to 512 bit RSA, 56 bit ciphers to 1024 bit.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac38115c1a4fb61c66c2a8cd2a9800751828d328)
Since the client has no way of communicating her supported parameter
range to the server, connections to servers that choose weak DH will
simply fail.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
- Do not advise generation of DH parameters with dsaparam to save
computation time.
- Promote use of custom parameters more, and explicitly forbid use of
built-in parameters weaker than 2048 bits.
- Advise the callback to ignore <keylength> - it is currently called
with 1024 bits, but this value can and should be safely ignored by
servers.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The default bitlength is now 2048. Also clarify that either the number
of bits or the generator must be present:
$ openssl dhparam -2
and
$ openssl dhparam 2048
generate parameters but
$ openssl dhparam
does not.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Backport old patch to make it work in mixture of perls for Windows.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Cherry-picked from 7bb98eee3c9e4694dfc2217001d5075ce8d2906e
(cherry picked from commit 051b41df4105355a5a9c7f1c0bd00cc70b2d324c)
The big "don't check for NULL" cleanup requires backporting some
of the lowest-level functions to actually do nothing if NULL is
given. This will make it easier to backport fixes to release
branches, where master assumes those lower-level functions are "safe"
This commit addresses those tickets: 3798 3799 3801.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f34b095fab1569d093b639bfcc9a77d6020148ff)
The function obj_cmp() (file crypto/objects/obj_dat.c) can in some
situations call memcmp() with a null pointer and a zero length.
This is invalid behaviour. When compiling openssl with undefined
behaviour sanitizer (add -fsanitize=undefined to compile flags) this
can be seen. One example that triggers this behaviour is the pkcs7
command (but there are others, e.g. I've seen it with the timestamp
function):
apps/openssl pkcs7 -in test/testp7.pem
What happens is that obj_cmp takes objects of the type ASN1_OBJECT and
passes their ->data pointer to memcmp. Zero-sized ASN1_OBJECT
structures can have a null pointer as data.
RT#3816
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b8dc08b74fc3c6d4c2fc855cc23bac691d985be)
Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.
Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.
RT#2958
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0bd6493369d960abef11c2346b9bbb308b4285a)
Matt's note: I added a call to X509V3err to Kurt's original patch.
RT#3840
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 344c271eb339fc2982e9a3584a94e51112d84584)
If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list()
should also return NULL.
Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14def5f5375594830597cc153e11c6017f6adddf)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cefc93910c4c0f7fa9f8c1f8f7aad084a7fa87d2)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_srvr.c
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_srvr.c
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc273a93617a5c1e69cb5db6f655e463f8e31806)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf9b0b6fb253fd40225d7c648a08646686e62d2d)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a89db885e0d8aac3a9df1bbccb0c1ddfd8b2e10a)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_stat.c
RT2943 only complains about the incorrect check of -K argument size,
we might as well do the same thing with the -iv argument.
Before this, we only checked that the given argument wouldn't give a
bitstring larger than EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH. we can be more precise and
check against the size of the actual cipher used.
(cherry picked from commit 8920a7cd04f43b1a090d0b0a8c9e16b94c6898d4)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The problem occurs in EVP_PKEY_sign() when using RSA with X931 padding.
It is only triggered if the RSA key size is smaller than the digest length.
So with SHA512 you can trigger the overflow with anything less than an RSA
512 bit key. I managed to trigger a 62 byte overflow when using a 16 bit RSA
key. This wasn't sufficient to cause a crash, although your mileage may
vary.
In practice RSA keys of this length are never used and X931 padding is very
rare. Even if someone did use an excessively short RSA key, the chances of
them combining that with a longer digest and X931 padding is very
small. For these reasons I do not believe there is a security implication to
this. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34166d41892643a36ad2d1f53cc0025e2edc2a39)
Add a sanity check to the print_bin function to ensure that the |off|
argument is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3deeeeb61b0c5b9b5f0993a67b7967d2f85186da)
Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb0f400b0cea2d2943f99b1e89c04ff6ed748cd5)
The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c427570e5098e120cbcb66e799f85c317aac7b91)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29b0a15a480626544dd0c803d5de671552544de6)
The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output
grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original
logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is
incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original
logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the
size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to
make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in
the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d9e37744cd5119f9921315864d1cd28717173cd)
There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69f5c80abd60896c8ed3039fc56210cc)
The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8269881093324b881b81472be037055571f73f3)
Conflicts:
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
Conflicts:
apps/speed.c
crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
crypto/evp/evp.h
Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 873fb39f20b6763daba226b74e83fb194924c7bf)
Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c5f8cd7bc661f90dc012c9d2bae1808a4281985f)
The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
This patch adds a NULL check.
RT3786
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)
EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec6114f5511b20c2e6ca741e61a39b99d6
and
7b3ba508af5c86afe43e28174aa3c53a0a24f4d9
removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.
This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.
Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3d015363ed09c4eff5c02ad41153387ffdf5af)
newsig may be used (freed) uninitialized on a malloc error.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68249414405500660578b337f1c8dd5dd4bb5bcc)
The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok",
so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06affe3dac65592a341547f5a47e52cedb7b71f8)
Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and
added appropriate error handling.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8817e2e0c998757d3bd036d7f45fe8d0a49fbe2d)
Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b611e5fe8eaac9512f72094c460f3ed6040076a)
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.
Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0eed48d37a4b7beea0c966caf09ad46f4a92a44)
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb327c9ed689b9aaf7bca01a3f5a0657cb)
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c4137b5e828d8fab0b244defb79257619dad8fc7)
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 111b60bea01d234b5873488c19ff2b9c5d4d58e9)
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.
This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1c9b2b06c2d203ad89778ce1b98e0b5ad)
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ec5c5dd361343d9017eff8547b19e86e4944ebc)
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.
*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.
Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f617b4969a9261b9d7d381670aefbe2cf766a2cb)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines. That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"No gost certificate sent by peer"},
Clearly not what we wanted. This change fixes this problem.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2cfdfe0918f03f8323c9523a2beb2b363ae86ca7)
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c
Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ae50d8270026edf5b3c7f8aaa0c6677462b33d97)
Resolve a problem when using s_server with ECDHE cipher
suites in OpenSSL_1_0_1-stable. Due to an uninitialized variable,
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh() is not always invoked within s_server. This bug
appears to have been introduced by
059907771b89549cbd07a81df1a5bdf51e062066.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30cd4ff294252c4b6a4b69cbef6a5b4117705d22)
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
While a true positive, it's almost harmless because EVP_DecryptInit_ex would have to fail and that doesn't happen under normal operation.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
if CAfile or CApath were also supplied and successfully loaded first.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 70e5fd877890489a3972bf8bf50bfec1fca3875e)
create an HMAC
Inspired by BoringSSL commit 2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f8e4e4f5253085ab673bb74094c3e492c56af44)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/e_des3.c
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 93f1c13619c5b41f2dcfdbf6ae666f867922a87a)
If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.
PR#3668
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ca5efc2874e094d6382b30416824eda6dde52fe)
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.
Reported-by: Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828
RT#3758
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7c82e339a677f8546e1456c7a8f6788598a9de43)
Fix some unsigned/signed warnings introduced as part of the fix
for CVE-2015-0293
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Remove entries from CHANGES and NEWS from letter releases that occur *after*
the next point release. Without this we get duplicate entries for the same
issue appearing multiple times.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional.
This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures),
however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content
correctly.
This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing,
decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated
with reading potentially untrusted data.
Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work.
CVE-2015-0289
Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
CVE-2015-0286
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from apps. Also fix an issue with
error handling with pkcs7.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 11abf92259e899f4f7da4a3e80781e84b0fb1a64)
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from lib crypto.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7573c597c1932ef709b2455ffab47348b5c54e5)
Passing a negative value for the "-time" option to s_time results in a seg
fault. This commit fixes it so that time has to be greater than 0.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dfef52f6f277327e118fdd0fe34486852c2789b6)
The function tls1_PRF counts the number of digests in use and partitions
security evenly between them. There always needs to be at least one digest
in use, otherwise this is an internal error. Add a sanity check for this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 668f6f08c62177ab5893fc26ebb67053aafdffc8)
The function sk_zero is supposed to zero the elements held within a stack.
It uses memset to do this. However it calculates the size of each element
as being sizeof(char **) instead of sizeof(char *). This probably doesn't
make much practical difference in most cases, but isn't a portable
assumption.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7132ac830fa08d9a936e011d7c541b0c52115b33)
Move memory allocation failure checks closer to the site of the malloc in
dgst app. Only a problem if the debug flag is set...but still should be
fixed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be1477adc97e76f4b83ed8075589f529069bd5d1)
Add some missing checks for memory allocation failures in ca app.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a561bfe944c0beba73551731cb98af70dfee3549)
Other curves don't have this problem.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9fbbdd73c58c29dc46cc314f7165e45e6d43fd60)
Td4 and Te4 are arrays of u8. A u8 << int promotes the u8 to an int first then shifts.
If the mathematical result of a shift (as modelled by lhs * 2^{rhs}) is not representable
in an integer, behaviour is undefined. In other words, you can't shift into the sign bit
of a signed integer. Fix this by casting to u32 whenever we're shifting left by 24.
(For consistency, cast other shifts, too.)
Caught by -fsanitize=shift
Submitted by Nick Lewycky (Google)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b37e5c14f0eddb10c7f91ef91004622d90ef361)
When printing out an ASN.1 structure if the type is an item template don't
fall thru and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dc1247a7494f50c88ce7492518bbe0ce6f124fa)
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0c7ca4033dcf5398334d4b78a7dfb941c8167a40)
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6aa8dab2bbfd5ad3cfc0d07fe5d7243635d5b2a2)
Conflicts:
crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34a7ed0c39aa3ab67eea1e106577525eaf0d7a00)
ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e488fd6ab2c295941e91a47ab7bcd346b7540c7)
Calling EVP_DigestInit_ex which has already had the digest set up for it
should be possible. You are supposed to be able to pass NULL for the type.
However currently this seg faults.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a01087027bd0c5ec053d4eabd972bd942bfcd92f)
In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c5a7b33c6269c3bd6bc0df6b4c22e4fba03b485)
Cleanse various intermediate buffers used by the PRF (backported version
from master).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 35fafc4dbc0b3a717ad1b208fe2867e8c64867de)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_enc.c
Ensure all malloc failures return -1.
Reported by Adam Langley (Google).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06c6a2b4a3a6e64303caa256398dd2dc16f9c35a)
BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
a pointer fits in 8 characters.
Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 460e920d8a274e27aab36346eeda6685a42c3314)
Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0b142f022e2c5072295e00ebc11c5b707a726d74)
New function ASN1_STRING_clear_free which cleanses an ASN1_STRING
structure before freeing it.
Call ASN1_STRING_clear_free on PKCS#8 private key components.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a8ae0891d4bfd18f224777aed1fbb172504421f1)
They are moved to the COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT instead.
This also fixes SSLv2 to be part of COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f417997a324037025be61737288e40e171a8218c)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c
RT#3725
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd865cadcb603918bdcfcf44e487721c657a1117)
Miscellaneous unchecked malloc fixes. Also fixed some mem leaks on error
paths as I spotted them along the way.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 918bb8652969fd53f0c390c1cd909265ed502c7e)
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
Conflicts:
apps/cms.c
apps/s_cb.c
apps/s_server.c
apps/speed.c
crypto/dh/dh_pmeth.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
The format script didn't correctly recognise some ASN.1 macros and
didn't reformat some files as a result. Fix script and reformat
affected files.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 437b14b533fe7f7408e3ebca6d5569f1d3347b1a)
Some Cisco appliances use a pre-standard version number for DTLS. We support
this as DTLS1_BAD_VER within the code.
This change fixes d2i_SSL_SESSION for that DTLS version.
Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3704
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_asn1.c
Conflicts:
ssl/dtls1.h
Fixed various missing return value checks in ssl3_send_newsession_ticket.
Also a mem leak on error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
When OpenSSL is configured with no-ec, then the new evp_extra_test fails to
pass. This change adds appropriate OPENSSL_NO_EC guards around the code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a988036259a4e119f6787b4c585f506226330120)
called evp_test.c, so I have called this one evp_extra_test.c
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/Makefile
test/Makefile
Conflicts:
test/Makefile
crypto/evp/evp_extra_test.c
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bcfa19a8d19506c26b5f8d9d9934ca2aa5f96b43)
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1549a265209d449b6aefd2b49d7d39f7fbe0689b)
The previous defaulting to TERMIOS took away -DTERMIOS / -DTERMIO a
bit too enthusiastically. Windows/DOSish platforms of all sorts get
identified as OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS, and they get a different treatment
altogether UNLESS -DTERMIO or -DTERMIOS is explicitely given with the
configuration. The answer is to restore those macro definitions for
the affected configuration targets.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ba4bdee7184a5cea5bef8739eb360e5c2bc3b52c)
Conflicts:
Configure
The rationale for this move is that TERMIOS is default, supported by
POSIX-1.2001, and most definitely on Linux. For a few other systems,
TERMIO may still be the termnial interface of preference, so we keep
-DTERMIO on those in Configure.
crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c is simplified in this regard, and will define
TERMIOS for all systems except a select few exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64e6bf64b36136d487e2fbf907f09612e69ae911)
Conflicts:
Configure
crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1d2932de4cefcc200f175863a42c311916269981)
Free up bio_err after memory leak data has been printed to it.
In int_free_ex_data if ex_data is NULL there is nothing to free up
so return immediately and don't reallocate it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c7a780bbebc1b6d87dc38a6aa3339033911a8bb)
use read_ahead with DTLS because it doesn't work. Therefore read_ahead needs
to be the default.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f4002412518703d07fee321d4c88ee0bbe1694fe)
Conflicts:
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
cherry-picked from db7cb7ab9a5968f32ddbe11c3fba71ccbf4ffa53
This wasn't cleanly cherry-picked, since the build
process changed a bit for 1.0.2.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Per discussion: should not exit. Should not print to stderr.
Errors are ignored. Updated doc to reflect that, and the fact
that this function is to be avoided.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit abdd677125f3a9e3082f8c5692203590fdb9b860)
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 004efdbb41f731d36bf12d251909aaa08704a756)
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 1.0.1 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
ssl/tls1.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c8435171a7af575f73c526d79e1ef0ee5960)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Conflicts:
crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
crypto/x509v3/v3nametest.c
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/ssltest.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1ffc6ca1c387efad0772c16dfe426afef45dc4f)
Change by SteveH from original by John Denker (in the RT)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 77ff1f3b8bfaa348956c5096a2b829f2e767b4f1)
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
context was also inherited (matches that of the existing SSL_CTX).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac8e9cbe14b59dacfe4ac52bc5ff06f8003e9b01)
Fix memory leak by freeing up saved_message.data if it is not NULL.
PR#3489
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41cd41c4416f545a18ead37e09e437c75fa07c95)
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc88aec8c9e001b0a0077d3cd4de1ed0e6)
Conflicts:
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b15f8769644b00ef7283521593360b7b2135cb63)
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e)
Check for NULL return from X509_NAME_ENTRY_new()
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2c60925d1ccc0b96287bdc9acb90198e7180d642)
When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 47606dda672a5008168f62d4b7d7f94cd2d31313)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
We need this for the freebsd kernel with glibc as used in the Debian kfreebsd
ports. There shouldn't be a problem defining this on systems not using glibc.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* adds links to various related documents.
* fixes a few typos.
* rewords a few sentences.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67472bd82bed9d5e481b0d75926aab93618902be)
Return an error code for I/O errors instead of an assertion failure.
PR#3470
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2521fcd8527008ceb3e4748f95b0ed4e2d70cfef)
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5b566320a8d774f9475540f7d0e6a704d)
Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.
This reverts commit f2df488a1c7402e48c21c83e937955dfe9f40bee.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Various build fixes, mostly uncovered by clang's unused-const-variable
and unused-function errors.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0e1c318ece3c82e96ae95a34a1badf58198d6b28)
From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d9f366c849c9627ab666d1b1addc024e6)
master branch has a specific regression test for a bug in x86_64-mont5 code,
see commit cdfe0fdde6a966bdb0447de66aa04a85d99a0551.
This code is now in 1.0.2/1.0.1, so also backport the test.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb565cd29e34caeeaf12ecfdbe6273c2c794f5a2)
Invalid zero-padding in the divisor could cause a division by 0.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a43bcd9e96c5180e5c6c82164ece643c0097485e)
The temporary variable causes unused variable warnings in opt mode with clang,
because the subsequent assert is compiled out.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6af16ec5eed85390bcbd004806a842d6153d6a31)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d04a1e0b5beb3329cdf8c4ec35b9113cbc41d2f2)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb1ddd3d9a0d01656b90693a214b911995a5fe8c)
The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves
of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length
lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds
read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released
versions of OpenSSL are not affected.
Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33d5ba862939ff8db70a9e36fc9a326fab3e8d98)
and UDP header) when setting an mtu. This constant is not always correct (e.g.
if using IPv6). Use the new DTLS_CTRL functions instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 464ce92026bd0c79186cbefa75470f39607110be)
we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit
fixes that.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d3d9eef31661633f5b003a9e115c1822f79d1870)
at least the minimum or it will fail.
There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up
being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This
shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having
logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum
mtu to use.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1620a2e49c777f31f2ce57966ae74006b48ad759)
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some
new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to
know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the
link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous
DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 59669b6abf620d1ed2ef4d1e2df25c998b89b64d)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_both.c
ssl/ssl_lib.c
used with no explanation. Some of this was introduced as part of RT#1929. The
value 28 is the length of the IP header (20 bytes) plus the UDP header (8
bytes). However use of this constant is incorrect because there may be
instances where a different value is needed, e.g. an IPv4 header is 20 bytes
but an IPv6 header is 40. Similarly you may not be using UDP (e.g. SCTP).
This commit introduces a new BIO_CTRL that provides the value to be used for
this mtu "overhead". It will be used by subsequent commits.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0d3ae34df573f477b6b1aaf614d52dcdfcff5fce)
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the
minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but
instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we
have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query
checks consistent.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6abb0d1f8e702a0daa9c32b8021d01eda0483018)
automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead.
Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 001235778a6e9c645dc0507cad6092d99c9af8f5)
RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit
replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the
underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This
happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the
MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf75017bfd60333ff65edf9840001cd2c49870a3)
Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state
being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A").
This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections
that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because
their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required
for the retry code path.
Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh).
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The current documentation contains a bunch of spelling and grammar mistakes. I also
found it hard to understand some paragraphs, so here is my attempt to improve its
readability.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 03b637a730e4a298c360cc143de7564060c06324)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e31a40f47c6bfd09c718d2af42ba8d8fe6bb932)
Conflicts:
apps/ocsp.c
(cherry picked from commit e16458269036f4334525009906d346f68a73b2a4)
PR#3612
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de87dd46c1283f899a9ecf4ccc72db74f36afbf2)
(cherry picked from commit 4d3df37bc7fd33d0bec5da04d2572caa0cdbab75)
Workaround for NetWare CodeWarrior compiler which doesn't properly lookup
includes when in same directory as the C file which includes it.
PR#3569
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 333fad9f2de1dea99552fcb424b312ca1a390f85)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 648495864513da788246f9b75dbbbce0614ed5e8)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f281b8df704ce0123fa2193f2890a25da1756528)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34890ac18eb5ee7bffe9d460480164e1546b491e)
the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e189b9dc10786c755919e6792e923c584c918a1)
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e94a6c0ede623960728415b68650a595e48f5a43)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
ssl/s3_srvr.c
The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2c7504ebd4ec15334ae151a31917753468f86f)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
The client sends a session ID with the session ticket, and uses
the returned ID to detect resumption, so we do not need to peek
at handshake messages: s->hit tells us explicitly if we're resuming.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
407886f589cf2dbaed82db0a44173036c3bc3317.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 980bc1ec6114f5511b20c2e6ca741e61a39b99d6)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_clnt.c
ssl/s3_clnt.c
The same change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
9eaeef81fa2d4fd6246dc02b6203fa936a5eaf67
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3ba508af5c86afe43e28174aa3c53a0a24f4d9)
This ensures that it's zeroed even if the SSL object is reused
(as in ssltest.c). It also ensures that it applies to DTLS, too.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a06cd5d056c6a5b1d161786873e21a5e53d554d8)
When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.
When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.
We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3881d8106df732fc433d30446625dfa2396da42d)
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
Don't attempt to access msg structure if recvmsg returns an error.
PR#3483
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 012aa9ec76b158179b4de44bb5de8b8472045eac)
If the hash or public key algorithm is "undef" the signature type
will receive special handling and shouldn't be included in the
cross reference table.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55f7fb8848b6e4bec291724a479e1580d6f407d6)
Out is the buffer which needs to contain at least inl + cipher_block_size - 1 bytes. Outl
is just an int*.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5211e094dec9486a540ac480f345df1a8d2b2862)
This doesn't really fix the datarace but changes it so it can only happens
once. This isn't really a problem since we always just set it to the same
value. We now just stop writing it after the first time.
PR3584, https://bugs.debian.org/534534
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d663df2399d1d9d6015bcfd2ec87b925ea3558a2)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL. We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things. This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d07187b59551e4fad3db4e52ea73f2c. Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.
CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a952e97d82eac6958c81ed1e256e6b8ca5)
CVE-2014-3513
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an origi
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the i
was performed by the OpenSSL team.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
algorithms MD2 and RC5 don't get built.
Also, disable building the test apps in crypto/des and crypto/pkcs7, as
they have no support at all.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
SSL_set_SSL_CTX is normally called for SNI after ClientHello has
received and the digest to use for each certificate has been decided.
The original ssl->cert contains the negotiated digests and is now
copied to the new ssl->cert.
PR: 3560
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Patch supplied by Matthieu Patou <mat@matws.net>, and modified to also
remove duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_digest.
PR#3551
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fdea3e49e7454aa76bd5ecf3a3747641354c68)
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Accidentally omitted from commit 455b65dfab0de51c9f67b3c909311770f2b3f801
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdc35a9d3e8cf4cfd9330d5df9883f42cf5648ad)
Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to
avoid a timing leak from padding failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aac102f75b517bdb56b1bcfd0a856052d559f6e)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
(cherry picked from commit 738911cde68b2b3706e502cf8daf5b14738f2f42)
(Original commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab0de51c9f67b3c909311770f2b3f801)
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.
(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1
This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit
Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff90124c6fd53bbb49dae5edb4e821e0a)
If we don't find a signer in the internal list, then fall
through and look at the internal list; don't just return NULL.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b2aa38a980e9fbf158aafe487fb729c492b241fb)
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.
OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.
This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.
(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d851732bad7370640702bc9c4a33189ede287)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6a14fe7576e7a14a46ba14df8be8fe478536b4fb)
"inline" without static is not correct as the compiler may choose to ignore it
and will then either emit an external definition, or expect one.
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86f50b36e63275a916b147f9d8764e3c0c060fdb)
Re-order algorithm list.
Be consistent in command synopsis.
Add content about signing.
Add EXAMPLE section
Add some missing options: -r, -fips-fingerprint -non-fips-allow
Various other fixes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6aa9dbab0f9b90060b7ee609b8c3c726ce4faf21)
Add the file written by James Westby, graciously contributed
under the terms of the OpenSSL license.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf2239b3b397174a8a6b1cc84ff68aba34ed5941)
The doc says that port can be "*" to mean any port.
That's wrong.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07e3b31fae98b985d3d2aad7066144b11833f688)
Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9a9b0c0401cae443f115ff19921d347b20aa396b)
Conflicts:
test/Makefile
Add the wrapper to all public header files (Configure
generates one). Don't bother for those that are just
lists of #define's that do renaming.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 089f10e69ece75ce31540501fe0898b15e898552)
The old code implicitly relies on the ASN.1 code returning a \0-prefixed buffer
when the buffer length is 0. Change this to verify explicitly that the ASN.1 string
has positive length.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82dc08de54ce443c2a9ac478faffe79e76157795)
When d2i_ECPrivateKey reads a private key with a missing (optional) public key,
generate one automatically from the group and private key.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed383f847156940e93f256fed78599873a4a9b28)
Conflicts:
doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
This change saves several EC routines from crashing when an EC_KEY is
missing a public key. The public key is optional in the EC private key
format and, without this patch, running the following through `openssl
ec` causes a crash:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MBkCAQEECAECAwQFBgcIoAoGCCqGSM49AwEH
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b391570bdeb386d4fd325917c248d593d3c43930)
I also removed some trailing whitespace and cleaned
up the "see also" list.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3e11c54466f1da8b707c932e308d345fd61101)
The description of when the server creates a DH key is
confusing. This cleans it up.
(rsalz: also removed trailing whitespace.)
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The EXAMPLE that used FILE and RC2 doesn't compile due to a
few minor errors. Tweak to use IDEA and AES-128. Remove
examples about RC2 and RC5.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
This patch was submitted by user "Kox" via the wiki
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2dd8cb3b9593f528d9537aa6a003d5c93df1e3c5)
Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.
Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3aac17a82fbaf2bc23ee62f24611e5883d3e7b97)
Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a207f7b6d86c3bc8ffb053e5f4d0c1ca0)
In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a7370c775dc9fd6198dbacd1706cf242b)
eliminating them as dead code.
Both volatile and "memory" are used because of some concern that the compiler
may still cache values across the asm block without it, and because this was
such a painful debugging session that I wanted to ensure that it's never
repeated.
(cherry picked from commit 7753a3a68431aa81b82beea4c3f5374b41454679)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
ssl/s3_lib.c
Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal
buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code.
Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-5139
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
CVE-2014-3508
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.
Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.
This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.
In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.
Fixes CVE-2014-3506
Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.
Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
We can't rename ssleay_rand_bytes to md_rand_bytes_lock as this will cause
an error code discrepancy. Instead keep ssleay_rand_bytes and add an
extra parameter: since ssleay_rand_bytes is not part of the public API
this wont cause any binary compatibility issues.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org >
(cherry picked from commit 8068a675a7d1a657c54546f24e673e59e6707f03)
Don't use multiple locks when SP800-90 DRBG is used outside FIPS mode.
PR#3176
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a3efe1b6e9d2aa2ce5661e4d4b97262eae743fa7)
Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.
By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test".
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961c4fbd27577fb519d9aea2dc788742715)
Conflicts:
ssl/Makefile
util/mkdef.pl
statement of opinion rather than a fact.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8d133e4b6f1ed1b7ad3c1a6d2c62f460e26c050)
PR#3456
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d48e78f0cf22aaddb563f4bcfccf25b1a45ac8a4)
Use same logic when determining when to expect a client
certificate for both TLS and DTLS.
PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit c8d710dc5f83d69d802f941a4cc5895eb5fe3d65)
The options which emulate a web server don't make sense when doing DTLS.
Exit with an error if an attempt is made to use them.
PR#3453
(cherry picked from commit 58a2aaeade8bdecd0f9f0df41927f7cff3012547)
Add description of the option to advertise support of
Next Protocol Negotiation extension (-nextprotoneg) to
man pages of s_client and s_server.
PR#3444
(cherry picked from commit 7efd0e777e65eaa6c60d85b1cc5c889f872f8fc4)
Conflicts:
doc/apps/s_server.pod
This is actually ok for this function, but initialised to zero anyway if
PURIFY defined.
This does have the impact of masking any *real* unitialised data reads in bn though.
Patch based on approach suggested by Rich Salz.
PR#3415
(cherry picked from commit 77747e2d9a5573b1dbc15e247ce18c03374c760c)
ERR_get_error(3) references the non-existent
ERR_get_last_error_line_data instead of the one that does exist,
ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.
PR#3283
(cherry picked from commit 5cc99c6cf5e908df6b00b04af7f08e99c0698c7b)
Gets rid of this;
defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 792.
(Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)
defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 800.
(Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 647f360e2e86818cee1f2d0429e071d14814e0b5)
Internal pointers in CCM, GCM and XTS contexts should either be
NULL or set to point to the appropriate key schedule. This needs
to be adjusted when copying contexts.
(cherry picked from commit c2fd5d79ffc4fc9d120a0faad579ce96473e6a2f)
IN parameter.
Under the old docs, the only thing stated was "at most
EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes will be written". It was kind of misleading
since it appears EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) WILL be written regardless of the
signature's buffer size.
(cherry picked from commit 6e6ba36d980f67b6e5c7b139f78da7acbbf8ec76)
If CSR verify fails in ca utility print out error messages.
Otherwise some errors give misleading output: for example
if the key size exceeds the library limit.
PR#2875
(cherry picked from commit a30bdb55d1361b9926eef8127debfc2e1bb8c484)
Update protocols supported and note that SSLv2 is effectively disabled
by default.
PR#3184
(cherry picked from commit 1b13a4f38dfc385d5e776f6b3e06c5795874cf9b)
In EVP_PBE_alg_add don't use the underlying NID for the cipher
as it may have a non-standard key size.
PR#3206
(cherry picked from commit efb7caef637a1de8468ca109efd355a9d0e73a45)
Document that the certificate passed to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert()
should not be freed by the application.
PR#3409
(cherry picked from commit 0535c2d67ca2d684087ef90be35d5fb207aab227)
Add restrictions section present in other branches.
Conflicts:
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.
Bug discovered and fixed by Miod Vallat from the OpenBSD team.
PR#3375
Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point
keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from
server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail.
PR#3400
(cherry picked from commit 99cd6a91fcb0931feaebbb4832681d40a66fad41)
Backport of the patch:
add ECC strings to ciphers(1), point out difference between DH and ECDH
and few other changes applicable to the 1.0.1 code base.
* Make a clear distinction between DH and ECDH key exchange.
* Group all key exchange cipher suite identifiers, first DH then ECDH
* add descriptions for all supported *DH* identifiers
* add ECDSA authentication descriptions
* add example showing how to disable all suites that offer no
authentication or encryption
* backport listing of elliptic curve cipher suites.
* backport listing of TLS 1.2 cipher suites, add note that DH_RSA
and DH_DSS is not implemented in this version
* backport of description of PSK and listing of PSK cipher suites
* backport description of AES128, AES256 and AESGCM options
* backport description of CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA256 options
Defines SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE and EXECUTE_TEST, and updates ssl/heartbeat_test.c
using these macros. SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE makes use of the new TEST_CASE_NAME
macro, defined to use __func__ or __FUNCTION__ on platforms that support those
symbols, or to use the file name and line number otherwise. This should fix
several reported build problems related to lack of C99 support.
SRP ciphersuites do not have no authentication. They have authentication
based on SRP. Add new SRP authentication flag and cipher string.
(cherry picked from commit a86b88acc373ac1fb0ca709a5fb8a8fa74683f67)
Because of a missing include <fcntl.h> we don't have O_CREATE and don't create
the file with open() using mode 0600 but fall back to using fopen() with the
default umask followed by a chmod().
Problem found by Jakub Wilk <jwilk@debian.org>.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag.
(cherry picked from commit 953c592572e8811b7956cc09fbd8e98037068b58)
Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
Add TLS padding extension to SSL_OP_ALL so it is used with other
"bugs" options and can be turned off.
This replaces SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG which is an ancient
option referring to SSLv2 and SSLREF.
PR#3336
the verify app man page didn't describe the usage of attime option
even though it was listed as a valid option in the -help message.
This patch fixes this omission.
Replace manual ASN.1 decoder with ASN1_get object. This
will decode the tag and length properly and check against
it does not exceed the supplied buffer length.
PR#3335
(cherry picked from commit b0308dddd1cc6a8e1de803ef29ba6da25ee072c2)
If the key type does not match any CMS recipient type return
an error instead of using a random key (MMA mitigation). This
does not leak any useful information to an attacker.
PR#3348
This patch resolves RT ticket #2608.
Thanks to Robert Dugal for originally spotting this, and to David
Ramos for noticing that the ball had been dropped.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
The lazy-initialisation of BN_MONT_CTX was serialising all threads, as
noted by Daniel Sands and co at Sandia. This was to handle the case that
2 or more threads race to lazy-init the same context, but stunted all
scalability in the case where 2 or more threads are doing unrelated
things! We favour the latter case by punishing the former. The init work
gets done by each thread that finds the context to be uninitialised, and
we then lock the "set" logic after that work is done - the winning
thread's work gets used, the losing threads throw away what they've done.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Even though the meat of dso_vms.c is compiled out on non-VMS builds,
the (pre-)compiler still traverses some of the macro handling. This
trips up at least one non-VMS build configuration, so this commit
makes the skip-VMS case more robust.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Newer pod2man considers =item [1-9] part of a numbered list, while =item
0 starts an unnumbered list. Add a zero effect formatting mark to override
this.
doc/apps/smime.pod around line 315: Expected text after =item, not a
number
...
PR#3146
When looking for an extension we need to set the last found
position to -1 to properly search all extensions.
PR#3309.
(cherry picked from commit 300b9f0b704048f60776881f1d378c74d9c32fbd)
Keep copy of any host, path and port values allocated by
OCSP_parse_url and free as necessary.
(cherry picked from commit 5219d3dd350cc74498dd49daef5e6ee8c34d9857)
Treat a zero length passed to ssleay_rand_add a no op: the existing logic
zeroes the md value which is very bad. OpenSSL itself never does this
internally and the actual call doesn't make sense as it would be passing
zero bytes of entropy.
Thanks to Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de> for reporting this bug.
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
Use bufsiz - 1 not BUFSIZ - 1 when prompting for a password in
the openssl utility.
Thanks to Rob Mackinnon, Leviathan Security for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 7ba08a4d73c1bdfd3aced09a628b1d7d7747cdca)
A short PEM encoded sequence if passed to the BIO, and the file
had 2 \n following would fail.
PR#3289
(cherry picked from commit 10378fb5f4c67270b800e8f7c600cd0548874811)
Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
Windows 8 SDKs complain that GetVersion() is deprecated.
We only use GetVersion like this:
(GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
which checks if the Windows version is NT based. Use a macro check_winnt()
which uses GetVersion() on older SDK versions and true otherwise.
(cherry picked from commit a4cc3c8041104896d51ae12ef7b678c31808ce52)
If you use "-newkey rsa" it's supposed to read the default number of bits from the
config file. However the value isn't used to generate the key, but it does
print it's generating such a key. The set_keygen_ctx() doesn't call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits() and you end up with the default set in
pkey_rsa_init() (1024). Afterwards the number of bits gets read from the config
file, but nothing is done with that anymore.
We now read the config first and use the value from the config file when no size
is given.
PR: 2592
(cherry picked from commit 3343220327664680420d4068e1fbe46d2236f1b0)
apps/pkcs12.c accepts -password as an argument. The document author
almost certainly meant to write "-password, -passin".
However, that is not correct, either. Actually the code treats
-password as equivalent to -passin, EXCEPT when -export is also
specified, in which case -password as equivalent to -passout.
(cherry picked from commit 856c6dfb09d69fc82ada2611c6cd792dfc60e355)
Remove reference to ERR_TXT_MALLOCED in the error library as that is
only used internally. Indicate that returned error data must not be
freed.
(cherry picked from commit f2d678e6e89b6508147086610e985d4e8416e867)
Always add a dynamically loaded ENGINE to list. Otherwise it can cause
problems when multiply loaded, especially if it adds new public key methods.
For all current engines we only want a single implementation anyway.
(cherry picked from commit e933f91f50108a43c0198cdc63ecdfdbc77b4d0d)
Use default instead of ENGINE version of digest. Without this
errors will occur if you use an ENGINE for a private key and
it doesn't implement the digest in question.
The flag SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING hasn't done anything since OpenSSL
0.9.7h but deleting it will break source compatibility with any software
that references it. Restore it but #define to zero.
(cherry picked from commit b17d6b8d1d49fa4732deff17cfd1833616af0d9c)
When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.
Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.
PR#3191
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
When deciding whether to use TLS 1.2 PRF and record hash algorithms
use the version number in the corresponding SSL_METHOD structure
instead of the SSL structure. The SSL structure version is sometimes
inaccurate. Note: OpenSSL 1.0.2 and later effectively do this already.
(CVE-2013-6449)
SHA512_Transform was initially added rather as tribute to tradition
than for practucal reasons. But use was recently found in ssl/s3_cbc.c
and it turned to be problematic on platforms that don't tolerate
misasligned references to memory and lack assembly subroutine.
(cherry picked from commit cdd1acd788020d2c525331da1712ada778f1373c)
PR: 3176.
In FIPS mode ssleay_rand_bytes is only used for PRNG seeding and is
performed in either a single threaded context (when the PRNG is first
initialised) or under a lock (reseeding). To avoid multiple locks disable
use of CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND in FIPS mode in ssleay_rand_bytes.
(cherry picked from commit 53142f72c9b9c9bad2f39ca6200a4f04f5c8001c)
PR: 3165
Submitted by: Daniel Richard G.
(cherry picked from commit 2df9ec01d563f9cc2deab07e8c3391059d476592)
(cherry picked from commit 0de70011adf6952e3b975d1a8a383879b64f3b77)
Original definition depended on __LONG_MAX__ that is not guaranteed to
be present. As we don't support platforms with int narrower that 32 bits
it's appropriate to make defition inconditional.
PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit 96180cac04591abfe50fc86096365553484bde65)
PR: 2808
With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key. Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
(cherry picked from commit 9fb523adce6fd6015b68da2ca8e4ac4900ac2be2)
(cherry picked from commit b9ef52b07897f249a9fa44943dba33fba8fb2721)
PR: 2809
DTLS/SCTP requires DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks to be protected with
SCTP-AUTH. It is checked if this has been activated successfully for
the local and remote peer. Due to a bug, however, the
gauth_number_of_chunks field of the authchunks struct is missing on
FreeBSD, and was therefore not considered in the OpenSSL implementation.
This patch sets the corresponding pointer for the check correctly
whether or not this bug is present.
(cherry picked from commit f596e3c491035fe80db5fc0c3ff6b647662b0003)
(cherry picked from commit b8140811367f6e1ef13afa6ffe9625309c46946c)
Since the TLS 1.2 supported signature algorithms extension is less
sophisticaed in OpenSSL 1.0.1 this has to be done in two stages.
RSA+MD5 is removed from supported signature algorithms extension:
any compliant implementation should never use RSA+MD5 as a result.
To cover the case of a broken implementation using RSA+MD5 anyway
disable lookup of MD5 algorithm in TLS 1.2.
Latest MIPS ISA specification declared 'branch likely' instructions
obsolete. To makes code future-proof replace them with equivalent.
(cherry picked from commit 0c2adb0a9be76da8de9bbfd5377215f71711a52e)
(I'd rather use an option, but it appears that the options field is
full.)
Now, we send the time in the gmt_unix_time field if the appropriate
one of these mode options is set, but randomize the field if the flag
is not set.
Instead, send random bytes.
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
* handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
which could be misused.)
- EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
equality (not an error).
Reported by: king cope
(cherry picked from commit 312a46791ab465cfa3bf26764361faed0e5df014)
This fix ensures that
* A HelloRequest is retransmitted if not responded by a ClientHello
* The HelloRequest "consumes" the sequence number 0. The subsequent
ServerHello uses the sequence number 1.
* The client also expects the sequence number of the ServerHello to
be 1 if a HelloRequest was received earlier.
This patch fixes the RFC violation.
(cherry picked from commit b62f4daac00303280361924b9cc19b3e27528b15)
Reported by: Prashant Jaikumar <rmstar@gmail.com>
Fix handling of application data received before a handshake.
(cherry picked from commit 0c75eeacd3285b395dc75b65c3e6fe6ffbef59f0)
PR #3090
Reported by: Franck Youssef <fry@open.ch>
If no new reason codes are obtained after checking a CRL exit with an
error to avoid repeatedly checking the same CRL.
This will only happen if verify errors such as invalid CRL scope are
overridden in a callback.
(cherry picked from commit 4b26645c1a71cf9ce489e4f79fc836760b670ffe)
PR: 3028
Fix bug introduced in PEM_X509_INFO_bio which wouldn't process RSA keys
correctly if they appeared first.
(cherry picked from commit 5ae8d6bcbaff99423a2608559d738a3fcf7ed6dc)
Bug would emerge when XTS is added to bsaes-armv7.pl. Pointed out by
Ard Biesheuvel of Linaro.
(cherry picked from commit 044f63086051d7542fa9485a1432498c39c4d8fa)
Fix PSS signature printing: consistently use 0x prefix for hex values for
padding length and trailer fields.
(cherry picked from commit deb24ad53147f5a8dd63416224a5edd7bbc0e74a)
Reencode certificates in X509_sign_ctx as well as X509_sign.
This was causing a problem in the x509 application when it modified an
existing certificate.
(cherry picked from commit c6d8adb8a45186617e0a8e2c09469bd164b92b31)
While ARMv7 in general is capable of unaligned access, not all instructions
actually are. And trouble is that compiler doesn't seem to differentiate
those capable and incapable of unaligned access. Side effect is that kernel
goes into endless loop retrying same instruction triggering unaligned trap.
Problem was observed in xts128.c and ccm128.c modules. It's possible to
resolve it by using (volatile u32*) casts, but letting STRICT_ALIGNMENT
be feels more appropriate.
(cherry picked from commit 3bdd80521a81d50ade4214053cd9b293f920a77b)
Don't check for binary curves by checking methods: the values will
be different in FIPS mode as they are redirected to the validated module
version.
(cherry picked from commit 94782e0e9c28bd872107b8f814f4db68c9fbf5ab)
If an ASN1_INTEGER structure is allocated but not explicitly set encode
it as zero: don't generate an invalid zero length INTEGER.
(cherry picked from commit 1643edc63c3e15b6db5a15a728bc288f2cc2bbc7)
podlators 2.5.0 has switched to dying on POD syntax errors. This means
that a bunch of long-standing erroneous POD in the openssl documentation
now leads to fatal errors from pod2man, halting installation.
Unfortunately POD constraints mean that you have to sort numeric lists
in ascending order if they start with 1: you cannot do 1, 0, 2 even if
you want 1 to appear first. I've reshuffled such (alas, I wish there
were a better way but I don't know of one).
(cherry picked from commit 5cc270774258149235f69e1789b3370f57b0e27b)
The version check for DTLS1_VERSION was redundant as
DTLS1_VERSION > TLS1_1_VERSION, however we do need to
check for DTLS1_BAD_VER for compatibility.
PR:2984
(cherry picked from commit d980abb22e22661e98e5cee33d760ab0c7584ecc)
Now we set the current certificate to the one used by a server
there is no need to call ssl_get_server_send_cert which will
fail if we haven't sent a certificate yet.
Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)
For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)
MD5 should use little endian order. Fortunately the only ciphersuite
affected is EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 (TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5) which
is a rarely used export grade ciphersuite.
We have to use EVP in FIPS mode so we can only partially mitigate
timing differences.
Make an extra call to EVP_DigestSignUpdate to hash additonal blocks
to cover any timing differences caused by removal of padding.
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
change the current certificate (in s->cert->key) to the one used and then
SSL_get_certificate and SSL_get_privatekey will automatically work.
Note for 1.0.1 and earlier also includes backport of the function
ssl_get_server_send_pkey.
Multiple copies of the ENGINE will cause problems when it is cleaned up as
the methods are stored in static structures which will be overwritten and
freed up more than once.
Set static methods to NULL when the ENGINE is freed so it can be reloaded.
Reported by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
Treat a NULL value passed to drbg_free_entropy callback as non-op. This
can happen if the call to fips_get_entropy fails.
Reported by: Phil Pennock <openssl-dev@spodhuis.org>
Make renegotiation work for TLS 1.2, 1.1 by not using a lower record
version client hello workaround if renegotiating.
of digest algorithms, mosty SHA, on Power7. Mystery of century, why SHA,
why slower algorithm are affected more... [from HEAD].
PR: 2794
Submitted by: Ashley Lai
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
If OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH is set then limit the size of client
ciphersuites to this value. A value of 50 should be sufficient.
Document workarounds in CHANGES.
Some servers hang when presented with a client hello record length exceeding
255 bytes but will work with longer client hellos if the TLS record version
in client hello does not exceed TLS v1.0. Unfortunately this doesn't fix all
cases...
continue with symmetric decryption process to avoid leaking timing
information to an attacker.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
Reported by: Remi Gacogne <rgacogne-bugs@coredump.fr>
Preserve unused bits value in non-canonicalised ASN1_STRING structures
by using ASN1_STRING_copy which preseves flags.
Submitted by: Bruce Stephens <bruce.stephens@isode.com>
Use same construct for EXHEADER in srp/Makefile as other makefiles to cope
with possibly empty EXHEADER.
signatures and MDC2 using EVP or RSA_sign. This has become more apparent
when the dgst utility in OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later switched to using the
EVP_DigestSign functions which call RSA_sign.
This means that the signature format OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later used with
dgst -sign and MDC2 is incompatible with previous versions.
Add detection in RSA_verify so either format works.
Note: MDC2 is disabled by default in OpenSSL and very rarely used in practice.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
Submitted by: steve
Update maximum message size for certifiate verify messages to support
4096 bit RSA keys again as TLS v1.2 messages is two bytes longer.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
- remove some unncessary SSL_err and permit
an srp user callback to allow a worker to obtain
a user verifier.
- cleanup and comments in s_server and demonstration
for asynchronous srp user lookup
New function to retrieve compression method from SSL_SESSION structure.
Delete SSL_SESSION_get_id_len and SSL_SESSION_get0_id functions
as they duplicate functionality of SSL_SESSION_get_id. Note: these functions
have never appeared in any release version of OpenSSL.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
Remove unnecessary code for srp and to add some comments to
s_client.
- the callback to provide a user during client connect is
no longer necessary since rfc 5054 a connection attempt
with an srp cipher and no user is terminated when the
cipher is acceptable
- comments to indicate in s_client the (non-)usefulness of
th primalaty tests for non known group parameters.
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
Make SRP conformant to rfc 5054.
Changes are:
- removal of the addition state after client hello
- removal of all pre-rfc srp alert ids
- sending a fatal alert when there is no srp extension but when the
server wants SRP
- removal of unnecessary code in the client.
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Send alert instead of assertion failure for incorrectly formatted DTLS
fragments.
Submitted by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@gentoo.org>
Reviewed by: steve
Include header file stdlib.h which is needed on some platforms to get
getenv() declaration.
using OBJ xref utilities instead of string comparison with OID name.
This removes the arbitrary restriction on using SHA1 only with some ECC
ciphersuites.
Reported by: Daniel Marschall <daniel-marschall@viathinksoft.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Fix OID routines.
Check on encoding leading zero rejection should start at beginning of
encoding.
Allow for initial digit when testing when to use BIGNUMs which can increase
first value by 2 * 40.
such operation can be considered as breaking binary compatibility. However!
OPNESSL_ia32cap_P is accessed by application through pointer returned by
OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc() and such change of *internal* OPENSSL_ia32cap_P
declaration is possible specifically on little-endian platforms, such as
x86[_64] ones in question. In addition, if 32-bit application calls
OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc(), it clears upper half of capability vector maintaining
the illusion that it's still 32 bits wide.
Move compression, point2oct and oct2point functions into separate files.
Add a flags field to EC_METHOD.
Add a flag EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT to use the default compession and oct functions
(all existing methods do this). This removes dependencies from EC_METHOD while
keeping original functionality.
Backport from HEAD with minor changes.
use of assembly language routines: rename the assembly language function
to the private_* variant unconditionally and perform tests from a small
C wrapper.
Add static build support to openssl utility.
Add new "fips" option to Configure.
Make use of installed fipsld and fips_standalone_sha1
Initialise FIPS error callbacks, locking and DRBG.
Doesn't do anything much yet: no crypto is redirected to the FIPS module.
Doesn't completely build either but the openssl utility can enter FIPS mode:
which doesn't do anything much either.
Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Setting SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS should be ignored for DTLS, but instead causes
the program to crash. This is due to missing version checks and is fixed with
this patch.
Submitted by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Reviewed by: steve
Call ssl_new() to reallocate SSL BIO internals if we want to replace
the existing internal SSL structure.
than client side as we need to keep the handshake record cache frozen when
it contains all the records need to process the certificate verify message.
(backport from HEAD).
Parse certificate request message and set digests appropriately.
Generate new TLS v1.2 format certificate verify message.
Keep handshake caches around for longer as they are needed for client auth.
all ssl related structures are opaque and internals cannot be directly
accessed. Many applications will need some modification to support this and
most likely some additional functions added to OpenSSL.
The advantage of this option is that any application supporting it will still
be binary compatible if SSL structures change.
(backport from HEAD).
different options:
"64" The build system will choose /POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV if
the compiler supports it, otherwise /POINTER_SIZE=64.
"64=" The build system will force /POINTER_SIZE=64.
"64=ARGV" The build system will force /POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV.
This meant a slight renumbering in util/libeay.num due to symbols
appearing in 1.0.0-stable. However, since there's been no release on
this branch yet, it should be harmless.
with turning trapping back on.
* test/maketests.com: Do the same check for /POINTER_SIZE=64=ARGV
here.
* test/clean-test.com: A new script for cleaning up.
directly in main(). 'if needed' also includes when argv is a 32 bit
pointer in an otherwise 64 bit environment.
* apps/makeapps.com: When using /POINTER_SIZE=64, try to use the additional
=ARGV, but only if it's supported. Fortunately, DCL is very helpful
telling us in this case.
- safestack macro changes for C++ were incomplete
- RLE decompression boundary case
- SSL 2.0 key arg length check
Submitted by: Google (Adam Langley, Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller)
seed to: this doesn't introduce any binary compatibility issues as the
function is only used internally.
The seed output is needed for FIPS 140-2 algorithm testing: the functionality
used to be in DSA_generate_parameters_ex() but was removed in OpenSSL 1.0.0
Submitted by: Jack Lloyd <lloyd@randombit.net>, "Mounir IDRASSI" <mounir.idrassi@idrix.net>, steve
Reviewed by: steve
As required by RFC4492 an absent supported points format by a server is
not an error: it should be treated as equivalent to an extension only
containing uncompressed.
stops complaining about a missing configuration file. Define the logical
name PERL_ENV_TABLES with values to Perl considers the DCL symbol table
as part of the environment (see 'man perlvms' for details), so cms-test.pl
can get the value of EXE_DIR from tests.com, among others.
* cms-test.pl: Make changes to have it work on VMS as well. Upper or mixed
case options need to be quoted and the openssl command needs a VMS-specific
treatment. It all should work properly on Unix, I hope it does on Windows
as well...
Submitted by: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Reviewed by: steve
Stop pkeyutl crashing if some arguments are missing. Also make str2fmt
tolerate NULL parameter.
this means that some implementations will be used automatically, e.g. aesni,
we do this for cryptodev anyway.
Setup cpuid in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() too as some ENGINEs use it.
Binary compatibility is not affected as this will only be
compiled in if explicitly requested (#ifdef EC_NISTP224_64_GCC_128).
Submitted by: Emilia Kasper (Google)
this means that some implementations will be used automatically, e.g. aesni,
we do this for cryptodev anyway.
Setup cpuid in ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() too as some ENGINEs use it.
Modest improvement coefficients mean that code already had some
parallelism and there was not very much room for improvement. Special
thanks to Ted Krovetz for benchmarking the code with such patience.
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