Ensure SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK (or d1->change_cipher_spec_ok for DTLS) is reset

once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.

(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)

Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e94a6c0ede)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
This commit is contained in:
Emilia Kasper 2014-11-19 17:01:36 +01:00
parent 15d717f574
commit 249a3e362f
8 changed files with 85 additions and 20 deletions

View File

@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would

View File

@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
memset(s->s3->client_random,0,sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
s->hit = 0;
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@ -492,7 +495,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
else
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
@ -513,7 +515,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:

View File

@ -246,6 +246,9 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
}
s->init_num=0;
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
@ -658,8 +661,14 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
/*
* This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
* extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
* to set this here because we don't know if we're
* expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@ -675,7 +684,18 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
* In a full handshake, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;

View File

@ -252,6 +252,10 @@ typedef struct dtls1_state_st
unsigned int handshake_fragment_len;
unsigned int retransmitting;
/*
* Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
* Cleared after the message has been processed.
*/
unsigned int change_cipher_spec_ok;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP

View File

@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
@ -420,12 +423,10 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
}
s->init_num=0;
@ -437,7 +438,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
@ -497,7 +497,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
@ -546,7 +545,6 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
@ -888,7 +886,6 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
s->hit = 1;
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
@ -904,7 +901,6 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit=1;
}
/* a miss or crap from the other end */

View File

@ -300,6 +300,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
@ -676,8 +679,14 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
* extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
* to set this here because we don't know if we're
* expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@ -696,6 +705,19 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
* In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
@ -705,7 +727,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
* In a full handshake, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@ -777,7 +810,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
{
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
}
else

View File

@ -393,8 +393,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
/*
* Set when the handshake is ready to process peer's ChangeCipherSpec message.
* Cleared after the message has been processed.
*/
#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
* restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
* from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
@ -456,8 +460,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
* and freed and MD_CTX-es for all required digests are stored in
* this array */
EVP_MD_CTX **handshake_dgst;
/* this is set whenerver we see a change_cipher_spec message
* come in when we are not looking for one */
/*
* Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
* Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
* Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
*/
int change_cipher_spec;
int warn_alert;

View File

@ -1513,7 +1513,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |