Sanity check EVP_EncodeUpdate buffer len
There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69f5c80abd60896c8ed3039fc56210cc)
This commit is contained in:
parent
974d4d675c
commit
951ede2a06
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
|
||||
unsigned int total = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
*outl = 0;
|
||||
if (inl == 0)
|
||||
if (inl <= 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
|
||||
if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user