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Fix return code for truncated DTLS fragment.

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Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.

I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Adam Langley 2014-06-06 14:44:20 -07:00 committed by Matt Caswell
parent 9871417fb7
commit 099ccdb808
1 changed files with 3 additions and 1 deletions
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4
ssl/d1_both.c
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@ -771,7 +771,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
i = -1;
if (i<=0)
goto err;
}