Change value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to avoid clash with SSL_OP_ALL and

OpenSSL 1.0.0. Add CHANGES entry noting the consequences.

CHANGES

@@ -4,6 +4,16 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 set SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+     1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+     mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+     SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+     TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value ot SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+     0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+     OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+     will need to be recompiled as a result.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
      disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
      protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
@@ -38,6 +48,7 @@
         Most broken servers should now work.
      3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
 	TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
      [Andy Polyakov]

ssl/ssl.h

@@ -556,7 +556,6 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG			0x00000080L
 #define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG				0x00000100L
 #define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG			0x00000200L
-#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1				0x00000400L
 
 /* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added
  * in OpenSSL 0.9.6d.  Usually (depending on the application protocol)
@@ -604,6 +603,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3					0x02000000L
 #define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1					0x04000000L
 #define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2				0x08000000L
+#define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1				0x10000000L
 
 /* These next two were never actually used for anything since SSLeay
  * zap so we have some more flags.