generic-library/openssl
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Update for 0.9.8s and 1.0.0f.

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(While the 1.0.0f CHANGES entry on VOS PRNG seeding was missing
in the 1.0.1 branch, the actual code is here already.)
This commit is contained in:
Bodo Möller 2012-01-05 13:46:27 +00:00
parent 409d2a1b71
commit 767d3e0054
2 changed files with 34 additions and 2 deletions
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34
CHANGES
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@ -298,6 +298,9 @@
and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
[Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
*) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
[Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]
@ -1226,7 +1229,36 @@
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
differences arising during decryption processing. A research
paper describing this attack can be found at:
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
[Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
*) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
[Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
*) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
(CVE-2011-4576)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. (CVE-2011-4619)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
[Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]

2
apps/cms.c
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@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file signer certificate file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip file recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid use subject key identifier\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid use subject key identifier\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file input file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");