Do not resume a session if the negotiated protocol version does not match
the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e189b9dc1
)
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parent
249a3e362f
commit
7fc5f4f117
6
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6
CHANGES
@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
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Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
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version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
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version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
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sanity and breaks all known clients.
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[David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
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*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
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early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
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renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
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@ -1051,7 +1051,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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else
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{
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i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
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if (i == 1)
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/*
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* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
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* version.
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* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
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* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
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* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
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* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
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* will abort the handshake with an error.
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*/
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if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version)
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{ /* previous session */
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s->hit=1;
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}
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