Reported by: Solar Designer of Openwall

Make sure tkeylen is initialised properly when encrypting CMS messages.
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2012-05-10 13:34:22 +00:00
parent 7ad8e1fc4e
commit 5b9d0995a1
4 changed files with 21 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
*) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
approved.
[Steve Henson]

View File

@ -139,10 +139,10 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
/* Generate random session key */
if (!enc || !ec->key)
{
tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
if (!tkey)
{
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
* leak information which may be useful in MMA.
*/
if (ec->debug)
if (enc || ec->debug)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);

View File

@ -208,6 +208,12 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
rec->input[k]=j;
l+=i;
rec->length+=i;
if (rec->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
{
memset(rec->input, 63, 64);
rec->length = 64;
l = 64;
}
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@ -260,7 +266,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
}
/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
* All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
if (i > (int)rec->length)
if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
{
/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
* by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is

View File

@ -793,6 +793,12 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
rec->input[k]=j;
l+=i;
rec->length+=i;
if (rec->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
{
memset(rec->input, 63, 64);
rec->length = 64;
l = 64;
}
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@ -889,6 +895,8 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
{
if (bs > (int)rec->length)
return -1;
rec->data += bs; /* skip the explicit IV */
rec->input += bs;
rec->length -= bs;