Additional workaround for PR#2771
If OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH is set then limit the size of client ciphersuites to this value. A value of 50 should be sufficient. Document workarounds in CHANGES.
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CHANGES
13
CHANGES
@ -4,9 +4,18 @@
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Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [xx XXX xxxx]
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*)
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*) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
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record length exceeds 255 bytes.
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Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [xx XXX xxxx]
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1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
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hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
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2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
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the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
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set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
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-DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
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Most broken servers should now work.
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3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
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TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
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*) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
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[Andy Polyakov]
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@ -469,6 +469,15 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
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return -1;
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}
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#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
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/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
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* as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
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* to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
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*/
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
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&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
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i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
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#endif
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s2n(i,p);
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p+=i;
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@ -755,6 +755,15 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
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goto err;
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}
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#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
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/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
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* as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
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* to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
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*/
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
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&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
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i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
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#endif
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s2n(i,p);
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p+=i;
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