Prepare for 1.0.1i release

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Object files
+*.o
+
+# editor artefacts
+*.swp
+.#*
+#*#
+*~
+
+# Top level excludes
+/Makefile.bak
+/Makefile
+/*.a
+/include
+/*.pc
+/rehash.time
+
+# Most *.c files under test/ are symlinks
+/test/*.c
+# Apart from these
+!/test/asn1test.c
+!/test/methtest.c
+!/test/dummytest.c
+!/test/igetest.c
+!/test/r160test.c
+!/test/fips_algvs.c
+
+/test/*.ss
+/test/*.srl
+/test/.rnd
+/test/test*.pem
+/test/newkey.pem
+
+# Certificate symbolic links
+*.0
+
+# Links under apps
+/apps/CA.pl
+/apps/md4.c
+
+
+# Auto generated headers
+/crypto/buildinf.h
+/crypto/opensslconf.h
+
+# Auto generated assembly language source files
+*.s
+!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s
+!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s
+
+# Executables
+/apps/openssl
+/test/sha256t
+/test/sha512t
+/test/*test
+/test/fips_aesavs
+/test/fips_desmovs
+/test/fips_dhvs
+/test/fips_drbgvs
+/test/fips_dssvs
+/test/fips_ecdhvs
+/test/fips_ecdsavs
+/test/fips_rngvs
+/test/fips_test_suite
+*.so*
+*.dylib*
+*.dll*
+# Exceptions
+!/test/bctest
+!/crypto/des/times/486-50.sol
+
+# Misc auto generated files
+/tools/c_rehash
+/test/evptests.txt
+lib
+Makefile.save
+*.bak

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

@@ -10,13 +10,18 @@ OpenSSL project.
 We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
 or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
 
+Major support:
+
+	Qualys		http://www.qualys.com/
+
 Very significant support:
 
-	OpenGear: www.opengear.com
+	OpenGear:	http://www.opengear.com/
 
 Significant support:
 
-	PSW Group: www.psw.net
+	PSW Group:	http://www.psw.net/
+	Acano Ltd.	http://acano.com/
 
 Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
 we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,306 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+  *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+     SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+     g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+
+     Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+     Group for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3512)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+     TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+     is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+     downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+     higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
+
+     Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+     researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3511)
+     [David Benjamin]
+
+  *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+     to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+     with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+     ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+     issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3510)
+     [Emilia K<>sper]
+
+  *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+     to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3507)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+     processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+     Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3506)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+     whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+     can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+     this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3505)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+     session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+     up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+
+     Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+     issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3509)
+     [Gabor Tyukasz]
+
+  *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+     dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+     properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+     Denial of Service attack.
+
+     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam<61>ki (Codenomicon) for
+     discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-5139)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+     X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+     from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+     output to the attacker.
+
+     Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3508)
+     [Emilia K<>sper, and Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+     for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+     bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+     handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+     SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+     Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+     researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+     [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+     OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+     in a DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-0221)
+     [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+     be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+     client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+     code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+     Thanks to J<>ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [J<>ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+     are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+     [Felix Gr<47>bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+     compilation flags.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+  *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+  *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+     can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+     server.
+
+     Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+     Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+     preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+     ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+     by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+     http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+     Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+     flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+     [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+  *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+     Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+     TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+     less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+     is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+     [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid 
+     handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+     Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+     (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+  *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+     structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+     to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+     avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+     Safari on OS X.  Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+     several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them.  The bug
+     is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+     10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+     [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+     supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+     [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+     ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+     Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+     and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+     <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2012-2686)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+     [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+     if renegotiating.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+     1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+     approved.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+     1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+     mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+     SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
+     TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+     0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+     OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+     will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+     inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+     in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+     disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+     protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+     that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+     above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+     SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+     client side.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+     record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
+     1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+        hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+     2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+	the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+        set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+        -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+        Most broken servers should now work.
+     3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+	TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1  [14 Mar 2012]
 
   *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
@@ -285,7 +585,75 @@
        Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
      [Steve Henson]
 
- Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
      client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
@@ -1264,6 +1632,86 @@
   *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
      [NTT]
 
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
+     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
+     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
  Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
@@ -1271,7 +1719,7 @@
      Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
      preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
      [Antonio Martin]
-  
+
  Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension

Configure

@@ -171,20 +171,22 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-debug",	"gcc44:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-debug-64",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-ben-macos",	"cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -arch i386 -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::-Wl,-search_paths_first::::",
 "debug-ben-macos-gcc46",	"gcc-mp-4.6:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wconversion -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-darwin64","cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
 "debug-ben-no-opt",	"gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-ben-strict",	"gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
-"debug-bodo",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-bodo",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
-"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
@@ -243,7 +245,7 @@ my %table=(
 "solaris-sparcv7-cc","cc:-xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-xarch=v8 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):/usr/ccs/bin/ar rs::/64",
+"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
 ####
 "debug-solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xarch=v8 -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 
@@ -464,8 +466,8 @@ my %table=(
 "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
 # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
 # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
-"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
+"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
+"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
 
 #
 # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)
@@ -524,7 +526,7 @@ my %table=(
 # 'perl Configure VC-WIN32' with '-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE'
 "VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
 # Unified CE target
-"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
+"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
 "VC-CE","cl::::WINCE::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
 
 # Borland C++ 4.5
@@ -718,6 +720,7 @@ my %disabled = ( # "what"         => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental
 		 "sctp"       => "default",
 		 "shared"         => "default",
 		 "store"	  => "experimental",
+		 "unit-test"	  => "default",
 		 "zlib"           => "default",
 		 "zlib-dynamic"   => "default"
 	       );
@@ -725,7 +728,7 @@ my @experimental = ();
 
 # This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults
 # (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"):
-my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE";
+my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST";
 
 # Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
 # To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental).
@@ -904,11 +907,11 @@ PROCESS_ARGS:
 				}
 			elsif (/^--with-fipsdir=(.*)$/)
 				{
-				$fipsdir="$1/";
+				$fipsdir="$1";
 				}
 			elsif (/^--with-fipslibdir=(.*)$/)
 				{
-				$fipslibdir="$1/";
+				$fipslibdir="$1";
 				}
 			elsif (/^--with-baseaddr=(.*)$/)
 				{

FAQ

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
 * What is an 'engine' version?
 * How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
+* How does the versioning scheme work?
 
 [LEGAL] Legal questions
 
@@ -82,11 +83,11 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.1 was released on Mar 14th, 2012.
+OpenSSL 1.0.1e was released on Feb 11th, 2013.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
-ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous CVS access.
+ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous Git access.
 
 
 * Where is the documentation?
@@ -108,12 +109,9 @@ In addition, you can read the most current versions at
 <URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
 to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
 not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
-that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using.
-
-For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
-might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
-predecessor, at <URL: http://www.columbia.edu/~ariel/ssleay/>.  Much
-of this still applies to OpenSSL.
+that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
+documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
+directory.
 
 There is some documentation about certificate extensions and PKCS#12
 in doc/openssl.txt
@@ -173,6 +171,19 @@ just do:
 
    pgp TARBALL.asc
 
+* How does the versioning scheme work?
+
+After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter 
+releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no
+new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and 
+can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to
+the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor
+binary compatibility is guaranteed.
+
+Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be
+backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear
+in the next minor release.
+
 [LEGAL] =======================================================================
 
 * Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
@@ -284,7 +295,7 @@ current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
 Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
 the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check
 out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate
-extensions documentation (currently in doc/openssl.txt).
+extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) )
 
 
 * Why can't I create certificate requests?
@@ -752,6 +763,9 @@ openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least
 acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
 more active team members (e.g. Steve).
 
+Note that bugs only present in the openssl utility are not in general
+considered to be security issues. 
+
 [PROG] ========================================================================
 
 * Is OpenSSL thread-safe?

INSTALL.W32

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
   is required if you intend to utilize assembler modules. Note that NASM
   is now the only supported assembler.
 
- If you are compiling from a tarball or a CVS snapshot then the Win32 files
+ If you are compiling from a tarball or a Git snapshot then the Win32 files
  may well be not up to date. This may mean that some "tweaking" is required to
  get it all to work. See the trouble shooting section later on for if (when?)
  it goes wrong.
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
 
  then ms\do_XXX should not give a warning any more. However the numbers that
  get assigned by this technique may not match those that eventually get
- assigned in the CVS tree: so anything linked against this version of the
+ assigned in the Git tree: so anything linked against this version of the
  library may need to be recompiled.
 
  If you get errors about unresolved symbols there are several possible

Makefile.org

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ RANLIB= ranlib
 NM= nm
 PERL= perl
 TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
 MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
 LIBDIR=lib
 
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ CLEARENV=	TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS}	\
 		$${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER}		\
 		$${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS}		\
 		$${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS}		\
-		$${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS}		\
+		$${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS}	\
 		$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS}	\
 		$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
 
@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
 			FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
 			export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
 		fi; \
-		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
+		$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto  CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared && \
+		(touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT) || :); \
 	else \
 		echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
 		exit 1; \
@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ rehash.time: certs apps
 		[ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
 		OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
 		export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
-		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs) && \
+		$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
 		touch rehash.time; \
 	else :; fi
 
@@ -469,9 +470,9 @@ tags:
 	find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
 
 errors:
+	$(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
 	$(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
 	(cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
-	$(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
 
 stacks:
 	$(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write

NEWS

@@ -5,7 +5,70 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3512
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3511
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3509
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-5139
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0160
+      o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers.
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+      o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
+      o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
+      o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
+      o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
+      o Include the fips configuration module.
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]:
+
+      o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+      o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms.
+      o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode.
+      o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+      o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
+      o Fix SEGV in AES code.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]:
 
       o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
       o SCTP support.
@@ -18,17 +81,30 @@
       o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
       o SRP support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]:
+
+      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
 
       o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
       o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
       o Various DTLS fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]:
 
       o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]:
 
       o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
       o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
@@ -36,7 +112,7 @@
       o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
       o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]:
 
       o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
       o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210
@@ -44,11 +120,11 @@
       o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms.
       o Various DTLS fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
       o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
@@ -56,18 +132,18 @@
       o Fix various platform compilation issues.
       o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
       o Fix for CVE-2010-2939
       o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633.
       o GOST MAC and CFB fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]:
 
       o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
       o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
@@ -90,20 +166,55 @@
       o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
       o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
+
+      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+      o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
+      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
       o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
       o Various DTLS fixes.
@@ -111,12 +222,12 @@
       o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
       o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
 
       o CFB cipher definition fixes.
       o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
 
       o Cipher definition fixes.
       o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
@@ -128,33 +239,33 @@
       o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
       o Many fixes to DTLS handling. 
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
 
       o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
 
       o Fix various build issues.
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
 
       o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
       o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
 
       o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
       o Various precautionary measures.
       o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
       o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
 
       o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
       o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
 
       o Add gcc 4.2 support.
       o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
@@ -165,23 +276,23 @@
       o RFC4507bis support.
       o TLS Extensions support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
 
       o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
       o RFC3779 support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
       o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
       o New cipher Camellia
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
 
       o Cipher string fixes.
       o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
@@ -191,12 +302,12 @@
       o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
       o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Extended Windows CE support
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
 
       o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
         make operations more streamlined and less contradictory.  This
@@ -270,36 +381,36 @@
       o Added initial support for Win64.
       o Added alternate pkg-config files.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
 
       o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
       o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
 
       o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
       o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
       o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
 
       o More compilation issues fixed.
       o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
@@ -308,7 +419,7 @@
       o More constification.
       o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
 
       o Several compilation issues fixed.
       o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
@@ -316,12 +427,12 @@
       o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
       o Performance improvements.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
 
       o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
       o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
 
       o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
       o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
@@ -329,14 +440,14 @@
       o Multiple X509 verification fixes
       o Speed up HMAC and other operations
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
 
       o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
       o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
       o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
       o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
         Bleichbacher's attack 
@@ -347,7 +458,7 @@
       o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
       o Documentation: fixes and additions.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
 
       o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
       o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
@@ -358,7 +469,7 @@
       o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
       o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
 
       o New library section OCSP.
       o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
@@ -404,23 +515,23 @@
       o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
       o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
 
       o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
       o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
         Bleichbacher's attack 
       o Security: make RSA blinding default.
       o Build: shared library support fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
 
       o Important security related bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
 
       o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
       o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
@@ -434,25 +545,25 @@
       o Fixes for smaller building problems.
       o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
 
       o Important building fixes on Unix.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
 
       o Various important bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
 
       o Important security related bugfixes.
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
 
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
       o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
 
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
       o BIGNUM library fixes.
@@ -465,7 +576,7 @@
         Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
         [in 0.9.6c-engine release].
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
 
       o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
       o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
@@ -482,7 +593,7 @@
       o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
       o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
 
       o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
         environment variables when running as root.
@@ -507,7 +618,7 @@
       o New function BN_rand_range().
       o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
 
       o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
       o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
@@ -522,7 +633,7 @@
     [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
         distribution.  See the file README.ENGINE.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
 
       o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 
       o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
@@ -531,7 +642,7 @@
       o New 'rand' application
       o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
 
       o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
       o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
@@ -567,7 +678,7 @@
       o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
       o Experimental MacOS support
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
 
       o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
         by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
@@ -578,7 +689,7 @@
       o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
         must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
       o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
       o RSA OEAP related fixes
       o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
@@ -592,7 +703,7 @@
       o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
       o Option to disable selected ciphers
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
       o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
       o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
       o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
@@ -614,7 +725,7 @@
       o Lots of memory leak fixes.
       o Lots of bug fixes.
 
-  Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c:
+  Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
       o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
       o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
       o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality

PROBLEMS

@@ -197,3 +197,17 @@ reconfigure with additional no-sse2 [or 386] option passed to ./config.
 We don't have framework to associate -ldl with no-dso, therefore the only
 way is to edit Makefile right after ./config no-dso and remove -ldl from
 EX_LIBS line.
+
+* hpux-parisc2-cc no-asm build fails with SEGV in ECDSA/DH.
+
+Compiler bug, presumably at particular patch level. Remaining
+hpux*-parisc*-cc configurations can be affected too. Drop optimization
+level to +O2 when compiling bn_nist.o.
+
+* solaris64-sparcv9-cc link failure
+
+Solaris 8 ar can fail to maintain symbol table in .a, which results in
+link failures. Apply 109147-09 or later or modify Makefile generated
+by ./Configure solaris64-sparcv9-cc and replace RANLIB assignment with
+
+	RANLIB= /usr/ccs/bin/ar rs

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 Mar 2012
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1i 6 Aug 2014
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current CVS or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
  OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
  can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
  compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable

STATUS

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-
-  OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 2012/03/14 12:14:06 $
-
-  DEVELOPMENT STATE
-
-    o  OpenSSL 1.1.0:  Under development...
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.1:  Released on March     14th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0h: Released on March     12th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0g: Released on January   18th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0f: Released on January    4th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0e: Released on September  6th, 2011
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0d: Released on February   8nd, 2011
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0c: Released on December   2nd, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0b: Released on November  16th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0a: Released on June      1st,  2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0:  Released on March     29th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8u: Released on March     12th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8t: Released on January   18th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8s: Released on January    4th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8r: Released on February   8nd, 2011
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8q: Released on December   2nd, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8p: Released on November  16th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8o: Released on June       1st, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8n: Released on March     24th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8m: Released on February  25th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8l: Released on November   5th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8k: Released on March     25th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8j: Released on January    7th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8i: Released on September 15th, 2008
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8h: Released on May       28th, 2008
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8g: Released on October   19th, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8f: Released on October   11th, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8e: Released on February  23rd, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8d: Released on September 28th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8c: Released on September  5th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8b: Released on May        4th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8a: Released on October   11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8:  Released on July       5th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7m: Released on February  23rd, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7l: Released on September 28th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7k: Released on September  5th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7j: Released on May        4th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7i: Released on October   14th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7h: Released on October   11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7g: Released on April     11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7f: Released on March     22nd, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7e: Released on October   25th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7d: Released on March     17th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7c: Released on September 30th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7b: Released on April     10th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7a: Released on February  19th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7:  Released on December  31st, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6m: Released on March     17th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6l: Released on November   4th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6k: Released on September 30th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6j: Released on April     10th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6i: Released on February  19th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6h: Released on December   5th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6g: Released on August     9th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6f: Released on August     8th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6e: Released on July      30th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6d: Released on May        9th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6c: Released on December  21st, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6b: Released on July       9th, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6a: Released on April      5th, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6:  Released on September 24th, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.5a: Released on April      1st, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.5:  Released on February  28th, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.4:  Released on August    09th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.3a: Released on May       29th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.3:  Released on May       25th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.2b: Released on March     22th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.1c: Released on December  23th, 1998
-
-  [See also http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html]
-
-  RELEASE SHOWSTOPPERS
-
-    o The Makefiles fail with some SysV makes.
-    o 
-
-  AVAILABLE PATCHES
-
-    o 
-
-  IN PROGRESS
-
-    o Steve is currently working on (in no particular order):
-        ASN1 code redesign, butchery, replacement.
-        OCSP
-        EVP cipher enhancement.
-        Enhanced certificate chain verification.
-	Private key, certificate and CRL API and implementation.
-	Developing and bugfixing PKCS#7 (S/MIME code).
-        Various X509 issues: character sets, certificate request extensions.
-    o Richard is currently working on:
-	Constification
-	Attribute Certificate support
-	Certificate Pair support
-	Storage Engines (primarly an LDAP storage engine)
-	Certificate chain validation with full RFC 3280 compatibility
-
-  NEEDS PATCH
-
-    o  0.9.8-dev: COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT do not
-       handle ECCdraft cipher suites correctly.
-
-    o  apps/ca.c: "Sign the certificate?" - "n" creates empty certificate file
-
-    o  "OpenSSL STATUS" is never up-to-date.
-
-  OPEN ISSUES
-
-    o  The Makefile hierarchy and build mechanism is still not a round thing:
-
-       1. The config vs. Configure scripts
-          It's the same nasty situation as for Apache with APACI vs.
-          src/Configure. It confuses.
-          Suggestion: Merge Configure and config into a single configure
-                      script with a Autoconf style interface ;-) and remove
-                      Configure and config. Or even let us use GNU Autoconf
-                      itself. Then we can avoid a lot of those platform checks
-                      which are currently in Configure.
-
-    o  Support for Shared Libraries has to be added at least
-       for the major Unix platforms. The details we can rip from the stuff
-       Ralf has done for the Apache src/Configure script. Ben wants the
-       solution to be really simple.
-
-       Status: Ralf will look how we can easily incorporate the
-               compiler PIC and linker DSO flags from Apache
-               into the OpenSSL Configure script.
-
-               Ulf: +1 for using GNU autoconf and libtool (but not automake,
-                    which apparently is not flexible enough to generate
-                    libcrypto)
-
-  WISHES
-
-    o  Add variants of DH_generate_parameters() and BN_generate_prime() [etc?]
-       where the callback function can request that the function be aborted.
-       [Gregory Stark <ghstark@pobox.com>, <rayyang2000@yahoo.com>]
-
-    o  SRP in TLS.
-       [wished by:
-        Dj <derek@yo.net>, Tom Wu <tom@arcot.com>,
-        Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>]
-
-       See http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-srp-00.txt
-       as well as http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/srp/.
-
-       Tom Holroyd tells us there is a SRP patch for OpenSSH at
-       http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/, that could
-       be useful.

TABLE

@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ $multilib     =
 $cc           = cc
 $cflags       = -q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst
 $unistd       = 
-$thread_cflag = -qthreaded
+$thread_cflag = -qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE
 $sys_id       = AIX
 $lflags       = 
 $bn_ops       = BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR
@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ $multilib     =
 $cc           = cc
 $cflags       = -q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst
 $unistd       = 
-$thread_cflag = -qthreaded
+$thread_cflag = -qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE
 $sys_id       = AIX
 $lflags       = 
 $bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR
@@ -1586,7 +1586,7 @@ $multilib     =
 
 *** debug-VC-WIN32
 $cc           = cl
-$cflags       = -W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE
+$cflags       = -W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = 
 $sys_id       = WIN32
@@ -1716,6 +1716,39 @@ $ranlib       =
 $arflags      = 
 $multilib     = 
 
+*** debug-ben-darwin64
+$cc           = cc
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall
+$unistd       = 
+$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
+$sys_id       = MACOSX
+$lflags       = -Wl,-search_paths_first%
+$bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
+$cpuid_obj    = x86_64cpuid.o
+$bn_obj       = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
+$des_obj      = 
+$aes_obj      = aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o
+$bf_obj       = 
+$md5_obj      = md5-x86_64.o
+$sha1_obj     = sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o
+$cast_obj     = 
+$rc4_obj      = 
+$rmd160_obj   = 
+$rc5_obj      = 
+$wp_obj       = wp-x86_64.o
+$cmll_obj     = cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o
+$modes_obj    = ghash-x86_64.o
+$engines_obj  = 
+$perlasm_scheme = macosx
+$dso_scheme   = dlfcn
+$shared_target= darwin-shared
+$shared_cflag = -fPIC -fno-common
+$shared_ldflag = -arch x86_64 -dynamiclib
+$shared_extension = .$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib
+$ranlib       = 
+$arflags      = 
+$multilib     = 
+
 *** debug-ben-debug
 $cc           = gcc44
 $cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O2 -pipe
@@ -1749,6 +1782,39 @@ $ranlib       =
 $arflags      = 
 $multilib     = 
 
+*** debug-ben-debug-64
+$cc           = gcc
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe
+$unistd       = 
+$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
+$sys_id       = 
+$lflags       = 
+$bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
+$cpuid_obj    = x86_64cpuid.o
+$bn_obj       = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o
+$des_obj      = 
+$aes_obj      = aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o
+$bf_obj       = 
+$md5_obj      = md5-x86_64.o
+$sha1_obj     = sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o
+$cast_obj     = 
+$rc4_obj      = rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o
+$rmd160_obj   = 
+$rc5_obj      = 
+$wp_obj       = wp-x86_64.o
+$cmll_obj     = cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o
+$modes_obj    = ghash-x86_64.o
+$engines_obj  = 
+$perlasm_scheme = elf
+$dso_scheme   = dlfcn
+$shared_target= bsd-gcc-shared
+$shared_cflag = -fPIC
+$shared_ldflag = 
+$shared_extension = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
+$ranlib       = 
+$arflags      = 
+$multilib     = 
+
 *** debug-ben-macos
 $cc           = cc
 $cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -arch i386 -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe
@@ -1949,7 +2015,7 @@ $multilib     =
 
 *** debug-bodo
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -2114,7 +2180,7 @@ $multilib     =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-elf
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -2147,7 +2213,7 @@ $multilib     =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -2180,7 +2246,7 @@ $multilib     =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-noasm
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -2213,7 +2279,7 @@ $multilib     =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -2741,7 +2807,7 @@ $multilib     =
 
 *** debug-steve64
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -5441,7 +5507,7 @@ $shared_target= solaris-shared
 $shared_cflag = -KPIC
 $shared_ldflag = -xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text
 $shared_extension = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
-$ranlib       = /usr/ccs/bin/ar rs
+$ranlib       = 
 $arflags      = 
 $multilib     = /64
 

apps/Makefile

@@ -577,14 +577,15 @@ openssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
 openssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
 openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
 openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
+openssl.o: openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
 passwd.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 passwd.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
 passwd.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h

apps/apps.c

@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@ int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[])
 		{
 		arg->count=20;
 		arg->data=(char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *)*arg->count);
+		if (arg->data == NULL)
+			return 0;
 		}
 	for (i=0; i<arg->count; i++)
 		arg->data[i]=NULL;
@@ -586,12 +588,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify,
 
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			ok = UI_add_input_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buf,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1);
 		if (ok >= 0 && verify)
 			{
 			buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
 			ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buff,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1, buf);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1, buf);
 			}
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			do
@@ -1542,6 +1544,8 @@ char *make_config_name()
 
 	len=strlen(t)+strlen(OPENSSL_CONF)+2;
 	p=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return NULL;
 	BUF_strlcpy(p,t,len);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
 	BUF_strlcat(p,"/",len);
@@ -2132,7 +2136,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	X509_NAME *n = NULL;
 	int nid;
 
-	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values)
+	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
 		goto error;
@@ -2236,6 +2240,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+	OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	return n;
 
 error:
@@ -2244,6 +2249,8 @@ error:
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	if (ne_types)
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
+	if (mval)
+		OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	if (buf)
 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return NULL;
@@ -2838,7 +2845,7 @@ double app_tminterval(int stop,int usertime)
 
 	if (proc==NULL)
 		{
-		if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+		if (check_winnt())
 			proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,FALSE,
 						GetCurrentProcessId());
 		if (proc==NULL) proc = (HANDLE)-1;

apps/apps.h

@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
 			do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
 			OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); ENGINE_cleanup(); \
 			CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
+			RAND_cleanup(); \
 			ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup();} while(0)
 #  else
 #    define apps_startup() \
@@ -198,6 +199,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
 			do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
 			OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); \
 			CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
+			RAND_cleanup(); \
 			ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup(); } while(0)
 #  endif
 #endif

apps/ca.c

@@ -1408,6 +1408,7 @@ bad:
 			if (!NCONF_get_number(conf,section,
 				ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours))
 				crlhours = 0;
+			ERR_clear_error();
 			}
 		if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0))
 			{
@@ -1619,12 +1620,14 @@ static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
 		{
 		ok=0;
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature verification problems....\n");
+		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		goto err;
 		}
 	if (i == 0)
 		{
 		ok=0;
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
+		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		goto err;
 		}
 	else
@@ -2776,6 +2779,9 @@ char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg)
 
 	revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
 
+	if (!revtm)
+		return NULL;
+
 	i = revtm->length + 1;
 
 	if (reason) i += strlen(reason) + 1;

apps/ciphers.c

@@ -96,13 +96,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	char buf[512];
 	BIO *STDout=NULL;
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#endif
 
 	apps_startup();
 

apps/cms.c

@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
 				cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
 #endif
+		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) 
+				flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) 
 				flags |= CMS_TEXT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) 
@@ -1039,6 +1041,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ret = 4;
 	if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
 		{
+		if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+			CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
 
 		if (secret_key)
 			{

apps/crl.c

@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ static const char *crl_usage[]={
 " -in arg         - input file - default stdin\n",
 " -out arg        - output file - default stdout\n",
 " -hash           - print hash value\n",
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+" -hash_old       - print old-style (MD5) hash value\n",
+#endif
 " -fingerprint    - print the crl fingerprint\n",
 " -issuer         - print issuer DN\n",
 " -lastupdate     - lastUpdate field\n",
@@ -108,6 +111,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	int informat,outformat;
 	char *infile=NULL,*outfile=NULL;
 	int hash=0,issuer=0,lastupdate=0,nextupdate=0,noout=0,text=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+       int hash_old=0;
+#endif
 	int fingerprint = 0, crlnumber = 0;
 	const char **pp;
 	X509_STORE *store = NULL;
@@ -192,6 +198,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			text = 1;
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hash") == 0)
 			hash= ++num;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hash_old") == 0)
+			hash_old= ++num;
+#endif
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nameopt") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -304,6 +314,14 @@ bad:
 				BIO_printf(bio_out,"%08lx\n",
 					X509_NAME_hash(X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
 				}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+			if (hash_old == i)
+				{
+				BIO_printf(bio_out,"%08lx\n",
+					X509_NAME_hash_old(
+						X509_CRL_get_issuer(x)));
+				}
+#endif
 			if (lastupdate == i)
 				{
 				BIO_printf(bio_out,"lastUpdate=");

apps/crl2p7.c

@@ -141,7 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			if(!certflst) certflst = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
-			sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv));
+			if (!certflst)
+				goto end;
+			if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv)))
+				{
+				sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(certflst);
+				goto end;
+				}
 			}
 		else
 			{

apps/dgst.c

@@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			out_bin = 1;
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-d") == 0)
 			debug=1;
-		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
-			non_fips_allow=1;
 		else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-fips-fingerprint"))
 			hmac_key = "etaonrishdlcupfm";
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
+			non_fips_allow=1;
 		else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-hmac"))
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1)
@@ -427,9 +427,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto end;
 			}
 		if (do_verify)
-			r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
+			r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, sigkey);
 		else
-			r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
+			r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, sigkey);
 		if (!r)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting context\n");

apps/dhparam.c

@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"This is going to take a long time\n");
 			if(!dh || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, &cb))
 				{
-				if(dh) DH_free(dh);
 				ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 				goto end;
 				}

apps/dsaparam.c

@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ bad:
 				goto end;
 				}
 #endif
+			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"Error, DSA key generation failed\n");
 			goto end;
 			}
@@ -429,13 +430,19 @@ bad:
 
 		assert(need_rand);
 		if ((dsakey=DSAparams_dup(dsa)) == NULL) goto end;
-		if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey)) goto end;
+		if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey))
+			{
+			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+			DSA_free(dsakey);
+			goto end;
+			}
 		if 	(outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
 			i=i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(out,dsakey);
 		else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
 			i=PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out,dsakey,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL);
 		else	{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad output format specified for outfile\n");
+			DSA_free(dsakey);
 			goto end;
 			}
 		DSA_free(dsakey);

apps/ecparam.c

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
  *                    in the asn1 der encoding
  *                    possible values: named_curve (default)
  *                                     explicit
- * -no_seed         - if 'explicit' parameters are choosen do not use the seed
+ * -no_seed         - if 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed
  * -genkey          - generate ec key
  * -rand file       - files to use for random number input
  * -engine e        - use engine e, possibly a hardware device
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ bad:
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, "                                   "
 				" explicit\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_seed          if 'explicit'"
-				" parameters are choosen do not"
+				" parameters are chosen do not"
 				" use the seed\n");
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, " -genkey           generate ec"
 				" key\n");

apps/enc.c

@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 #include <ctype.h>
 
 int set_hex(char *in,unsigned char *out,int size);
@@ -331,6 +333,18 @@ bad:
         setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
+	if (cipher && EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err, "AEAD ciphers not supported by the enc utility\n");
+		goto end;
+		}
+
+	if (cipher && (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE))
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphers in XTS mode are not supported by the enc utility\n");
+		goto end;
+		}
+
 	if (md && (dgst=EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s is an unsupported message digest type\n",md);

apps/genrsa.c

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
-#define DEFBITS	512
+#define DEFBITS	1024
 #undef PROG
 #define PROG genrsa_main
 

apps/ocsp.c

@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ENGINE *e = NULL;
 	char **args;
 	char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/";
+	char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL;
 	char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL;
 	char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL;
 	char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
@@ -204,6 +205,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			}
 		else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url"))
 			{
+			if (thost)
+				OPENSSL_free(thost);
+			if (tport)
+				OPENSSL_free(tport);
+			if (tpath)
+				OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 			if (args[1])
 				{
 				args++;
@@ -212,6 +219,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 					BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
 					badarg = 1;
 					}
+				thost = host;
+				tport = port;
+				tpath = path;
 				}
 			else badarg = 1;
 			}
@@ -617,7 +627,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-ndays n	 	 number of days before next update\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_key_id       identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nrequest n        number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg>     use specified digest in the request");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg>     use specified digest in the request\n");
 		goto end;
 		}
 
@@ -920,12 +930,12 @@ end:
 	sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free);
 	sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free);
 
-	if (use_ssl != -1)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(host);
-		OPENSSL_free(port);
-		OPENSSL_free(path);
-		}
+	if (thost)
+		OPENSSL_free(thost);
+	if (tport)
+		OPENSSL_free(tport);
+	if (tpath)
+		OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 
 	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 }
@@ -1409,7 +1419,7 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
 		}
 	resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, headers, req, req_timeout);
 	if (!resp)
-		BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responsder\n");
+		BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n");
 	end:
 	if (cbio)
 		BIO_free_all(cbio);

apps/openssl.c

@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
 #include "apps.h"
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>

apps/pkcs12.c

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
     int maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
     int twopass = 0;
     int keytype = 0;
-    int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+    int cert_pbe;
     int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
     int ret = 1;
     int macver = 1;
@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
     apps_startup();
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    if (FIPS_mode())
+	cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+    else
+#endif
+    cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+
     enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
     if (bio_err == NULL ) bio_err = BIO_new_fp (stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
 

apps/progs.h

@@ -107,16 +107,16 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"gendsa",gendsa_main},
 #endif
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"genpkey",genpkey_main},
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_server",s_server_main},
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_client",s_client_main},
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SPEED
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"speed",speed_main},
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_time",s_time_main},
 #endif
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"version",version_main},
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
 #endif
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"crl2pkcs7",crl2pkcs7_main},
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"sess_id",sess_id_main},
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ciphers",ciphers_main},
 #endif
 	{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"nseq",nseq_main},

apps/progs.pl

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV)
 	push(@files,$_);
 	$str="\t{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,\"$_\",${_}_main},\n";
 	if (($_ =~ /^s_/) || ($_ =~ /^ciphers$/))
-		{ print "#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))\n${str}#endif\n"; } 
+		{ print "#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)\n${str}#endif\n"; } 
 	elsif ( ($_ =~ /^speed$/))
 		{ print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SPEED\n${str}#endif\n"; }
 	elsif ( ($_ =~ /^engine$/))

apps/req.c

@@ -644,6 +644,11 @@ bad:
 		if (inrand)
 			app_RAND_load_files(inrand);
 
+		if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
+			{
+			newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
+			}
+
 		if (keyalg)
 			{
 			genctx = set_keygen_ctx(bio_err, keyalg, &pkey_type, &newkey,
@@ -652,12 +657,6 @@ bad:
 				goto end;
 			}
 	
-		if (newkey <= 0)
-			{
-			if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
-				newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
-			}
-
 		if (newkey < MIN_KEY_LENGTH && (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA))
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"private key length is too short,\n");
@@ -1490,7 +1489,13 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n,nid, chtype,
 				(unsigned char *) buf, -1,-1,mval)) goto err;
 	ret=1;
@@ -1549,7 +1554,12 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
 
 	if(!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype,
 					(unsigned char *)buf, -1)) {
@@ -1649,6 +1659,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(BIO *err, const char *gstr, int *pkey_type,
 				keylen = atol(p + 1);
 				*pkeylen = keylen;
 				}
+			else
+				keylen = *pkeylen;
 			}
 		else if (p)
 			paramfile = p + 1;

apps/s_cb.c

@@ -237,8 +237,8 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
 
 		/* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
 		 * the private key */
-		
-		
+
+
 		/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
 		 * the SSL context */
 		if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
@@ -436,6 +436,8 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 
 	if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
 	    version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+	    version == TLS1_1_VERSION ||
+	    version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
 	    version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 	    version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
@@ -745,6 +747,10 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
 		break;
 #endif
 
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
+		extname = "TLS padding";
+		break;
+
 		default:
 		extname = "unknown";
 		break;

apps/s_client.c

@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",SSL_HOST_NAME,PORT_STR);
 
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify arg   - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert arg     - certificate file to use, PEM format assumed\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -key arg      - Private key file to use, in cert file if\n");
@@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg   - PEM format file of CA's\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect    - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause        - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -prexit       - print session information even on connection failure\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -showcerts    - show all certificates in the chain\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -debug        - extra output\n");
 #ifdef WATT32
@@ -357,12 +359,14 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug      - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status           - request certificate status from server\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket        - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
 # endif
 #endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
+#endif
  	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label   - Export keying material using label\n");
  	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexportlen len  - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
 	}
@@ -502,7 +506,9 @@ static char * MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
 	}
 
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+#endif
 
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */
@@ -536,7 +542,7 @@ static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, con
 	ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
 	return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 	}
-# endif
+# endif  /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
 #endif
 
 enum
@@ -622,13 +628,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	SRP_ARG srp_arg = {NULL,NULL,0,0,0,1024};
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif
 
 	apps_startup();
 	c_Pause=0;
@@ -951,11 +951,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			jpake_secret = *++argv;
 			}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-use_srtp") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
 			}
+#endif
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keymatexport") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -1136,6 +1138,8 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "PSK key given or JPAKE in use, setting client callback\n");
 		SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb);
 		}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
 #endif
@@ -1896,6 +1900,10 @@ end:
 			print_stuff(bio_c_out,con,1);
 		SSL_free(con);
 		}
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+	if (next_proto.data)
+		OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data);
+#endif
 	if (ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
 	if (cert)
 		X509_free(cert);
@@ -1903,6 +1911,8 @@ end:
 		EVP_PKEY_free(key);
 	if (pass)
 		OPENSSL_free(pass);
+	if (vpm)
+		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
 	if (cbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(cbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(cbuf); }
 	if (sbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(sbuf); }
 	if (mbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(mbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(mbuf); }
@@ -2067,6 +2077,7 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
 	}
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
  	{
  	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile=SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s);
  
@@ -2074,6 +2085,7 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
 		BIO_printf(bio,"SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
 			   srtp_profile->name);
 	}
+#endif
  
 	SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s));
 	if (keymatexportlabel != NULL)

apps/s_server.c

@@ -463,6 +463,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -context arg  - set session ID context\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify arg   - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -Verify arg   - turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert.\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert arg     - certificate file to use\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err,"                 (default is %s)\n",TEST_CERT);
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -crl_check    - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.\n" \
@@ -534,6 +535,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ecdhe     - Disable ephemeral ECDH\n");
 #endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs         - Turn on SSL bug compatibility\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -hack         - workaround for early Netscape code\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -www          - Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -WWW          - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -HTTP         - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
@@ -556,10 +558,16 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
 # endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
         BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
+# endif
 #endif
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label   - Export keying material using label\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexportlen len  - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status           - respond to certificate status requests\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_verbose   - enable status request verbose printout\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_timeout n - status request responder timeout\n");
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_url URL   - status request fallback URL\n");
 	}
 
 static int local_argc=0;
@@ -737,7 +745,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
 	
 	if (servername)
 		{
-    		if (strcmp(servername,p->servername)) 
+    		if (strcasecmp(servername,p->servername)) 
 			return p->extension_error;
 		if (ctx2)
 			{
@@ -923,7 +931,9 @@ static char *jpake_secret = NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
 	static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm;
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 static char *srtp_profiles = NULL;
+#endif
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 	{
@@ -969,17 +979,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 	char *srpuserseed = NULL;
 	char *srp_verifier_file = NULL;
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1)
-	meth=TLSv1_server_method();
-#else
-  /*  #error no SSL version enabled */
-#endif
 
 	local_argc=argc;
 	local_argv=argv;
@@ -1216,13 +1216,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srp_verifier_file = *(++argv);
-			meth=TLSv1_server_method();
+			meth = TLSv1_server_method();
 			}
 		else if (strcmp(*argv, "-srpuserseed") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srpuserseed = *(++argv);
-			meth=TLSv1_server_method();
+			meth = TLSv1_server_method();
 			}
 #endif
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-www") == 0)
@@ -1329,11 +1329,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 			jpake_secret = *(++argv);
 			}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-use_srtp") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			srtp_profiles = *(++argv);
 			}
+#endif
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keymatexport") == 0)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -1360,6 +1362,14 @@ bad:
 		sv_usage();
 		goto end;
 		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+	if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,
+				"Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n");
+		goto end;
+		}
+#endif
 
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
 	if (jpake_secret)
@@ -1441,25 +1451,24 @@ bad:
 				goto end;
 				}
 			}
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-		if (next_proto_neg_in)
-			{
-			unsigned short len;
-			next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len,
-				next_proto_neg_in);
-			if (next_proto.data == NULL)
-				goto end;
-			next_proto.len = len;
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			next_proto.data = NULL;
-			}
-# endif
 #endif
 		}
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 
+	if (next_proto_neg_in)
+		{
+		unsigned short len;
+		next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&len, next_proto_neg_in);
+		if (next_proto.data == NULL)
+			goto end;
+		next_proto.len = len;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		next_proto.data = NULL;
+		}
+#endif
+
 
 	if (s_dcert_file)
 		{
@@ -1560,8 +1569,10 @@ bad:
 	else
 		SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,128);
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
 		SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
+#endif
 
 #if 0
 	if (cipher == NULL) cipher=getenv("SSL_CIPHER");
@@ -1740,7 +1751,7 @@ bad:
 		}
 #endif
 	
-	if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,s_cert,s_key))
+	if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key))
 		goto end;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (ctx2 && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2,s_cert2,s_key2))
@@ -1748,7 +1759,7 @@ bad:
 #endif
 	if (s_dcert != NULL)
 		{
-		if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,s_dcert,s_dkey))
+		if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey))
 			goto end;
 		}
 
@@ -1903,7 +1914,15 @@ end:
 		OPENSSL_free(pass);
 	if (dpass)
 		OPENSSL_free(dpass);
+	if (vpm)
+		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (tlscstatp.host)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
+	if (tlscstatp.port)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
+	if (tlscstatp.path)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
 	if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
 	if (s_cert2)
 		X509_free(s_cert2);
@@ -2443,6 +2462,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 		BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Shared ciphers:%s\n",buf);
 	str=SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con));
 	BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"CIPHER is %s\n",(str != NULL)?str:"(NONE)");
+
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
 	SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len);
 	if (next_proto_neg)
@@ -2452,6 +2472,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 		BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
 		}
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
 	{
 	SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile
 	  = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con);
@@ -2460,6 +2481,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
 		BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n",
 			   srtp_profile->name);
 	}
+#endif
 	if (SSL_cache_hit(con)) BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"Reused session-id\n");
 	if (SSL_ctrl(con,SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS,0,NULL) &
 		TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
@@ -2711,6 +2733,11 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
 				}
 			BIO_puts(io,"\n");
 
+			BIO_printf(io,
+				"Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
+		      		SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
+							"" : " NOT");
+
 			/* The following is evil and should not really
 			 * be done */
 			BIO_printf(io,"Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");

apps/s_socket.c

@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char ip[4], int port, int type)
 		{
 		i=0;
 		i=setsockopt(s,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i));
-		if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
+		if (i < 0) { closesocket(s); perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
 		}
 #endif
 
@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ redoit:
 		if ((*host=(char *)OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(h1->h_name)+1)) == NULL)
 			{
 			perror("OPENSSL_malloc");
+			closesocket(ret);
 			return(0);
 			}
 		BUF_strlcpy(*host,h1->h_name,strlen(h1->h_name)+1);
@@ -458,11 +459,13 @@ redoit:
 		if (h2 == NULL)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname failure\n");
+			closesocket(ret);
 			return(0);
 			}
 		if (h2->h_addrtype != AF_INET)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname addr is not AF_INET\n");
+			closesocket(ret);
 			return(0);
 			}
 		}

apps/smime.c

@@ -541,8 +541,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		{
 		if (!cipher)
 			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2			
-			cipher = EVP_rc2_40_cbc();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES			
+			cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 #else
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 			goto end;

apps/speed.c

@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static const char *names[ALGOR_NUM]={
   "aes-128 cbc","aes-192 cbc","aes-256 cbc",
   "camellia-128 cbc","camellia-192 cbc","camellia-256 cbc",
   "evp","sha256","sha512","whirlpool",
-  "aes-128 ige","aes-192 ige","aes-256 ige","ghash"};
+  "aes-128 ige","aes-192 ige","aes-256 ige","ghash" };
 static double results[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM];
 static int lengths[SIZE_NUM]={16,64,256,1024,8*1024};
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig)
 #if defined(_WIN32)
 
 #if !defined(SIGALRM)
-#define SIGALRM
+# define SIGALRM
 #endif
 static unsigned int lapse,schlock;
 static void alarm_win32(unsigned int secs) { lapse = secs*1000; }

apps/srp.c

@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char* id, char type)
 	if (type == DB_SRP_INDEX) 
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 		{
-		pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
-		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX  && !strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid])) 
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
+		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX  && !strcmp(id,pp[DB_srpid])) 
 			return i;
 		}
 	else for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 		{
-		pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
 
 		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != DB_SRP_INDEX && !strcmp(id,pp[DB_srpid])) 
 			return i;
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static void print_entry(CA_DB *db, BIO *bio, int indx, int verbose, char *s)
 	if (indx >= 0 && verbose)
 		{
 		int j;
-		char **pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx);
+		char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx);
 		BIO_printf(bio, "%s \"%s\"\n", s, pp[DB_srpid]);
 		for (j = 0; j < DB_NUMBER; j++)
 			{
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void print_user(CA_DB *db, BIO *bio, int userindex, int verbose)
 	{
 	if (verbose > 0)
 		{
-		char **pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+		char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
 
 		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != 'I')
 			{
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ bad:
 	/* Lets check some fields */
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 		{
-		pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+		pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
 	
 		if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX)
 			{
@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ bad:
 
 	if (gNindex >= 0)
 		{
-		gNrow = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, gNindex);
-		print_entry(db, bio_err, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N") ;
+		gNrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,gNindex);
+		print_entry(db, bio_err, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N");
 		}
 	else if (maxgN > 0 && !SRP_get_default_gN(gN))
 		{
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ bad:
 			if (userindex >= 0)
 				{
 				/* reactivation of a new user */
-				char **row = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+				char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
 				BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" reactivated.\n", user);
 				row[DB_srptype][0] = 'V';
 
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ bad:
 			else
 				{
 
-				char **row = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+				char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
 				char type = row[DB_srptype][0];
 				if (type == 'v')
 					{
@@ -664,9 +664,9 @@ bad:
 
 					if (!(gNid=srp_create_user(user,&(row[DB_srpverifier]), &(row[DB_srpsalt]),gNrow?gNrow[DB_srpsalt]:NULL, gNrow?gNrow[DB_srpverifier]:NULL, passout, bio_err,verbose)))
 						{
-							BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user);
-							errors++;
-							goto err;
+						BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user);
+						errors++;
+						goto err;
 						}
 
 					row[DB_srptype][0] = 'v';
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ bad:
 				}
 			else
 				{
-				char **xpp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
+				char **xpp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
 				BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" revoked. t\n", user);
 
 				xpp[DB_srptype][0] = 'R';
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ bad:
 		/* Lets check some fields */
 		for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
 			{
-			pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
+			pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
 	
 			if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == 'v')
 				{

apps/verify.c

@@ -222,11 +222,19 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			goto end;
 		}
 
-	if (argc < 1) check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
+	ret = 0;
+	if (argc < 1)
+		{ 
+		if (1 != check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
+			ret = -1;
+		}
 	else
+		{
 		for (i=0; i<argc; i++)
-			check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
-	ret=0;
+			if (1 != check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
+				ret = -1;
+		}
+
 end:
 	if (ret == 1) {
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
@@ -235,13 +243,16 @@ end:
 		BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
 #endif
 		BIO_printf(bio_err," cert1 cert2 ...\n");
+
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"recognized usages:\n");
-		for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
+		for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++)
+			{
 			X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
 			ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
-			BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n", X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
-								X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
-		}
+			BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n",
+				   X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
+				   X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
+			}
 	}
 	if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
 	if (cert_ctx != NULL) X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx);
@@ -249,7 +260,7 @@ end:
 	sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
 	sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
 	apps_shutdown();
-	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
+	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret < 0 ? 2 : ret);
 	}
 
 static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,

apps/x509.c

@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			days=atoi(*(++argv));
 			if (days == 0)
 				{
-				BIO_printf(STDout,"bad number of days\n");
+				BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad number of days\n");
 				goto bad;
 				}
 			}
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ bad:
 				}
 			else if (text == i)
 				{
-				X509_print_ex(out,x,nmflag, certflag);
+				X509_print_ex(STDout,x,nmflag, certflag);
 				}
 			else if (startdate == i)
 				{

config

@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
 			    libc=/usr/lib/libc.so
 			else					# OpenBSD
 			    # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we
-			    libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
+			    libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
 			fi
 			case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in
 			*ELF*)	OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;;

crypto/Makefile

@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S;	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@
 ppccpuid.s:	ppccpuid.pl;	$(PERL) ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 pariscid.s:	pariscid.pl;	$(PERL) pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 alphacpuid.s:	alphacpuid.pl
-	$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+	(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+	$(PERL) alphacpuid.pl > $$preproc && \
+	$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
 
 testapps:
 	[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (	if echo $(SDIRS) | fgrep ' des '; \

crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl

@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ _armv4_AES_encrypt:
 .type   private_AES_set_encrypt_key,%function
 .align	5
 private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_set_encrypt_key
 	teq	r0,#0
 	moveq	r0,#-1
@@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	bne	.Labrt
 
 .Lok:	stmdb   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
-	sub	$tbl,r3,#private_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024	@ Te4
+	sub	$tbl,r3,#_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024	@ Te4
 
 	mov	$rounds,r0		@ inp
 	mov	lr,r1			@ bits
@@ -685,7 +686,7 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 .align	5
 private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
 	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!            @ push lr
-	bl	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	bl	_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key
 	teq	r0,#0
 	ldrne	lr,[sp],#4              @ pop lr
 	bne	.Labrt

crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl

@@ -1036,9 +1036,9 @@ _mips_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	nop
 .end	_mips_AES_set_encrypt_key
 
-.globl	AES_set_encrypt_key
-.ent	AES_set_encrypt_key
-AES_set_encrypt_key:
+.globl	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
+.ent	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
+private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
 	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
 	.set	noreorder
@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
 	.cplocal	$Tbl
-	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_set_encrypt_key
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,private_AES_set_encrypt_key
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
@@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	jr	$ra
 	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
-.end	AES_set_encrypt_key
+.end	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
 ___
 
 my ($head,$tail)=($inp,$bits);
@@ -1091,9 +1091,9 @@ my ($tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8,$tp9,$tpb,$tpd,$tpe)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7,$s0,$s1,$s2,$s3);
 my ($m,$x80808080,$x7f7f7f7f,$x1b1b1b1b)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2);
 $code.=<<___;
 .align	5
-.globl	AES_set_decrypt_key
-.ent	AES_set_decrypt_key
-AES_set_decrypt_key:
+.globl	private_AES_set_decrypt_key
+.ent	private_AES_set_decrypt_key
+private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
 	.frame	$sp,$FRAMESIZE,$ra
 	.mask	$SAVED_REGS_MASK,-$SZREG
 	.set	noreorder
@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i);	# optimize non-nubi prologue
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /o32/i);	# non-o32 PIC-ification
 	.cplocal	$Tbl
-	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,AES_set_decrypt_key
+	.cpsetup	$pf,$zero,private_AES_set_decrypt_key
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
@@ -1226,7 +1226,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	jr	$ra
 	$PTR_ADD $sp,$FRAMESIZE
-.end	AES_set_decrypt_key
+.end	private_AES_set_decrypt_key
 ___
 }}}
 

crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl

@@ -1015,7 +1015,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
 		$SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,8,",$1,31-$2)
 		:            sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,8,",$1,63-$2)/e;
 
-	s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	s/,\*/,/			if ($SIZE_T==4);
+	s/\bbv\b(.*\(%r2\))/bve$1/	if ($SIZE_T==8);
 	print $_,"\n";
 }
 close STDOUT;

crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl

@@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	private_AES_set_encrypt_key,\@function
 .align	16
 private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	lghi	$t0,0
 	cl${g}r	$inp,$t0
 	je	.Lminus1
@@ -836,7 +837,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	je	1f
 	lg	%r1,24($inp)
 	stg	%r1,24($key)
-1:	st	$bits,236($key)	# save bits
+1:	st	$bits,236($key)	# save bits [for debugging purposes]
+	lgr	$t0,%r5
 	st	%r5,240($key)	# save km code
 	lghi	%r2,0
 	br	%r14
@@ -844,7 +846,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 .align	16
 .Lekey_internal:
-	stm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)	# all non-volatile regs
+	stm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# all non-volatile regs and $key
 
 	larl	$tbl,AES_Te+2048
 
@@ -904,8 +906,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	la	$key,16($key)		# key+=4
 	la	$t3,4($t3)		# i++
 	brct	$rounds,.L128_loop
+	lghi	$t0,10
 	lghi	%r2,0
-	lm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 
 .align	16
@@ -952,8 +955,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	st	$s2,32($key)
 	st	$s3,36($key)
 	brct	$rounds,.L192_continue
+	lghi	$t0,12
 	lghi	%r2,0
-	lm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 
 .align	16
@@ -1014,8 +1018,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	st	$s2,40($key)
 	st	$s3,44($key)
 	brct	$rounds,.L256_continue
+	lghi	$t0,14
 	lghi	%r2,0
-	lm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 
 .align	16
@@ -1066,34 +1071,26 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	private_AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function
 .align	16
 private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
-	st${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)	# save non-volatile registers!
-	bras	$ra,AES_set_encrypt_key
-	l${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	#st${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to
+	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)	# save non-volatile registers and $key!
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	#l${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	ltgr	%r2,%r2
 	bnzr	$ra
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
-	l	$t0,240($key)
+	#l	$t0,240($key)
 	lhi	$t1,16
 	cr	$t0,$t1
 	jl	.Lgo
 	oill	$t0,0x80	# set "decrypt" bit
 	st	$t0,240($key)
 	br	$ra
-
-.align	16
-.Ldkey_internal:
-	st${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	bras	$ra,.Lekey_internal
-	l${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
-
-.Lgo:	llgf	$rounds,240($key)
+.align	16
+.Lgo:	lgr	$rounds,$t0	#llgf	$rounds,240($key)
 	la	$i1,0($key)
 	sllg	$i2,$rounds,4
 	la	$i2,0($i2,$key)
@@ -1601,11 +1598,11 @@ $code.=<<___ if(1);
 	lghi	$s1,0x7f
 	nr	$s1,%r0
 	lghi	%r0,0			# query capability vector
-	la	%r1,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	la	%r1,$tweak-16($sp)
 	.long	0xb92e0042		# km %r4,%r2
 	llihh	%r1,0x8000
 	srlg	%r1,%r1,32($s1)		# check for 32+function code
-	ng	%r1,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	ng	%r1,$tweak-16($sp)
 	lgr	%r0,$s0			# restore the function code
 	la	%r1,0($key1)		# restore $key1
 	jz	.Lxts_km_vanilla
@@ -1631,7 +1628,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if(1);
 
 	lrvg	$s0,$tweak+0($sp)	# load the last tweak
 	lrvg	$s1,$tweak+8($sp)
-	stmg	%r0,%r3,$tweak-32(%r1)	# wipe copy of the key
+	stmg	%r0,%r3,$tweak-32($sp)	# wipe copy of the key
 
 	nill	%r0,0xffdf		# switch back to original function code
 	la	%r1,0($key1)		# restore pointer to $key1
@@ -1687,11 +1684,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	$i1,0x87
 	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
-	srlg	$i2,$s0,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s0,$s0,1
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
 	xgr	$s0,$i1
-	ogr	$s1,$i2
 .Lxts_km_start:
 	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
@@ -1748,11 +1743,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	$i1,0x87
 	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
-	srlg	$i2,$s0,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s0,$s0,1
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
 	xgr	$s0,$i1
-	ogr	$s1,$i2
 
 	ltr	$len,$len		# clear zero flag
 	br	$ra
@@ -1784,8 +1777,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	clr	%r0,%r1
 	jl	.Lxts_enc_software
 
+	st${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	stm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 
 	sllg	$len,$len,4		# $len&=~15
 	slgr	$out,$inp
@@ -1833,9 +1826,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	stg	$i2,8($i3)
 
 .Lxts_enc_km_done:
-	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)		# wipe tweak
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+8($sp)
+	l${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 .align	16
@@ -1846,12 +1839,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
 
 	slgr	$out,$inp
 
-	xgr	$s0,$s0			# clear upper half
-	xgr	$s1,$s1
-	lrv	$s0,$stdframe+4($sp)	# load secno
-	lrv	$s1,$stdframe+0($sp)
-	xgr	$s2,$s2
-	xgr	$s3,$s3
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# ivp
+	llgf	$s0,0($s3)		# load iv
+	llgf	$s1,4($s3)
+	llgf	$s2,8($s3)
+	llgf	$s3,12($s3)
 	stm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	la	$key,0($key2)
 	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
@@ -1867,11 +1859,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
@@ -1920,11 +1910,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
@@ -1959,7 +1947,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .size	AES_xts_encrypt,.-AES_xts_encrypt
 ___
 # void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
-#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,u64 secno);
+#	const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
+#	const unsigned char iv[16]);
 #
 $code.=<<___;
 .globl	AES_xts_decrypt
@@ -1991,8 +1980,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	clr	%r0,%r1
 	jl	.Lxts_dec_software
 
+	st${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	stm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 
 	nill	$len,0xfff0		# $len&=~15
 	slgr	$out,$inp
@@ -2031,11 +2020,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	lghi	$i1,0x87
 	srag	$i2,$s1,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	$i1,$i2			# rem
-	srlg	$i2,$s0,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s0,$s0,1
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
+	algr	$s0,$s0
+	alcgr	$s1,$s1
 	xgr	$s0,$i1
-	ogr	$s1,$i2
 	lrvgr	$i1,$s0			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$i2,$s1
 
@@ -2078,9 +2065,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	stg	$s2,0($i3)
 	stg	$s3,8($i3)
 .Lxts_dec_km_done:
-	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)		# wipe tweak
-	st${g}	$sp,$tweak($sp)
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+0($sp)	# wipe tweak
+	stg	$sp,$tweak+8($sp)
+	l${g}	$ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	lm${g}	%r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 .align	16
@@ -2092,12 +2079,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	srlg	$len,$len,4
 	slgr	$out,$inp
 
-	xgr	$s0,$s0			# clear upper half
-	xgr	$s1,$s1
-	lrv	$s0,$stdframe+4($sp)	# load secno
-	lrv	$s1,$stdframe+0($sp)
-	xgr	$s2,$s2
-	xgr	$s3,$s3
+	l${g}	$s3,$stdframe($sp)	# ivp
+	llgf	$s0,0($s3)		# load iv
+	llgf	$s1,4($s3)
+	llgf	$s2,8($s3)
+	llgf	$s3,12($s3)
 	stm${g}	%r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	la	$key,0($key2)
 	larl	$tbl,AES_Te
@@ -2116,11 +2102,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits 
@@ -2159,11 +2143,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$i2,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$i3,$s3
 	stmg	$i2,$i3,$tweak($sp)	# save the 1st tweak
@@ -2179,11 +2161,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	lghi	%r1,0x87
 	srag	%r0,$s3,63		# broadcast upper bit
 	ngr	%r1,%r0			# rem
-	srlg	%r0,$s1,63		# carry bit from lower half
-	sllg	$s1,$s1,1
-	sllg	$s3,$s3,1
+	algr	$s1,$s1
+	alcgr	$s3,$s3
 	xgr	$s1,%r1
-	ogr	$s3,%r0
 	lrvgr	$s1,$s1			# flip byte order
 	lrvgr	$s3,$s3
 	srlg	$s0,$s1,32		# smash the tweak to 4x32-bits

crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl

@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $verticalspin=1;	# unlike 32-bit version $verticalspin performs
 			# ~15% better on both AMD and Intel cores

crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl

@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
 	   $1>=10);
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 # void aesni_cbc_sha1_enc(const void *inp,
 #			void *out,

crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl

@@ -172,7 +172,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $movkey = $PREFIX eq "aesni" ? "movups" : "movups";
 @_4args=$win64?	("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") :	# Win64 order

crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl

@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@
 # function is:
 #
 # 		conversion	conversion/8x block
-# Core 2	410		0.37
-# Nehalem	310		0.35
-# Atom		570		0.26
+# Core 2	240		0.22
+# Nehalem	180		0.20
+# Atom		430		0.19
 #
 # The ratio values mean that 128-byte blocks will be processed
-# 21-27% slower, 256-byte blocks - 12-16%, 384-byte blocks - 8-11%,
+# 16-18% slower, 256-byte blocks - 9-10%, 384-byte blocks - 6-7%,
 # etc. Then keep in mind that input sizes not divisible by 128 are
 # *effectively* slower, especially shortest ones, e.g. consecutive
 # 144-byte blocks are processed 44% slower than one would expect,
@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@
 # Add decryption procedure. Performance in CPU cycles spent to decrypt
 # one byte out of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is:
 #
-# Core 2	11.0
-# Nehalem	9.16
+# Core 2	9.83
+# Nehalem	7.74
+# Atom		19.0
 #
 # November 2011.
 #
@@ -104,7 +105,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
 my @XMM=map("%xmm$_",(15,0..14));	# best on Atom, +10% over (0..15)
@@ -454,6 +456,7 @@ sub MixColumns {
 # modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last]
 my @x=@_[0..7];
 my @t=@_[8..15];
+my $inv=@_[16];	# optional
 $code.=<<___;
 	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[0], @t[0]	# x0 <<< 32
 	pshufd	\$0x93, @x[1], @t[1]
@@ -495,7 +498,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	pxor	@t[4], @t[0]
 	 pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[2], @x[6]
 	pxor	@t[5], @t[1]
-
+___
+$code.=<<___ if (!$inv);
 	pxor	@t[3], @x[4]
 	pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
 	pxor	@t[6], @x[3]
@@ -503,9 +507,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	pxor	@t[2], @x[6]
 	 movdqa	@t[1], @x[7]
 ___
+$code.=<<___ if ($inv);
+	pxor	@x[4], @t[3]
+	pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[6]
+	 movdqa	@t[0], @x[3]
+	pxor	@t[2], @x[6]
+	 movdqa	@t[6], @x[2]
+	 movdqa	@t[1], @x[7]
+	 movdqa	@x[6], @x[4]
+	 movdqa	@t[3], @x[6]
+___
 }
 
-sub InvMixColumns {
+sub InvMixColumns_orig {
 my @x=@_[0..7];
 my @t=@_[8..15];
 
@@ -659,6 +674,54 @@ $code.=<<___;
 ___
 }
 
+sub InvMixColumns {
+my @x=@_[0..7];
+my @t=@_[8..15];
+
+# Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to
+#
+# | 0e 0b 0d 09 |   | 02 03 01 01 |   | 05 00 04 00 |
+# | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 |
+# | 0d 09 0e 0b |   | 01 01 02 03 |   | 04 00 05 00 |
+# | 0b 0d 09 0e |   | 03 01 01 02 |   | 00 04 00 05 |
+
+$code.=<<___;
+	# multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[0], @t[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[6], @t[6]
+	pxor	@x[0], @t[0]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[7], @t[7]
+	pxor	@x[6], @t[6]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[1], @t[1]
+	pxor	@x[7], @t[7]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[2], @t[2]
+	pxor	@x[1], @t[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[3], @t[3]
+	pxor	@x[2], @t[2]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[0]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[1]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[4], @t[4]
+	pxor	@x[3], @t[3]
+	 pxor	@t[0], @x[2]
+	 pxor	@t[1], @x[3]
+	pshufd	\$0x4E, @x[5], @t[5]
+	pxor	@x[4], @t[4]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[1]
+	 pxor	@t[2], @x[4]
+	pxor	@x[5], @t[5]
+
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[2]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[3]
+	 pxor	@t[6], @x[4]
+	 pxor	@t[3], @x[5]
+	 pxor	@t[4], @x[6]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[4]
+	 pxor	@t[7], @x[5]
+	 pxor	@t[5], @x[7]
+___
+	&MixColumns	(@x,@t,1);	# flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6
+}
+
 sub aesenc {				# not used
 my @b=@_[0..7];
 my @t=@_[8..15];
@@ -754,7 +817,7 @@ _bsaes_encrypt8:
 
 	movdqa	($key), @XMM[9]		# round 0 key
 	lea	0x10($key), $key
-	movdqa	0x60($const), @XMM[8]	# .LM0SR
+	movdqa	0x50($const), @XMM[8]	# .LM0SR
 	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[0]	# xor with round0 key
 	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[1]
 	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
@@ -905,46 +968,82 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	_bsaes_key_convert,\@abi-omnipotent
 .align	16
 _bsaes_key_convert:
-	lea	.LBS1(%rip), $const
+	lea	.Lmasks(%rip), $const
 	movdqu	($inp), %xmm7		# load round 0 key
-	movdqa	-0x10($const), %xmm8	# .LBS0
-	movdqa	0x00($const), %xmm9	# .LBS1
-	movdqa	0x10($const), %xmm10	# .LBS2
-	movdqa	0x40($const), %xmm13	# .LM0
-	movdqa	0x60($const), %xmm14	# .LNOT
-
-	movdqu	0x10($inp), %xmm6	# load round 1 key
 	lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+	movdqa	0x00($const), %xmm0	# 0x01...
+	movdqa	0x10($const), %xmm1	# 0x02...
+	movdqa	0x20($const), %xmm2	# 0x04...
+	movdqa	0x30($const), %xmm3	# 0x08...
+	movdqa	0x40($const), %xmm4	# .LM0
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5, %xmm5		# .LNOT
+
+	movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load round 1 key
 	movdqa	%xmm7, ($out)		# save round 0 key
 	lea	0x10($out), $out
 	dec	$rounds
 	jmp	.Lkey_loop
 .align	16
 .Lkey_loop:
-	pshufb	%xmm13, %xmm6		# .LM0
-	movdqa	%xmm6, %xmm7
-___
-	&bitslice_key	(map("%xmm$_",(0..7, 8..12)));
-$code.=<<___;
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm5		# "pnot"
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm6
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm1
-	lea	0x10($inp), $inp
-	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00($out)	# write bit-sliced round key
-	movdqa	%xmm1, 0x10($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm2, 0x20($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm3, 0x30($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm4, 0x40($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm5, 0x50($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm6, 0x60($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm7, 0x70($out)
+	pshufb	%xmm4, %xmm6		# .LM0
+
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm8
+	movdqa	%xmm1,	%xmm9
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm8
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm9
+	movdqa	%xmm2,	%xmm10
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm0,	%xmm8
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm0		# 0x10...
+	movdqa	%xmm3,	%xmm11
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm1,	%xmm9
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm1		# 0x20...
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm10
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm11
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm12
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm2,	%xmm10
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm2		# 0x40...
+	movdqa	%xmm1,	%xmm13
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm3,	%xmm11
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm3		# 0x80...
+
+	movdqa	%xmm2,	%xmm14
+	movdqa	%xmm3,	%xmm15
+	 pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm8		# "pnot"
+	 pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm9
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm13
+	 movdqa	%xmm8, 0x00($out)	# write bit-sliced round key
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm0,	%xmm12
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm0		# 0x01...
+	 movdqa	%xmm9, 0x10($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm1,	%xmm13
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm1		# 0x02...
+	 lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm15
+	 movdqa	%xmm10, 0x20($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm2,	%xmm14
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm2		# 0x04...
+	 movdqa	%xmm11, 0x30($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm3,	%xmm15
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm3		# 0x08...
+	 movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load next round key
+
+	pxor	%xmm5, %xmm13		# "pnot"
+	pxor	%xmm5, %xmm14
+	movdqa	%xmm12, 0x40($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm13, 0x50($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm14, 0x60($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm15, 0x70($out)
 	lea	0x80($out),$out
-	movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load next round key
 	dec	$rounds
 	jnz	.Lkey_loop
 
-	movdqa	0x70($const), %xmm7	# .L63
+	movdqa	0x50($const), %xmm7	# .L63
 	#movdqa	%xmm6, ($out)		# don't save last round key
 	ret
 .size	_bsaes_key_convert,.-_bsaes_key_convert
@@ -1990,6 +2089,8 @@ ___
 #	const unsigned char iv[16]);
 #
 my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=@XMM[13..15];
+$arg6=~s/d$//;
+
 $code.=<<___;
 .globl	bsaes_xts_encrypt
 .type	bsaes_xts_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
@@ -2800,14 +2901,8 @@ _bsaes_const:
 	.quad	0x0504070600030201, 0x0f0e0d0c0a09080b
 .LSRM0:
 	.quad	0x0304090e00050a0f, 0x01060b0c0207080d
-.LM0:
-	.quad	0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d
 .LM0SR:
 	.quad	0x0a0e02060f03070b, 0x0004080c05090d01
-.LNOT:		# magic constants
-	.quad	0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff
-.L63:
-	.quad	0x6363636363636363, 0x6363636363636363
 .LSWPUP:	# byte-swap upper dword
 	.quad	0x0706050403020100, 0x0c0d0e0f0b0a0908
 .LSWPUPM0SR:
@@ -2830,6 +2925,15 @@ _bsaes_const:
 	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000800000000
 .Lxts_magic:
 	.long	0x87,0,1,0
+.Lmasks:
+	.quad	0x0101010101010101, 0x0101010101010101
+	.quad	0x0202020202020202, 0x0202020202020202
+	.quad	0x0404040404040404, 0x0404040404040404
+	.quad	0x0808080808080808, 0x0808080808080808
+.LM0:
+	.quad	0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d
+.L63:
+	.quad	0x6363636363636363, 0x6363636363636363
 .asciz	"Bit-sliced AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Emilia Käsper, Peter Schwabe, Andy Polyakov"
 .align	64
 .size	_bsaes_const,.-_bsaes_const

crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl

@@ -843,6 +843,8 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0;		# decryption sbox final output
 	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));		# out
 	&mov	($round,&wparam(2));		# len
 	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# key
+	&sub	($round,16);
+	&jc	(&label("cbc_abort"));
 	&lea	($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
 	&mov	($const,&wparam(4));		# ivp
 	&and	($base,-16);
@@ -853,7 +855,6 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0;		# decryption sbox final output
 	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
 
 	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$out);		# save out
-	&sub	($round,16);
 	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$key)		# save key
 	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$const);		# save ivp
 	&mov	($out,$round);			# $out works as $len
@@ -896,6 +897,7 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0;		# decryption sbox final output
 	&mov	($base,&DWP(8,"esp"));		# restore ivp
 	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
 	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$base),"xmm1");		# write IV
+&set_label("cbc_abort");
 &function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
 
 &asm_finish();

crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl

@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 $PREFIX="vpaes";
 
@@ -263,7 +264,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
 	pshufb  %xmm2,  %xmm4	# 4 = sbou
 	pxor	%xmm0,  %xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
 	movdqa	0x70(%r10), %xmm0	# 0 : sbot
-	movdqa	.Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd(%r11), %xmm2
+	movdqa	-0x160(%r11), %xmm2	# .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160
 	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
 	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
 	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm0
@@ -869,6 +870,8 @@ ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
 ___
 ($len,$key)=($key,$len);
 $code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jc	.Lcbc_abort
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
 	lea	-0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -887,7 +890,6 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	movdqu	($ivp),%xmm6		# load IV
 	sub	$inp,$out
-	sub	\$16,$len
 	call	_vpaes_preheat
 	cmp	\$0,${enc}d
 	je	.Lcbc_dec_loop
@@ -932,6 +934,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
 .Lcbc_epilogue:
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
+.Lcbc_abort:
 	ret
 .size	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
 ___
@@ -1057,7 +1060,7 @@ _vpaes_consts:
 .Lk_dsbo:	# decryption sbox final output
 	.quad	0x1387EA537EF94000, 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D
 	.quad	0x12D7560F93441D00, 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C
-.asciz	"Vector Permutaion AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
+.asciz	"Vector Permutation AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
 .align	64
 .size	_vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts
 ___

crypto/armcap.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ unsigned int _armv7_tick(void);
 
 unsigned int OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
 	{
-	if (OPENSSL_armcap_P|ARMV7_TICK)
+	if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK)
 		return _armv7_tick();
 	else
 		return 0;

crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 	BUF_MEM *b;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	int i;
-	int ret=-1;
 	ASN1_const_CTX c;
-	int want=HEADER_SIZE;
+	size_t want=HEADER_SIZE;
 	int eos=0;
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64)
-	/* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */
-	long off=0;
-#else
-	int off=0;
-#endif
-	int len=0;
+	size_t off=0;
+	size_t len=0;
 
 	b=BUF_MEM_new();
 	if (b == NULL)
@@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			want-=(len-off);
 
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
+			if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 				{
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 				goto err;
@@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 				goto err;
 				}
 			if (i > 0)
+				{
+				if (len+i < len)
+					{
+					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+					goto err;
+					}
 				len+=i;
+				}
 			}
 		/* else data already loaded */
 
@@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			/* no data body so go round again */
 			eos++;
+			if (eos < 0)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			want=HEADER_SIZE;
 			}
 		else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC))
@@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 		else 
 			{
 			/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
-			want=(int)c.slen;
+			want=c.slen;
 			if (want > (len-off))
 				{
 				want-=(len-off);
+				if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
+					len+want < len)
+						{
+						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+						goto err;
+						}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 					{
 					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 						    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
 						goto err;
 						}
+					/* This can't overflow because
+					 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
 					len+=i;
-					want -= i;
+					want-=i;
 					}
 				}
-			off+=(int)c.slen;
+			if (off + c.slen < off)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			off+=c.slen;
 			if (eos <= 0)
 				{
 				break;
@@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (off > INT_MAX)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	*pb = b;
 	return off;
 err:
 	if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
-	return(ret);
+	return -1;
 	}

crypto/asn1/a_int.c

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
 	int pad=0,ret,i,neg;
 	unsigned char *p,*n,pb=0;
 
-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0);
+	if (a == NULL) return(0);
 	neg=a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
 	if (a->length == 0)
 		ret=1;

crypto/asn1/a_object.c

@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
 	ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
 	return(NULL);
 }
+
 ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	     long len)
 	{
 	ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
 	const unsigned char *p;
 	unsigned char *data;
-	int i;
-	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
-	 * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+	int i, length;
+
+	/* Sanity check OID encoding.
+	 * Need at least one content octet.
+	 * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+	 * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
 	 */
-	for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+	if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+	    p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+	length = (int)len;
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
 		{
 		if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
 			{
@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
 	ret->data = NULL;
 	/* once detached we can change it */
-	if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+	if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
 		{
 		ret->length=0;
 		if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
-		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
 		if (data == NULL)
 			{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
 		ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
 		}
-	memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
+	memcpy(data,p,length);
 	/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
 	ret->data  =data;
-	ret->length=(int)len;
+	ret->length=length;
 	ret->sn=NULL;
 	ret->ln=NULL;
 	/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
-	p+=len;
+	p+=length;
 
 	if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
 	*pp=p;

crypto/asn1/a_strex.c

@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
 	stmp.data = NULL;
+	stmp.length = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
 	if(ret < 0) return ret;
 	*out = stmp.data;

crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int sk_table_cmp(const ASN1_STRING_TABLE * const *a,
  * certain software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them.
  */
 
-static unsigned long global_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL;
+static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
 
 void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask)
 {

crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c

@@ -196,24 +196,29 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
 	struct tm *ts;
 	struct tm data;
 	size_t len = 20;
+	int free_s = 0;
 
 	if (s == NULL)
+		{
+		free_s = 1;
 		s=M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+		}
 	if (s == NULL)
-		return(NULL);
+		goto err;
+
 
 	ts=OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
 	if (ts == NULL)
-		return(NULL);
+		goto err;
 
 	if (offset_day || offset_sec)
 		{ 
 		if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec))
-			return NULL;
+			goto err;
 		}
 
 	if((ts->tm_year < 50) || (ts->tm_year >= 150))
-		return NULL;
+		goto err;
 
 	p=(char *)s->data;
 	if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)s->length < len))
@@ -222,7 +227,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
 		if (p == NULL)
 			{
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return(NULL);
+			goto err;
 			}
 		if (s->data != NULL)
 			OPENSSL_free(s->data);
@@ -237,6 +242,10 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
 	ebcdic2ascii(s->data, s->data, s->length);
 #endif
 	return(s);
+	err:
+	if (free_s && s)
+		M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
+	return NULL;
 	}
 
 
@@ -261,6 +270,11 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
 	t -= offset*60; /* FIXME: may overflow in extreme cases */
 
 	tm = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
+	/* NB: -1, 0, 1 already valid return values so use -2 to
+	 * indicate error.
+	 */
+	if (tm == NULL)
+		return -2;
 	
 #define return_cmp(a,b) if ((a)<(b)) return -1; else if ((a)>(b)) return 1
 	year = g2(s->data);

crypto/asn1/a_verify.c

@@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
 
 	int mdnid, pknid;
 
+	if (!pkey)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
 	/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */

crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c

@@ -258,7 +258,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from)
 	if (!ameth)
 		return 0;
 	ameth->pkey_base_id = to;
-	return EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth);
+	if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth))
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
 	}
 
 int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *ppkey_base_id, int *ppkey_flags,

crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c

@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),"unknown public key type"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM),"unknown signature algorithm"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG)          ,"unknown tag"},
-{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT)        ,"unkown format"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT)        ,"unknown format"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE),"unsupported any defined by type"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER)   ,"unsupported cipher"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported encryption algorithm"},

crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
 	*pclass=xclass;
 	if (!asn1_get_length(&p,&inf,plength,(int)max)) goto err;
 
+	if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
+		goto err;
+
 #if 0
 	fprintf(stderr,"p=%d + *plength=%ld > omax=%ld + *pp=%d  (%d > %d)\n", 
 		(int)p,*plength,omax,(int)*pp,(int)(p+ *plength),

crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c

@@ -667,6 +667,8 @@ static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio)
 	int len, state, save_state = 0;
 
 	headers = sk_MIME_HEADER_new(mime_hdr_cmp);
+	if (!headers)
+		return NULL;
 	while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) {
 	/* If whitespace at line start then continuation line */
 	if(mhdr && isspace((unsigned char)linebuf[0])) state = MIME_NAME;

crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c

@@ -134,15 +134,23 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d, ASN1_STRING **oct)
 		
 	if (!(octmp->length = i2d(obj, NULL))) {
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
-		return NULL;
+		goto err;
 	}
 	if (!(p = OPENSSL_malloc (octmp->length))) {
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return NULL;
+		goto err;
 	}
 	octmp->data = p;
 	i2d (obj, &p);
 	return octmp;
+	err:
+	if (!oct || !*oct)
+		{
+		ASN1_STRING_free(octmp);
+		if (oct)
+			*oct = NULL;
+		}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 #endif

crypto/asn1/bio_asn1.c

@@ -154,7 +154,10 @@ static int asn1_bio_new(BIO *b)
 	if (!ctx)
 		return 0;
 	if (!asn1_bio_init(ctx, DEFAULT_ASN1_BUF_SIZE))
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 		return 0;
+		}
 	b->init = 1;
 	b->ptr = (char *)ctx;
 	b->flags = 0;

crypto/asn1/charmap.pl

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/local/bin/perl -w
 
+# Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org).
+# Licensed under the terms of the OpenSSL license.
+
 use strict;
 
 my ($i, @arr);

crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c

@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len)
 	ASN1_STRING *os;
 
 	if ((os=M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) return(0);
-	if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len)) return(0);
+	if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len))
+		{
+		M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	ASN1_TYPE_set(a,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,os);
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/asn1/t_x509.c

@@ -475,6 +475,8 @@ int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase)
 	l=80-2-obase;
 
 	b=X509_NAME_oneline(name,NULL,0);
+	if (!b)
+		return 0;
 	if (!*b)
 		{
 		OPENSSL_free(b);

crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c

@@ -453,9 +453,14 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
 			{
 			derlst = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk)
 						* sizeof(*derlst));
-			tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
-			if (!derlst || !tmpdat)
+			if (!derlst)
 				return 0;
+			tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
+			if (!tmpdat)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_free(derlst);
+				return 0;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	/* If not sorting just output each item */

crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c

@@ -446,11 +446,11 @@ static int asn1_print_fsname(BIO *out, int indent,
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-static int asn1_print_boolean_ctx(BIO *out, const int bool,
+static int asn1_print_boolean_ctx(BIO *out, int boolval,
 							const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
 	{
 	const char *str;
-	switch (bool)
+	switch (boolval)
 		{
 		case -1:
 		str = "BOOL ABSENT";
@@ -574,10 +574,10 @@ static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld,
 		{
 		case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
 			{
-			int bool = *(int *)fld;
-			if (bool == -1)
-				bool = it->size;
-			ret = asn1_print_boolean_ctx(out, bool, pctx);
+			int boolval = *(int *)fld;
+			if (boolval == -1)
+				boolval = it->size;
+			ret = asn1_print_boolean_ctx(out, boolval, pctx);
 			}
 		break;
 

crypto/asn1/x_crl.c

@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
 				{
 				/* We handle IDP and deltas */
 				if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
+					|| (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier)
 					|| (nid == NID_delta_crl))
 					break;;
 				crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;

crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c

@@ -175,12 +175,15 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	if (key->pkey)
 		{
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
 		ret = key->pkey;
 		}
 	else
+		{
 		key->pkey = ret;
-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 
 	return ret;

crypto/bio/b_sock.c

@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int s, int on)
 #endif
 	return(ret == 0);
 	}
-#endif
 
 int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode)
 	{
@@ -973,3 +972,4 @@ int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode)
 #endif
 	return(ret == 0);
 	}
+#endif

crypto/bio/bio_lib.c

@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ int BIO_free(BIO *a)
 
 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, a, &a->ex_data);
 
-	if ((a->method == NULL) || (a->method->destroy == NULL)) return(1);
-	a->method->destroy(a);
+	if ((a->method != NULL) && (a->method->destroy != NULL))
+		a->method->destroy(a);
 	OPENSSL_free(a);
 	return(1);
 	}
@@ -521,40 +521,40 @@ void BIO_free_all(BIO *bio)
 
 BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
 	{
-	BIO *ret=NULL,*eoc=NULL,*bio,*new;
+	BIO *ret=NULL,*eoc=NULL,*bio,*new_bio;
 
 	for (bio=in; bio != NULL; bio=bio->next_bio)
 		{
-		if ((new=BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL) goto err;
-		new->callback=bio->callback;
-		new->cb_arg=bio->cb_arg;
-		new->init=bio->init;
-		new->shutdown=bio->shutdown;
-		new->flags=bio->flags;
+		if ((new_bio=BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL) goto err;
+		new_bio->callback=bio->callback;
+		new_bio->cb_arg=bio->cb_arg;
+		new_bio->init=bio->init;
+		new_bio->shutdown=bio->shutdown;
+		new_bio->flags=bio->flags;
 
 		/* This will let SSL_s_sock() work with stdin/stdout */
-		new->num=bio->num;
+		new_bio->num=bio->num;
 
-		if (!BIO_dup_state(bio,(char *)new))
+		if (!BIO_dup_state(bio,(char *)new_bio))
 			{
-			BIO_free(new);
+			BIO_free(new_bio);
 			goto err;
 			}
 
 		/* copy app data */
-		if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new->ex_data,
+		if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data,
 					&bio->ex_data))
 			goto err;
 
 		if (ret == NULL)
 			{
-			eoc=new;
+			eoc=new_bio;
 			ret=eoc;
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			BIO_push(eoc,new);
-			eoc=new;
+			BIO_push(eoc,new_bio);
+			eoc=new_bio;
 			}
 		}
 	return(ret);

crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c

@@ -77,10 +77,20 @@
 #define OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE 0xc0
 #endif
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && !defined(IP_MTU)
 #define IP_MTU      14 /* linux is lame */
 #endif
 
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+/* Standard definition causes type-punning problems. */
+#undef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
+#define s6_addr32 __u6_addr.__u6_addr32
+#define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a)               \
+        (((a)->s6_addr32[0] == 0) &&          \
+         ((a)->s6_addr32[1] == 0) &&          \
+         ((a)->s6_addr32[2] == htonl(0x0000ffff)))
+#endif
+
 #ifdef WATT32
 #define sock_write SockWrite  /* Watt-32 uses same names */
 #define sock_read  SockRead
@@ -255,7 +265,7 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
 	{
 #if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO)
 	bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
-	int sz = sizeof(int);
+	union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
 
 	/* Is a timer active? */
 	if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0)
@@ -265,8 +275,10 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
 		/* Read current socket timeout */
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
 		int timeout;
+
+		sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
 		if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
-					   (void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
+					   (void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); }
 		else
 			{
@@ -274,9 +286,12 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
 			data->socket_timeout.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
 			}
 #else
+		sz.i = sizeof(data->socket_timeout);
 		if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, 
 						&(data->socket_timeout), (void *)&sz) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); }
+		else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
+			OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(data->socket_timeout));
 #endif
 
 		/* Get current time */
@@ -445,11 +460,10 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	int *ip;
 	struct sockaddr *to = NULL;
 	bio_dgram_data *data = NULL;
-#if defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU)
-	long sockopt_val = 0;
-	unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && (defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU))
+	int sockopt_val = 0;
+	socklen_t sockopt_len;	/* assume that system supporting IP_MTU is
+				 * modern enough to define socklen_t */
 	socklen_t addr_len;
 	union	{
 		struct sockaddr	sa;
@@ -531,7 +545,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		break;
 		/* (Linux)kernel sets DF bit on outgoing IP packets */
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO)
 		addr_len = (socklen_t)sizeof(addr);
 		memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 		if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0)
@@ -539,7 +553,6 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			ret = 0;
 			break;
 			}
-		sockopt_len = sizeof(sockopt_val);
 		switch (addr.sa.sa_family)
 			{
 		case AF_INET:
@@ -548,7 +561,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 				&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
 				perror("setsockopt");
 			break;
-#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER)
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO)
 		case AF_INET6:
 			sockopt_val = IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO;
 			if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER,
@@ -565,7 +578,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		break;
 #endif
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU)
 		addr_len = (socklen_t)sizeof(addr);
 		memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 		if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0)
@@ -727,12 +740,15 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 #endif
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
 		{
-		int timeout, sz = sizeof(timeout);
+		union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+		int timeout;
 		struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+
+		sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
 		if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
-			(void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
+			(void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
 		else
 			{
@@ -740,12 +756,20 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
 			ret = sizeof(*tv);
 			}
-		}
 #else
+		sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
 		if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, 
-			ptr, (void *)&ret) < 0)
+			ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
+		else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(struct timeval));
+			ret = (int)sz.s;
+			}
+		else
+			ret = sz.i;
 #endif
+		}
 		break;
 #endif
 #if defined(SO_SNDTIMEO)
@@ -765,12 +789,15 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 #endif
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
 		{
-		int timeout, sz = sizeof(timeout);
+		union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+		int timeout;
 		struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
+
+		sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
 		if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO,
-			(void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
+			(void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
 		else
 			{
@@ -778,12 +805,20 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
 			ret = sizeof(*tv);
 			}
-		}
 #else
+		sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
 		if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, 
-			ptr, (void *)&ret) < 0)
+			ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0)
 			{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
+		else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(struct timeval));
+			ret = (int)sz.s;
+			}
+		else
+			ret = sz.i;
 #endif
+		}
 		break;
 #endif
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP:
@@ -871,8 +906,8 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
 	memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
 	ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len);
 	OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
-	
-	for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
+
+	for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
 	     p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + sockopt_len;
 	     p += sizeof(uint8_t))
 		{
@@ -955,7 +990,6 @@ static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *a)
 #ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
 void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp)
 	{
-	unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
 	int ret;
 	struct sctp_authkey_event* authkeyevent = &snp->sn_auth_event;
 
@@ -965,9 +999,8 @@ void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp)
 
 		/* delete key */
 		authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyevent->auth_keynumber;
-		sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
 		ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY,
-		      &authkeyid, sockopt_len);
+		      &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid));
 		}
 	}
 #endif
@@ -1164,7 +1197,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 			ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen);
 			OPENSSL_assert(ii >= 0);
 
-			for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
+			for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
 				 p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + optlen;
 				 p += sizeof(uint8_t))
 				{
@@ -1298,9 +1331,9 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	{
 	long ret=1;
 	bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL;
-	unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
+	socklen_t sockopt_len = 0;
 	struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid;
-	struct sctp_authkey *authkey;
+	struct sctp_authkey *authkey = NULL;
 
 	data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *)b->ptr;
 
@@ -1355,6 +1388,11 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		/* Add new key */
 		sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkey) + 64 * sizeof(uint8_t);
 		authkey = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
+		if (authkey == NULL)
+			{
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+			}
 		memset(authkey, 0x00, sockopt_len);
 		authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1;
 #ifndef __FreeBSD__
@@ -1366,6 +1404,8 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		memcpy(&authkey->sca_key[0], ptr, 64 * sizeof(uint8_t));
 
 		ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_KEY, authkey, sockopt_len);
+		OPENSSL_free(authkey);
+		authkey = NULL;
 		if (ret < 0) break;
 
 		/* Reset active key */

crypto/bio/bss_log.c

@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK slg_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
 
 static void xopenlog(BIO* bp, char* name, int level)
 {
-	if (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
+	if (check_winnt())
 		bp->ptr = RegisterEventSourceA(NULL,name);
 	else
 		bp->ptr = NULL;

crypto/bn/Makefile

@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ ppc-mont.s:	asm/ppc-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 ppc64-mont.s:	asm/ppc64-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
 
 alpha-mont.s:	asm/alpha-mont.pl
-	$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
+	(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
+	$(PERL) asm/alpha-mont.pl > $$preproc && \
+	$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
 
 # GNU make "catch all"
 %-mont.s:	asm/%-mont.pl;	$(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@

crypto/bn/asm/mips-mont.pl

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	bnez	$at,1f
 	li	$t0,0
 	slt	$at,$num,17	# on in-order CPU
-	bnezl	$at,bn_mul_mont_internal
+	bnez	$at,bn_mul_mont_internal
 	nop
 1:	jr	$ra
 	li	$a0,0

crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl

@@ -140,10 +140,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
 	$LD	$t1,0($a0)
 	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -200,10 +200,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	$ADDU	$v0,$ta2
 	sltu	$at,$ta3,$at
 	$ST	$ta3,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$at
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$at
 
 	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
 	nop
@@ -300,10 +299,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_mul_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$MULTU	$t0,$a3
 	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -341,10 +340,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	$ADDU	$v0,$at
 	sltu	$ta3,$v0,$at
 	$ST	$v0,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$ta3,$ta2
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$ta3,$ta2
 
 	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
 	nop
@@ -429,10 +427,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$ta0,$a2,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$MULTU	$t0,$t0
 	$LD	$t2,$BNSZ($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -463,11 +461,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mflo	$ta3
 	mfhi	$ta2
 	$ST	$ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ST	$ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
 
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
+	$ST	$ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
 
 	beqz	$a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
 	nop
@@ -547,10 +544,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$at,.L_bn_add_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_add_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
 	subu	$a3,4
 	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -589,11 +586,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	$ADDU	$t3,$ta3,$v0
 	sltu	$v0,$t3,$ta3
 	$ST	$t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 	
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 
 	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
 	nop
@@ -679,10 +675,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
 	li	$minus4,-4
 	and	$at,$a3,$minus4
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	beqz	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
 
 .L_bn_sub_words_loop:
+	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
 	$LD	$ta0,0($a2)
 	subu	$a3,4
 	$LD	$t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -722,11 +718,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	$SUBU	$t3,$ta3,$v0
 	sgtu	$v0,$t3,$ta3
 	$ST	$t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
-	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 
 	.set	noreorder
-	bgtzl	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
-	$LD	$t0,0($a1)
+	bgtz	$at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
+	$ADDU	$v0,$t9
 
 	beqz	$a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
 	nop
@@ -819,7 +814,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	.set	reorder
 	move	$ta3,$ra
-	bal	bn_div_words
+	bal	bn_div_words_internal
 	move	$ra,$ta3
 	$MULTU	$ta2,$v0
 	$LD	$t2,-2*$BNSZ($a3)
@@ -840,8 +835,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	sltu	$ta0,$a1,$a2
 	or	$t8,$ta0
 	.set	noreorder
-	beqzl	$at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
+	beqz	$at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
 	$SUBU	$v0,1
+	$ADDU	$v0,1
 	.set	reorder
 .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done:
 	.set	noreorder
@@ -902,7 +898,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	and	$t2,$a0
 	$SRL	$at,$a1,$t1
 	.set	noreorder
-	bnezl	$t2,.+8
+	beqz	$t2,.+12
+	nop
 	break	6		# signal overflow
 	.set	reorder
 	$SLL	$a0,$t9
@@ -917,7 +914,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	$SRL	$DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ	# bits
 	sgeu	$at,$a0,$a2
 	.set	noreorder
-	bnezl	$at,.+8
+	beqz	$at,.+12
+	nop
 	$SUBU	$a0,$a2
 	.set	reorder
 

crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl

@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 use strict;
 my $code=".text\n\n";

crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 # of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires
 # more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't
 # seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC
-# 2.0 code path, provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
+# 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
 # it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest
 # one.
 #
@@ -988,6 +988,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
 	# assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode...
 	s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4);
 
+	s/\bbv\b/bve/gm	if ($SIZE_T==8);
+
 	print $_,"\n";
 }
 close STDOUT;

crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl

@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 ($lo,$hi)=("%rax","%rdx");	$a=$lo;
 ($i0,$i1)=("%rsi","%rdi");

crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl

@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 # int bn_mul_mont(
 $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,

crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 # int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
 $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
@@ -900,8 +901,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	jnz	.Lgather
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
-	movaps	%xmm6,(%rsp)
-	movaps	%xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
+	movaps	(%rsp),%xmm6
+	movaps	0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
 	lea	0x28(%rsp),%rsp
 ___
 $code.=<<___;

crypto/bn/bn.h

@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -774,11 +776,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

crypto/bn/bn_div.c

@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
     *
     *					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
     */
+#undef bn_div_words
 #  define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0)		\
 	({  asm volatile (			\
 		"divl	%4"			\
@@ -155,6 +156,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
     * Same story here, but it's 128-bit by 64-bit division. Wow!
     *					<appro@fy.chalmers.se>
     */
+#  undef bn_div_words
 #  define bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0)		\
 	({  asm volatile (			\
 		"divq	%4"			\

crypto/bn/bn_exp.c

@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
 
     /* Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
      * 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size... */ 
-    if (window==5)
+    if (window==5 && top>1)
 	{
 	void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp,const BN_ULONG *ap,
 			const void *table,const BN_ULONG *np,

crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c

@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ err:
 /* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */
 static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
         const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{

crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c

@@ -628,8 +628,11 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
 			}
 		if (ubits==vbits)
 			{
-			bn_correct_top(u);
-			ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
+			BN_ULONG ul;
+			int utop = (ubits-1)/BN_BITS2;
+
+			while ((ul=udp[utop])==0 && utop) utop--;
+			ubits = utop*BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul);
 			}
 		}
 	bn_correct_top(b);

crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h

@@ -282,16 +282,23 @@ extern "C" {
 #  endif
 # elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
 #  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
-#   define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)	({	\
+#   if __GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4 /* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */
+#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)		 (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64)
+#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({	\
+	__uint128_t ret=(__uint128_t)(a)*(b);	\
+	(high)=ret>>64; (low)=ret;	 })
+#   else
+#     define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b)	({	\
 	register BN_ULONG ret;		\
 	asm ("dmultu	%1,%2"		\
 	     : "=h"(ret)		\
 	     : "r"(a), "r"(b) : "l");	\
 	ret;			})
-#   define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)	\
+#     define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b)\
 	asm ("dmultu	%2,%3"		\
 	     : "=l"(low),"=h"(high)	\
 	     : "r"(a), "r"(b));
+#    endif
 #  endif
 # endif		/* cpu */
 #endif		/* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */

crypto/bn/bn_lib.c

@@ -320,6 +320,15 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
 		BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		return(NULL);
 		}
+#ifdef PURIFY
+	/* Valgrind complains in BN_consttime_swap because we process the whole
+	 * array even if it's not initialised yet. This doesn't matter in that
+	 * function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not
+	 * actually going to use the data)
+	*/
+	memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG)*words);
+#endif
+
 #if 1
 	B=b->d;
 	/* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */
@@ -824,3 +833,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

crypto/bn/bn_mont.c

@@ -478,32 +478,38 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from)
 BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock,
 					const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
 
 	CRYPTO_r_lock(lock);
-	if (!*pmont)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
-
-		if (!*pmont)
-			{
-			ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
-			if (ret && !BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
-				BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
-			else
-				*pmont = ret;
-			}
-		}
-	
 	ret = *pmont;
-	
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in
+	 * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent
+	 * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to
+	 * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work
+	 * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race
+	 * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */
+	ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+	if (!ret)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
+		{
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
+	if (*pmont)
+		{
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		ret = *pmont;
+		}
 	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		
+		*pmont = ret;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
 	return ret;
 	}

crypto/bn/bn_nist.c

@@ -286,26 +286,25 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void)
 	}
 
 
-static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top, int max)
+static void nist_cp_bn_0(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top, int max)
 	{
 	int i;
-	BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
 
 #ifdef BN_DEBUG
 	OPENSSL_assert(top <= max);
 #endif
-	for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
-		*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
-	for (i = (max) - (top); i != 0; i--)
-		*_tmp1++ = (BN_ULONG) 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+		dst[i] = src[i];
+	for (; i < max; i++)
+		dst[i] = 0;
 	}
 
-static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top)
+static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *dst, const BN_ULONG *src, int top)
 	{ 
 	int i;
-	BN_ULONG *_tmp1 = (buf), *_tmp2 = (a);
-	for (i = (top); i != 0; i--)
-		*_tmp1++ = *_tmp2++;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
+		dst[i] = src[i];
 	}
 
 #if BN_BITS2 == 64
@@ -451,8 +450,9 @@ int BN_nist_mod_192(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	 */
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_192[0],BN_NIST_192_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
+	res   = c_d;
 	res   = (BN_ULONG *)
-	 (((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
+	 (((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) | ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_192_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_192_TOP;
 	bn_correct_top(r);
@@ -479,8 +479,11 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	int	top = a->top, i;
 	int	carry;
 	BN_ULONG *r_d, *a_d = a->d;
-	BN_ULONG buf[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
-		 c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
+	union	{
+		BN_ULONG	bn[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
+		unsigned int	ui[BN_NIST_224_TOP*sizeof(BN_ULONG)/sizeof(unsigned int)];
+		} buf;
+	BN_ULONG c_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP],
 		*res;
 	PTR_SIZE_INT mask;
 	union { bn_addsub_f f; PTR_SIZE_INT p; } u;
@@ -519,18 +522,18 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	/* copy upper 256 bits of 448 bit number ... */
 	nist_cp_bn_0(c_d, a_d + (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), top - (BN_NIST_224_TOP-1), BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 	/* ... and right shift by 32 to obtain upper 224 bits */
-	nist_set_224(buf, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
+	nist_set_224(buf.bn, c_d, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8);
 	/* truncate lower part to 224 bits too */
 	r_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP-1] &= BN_MASK2l;
 #else
-	nist_cp_bn_0(buf, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
+	nist_cp_bn_0(buf.bn, a_d + BN_NIST_224_TOP, top - BN_NIST_224_TOP, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 #endif
 
 #if defined(NIST_INT64) && BN_BITS2!=64
 	{
 	NIST_INT64		acc;	/* accumulator */
 	unsigned int		*rp=(unsigned int *)r_d;
-	const unsigned int	*bp=(const unsigned int *)buf;
+	const unsigned int	*bp=(const unsigned int *)buf.ui;
 
 	acc  = rp[0];	acc -= bp[7-7];
 			acc -= bp[11-7]; rp[0] = (unsigned int)acc; acc >>= 32;
@@ -565,13 +568,13 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	{
 	BN_ULONG t_d[BN_NIST_224_TOP];
 
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 10, 9, 8, 7, 0, 0, 0);
 	carry = (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 13, 12, 11, 0, 0, 0);
 	carry += (int)bn_add_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7);
 	carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
-	nist_set_224(t_d, buf, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
+	nist_set_224(t_d, buf.bn, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 12, 11);
 	carry -= (int)bn_sub_words(r_d, r_d, t_d, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 
 #if BN_BITS2==64
@@ -606,7 +609,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_224(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 	/* otherwise it's effectively same as in BN_nist_mod_192... */
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_224[0],BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
-	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+	res   = c_d;
+	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_224_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_224_TOP;
@@ -805,7 +809,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_256(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_256[0],BN_NIST_256_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
-	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+	res   = c_d;
+	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_256_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_256_TOP;
@@ -1026,7 +1031,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_384(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 
 	mask  = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)(*u.f)(c_d,r_d,_nist_p_384[0],BN_NIST_384_TOP);
 	mask &= 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)carry;
-	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)c_d&~mask) |
+	res   = c_d;
+	res   = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d, res, BN_NIST_384_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_384_TOP;
@@ -1092,7 +1098,8 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
 
 	bn_add_words(r_d,r_d,t_d,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
 	mask = 0-(PTR_SIZE_INT)bn_sub_words(t_d,r_d,_nist_p_521,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
-	res  = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)t_d&~mask) |
+	res  = t_d;
+	res  = (BN_ULONG *)(((PTR_SIZE_INT)res&~mask) |
 	 ((PTR_SIZE_INT)r_d&mask));
 	nist_cp_bn(r_d,res,BN_NIST_521_TOP);
 	r->top = BN_NIST_521_TOP;

crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	if (al <= 0)
 		{
 		r->top=0;
+		r->neg = 0;
 		return 1;
 		}
 

crypto/bn/bn_word.c

@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
 			a->neg=!(a->neg);
 		return(i);
 		}
-	/* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
-	if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
-			(bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
-		return(0);
-	i=0;
-	for (;;)
+	for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
 		{
-		if (i >= a->top)
-			l=w;
-		else
-			l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
-		a->d[i]=l;
-		if (w > l)
-			w=1;
-		else
-			break;
-		i++;
+		a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+		w = (w>l)?1:0;
 		}
-	if (i >= a->top)
+	if (w && i==a->top)
+		{
+		if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
 		a->top++;
+		a->d[i]=w;
+		}
 	bn_check_top(a);
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/buffer/buffer.c

@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 
+/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
+ * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures
+ * that the result fits in an int. */
+#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
+
 BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *ret;
@@ -105,6 +110,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -142,6 +153,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -162,14 +179,14 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
 	return(len);
 	}
 
-void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t size)
+void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t size)
 	{
 	size_t i;
 	if (in)
 		{
 		out += size - 1;
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
-			*in++ = *out--;
+			*out-- = *in++;
 		}
 	else
 		{

crypto/buffer/buffer.h

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ int	BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
 char *	BUF_strdup(const char *str);
 char *	BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
 void *	BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
-void	BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
+void	BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
 
 /* safe string functions */
 size_t BUF_strlcpy(char *dst,const char *src,size_t siz);

crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl

@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
 die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
 
-open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
+open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
+*STDOUT=*OUT;
 
 sub hi() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1h/;    $r; }
 sub lo() { my $r=shift; $r =~ s/%[er]([a-d])x/%\1l/;