prepare for 1.0.1a release

BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.

Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,36 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+     record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
+     1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+        hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+     2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+	the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+        set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+        -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+        Most broken servers should now work.
+     3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+	TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+
+  *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1  [14 Mar 2012]
 
   *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
@@ -285,7 +315,18 @@
        Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
      [Steve Henson]
 
- Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
      client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to

Configure

@@ -904,11 +904,11 @@ PROCESS_ARGS:
 				}
 			elsif (/^--with-fipsdir=(.*)$/)
 				{
-				$fipsdir="$1/";
+				$fipsdir="$1";
 				}
 			elsif (/^--with-fipslibdir=(.*)$/)
 				{
-				$fipslibdir="$1/";
+				$fipslibdir="$1";
 				}
 			elsif (/^--with-baseaddr=(.*)$/)
 				{

FAQ

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.1 was released on Mar 14th, 2012.
+OpenSSL 1.0.1a was released on Apr 19th, 2012.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:

Makefile.org

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ CLEARENV=	TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS}	\
 		$${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER}		\
 		$${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS}		\
 		$${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS}		\
-		$${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS}		\
+		$${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS}	\
 		$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS}	\
 		$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
 

NEWS

@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+      o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
+      o Fix SEGV in AES code.
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1:
 
       o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 Mar 2012
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1a 19 Apr 2012
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

STATUS

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 
   OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 2012/03/14 12:14:06 $
+  ______________                           $Date: 2012/04/19 12:17:17 $
 
   DEVELOPMENT STATE
 
     o  OpenSSL 1.1.0:  Under development...
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.1a: Released on April     19th, 2012
     o  OpenSSL 1.0.1:  Released on March     14th, 2012
     o  OpenSSL 1.0.0h: Released on March     12th, 2012
     o  OpenSSL 1.0.0g: Released on January   18th, 2012

apps/s_client.c

@@ -622,13 +622,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	SRP_ARG srp_arg = {NULL,NULL,0,0,0,1024};
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif
 
 	apps_startup();
 	c_Pause=0;

apps/s_server.c

@@ -969,17 +969,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
 	char *srpuserseed = NULL;
 	char *srp_verifier_file = NULL;
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1)
-	meth=TLSv1_server_method();
-#else
-  /*  #error no SSL version enabled */
-#endif
 
 	local_argc=argc;
 	local_argv=argv;

crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl

@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ _armv4_AES_encrypt:
 .type   private_AES_set_encrypt_key,%function
 .align	5
 private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_set_encrypt_key
 	teq	r0,#0
 	moveq	r0,#-1
@@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	bne	.Labrt
 
 .Lok:	stmdb   sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
-	sub	$tbl,r3,#private_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024	@ Te4
+	sub	$tbl,r3,#_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024	@ Te4
 
 	mov	$rounds,r0		@ inp
 	mov	lr,r1			@ bits
@@ -685,7 +686,7 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 .align	5
 private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
 	str	lr,[sp,#-4]!            @ push lr
-	bl	private_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	bl	_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key
 	teq	r0,#0
 	ldrne	lr,[sp],#4              @ pop lr
 	bne	.Labrt

crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl

@@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	private_AES_set_encrypt_key,\@function
 .align	16
 private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
+_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	lghi	$t0,0
 	cl${g}r	$inp,$t0
 	je	.Lminus1
@@ -836,7 +837,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
 	je	1f
 	lg	%r1,24($inp)
 	stg	%r1,24($key)
-1:	st	$bits,236($key)	# save bits
+1:	st	$bits,236($key)	# save bits [for debugging purposes]
+	lgr	$t0,%r5
 	st	%r5,240($key)	# save km code
 	lghi	%r2,0
 	br	%r14
@@ -844,7 +846,7 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 .align	16
 .Lekey_internal:
-	stm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)	# all non-volatile regs
+	stm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# all non-volatile regs and $key
 
 	larl	$tbl,AES_Te+2048
 
@@ -904,8 +906,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	la	$key,16($key)		# key+=4
 	la	$t3,4($t3)		# i++
 	brct	$rounds,.L128_loop
+	lghi	$t0,10
 	lghi	%r2,0
-	lm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 
 .align	16
@@ -952,8 +955,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	st	$s2,32($key)
 	st	$s3,36($key)
 	brct	$rounds,.L192_continue
+	lghi	$t0,12
 	lghi	%r2,0
-	lm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 
 .align	16
@@ -1014,8 +1018,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	st	$s2,40($key)
 	st	$s3,44($key)
 	brct	$rounds,.L256_continue
+	lghi	$t0,14
 	lghi	%r2,0
-	lm${g}	%r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	lm${g}	%r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$ra
 
 .align	16
@@ -1066,34 +1071,26 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	private_AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function
 .align	16
 private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
-	st${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)	# save non-volatile registers!
-	bras	$ra,AES_set_encrypt_key
-	l${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
+	#st${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)	# I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to
+	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)	# save non-volatile registers and $key!
+	bras	$ra,_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	#l${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	ltgr	%r2,%r2
 	bnzr	$ra
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
-	l	$t0,240($key)
+	#l	$t0,240($key)
 	lhi	$t1,16
 	cr	$t0,$t1
 	jl	.Lgo
 	oill	$t0,0x80	# set "decrypt" bit
 	st	$t0,240($key)
 	br	$ra
-
-.align	16
-.Ldkey_internal:
-	st${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	st${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	bras	$ra,.Lekey_internal
-	l${g}	$key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
-	l${g}	$ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
-
-.Lgo:	llgf	$rounds,240($key)
+.align	16
+.Lgo:	lgr	$rounds,$t0	#llgf	$rounds,240($key)
 	la	$i1,0($key)
 	sllg	$i2,$rounds,4
 	la	$i2,0($i2,$key)

crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl

@@ -65,12 +65,12 @@
 # function is:
 #
 # 		conversion	conversion/8x block
-# Core 2	410		0.37
-# Nehalem	310		0.35
-# Atom		570		0.26
+# Core 2	240		0.22
+# Nehalem	180		0.20
+# Atom		430		0.19
 #
 # The ratio values mean that 128-byte blocks will be processed
-# 21-27% slower, 256-byte blocks - 12-16%, 384-byte blocks - 8-11%,
+# 16-18% slower, 256-byte blocks - 9-10%, 384-byte blocks - 6-7%,
 # etc. Then keep in mind that input sizes not divisible by 128 are
 # *effectively* slower, especially shortest ones, e.g. consecutive
 # 144-byte blocks are processed 44% slower than one would expect,
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 #
 # Core 2	11.0
 # Nehalem	9.16
+# Atom		20.9
 #
 # November 2011.
 #
@@ -754,7 +755,7 @@ _bsaes_encrypt8:
 
 	movdqa	($key), @XMM[9]		# round 0 key
 	lea	0x10($key), $key
-	movdqa	0x60($const), @XMM[8]	# .LM0SR
+	movdqa	0x50($const), @XMM[8]	# .LM0SR
 	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[0]	# xor with round0 key
 	pxor	@XMM[9], @XMM[1]
 	 pshufb	@XMM[8], @XMM[0]
@@ -905,46 +906,82 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	_bsaes_key_convert,\@abi-omnipotent
 .align	16
 _bsaes_key_convert:
-	lea	.LBS1(%rip), $const
+	lea	.Lmasks(%rip), $const
 	movdqu	($inp), %xmm7		# load round 0 key
-	movdqa	-0x10($const), %xmm8	# .LBS0
-	movdqa	0x00($const), %xmm9	# .LBS1
-	movdqa	0x10($const), %xmm10	# .LBS2
-	movdqa	0x40($const), %xmm13	# .LM0
-	movdqa	0x60($const), %xmm14	# .LNOT
-
-	movdqu	0x10($inp), %xmm6	# load round 1 key
 	lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+	movdqa	0x00($const), %xmm0	# 0x01...
+	movdqa	0x10($const), %xmm1	# 0x02...
+	movdqa	0x20($const), %xmm2	# 0x04...
+	movdqa	0x30($const), %xmm3	# 0x08...
+	movdqa	0x40($const), %xmm4	# .LM0
+	pcmpeqd	%xmm5, %xmm5		# .LNOT
+
+	movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load round 1 key
 	movdqa	%xmm7, ($out)		# save round 0 key
 	lea	0x10($out), $out
 	dec	$rounds
 	jmp	.Lkey_loop
 .align	16
 .Lkey_loop:
-	pshufb	%xmm13, %xmm6		# .LM0
-	movdqa	%xmm6, %xmm7
-___
-	&bitslice_key	(map("%xmm$_",(0..7, 8..12)));
-$code.=<<___;
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm5		# "pnot"
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm6
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm0
-	pxor	%xmm14, %xmm1
-	lea	0x10($inp), $inp
-	movdqa	%xmm0, 0x00($out)	# write bit-sliced round key
-	movdqa	%xmm1, 0x10($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm2, 0x20($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm3, 0x30($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm4, 0x40($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm5, 0x50($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm6, 0x60($out)
-	movdqa	%xmm7, 0x70($out)
+	pshufb	%xmm4, %xmm6		# .LM0
+
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm8
+	movdqa	%xmm1,	%xmm9
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm8
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm9
+	movdqa	%xmm2,	%xmm10
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm0,	%xmm8
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm0		# 0x10...
+	movdqa	%xmm3,	%xmm11
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm1,	%xmm9
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm1		# 0x20...
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm10
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm11
+	movdqa	%xmm0,	%xmm12
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm2,	%xmm10
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm2		# 0x40...
+	movdqa	%xmm1,	%xmm13
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm3,	%xmm11
+	psllq	\$4,	%xmm3		# 0x80...
+
+	movdqa	%xmm2,	%xmm14
+	movdqa	%xmm3,	%xmm15
+	 pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm8		# "pnot"
+	 pxor	%xmm5,	%xmm9
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm12
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm13
+	 movdqa	%xmm8, 0x00($out)	# write bit-sliced round key
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm0,	%xmm12
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm0		# 0x01...
+	 movdqa	%xmm9, 0x10($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm1,	%xmm13
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm1		# 0x02...
+	 lea	0x10($inp), $inp
+
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm14
+	pand	%xmm6,	%xmm15
+	 movdqa	%xmm10, 0x20($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm2,	%xmm14
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm2		# 0x04...
+	 movdqa	%xmm11, 0x30($out)
+	pcmpeqb	%xmm3,	%xmm15
+	psrlq	\$4,	%xmm3		# 0x08...
+	 movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load next round key
+
+	pxor	%xmm5, %xmm13		# "pnot"
+	pxor	%xmm5, %xmm14
+	movdqa	%xmm12, 0x40($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm13, 0x50($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm14, 0x60($out)
+	movdqa	%xmm15, 0x70($out)
 	lea	0x80($out),$out
-	movdqu	($inp), %xmm6		# load next round key
 	dec	$rounds
 	jnz	.Lkey_loop
 
-	movdqa	0x70($const), %xmm7	# .L63
+	movdqa	0x50($const), %xmm7	# .L63
 	#movdqa	%xmm6, ($out)		# don't save last round key
 	ret
 .size	_bsaes_key_convert,.-_bsaes_key_convert
@@ -2800,14 +2837,8 @@ _bsaes_const:
 	.quad	0x0504070600030201, 0x0f0e0d0c0a09080b
 .LSRM0:
 	.quad	0x0304090e00050a0f, 0x01060b0c0207080d
-.LM0:
-	.quad	0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d
 .LM0SR:
 	.quad	0x0a0e02060f03070b, 0x0004080c05090d01
-.LNOT:		# magic constants
-	.quad	0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff
-.L63:
-	.quad	0x6363636363636363, 0x6363636363636363
 .LSWPUP:	# byte-swap upper dword
 	.quad	0x0706050403020100, 0x0c0d0e0f0b0a0908
 .LSWPUPM0SR:
@@ -2830,6 +2861,15 @@ _bsaes_const:
 	.quad	0x0000000000000000, 0x0000000800000000
 .Lxts_magic:
 	.long	0x87,0,1,0
+.Lmasks:
+	.quad	0x0101010101010101, 0x0101010101010101
+	.quad	0x0202020202020202, 0x0202020202020202
+	.quad	0x0404040404040404, 0x0404040404040404
+	.quad	0x0808080808080808, 0x0808080808080808
+.LM0:
+	.quad	0x02060a0e03070b0f, 0x0004080c0105090d
+.L63:
+	.quad	0x6363636363636363, 0x6363636363636363
 .asciz	"Bit-sliced AES for x86_64/SSSE3, Emilia Käsper, Peter Schwabe, Andy Polyakov"
 .align	64
 .size	_bsaes_const,.-_bsaes_const

crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86.pl

@@ -843,6 +843,8 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0;		# decryption sbox final output
 	&mov	($out,&wparam(1));		# out
 	&mov	($round,&wparam(2));		# len
 	&mov	($key,&wparam(3));		# key
+	&sub	($round,16);
+	&jc	(&label("cbc_abort"));
 	&lea	($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
 	&mov	($const,&wparam(4));		# ivp
 	&and	($base,-16);
@@ -853,7 +855,6 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0;		# decryption sbox final output
 	&mov	(&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
 
 	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$out);		# save out
-	&sub	($round,16);
 	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$key)		# save key
 	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$const);		# save ivp
 	&mov	($out,$round);			# $out works as $len
@@ -896,6 +897,7 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0;		# decryption sbox final output
 	&mov	($base,&DWP(8,"esp"));		# restore ivp
 	&mov	("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
 	&movdqu	(&QWP(0,$base),"xmm1");		# write IV
+&set_label("cbc_abort");
 &function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
 
 &asm_finish();

crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-x86_64.pl

@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
 	pshufb  %xmm2,  %xmm4	# 4 = sbou
 	pxor	%xmm0,  %xmm4	# 4 = sb1u + k
 	movdqa	0x70(%r10), %xmm0	# 0 : sbot
-	movdqa	.Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd(%r11), %xmm2
+	movdqa	-0x160(%r11), %xmm2	# .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160
 	pshufb  %xmm3,	%xmm0	# 0 = sb1t
 	pxor	%xmm4,	%xmm0	# 0 = A
 	pshufb	%xmm2,	%xmm0
@@ -869,6 +869,8 @@ ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
 ___
 ($len,$key)=($key,$len);
 $code.=<<___;
+	sub	\$16,$len
+	jc	.Lcbc_abort
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
 	lea	-0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -887,7 +889,6 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	movdqu	($ivp),%xmm6		# load IV
 	sub	$inp,$out
-	sub	\$16,$len
 	call	_vpaes_preheat
 	cmp	\$0,${enc}d
 	je	.Lcbc_dec_loop
@@ -932,6 +933,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
 .Lcbc_epilogue:
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
+.Lcbc_abort:
 	ret
 .size	${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
 ___

crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 	BUF_MEM *b;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	int i;
-	int ret=-1;
 	ASN1_const_CTX c;
-	int want=HEADER_SIZE;
+	size_t want=HEADER_SIZE;
 	int eos=0;
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64)
-	/* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */
-	long off=0;
-#else
-	int off=0;
-#endif
-	int len=0;
+	size_t off=0;
+	size_t len=0;
 
 	b=BUF_MEM_new();
 	if (b == NULL)
@@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			want-=(len-off);
 
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
+			if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 				{
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 				goto err;
@@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 				goto err;
 				}
 			if (i > 0)
+				{
+				if (len+i < len)
+					{
+					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+					goto err;
+					}
 				len+=i;
+				}
 			}
 		/* else data already loaded */
 
@@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			/* no data body so go round again */
 			eos++;
+			if (eos < 0)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			want=HEADER_SIZE;
 			}
 		else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC))
@@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 		else 
 			{
 			/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
-			want=(int)c.slen;
+			want=c.slen;
 			if (want > (len-off))
 				{
 				want-=(len-off);
+				if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
+					len+want < len)
+						{
+						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+						goto err;
+						}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 					{
 					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 						    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
 						goto err;
 						}
+					/* This can't overflow because
+					 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
 					len+=i;
-					want -= i;
+					want-=i;
 					}
 				}
-			off+=(int)c.slen;
+			if (off + c.slen < off)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			off+=c.slen;
 			if (eos <= 0)
 				{
 				break;
@@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (off > INT_MAX)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	*pb = b;
 	return off;
 err:
 	if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
-	return(ret);
+	return -1;
 	}

crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c

@@ -446,11 +446,11 @@ static int asn1_print_fsname(BIO *out, int indent,
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-static int asn1_print_boolean_ctx(BIO *out, const int bool,
+static int asn1_print_boolean_ctx(BIO *out, int boolval,
 							const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
 	{
 	const char *str;
-	switch (bool)
+	switch (boolval)
 		{
 		case -1:
 		str = "BOOL ABSENT";
@@ -574,10 +574,10 @@ static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld,
 		{
 		case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
 			{
-			int bool = *(int *)fld;
-			if (bool == -1)
-				bool = it->size;
-			ret = asn1_print_boolean_ctx(out, bool, pctx);
+			int boolval = *(int *)fld;
+			if (boolval == -1)
+				boolval = it->size;
+			ret = asn1_print_boolean_ctx(out, boolval, pctx);
 			}
 		break;
 

crypto/bio/b_sock.c

@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int s, int on)
 #endif
 	return(ret == 0);
 	}
-#endif
 
 int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode)
 	{
@@ -973,3 +972,4 @@ int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode)
 #endif
 	return(ret == 0);
 	}
+#endif

crypto/bio/bio_lib.c

@@ -521,40 +521,40 @@ void BIO_free_all(BIO *bio)
 
 BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
 	{
-	BIO *ret=NULL,*eoc=NULL,*bio,*new;
+	BIO *ret=NULL,*eoc=NULL,*bio,*new_bio;
 
 	for (bio=in; bio != NULL; bio=bio->next_bio)
 		{
-		if ((new=BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL) goto err;
-		new->callback=bio->callback;
-		new->cb_arg=bio->cb_arg;
-		new->init=bio->init;
-		new->shutdown=bio->shutdown;
-		new->flags=bio->flags;
+		if ((new_bio=BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL) goto err;
+		new_bio->callback=bio->callback;
+		new_bio->cb_arg=bio->cb_arg;
+		new_bio->init=bio->init;
+		new_bio->shutdown=bio->shutdown;
+		new_bio->flags=bio->flags;
 
 		/* This will let SSL_s_sock() work with stdin/stdout */
-		new->num=bio->num;
+		new_bio->num=bio->num;
 
-		if (!BIO_dup_state(bio,(char *)new))
+		if (!BIO_dup_state(bio,(char *)new_bio))
 			{
-			BIO_free(new);
+			BIO_free(new_bio);
 			goto err;
 			}
 
 		/* copy app data */
-		if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new->ex_data,
+		if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data,
 					&bio->ex_data))
 			goto err;
 
 		if (ret == NULL)
 			{
-			eoc=new;
+			eoc=new_bio;
 			ret=eoc;
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			BIO_push(eoc,new);
-			eoc=new;
+			BIO_push(eoc,new_bio);
+			eoc=new_bio;
 			}
 		}
 	return(ret);

crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c

@@ -628,8 +628,11 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
 			}
 		if (ubits==vbits)
 			{
-			bn_correct_top(u);
-			ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
+			BN_ULONG ul;
+			int utop = (ubits-1)/BN_BITS2;
+
+			while ((ul=udp[utop])==0 && utop) utop--;
+			ubits = utop*BN_BITS2 + BN_num_bits_word(ul);
 			}
 		}
 	bn_correct_top(b);

crypto/buffer/buffer.c

@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 
+/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
+ * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures
+ * that the result fits in an int. */
+#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
+
 BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *ret;
@@ -105,6 +110,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -142,6 +153,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);

crypto/cmac/cmac.c

@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen,
 			return 0;
 		if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx->cctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, zero_iv))
 			return 0;
+		memset(ctx->tbl, 0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx->cctx));
+		ctx->nlast_block = 0;
 		return 1;
 		}
 	/* Initialiase context */

crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c

@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ typedef struct
     } aux;
     } EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1;
 
+#define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH	((size_t)-1)
+
 #if	defined(AES_ASM) &&	( \
 	defined(__x86_64)	|| defined(__x86_64__)	|| \
 	defined(_M_AMD64)	|| defined(_M_X64)	|| \
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
 	key->tail = key->head;
 	key->md   = key->head;
 
-	key->payload_length = 0;
+	key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
 
 	return ret<0?0:1;
 	}
@@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 	if (len%AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0;
 
 	if (ctx->encrypt) {
-		if (plen==0)
+		if (plen==NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH)
 			plen = len;
 		else if (len!=((plen+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH+AES_BLOCK_SIZE)&-AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
 			return 0;
@@ -271,7 +273,7 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 		}
 	}
 
-	key->payload_length = 0;
+	key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
 
 	return 1;
 	}

crypto/evp/e_rc4_hmac_md5.c

@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ typedef struct
     size_t		payload_length;
     } EVP_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
 
+#define NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH	((size_t)-1)
+
 void rc4_md5_enc (RC4_KEY *key, const void *in0, void *out,
 		MD5_CTX *ctx,const void *inp,size_t blocks);
 
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
 	key->tail = key->head;
 	key->md   = key->head;
 
-	key->payload_length = 0;
+	key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
 
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -101,8 +103,7 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
 #if	!defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) &&	( \
 	defined(__x86_64)	|| defined(__x86_64__)	|| \
 	defined(_M_AMD64)	|| defined(_M_X64)	|| \
-	defined(__INTEL__)		) && \
-	!(defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))
+	defined(__INTEL__)		)
 #define	STITCHED_CALL
 #endif
 
@@ -123,10 +124,10 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 #endif
 	size_t	plen = key->payload_length;
 
-	if (plen && len!=(plen+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)) return 0;
+	if (plen!=NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH && len!=(plen+MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)) return 0;
 
 	if (ctx->encrypt) {
-		if (plen==0) plen = len;
+		if (plen==NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) plen = len;
 #if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
 		/* cipher has to "fall behind" */
 		if (rc4_off>md5_off) md5_off+=MD5_CBLOCK;
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 #endif
 		/* decrypt HMAC at once */
 		RC4(&key->ks,len-rc4_off,in+rc4_off,out+rc4_off);
-		if (plen) {	/* "TLS" mode of operation */
+		if (plen!=NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH) {	/* "TLS" mode of operation */
 			MD5_Update(&key->md,out+md5_off,plen-md5_off);
 
 			/* calculate HMAC and verify it */
@@ -207,7 +208,7 @@ static int rc4_hmac_md5_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 		}
 	}
 
-	key->payload_length = 0;
+	key->payload_length = NO_PAYLOAD_LENGTH;
 
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -288,6 +289,8 @@ static EVP_CIPHER r4_hmac_md5_cipher=
 
 const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_rc4_hmac_md5(void)
 	{
-	return(&r4_hmac_md5_cipher);
+	extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+	/* RC4_CHAR flag ------------vvvvv */
+	return(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0]&(1<<20) ? NULL : &r4_hmac_md5_cipher);
 	}
 #endif

crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *imp
 #endif
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-		return FIPS_cipherinit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, enc);
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			return FIPS_cipherinit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, enc);
 #else
 		ctx->cipher=cipher;
 		if (ctx->cipher->ctx_size)
@@ -207,7 +208,8 @@ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *imp
 skip_to_init:
 #endif
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	return FIPS_cipherinit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, enc);
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		return FIPS_cipherinit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, enc);
 #else
 	/* we assume block size is a power of 2 in *cryptUpdate */
 	OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->block_size == 1

crypto/evp/p5_crpt.c

@@ -138,5 +138,6 @@ int PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
 	OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
 	rv = 1;
 	err:
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	return rv;
 }

crypto/mem.c

@@ -363,6 +363,10 @@ void *CRYPTO_realloc_clean(void *str, int old_len, int num, const char *file,
 
 	if (num <= 0) return NULL;
 
+	/* We don't support shrinking the buffer. Note the memcpy that copies
+	 * |old_len| bytes to the new buffer, below. */
+	if (num < old_len) return NULL;
+
 	if (realloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		realloc_debug_func(str, NULL, num, file, line, 0);
 	ret=malloc_ex_func(num,file,line);

crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if(!$softonly);
 .align	32
 .Lsoft_ghash:
 ___
-$cdoe.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/);
+$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/);
 	llgfr	$len,$len
 ___
 $code.=<<___;

crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u8;
 #  define BSWAP4(x) ({	u32 ret=(x);			\
 			asm ("bswapl %0"		\
 			: "+r"(ret));	ret;		})
-# elif (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__))
+# elif (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY)
 #  define BSWAP8(x) ({	u32 lo=(u64)(x)>>32,hi=(x);	\
 			asm ("bswapl %0; bswapl %1"	\
 			: "+r"(hi),"+r"(lo));		\

crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000100fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000101fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1-fips 14 Mar 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1a-fips 19 Apr 2012"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 Mar 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.1a 19 Apr 2012"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

crypto/perlasm/x86masm.pl

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ sub ::generic
     # fix hexadecimal constants
     for (@arg) { s/(?<![\w\$\.])0x([0-9a-f]+)/0$1h/oi; }
 
-    if ($opcode =~ /lea/ && @arg[1] =~ s/.*PTR\s+([^\[]+)$/$1/)	# no []
+    if ($opcode =~ /lea/ && @arg[1] =~ s/.*PTR\s+(\(.*\))$/OFFSET $1/)	# no []
     {	$opcode="mov";	}
     elsif ($opcode !~ /movq/)
     {	# fix xmm references

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c

@@ -430,6 +430,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 	STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk=NULL;
 	STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
 	PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
+       unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+       int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
 
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
 	p7->state=PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -507,8 +509,6 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 		int max;
 		X509_OBJECT ret;
 #endif
-		unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
-		int eklen, tkeylen;
 
 		if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
 			{
@@ -609,11 +609,13 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 			{
 			OPENSSL_cleanse(ek,eklen);
 			OPENSSL_free(ek);
+                       ek = NULL;
 			}
 		if (tkey)
 			{
 			OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey,tkeylen);
 			OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+                       tkey = NULL;
 			}
 
 		if (out == NULL)
@@ -656,6 +658,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 	if (0)
 		{
 err:
+               if (ek)
+                       {
+                       OPENSSL_cleanse(ek,eklen);
+                       OPENSSL_free(ek);
+                       }
+               if (tkey)
+                       {
+                       OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey,tkeylen);
+                       OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+                       }
 		if (out != NULL) BIO_free_all(out);
 		if (btmp != NULL) BIO_free_all(btmp);
 		if (etmp != NULL) BIO_free_all(etmp);

crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-s390x.pl

@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ $ikey="%r7";
 $iinp="%r8";
 
 $code.=<<___;
-.globl	RC4_set_key
-.type	RC4_set_key,\@function
+.globl	private_RC4_set_key
+.type	private_RC4_set_key,\@function
 .align	64
-RC4_set_key:
+private_RC4_set_key:
 	stm${g}	%r6,%r8,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	lhi	$cnt,256
 	la	$idx,0(%r0)
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ RC4_set_key:
 .Ldone:
 	lm${g}	%r6,%r8,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
 	br	$rp
-.size	RC4_set_key,.-RC4_set_key
+.size	private_RC4_set_key,.-private_RC4_set_key
 
 ___
 }

crypto/x509/x509_lu.c

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void X509_LOOKUP_free(X509_LOOKUP *ctx)
 	if (ctx == NULL) return;
 	if (	(ctx->method != NULL) &&
 		(ctx->method->free != NULL))
-		ctx->method->free(ctx);
+		(*ctx->method->free)(ctx);
 	OPENSSL_free(ctx);
 	}
 

doc/crypto/EVP_DigestInit.pod

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ EVP_MD_CTX_init, EVP_MD_CTX_create, EVP_DigestInit_ex, EVP_DigestUpdate,
 EVP_DigestFinal_ex, EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup, EVP_MD_CTX_destroy, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE,
 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex, EVP_MD_CTX_copy, EVP_MD_type, EVP_MD_pkey_type, EVP_MD_size,
 EVP_MD_block_size, EVP_MD_CTX_md, EVP_MD_CTX_size, EVP_MD_CTX_block_size, EVP_MD_CTX_type,
-EVP_md_null, EVP_md2, EVP_md5, EVP_sha, EVP_sha1, EVP_dss, EVP_dss1, EVP_mdc2,
+EVP_md_null, EVP_md2, EVP_md5, EVP_sha, EVP_sha1, EVP_sha224, EVP_sha256,
+EVP_sha384, EVP_sha512, EVP_dss, EVP_dss1, EVP_mdc2,
 EVP_ripemd160, EVP_get_digestbyname, EVP_get_digestbynid, EVP_get_digestbyobj -
 EVP digest routines
 
@@ -33,16 +34,15 @@ EVP digest routines
 
  int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out,EVP_MD_CTX *in);  
 
- #define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE (16+20) /* The SSLv3 md5+sha1 type */
+ #define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE 64	/* SHA512 */
 
+ int EVP_MD_type(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md);	
+ int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+ int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md);
 
- #define EVP_MD_type(e)			((e)->type)
- #define EVP_MD_pkey_type(e)		((e)->pkey_type)
- #define EVP_MD_size(e)			((e)->md_size)
- #define EVP_MD_block_size(e)		((e)->block_size)
-
- #define EVP_MD_CTX_md(e)		(e)->digest)
- #define EVP_MD_CTX_size(e)		EVP_MD_size((e)->digest)
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+ #define EVP_MD_CTX_size(e)		EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e))
  #define EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(e)	EVP_MD_block_size((e)->digest)
  #define EVP_MD_CTX_type(e)		EVP_MD_type((e)->digest)
 
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ EVP digest routines
  const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void);
  const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void);
 
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha224(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha256(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha384(void);
+ const EVP_MD *EVP_sha512(void);
+
  const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name);
  #define EVP_get_digestbynid(a) EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a))
  #define EVP_get_digestbyobj(a) EVP_get_digestbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a))
@@ -124,12 +129,14 @@ B<EVP_MD_CTX>.
 
 EVP_MD_pkey_type() returns the NID of the public key signing algorithm associated
 with this digest. For example EVP_sha1() is associated with RSA so this will
-return B<NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption>. This "link" between digests and signature
-algorithms may not be retained in future versions of OpenSSL.
+return B<NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption>. Since digests and signature algorithms
+are no longer linked this function is only retained for compatibility
+reasons.
 
-EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha(), EVP_sha1(), EVP_mdc2() and EVP_ripemd160()
-return B<EVP_MD> structures for the MD2, MD5, SHA, SHA1, MDC2 and RIPEMD160 digest
-algorithms respectively. The associated signature algorithm is RSA in each case.
+EVP_md2(), EVP_md5(), EVP_sha(), EVP_sha1(), EVP_sha224(), EVP_sha256(),
+EVP_sha384(), EVP_sha512(), EVP_mdc2() and EVP_ripemd160() return B<EVP_MD>
+structures for the MD2, MD5, SHA, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, MDC2
+and RIPEMD160 digest algorithms respectively. 
 
 EVP_dss() and EVP_dss1() return B<EVP_MD> structures for SHA and SHA1 digest
 algorithms but using DSS (DSA) for the signature algorithm. Note: there is 
@@ -171,8 +178,8 @@ The B<EVP> interface to message digests should almost always be used in
 preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes
 transparent to the digest used and much more flexible.
 
-SHA1 is the digest of choice for new applications. The other digest algorithms
-are still in common use.
+New applications should use the SHA2 digest algorithms such as SHA256. 
+The other digest algorithms are still in common use.
 
 For most applications the B<impl> parameter to EVP_DigestInit_ex() will be
 set to NULL to use the default digest implementation.
@@ -187,6 +194,19 @@ implementations of digests to be specified.
 In OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if digest contexts are not cleaned up after use
 memory leaks will occur. 
 
+Stack allocation of EVP_MD_CTX structures is common, for example:
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+This will cause binary compatibility issues if the size of EVP_MD_CTX
+structure changes (this will only happen with a major release of OpenSSL).
+Applications wishing to avoid this should use EVP_MD_CTX_create() instead:
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
+ mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+
+
 =head1 EXAMPLE
 
 This example digests the data "Test Message\n" and "Hello World\n", using the
@@ -197,7 +217,7 @@ digest name passed on the command line.
 
  main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
- EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
  const EVP_MD *md;
  char mess1[] = "Test Message\n";
  char mess2[] = "Hello World\n";
@@ -218,12 +238,12 @@ digest name passed on the command line.
 	exit(1);
  }
 
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdctx);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mdctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, mess1, strlen(mess1));
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, mess2, strlen(mess2));
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdctx, md_value, &md_len);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdctx);
+ mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, mess1, strlen(mess1));
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, mess2, strlen(mess2));
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, md_value, &md_len);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(mdctx);
 
  printf("Digest is: ");
  for(i = 0; i < md_len; i++) printf("%02x", md_value[i]);

openssl.spec

@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@
 %define libmaj 1
 %define libmin 0
 %define librel 1
-#%define librev a
+%define librev a
 Release: 1
 
 %define openssldir /var/ssl
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}%{librev}
+#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
+Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}%{librev}
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 Copyright: Freely distributable
 Group: System Environment/Libraries

ssl/bio_ssl.c

@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ err:
 
 BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
 	BIO *ret=NULL,*con=NULL,*ssl=NULL;
 
 	if ((con=BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL)
@@ -549,6 +550,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 	return(ret);
 err:
 	if (con != NULL) BIO_free(con);
+#endif
 	return(NULL);
 	}
 

ssl/d1_lib.c

@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
 	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
 		{
 		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
 		return -1;
 		}
 

ssl/d1_srvr.c

@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		p=s->s3->server_random;
 		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
 		l2n(Time,p);
-		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4);
 		/* Do the message type and length last */
 		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 

ssl/s23_clnt.c

@@ -287,12 +287,14 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
 	if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
 		ssl2_compat = 0;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT
 	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
 		{
 		version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
 		}
-	else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+	else
+#endif
+	if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
 		{
 		version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
 		}
@@ -467,6 +469,15 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
 				return -1;
 				}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
+			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
+			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
+			 */
+			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
 			s2n(i,p);
 			p+=i;
 
@@ -521,8 +532,13 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			d=buf;
 			*(d++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
 			*(d++) = version_major;
-			*(d++) = version_minor; /* arguably we should send the *lowest* suported version here
-			                         * (indicating, e.g., TLS 1.0 in "SSL 3.0 format") */
+			/* Some servers hang if we use long client hellos
+			 * and a record number > TLS 1.0.
+			 */
+			if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+				*(d++) = 1;
+			else
+				*(d++) = version_minor;
 			s2n((int)l,d);
 
 			/* number of bytes to write */

ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -755,6 +755,15 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
 			goto err;
 			}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
+			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
+			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
+			 */
+			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
 		s2n(i,p);
 		p+=i;
 

ssl/s3_lib.c

@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aRSA,
 	SSL_eNULL,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_SSLV3,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_STRONG_NONE|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	0,
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aRSA,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aRSA,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
@@ -1129,7 +1129,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aDSS,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aRSA,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
@@ -1411,7 +1411,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
@@ -1427,7 +1427,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aDH,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
@@ -1443,7 +1443,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aDSS,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
@@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aRSA,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,
@@ -1475,7 +1475,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aNULL,
 	SSL_AES128,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	128,
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[]={
 	SSL_aNULL,
 	SSL_AES256,
 	SSL_SHA256,
-	SSL_TLSV1,
+	SSL_TLSV1_2,
 	SSL_NOT_EXP|SSL_HIGH|SSL_FIPS,
 	SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF,
 	256,

ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -664,10 +664,14 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
 		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
 		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
+		{
+#if 1
+		clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1;	/* must be AEAD cipher */
+#else
 		clear=1;
-
-	if (clear)
+#endif
 		mac_size=0;
+		}
 	else
 		{
 		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
@@ -736,7 +740,14 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 	wr->type=type;
 
 	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
-	*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+	/* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
+	 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
+	 */
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
+				&& TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+		*(p++) = 0x1;
+	else
+		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 
 	/* field where we are to write out packet length */
 	plen=p; 

ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -2930,7 +2930,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
 		{
 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-		if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+		if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
 			{
 			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);

ssl/ssl.h

@@ -2058,6 +2058,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT				 246
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF			 295
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD			 247
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM			 316
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO			 248
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT				 249
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC					 250

ssl/ssl_ciph.c

@@ -616,18 +616,19 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
 		{
 		const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
 
-		if	(s->ssl_version >= TLS1_VERSION &&
-			 c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
+		if (s->ssl_version>>8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
+		    s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+			return 1;
+
+		if	(c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 &&
 			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 &&
 			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5")))
 			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
-		else if (s->ssl_version >= TLS1_VERSION &&
-			 c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
+		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 &&
 			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
 			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
 			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;
-		else if (s->ssl_version >= TLS1_VERSION &&
-			 c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
+		else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 &&
 			 c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 &&
 			 (evp=EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1")))
 			*enc = evp, *md = NULL;

ssl/ssl_err.c

@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT),	"DTLS1_ACCEPT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF),	"DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD),	"DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM),	"DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO),	"DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT),	"DTLS1_CONNECT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC),	"DTLS1_ENC"},

ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 		skip_ext:
 
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
 		{
 		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
 			return NULL; 

util/cygwin.sh

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ CONFIG_OPTIONS="--prefix=/usr shared zlib no-idea no-rc5"
 INSTALL_PREFIX=/tmp/install/INSTALL
 
 VERSION=
+SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=
 SUBVERSION=$1
 
 function cleanup()
@@ -28,6 +29,13 @@ function get_openssl_version()
     echo "       Check value of variable VERSION in Makefile."
     exit 1
   fi
+  eval `grep '^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=' Makefile`
+  if [ -z "${SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER}" ]
+  then
+    echo "Error: Couldn't retrieve OpenSSL shared lib version from Makefile."
+    echo " Check value of variable SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER in Makefile."
+    exit 1
+  fi
 }
 
 function base_install()
@@ -124,7 +132,7 @@ strip usr/bin/*.exe usr/bin/*.dll usr/lib/engines/*.so
 chmod u-w usr/lib/engines/*.so
 
 # Runtime package
-tar cjf libopenssl${VERSION//[!0-9]/}-${VERSION}-${SUBVERSION}.tar.bz2 \
+tar cjf libopenssl${SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER//[!0-9]/}-${VERSION}-${SUBVERSION}.tar.bz2 \
      usr/bin/cyg*dll
 # Base package
 find etc usr/bin/openssl.exe usr/bin/c_rehash usr/lib/engines usr/share/doc \
@@ -139,7 +147,7 @@ tar cjfT openssl-devel-${VERSION}-${SUBVERSION}.tar.bz2 -
 
 ls -l openssl-${VERSION}-${SUBVERSION}.tar.bz2
 ls -l openssl-devel-${VERSION}-${SUBVERSION}.tar.bz2
-ls -l libopenssl${VERSION//[!0-9]/}-${VERSION}-${SUBVERSION}.tar.bz2
+ls -l libopenssl${SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER//[!0-9]/}-${VERSION}-${SUBVERSION}.tar.bz2
 
 cleanup