With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.
Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.
User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2105
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-2176
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.
Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.
The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()
i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.
The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.
Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.
It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.
CVE-2016-2106
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f3582139fbb259a1c3cbb0a25236500a409bf26)
If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake,
but simply omit/skip that extension.
Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo
registration.
Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the
same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 77076dc944f76e821e4eae3a6563b853ce00c0ed)
Conflicts:
crypto/x509/x509_err.c
crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b33d1141b6dcce947708b984c5e9e91dad3d675d)
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 295f3a24919157e2f9021d0b1709353710ad63db)
The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function
properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers
(e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption
anyway.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d78df5dfd650e6de159a19a033513481064644f5)
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.
Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 446ba8de9af9aa4fa3debc7c76a38f4efed47a62)
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 79356a83b78a2d936dcd022847465d9ebf6c67b1)
IBM argues that in certain scenarios capability query is really
expensive. At the same time it's asserted that query results can
be safely cached, because disabling CPACF is incompatible with
reboot-free operation.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 670ad0fbf6ebcf113e278d8174081a7e2d2fa44c)
Backport of commits:
79c7f74d6cefd5d32fa20e69195ad3de834ce065
bdcd660e33710079b495cf5cc6a1aaa5d2dcd317
from master.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in
chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents
small files allocating excessive amounts of data.
CVE-2016-2109
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c62981390d6cf9e3d612c489b8b77c2913b25807)
As it turns out branch hints grew as kind of a misconception. In
addition their interpretation by GNU assembler is affected by
assembler flags and can end up with opposite meaning on different
processors. As we have to loose quite a lot on misinterprerations,
especially on newer processors, we just omit them altogether.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20b88bb160865b0c2998056fe841b1cbacd6d4c7)
Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message
contains excess data.
The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side
only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would
be needed to have a significant impact.
This was found by libFuzzer.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
* Perform ALPN after the SNI callback; the SSL_CTX may change due to
that processing
* Add flags to indicate that we actually sent ALPN, to properly error
out if unexpectedly received.
* document ALPN functions
* unit tests
Backport of commit 817cd0d52f0462039d1fe60462150be7f59d2002
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code,
although it was suppressing its use.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur.
Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed
to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it
anyway.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffe9150b1508a0ffc9e724f975691f24eb045c05)
If there is cause to think LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32 and LD_PRELOAD_32 are
appropriate variables to touch, do so. Otherwise, touch the usual
LD_LIBRARY_PATH and LD_PRELOAD. This covers for older installations
that don't have a mix of 32-bit and 64-bit libs.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a772e9d01a81dae132cb03107292b3ecc725e5af)
Submitted by Erik Forsberg <erik@efca.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86e75432835ec3ef7700a7103f9847e3c3d4350d)
Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit adc4f1fc25b2cac90076f1e1695b05b7aeeae501)
Not all assemblers of "gas" flavour handle binary constants, e.g.
seasoned MacOS Xcode doesn't, so give them a hand.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e42e3ff9cde43830555549fdafa2a8b37b9485b)
PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an
integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption.
However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not
normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not
significant.
Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be
more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5f57abe2b150139b8b057313d52b1fe8f126c952)
and reorganize/harmonize post-conditions.
Additional hardening following on from CVE-2016-0702
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
At the same time remove miniscule bias in final subtraction.
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even with
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to be 4% for Sandy
Bridge and 7% on Broadwell.
CVE-2016-0702
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
Performance penalty is 2% on Linux and 5% on Windows.
CVE-2016-0702
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%.
CVE-2016-0702
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
SSLv2 should be off by default. You can only turn it on if you have called
SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or
SSL_clear_options(SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2). You should not be able to inadvertantly
turn it on again via SSL_CONF without having done that first.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not
configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if
"enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the
version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either
of:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
or
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client
or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search
key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit
EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
Mitigation for CVE-2016-0800
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using
an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|.
For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This leaves ret->d as NULL leading
to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this
case memory is allocated to ret->d, but it is insufficiently sized
leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn.
This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever
called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is
anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
All OpenSSL internal usage of this function uses data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be a rare.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
CVE-2016-0797
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Even though AVX support was added in GAS 2.19 vpclmulqdq was apparently
added in 2.20.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d3cdab17362b9ab0f1a0525b736c862937a9cd2f)
This reverts commit 6656ba7152dfe4bba865e327dd362ea08544aa80.
This broke existing engines that didn't properly implement the sign and verify
functions.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
MR: #2077
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string
in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length
of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to
an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of
a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also
occur.
These issues will only occur on certain platforms where sizeof(size_t) >
sizeof(int). E.g. many 64 bit systems. The first issue may mask the second
issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
as command line arguments.
Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
CVE-2016-0799
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
way of distinguishing these two cases.
Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
300 bytes per connection.
Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure
a seed are not vulnerable.
In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.
To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.
Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However,
note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the
indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular,
computations are currently not carried out in constant time.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This is a partial revert of commit c8491de39 ("GH354: Memory leak fixes"),
which was cherry-picked from commit 55500ea7c in OpenSSL 1.1.
That commit introduced a change in behaviour which is a regression for
software implementing Microsoft Authenticode — which requires a PKCS#7
signature to be validated against explicit external data, even though
it's a non-detached signature with its own embedded data.
The is fixed differently in OpenSSL 1.1 by commit 6b2ebe433 ("Add
PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT flag"), but that approach isn't viable in the
1.0.2 stable branch, so just comment the offending check back out again.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Building for the Cygwin distro requires to be able to build debuginfo
files. This in turn requires to build object files without stripping.
The stripping is performed by the next step after building which creates
the debuginfo files.
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 42b8f1427a8cdf320e51374a5fbfefc74bec0519)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Fix double free bug when parsing malformed DSA private keys.
Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.
CVE-2016-0705
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
It's never problem if CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt is called from EVP, because
buffer in question is always aligned within EVP_CIPHER_CTX structure.
RT#4218
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e4bbeb49fb6522d858703201b5adee9611e7b7b)
Change the default keysize to 2048 bits, and the minimum to 512 bits.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a76265574398944d686d2d0de9bacca162f555ca)
Trouble is that LINK variable assignment in make-file interferes with
LINK environment variable, which can be used to modify Microsoft's
LINK.EXE behaviour.
RT#4289
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d44bb1c31ca00f4359090daa15659c0dd1a08f0d)
Resolved conflicts:
util/pl/VC-32.pl
Previous commit f73c737c7 attempted to "fix" a problem with the way
SSL_shutdown() behaved whilst in mid-handshake. The original behaviour had
SSL_shutdown() return immediately having taken no action if called mid-
handshake with a return value of 1 (meaning everything was shutdown
successfully). In fact the shutdown has not been successful.
Commit f73c737c7 changed that to send a close_notify anyway and then
return. This seems to be causing some problems for some applications so
perhaps a better (much simpler) approach is revert to the previous
behaviour (no attempt at a shutdown), but return -1 (meaning the shutdown
was not successful).
This also fixes a bug where SSL_shutdown always returns 0 when shutdown
*very* early in the handshake (i.e. we are still using SSLv23_method).
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Also in X509_verify_cert() avoid using "i" not only as a loop
counter, but also as a trust outcome and as an error ordinal.
Finally, make sure that all "goto end" jumps return an error, with
"end" renamed to "err" accordingly.
[ The 1.1.0 version of X509_verify_cert() is major rewrite,
which addresses these issues in a more systemic way. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Also fix option processing in pkeyutl to allow use of (formerly)
"out-of-order" switches that were needless implementation limitations.
RT2018
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53619f9f40740ae8b256998574758aa191635db8)
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ab31975bacb9c907261088937d3aa4102e3af84)
Can't hurt and seems to prevent problems from some over-aggressive
(LTO?) compilers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 98ab57644f44d2d83595c2d0f69138a284d6096b)
Add tests for have_precompute_mult for the optimised curves (nistp224,
nistp256 and nistp521) if present
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ce4e7e605577cb5818de068e2c6da60901cddba)
During precomputation if the group given is well known then we memcpy a
well known precomputation. However we go the wrong label in the code and
don't store the data properly. Consequently if we call have_precompute_mult
the data isn't there and we return 0.
RT#3600
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 615614c8862fb89dcf1551a4e113be0789dddf5f)
The function DH_check_pub_key() was missing some return value checks in
some calls to BN functions.
RT#4278
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5a12207eccfd814bde68b880a96910dfa25f164)
A new return value for DH_check_pub_key was recently added:
DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID. As this is a flag which can be ORed with other
return values it should have been set to the value 4 not 3.
RT#4278
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb389fe80462e20daba30835a9e86354451bd14f)
Following on from the previous commit, add a test to ensure that
DH_compute_key correctly fails if passed a bad y such that:
y^q (mod p) != 1
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.
CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 2 or 2)
Issue reported by Antonio Sanso
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC
5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that
are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's
private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete
multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same DH exponent.
A simple mitigation is to ensure that y^q (mod p) == 1
CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 1 of 2)
Issue reported by Antonio Sanso.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Based on patch by: Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>
CVE-2015-3197
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Calling SSL_shutdown while in init previously gave a "1" response, meaning
everything was successfully closed down (even though it wasn't). Better is
to send our close_notify, but fail when trying to receive one.
The problem with doing a shutdown while in the middle of a handshake is
that once our close_notify is sent we shouldn't really do anything else
(including process handshake/CCS messages) until we've received a
close_notify back from the peer. However the peer might send a CCS before
acting on our close_notify - so we won't be able to read it because we're
not acting on CCS messages!
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
For BSD systems, Configure adds a shared_ldflags including a reference
to the Makefile variable LIBRPATH, but since it must be passed down to
Makefile.shared, care must be taken so the value of LIBRPATH doesn't
get expanded too early, or it ends up giving an empty string.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c64879d3f3cc4c7f1c436a9fe3bd109847a23629)
- bugfix: should not treat '--' as invalid domain substring.
- '-' should not be the first letter of a domain
Signed-off-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Error in the definition of the macro SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist,
slistlen): the third parameter 'slistlen' not used in the substitution
code; used 'clistlen' instead. As a result of this, compilation error
occurs when any application uses this macro.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
It makes no sense to call the OCSP status callback if we are resuming a
session because no certificates will be sent.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
If a server sends the status_request extension then it may choose
to send the CertificateStatus message. However this is optional.
We were treating it as mandatory and the connection was failing.
Thanks to BoringSSL for reporting this issue.
RT#4120
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Found by clang scan-build.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
RT: #4184, MR: #1496
(cherry picked from commit 679d87515d23ca31491effdc264edc81c695a72a)
BIO_int_ctrl isn't made for the purpose BIO_get_conn_int_port used it
for.
This also changes BIO_C_GET_CONNECT to actually return the port
instead of assigning it to a pointer that was never returned back to
the caller.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Fix some more URLs mangled by indent in the reformat. These ones don't exist
in master so we have a separate commit. Based on a patch supplied by Arnaud
Lacombe <al@aerilon.ca>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Some URLs in the source code ended up getting mangled by indent. This fixes
it. Based on a patch supplied by Arnaud Lacombe <al@aerilon.ca>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Commit 2b0180c37fa6ffc48ee40caa831ca398b828e680 attempted to do this but
only hit one of many BN_mod_exp codepaths. Fix remaining variants and add
a test for each method.
Thanks to Hanno Boeck for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d911097d7c93e4cfeab624b34d73fe51da158b69)
A BIO_flush call in the DTLS code was not correctly setting the |rwstate|
variable to SSL_WRITING. This means that SSL_get_error() will not return
SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE in the event of an IO retry.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67f60be8c9ae5ff3129fcd6238baf124385a41d8)
If using DTLS and NBIO then if a second or subsequent handshake message
fragment hits a retry, then the retry attempt uses the wrong fragment
offset value. This commit restores the fragment offset from the last
attempt.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ad226e88bee97847496e542d63c67997d5beda6)
If the call to OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs fails to find the relevant NID then
we should set the NID to NID_undef.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 330dcb09b2df7e1e6d1d3d14a5df7269aebd9a68)
As part of this, move release creation to a script to be called from
.travis.yml. That makes it much easier to test outside of travis.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 382af61f6213e975b4c2a50fd8b9fedd23d86ab5)
Introducing DISTTARVARS to propagate changed variables down to the
tar-making target.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4d3c30a1799bf7b4dc7223b84417c4de992a6b9c)
It seems like some tar versions don't like the name:id form for
--owner and --group. The closest known anonymous user being 0 (root),
that seems to be the most appropriate user/group to assign ownership
to. It matters very little when unpacking either way.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b91dd150d2b9b5ddca37722e7f52ea59ba7f80da)
Make TARFILE include ../ instead of having that hard coded all over the place.
When transforming file names in TAR_COMMAND, use $(NAME) instead of openssl-$(VERSION)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a544810f08539f1549eea9be36bd878c67c8e26)
Avoid seg fault by checking mgf1 parameter is not NULL. This can be
triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG) for discovering this bug.
CVE-2015-3194
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
When parsing a combined structure pass a flag to the decode routine
so on error a pointer to the parent structure is not zeroed as
this will leak any additional components in the parent.
This can leak memory in any application parsing PKCS#7 or CMS structures.
CVE-2015-3195.
Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.
PR#4131
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The feature_test_macros(7) manual tells us that _BSD_SOURCE is
deprecated since glibc 2.20 and that the compiler will warn about it
being used, unless _DEFAULT_SOURCE is defined as well.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f9fd35248c9a3b1125d9ab82ffb19d62e86533ac)
In the DTLS ClientHello processing the return value is stored in |ret| which
by default is -1. |ret| is only updated to a positive value once we are past
all points where we could hit an error. We wish to return 1 on success or 2
on success *and* we have validated the DTLS cookie. Previously on successful
validation of the cookie we were setting |ret| to -2, and then once we were
past all error points we set |ret = -ret|. This is non-obvious behaviour and
could be error prone. This commit tries to make this a bit more intuitive.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
If somewhere in SSL_new() there is a memory allocation failure, ssl3_free() can
get called with s->s3 still being NULL.
Patch also provided by Willy Tarreau <wtarreau@haproxy.com>
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3e7bd2ce0b16f8611298175d6dc7cb35ee06ea6d)
Thanks to Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com> for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 158e5207a794603f5d64ffa95e0247c7808ab445)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
Strict ISO confirming C compilers only define __sun
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
RT #4144, MR #1353
(cherry picked from commit 3d32218812e87221344f2985512e42e4aaa88745)
Original patch by Frank Morgner.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
GH: #456
(cherry picked from commit 68db80e2d1accdd4c4a6b4763559c6cfe9663820)
Though the callers check the function return value and ignore the
size_t output argument on failure, it is still often not ideal to
store -1 in a size_t on error. That might signal an unduly large
buffer. Instead set the size_t to 0, to indicate no space.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There are lots of calls to EVP functions from within libssl There were
various places where we should probably check the return value but don't.
This adds these checks.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The problem remained unnoticed so far, because it's never called by default.
You have to craft OPENSSL_ppccap environment variable to trigger the problem.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e4693b4e2a0c3f6241d4d3e61460c34c7e0013f6)
It was also found that stich performs suboptimally on AMD Jaguar, hence
execution is limited to XOP-capable and Intel processors.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a5fd24d19bbb586b1c6d235c2021e9bead22c9f5)
If a DTLS client that does not support secure renegotiation connects to an
OpenSSL DTLS server then, by default, renegotiation is disabled. If a
server application attempts to initiate a renegotiation then OpenSSL is
supposed to prevent this. However due to a discrepancy between the TLS and
DTLS code, the server sends a HelloRequest anyway in DTLS.
This is not a security concern because the handshake will still fail later
in the process when the client responds with a ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In DTLS if an IO retry occurs during writing of a fragmented ClientHello
then we can end up reseting the finish mac variables on the retry, which
causes a handshake failure. We should only reset on the first attempt not
on retries.
Thanks to BoringSSL for reporting this issue.
RT#4119
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The function tls1_get_curvelist() has an explicit check to see if s->cert
is NULL or not. However the check appears *after* calling the tls1_suiteb
macro which derefs s->cert. In reality s->cert can never be NULL because
it is created in SSL_new(). If the malloc fails then the SSL_new call fails
and no SSL object is created.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6329b6092b28b656be8a1e4a8363d2e3bcc32053)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
During work on a larger change in master a number of locations were
identified where return value checks were missing. This backports the
relevant fixes.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
./Configure [target] --strict-warnings -Wno-pedantic-ms-format
would not add '-pedantic' because it matches '-Wno-pedantic-ms-format',
which was added first.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6703c4ea87b30554283deaa5df1f8d68725d3ee4)
EVP_SignInit_ex was missing from the NAME section of its man page so
typing "man EVP_SignInit_ex" failed to load the page.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3d866ea67e8b19777e88ac2a78ee4188e0983168)
Clarify that git format-patch output is preferred for creating patch files.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f89ee71bc81017e04ac50f570d8aed87f495bcf2)
Close GH Issue 69
Close GH PR 457/RT4113
Some other updates
By Rich Salz, Alessandro Ghedini, Steve Marquess, Collin Anderson
(manual cherry-pick of a2aaf8be7e3c22a61ef89f273aa85f482b955336 and
b06935f439af7150d3ae566922353c3f210e63ed)
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
0 is a valid file descriptor.
RT#4068
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4428c7dba8f6f407d915c1226f4e0f673e8be241)
Previous language was unclear. New language isn't pretty but I believe
it is more accurate.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8cbb048c3ea416f2bd8a3706d027f3aa26ef08d9)
Don't mark a certificate as self signed if keyUsage is present and
certificate signing not asserted.
PR#3979
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f51e5ed6b4b91d12228da873db72aa28109d1797)
RFC5753 requires that we omit parameters for AES key wrap and set them
to NULL for 3DES wrap. OpenSSL decrypt uses the received algorithm
parameters so can transparently handle either form.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ec36aff2a3c221b640dafa56ac838312e6724f4)
The function int_rsa_verify is an internal function used for verifying an
RSA signature. It takes an argument |dtype| which indicates the digest type
that was used. Dependant on that digest type the processing of the
signature data will vary. In particular if |dtype == NID_mdc2| and the
signature data is a bare OCTETSTRING then it is treated differently to the
default case where the signature data is treated as a DigestInfo (X509_SIG).
Due to a missing "else" keyword the logic actually correctly processes the
OCTETSTRING format signature first, and then attempts to continue and
process it as DigestInfo. This will invariably fail because we already know
that it is a bare OCTETSTRING.
This failure doesn't actualy make a real difference because it ends up at
the |err| label regardless and still returns a "success" result. This patch
just cleans things up to make it look a bit more sane.
RT#4076
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dffe51091f412dcbc18f6641132f0b4f0def6bce)
Disable -Wshadow error when building with GCC
Add support for linu-x86_64-clang debug; this is needed for Travis CI.
Disable linux-clang and mingw debug builds on Travis CI; not supported.
Fix Travis email notifications config
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
It returns -1 on error, not 0.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #1231
(cherry picked from commit d6e92c0bd6c36fc68291e79ef5753fd7f0420695)
BN_with_flags() will read the dest->flags to keep the BN_FLG_MALLOCED but
overwrites everything else.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #1231
(cherry picked from commit f92768e6f5259069bd21dbed2b98b3423c1dfca4)
Some extension handling functions were passing in a pointer to the start
of the data, plus the length in order to calculate the end, rather than
just passing in the end to start with. This change makes things a little
more readable.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for pointing them out.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
MR #1198
(cherry picked from commit 605236f6a8fe0743af2f63d93239a74c69dae137)
RFC 5077 section 3.3 says: If the server determines that it does not
want to include a ticket after it has included the SessionTicket
extension in the ServerHello, then it sends a zero-length ticket in the
NewSessionTicket handshake message.
Previously the client would fail upon attempting to allocate a
zero-length buffer. Now, we have the client ignore the empty ticket and
keep the existing session.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
BUF_strndup was calling strlen through BUF_strlcpy, and ended up reading
past the input if the input was not a C string.
Make it explicitly part of BUF_strndup's contract to never read more
than |siz| input bytes. This augments the standard strndup contract to
be safer.
The commit also adds a check for siz overflow and some brief documentation
for BUF_strndup().
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 110f7b37de9feecfb64950601cc7cec77cf6130b)
For all release branches. It adds travis build support. If you don't
have a config file it uses the default (because we enabled travis for the
project), which uses ruby/rake/rakefiles, and you get confusing "build
still failing" messages.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit db9defdfe306e1adf0af7188b187d535eb0268da)
If we use BIO_new_file(), on Windows it'll jump through hoops to work
around their unusual charset/Unicode handling. it'll convert a UTF-8
filename to UCS-16LE and attempt to use _wfopen().
If you use BIO_read_filename(), it doesn't do this. Shouldn't it be
consistent?
It would certainly be nice if SSL_use_certificate_chain_file() worked.
Also made BIO_C_SET_FILENAME work (rsalz)
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ff03599a2f518dbdf13bca0bb0208e431b892fe9)
There are a couple of minor fixes here:
1) Handle the case when RegisterEventSource() fails (which it may for
various reasons) and do the work of logging the event only if it succeeds.
2) Handle the case when ReportEvent() fails and do our best in debug builds
to at least attempt somehow indicate that something has gone wrong. The
typical situation would be someone running tools like DbMon, DBWin32,
DebugView or just having the debugger attached. The intent is to make sure
that at least some data will be captured so that we can save hours and days
of debugging time.
3) Minor fix to change the MessageBox() flag to MB_ICONERROR. Though the
value of MB_ICONERROR is the same value as MB_ICONSTOP, the intent is
better conveyed by using MB_ICONERROR.
Testing performed:
1) Clean compilation for debug-VC-WIN32 and VC-WIN32.
2) Good test results (nmake -f ms\ntdll.mak test) for debug-VC-WIN32 and
VC-WIN32.
3) Stepped through relevant changes using WinDBG and exercised the impacted
code paths.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4cd94416a452c3a3e0df24c297f7d2f0e6d5bb5f)
There were some memory leaks in the creation of an SRP verifier (both on
successful completion and also on some error paths).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bf95cde28712cfcad90cb3975cdcb8e5c0f20fde)
In master we have the function OPENSSL_clear_free(x,y), which immediately
returns if x == NULL. In <=1.0.2 this function does not exist so we have to
do:
OPENSSL_cleanse(x, y);
OPENSSL_free(x);
However, previously, OPENSSL_cleanse did not check that if x == NULL, so
the real equivalent check would have to be:
if (x != NULL)
OPENSSL_cleanse(x, y);
OPENSSL_free(x);
It would be easy to get this wrong during cherry-picking to other branches
and therefore, for safety, it is best to just ensure OPENSSL_cleanse also
checks for NULL.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 020d8fc83fe1a94232db1ee1166309e2458a8a18)
Previously, the conversion would silently coerce to ASCII. Now, we error
out.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b785504a10310cb2872270eb409b70971be5e76e)
Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate.
In particular: reject extra trailing padding, and padding in the middle
of the content. Don't limit line length. Add tests.
Previously, the behaviour was ill-defined, and depended on the position
of the padding within the input.
In addition, this appears to fix a possible two-byte oob read.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3cdd1e94b1d71f2ce3002738f9506da91fe2af45)
If the field separator isn't specified through -nameopt then use
XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC instead of printing nothing and returing an error.
PR#2397
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 03706afa30aeb4407287171a9d6f9a765395d0a2)
Fix both the caller to error out on malloc failure, as well as the
eventual callee to handle a NULL gracefully.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Avoid using cnid = 0, use NID_undef instead, and return early instead
of trying to find an instance of that in the subject DN.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fffc2faeb2b5cad4516cc624352d445284aa7522)
Initialize pointers in param id by the book (explicit NULL assignment,
rather than just memset 0).
In x509_verify_param_zero() set peername to NULL after freeing it.
In x509_vfy.c's internal check_hosts(), avoid potential leak of
possibly already non-NULL peername. This is only set when a check
succeeds, so don't need to do this repeatedly in the loop.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0724ef1c9b9e2090bdd96b784f492b6a3952957)
No, we should just delete it. And updated the README
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8db78781069697cfa30a2261413f33f5055a2838)
Backport of equivalent fix from master. The only compression
method is stateful and hence incompatible with DTLS. The DTLS
test was not working for DTLS1.2
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Fix the setup of DTLS1.2 buffers to take account of the Header
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Commit f0348c842e7 introduced a problem with session resumption. The
version for the session is fixed when the session is created. By moving
the creation of the session earlier in the process the version is fixed
*before* version negotiation has completed when processing the ServerHello
on the client side. This fix updates the session version after version neg
has completed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Builds using no-tlsext in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8 are broken. This commit fixes the
issue. The same commit is applied to 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 branches for code
consistency. However this commit will not fix no-tlsext in those branches
which have always been broken for other reasons. The commit is not applied
to master at all, because no-tlsext has been completely removed from that
branch.
Based on a patch by Marc Branchaud <marcnarc@xiplink.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |z| value should be 0x04 not 0x02
RT#3838
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 91d2728b38b1df930f337e163816a0fc9580b6a6)
The NULL cipher case can't actually happen because we have no
EVP_PBE_CTL combinations where cipher_nid is -1 and keygen is
PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen. But make the code more obviously correct.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 394f7b6fcc38132b8ccff0a3253b9dd15640cfc0)
- Pass in the right ciphertext length to ensure we're indeed testing
ciphertext corruption (and not truncation).
- Only test one mutation per byte to not make the test too slow.
- Add a separate test for truncated ciphertexts.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 25d6b3401ca40c9a2cbe5080449c1c2a37037777)
Because we recently encourage people to have a .dir-locals.el, it's a good
idea to ignore it on a git level.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d7c02691a5e6f2716759eacb6f48c39f15ee57c8)
Slightly modified from the original PR.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a7e974c7be90e2c9673e2ce6215a70f734eb8ad4)
Don't dereference |d| when |top| is zero. Also test that various BIGNUM methods behave correctly on zero/even inputs.
Follow-up to b11980d79a52ec08844f08bea0e66c04b691840b
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Apparently, emacs sees changes to auto-fill-mode as insecure
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6dc08048d93ff35de882878f190ae49aa698b5d2)
This file, when copied to .dir-locals.el in the OpenSSL source top,
will make sure that the CC mode style "OpenSSL-II" will be used for
all C files.
Additionally, I makes sure that tabs are never used as indentation
character, regardless of the emacs mode, and that the fill column is
78.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0927f0d822b1e0f55cb7d8bacf9004ad3495514b)
This hopefully conforms closely enough to the current code style.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d9b3554b2d9724bc2d1621a026ddaf0223e2d191)
Fix more potential leaks in X509_verify_cert()
Fix memory leak in ClientHello test
Fix memory leak in gost2814789 test
Fix potential memory leak in PKCS7_verify()
Fix potential memory leaks in X509_add1_reject_object()
Refactor to use "goto err" in cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55500ea7c46c27a150a46832e1260891aaad8e52)
If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error. Also update the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f00a10b89734e84fe80f98ad9e2e77b557c701ae)
add -help descriptions of -curves, -sigalgs, -client_sigalgs
to s_client and s_server
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Also known as RT 4106
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b48357d9953decc43333979ca11ebc1500040f4e)
A DTLS client will abort a handshake if the server attempts to renew the
session ticket. This is caused by a state machine discrepancy between DTLS
and TLS discovered during the state machine rewrite work.
The bug can be demonstrated as follows:
Start a DTLS s_server instance:
openssl s_server -dtls
Start a client and obtain a session but no ticket:
openssl s_client -dtls -sess_out session.pem -no_ticket
Now start a client reusing the session, but allow a ticket:
openssl s_client -dtls -sess_in session.pem
The client will abort the handshake.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ee4ffd6fccd169775ba74afb1dbfecff48ee413d)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_clnt.c
Clarify and update documention for extra chain certificates.
PR#3878.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2fd7fb99dba9f56fbcb7ee1686bef30c7aef4754)
Part of RT 3997
Per Ben, just jump to common exit code.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc2829e6641092abed8360433dbe67e883fd1cc6)
When config'd with "sctp" running "make test" causes a seg fault. This is
actually due to the way ssltest works - it dives under the covers and frees
up BIOs manually and so some BIOs are NULL when the SCTP code does not
expect it. The simplest fix is just to add some sanity checks to make sure
the BIOs aren't NULL before we use them.
This problem occurs in master and 1.0.2. The fix has also been applied to
1.0.1 to keep the code in sync.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f75d5171be0b3b5419c8974133e1573cf976a8bb)
There are some missing return value checks in the SCTP code. In master this
was causing a compilation failure when config'd with
"--strict-warnings sctp".
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d8e8590ed90eba6ef651d09d77befb14f980de2c)
The function BN_MONT_CTX_set was assuming that the modulus was non-zero
and therefore that |mod->top| > 0. In an error situation that may not be
the case and could cause a seg fault.
This is a follow on from CVE-2015-1794.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)
The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.
CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates was using some variables that only
apply if OPENSSL_NO_EC2M is not defined.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8d11b7c7ee84ad0aa243476088285d15b22c5470)
Thanks, folks!
348 Benjamin Kaduk
317 Christian Brueffer
254 Erik Tews
253 Erik Tews
219 Carl Mehner
155 (ghost)
95 mancha
51 DominikNeubauer
(Manually picked from 59c554b36e39256ac2cfc34dca052453e10c6d9c)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The DTLS code is supposed to drop packets if we try to write them out but
the underlying BIO write buffers are full. ssl3_write_pending() contains
an incorrect test for DTLS that controls this. The test only checks for
DTLS1 so DTLS1.2 does not correctly clear the internal OpenSSL buffer which
can later cause an assert to be hit. This commit changes the test to cover
all DTLS versions.
RT#3967
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e8b24dbfb98ed7c5b355cb6a959906a418e264b)
The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext can be used to set custom session
ticket data passed in the initial ClientHello. This can be particularly
useful for EAP-FAST. However, when using SSLv23_method, the session does
not get created until the ServerHello has been received. The extension code
will only add the SessionTicket data to the ClientHello if a session already
exists. Therefore SSL_set_session_ticket_ext has no impact when used in
conjunction with SSLv23_method. The solution is to simply create the session
during creation of the ClientHello instead of waiting for the ServerHello.
This commit fixes the test failure introduced by the previous commit.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The function SSL_set_session_ticket_ext sets the ticket data to be sent in
the ClientHello. This is useful for EAP-FAST. This commit adds a test to
ensure that when this function is called the expected ticket data actually
appears in the ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'. These
should be safe to remove. If something went wrong when re-encoding,
there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This requires 'iconv' and that 'file' can take the options '-b' and '-i'.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f608b4064d58ca4dfdfdfc921308b51cb96205e2)
Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
already expect that tar variant).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 27f98436b9a84b94fbdd8e32960504634ae44cc0)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 79a55b1f2796bf6471360e8b6ab131cdedca256e)
Conflicts:
doc/apps/verify.pod
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
verification tests.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.
Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.
CVE-2015-1793
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d62298b2af0722f94345012c86eaed4)
The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
A small rearrangement so the inclusion of rsaz_exp.h would be
unconditional, but what that header defines becomes conditional.
This solves the weirdness where rsaz_exp.h gets in and out of the
dependency list for bn_exp.c, depending on the present architecture.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Typo in local variable name; introduced by previous fix.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc3f3fc2b1c94d65824ab8d69595b6d89b17cf8d)
Construct bio_err and bio_stdout from file handles instead of FILE
pointers, since the latter might not be implemented (when OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
is defined).
Convert all output to use BIO_printf.
Change lh_foo to lh_SSL_SESSION_foo.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb8abd6735e198de36c1eb9098a7f1516d156220)
Conflicts:
crypto/threads/mttest.c
It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Recent HMAC changes broke ABI compatibility due to a new field in HMAC_CTX.
This backs that change out, and does it a different way.
Thanks to Timo Teras for the concept.
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Fix loop in do_free_upto if cmsbio is NULL: this will happen when attempting
to verify and a digest is not recognised. Reported by Johannes Bauer.
CVE-2015-1792
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Fix error handling in ssl_session_dup, as well as incorrect setting up of
the session ticket. Follow on from CVE-2015-1791.
Thanks to LibreSSL project for reporting these issues.
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_sess.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
It should not be possible for DTLS message fragments to span multiple
packets. However previously if the message header fitted exactly into one
packet, and the fragment body was in the next packet then this would work.
Obviously this would fail if packets get re-ordered mid-flight.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In the event of an error in the HMAC function, leaks can occur because the
HMAC_CTX does not get cleaned up.
Thanks to the BoringSSL project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e43a13c807e42688c72c4f3d001112bf0a110464)
The function EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean value.
It returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if it is not, and -1
on error. Many usages within OpenSSL were incorrectly using this
function and therefore not correctly handling error conditions.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68886be7e2cd395a759fcd41d2cede461b68843d)
This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
This fixes a memory leak that can occur whilst duplicating a BIO chain if
the call to CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() fails. It also fixes a second memory leak
where if a failure occurs after successfully creating the first BIO in the
chain, then the beginning of the new chain was not freed.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
BUF_MEM_free() attempts to cleanse memory using memset immediately prior
to a free. This is at risk of being optimised away by the compiler, so
replace with a call to OPENSSL_cleanse() instead.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
For librypto to be complete, the stuff in both crypto/ and engines/
have to be built. Doing 'make test' or 'make apps' from a clean
source tree failed to do so.
Corrected by using the new 'build_libcrypto' in the top Makefile.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit acaff3b797f50a0a0e17a0be45b7fafad962004e)
There's a need for a target that will build all of libcrypto, so let's
add 'build_libcrypto' that does this. For ortogonality, let's also
add 'build_libssl'. Have both also depend on 'libcrypto.pc' and
'libssl.pc' so those get built together with the libraries.
This makes 'all' depend on fewer things directly.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 177b5f9c82e1152d6ce20a83556db629697fff65)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e4a355dcabe2f75df5bb8b41b394d37037169d2)
At least in the case of SSLv3 we can't send an extention.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #811
(cherry picked from commit 3c06513f3833d4692f620e2c03d7a840871c08a7)
Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f3d889523ee84f1e87e4da0d59e2702a4bee7907)
Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7ee4815f2452c854cc859e8dda88f2673cdddea)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Ensure the Kerberos pre-master secret has OPENSSL_cleanse called on it.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
A BIGNUM can have the value of -0. The function BN_bn2hex fails to account
for this and can allocate a buffer one byte too short in the event of -0
being used, leading to a one byte buffer overrun. All usage within the
OpenSSL library is considered safe. Any security risk is considered
negligible.
With thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and
Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c56353071d9849220714d8a556806703771b9269)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_print.c
The session object on the client side is initially created during
construction of the ClientHello. If the client is DTLS1.2 capable then it
will store 1.2 as the version for the session. However if the server is only
DTLS1.0 capable then when the ServerHello comes back the client switches to
using DTLS1.0 from then on. However the session version does not get
updated. Therefore when the client attempts to resume that session the
server throws an alert because of an incorrect protocol version.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7322abf5cefdeb47c7d61f3b916c428bf2cd69b6)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Some tool chains (e.g. android) do not define IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and so
this build breaks.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 133dce447b259e0bb93076bf5fd0ce475d16910a)
objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be
used as a C identifier. Improve the test to match the real C
rules.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 591b7aef05b22cba09b179e5787a9bf40dfc9508)
This is for consistency.
Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f131556d6678bc3754f1e6d98a9a5bfc24e368c)
Conflicts:
e_os2.h
The code in bss_dgram.c checks if IP_MTUDISCOVER is defined, where it
should test for IP_MTU_DISCOVER
RT#3888
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0baaff1a76d4c91b9c1121059be63175454d7b03)
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c2b1d872b25f3ec78e04f5cd2de8f21e853c4a6)
Also add more ciphersuite test coverage, and a negative test for
512-bit DHE.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ee85aab75d7c9f20058f781bfe9222323df08eb)
The size of the SRP extension can never be negative (the variable
|size| is unsigned). Therefore don't check if it is less than zero.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c89d290834f3ed9146eeb8b64fe5de817679a0b)
The return value of i2d functions can be negative if an error occurs.
Therefore don't assign the return value to an unsigned type and *then*
check if it is negative.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 90e7cdff3aa66779486914f88333f6601f0c1cf4)
The members of struct timeval on OpenVMS are unsigned. The logic for
calculating timeouts needs adjusting to deal with this.
RT#3862
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fc52ac9028b9492fb086ba35a3352ea46e03ecfc)
If the record received is for a version that we don't support, previously we
were sending an alert back. However if the incoming record already looks
like an alert then probably we shouldn't do that. So suppress an outgoing
alert if it looks like we've got one incoming.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
bn_get_bits5 was overstepping array boundary by 1 byte. It was exclusively
read overstep and data could not have been used. The only potential problem
would be if array happens to end on the very edge of last accesible page.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69567687b0b7ed67831c17a010f4d46dfd059aef)
BLKINIT optimization worked on T4, but for some reason appears "too
aggressive" for T3 triggering intermiitent EC failures. It's not clear
why only EC is affected...
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 579734ced696125c0768a2f4e56e97939b0e6e49)
The update: target in engines/ didn't recurse into engines/ccgost.
The update: and depend: targets in engines/ccgost needed a fixup.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b822d2566853ee5e313c37529f71336209b28ab)
We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the
Makefile in the directory the header file lived in. This is error
prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually
just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was
done.
This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds
an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or
local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a
double run through the whole file tree.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f539dc1a2f45580435c39dada44dd276e79cb88)
Conflicts:
Makefile.org
apps/Makefile
test/Makefile
The certificate masks are used to select which ciphersuite we are going to
use. The variables |emask_k| and |emask_a| relate to export grade key
exchange and authentication respecitively. The variables |mask_k| and
|mask_a| are the equivalent versions for non-export grade. This fixes an
instance where the two usages of export/non-export were mixed up. In
practice it makes little difference since it still works!
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdfe8b06ae97da3bc3a77aa3db00f8e0445f3c70)
Remove support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites. These two
ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH
ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked
since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new
export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to
fix them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 13f8eb4730b9fc039e743870f81e5ff54b3d05b8)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
If BN_rand is called with |bits| set to 1 and |top| set to 1 then a 1 byte
buffer overflow can occur. There are no such instances within the OpenSSL at
the moment.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke, Filip Palian for
discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The functions BN_rshift and BN_lshift shift their arguments to the right or
left by a specified number of bits. Unpredicatable results (including
crashes) can occur if a negative number is supplied for the shift value.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and Filip Palian
for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7cc18d8158b5fc2676393d99b51c30c135502107)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/bn/bn_err.c
If a client receives a bad hello request in DTLS then the alert is not
sent correctly.
RT#2801
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4dc1aa0436fdb8af50960db676b739c8ef81f38c)
40 bit ciphers are limited to 512 bit RSA, 56 bit ciphers to 1024 bit.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac38115c1a4fb61c66c2a8cd2a9800751828d328)
Also reorder preferences to prefer prime curves to binary curves, and P-256 to everything else.
The result:
$ openssl s_server -named_curves "auto"
This command will negotiate an ECDHE ciphersuite with P-256:
$ openssl s_client
This command will negotiate P-384:
$ openssl s_client -curves "P-384"
This command will not negotiate ECDHE because P-224 is disabled with "auto":
$ openssl s_client -curves "P-224"
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Since the client has no way of communicating her supported parameter
range to the server, connections to servers that choose weak DH will
simply fail.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
- Do not advise generation of DH parameters with dsaparam to save
computation time.
- Promote use of custom parameters more, and explicitly forbid use of
built-in parameters weaker than 2048 bits.
- Advise the callback to ignore <keylength> - it is currently called
with 1024 bits, but this value can and should be safely ignored by
servers.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The default bitlength is now 2048. Also clarify that either the number
of bits or the generator must be present:
$ openssl dhparam -2
and
$ openssl dhparam 2048
generate parameters but
$ openssl dhparam
does not.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Backport old patch to make it work in mixture of perls for Windows.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Cherry-picked from 7bb98eee3c9e4694dfc2217001d5075ce8d2906e
The big "don't check for NULL" cleanup requires backporting some
of the lowest-level functions to actually do nothing if NULL is
given. This will make it easier to backport fixes to release
branches, where master assumes those lower-level functions are "safe"
This commit addresses those tickets: 3798 3799 3801.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The function obj_cmp() (file crypto/objects/obj_dat.c) can in some
situations call memcmp() with a null pointer and a zero length.
This is invalid behaviour. When compiling openssl with undefined
behaviour sanitizer (add -fsanitize=undefined to compile flags) this
can be seen. One example that triggers this behaviour is the pkcs7
command (but there are others, e.g. I've seen it with the timestamp
function):
apps/openssl pkcs7 -in test/testp7.pem
What happens is that obj_cmp takes objects of the type ASN1_OBJECT and
passes their ->data pointer to memcmp. Zero-sized ASN1_OBJECT
structures can have a null pointer as data.
RT#3816
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b8dc08b74fc3c6d4c2fc855cc23bac691d985be)
Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.
Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.
RT#2958
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0bd6493369d960abef11c2346b9bbb308b4285a)
Matt's note: I added a call to X509V3err to Kurt's original patch.
RT#3840
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 344c271eb339fc2982e9a3584a94e51112d84584)
If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list()
should also return NULL.
Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14def5f5375594830597cc153e11c6017f6adddf)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cefc93910c4c0f7fa9f8c1f8f7aad084a7fa87d2)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_srvr.c
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc273a93617a5c1e69cb5db6f655e463f8e31806)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf9b0b6fb253fd40225d7c648a08646686e62d2d)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a89db885e0d8aac3a9df1bbccb0c1ddfd8b2e10a)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
ssl/ssl_stat.c
Remove dependency on ssl_locl.h from v3_scts.c, and incidentally fix a build problem with
kerberos (the dependency meant v3_scts.c was trying to include krb5.h, but without having been
passed the relevanant -I flags to the compiler)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d13bd6130bd856e9f512c43499e5fc70943bf133)
Conflicts:
crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
RT2943 only complains about the incorrect check of -K argument size,
we might as well do the same thing with the -iv argument.
Before this, we only checked that the given argument wouldn't give a
bitstring larger than EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH. we can be more precise and
check against the size of the actual cipher used.
(cherry picked from commit 8920a7cd04f43b1a090d0b0a8c9e16b94c6898d4)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Use sizeof *foo parameter, to avoid these errors.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53ba0a9e91ad203de2943edaf1090ab17ec435fa)
The problem occurs in EVP_PKEY_sign() when using RSA with X931 padding.
It is only triggered if the RSA key size is smaller than the digest length.
So with SHA512 you can trigger the overflow with anything less than an RSA
512 bit key. I managed to trigger a 62 byte overflow when using a 16 bit RSA
key. This wasn't sufficient to cause a crash, although your mileage may
vary.
In practice RSA keys of this length are never used and X931 padding is very
rare. Even if someone did use an excessively short RSA key, the chances of
them combining that with a longer digest and X931 padding is very
small. For these reasons I do not believe there is a security implication to
this. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34166d41892643a36ad2d1f53cc0025e2edc2a39)
Add a sanity check to the print_bin function to ensure that the |off|
argument is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3deeeeb61b0c5b9b5f0993a67b7967d2f85186da)
Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb0f400b0cea2d2943f99b1e89c04ff6ed748cd5)
The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c427570e5098e120cbcb66e799f85c317aac7b91)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29b0a15a480626544dd0c803d5de671552544de6)
The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output
grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original
logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is
incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original
logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the
size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to
make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in
the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d9e37744cd5119f9921315864d1cd28717173cd)
There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69f5c80abd60896c8ed3039fc56210cc)
The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8269881093324b881b81472be037055571f73f3)
Conflicts:
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 873fb39f20b6763daba226b74e83fb194924c7bf)
Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This reverts commit 47daa155a31b0a54ce09ad2ed4d55fad74096dab.
The above commit was backported to the 1.0.2 branch as part of backporting
the alternative chain verify algorithm changes. However it has been pointed
out (credit to Shigeki Ohtsu) that this is unnecessary in 1.0.2 as this
commit is a work around for loop checking that only exists in master.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53dd4ddf71ad79a64be934ca19445b1cf560adab)
The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
This patch adds a NULL check.
RT3786
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)
EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec6114f5511b20c2e6ca741e61a39b99d6
and
7b3ba508af5c86afe43e28174aa3c53a0a24f4d9
removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.
This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.
Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3d015363ed09c4eff5c02ad41153387ffdf5af)
newsig may be used (freed) uninitialized on a malloc error.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68249414405500660578b337f1c8dd5dd4bb5bcc)
The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok",
so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06affe3dac65592a341547f5a47e52cedb7b71f8)
Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and
added appropriate error handling.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8817e2e0c998757d3bd036d7f45fe8d0a49fbe2d)
Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b611e5fe8eaac9512f72094c460f3ed6040076a)
This addresses
- request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576;
- clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to
see if there will be some traction from compiler side);
- more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout
(desired when RT#3553 was reviewed);
- minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around);
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23f6eec71dbd472044db7dc854599f1de14a1f48)
Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5991ec528b1c339062440811e2641f5ea2b328b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.
Conflicts:
apps/cms.c
apps/ocsp.c
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
apps/smime.c
apps/verify.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact
in the trust store.
When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.
RT3637
RT3621
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.
Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0eed48d37a4b7beea0c966caf09ad46f4a92a44)
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb327c9ed689b9aaf7bca01a3f5a0657cb)
The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions.
Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c4137b5e828d8fab0b244defb79257619dad8fc7)
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 111b60bea01d234b5873488c19ff2b9c5d4d58e9)
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.
This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1c9b2b06c2d203ad89778ce1b98e0b5ad)
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ec5c5dd361343d9017eff8547b19e86e4944ebc)
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.
*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.
Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f617b4969a9261b9d7d381670aefbe2cf766a2cb)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines. That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"No gost certificate sent by peer"},
Clearly not what we wanted. This change fixes this problem.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2cfdfe0918f03f8323c9523a2beb2b363ae86ca7)
The macros BSWAP4 and BSWAP8 have statetemnt expressions
implementations that use local variable names that shadow variables
outside the macro call, generating warnings like this
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:263:14: warning: declaration shadows a local variable
[-Wshadow]
seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
^
../modes/modes_lcl.h:41:29: note: expanded from macro 'BSWAP8'
^
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:223:12: note: previous declaration is here
size_t ret = 0;
^
Have clang be quiet by modifying the macro variable names slightly
(suffixing them with an underscore).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2da2a4349c1598ad0648405fe175e7846d893c45)
We use GNU statement expressions in crypto/md32_common.h, surrounded
by checks that GNU C is indeed used to compile. It seems that clang,
at least on Linux, pretends to be GNU C, therefore finds the statement
expressions and then warns about them.
The solution is to have clang be quiet about it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 04958e84d8079fa57a782db70f003c38b5b156fd)
ebcdic.c:284:7: warning: ISO C requires a translation unit to contain at least one
declaration [-Wempty-translation-unit]
^
1 warning generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c25dea53e9db2b4956c315f85dae3f1c2854fd2b)
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c
Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
ARM has optimized Cortex-A5x pipeline to favour pairs of complementary
AES instructions. While modified code improves performance of post-r0p0
Cortex-A53 performance by >40% (for CBC decrypt and CTR), it hurts
original r0p0. We favour later revisions, because one can't prevent
future from coming. Improvement on post-r0p0 Cortex-A57 exceeds 50%,
while new code is not slower on r0p0, or Apple A7 for that matter.
[Update even SHA results for latest Cortex-A53.]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 94376cccb4ed5b376220bffe0739140ea9dad8c8)
RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30cd4ff294252c4b6a4b69cbef6a5b4117705d22)
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
create an HMAC
Inspired by BoringSSL commit 2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4f9fab6bd0253416eeace5a45142c7c4a83bc511)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
In DTLS, immediately prior to epoch change, the write_sequence is supposed
to be stored in s->d1->last_write_sequence. The write_sequence is then reset
back to 00000000. In the event of retransmits of records from the previous
epoch, the last_write_sequence is restored. This commit fixes a bug in
DTLS1.2 where the write_sequence was being reset before last_write_sequence
was saved, and therefore retransmits are sent with incorrect sequence
numbers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d5d0a1cb1347d4a8547e78aec56c50c528186e50)
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 93f1c13619c5b41f2dcfdbf6ae666f867922a87a)
If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.
PR#3668
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ca5efc2874e094d6382b30416824eda6dde52fe)
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.
Reported-by: Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828
RT#3758
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7c82e339a677f8546e1456c7a8f6788598a9de43)
Don't check that the curve appears in the list of acceptable curves for the
peer, if they didn't send us such a list (RFC 4492 does not require that the
extension be sent).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b79d24101e3b5904b3770d60e32bdd6edc558337)
In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ecd32a1f8f0643ae7b38f59bbaf9f0d6ef326fe)
Fix builds config'd with no-ec and no-ec2m. Technically this combination is
redundant - but the fix is straight forward. Fix from OpenWrt.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Updated test/testssl script to include the new DTLS capability in ssltest.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c381e54233be3d0dcbce7cc853c4767d979fe90)
Fix some unsigned/signed warnings introduced as part of the fix
for CVE-2015-0293
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There were some discrepancies in the CHANGES file between the 1.0.1 version
and 1.0.2. This corrects it.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Remove entries from CHANGES and NEWS from letter releases that occur *after*
the next point release. Without this we get duplicate entries for the same
issue appearing multiple times.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional.
This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures),
however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content
correctly.
This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing,
decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated
with reading potentially untrusted data.
Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work.
CVE-2015-0289
Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.
CVE-2015-0286
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
cipher being used and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent
by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
CVE-2015-1787
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
If a client renegotiates using an invalid signature algorithms extension
it will crash a server with a NULL pointer dereference.
Thanks to David Ramos of Stanford University for reporting this bug.
CVE-2015-0291
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
Fix a bug where invalid PSS parameters are not rejected resulting in a
NULL pointer exception. This can be triggered during certificate
verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server
enabling client authentication.
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issues.
CVE-2015-0208
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes
the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to
loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received
with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen
means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invokation to the
next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Erorrs processing the initial
ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could
be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
server.
CVE-2015-0207
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
CVE-2015-0290
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Add support for ServerInfo SSL_CONF option and update documentation. This
was wrongly omitted from the 1.0.2 release.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from apps. Also fix an issue with
error handling with pkcs7.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 11abf92259e899f4f7da4a3e80781e84b0fb1a64)
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from lib crypto.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7573c597c1932ef709b2455ffab47348b5c54e5)
Passing a negative value for the "-time" option to s_time results in a seg
fault. This commit fixes it so that time has to be greater than 0.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dfef52f6f277327e118fdd0fe34486852c2789b6)
The function tls1_PRF counts the number of digests in use and partitions
security evenly between them. There always needs to be at least one digest
in use, otherwise this is an internal error. Add a sanity check for this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 668f6f08c62177ab5893fc26ebb67053aafdffc8)
The function sk_zero is supposed to zero the elements held within a stack.
It uses memset to do this. However it calculates the size of each element
as being sizeof(char **) instead of sizeof(char *). This probably doesn't
make much practical difference in most cases, but isn't a portable
assumption.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7132ac830fa08d9a936e011d7c541b0c52115b33)
Move memory allocation failure checks closer to the site of the malloc in
dgst app. Only a problem if the debug flag is set...but still should be
fixed.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be1477adc97e76f4b83ed8075589f529069bd5d1)
Add some missing checks for memory allocation failures in ca app.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a561bfe944c0beba73551731cb98af70dfee3549)
Previously, ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t would return 1 if s > t, -1 if
s < t, and 0 if s == t.
This behavior was broken in a refactor [0], resulting in the opposite
time comparison behavior.
[0]: 904348a4922333106b613754136305db229475ea
PR#3706
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit da27006df06853a33b132133699a7aa9d4277920)
Other curves don't have this problem.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9fbbdd73c58c29dc46cc314f7165e45e6d43fd60)
Td4 and Te4 are arrays of u8. A u8 << int promotes the u8 to an int first then shifts.
If the mathematical result of a shift (as modelled by lhs * 2^{rhs}) is not representable
in an integer, behaviour is undefined. In other words, you can't shift into the sign bit
of a signed integer. Fix this by casting to u32 whenever we're shifting left by 24.
(For consistency, cast other shifts, too.)
Caught by -fsanitize=shift
Submitted by Nick Lewycky (Google)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b37e5c14f0eddb10c7f91ef91004622d90ef361)
When printing out an ASN.1 structure if the type is an item template don't
fall thru and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dc1247a7494f50c88ce7492518bbe0ce6f124fa)
If SSL_check_chain is called with a NULL X509 object or a NULL EVP_PKEY
or the type of the public key is unrecognised then the local variable
|cpk| in tls1_check_chain does not get initialised. Subsequently an
attempt is made to deref it (after the "end" label), and a seg fault will
result.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d813f9eb383a93e472e69750cd1edbb170205ad2)
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0c7ca4033dcf5398334d4b78a7dfb941c8167a40)
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6aa8dab2bbfd5ad3cfc0d07fe5d7243635d5b2a2)
The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34a7ed0c39aa3ab67eea1e106577525eaf0d7a00)
ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e488fd6ab2c295941e91a47ab7bcd346b7540c7)
Calling EVP_DigestInit_ex which has already had the digest set up for it
should be possible. You are supposed to be able to pass NULL for the type.
However currently this seg faults.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a01087027bd0c5ec053d4eabd972bd942bfcd92f)
In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c5a7b33c6269c3bd6bc0df6b4c22e4fba03b485)
Ensure all malloc failures return -1.
Reported by Adam Langley (Google).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06c6a2b4a3a6e64303caa256398dd2dc16f9c35a)
BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
a pointer fits in 8 characters.
Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 460e920d8a274e27aab36346eeda6685a42c3314)
Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)
If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.
For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:
openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
CVE-2015-0285
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b)
Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0b142f022e2c5072295e00ebc11c5b707a726d74)
Since commit 741c9959 ("DTLS revision."), we put the wrong protocol
version into our ClientHello for DTLS1_BAD_VER. The old DTLS
code which used ssl->version was replaced by the more generic SSL3 code
which uses ssl->client_version. The Cisco ASA no longer likes our
ClientHello.
RT#3711
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7683aaf36341dc65672ac2ccdbfd4a232e3626d)
Commit 9cf0f187 in HEAD, and 68039af3 in 1.0.2, removed a version check
from dtls1_buffer_message() which was needed to distinguish between DTLS
1.x and Cisco's pre-standard version of DTLS (DTLS1_BAD_VER).
Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3703
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5178a16c4375471d25e1f5ef5de46febb62a5529)
New function ASN1_STRING_clear_free which cleanses an ASN1_STRING
structure before freeing it.
Call ASN1_STRING_clear_free on PKCS#8 private key components.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a8ae0891d4bfd18f224777aed1fbb172504421f1)
This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c
RT#3725
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd865cadcb603918bdcfcf44e487721c657a1117)
Miscellaneous unchecked malloc fixes. Also fixed some mem leaks on error
paths as I spotted them along the way.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 918bb8652969fd53f0c390c1cd909265ed502c7e)
Conflicts:
crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
The format script didn't correctly recognise some ASN.1 macros and
didn't reformat some files as a result. Fix script and reformat
affected files.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 437b14b533fe7f7408e3ebca6d5569f1d3347b1a)
Some Cisco appliances use a pre-standard version number for DTLS. We support
this as DTLS1_BAD_VER within the code.
This change fixes d2i_SSL_SESSION for that DTLS version.
Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3704
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_asn1.c
Fixed various missing return value checks in ssl3_send_newsession_ticket.
Also a mem leak on error.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
When OpenSSL is configured with no-ec, then the new evp_extra_test fails to
pass. This change adds appropriate OPENSSL_NO_EC guards around the code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a988036259a4e119f6787b4c585f506226330120)
Updates to include SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512. In particular note
the restriction on setting md to NULL with regards to thread safety.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7812493a0da6b740274135ce340ff7505027057)
called evp_test.c, so I have called this one evp_extra_test.c
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/Makefile
test/Makefile
The typo doesn't affect supported configuration, only unsupported masm.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3372c4fffa0556a688f8f1f550b095051398f596)
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bcfa19a8d19506c26b5f8d9d9934ca2aa5f96b43)
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1549a265209d449b6aefd2b49d7d39f7fbe0689b)
The previous defaulting to TERMIOS took away -DTERMIOS / -DTERMIO a
bit too enthusiastically. Windows/DOSish platforms of all sorts get
identified as OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS, and they get a different treatment
altogether UNLESS -DTERMIO or -DTERMIOS is explicitely given with the
configuration. The answer is to restore those macro definitions for
the affected configuration targets.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ba4bdee7184a5cea5bef8739eb360e5c2bc3b52c)
Conflicts:
Configure
The rationale for this move is that TERMIOS is default, supported by
POSIX-1.2001, and most definitely on Linux. For a few other systems,
TERMIO may still be the termnial interface of preference, so we keep
-DTERMIO on those in Configure.
crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c is simplified in this regard, and will define
TERMIOS for all systems except a select few exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64e6bf64b36136d487e2fbf907f09612e69ae911)
Conflicts:
Configure
crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
manually picked from e7b85bc40200961984925604ca444517359a6067
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 774ccae63c3a41a3f0762cbc818271d3ef9f369f)
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1d2932de4cefcc200f175863a42c311916269981)
Specifically, an ASN.1 NumericString in the certificate CN will fail UTF-8 conversion
and result in a negative return value, which the "x509 -checkhost" command-line option
incorrectly interpreted as success.
Also update X509_check_host docs to reflect reality.
Thanks to Sean Burford (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0923e7df9eafec6db9c75405d7085ec8581f01bd)
Free up bio_err after memory leak data has been printed to it.
In int_free_ex_data if ex_data is NULL there is nothing to free up
so return immediately and don't reallocate it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c7a780bbebc1b6d87dc38a6aa3339033911a8bb)
on affected platforms (PowerPC and AArch64).
For reference, minimalistic #ifdef GHASH is sufficient, because
it's never defined with OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT and ctx->ghash
is never referred.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b2991c081aba5351a3386bdde2927672d53e5c99)
Making a specific variable $failure_code and a bit of commenting in the
VMS section should help clear things up.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e00ab250c878f7a7f0ae908a6305cebf6883a244)
use read_ahead with DTLS because it doesn't work. Therefore read_ahead needs
to be the default.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f4002412518703d07fee321d4c88ee0bbe1694fe)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3d0cf918078fecee8b040807a2603e41937092f6)
Per discussion: should not exit. Should not print to stderr.
Errors are ignored. Updated doc to reflect that, and the fact
that this function is to be avoided.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit abdd677125f3a9e3082f8c5692203590fdb9b860)
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 004efdbb41f731d36bf12d251909aaa08704a756)
This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)
This commit is for the 1.0.2 changes
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
crypto/rsa/rsa.h
demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
(cherry picked from commit 1d97c8435171a7af575f73c526d79e1ef0ee5960)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn_lcl.h
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
crypto/engine/eng_all.c
crypto/rc4/rc4_utl.c
crypto/sha/sha.h
ssl/kssl.c
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1ffc6ca1c387efad0772c16dfe426afef45dc4f)
Update the X509v3 name parsing to allow multiple xn-- international
domain name indicators in a name. Previously, only allowed one at
the beginning of a name, which was wrong.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 31d1d3741f16bd80ec25f72dcdbf6bbdc5664374)
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 652ff0f4796eecd8729b4690f2076d1c7ccb2862)
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
context was also inherited (matches that of the existing SSL_CTX).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac8e9cbe14b59dacfe4ac52bc5ff06f8003e9b01)
Change by SteveH from original by John Denker (in the RT)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 77ff1f3b8bfaa348956c5096a2b829f2e767b4f1)
Fix memory leak by freeing up saved_message.data if it is not NULL.
PR#3489
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41cd41c4416f545a18ead37e09e437c75fa07c95)
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This is re-commit without unrelated modification.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0548505f4cbd49b9724fab28881e096f9d951e6f)
This facilitates "universal" builds, ones that target multiple
architectures, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv7. See commentary in
Configure for details.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c1669e1c205dc8e695fb0c10a655f434e758b9f7)
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b15f8769644b00ef7283521593360b7b2135cb63)
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e)
This change documents the world as-is, by turning all warnings on,
and then turning warnings that trigger off again.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Check for NULL return from X509_NAME_ENTRY_new()
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2c60925d1ccc0b96287bdc9acb90198e7180d642)
Since SGC has been removed from OpenSSL 1.0.2 the
SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is no longer used. However the #define is
retained for compatibility.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 63eab8a620944a990ab3985620966ccd9f48d681)
When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4f605ccb779e32a770093d687e0554e0bbb137d3)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
We need this for the freebsd kernel with glibc as used in the Debian kfreebsd
ports. There shouldn't be a problem defining this on systems not using glibc.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
* adds links to various related documents.
* fixes a few typos.
* rewords a few sentences.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67472bd82bed9d5e481b0d75926aab93618902be)
Return an error code for I/O errors instead of an assertion failure.
PR#3470
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2521fcd8527008ceb3e4748f95b0ed4e2d70cfef)
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.
This reverts commit 738911cde68b2b3706e502cf8daf5b14738f2f42.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d9f366c849c9627ab666d1b1addc024e6)
master branch has a specific regression test for a bug in x86_64-mont5 code,
see commit cdfe0fdde6a966bdb0447de66aa04a85d99a0551.
This code is now in 1.0.2/1.0.1, so also backport the test.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The client_version needs to be preserved for the RSA key exchange.
This change also means that renegotiation will, like TLS, repeat the old
client_version rather than advertise only the final version. (Either way,
version change on renego is not allowed.) This is necessary in TLS to work
around an SChannel bug, but it's not strictly necessary in DTLS.
(From BoringSSL)
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec1af3c4195c1dfecdd9dc7458850ab1b8b951e0)
The temporary variable causes unused variable warnings in opt mode with clang,
because the subsequent assert is compiled out.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Odd-length lists should be rejected everywhere upon parsing. Nevertheless,
be extra careful and add guards against off-by-one reads.
Also, drive-by replace inexplicable double-negation with an explicit comparison.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves
of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length
lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds
read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released
versions of OpenSSL are not affected.
Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33d5ba862939ff8db70a9e36fc9a326fab3e8d98)
and UDP header) when setting an mtu. This constant is not always correct (e.g.
if using IPv6). Use the new DTLS_CTRL functions instead.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 464ce92026bd0c79186cbefa75470f39607110be)
we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit
fixes that.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d3d9eef31661633f5b003a9e115c1822f79d1870)
at least the minimum or it will fail.
There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up
being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This
shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having
logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum
mtu to use.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1620a2e49c777f31f2ce57966ae74006b48ad759)
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some
new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to
know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the
link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous
DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 59669b6abf620d1ed2ef4d1e2df25c998b89b64d)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_both.c
used with no explanation. Some of this was introduced as part of RT#1929. The
value 28 is the length of the IP header (20 bytes) plus the UDP header (8
bytes). However use of this constant is incorrect because there may be
instances where a different value is needed, e.g. an IPv4 header is 20 bytes
but an IPv6 header is 40. Similarly you may not be using UDP (e.g. SCTP).
This commit introduces a new BIO_CTRL that provides the value to be used for
this mtu "overhead". It will be used by subsequent commits.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0d3ae34df573f477b6b1aaf614d52dcdfcff5fce)
mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the
minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but
instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we
have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query
checks consistent.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6abb0d1f8e702a0daa9c32b8021d01eda0483018)
automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead.
Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 001235778a6e9c645dc0507cad6092d99c9af8f5)
RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit
replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the
underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This
happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the
MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf75017bfd60333ff65edf9840001cd2c49870a3)
Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state
being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A").
This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections
that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because
their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required
for the retry code path.
Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh).
Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The current documentation contains a bunch of spelling and grammar mistakes. I also
found it hard to understand some paragraphs, so here is my attempt to improve its
readability.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 03b637a730e4a298c360cc143de7564060c06324)
Workaround for NetWare CodeWarrior compiler which doesn't properly lookup
includes when in same directory as the C file which includes it.
PR#3569
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 333fad9f2de1dea99552fcb424b312ca1a390f85)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 648495864513da788246f9b75dbbbce0614ed5e8)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f281b8df704ce0123fa2193f2890a25da1756528)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34890ac18eb5ee7bffe9d460480164e1546b491e)
When using the -xcert option to test certificate validity print out
if we pass Suite B compliance. We print out "not tested" if we aren't
in Suite B mode.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7d4cdededc371854eb36e773ed18204593e994e1)
the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e189b9dc10786c755919e6792e923c584c918a1)
ECDH_compute_key is silently ignored and the KDF is run on duff data
Thanks to github user tomykaira for the suggested fix.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8d02bebddf4b69f7f260adfed4be4f498dcbd16c)
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e94a6c0ede623960728415b68650a595e48f5a43)
The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2c7504ebd4ec15334ae151a31917753468f86f)
The client sends a session ID with the session ticket, and uses
the returned ID to detect resumption, so we do not need to peek
at handshake messages: s->hit tells us explicitly if we're resuming.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
407886f589cf2dbaed82db0a44173036c3bc3317.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 980bc1ec6114f5511b20c2e6ca741e61a39b99d6)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_clnt.c
The same change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
9eaeef81fa2d4fd6246dc02b6203fa936a5eaf67
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3ba508af5c86afe43e28174aa3c53a0a24f4d9)
This ensures that it's zeroed even if the SSL object is reused
(as in ssltest.c). It also ensures that it applies to DTLS, too.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a06cd5d056c6a5b1d161786873e21a5e53d554d8)
When no-ssl3 is set only make SSLv3 disabled by default. Retain -ssl3
options for s_client/s_server/ssltest.
When no-ssl3-method is set SSLv3_*method() is removed and all -ssl3
options.
We should document this somewhere, e.g. wiki, FAQ or manual page.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3881d8106df732fc433d30446625dfa2396da42d)
If no keyfile has been specified use the certificate file instead.
Fix typo: we need to check the chain is not NULL, not the chain file.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The supported signature algorithms extension needs to be processed before
the certificate to use is decided and before a cipher is selected (as the
set of shared signature algorithms supported may impact the choice).
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Don't attempt to access msg structure if recvmsg returns an error.
PR#3483
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 012aa9ec76b158179b4de44bb5de8b8472045eac)
If the hash or public key algorithm is "undef" the signature type
will receive special handling and shouldn't be included in the
cross reference table.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55f7fb8848b6e4bec291724a479e1580d6f407d6)
Out is the buffer which needs to contain at least inl + cipher_block_size - 1 bytes. Outl
is just an int*.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5211e094dec9486a540ac480f345df1a8d2b2862)
This doesn't really fix the datarace but changes it so it can only happens
once. This isn't really a problem since we always just set it to the same
value. We now just stop writing it after the first time.
PR3584, https://bugs.debian.org/534534
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
see RT #3203
Future versions of OpenSSL use the canonical terms "ECDHE" and "DHE"
as configuration strings and compilation constants. This patch
introduces aliases so that the stable 1.0.2 branch can be
forward-compatible with code and configuration scripts that use the
normalized terms, while avoiding changing any library output for
stable users.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d663df2399d1d9d6015bcfd2ec87b925ea3558a2)
SSL_set_SSL_CTX is used to change the SSL_CTX for SNI, keep the
supported signature algorithms and raw cipherlist.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14e14bf6964965d02ce89805d9de867f000095aa)
Since SNI will typically switch the SSL_CTX structure to the one
corresponding to the appopriate server we need to parse custom
extensions using the switched SSL_CTX not the original one. This
is done by parsing custom extensions *after* SNI.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL. We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things. This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d07187b59551e4fad3db4e52ea73f2c. Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.
CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a952e97d82eac6958c81ed1e256e6b8ca5)
Related to CVE-2014-3513
This fix was developed by the OpenSSL Team
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
util/ssleay.num
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
CVE-2014-3513
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an original
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the issue
was performed by the OpenSSL team.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Patch supplied by Matthieu Patou <mat@matws.net>, and modified to also
remove duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_digest.
PR#3551
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fdea3e49e7454aa76bd5ecf3a3747641354c68)
If data is NULL, return the size needed to hold the
derived key. No other API to do this, so document
the behavior.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5aed169305941fb1eba15fd4bacc0f998b0e43f7)
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Accidentally omitted from commit 455b65dfab0de51c9f67b3c909311770f2b3f801
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdc35a9d3e8cf4cfd9330d5df9883f42cf5648ad)
Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to
avoid a timing leak from padding failure.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aac102f75b517bdb56b1bcfd0a856052d559f6e)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
(Original commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab0de51c9f67b3c909311770f2b3f801)
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.
(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1
This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
ssl/s3_cbc.c
i2d_re_X509_tbs re-encodes the TBS portion of the certificate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 95b1752cc7531e4b609aea166f2db1c155ab5bdd)
This reverts commit 519ad9b3845c475d29db8b84b59bde7edecb4e70.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This reverts commit cacdfcb2479984d9bfcc79b623118d8af6fea169.
Conflicts:
crypto/x509/x509.h
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit
Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff90124c6fd53bbb49dae5edb4e821e0a)
GetDIBits has been around since Windows2000 and
BitBitmapBits is an old Win16 compatibility function
that is much slower.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 99b00fd99330afb0be46265c3e28f25f938d3221)
Move the readdir() lines out of the if statement, so
that flist is available globally.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6f46c3c3b007f1aed77bbb4d1657fab8521e2e08)
If we don't find a signer in the internal list, then fall
through and look at the internal list; don't just return NULL.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b2aa38a980e9fbf158aafe487fb729c492b241fb)
Say where to email bug reports.
Mention general RT tracker info in a separate paragraph.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 468ab1c20d1f3a43a63d0516fed6c9fefb3ccf71)
This is funny; Ben commented in the source, Matt opend a ticket,
and Rich is doing the submit. Need more code-review? :)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit eb63bce040d1cc6147d256f516b59552c018e29b)
For portability don't use "if ! expr"
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b999f66e34d19ae4d81263bc96b8b8d548d2e13c)
When calling X509_set_version to set v1 certificate, that
should mean that the version number field is omitted.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1f18f50c4b0711ebe4a20038d324c0de5dce4512)
This is a more comprehensive fix. It changes all
keygen apps to use 2K keys. It also changes the
default to use SHA256 not SHA1. This is from
Kurt's upstream Debian changes.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 44e0c2bae4bfd87d770480902618dbccde84fd81)
In addition to Matthias's change, I also added -n to
not remove links. And updated the manpage.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a787c2590e468585a1a19738e0c7f481ec91b762)
The documentation is wrong about what happens when the
session cache fills up.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e9edfc419674f20b482a9beff9c246519f9c503e)
pod2man now complains when item tags are not sequential.
Also complains about missing =back and other tags.
Silence the warnings; most were already done.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fe7573042fa7f406fedb78d959659b39a7a1dcfb)
Copy the ifdef/undef stanza from x509.h to x509v3.h
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 83e4e03eeb22d2fbaec516a466330f2ccab22864)
Also, I (rsalz) changed "#ifdef undef" to "#if 0"
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6b0dc6eff1a59274730802db923d55802378d011)
The function returns 0 or 1, only.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b0e659cfaca9ff4a481cc63b7f6b6e97303ad8fe)
The function returns 0 or 1, only.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b0e659cfaca9ff4a481cc63b7f6b6e97303ad8fe)
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.
OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.
This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.
(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d851732bad7370640702bc9c4a33189ede287)
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6a14fe7576e7a14a46ba14df8be8fe478536b4fb)
Can't really happen, but the flow of control isn't obvious.
Add an initializer.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ff3687eab8b0915198ad84d83da5998860b11b3)
"inline" without static is not correct as the compiler may choose to ignore it
and will then either emit an external definition, or expect one.
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86f50b36e63275a916b147f9d8764e3c0c060fdb)
RT842, closed back in 2004, changed the default serial number
to be a random number rather than zero. Finally time to update
the doc
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3aba132d61baeecffb9a6f8da7d0809352cbfb2d)
Add .crt/.cer/.crl to the filenames parsed.
I also updated the podpage (since it didn't exist when
this ticket was first created, nor when it was re-created
seven years later).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 80ec8d4e3ee212786dc3092b1c97305b871827f0)
Andy pointed out there is also darwin64, so tweak the pattern.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 457f7b14ecce885dce0b1a16bcd0723f1d7a2792)
Re-order algorithm list.
Be consistent in command synopsis.
Add content about signing.
Add EXAMPLE section
Add some missing options: -r, -fips-fingerprint -non-fips-allow
Various other fixes.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Add the file written by James Westby, graciously contributed
under the terms of the OpenSSL license.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf2239b3b397174a8a6b1cc84ff68aba34ed5941)
The doc says that port can be "*" to mean any port.
That's wrong.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07e3b31fae98b985d3d2aad7066144b11833f688)
Add Darwin to list of case-insensitive filenames when
installing manapges. When doing this, I noticed that
we weren't setting "filecase" for the HTML doc install.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82d9185ae53f6ba93953ae0e484179be89c8508a)
Fix comments in ssltest.c: return value of 0 now means extension is
omitted and add_cb is not called for servers if the corresponding
extension is absent in ClientHello.
Test add_cb is not called if extension is not received.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f47e203975133ddbae3cde20c8c3c0516f62066c)
Instead of SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_srv_ext
use SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext and SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8cafe9e8bfcc99d12adf083c61411955995668c4)
Support separate parse and add callback arguments.
Add new callback so an application can free extension data.
Change return value for send functions so < 0 is an error 0
omits extension and > 0 includes it. This is more consistent
with the behaviour of other functions in OpenSSL.
Modify parse_cb handling so <= 0 is an error.
Make SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext argument
order consistent.
NOTE: these changes WILL break existing code.
Remove (now inaccurate) in line documentation.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33f653adf3bff5b0795e22de1f54b7c5472252d0)
Use "parse" and "add" for function and callback names instead of
"first" and "second".
Change arguments to callback so the extension type is unsigned int
and the buffer length is size_t. Note: this *will* break existing code.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2a9e38f39eacc2e052d694f5b5fa5b7e734abc)
Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the
serverinfo checks are no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 707b026d7871eb12c23671c975e6a15a8c331785)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reject attempts to use extensions handled internally.
Add flags to each extension structure to indicate if an extension
has been sent or received. Enforce RFC5246 compliance by rejecting
duplicate extensions and unsolicited extensions and only send a
server extension if we have sent the corresponding client extension.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 28ea0a0c6a5e4e217c405340fa22a8503c7a17db)
Use the same structure for client and server custom extensions.
Add utility functions in new file t1_ext.c.
Use new utility functions to handle custom server and client extensions
and remove a lot of code duplication.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ecf4d660902dcef6e0afc51d52926f00d409ee6b)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_lib.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Move custom extension structures from SSL_CTX to CERT structure.
This change means the form can be revised in future without binary
compatibility issues. Also since CERT is part of SSL structures
so per-SSL custom extensions could be supported in future as well as
per SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b83294fe3022b9d5d525ccdcfeb53d39c25b05bd)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_cert.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5a3d21c0585064292bde5cd34089e120487ab687)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_cbc.c
test/Makefile
Add the wrapper to all public header files (Configure
generates one). Don't bother for those that are just
lists of #define's that do renaming.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Cherry-pick of commit 17e80c6bd05de7406a65116f34ed59665607d8d5
The old code implicitly relies on the ASN.1 code returning a \0-prefixed buffer
when the buffer length is 0. Change this to verify explicitly that the ASN.1 string
has positive length.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82dc08de54ce443c2a9ac478faffe79e76157795)
When d2i_ECPrivateKey reads a private key with a missing (optional) public key,
generate one automatically from the group and private key.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed383f847156940e93f256fed78599873a4a9b28)
This change saves several EC routines from crashing when an EC_KEY is
missing a public key. The public key is optional in the EC private key
format and, without this patch, running the following through `openssl
ec` causes a crash:
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MBkCAQEECAECAwQFBgcIoAoGCCqGSM49AwEH
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b391570bdeb386d4fd325917c248d593d3c43930)
I also removed some trailing whitespace and cleaned
up the "see also" list.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3e11c54466f1da8b707c932e308d345fd61101)
Extra SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile() declaration in ssl/srtp.h
causes -Werror builds to fail.
Cherry-picked from 3609b02305c3678525930ff9bacb566c0122ea2a
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The description of when the server creates a DH key is
confusing. This cleans it up.
(rsalz: also removed trailing whitespace.)
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
The EXAMPLE that used FILE and RC2 doesn't compile due to a
few minor errors. Tweak to use IDEA and AES-128. Remove
examples about RC2 and RC5.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
This patch was submitted by user "Kox" via the wiki
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2dd8cb3b9593f528d9537aa6a003d5c93df1e3c5)
Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.
Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a207f7b6d86c3bc8ffb053e5f4d0c1ca0)
In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a7370c775dc9fd6198dbacd1706cf242b)
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal
buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code.
Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for reporting this issue.
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-2970
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
CVE-2014-3508
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.
Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.
This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.
In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.
Fixes CVE-2014-3506
Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.
Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
We can't rename ssleay_rand_bytes to md_rand_bytes_lock as this will cause
an error code discrepancy. Instead keep ssleay_rand_bytes and add an
extra parameter: since ssleay_rand_bytes is not part of the public API
this wont cause any binary compatibility issues.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org >
Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.
By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test".
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961c4fbd27577fb519d9aea2dc788742715)
Conflicts:
ssl/heartbeat_test.c
ssl/ssl.h
util/mkdef.pl
and improve performance by 10% on POWER[78].
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5c3598307ebbf5a88d1c39fbb2629536e443a5dd)
statement of opinion rather than a fact.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8d133e4b6f1ed1b7ad3c1a6d2c62f460e26c050)
PR#3456
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d48e78f0cf22aaddb563f4bcfccf25b1a45ac8a4)
Use same logic when determining when to expect a client
certificate for both TLS and DTLS.
PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit c8d710dc5f83d69d802f941a4cc5895eb5fe3d65)
The options which emulate a web server don't make sense when doing DTLS.
Exit with an error if an attempt is made to use them.
PR#3453
(cherry picked from commit 58a2aaeade8bdecd0f9f0df41927f7cff3012547)
Add description of the option to advertise support of
Next Protocol Negotiation extension (-nextprotoneg) to
man pages of s_client and s_server.
PR#3444
(cherry picked from commit 7efd0e777e65eaa6c60d85b1cc5c889f872f8fc4)
This is actually ok for this function, but initialised to zero anyway if
PURIFY defined.
This does have the impact of masking any *real* unitialised data reads in bn though.
Patch based on approach suggested by Rich Salz.
PR#3415
(cherry picked from commit 77747e2d9a5573b1dbc15e247ce18c03374c760c)
Reduces number of silly casts in OpenSSL code and likely most
applications. Consistent with (char *) for "peername" value from
X509_check_host() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername().
(cherry picked from commit 297c67fcd817ea643de2fdeff4e434b050d571e2)
Pass address of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID peername to X509_check_host().
Document modified interface.
(cherry picked from commit ced3d9158a7a8c676be504bb6cd3b5ffb7cc7f13)
ERR_get_error(3) references the non-existent
ERR_get_last_error_line_data instead of the one that does exist,
ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.
PR#3283
(cherry picked from commit 5cc99c6cf5e908df6b00b04af7f08e99c0698c7b)
Internal pointers in CCM, GCM and XTS contexts should either be
NULL or set to point to the appropriate key schedule. This needs
to be adjusted when copying contexts.
(cherry picked from commit c2fd5d79ffc4fc9d120a0faad579ce96473e6a2f)
We can't unfortunately print the CMAC cipher used without extending the API.
PR#2579
(cherry picked from commit 79e31a2842e10271581cbfdaae0145dd4bd35107)
IN parameter.
Under the old docs, the only thing stated was "at most
EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes will be written". It was kind of misleading
since it appears EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) WILL be written regardless of the
signature's buffer size.
(cherry picked from commit 6e6ba36d980f67b6e5c7b139f78da7acbbf8ec76)
If CSR verify fails in ca utility print out error messages.
Otherwise some errors give misleading output: for example
if the key size exceeds the library limit.
PR#2875
(cherry picked from commit a30bdb55d1361b9926eef8127debfc2e1bb8c484)
Update protocols supported and note that SSLv2 is effectively disabled
by default.
PR#3184
(cherry picked from commit 1b13a4f38dfc385d5e776f6b3e06c5795874cf9b)
In EVP_PBE_alg_add don't use the underlying NID for the cipher
as it may have a non-standard key size.
PR#3206
(cherry picked from commit efb7caef637a1de8468ca109efd355a9d0e73a45)
Document that the certificate passed to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert()
should not be freed by the application.
PR#3409
(cherry picked from commit 0535c2d67ca2d684087ef90be35d5fb207aab227)
This ensures high performance is situations when assembler supports
AVX2, but not AD*X.
(cherry picked from commit f3f620e1e0fa3553116f0b3e8c8d68b070fcdb79)
Resolved conflicts:
crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
Just store NUL-terminated strings. This works better when we add
support for multiple hostnames.
(cherry picked from commit b3012c698a086937319ed413a113ed7bec1edd1a)
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.
Bug discovered and fixed by Miod Vallat from the OpenBSD team.
PR#3375
Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point
keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from
server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail.
PR#3400
(cherry picked from commit 99cd6a91fcb0931feaebbb4832681d40a66fad41)
compiler supports it. Otherwise, there are warnings about it lacking
everywhere, which is quite tedious to read through while trying to check
for other warnings.
A client reference identity of ".example.com" matches a server
certificate presented identity that is any sub-domain of "example.com"
(e.g. "www.sub.example.com).
With the X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS flag, it matches
only direct child sub-domains (e.g. "www.sub.example.com").
(cherry picked from commit e52c52f10bb8e34aaf8f28f3e5b56939e8f6b357)
armcap.c is shared between 32- and 64-bit builds and features link-time
detection of getauxval.
Submitted by: Ard Biesheuvel.
(cherry picked from commit e8d93e342b4b7d43c73e955e81e227c514d389d9)
Backport of patch:
add ECC strings to ciphers(1), point out difference between DH and ECDH
and backport of other other assorted fixes to this man page
* Make a clear distinction between DH and ECDH key exchange.
* Group all key exchange cipher suite identifiers, first DH then ECDH
* add descriptions for all supported *DH* identifiers
* add ECDSA authentication descriptions
* add example showing how to disable all suites that offer no
authentication or encryption
* update status of static DH (it's now supported)
* backport descriptions of AES128, AES256, AESGCM
* backport descriptions of CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA256
* backport listing of standard names for ECC cipher suites
and TLSv1.2 cipher suites
* backport description of PSK cipher suites
Defines SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE and EXECUTE_TEST, and updates ssl/heartbeat_test.c
using these macros. SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE makes use of the new TEST_CASE_NAME
macro, defined to use __func__ or __FUNCTION__ on platforms that support those
symbols, or to use the file name and line number otherwise. This should fix
several reported build problems related to lack of C99 support.
SRP ciphersuites do not have no authentication. They have authentication
based on SRP. Add new SRP authentication flag and cipher string.
(cherry picked from commit a86b88acc373ac1fb0ca709a5fb8a8fa74683f67)
Because of a missing include <fcntl.h> we don't have O_CREATE and don't create
the file with open() using mode 0600 but fall back to using fopen() with the
default umask followed by a chmod().
Problem found by Jakub Wilk <jwilk@debian.org>.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag.
(cherry picked from commit 953c592572e8811b7956cc09fbd8e98037068b58)
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 1632ef744872edc2aa2a53d487d3e79c965a4ad3)
Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
(cherry picked from commit bc8923b1ec9c467755cd86f7848c50ee8812e441)
Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
(cherry picked from commit d3152655d5319ce883c8e3ac4b99f8de4c59d846)
Add certificates if -nocerts and -certfile specified when signing
in smime application. This can be used this to specify the
order certificates appear in the PKCS#7 structure: some broken
applications require a certain ordering.
PR#3316
(cherry picked from commit e114abee9ec084a56c1d6076ac6de8a7a3a5cf34)
Add TLS padding extension to SSL_OP_ALL so it is used with other
"bugs" options and can be turned off.
This replaces SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG which is an ancient
option referring to SSLv2 and SSLREF.
PR#3336
(cherry picked from commit 758415b2259fa45d3fe17d8e53ae1341b7b6e482)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
Make sure there is an extra 4 bytes for server done message when
NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is defined.
PR#3361
(cherry picked from commit 92d81ba622396425764d676ba4fb3f0dac273f17)
Fixes to host checking wild card support and add support for
setting host checking flags when verifying a certificate
chain.
(cherry picked from commit 397a8e747dc3f964196caed5ca4e08d4b598362a)
Replace manual ASN.1 decoder with ASN1_get object. This
will decode the tag and length properly and check against
it does not exceed the supplied buffer length.
PR#3335
(cherry picked from commit b0308dddd1cc6a8e1de803ef29ba6da25ee072c2)
If the key type does not match any CMS recipient type return
an error instead of using a random key (MMA mitigation). This
does not leak any useful information to an attacker.
PR#3348
(cherry picked from commit bd43b4cf778a53ffa5d77510ecd408a009dc00d2)
Even though the meat of dso_vms.c is compiled out on non-VMS builds,
the (pre-)compiler still traverses some of the macro handling. This
trips up at least one non-VMS build configuration, so this commit
makes the skip-VMS case more robust.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
This patch resolves RT ticket #2608.
Thanks to Robert Dugal for originally spotting this, and to David
Ramos for noticing that the ball had been dropped.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
The lazy-initialisation of BN_MONT_CTX was serialising all threads, as
noted by Daniel Sands and co at Sandia. This was to handle the case that
2 or more threads race to lazy-init the same context, but stunted all
scalability in the case where 2 or more threads are doing unrelated
things! We favour the latter case by punishing the former. The init work
gets done by each thread that finds the context to be uninitialised, and
we then lock the "set" logic after that work is done - the winning
thread's work gets used, the losing threads throw away what they've done.
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Newer pod2man considers =item [1-9] part of a numbered list, while =item
0 starts an unnumbered list. Add a zero effect formatting mark to override
this.
doc/apps/smime.pod around line 315: Expected text after =item, not a
number
...
PR#3146
It's not clear whether this inconsistency could lead to an actual
computation error, but it involved a BIGNUM being passed around the
montgomery logic in an inconsistent state. This was found using flags
-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND, and working backwards from this assertion
in 'ectest';
ectest: bn_mul.c:960: BN_mul: Assertion `(_bnum2->top == 0) ||
(_bnum2->d[_bnum2->top - 1] != 0)' failed
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a52926189155d906d8c11ff97cbc1e5191d202cd)
Gets rid of this;
defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 792.
(Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)
defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 800.
(Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)
Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 647f360e2e86818cee1f2d0429e071d14814e0b5)
algorithm suggested in following paper:
Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
(cherry picked from commit f8cee9d08181f9e966ef01d3b69ba78b6cb7c8a8)
When looking for an extension we need to set the last found
position to -1 to properly search all extensions.
PR#3309.
(cherry picked from commit 300b9f0b704048f60776881f1d378c74d9c32fbd)
Keep copy of any host, path and port values allocated by
OCSP_parse_url and free as necessary.
(cherry picked from commit 5219d3dd350cc74498dd49daef5e6ee8c34d9857)
Treat a zero length passed to ssleay_rand_add a no op: the existing logic
zeroes the md value which is very bad. OpenSSL itself never does this
internally and the actual call doesn't make sense as it would be passing
zero bytes of entropy.
Thanks to Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de> for reporting this bug.
(cherry picked from commit 5be1ae28ef3c4bdec95b94f14e0e939157be550a)
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3)
Use bufsiz - 1 not BUFSIZ - 1 when prompting for a password in
the openssl utility.
Thanks to Rob Mackinnon, Leviathan Security for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 7ba08a4d73c1bdfd3aced09a628b1d7d7747cdca)
A short PEM encoded sequence if passed to the BIO, and the file
had 2 \n following would fail.
PR#3289
(cherry picked from commit 10378fb5f4c67270b800e8f7c600cd0548874811)
Don't clear verification errors from the error queue unless
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR is set.
If errors occur during verification and SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR
is set return 2 so applications can issue warnings.
Some CMS SignedData structure use a signature algorithm OID such
as SHA1WithRSA instead of the RSA algorithm OID. Workaround this
case by tolerating the signature if we recognise the OID.
(cherry picked from commit 3a98f9cf20c6af604799ee079bec496b296bb5cc)
Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
The problem is that OpenSSH calls EVP_Cipher, which is not as
protective as EVP_CipherUpdate. Formally speaking we ought to
do more checks in *_cipher methods, including rejecting
lengths not divisible by block size (unless ciphertext stealing
is in place). But for now I implement check for zero length in
low-level based on precedent.
PR: 3087, 2775
(cherry picked from commit 5e44c144e649a53bae2724b34d908f6cb26b01ed)
Although the memory allocated by compression methods is fixed and
cannot grow over time it can cause warnings in some leak checking
tools. The function SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods() will free
and zero the list of supported compression methods. This should
*only* be called in a single threaded context when an application
is shutting down to avoid interfering with existing contexts
attempting to look up compression methods.
Add option to set an alternative to the default hmacWithSHA1 PRF
for PKCS#8 private key encryptions. This is used automatically
by PKCS8_encrypt if the nid specified is a PRF.
Add option to pkcs8 utility.
Update docs.
Don't set the fips flags in cipher and digests as the implementations
aren't suitable for FIPS mode and will be redirected to the FIPS module
versions anyway.
Return EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS or EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS if a FIPS implementation
exists when calling EVP_CIPHER_flags and EVP_MD_flags repectively.
Remove unused FIPS code from e_aes.c: the 1.0.2 branch will never be
used to build a FIPS module.
Windows 8 SDKs complain that GetVersion() is deprecated.
We only use GetVersion like this:
(GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
which checks if the Windows version is NT based. Use a macro check_winnt()
which uses GetVersion() on older SDK versions and true otherwise.
(cherry picked from commit a4cc3c8041104896d51ae12ef7b678c31808ce52)
When setting the current certificate check that it has a corresponding
private key.
(cherry picked from commit 358d352aa244b4f2ef655bccff6658d92d5ce03c)
New flags to build certificate chains. The can be used to rearrange
the chain so all an application needs to do is add all certificates
in arbitrary order and then build the chain to check and correct them.
Add verify error code when building chain.
Update docs.
(cherry picked from commit 13dc3ce9ab483cade378bcf3844c92bacd817316)
This can be used to speed up SRTP with libsrtp, e.g. on TI omap/sitara based devices.
(cherry picked from commit be2c4d9bd9e81030c547a34216ae2d8e5c888190)
If you use "-newkey rsa" it's supposed to read the default number of bits from the
config file. However the value isn't used to generate the key, but it does
print it's generating such a key. The set_keygen_ctx() doesn't call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits() and you end up with the default set in
pkey_rsa_init() (1024). Afterwards the number of bits gets read from the config
file, but nothing is done with that anymore.
We now read the config first and use the value from the config file when no size
is given.
PR: 2592
(cherry picked from commit 3343220327664680420d4068e1fbe46d2236f1b0)
apps/pkcs12.c accepts -password as an argument. The document author
almost certainly meant to write "-password, -passin".
However, that is not correct, either. Actually the code treats
-password as equivalent to -passin, EXCEPT when -export is also
specified, in which case -password as equivalent to -passout.
(cherry picked from commit 856c6dfb09d69fc82ada2611c6cd792dfc60e355)
Improve CBC decrypt and CTR by ~13/16%, which adds up to ~25/33%
improvement over "pre-Silvermont" version. [Add performance table to
aesni-x86.pl].
(cherry picked from commit 5599c7331b90d9d29c9914c2a95c16d91485415a)
as issuer and subject names. Although this is an incompatible change
it should have little impact in pratice because self-issued certificates
that are not self-signed are rarely encountered.
(cherry picked from commit b1efb7161f409c81178b9aa95583db3390f90b1b)
When a chain is complete and ends in a trusted root checks are also
performed on the TA and the callback notified with ok==1. For
consistency do the same for chains where the TA is not self signed.
(cherry picked from commit 385b3486661628f3f806205752bf968b8114b347)
If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake.
Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.
(cherry picked from commit ac20719d994729970eb3b775c7bffa81f0e9f960)
Conflicts:
ssl/t1_lib.c
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.
(cherry picked from commit 36086186a9b90cdad0d2cd0a598a10f03f8f4bcc)
Conflicts:
Configure
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/ssltest.c
If an application calls the macro SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
return either the old "shared" extra certificates or those associated
with the current certificate.
This means applications which call SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file
and retrieve the additional chain using SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
will still work. An application which only wants to check the shared
extra certificates can call the new macro
SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only
(cherry picked from commit a51f767645c117667d337f77fe1dd9c0a66d8410)
New ctrl sets current certificate based on certain criteria. Currently
two options: set the first valid certificate as current and set the
next valid certificate as current. Using these an application can
iterate over all certificates in an SSL_CTX or SSL structure.
(cherry picked from commit 0f78819c8ccb7c526edbe90d5b619281366ce75c)
eliminating them as dead code.
Both volatile and "memory" are used because of some concern that the compiler
may still cache values across the asm block without it, and because this was
such a painful debugging session that I wanted to ensure that it's never
repeated.
(cherry picked from commit 7753a3a68431aa81b82beea4c3f5374b41454679)
Always add a dynamically loaded ENGINE to list. Otherwise it can cause
problems when multiply loaded, especially if it adds new public key methods.
For all current engines we only want a single implementation anyway.
(cherry picked from commit e933f91f50108a43c0198cdc63ecdfdbc77b4d0d)
The flag SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING hasn't done anything since OpenSSL
0.9.7h but deleting it will break source compatibility with any software
that references it. Restore it but #define to zero.
Fix a limitation in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): use algorithm
specific chains instead of the shared chain.
Update docs.
(cherry picked from commit a4339ea3ba045b7da038148f0d48ce25f2996971)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.
Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.
PR#3191
(cherry picked from commit b77b58a398c8b9b4113f3fb6b48e162a3b8d4527)
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
(cherry picked from commit 34628967f1e65dc8f34e000f0f5518e21afbfc7b)
SHA512_Transform was initially added rather as tribute to tradition
than for practucal reasons. But use was recently found in ssl/s3_cbc.c
and it turned to be problematic on platforms that don't tolerate
misasligned references to memory and lack assembly subroutine.
(cherry picked from commit cdd1acd788020d2c525331da1712ada778f1373c)
Move the IP, email and host checking fields from the public
X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure into an opaque X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
structure. By doing this the structure can be modified in future
without risk of breaking any applications.
PR: 3176.
In FIPS mode ssleay_rand_bytes is only used for PRNG seeding and is
performed in either a single threaded context (when the PRNG is first
initialised) or under a lock (reseeding). To avoid multiple locks disable
use of CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND in FIPS mode in ssleay_rand_bytes.
rsaz_exp.c: harmonize line terminating;
asm/rsaz-*.pl: minor optimizations.
asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl: sync from master.
(cherry picked from commit 31ed9a21315c571db443c68e4f618ecb51c631f9)
New functions to retrieve current certificate or private key
from an SSL_CTX.
Constify SSL_get_private_key().
(cherry picked from commit a25f9adc778e17568fe2a325e5c3606adb8329f1)
If pointer comparison for current certificate fails check
to see if a match using X509_cmp succeeds for the current
certificate: this is useful for cases where the certificate
pointer is not available.
(cherry picked from commit 6856b288a6e66edd23907b7fa264f42e05ac9fc7)
PR#3169
This patch, which currently applies successfully against master and
1_0_2, adds the following functions:
SSL_[CTX_]select_current_cert() - set the current certificate without
disturbing the existing structure.
SSL_[CTX_]get0_chain_certs() - get the current certificate's chain.
SSL_[CTX_]clear_chain_certs() - clear the current certificate's chain.
The patch also adds these functions to, and fixes some existing errors
in, SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod.
(cherry picked from commit 2f56c9c015dbca45379c9a725915b3b8e765a119)
Add function to retrieve the signature from a CMS_SignerInfo structure:
applications can then read or modify it.
(cherry picked from commit e8df6cec4c09b9a94c4c07abcf0402d31ec82cc1)
Original definition depended on __LONG_MAX__ that is not guaranteed to
be present. As we don't support platforms with int narrower that 32 bits
it's appropriate to make defition inconditional.
PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit 96180cac04591abfe50fc86096365553484bde65)
Extend SSL_CONF to return command value types.
Add certificate and key options.
Update documentation.
(cherry picked from commit ec2f7e568ea18a22ab57326fffe78ef2aa6884f5)
PR: 2809
DTLS/SCTP requires DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks to be protected with
SCTP-AUTH. It is checked if this has been activated successfully for
the local and remote peer. Due to a bug, however, the
gauth_number_of_chunks field of the authchunks struct is missing on
FreeBSD, and was therefore not considered in the OpenSSL implementation.
This patch sets the corresponding pointer for the check correctly
whether or not this bug is present.
PR: 2808
With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key. Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.
This is a forward-port of commits:
4af793036f6ef4f0a1078e5d7155426a98d50e37
f4c93b46edb51da71f09eda99e83eaf193a33c08
3da721dac9382c48812c8eba455528fd59af2eef
2583270191a8b27eed303c03ece1da97b9b69fd3
While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:
* It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
* If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
Removing RSA+MD5 from the default signature algorithm list
prevents its use by default.
If a broken implementation attempts to use RSA+MD5 anyway the sanity
checking of signature algorithms will cause a fatal alert.
(cherry picked from commit 77a0f740d00ecf8f6b01c0685a2f858c3f65a3dd)
Latest MIPS ISA specification declared 'branch likely' instructions
obsolete. To makes code future-proof replace them with equivalent.
(cherry picked from commit 0c2adb0a9be76da8de9bbfd5377215f71711a52e)
Add a script to generate keys and certificates for the S/MIME and CMS
tests.
Update certificates and add EC examples.
(cherry picked from commit a0957d55059f0b6052235737f7441fc35da41afd)
Add X9.42 DH KDF. Move sharedinfo generation code to CMS library as the
same structure is used by DH and ECDH.
Move ASN1_OBJECT typedef to ossl_typ.h so it can be picked up by dh headers
without the need to use ASN1.
(cherry picked from commit dc1ce3bc64845d16314af1f11acf5384e4ae9b34)
For RSA and DSA keys return an appropriate RecipientInfo type. By setting
CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE for DSA keys an appropriate error is returned if
an attempt is made to use DSA with enveloped data.
(cherry picked from commit 41b920ef01abeb4c4b1c0f11e647370ae6533d02)
Check and set AlgorithmIdenfier parameters for key wrap algorithms.
Currently these just set parameters to NULL.
(cherry picked from commit e61f5d55bc0072e75023be8971ae6e849643f466)
Add support for ECDH in enveloped data. The CMS ctrls for the EC ASN1
method decode/encode the appropriate parameters from the CMS ASN1 data
and send appropriate data to the EC public key method.
(cherry picked from commit 88e20b8584a78c803eca7aa9fcf8c46ff0ece4ae)
Add hooks to support key agreement recipient info type (KARI) using
algorithm specific code in the relevant public key ASN1 method.
(cherry picked from commit 17c2764d2e6fc5a010ad3c12662068689ed2ad17)
Add support for custom public key parameters in the cms utility using
the -keyopt switch. Works for -sign and also -encrypt if -recip is used.
(cherry picked from commit 02498cc885b801f38f33c0a0d08d4603fd6350c7)
Extend RSA ASN1 method to support CMS PSS signatures for both sign
and verify.
For signing the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are read and the appropriate
CMS structures set up.
For verification the CMS structures are analysed and the corresponding
parameters in the EVP_PKEY_CTX set.
Also add RSA-OAEP support.
For encrypt the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are used.
For decrypt the CMS structure is uses to set the appropriate EVP_PKEY_CTX
parameters.
(cherry picked from commit 0574cadf857b19485465b9d71b7dec9549857a4d)
Also sync error codes with OpenSSL 1.0.1 and add new ones.
Add OAEP ctrls to retrieve MD and label. Return errors if
an attempt is made to set or retrieve OAEP parameters when
padding mode is not OAEP.
(cherry picked from commit 211a14f6279f127f7a5a59948819bd939131b0b6)
Extend OAEP support. Generalise the OAEP padding functions to support
arbitrary digests. Extend EVP_PKEY RSA method to handle the new OAEP
padding functions and add ctrls to set the additional parameters.
(cherry picked from commit 271fef0ef39a1c0cb5233a5adf3ff8733abb375e)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
Add support for customisation of CMS handling of signed and enveloped
data from custom public key parameters.
This will provide support for RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP but could also be
applied to other algorithms.
(cherry picked from commit e365352d6a6368039392fed14a328f8c0bf955c3)
Add OIDs for KDF schemes from RFC5753 and add cross references for
each type and the appropriate digest to use.
(cherry picked from commit 6af440ced43d766e418c2eb0cda1525eecd3e62b)
Conflicts:
crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
Add support for key wrap algorithms via EVP interface.
Generalise AES wrap algorithm and add to modes, making existing
AES wrap algorithm a special case.
Move test code to evptests.txt
(cherry picked from commit 97cf1f6c2854a3a955fd7dd3a1f113deba00c9ef)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
Add code to support GCM an CCM modes in evp_test. On encrypt this
will compare the expected ciphertext and tag. On decrypt it will
compare the expected plaintext: tag comparison is done internally.
Add a simple CCM test case and convert all tests from crypto/modes/gcm128.c
(cherry picked from commit 15652f9825de25481676767aa73945409f9c82e2)
Return an error if an attempt is made to enable the Dual EC DRBG: it
is not used by default.
(cherry picked from commit a4870de5aaef562c0947494b410a2387f3a6d04d)
Make DTLS behave like TLS when negotiating version: record layer has
DTLS 1.0, message version is 1.2.
Tolerate different version numbers if version hasn't been negotiated
yet.
(cherry picked from commit 40088d8b8190a2a33828a769c23bf35de542c7dc)
Add DTLS record header parsing, different client hello format and add
HelloVerifyRequest message type.
Add code to d1_pkt.c to send message headers to the message callback.
(cherry picked from commit 890f2f8b92b385ef3898cdb4a15a071ffcf8107f)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Check for Suite B support using method flags instead of version numbers:
anything supporting TLS 1.2 cipher suites will also support Suite B.
Return an error if an attempt to use DTLS 1.0 is made in Suite B mode.
(cherry picked from commit 4544f0a69161a37ee3edce3cc1bc34c3678a4d64)
If we successfully match a cookie don't set return value to 2 as this
results in other error conditions returning 2 as well.
Instead set return value to -2 which can be checked later if everything
else is OK.
(cherry picked from commit c56f5b8edfbcec704f924870daddd96a5f768fbb)
Add new methods DTLS_*_method() which support both DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 and
pick the highest version the peer supports during negotiation.
As with SSL/TLS options can change this behaviour specifically
SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 and SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2.
(cherry picked from commit c6913eeb762edffddecaaba5c84909d7a7962927)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
Port TLS 1.2 GCM code to DTLS. Enable use of TLS 1.2 only ciphers when in
DTLS 1.2 mode too.
(cherry picked from commit 4221c0dd3004117c63b182af5e8ab345b7265902)
Add DTLS1.2 support for cached records when computing handshake macs
instead of the MD5+SHA1 case for DTLS < 1.2 (this is a port of the
equivalent TLS 1.2 code to DTLS).
(cherry picked from commit 04fac50045929e7078cad4835478dd7f16b6d4bd)
Add correct flags for DTLS 1.2, update s_server and s_client to handle
DTLS 1.2 methods.
Currently no support for version negotiation: i.e. if client/server selects
DTLS 1.2 it is that or nothing.
(cherry picked from commit c3b344e36a088283731b4f65a70e85b100f55686)
Conflicts:
apps/s_server.c
Since this is always called from DTLS code it is safe to assume the header
length should be the DTLS value. This avoids the need to check the version
number and should work with any version of DTLS (not just 1.0).
(cherry picked from commit 9cf0f187542f080031f83c5e538d3e1872ac09d1)
Extend DTLS method creation macros to support version numbers and encryption
methods. Update existing code.
(cherry picked from commit cfd298b7aef2b095bee8d172a6a40d6c59d1574b)
Some TLS extensions were disabled for DTLS. Possibly because they caused
problems with the old duplicated code. Enable them again.
(cherry picked from commit 874a18cfadc6bac0ad73482325f2ca72dfccdb82)
Use the enc_flags field to determine whether we should use explicit IV,
signature algorithms or SHA256 default PRF instead of hard coding which
versions support each requirement.
(cherry picked from commit cbd64894ec687c6f37d8e43c16dff78e63f6be87)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Revise DTLS code. There was a *lot* of code duplication in the
DTLS code that generates records. This makes it harder to maintain and
sometimes a TLS update is omitted by accident from the DTLS code.
Specifically almost all of the record generation functions have code like
this:
some_pointer = buffer + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH;
... Record creation stuff ...
set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL_MT_SOMETHING, message_len);
...
write_handshake_message(ssl);
Where the "Record creation stuff" is identical between SSL/TLS and DTLS or
in some cases has very minor differences.
By adding a few fields to SSL3_ENC to include the header length, some flags
and function pointers for handshake header setting and handshake writing the
code can cope with both cases.
(cherry picked from commit 173e72e64c6a07ae97660c322396b66215009f33)
Add various functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
structure.
(cherry picked from commit 94c2f77a62be7079ab1893ab14b18a30157c4532)
- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
which could be misused.)
- EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
equality (not an error).
Reported by: king cope
(cherry picked from commit 312a46791ab465cfa3bf26764361faed0e5df014)
- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
which could be misused.)
- EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
equality (not an error).
Reported by: king cope
(cherry picked from commit 312a46791ab465cfa3bf26764361faed0e5df014)
This change adds support for ALPN[1] in OpenSSL. ALPN is the IETF
blessed version of NPN and we'll be supporting both ALPN and NPN for
some time yet.
Cherry-picked from 6f017a8f9db3a79f3a3406cf8d493ccd346db691.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-00
When verifying a partial path always check to see if the EE certificate
is explicitly trusted: the path could contain other untrusted certificates.
(cherry picked from commit 52073b76753815ef1dcc3ab3f9dba75803f717f4)
is needed to test some profiles/protocols which reject certificates
with unsupported versions.
(cherry picked from commit df316fd43c5b1e063b84279f245087a578b67e9b)
by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated summary of
the connection parameters.
(cherry picked from commit 4f3df8bea2981b1547eaae8704f0207c7766c2fa)
New option -verify_quiet to shut up the verify callback unless there is
an error.
(manually applied from commit 2a7cbe77b3abb244c2211d22d7aa3416b97c9342)
Preliminary documentation for chain and verify stores and certificate chain
setting functions.
(cherry picked from commit eeb15452a053c14305210522be0e7313cb763bac)
This fix ensures that
* A HelloRequest is retransmitted if not responded by a ClientHello
* The HelloRequest "consumes" the sequence number 0. The subsequent
ServerHello uses the sequence number 1.
* The client also expects the sequence number of the ServerHello to
be 1 if a HelloRequest was received earlier.
This patch fixes the RFC violation.
(cherry picked from commit b62f4daac00303280361924b9cc19b3e27528b15)
Reported by: Prashant Jaikumar <rmstar@gmail.com>
Fix handling of application data received before a handshake.
(cherry picked from commit 0c75eeacd3285b395dc75b65c3e6fe6ffbef59f0)
PR #3090
Reported by: Franck Youssef <fry@open.ch>
If no new reason codes are obtained after checking a CRL exit with an
error to avoid repeatedly checking the same CRL.
This will only happen if verify errors such as invalid CRL scope are
overridden in a callback.
(cherry picked from commit 4b26645c1a71cf9ce489e4f79fc836760b670ffe)
PR: 3028
Fix bug introduced in PEM_X509_INFO_bio which wouldn't process RSA keys
correctly if they appeared first.
(cherry picked from commit 5ae8d6bcbaff99423a2608559d738a3fcf7ed6dc)
Bug would emerge when XTS is added to bsaes-armv7.pl. Pointed out by
Ard Biesheuvel of Linaro.
(cherry picked from commit 044f63086051d7542fa9485a1432498c39c4d8fa)
Improve RSA sing performance by 20-30% by:
- switching from floating-point to integer conditional moves;
- daisy-chaining sqr-sqr-sqr-sqr-sqr-mul sequences;
- using MONTMUL even during powers table setup;
(cherry picked from commit 4ddacd9921f48013b5cd011e4b93b294c14db1c2)
Fix PSS signature printing: consistently use 0x prefix for hex values for
padding length and trailer fields.
(cherry picked from commit deb24ad53147f5a8dd63416224a5edd7bbc0e74a)
Note that it initially applies to 1.0.2, and not to HEAD. This is
in order to allow development with existing libunbound installations
that are dependent on OpenSSL 1.0.x. More details in RT.
RT: 3003
Reencode certificates in X509_sign_ctx as well as X509_sign.
This was causing a problem in the x509 application when it modified an
existing certificate.
(cherry picked from commit c6d8adb8a45186617e0a8e2c09469bd164b92b31)
While ARMv7 in general is capable of unaligned access, not all instructions
actually are. And trouble is that compiler doesn't seem to differentiate
those capable and incapable of unaligned access. Side effect is that kernel
goes into endless loop retrying same instruction triggering unaligned trap.
Problem was observed in xts128.c and ccm128.c modules. It's possible to
resolve it by using (volatile u32*) casts, but letting STRICT_ALIGNMENT
be feels more appropriate.
(cherry picked from commit 3bdd80521a81d50ade4214053cd9b293f920a77b)
Don't check for binary curves by checking methods: the values will
be different in FIPS mode as they are redirected to the validated module
version.
(cherry picked from commit 94782e0e9c28bd872107b8f814f4db68c9fbf5ab)
If an ASN1_INTEGER structure is allocated but not explicitly set encode
it as zero: don't generate an invalid zero length INTEGER.
(cherry picked from commit 1643edc63c3e15b6db5a15a728bc288f2cc2bbc7)
Add CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt: this function encrypts an existing content
encryption key to match the key in the RecipientInfo structure: this is
useful if a new recpient is added to and existing enveloped data structure.
Add documentation.
(cherry picked from commit e1f1d28f34cc5cfc87772e0d8331e00137a4a213)
Two example programs one for command line argument processing and
one for configuration file processing.
(cherry picked from commit 3646578ae7e29230d7b05a5487ad12990b2ae688)
Fix some typos and update version number first added: it has now been
backported to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
(cherry picked from commit 4365e4aad97fa37e4a97eb2270a64c03e6547014)
key to the one in a request. This is useful for cases where the public
key cannot be used for signing e.g. DH.
(cherry picked from commit 43206a2d7cc87c959535c0f69e2aa3b364eafd6e)
podlators 2.5.0 has switched to dying on POD syntax errors. This means
that a bunch of long-standing erroneous POD in the openssl documentation
now leads to fatal errors from pod2man, halting installation.
Unfortunately POD constraints mean that you have to sort numeric lists
in ascending order if they start with 1: you cannot do 1, 0, 2 even if
you want 1 to appear first. I've reshuffled such (alas, I wish there
were a better way but I don't know of one).
(cherry picked from commit 5cc270774258149235f69e1789b3370f57b0e27b)
Add description of "allocate and encode" operation for ASN1 routines.
Document how versioning will for after the letter release reaches
y.
(cherry picked from commit 2527b94fec345c0bec58f4c7a810b7b8d0552b17)
The version check for DTLS1_VERSION was redundant as
DTLS1_VERSION > TLS1_1_VERSION, however we do need to
check for DTLS1_BAD_VER for compatibility.
PR:2984
(cherry picked from commit d980abb22e22661e98e5cee33d760ab0c7584ecc)
Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)
For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)
(cherry picked from commit 32cc2479b473c49ce869e57fded7e9a77b695c0d)
MD5 should use little endian order. Fortunately the only ciphersuite
affected is EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 (TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5) which
is a rarely used export grade ciphersuite.
(cherry picked from commit f306b87d766e6ecf30824635c7c395b67cff9dbc)
Kludge alert. This is arranged by passing padding length in unused
bits of SSL3_RECORD->type, so that orig_len can be reconstructed.
(cherry picked from commit 8bfd4c659f180a6ce34f21c0e62956b362067fba)
RISCs are picky and alignment granted by compiler for md_state can be
insufficient for SHA512.
(cherry picked from commit 36260233e7e3396feed884d3f501283e0453c04f)
Break dependency on uint64_t. It's possible to declare bits as
unsigned int, because TLS packets are limited in size and 32-bit
value can't overflow.
(cherry picked from commit cab13fc8473856a43556d41d8dac5605f4ba1f91)
We have to use EVP in FIPS mode so we can only partially mitigate
timing differences.
Make an extra call to EVP_DigestSignUpdate to hash additonal blocks
to cover any timing differences caused by removal of padding.
(cherry picked from commit b908e88ec15aa0a74805e3f2236fc4f83f2789c2)
This change updates the DTLS code to match the constant-time CBC
behaviour in the TLS.
(cherry picked from commit 9f27de170d1b7bef3d46d41382dc4dafde8b3900)
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681f600b2f165e4adc57547b097b475fd)
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bccfc0bb9da254dc84e23bc6a1c78a64e)
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)
the SSL_CONF APIs.
This is complicated a little because the SSL_CTX structure is not available
when the command line is processed: so just check syntax of commands initially
and store them, ready to apply later.
(backport from HEAD)
client hello message. Previously this could only be retrieved on an initial
connection and it was impossible to determine the cipher IDs of any uknown
ciphersuites.
(backport from HEAD)
by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
comparison.
Print out results of checks for each candidate chain tested in
s_server/s_client.
(backport from HEAD)
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
to test if a chain is correctly configured.
Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
(backport from HEAD)
details in s_client.
Also add ctrl to set client certificate types. If not used sensible values
will be included based on supported signature algorithms: for example if
we don't include any DSA signing algorithms the DSA certificate type is
omitted.
Fix restriction in old code where certificate types would be truncated
if it exceeded TLS_CT_NUMBER.
(backport from HEAD)
the permitted signature algorithms for server and client authentication
are the same but it is now possible to set different algorithms for client
authentication only.
(backport from HEAD)
is required by client or server. An application can decide which
certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
certificate callback: for example you can now clear existing certificates
and specify the whole chain.
(backport from HEAD)
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
to have similar checks in it.
Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
(backport from HEAD)
Only store encoded versions of peer and configured signature algorithms.
Determine shared signature algorithms and cache the result along with NID
equivalents of each algorithm.
(backport from HEAD)
TLS v1.2. These are sent as an extension for clients and during a certificate
request for servers.
TODO: add support for shared signature algorithms, respect shared algorithms
when deciding which ciphersuites and certificates to permit.
(backport from HEAD)
Support - as a file for standard input or output.
Add -badsig option to generate invalid signatures for testing.
New -rmd option to specify digest to sign OCSP responses with.
Multiple copies of the ENGINE will cause problems when it is cleaned up as
the methods are stored in static structures which will be overwritten and
freed up more than once.
Set static methods to NULL when the ENGINE is freed so it can be reloaded.
Reported by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>
Treat a NULL value passed to drbg_free_entropy callback as non-op. This
can happen if the call to fips_get_entropy fails.
When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
(often lower perfomance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
Reported by: Phil Pennock <openssl-dev@spodhuis.org>
Make renegotiation work for TLS 1.2, 1.1 by not using a lower record
version client hello workaround if renegotiating.
of digest algorithms, mosty SHA, on Power7. Mystery of century, why SHA,
why slower algorithm are affected more... [from HEAD].
PR: 2794
Submitted by: Ashley Lai
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
If OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH is set then limit the size of client
ciphersuites to this value. A value of 50 should be sufficient.
Document workarounds in CHANGES.
Some servers hang when presented with a client hello record length exceeding
255 bytes but will work with longer client hellos if the TLS record version
in client hello does not exceed TLS v1.0. Unfortunately this doesn't fix all
cases...
enabled instead of requiring an application to hard code a (possibly
inappropriate) parameter set and delve into EC internals we just
automatically use the preferred curve.
(backport from HEAD)
Tidy some code up.
Don't allocate a structure to handle ECC extensions when it is used for
default values.
Make supported curves configurable.
Add ctrls to retrieve shared curves: not fully integrated with rest of
ECC code yet.
(backport from HEAD)
extensions to s_client and s_server to print out retrieved valued.
Extend CERT structure to cache supported signature algorithm data.
(backport from HEAD)
between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
(backport from HEAD)
structure.
Before this the only way to add a custom chain was in the parent SSL_CTX
(which is shared by all key types and SSL structures) or rely on auto
chain building (which is performed on each handshake) from the trust store.
(backport from HEAD)
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