Add ticket length before buffering DTLS message
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required. By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be sent on retransmission. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4f9fab6bd0253416eeace5a45142c7c4a83bc511) Conflicts: ssl/s3_srvr.c
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@ -3391,10 +3391,10 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
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/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
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/* Total length */
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len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
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ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
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/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
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p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
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s2n(len - 6, p);
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ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
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s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
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OPENSSL_free(senc);
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}
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