update CHANGES
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OpenSSL CHANGES
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_______________
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Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
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can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
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server.
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Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
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Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
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preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
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[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
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*) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
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ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
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by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
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http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
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Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
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flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
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[Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
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Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
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this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
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Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
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TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
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less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
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is at least 512 bytes long.
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[Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
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*) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
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MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
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[Steve Henson]
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@ -307,6 +280,35 @@
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certificates.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
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*) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
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can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
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server.
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Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
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Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
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preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
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[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
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*) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
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ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
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by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
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http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
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Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
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flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
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[Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
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*) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
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Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
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TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
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less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
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is at least 512 bytes long.
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[Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
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*) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
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