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207 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
33dd083206 Prepare for 1.0.2d release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-07-09 13:03:09 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5627e0f77d Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-07-09 09:31:25 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9dee5244e1 Add documentation for some missing verify options
Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 79a55b1f27)

Conflicts:
	doc/apps/verify.pod
2015-07-07 22:07:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
692f07c3e0 Reject calls to X509_verify_cert that have not been reinitialised
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase  where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.

With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.

With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.

Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-07-07 21:50:09 +01:00
Matt Caswell
f404943bca Add test for CVE-2015-1793
This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
verification tests.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-07-07 21:48:55 +01:00
Matt Caswell
21376d8ae3 Fix alternate chains certificate forgery issue
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.

This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.

Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.

CVE-2015-1793

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-07-07 21:48:55 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c0b674b7cb Relax CCM tag check.
In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9cca7be11d)
2015-07-06 18:35:35 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a229c2b805 document -2 return value
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5727582cf5)
2015-07-06 18:35:35 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3c66a669df Fix PSK handling.
The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).

Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-07-02 12:01:27 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f8f75a7e4a Check for errors with SRP
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5fced2395d)
2015-06-29 19:21:15 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7c1dae55d4 Don't output bogus errors in PKCS12_parse
PR#3923

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffbf304d48)
2015-06-25 04:55:43 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
edbc9050be Add docs for ssl verification parameter functions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 77672802a6)
2015-06-24 22:22:23 +01:00
Vitezslav Cizek
c00206c326 GH297: Fix NAME section of SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo.pod
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-23 08:17:57 -04:00
Rich Salz
4ce5ed5f39 RT3682: Avoid double-free on OCSP parse error
Found by Kurt Cancemi

(Manual cherry-pick of f8e427154bbc0c33f29fa7aad001b1b655e5995b)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-23 08:14:24 -04:00
Russell Webb
295c629ab1 RT3856: Fix memory leaks in test code
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2d540402aa)
2015-06-23 08:04:19 -04:00
Richard Levitte
c61bb1abaf make update
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-23 03:03:10 +02:00
Richard Levitte
f59186e436 Rearrange rsaz
A small rearrangement so the inclusion of rsaz_exp.h would be
unconditional, but what that header defines becomes conditional.

This solves the weirdness where rsaz_exp.h gets in and out of the
dependency list for bn_exp.c, depending on the present architecture.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-23 03:02:05 +02:00
Rich Salz
0abf610447 RT3907-fix
Typo in local variable name; introduced by previous fix.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc3f3fc2b1)
2015-06-22 20:50:20 -04:00
Rich Salz
57bd71b45b RT3907: avoid "local" in testssl script
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 75ba5c58c6)
2015-06-22 15:50:02 -04:00
Rich Salz
4475451164 RT3917: add cleanup on an error path
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7fba8407cc)
2015-06-21 17:55:06 -04:00
Richard Levitte
220b9519eb Cleanup mttest.c : because we no longer use stdio here, don't include it
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ca96efd24)
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
710e28ef93 Add -ldl to the build of mttest.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d62c98c81c)
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
05d20833e3 Cleanup mttest.c : do not try to output reference counts when threads are done
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 964626957f)
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
90ee3c1646 Cleanup mttest.c : better error reporting when certs are missing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a1789d254)
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
7ef465050e Cleanup mttest.c : make ssl_method a pointer to const
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f4c73bfe0a)

Conflicts:
	crypto/threads/mttest.c
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
8ca211707a Cleanup mttest.c : more output changes
More fprintf()s and printf()s to turn into BIO calls.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
9007dfa203 Cleanup mttest.c : modernise output
Construct bio_err and bio_stdout from file handles instead of FILE
pointers, since the latter might not be implemented (when OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
is defined).
Convert all output to use BIO_printf.
Change lh_foo to lh_SSL_SESSION_foo.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb8abd6735)

Conflicts:
	crypto/threads/mttest.c
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
603bebc0e7 Cleanup mttest.c : modernise the threads setup
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5c78e18352)

Conflicts:
	crypto/threads/mttest.c
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Richard Levitte
56f0733145 Cleanup mttest.c : remove MS_CALLBACK
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a3f9286556)
2015-06-21 22:12:07 +02:00
Rich Salz
8e6bb99979 RT1688: Add dependencies for parallel make
Backport to 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 to fix RT 3905

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-21 15:26:54 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8615d8b4ec typo: should be OPENSSL_free
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bc9567cdc9)
2015-06-20 19:28:58 +01:00
Richard Levitte
4f0812cc28 Make preprocessor error into real preprocessor error
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b4f0d1a4a8)
2015-06-16 13:13:49 +02:00
Richard Levitte
3bf9adaa2b Remove one extraneous parenthesis
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30cf91784b)
2015-06-16 13:13:48 +02:00
Matt Caswell
54ae378c9e Prepare for 1.0.2d-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-12 16:14:35 +01:00
Matt Caswell
0ee5fcde06 Prepare for 1.0.2c release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-12 16:10:40 +01:00
Matt Caswell
d4c1763858 Updated CHANGES and NEWS entries for new release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-12 15:56:51 +01:00
Adam Langley
fe64245aa1 Allow a zero length extension block
It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-12 15:43:02 +01:00
Matt Caswell
1030f89f5e Fix ABI break with HMAC
Recent HMAC changes broke ABI compatibility due to a new field in HMAC_CTX.
This backs that change out, and does it a different way.

Thanks to Timo Teras for the concept.

Conflicts:
	crypto/hmac/hmac.c

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-12 14:08:54 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b6ed991731 Prepare for 1.0.2c-dev
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:59:37 +01:00
Matt Caswell
7b560c174d Prepare for 1.0.2b release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:55:38 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c26bfada81 make update
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:55:38 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
40b8eb792d bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4924b37ee0)
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
ab17f6b746 Update CHANGES and NEWS
Updates to CHANGES and NEWS to take account of the latest security fixes.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
7bc2aee4f1 PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent.
CVE-2015-1790

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
9bc3665ac9 Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.

CVE-2015-1789

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aa5ab40860 Fix infinite loop in CMS
Fix loop in do_free_upto if cmsbio is NULL: this will happen when attempting
to verify and a digest is not recognised. Reported by Johannes Bauer.

CVE-2015-1792

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Richard Levitte
8aa556e1c3 make update
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 15:51:16 +02:00
Richard Levitte
5ef5b9ffa9 Correction of make depend merge error
$(PROGS) was mistakenly removed, adding it back.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 15:51:16 +02:00
Matt Caswell
d44f89c990 More ssl_session_dup fixes
Fix error handling in ssl_session_dup, as well as incorrect setting up of
the session ticket. Follow on from CVE-2015-1791.

Thanks to LibreSSL project for reporting these issues.

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_sess.c

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 10:04:00 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
c35e138a58 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha*.c: address linker warning about OPENSSL_ia32cap_P size mismatch.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f0fa5c8306)
2015-06-11 10:14:01 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
57e477b9ec Only allow a temporary rsa key exchange when they key is larger than 512.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #838
2015-06-11 00:06:06 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
39a298a1c0 Properly check certificate in case of export ciphers.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #838
2015-06-11 00:06:06 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
1fdf36f511 gcm.c: address linker warning about OPENSSL_ia32cap_P size mismatch.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 75c4827dfe)
2015-06-10 23:58:07 +02:00
Matt Caswell
9dcab127e1 DTLS handshake message fragments musn't span packets
It should not be possible for DTLS message fragments to span multiple
packets. However previously if the message header fitted exactly into one
packet, and the fragment body was in the next packet then this would work.
Obviously this would fail if packets get re-ordered mid-flight.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-06-10 12:10:18 +01:00
Matt Caswell
3e8f9dc1a0 Fix leak in HMAC error path
In the event of an error in the HMAC function, leaks can occur because the
HMAC_CTX does not get cleaned up.

Thanks to the BoringSSL project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e43a13c807)
2015-06-10 11:06:05 +01:00
Matt Caswell
7cb79c7afb EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean
The function EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean value.
It returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if it is not, and -1
on error. Many usages within OpenSSL were incorrectly using this
function and therefore not correctly handling error conditions.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68886be7e2)
2015-06-10 10:49:06 +01:00
Matt Caswell
d272599277 Tighten extension handling
This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c
2015-06-10 10:24:49 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b3c02473f7 Fix memory leaks in BIO_dup_chain()
This fixes a memory leak that can occur whilst duplicating a BIO chain if
the call to CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() fails. It also fixes a second memory leak
where if a failure occurs after successfully creating the first BIO in the
chain, then the beginning of the new chain was not freed.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
2015-06-10 10:24:49 +01:00
Matt Caswell
23cd01ef61 Replace memset with OPENSSL_cleanse()
BUF_MEM_free() attempts to cleanse memory using memset immediately prior
to a free. This is at risk of being optimised away by the compiler, so
replace with a call to OPENSSL_cleanse() instead.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-10 10:24:30 +01:00
Matt Caswell
dcad51bc13 Fix Kerberos issue in ssl_session_dup
The fix for CVE-2015-1791 introduced an error in ssl_session_dup for
Kerberos.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-06-10 09:37:01 +01:00
Richard Levitte
80d586d97f When making libcrypto from apps or test, make sure to include engines
For librypto to be complete, the stuff in both crypto/ and engines/
have to be built.  Doing 'make test' or 'make apps' from a clean
source tree failed to do so.
Corrected by using the new 'build_libcrypto' in the top Makefile.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit acaff3b797)
2015-06-10 02:09:49 +02:00
Richard Levitte
cbfec68a79 Add and rearrange building of libraries
There's a need for a target that will build all of libcrypto, so let's
add 'build_libcrypto' that does this.  For ortogonality, let's also
add 'build_libssl'.  Have both also depend on 'libcrypto.pc' and
'libssl.pc' so those get built together with the libraries.
This makes 'all' depend on fewer things directly.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 177b5f9c82)

Conflicts:
	Makefile.org
2015-06-10 02:09:39 +02:00
Jeffrey Walton
31909e7968 Explicitly mention PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC in EVP doc.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82c4d79318)
2015-06-08 20:21:23 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
34cdff92e9 return correct NID for undefined object
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0fb9990480)
2015-06-08 21:46:42 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
05627d57e5 Use CRYPTO_memcmp in s3_cbc.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-08 15:04:28 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
ac32a77cd6 Use CRYPTO_memcmp when comparing authenticators
Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e4a355dca)
2015-06-08 15:01:14 +02:00
Ben Laurie
f877da9ced Use cc instead of gcc so either clang or gcc is used as appropriate. Add clang
flags needed to keep it happy.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-05 11:15:11 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
ba9d44b28d Allow all curves when the client doesn't send an supported elliptic curves extension
At least in the case of SSLv3 we can't send an extention.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #811

(cherry picked from commit 3c06513f38)
2015-06-04 21:12:33 +02:00
Matt Caswell
da5fab7325 Remove misleading comment
Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f3d889523e)
2015-06-04 12:53:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
efd89aa9cc Clean premaster_secret for GOST
Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7ee4815f2)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2015-06-04 12:53:43 +01:00
Matt Caswell
4e3dbe37ca Clean Kerberos pre-master secret
Ensure the Kerberos pre-master secret has OPENSSL_cleanse called on it.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-04 11:44:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
3610719931 Fix off-by-one error in BN_bn2hex
A BIGNUM can have the value of -0. The function BN_bn2hex fails to account
for this and can allocate a buffer one byte too short in the event of -0
being used, leading to a one byte buffer overrun. All usage within the
OpenSSL library is considered safe. Any security risk is considered
negligible.

With thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and
Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c56353071d)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn_print.c
2015-06-04 09:26:43 +01:00
Matt Caswell
af3aa2b5ef Fix DTLS session resumption
The session object on the client side is initially created during
construction of the ClientHello. If the client is DTLS1.2 capable then it
will store 1.2 as the version for the session. However if the server is only
DTLS1.0 capable then when the ServerHello comes back the client switches to
using DTLS1.0 from then on. However the session version does not get
updated. Therefore when the client attempts to resume that session the
server throws an alert because of an incorrect protocol version.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7322abf5ce)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
2015-06-04 09:16:55 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
adba3b3bf1 make update
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-03 15:18:20 +01:00
Sergey Agievich
ad0fb7f498 Add funtions to set item_sign and item_verify
PR#3872

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-03 15:18:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b1d5b8a4a4 Fix compilation failure for some tool chains
Some tool chains (e.g. android) do not define IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and so
this build breaks.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 133dce447b)
2015-06-02 23:38:03 +01:00
Annie Yousar
fb22f74064 RT3230: Better test for C identifier
objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be
used as a C identifier.  Improve the test to match the real C
rules.

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 591b7aef05)
2015-06-02 17:17:43 -04:00
Richard Levitte
858de8718f Add the macro OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64
This is for consistency.
Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f131556d6)

Conflicts:
	e_os2.h
2015-06-02 18:03:36 +02:00
Olaf Johansson
bd5b5b4c4b GH249: Fix bad regexp in arg parsing.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8846adbd36)
2015-06-02 11:25:24 -04:00
Per Allansson
188f3f9767 Fix IP_MTU_DISCOVER typo
The code in bss_dgram.c checks if IP_MTUDISCOVER is defined, where it
should test for IP_MTU_DISCOVER

RT#3888

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0baaff1a76)
2015-06-02 12:59:11 +01:00
Matt Caswell
27c76b9b80 Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.

CVE-2015-1791

This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.

Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-02 09:30:31 +01:00
Matt Caswell
8744ba5e42 Check the message type requested is the type received in DTLS
dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c2b1d872b)
2015-06-01 00:30:56 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4d9dc0c269 check for error when creating PKCS#8 structure
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2849707fa6)
2015-05-28 18:01:52 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7e365298ea PEM doc fixes
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f097f81c89)
2015-05-28 18:01:52 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
b6f33dce3b Fix ssltest to use 1024-bit DHE parameters
Also add more ciphersuite test coverage, and a negative test for
512-bit DHE.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ee85aab75)
2015-05-26 12:42:40 +02:00
Matt Caswell
cdc47dcf19 Don't check for a negative SRP extension size
The size of the SRP extension can never be negative (the variable
|size| is unsigned). Therefore don't check if it is less than zero.

RT#3862

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c89d29083)
2015-05-26 10:38:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9cab86ee0a Fix error check in GOST engine
The return value of i2d functions can be negative if an error occurs.
Therefore don't assign the return value to an unsigned type and *then*
check if it is negative.

RT#3862

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 90e7cdff3a)
2015-05-26 10:38:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e40d7c1f3a Handle unsigned struct timeval members
The members of struct timeval on OpenVMS are unsigned. The logic for
calculating timeouts needs adjusting to deal with this.

RT#3862

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fc52ac9028)
2015-05-26 10:38:56 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3ae6186564 Housekeeping 'make TABLE' update.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-26 10:23:21 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
aa1e42215b Configure: replace -mv8 with -mcpu=v8 in SPARC config lines.
RT#3860

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-26 10:22:01 +02:00
Billy Brumley
bec1093cce fix copy paste error in ec_GF2m function prototypes
RT#3858

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 71f6130b7a)
2015-05-26 10:14:19 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
78ac7fa18d bn/bn_lcl.h: fix MIPS-specific gcc version check.
RT#3859

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 60c268b21a)
2015-05-26 10:07:59 +02:00
Matt Caswell
11414f17d9 Don't send an alert if we've just received one
If the record received is for a version that we don't support, previously we
were sending an alert back. However if the incoming record already looks
like an alert then probably we shouldn't do that. So suppress an outgoing
alert if it looks like we've got one incoming.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-05-25 17:52:27 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
0a59e2dc30 bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix valgrind error.
bn_get_bits5 was overstepping array boundary by 1 byte. It was exclusively
read overstep and data could not have been used. The only potential problem
would be if array happens to end on the very edge of last accesible page.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69567687b0)
2015-05-24 21:31:49 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
0945bfcb22 bn/bn_gf2m.c: appease STACK, unstable code detector.
RT#3852

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86e5d1e32b)
2015-05-24 21:27:32 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
f5d840a079 bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl: fix intermittent EC failures on SPARC T3.
BLKINIT optimization worked on T4, but for some reason appears "too
aggressive" for T3 triggering intermiitent EC failures. It's not clear
why only EC is affected...

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 579734ced6)
2015-05-24 13:26:37 +02:00
Richard Levitte
886ef2b650 Fix update and depend in engines/
The update: target in engines/ didn't recurse into engines/ccgost.
The update: and depend: targets in engines/ccgost needed a fixup.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b822d2566)
2015-05-23 11:08:12 +02:00
Richard Levitte
8b89cb3307 Missed a couple of spots in the update change
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6f45032f67)

Conflicts:
	apps/Makefile
2015-05-23 06:25:12 +02:00
Richard Levitte
bf42354620 Fix the update target and remove duplicate file updates
We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the
Makefile in the directory the header file lived in.  This is error
prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually
just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was
done.

This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds
an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or
local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a
double run through the whole file tree.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f539dc1a2)

Conflicts:
	Makefile.org
	apps/Makefile
	test/Makefile
2015-05-23 06:25:12 +02:00
Matt Caswell
e4731f76e2 Fix typo setting up certificate masks
The certificate masks are used to select which ciphersuite we are going to
use. The variables |emask_k| and |emask_a| relate to export grade key
exchange and authentication respecitively. The variables |mask_k| and
|mask_a| are the equivalent versions for non-export grade. This fixes an
instance where the two usages of export/non-export were mixed up. In
practice it makes little difference since it still works!

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdfe8b06ae)
2015-05-23 00:01:48 +01:00
Matt Caswell
595487ea19 Remove export static DH ciphersuites
Remove support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites. These two
ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH
ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked
since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new
export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to
fix them.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 13f8eb4730)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
2015-05-23 00:01:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c6eb1cbd1e Fix off-by-one in BN_rand
If BN_rand is called with |bits| set to 1 and |top| set to 1 then a 1 byte
buffer overflow can occur. There are no such instances within the OpenSSL at
the moment.

Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke, Filip Palian for
discovering and reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-05-22 23:43:07 +01:00
Matt Caswell
1a9499cf23 Reject negative shifts for BN_rshift and BN_lshift
The functions BN_rshift and BN_lshift shift their arguments to the right or
left by a specified number of bits. Unpredicatable results (including
crashes) can occur if a negative number is supplied for the shift value.

Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and Filip Palian
for discovering and reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7cc18d8158)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn.h
	crypto/bn/bn_err.c
2015-05-22 23:19:34 +01:00
Lubom
254c01ed54 Lost alert in DTLS
If a client receives a bad hello request in DTLS then the alert is not
sent correctly.

RT#2801

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4dc1aa0436)
2015-05-22 09:44:44 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
2d8e705b2a Correctly check for export size limit
40 bit ciphers are limited to 512 bit RSA, 56 bit ciphers to 1024 bit.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac38115c1a)
2015-05-20 22:19:34 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
f4d1fb7769 Only support >= 256-bit elliptic curves with ecdh_auto (server) or by default (client).
Also reorder preferences to prefer prime curves to binary curves, and P-256 to everything else.

The result:

$ openssl s_server -named_curves "auto"

This command will negotiate an ECDHE ciphersuite with P-256:

$ openssl s_client

This command will negotiate P-384:

$ openssl s_client -curves "P-384"

This command will not negotiate ECDHE because P-224 is disabled with "auto":

$ openssl s_client -curves "P-224"

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 16:04:37 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
10a70da729 client: reject handshakes with DH parameters < 768 bits.
Since the client has no way of communicating her supported parameter
range to the server, connections to servers that choose weak DH will
simply fail.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
dcbc03ede7 Update documentation with Diffie-Hellman best practices.
- Do not advise generation of DH parameters with dsaparam to save
computation time.
- Promote use of custom parameters more, and explicitly forbid use of
built-in parameters weaker than 2048 bits.
- Advise the callback to ignore <keylength> - it is currently called
with 1024 bits, but this value can and should be safely ignored by
servers.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
b32aa8e63e dhparam: fix documentation
The default bitlength is now 2048. Also clarify that either the number
of bits or the generator must be present:

$ openssl dhparam -2
and
$ openssl dhparam 2048
generate parameters but
$ openssl dhparam
does not.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
82697bc2b9 s_server: Use 2048-bit DH parameters by default.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
StudioEtrange
17b753f23a GitHub284: Fix typo in xx-32.pl scripts.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 04:34:42 -04:00
Robert Swiecki
cdcb94eea7 Don't add write errors into bytecounts
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 00d565cfbe)
2015-05-19 07:20:18 -04:00
Andy Polyakov
051b41df41 mk1mf.pl: replace chop for windows.
Backport old patch to make it work in mixture of perls for Windows.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Cherry-picked from 7bb98eee3c
2015-05-15 14:18:21 -04:00
Rich Salz
c59bd61b2e RT1207: document SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c490a5512e)
2015-05-13 13:03:32 -04:00
Rich Salz
f34b095fab Add NULL checks from master
The big "don't check for NULL" cleanup requires backporting some
of the lowest-level functions to actually do nothing if NULL is
given.  This will make it easier to backport fixes to release
branches, where master assumes those lower-level functions are "safe"

This commit addresses those tickets: 3798 3799 3801.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-13 12:55:03 -04:00
Andy Polyakov
d3bb25e30a aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl: fix Windows compilation failure with old assembler.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82c4a07939)
2015-05-13 17:00:06 +02:00
Hanno Böck
eba8bf485a Call of memcmp with null pointers in obj_cmp()
The function obj_cmp() (file crypto/objects/obj_dat.c) can in some
situations call memcmp() with a null pointer and a zero length.

This is invalid behaviour. When compiling openssl with undefined
behaviour sanitizer (add -fsanitize=undefined to compile flags) this
can be seen. One example that triggers this behaviour is the pkcs7
command (but there are others, e.g. I've seen it with the timestamp
function):
apps/openssl pkcs7 -in test/testp7.pem

What happens is that obj_cmp takes objects of the type ASN1_OBJECT and
passes their ->data pointer to memcmp. Zero-sized ASN1_OBJECT
structures can have a null pointer as data.

RT#3816

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b8dc08b74)
2015-05-13 15:28:48 +01:00
Matt Caswell
464774d75f Don't allow a CCS when expecting a CertificateVerify
Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.

Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.

RT#2958

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0bd649336)
2015-05-13 11:21:01 +01:00
Kurt Cancemi
833518cf0e Add missing NULL check in X509V3_parse_list()
Matt's note: I added a call to X509V3err to Kurt's original patch.

RT#3840

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 344c271eb3)
2015-05-11 12:19:54 +01:00
Bjoern D. Rasmussen
8a73e3a0e8 Fix for memcpy() and strcmp() being undefined.
clang says: "s_cb.c:958:9: error: implicitly declaring library function
'memcpy'"

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f744cceff)

Conflicts:
	apps/s_cb.c
2015-05-11 12:03:12 +01:00
Matt Caswell
edc2a76ade Check sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null return value
If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list()
should also return NULL.

Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14def5f537)
2015-05-11 11:53:50 +01:00
Viktor Dukhovni
8dfe1e4dd2 Fix typo in valid_star
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
2015-05-07 14:00:38 -04:00
Matt Caswell
feb96e914a Add more error state transitions (DTLS)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cefc93910c)

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_srvr.c
2015-05-05 20:05:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
67fb63e9b7 Add more error state transitions (client)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client
side.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc273a9361)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
2015-05-05 20:05:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
eecc697b65 Add more error state transitions
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf9b0b6fb2)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2015-05-05 19:52:26 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e4f77bf183 Add Error state
Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a89db885e0)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
	ssl/ssl_stat.c
2015-05-05 19:50:12 +01:00
Matt Caswell
cd5f206c2f Remove libcrypto to libssl dependency
Remove dependency on ssl_locl.h from v3_scts.c, and incidentally fix a build problem with
kerberos (the dependency meant v3_scts.c was trying to include krb5.h, but without having been
passed the relevanant -I flags to the compiler)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d13bd6130b)

Conflicts:
	crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
2015-05-05 09:09:56 +01:00
Richard Levitte
3cf40601b7 RT2943: Check sizes if -iv and -K arguments
RT2943 only complains about the incorrect check of -K argument size,
we might as well do the same thing with the -iv argument.

Before this, we only checked that the given argument wouldn't give a
bitstring larger than EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH.  we can be more precise and
check against the size of the actual cipher used.

(cherry picked from commit 8920a7cd04)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-04 20:21:21 +02:00
Rich Salz
82e586a90b Fix cut/paste error
Was memset with wrong sizeof.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23b0fa5ab6)
2015-05-04 10:54:18 -04:00
Gilles Khouzam
a659386639 RT3820: Don't call GetDesktopWindow()
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bed2edf1cb)
2015-05-02 08:01:52 -04:00
Rich Salz
5b38d54753 RT3776: Wrong size for malloc
Use sizeof *foo parameter, to avoid these errors.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53ba0a9e91)
2015-05-02 07:55:17 -04:00
Hanno Böck
6b3a315003 Fix uninitialized variable.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 539ed89f68)
2015-05-02 07:45:35 -04:00
Matt Caswell
f296e411ef Fix buffer overrun in RSA signing
The problem occurs in EVP_PKEY_sign() when using RSA with X931 padding.
It is only triggered if the RSA key size is smaller than the digest length.
So with SHA512 you can trigger the overflow with anything less than an RSA
512 bit key. I managed to trigger a 62 byte overflow when using a 16 bit RSA
key. This wasn't sufficient to cause a crash, although your mileage may
vary.

In practice RSA keys of this length are never used and X931 padding is very
rare. Even if someone did use an excessively short RSA key, the chances of
them combining that with a longer digest and X931 padding is very
small. For these reasons I do not believe there is a security implication to
this. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34166d4189)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5bea7975a6 Add sanity check to print_bin function
Add a sanity check to the print_bin function to ensure that the |off|
argument is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3deeeeb61b)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9c5efc9c65 Add sanity check to ssl_get_prev_session
Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb0f400b0c)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
75862f7741 Sanity check the return from final_finish_mac
The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c427570e50)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_locl.h
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
99ceb2d40c Add sanity check in ssl3_cbc_digest_record
For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29b0a15a48)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
abc7a266a3 Clarify logic in BIO_*printf functions
The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output
grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original
logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is
incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original
logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the
size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to
make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in
the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d9e37744c)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
33c99f2c81 Sanity check EVP_EncodeUpdate buffer len
There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
1a3701f4fe Sanity check EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD
The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c826988109)

Conflicts:
	ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
2015-04-30 23:21:50 +01:00
Matt Caswell
4ce06271aa Sanity check DES_enc_write buffer length
Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 873fb39f20)
2015-04-30 23:14:55 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c5f8cd7bc6 Add length sanity check in SSLv2 n_do_ssl_write()
Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.

Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-29 17:23:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
937a766982 Revert "Fix verify algorithm."
This reverts commit 47daa155a3.

The above commit was backported to the 1.0.2 branch as part of backporting
the alternative chain verify algorithm changes. However it has been pointed
out (credit to Shigeki Ohtsu) that this is unnecessary in 1.0.2 as this
commit is a work around for loop checking that only exists in master.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-04-29 15:44:03 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
07977739f0 NISTZ256: use EC_POINT API and check errors.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6038354cf8)
2015-04-27 19:50:19 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
c7e78b6bed NISTZ256: don't swallow malloc errors
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a4d5269e6d)
2015-04-27 18:06:01 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
df6c736fbd NISTZ256: set Z_is_one to boolean 0/1 as is customary.
Cosmetic, no real effect.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4446044a79)
2015-04-27 16:50:05 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
c30a1b3b33 Error checking and memory leak fixes in NISTZ256.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-04-27 16:37:19 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
9ed55313a7 Fix error checking and memory leaks in NISTZ256 precomputation.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53dd4ddf71)
2015-04-24 17:47:01 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
7238a82c8a Correctly set Z_is_one on the return value in the NISTZ256 implementation.
Also add a few comments about constant-timeness.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-24 17:35:56 +02:00
Loganaden Velvindron
6e5d130765 Fix CRYPTO_strdup
The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
This patch adds a NULL check.

RT3786

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)
2015-04-22 17:20:38 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
8f0f9ffda3 Repair EAP-FAST session resumption
EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec61
and
7b3ba508af
removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.

This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.

Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.

Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3d015363)
2015-04-21 19:31:09 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
5c4fd8b515 Initialize variable
newsig may be used (freed) uninitialized on a malloc error.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6824941440)
2015-04-21 19:27:24 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
496c79f60c make update
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-21 17:50:36 +02:00
Richard Levitte
186578be45 Initialised 'ok' and redo the logic.
The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok",
so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06affe3dac)
2015-04-21 01:45:47 +02:00
Matt Caswell
f4c5cd3085 Fix return checks in GOST engine
Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and
added appropriate error handling.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8817e2e0c9)
2015-04-20 23:10:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
0ddf91c5f3 Fix misc NULL derefs in sureware engine
Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b611e5fe8)
2015-04-20 23:10:56 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
73824ba8fe aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl: fix typo affecting Windows build.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7be6bc68c6)
2015-04-20 18:40:46 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e95e22af50 aes/asm/aesni-x86[_64].pl update.
This addresses

- request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576;
- clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to
see if there will be some traction from compiler side);
- more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout
(desired when RT#3553 was reviewed);
- minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around);

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23f6eec71d)
2015-04-20 15:44:36 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
47daa155a3 Fix verify algorithm.
Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5991ec528)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
be856c0391 Add documentation for the -no_alt_chains option for various apps, as well as
the X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag.

Conflicts:
	doc/apps/cms.pod
	doc/apps/ocsp.pod
	doc/apps/s_client.pod
	doc/apps/s_server.pod
	doc/apps/smime.pod
	doc/apps/verify.pod

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
017a06c7d1 Add -no_alt_chains option to apps to implement the new
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.

Conflicts:
	apps/cms.c
	apps/ocsp.c
	apps/s_client.c
	apps/s_server.c
	apps/smime.c
	apps/verify.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
dfd3322d72 Add flag to inhibit checking for alternate certificate chains. Setting this
behaviour will force behaviour as per previous versions of OpenSSL

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
6281abc796 In certain situations the server provided certificate chain may no longer be
valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact
in the trust store.

When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.

RT3637
RT3621

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3661bb4e79 Fix encoding bug in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.

Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0eed48d37)
2015-04-18 14:43:33 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
e697a4c3d7 Error out immediately on empty ciphers list.
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb32)
2015-04-17 18:44:35 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
5613feaacc Use -Wall -Wextra with clang
The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions.
Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-17 18:26:09 +02:00
Viktor Dukhovni
3b38646d13 Code style: space after 'if'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab@openssl.org>
2015-04-16 13:50:01 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf5b8ff17d Limit depth of nested sequences when generating ASN.1
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c4137b5e82)
2015-04-16 16:06:11 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a696708ae6 Reject empty generation strings.
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 111b60bea0)
2015-04-16 16:06:10 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5101c35c91 Fix ssl_get_prev_session overrun
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.

This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.

With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1c9)
2015-04-14 14:59:40 +01:00
Matt Caswell
35bac91676 Check for ClientHello message overruns
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.

With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
2015-04-14 14:48:24 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
ea9de25f2f do_dirname: Don't change gen on failures
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ec5c5dd36)
2015-04-11 20:35:13 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
f6cddcccc8 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free: Check param for NULL
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit f49baeff50)
2015-04-11 20:35:13 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6df777ed50 Don't set *pval to NULL in ASN1_item_ex_new.
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.

*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.

Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f617b4969a)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
2015-04-10 19:52:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
07395b7a6d Fix ECDH key identifier support.
PR#3789

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a317fa07c)
2015-04-10 18:52:49 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
784f155e0d Fix ECDH detection, add ECDH keyid test.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9fdbc9df76)
2015-04-10 18:52:49 +01:00
Richard Levitte
42802a94be Have mkerr.pl treat already existing multiline string defs properly
Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines.  That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:

    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
     "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},

However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:

    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
     "No gost certificate sent by peer"},

Clearly not what we wanted.  This change fixes this problem.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2cfdfe0918)
2015-04-08 21:46:15 +02:00
Richard Levitte
9e63eeaf76 Ignore the non-dll windows specific build directories
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37d92b1b2b)
2015-04-08 18:00:47 +02:00
Richard Levitte
700c0eb8d9 Appease clang -Wshadow
The macros BSWAP4 and BSWAP8 have statetemnt expressions
implementations that use local variable names that shadow variables
outside the macro call, generating warnings like this

e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:263:14: warning: declaration shadows a local variable
      [-Wshadow]
    seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
             ^
../modes/modes_lcl.h:41:29: note: expanded from macro 'BSWAP8'
                            ^
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:223:12: note: previous declaration is here
    size_t ret = 0;
           ^

Have clang be quiet by modifying the macro variable names slightly
(suffixing them with an underscore).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2da2a4349c)
2015-04-08 17:59:41 +02:00
Richard Levitte
a4ba716333 Appease clang -Wgnu-statement-expression
We use GNU statement expressions in crypto/md32_common.h, surrounded
by checks that GNU C is indeed used to compile.  It seems that clang,
at least on Linux, pretends to be GNU C, therefore finds the statement
expressions and then warns about them.

The solution is to have clang be quiet about it.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 04958e84d8)
2015-04-08 17:59:41 +02:00
Richard Levitte
d21cbd7d5e Appease clang -Wempty-translation-unit
ebcdic.c:284:7: warning: ISO C requires a translation unit to contain at least one
      declaration [-Wempty-translation-unit]
      ^
1 warning generated.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c25dea53e9)
2015-04-08 17:59:40 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
ae50d82700 Harden SSLv2-supporting servers against Bleichenbacher's attack.
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c

Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-04-08 16:28:42 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
ff864ffef3 modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl: up to 90% performance improvement.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7eeeb49e11)
2015-04-02 10:04:37 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
0a1f31f7ba sha/asm/sha*-armv8.pl: add Denver and X-Gene esults.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be5a87a1b0)
2015-04-02 09:51:32 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
5a27a20be3 aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: optimize for Cortex-A5x.
ARM has optimized Cortex-A5x pipeline to favour pairs of complementary
AES instructions. While modified code improves performance of post-r0p0
Cortex-A53 performance by >40% (for CBC decrypt and CTR), it hurts
original r0p0. We favour later revisions, because one can't prevent
future from coming. Improvement on post-r0p0 Cortex-A57 exceeds 50%,
while new code is not slower on r0p0, or Apple A7 for that matter.

[Update even SHA results for latest Cortex-A53.]

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 94376cccb4)
2015-04-02 09:51:24 +02:00
Douglas E Engert
3d5bb773ec Ensure EC private keys retain leading zeros
RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30cd4ff294)

Conflicts:
	crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
2015-03-31 16:38:20 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
c8ece537e3 ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: update commentary with before-after performance data.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b06a6f7cc44baa0c17207a8f72c4ac360be7b555)
2015-03-28 15:56:28 +01:00
Matt Caswell
8338cf0bdb Fix bug in s_client. Previously default verify locations would only be loaded
if CAfile or CApath were also supplied and successfully loaded first.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 13:07:31 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ddbf312fb4 Fix HMAC to pass invalid key len test
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:58:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
e7c2ad508d Add HMAC test for invalid key len
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:58:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
929b0d70c1 Ensure that both the MD and key have been initialised before attempting to
create an HMAC

Inspired by BoringSSL commit 2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/hmac/hmac.c
2015-03-25 12:58:53 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b7279ed55c Add more HMAC tests
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:56:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8f8e4e4f52 Fix RAND_(pseudo_)?_bytes returns
Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:41:28 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a20718fa2c Add ticket length before buffering DTLS message
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4f9fab6bd0)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2015-03-25 12:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4285b85163 Ensure last_write_sequence is saved in DTLS1.2
In DTLS, immediately prior to epoch change, the write_sequence is supposed
to be stored in s->d1->last_write_sequence. The write_sequence is then reset
back to 00000000. In the event of retransmits of records from the previous
epoch, the last_write_sequence is restored. This commit fixes a bug in
DTLS1.2 where the write_sequence was being reset before last_write_sequence
was saved, and therefore retransmits are sent with incorrect sequence
numbers.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d5d0a1cb13)
2015-03-25 12:28:45 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
fe82be2b33 Don't send a for ServerKeyExchange for kDHr and kDHd
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 93f1c13619)
2015-03-24 22:42:30 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8509128179 Fix OCSP tests.
OCSP verification changes mean the OCSP tests now need -trusted_first

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-03-24 21:22:00 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d3a9eaccc1 Configuration file examples.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b68c30da0)
2015-03-24 12:27:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4ba9a4265b Make OCSP response verification more flexible.
If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.

PR#3668

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ca5efc287)
2015-03-24 12:14:04 +00:00
Mike Frysinger
bc0eb82b85 Fix malloc define typo
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.

Reported-by: Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828

RT#3758
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 7c82e339a6)
2015-03-24 11:34:20 +00:00
Matt Caswell
bd891f098b Don't check curves that haven't been sent
Don't check that the curve appears in the list of acceptable curves for the
peer, if they didn't send us such a list (RFC 4492 does not require that the
extension be sent).

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b79d24101e)
2015-03-23 14:06:17 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c45dfdc68a sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl: adapt for use in Linux kernel context.
In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google).

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ecd32a1f8)
2015-03-23 13:38:46 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b5dc90121c Fix no-ec with no-ec2m
Fix builds config'd with no-ec and no-ec2m. Technically this combination is
redundant - but the fix is straight forward. Fix from OpenWrt.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-03-22 20:32:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b0b7232877 Add DTLS tests to make test
Updated test/testssl script to include the new DTLS capability in ssltest.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c381e5423)
2015-03-20 12:09:24 +00:00
David Woodhouse
ece8574ae6 Add DTLS support to ssltest
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 98b8cdd322)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssltest.c
2015-03-20 12:09:22 +00:00
David Woodhouse
3edf1b98e0 Add DTLS to SSL_get_version
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 504e643e09)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_lib.c
2015-03-20 12:06:12 +00:00
Matt Caswell
0d6d10d97d Prepare for 1.0.2b-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 13:34:56 +00:00
265 changed files with 5348 additions and 1856 deletions

4
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -100,8 +100,12 @@ tags
TAGS
# Windows
/tmp32
/tmp32.dbg
/tmp32dll
/tmp32dll.dbg
/out32
/out32.dbg
/out32dll
/out32dll.dbg
/inc32

105
CHANGES
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,111 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
*) Alternate chains certificate forgery
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
(Google/BoringSSL).
[Matt Caswell]
Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
*) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
restored.
Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
*) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
field.
This can be used to perform denial of service against any
system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
client authentication enabled.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
(CVE-2015-1788)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
time string.
An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
callbacks.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
independently by Hanno B<>ck.
(CVE-2015-1789)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
servers are not affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-1790)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
the CMS code.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
(CVE-2015-1792)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
a double free of the ticket data.
(CVE-2015-1791)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites
EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites
were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to
1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were
introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export
ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
curves, prefer P-256 (both).
[Emilia Kasper]
*) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
[Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
*) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix

View File

@@ -105,7 +105,24 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimenta
my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED";
my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Wno-padded -Wno-shorten-64-to-32 -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wno-missing-noreturn -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-sign-conversion -Wno-unreachable-code -Wno-conversion -Wno-documentation -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-cast-align -Wno-incompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-unused-macros -Wno-disabled-macro-expansion -Wno-conditional-uninitialized -Wno-switch-enum";
# TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the following
# warnings can also be enabled:
# -Wconditional-uninitialized, -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros,
# -Wmissing-field-initializers, -Wmissing-variable-declarations,
# -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
# -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
# -Wextended-offsetof
my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof";
# These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang.
# TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the
# following warnings can also be enabled: -Wconditional-uninitialized,
# -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros, -Wmissing-field-initializers,
# -Wmissing-variable-declarations,
# -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
# -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
# -Wextended-offsetof
my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
my $strict_warnings = 0;
@@ -233,12 +250,12 @@ my %table=(
#### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups
"solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mv8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes -mcpu=ultrasparc
"solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris64-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
####
"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mv8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -O -g -mcpu=ultrasparc -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wno-long-long -D__EXTENSIONS__ -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups
@@ -255,7 +272,7 @@ my %table=(
#### SunOS configs, assuming sparc for the gcc one.
#"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::",
"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
#### IRIX 5.x configs
# -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate.
@@ -398,7 +415,7 @@ my %table=(
"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
@@ -419,7 +436,7 @@ my %table=(
#### SPARC Linux setups
# Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
# assisted with debugging of following two configs.
"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but
# -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -454,7 +471,7 @@ my %table=(
"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it
@@ -462,7 +479,7 @@ my %table=(
# triggered by RIPEMD160 code.
"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86_64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86_64", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"bsdi-elf-gcc", "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -1195,6 +1212,7 @@ my $cc = $fields[$idx_cc];
if($ENV{CC}) {
$cc = $ENV{CC};
}
my $cflags = $fields[$idx_cflags];
my $unistd = $fields[$idx_unistd];
my $thread_cflag = $fields[$idx_thread_cflag];
@@ -1630,12 +1648,21 @@ if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
if ($strict_warnings)
{
my $ecc = $cc;
$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
my $wopt;
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($cc =~ /gcc$/ or $cc =~ /clang$/);
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
}
if ($ecc eq "clang")
{
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
}
}
}
open(IN,'<Makefile.org') || die "unable to read Makefile.org:$!\n";

View File

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
all: Makefile build_all openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
all: Makefile build_all
# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
@@ -269,21 +269,25 @@ reflect:
@[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)
sub_all: build_all
build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
build_libs: build_crypto build_ssl build_engines
build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
build_crypto:
@dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
build_ssl:
build_ssl: build_crypto
@dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
build_engines:
build_engines: build_crypto
@dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
build_apps:
build_apps: build_libs
@dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
build_tests:
build_tests: build_libs
@dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
build_tools:
build_tools: build_libs
@dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
@@ -457,6 +461,9 @@ tests: rehash
report:
@$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
@set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
depend:
@set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
@@ -481,26 +488,10 @@ util/libeay.num::
util/ssleay.num::
$(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
crypto/objects/obj_dat.h: crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
$(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
crypto/objects/obj_mac.h: crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
$(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
crypto/objects/obj_xref.h: crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
$(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt >crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
apps/openssl-vms.cnf: apps/openssl.cnf
$(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf
crypto/bn/bn_prime.h: crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
$(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl >crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
TABLE: Configure
(echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
$(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h crypto/objects/obj_xref.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE depend
# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file

16
NEWS
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,22 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291)

2
README
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.2a 19 Mar 2015
OpenSSL 1.0.2d 9 Jul 2015
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

118
TABLE
View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BS2000-OSD
$cc = c89
$cflags = -O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -DCHARSET_EBCDIC
$cflags = -O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-generic32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-generic64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-ia64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-sparc64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-sparcv8
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -mv8 -Wall
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-x86
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-x86-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-x86_64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ $multilib =
*** DJGPP
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall
$cflags = -I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag =
$sys_id = MSDOS
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ $multilib =
*** QNX6
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIOS
$cflags =
$unistd =
$thread_cflag =
$sys_id =
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ $multilib =
*** QNX6-i386
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O2 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag =
$sys_id =
@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-BSD-x86-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall -g
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2348,7 +2348,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2416,7 +2416,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2450,7 +2450,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2484,7 +2484,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-elf-noefence
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-generic32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-ia32-aes
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2620,7 +2620,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-pentium
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2654,7 +2654,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-ppro
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2688,7 +2688,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-x86_64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2790,7 +2790,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mv8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -3708,7 +3708,7 @@ $multilib = /pa20_64
*** hurd-x86
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -3776,7 +3776,7 @@ $multilib =
*** irix-cc
$cc = cc
$cflags = -O2 -use_readonly_const -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN
$cflags = -O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -3810,7 +3810,7 @@ $multilib =
*** irix-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN
$cflags = -O3 -DB_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -3844,7 +3844,7 @@ $multilib =
*** irix-mips3-cc
$cc = cc
$cflags = -n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3878,7 +3878,7 @@ $multilib = 32
*** irix-mips3-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3912,7 +3912,7 @@ $multilib = 32
*** irix64-mips4-cc
$cc = cc
$cflags = -64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3946,7 +3946,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** irix64-mips4-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3980,7 +3980,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-aarch64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4014,7 +4014,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha+bwx-ccc
$cc = ccc
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4048,7 +4048,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha+bwx-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4082,7 +4082,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha-ccc
$cc = ccc
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4116,7 +4116,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4150,7 +4150,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-aout
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -4184,7 +4184,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-armv4
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4218,7 +4218,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4252,7 +4252,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-generic32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4286,7 +4286,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-generic64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4320,7 +4320,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-ia32-icc
$cc = icc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4388,7 +4388,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-ia64-icc
$cc = icc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4422,7 +4422,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-mips32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4456,7 +4456,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-mips64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4490,7 +4490,7 @@ $multilib = 32
*** linux-ppc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4524,7 +4524,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-ppc64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4558,7 +4558,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-ppc64le
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4592,7 +4592,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-sparcv8
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W
$cflags = -mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4626,7 +4626,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-sparcv9
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W
$cflags = -m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id = ULTRASPARC
@@ -4660,7 +4660,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-x32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4694,7 +4694,7 @@ $multilib = x32
*** linux-x86_64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4728,7 +4728,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-x86_64-clang
$cc = clang
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Wno-padded -Wno-shorten-64-to-32 -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wno-missing-noreturn -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-sign-conversion -Wno-unreachable-code -Wno-conversion -Wno-documentation -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-cast-align -Wno-incompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-unused-macros -Wno-disabled-macro-expansion -Wno-conditional-uninitialized -Wno-switch-enum -Qunused-arguments
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4762,7 +4762,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-x86_64-icc
$cc = icc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4796,7 +4796,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux32-s390x
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4830,7 +4830,7 @@ $multilib = /highgprs
*** linux64-mips64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4864,7 +4864,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux64-s390x
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4898,7 +4898,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux64-sparcv9
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id = ULTRASPARC
@@ -5748,7 +5748,7 @@ $multilib =
*** solaris-sparcv8-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mv8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W
$cflags = -mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -6054,7 +6054,7 @@ $multilib = /64
*** sunos-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int
$cflags = -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id = SUNOS

View File

@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ req: sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
sreq.o: req.c
$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) -o sreq.o req.c
openssl-vms.cnf: openssl.cnf
$(PERL) $(TOP)/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < openssl.cnf > openssl-vms.cnf
files:
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
@@ -127,12 +130,12 @@ links:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
depend:
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
$(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
else \
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
fi
update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
depend: local_depend
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
local_depend:
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
@@ -144,10 +147,10 @@ clean:
rm -f req
$(DLIBSSL):
(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=ssl all)
(cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
$(DLIBCRYPTO):
(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto all)
(cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
$(EXE): progs.h $(E_OBJ) $(PROGRAM).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(DLIBSSL)
$(RM) $(EXE)

View File

@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
char *prompt = NULL;
prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
if(!prompt) {
if (!prompt) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
return 0;
@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
if(!buff) {
if (!buff) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
OPENSSL_free(prompt);
@@ -2371,6 +2371,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
else
return 0;

View File

@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)
{
CONF *cnf = NULL;
int len;
long errline;
long errline = 0;
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL;

View File

@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if(!tofree) {
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if(!tofree) {
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
if(!tmp) {
if (!tmp) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2843,7 +2843,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
if (prevtm) {
*prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
if(!*prevtm) {
if (!*prevtm) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2887,7 +2887,7 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
goto err;
}
comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
if(!comp_time) {
if (!comp_time) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}

View File

@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) {
cms_key_param *nparam;
nparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(cms_key_param));
if(!nparam) {
if (!nparam) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto argerr;
}
@@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,

View File

@@ -548,9 +548,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else
OPENSSL_cleanse(str, strlen(str));
}
if ((hiv != NULL) && !set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
goto end;
if (hiv != NULL) {
int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (siz == 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n");
} else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
goto end;
}
}
if ((hiv == NULL) && (str == NULL)
&& EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) != 0) {
@@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "iv undefined\n");
goto end;
}
if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, sizeof key)) {
if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex key value\n");
goto end;
}

View File

@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
OPENSSL_free(tport);
if (tpath)
OPENSSL_free(tpath);
thost = tport = tpath = NULL;
if (args[1]) {
args++;
if (!OCSP_parse_url(*args, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
@@ -535,6 +536,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,

View File

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h> /* for memcpy() and strcmp() */
#define USE_SOCKETS
#define NON_MAIN
#include "apps.h"
@@ -456,7 +457,7 @@ int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
if (ncurves <= 0)
return 1;
curves = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int));
if(!curves) {
if (!curves) {
BIO_puts(out, "Malloc error getting supported curves\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -1012,7 +1013,7 @@ int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
/* Initialize a random secret */
if (!cookie_initialized) {
if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n");
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
" -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -560,7 +562,7 @@ static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
int l;
if(!pass) {
if (!pass) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
return NULL;
}
@@ -1336,13 +1338,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback);
if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx))) {
/*
* BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting default verify locations\n");
*/
if ((CAfile || CApath)
&& !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
}
if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
/* goto end; */
}
ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download);

View File

@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx);
static void free_sessions(void);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile);
static DH *get_dh512(void);
static DH *get_dh2048(void);
#endif
#ifdef MONOLITH
@@ -230,30 +230,48 @@ static void s_server_init(void);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
0xDA, 0x58, 0x3C, 0x16, 0xD9, 0x85, 0x22, 0x89, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xAF, 0x75,
0x6F, 0x4C, 0xCA, 0x92, 0xDD, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x04, 0xFB, 0x0F,
0xED, 0x94, 0xEF, 0x9C, 0x8A, 0x44, 0x03, 0xED, 0x57, 0x46, 0x50, 0xD3,
0x69, 0x99, 0xDB, 0x29, 0xD7, 0x76, 0x27, 0x6B, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0x12,
0xE2, 0x18, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1E, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7C,
0x47, 0x74, 0xE8, 0x33,
static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6,
0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1,
0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9,
0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD,
0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17,
0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F,
0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD,
0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30,
0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E,
0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4,
0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58,
0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B,
0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C,
0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B,
0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD,
0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C,
0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C,
0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29,
0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B,
0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C,
0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55,
0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B,
};
static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
0x02,
};
static DH *get_dh512(void)
DH *get_dh2048()
{
DH *dh = NULL;
DH *dh;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
return (NULL);
return (dh);
return NULL;
dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
return dh;
}
#endif
@@ -553,6 +571,8 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - Print the SSL states\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -754,7 +774,7 @@ static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = inl;
wbuf =
(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num);
if(!wbuf)
if (!wbuf)
return 0;
OPENSSL_free(b->ptr);
@@ -1865,7 +1885,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n");
dh = get_dh512();
dh = get_dh2048();
if (dh == NULL) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
(void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
@@ -2453,8 +2477,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
l += k;
i -= k;
if (k > 0) {
l += k;
i -= k;
}
if (i <= 0)
break;
}
@@ -3281,7 +3307,8 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
{
unsigned int count = 0;
do {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
return 0;
/*
* Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
* is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg.
@@ -3323,7 +3350,7 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
unsigned char *p;
sess = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(simple_ssl_session));
if(!sess) {
if (!sess) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -3334,12 +3361,12 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
sess->id = BUF_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen);
sess->der = OPENSSL_malloc(sess->derlen);
if(!sess->id || !sess->der) {
if (!sess->id || !sess->der) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
if(sess->id)
if (sess->id)
OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
if(sess->der)
if (sess->der)
OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
OPENSSL_free(sess);
return 0;

View File

@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int parseArgs(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
maxTime = atoi(*(++argv));
if(maxTime <= 0) {
if (maxTime <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "time must be > 0\n");
badop = 1;
}

View File

@@ -441,6 +441,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,

View File

@@ -2775,7 +2775,7 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
inp = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1]);
out = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024);
if(!inp || !out) {
if (!inp || !out) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Out of memory\n");
goto end;
}
@@ -2791,7 +2791,7 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
print_message(alg_name, 0, mblengths[j]);
Time_F(START);
for (count = 0, run = 1; run && count < 0x7fffffff; count++) {
unsigned char aad[13];
unsigned char aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
size_t len = mblengths[j];
int packlen;
@@ -2826,7 +2826,8 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
aad[11] = len >> 8;
aad[12] = len;
pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx,
EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, aad);
EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, aad);
EVP_Cipher(&ctx, out, inp, len + pad);
}
}
@@ -2865,9 +2866,9 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
}
end:
if(inp)
if (inp)
OPENSSL_free(inp);
if(out)
if (out)
OPENSSL_free(out);
}
#endif

View File

@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if(!tofree) {
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if(!tofree) {
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}

View File

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (ret == 1) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-attime timestamp]");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-engine e]");
#endif

View File

@@ -125,12 +125,17 @@ install:
lint:
@target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE)
depend:
update: local_depend
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
depend: local_depend
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
local_depend:
@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
clean:
rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff

View File

@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -1499,13 +1499,13 @@ ___
# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
if ($win64) {
if ($win64 && $avx) {
$rec="%rcx";
$frame="%rdx";
$context="%r8";
$disp="%r9";
$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
$code.=<<___;
.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
.type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
@@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
.rva .LSEH_end_${func}_shaext
.rva .LSEH_info_${func}_shaext
___
$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
$code.=<<___;
.section .xdata
.align 8
.LSEH_info_${func}_xop:

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
# Westmere 3.77/1.37 1.37 1.52 1.27
# * Bridge 5.07/0.98 0.99 1.09 0.91
# Haswell 4.44/0.80 0.97 1.03 0.72
# Atom 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46
# Silvermont 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46
# Bulldozer 5.80/0.98 1.05 1.24 0.93
$PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ require "x86asm.pl";
&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
&static_label("key_const");
if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=\&movups; }
else { $movekey=\&movups; }
@@ -181,7 +184,10 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
else
{ &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
@@ -197,7 +203,10 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
else
{ &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
@@ -349,17 +358,15 @@ sub aesni_generate6
&neg ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,16);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"));
&jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner"));
&set_label("${p}6_loop",16);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner");
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
@@ -615,6 +622,14 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&set_label("ecb_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
######################################################################
@@ -704,6 +719,15 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
&mov ($out,&wparam(5));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
@@ -804,6 +828,15 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
&mov ($out,&wparam(5));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
}
@@ -1053,6 +1086,17 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&set_label("ctr32_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(80,"esp"));
&function_end("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
@@ -1394,6 +1438,20 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0); # write output
&set_label("xts_enc_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
&function_end("aesni_xts_encrypt");
@@ -1756,6 +1814,20 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output
&set_label("xts_dec_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
&function_end("aesni_xts_decrypt");
}
@@ -1808,6 +1880,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&add ($len,16);
&jnz (&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
&movaps ($ivec,$inout0);
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
&set_label("cbc_enc_tail");
@@ -1871,7 +1944,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movaps ($inout0,$inout5);
&movaps ($ivec,$rndkey0);
&add ($len,0x50);
&jle (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
&jle (&label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected"));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail");
@@ -1910,10 +1983,14 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x40,$out));
&movaps ($inout0,$inout4);
&pxor ($inout4,$inout4);
&sub ($len,0x50);
&jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
@@ -1933,6 +2010,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout1,$in0);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movaps ($inout0,$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
&movaps ($ivec,$in1);
&sub ($len,0x20);
@@ -1945,7 +2023,9 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout2,$in1);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movaps ($inout0,$inout2);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x20,$out));
&movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
&sub ($len,0x30);
@@ -1961,29 +2041,44 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
&movaps ($inout0,$inout3);
&pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&sub ($len,0x40);
&jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
&set_label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected",16);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&pxor ($inout4,$inout4);
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected");
&and ($len,15);
&jnz (&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial"));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
&jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial",16);
&movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
&mov ("ecx",16);
&mov ($inp,"esp");
&sub ("ecx",$len);
&data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb
&movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
&set_label("cbc_ret");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"esp")); # pull original %esp
&mov ($key_,&wparam(4));
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec); # output IV
&pxor ($ivec,$ivec);
&set_label("cbc_abort");
&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
@@ -2000,14 +2095,24 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
# $round rounds
&function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
&push ("ebp");
&push ("ebx");
&test ("eax","eax");
&jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
&test ($key,$key);
&jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
&call (&label("pic"));
&set_label("pic");
&blindpop("ebx");
&lea ("ebx",&DWP(&label("key_const")."-".&label("pic"),"ebx"));
&picmeup("ebp","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","ebx",&label("key_const"));
&movups ("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax")); # pull first 128 bits of *userKey
&xorps ("xmm4","xmm4"); # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
&mov ("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
&and ("ebp",1<<28|1<<11); # AVX and XOP bits
&cmp ($rounds,256);
&je (&label("14rounds"));
&cmp ($rounds,192);
@@ -2016,6 +2121,9 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jne (&label("bad_keybits"));
&set_label("10rounds",16);
&cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
&je (&label("10rounds_alt"));
&mov ($rounds,9);
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 1
@@ -2040,8 +2148,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&call (&label("key_128"));
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(80,$key),$rounds);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&ret();
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_128",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
@@ -2055,8 +2163,76 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ("xmm0","xmm1");
&ret();
&set_label("10rounds_alt",16);
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
&mov ($rounds,8);
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&set_label("loop_key128");
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
&dec ($rounds);
&jnz (&label("loop_key128"));
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x30,"ebx"));
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm0");
&mov ($rounds,9);
&mov (&DWP(96,$key),$rounds);
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("12rounds",16);
&movq ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining 1/3 of *userKey
&cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
&je (&label("12rounds_alt"));
&mov ($rounds,11);
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 1,2
@@ -2077,8 +2253,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&call (&label("key_192b"));
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(48,$key),$rounds);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&ret();
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_192a",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
@@ -2108,10 +2284,52 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&jmp (&label("key_192b_warm"));
&set_label("12rounds_alt",16);
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x10,"ebx"));
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
&mov ($rounds,8);
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&set_label("loop_key192");
&movq (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&lea ($key,&DWP(24,$key));
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm3");
&pshufd ("xmm3","xmm0",0xff);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&dec ($rounds);
&jnz (&label("loop_key192"));
&mov ($rounds,11);
&mov (&DWP(32,$key),$rounds);
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("14rounds",16);
&movups ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining half of *userKey
&mov ($rounds,13);
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
&cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
&je (&label("14rounds_alt"));
&mov ($rounds,13);
&$movekey (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2"); # round 1
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 2
@@ -2143,7 +2361,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&ret();
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_256a",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
@@ -2169,11 +2388,77 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ("xmm2","xmm1");
&ret();
&set_label("14rounds_alt",16);
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
&mov ($rounds,7);
&movdqu (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2");
&set_label("loop_key256");
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4");
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm3");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&dec ($rounds);
&jz (&label("done_key256"));
&pshufd ("xmm2","xmm0",0xff);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm3");
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm1")
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm1");
&movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm2");
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
&jmp (&label("loop_key256"));
&set_label("done_key256");
&mov ($rounds,13);
&mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
&set_label("good_key");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&xor ("eax","eax");
&pop ("ebx");
&pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&set_label("bad_pointer",4);
&mov ("eax",-1);
&pop ("ebx");
&pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&set_label("bad_keybits",4);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
&mov ("eax",-2);
&pop ("ebx");
&pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
@@ -2223,10 +2508,18 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0");
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&xor ("eax","eax"); # return success
&set_label("dec_key_ret");
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
&set_label("key_const",64);
&data_word(0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d);
&data_word(0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605);
&data_word(1,1,1,1);
&data_word(0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b);
&asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
&asm_finish();

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -24,8 +24,12 @@
#
# CBC enc CBC dec CTR
# Apple A7 2.39 1.20 1.20
# Cortex-A53 2.45 1.87 1.94
# Cortex-A57 3.64 1.34 1.32
# Cortex-A53 1.32 1.29 1.46
# Cortex-A57(*) 1.95 0.85 0.93
# Denver 1.96 0.86 0.80
#
# (*) original 3.64/1.34/1.32 results were for r0p0 revision
# and are still same even for updated module;
$flavour = shift;
open STDOUT,">".shift;
@@ -308,17 +312,17 @@ ${prefix}_${dir}crypt:
.Loop_${dir}c:
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
aes$mc $inout,$inout
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
subs $rounds,$rounds,#2
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
aes$mc $inout,$inout
vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
b.gt .Loop_${dir}c
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key]
aes$mc $inout,$inout
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key]
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
veor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
@@ -336,6 +340,7 @@ my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step,$step1)=($enc,"w6","x7","x8","x12");
my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
my ($dat,$tmp,$rndzero_n_last)=($dat0,$tmp0,$tmp1);
my ($key4,$key5,$key6,$key7)=("x6","x12","x14",$key);
### q8-q15 preloaded key schedule
@@ -385,16 +390,42 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor $rndzero_n_last,q8,$rndlast
b.eq .Lcbc_enc128
vld1.32 {$in0-$in1},[$key_]
add $key_,$key,#16
add $key4,$key,#16*4
add $key5,$key,#16*5
aese $dat,q8
aesmc $dat,$dat
add $key6,$key,#16*6
add $key7,$key,#16*7
b .Lenter_cbc_enc
.align 4
.Loop_cbc_enc:
aese $dat,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat,$dat
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
.Lenter_cbc_enc:
aese $dat,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat,$dat
b.gt .Loop_cbc_enc
aese $dat,$in0
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q8},[$key4]
cmp $rounds,#4
aese $dat,$in1
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q9},[$key5]
b.eq .Lcbc_enc192
aese $dat,q8
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q8},[$key6]
aese $dat,q9
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q9},[$key7]
nop
.Lcbc_enc192:
aese $dat,q8
aesmc $dat,$dat
subs $len,$len,#16
@@ -403,7 +434,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
cclr $step,eq
aese $dat,q10
aesmc $dat,$dat
add $key_,$key,#16
aese $dat,q11
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.8 {q8},[$inp],$step
@@ -412,16 +442,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last
aese $dat,q13
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_] // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
aese $dat,q14
aesmc $dat,$dat
aese $dat,q15
mov $cnt,$rounds
veor $ivec,$dat,$rndlast
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop_cbc_enc
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
b .Lcbc_done
.align 5
@@ -483,79 +511,78 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Loop3x_cbc_dec:
aesd $dat0,q8
aesd $dat1,q8
aesd $dat2,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat0,q9
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_cbc_dec
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp0,$ivec,$rndlast
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp1,$in0,$rndlast
aesd $dat0,q9
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
subs $len,$len,#0x30
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
veor $tmp1,$in0,$rndlast
mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
aesd $dat0,q12
aesd $dat1,q12
aesd $dat2,q12
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2
// are loaded with last "words"
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
mov $key_,$key
aesd $dat0,q13
aesd $dat1,q13
aesd $dat2,q13
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q12
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q13
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q14
aesd $dat1,q14
aesd $dat2,q14
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q15
aesd $dat1,q15
aesd $dat2,q15
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
veor $tmp0,$tmp0,$dat0
veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1
veor $dat2,$dat2,$tmp2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vst1.8 {$dat2},[$out],#16
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
b.hs .Loop3x_cbc_dec
@@ -566,39 +593,39 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Lcbc_dec_tail:
aesd $dat1,q8
aesd $dat2,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lcbc_dec_tail
aesd $dat1,q8
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q12
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
cmn $len,#0x20
aesd $dat1,q13
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast
aesd $dat1,q14
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
aesd $dat1,q15
@@ -699,70 +726,69 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 4
.Loop3x_ctr32:
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
aese $dat2,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
aese $dat1,q9
aese $dat2,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_ctr32
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
aese $dat2,q8
mov $key_,$key
aesmc $tmp0,$dat0
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $tmp1,$dat1
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
vorr $dat0,$ivec,$ivec
aese $tmp0,q9
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aese $tmp1,q9
aese $dat2,q9
vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec
aese $tmp0,q9
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aese $tmp1,q9
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
mov $key_,$key
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $tmp2,$dat2
vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec
add $tctr0,$ctr,#1
aese $tmp0,q12
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q12
aese $tmp2,q12
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
add $tctr1,$ctr,#2
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
aese $tmp2,q12
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
add $ctr,$ctr,#3
aese $tmp0,q13
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q13
aese $tmp2,q13
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
veor $in2,$in2,$rndlast
rev $tctr0,$tctr0
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
aese $tmp2,q13
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
vmov.32 ${dat0}[3], $tctr0
rev $tctr1,$tctr1
aese $tmp0,q14
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q14
aese $tmp2,q14
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
vmov.32 ${dat1}[3], $tctr1
rev $tctr2,$ctr
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
aese $tmp2,q14
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
vmov.32 ${dat2}[3], $tctr2
subs $len,$len,#3
@@ -770,13 +796,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
aese $tmp1,q15
aese $tmp2,q15
mov $cnt,$rounds
veor $in0,$in0,$tmp0
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
veor $in1,$in1,$tmp1
mov $cnt,$rounds
vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16
veor $in2,$in2,$tmp2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$in2},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop3x_ctr32
@@ -788,40 +815,40 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Lctr32_tail:
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
aese $dat1,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lctr32_tail
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat0,q9
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],$step
aese $dat0,q12
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q12
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp]
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat0,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat0,q14
aese $dat1,q14
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
aese $dat0,q14
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q14
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
aese $dat0,q15

View File

@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
else {
ret = a->length;
i = a->data[0];
if (ret == 1 && i == 0)
neg = 0;
if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
pad = 1;
pb = 0;
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
p += a->length - 1;
i = a->length;
/* Copy zeros to destination as long as source is zero */
while (!*n) {
while (!*n && i > 1) {
*(p--) = 0;
n--;
i--;
@@ -419,7 +421,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_negative(bn))
if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn))
ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
else
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;

View File

@@ -464,3 +464,21 @@ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
{
ameth->pkey_ctrl = pkey_ctrl;
}
void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *a,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
EVP_PKEY *pkey),
int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *alg1,
X509_ALGOR *alg2,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig))
{
ameth->item_sign = item_sign;
ameth->item_verify = item_verify;
}

View File

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
#define ASN1_GEN_STR(str,val) {str, sizeof(str) - 1, val}
#define ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX 20
/* Maximum number of nested sequences */
#define ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH 50
/* Input formats */
@@ -110,13 +112,16 @@ typedef struct {
int exp_count;
} tag_exp_arg;
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
int *perr);
static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class,
int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok);
static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag,
int *pclass);
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf);
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
int depth, int *perr);
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype);
static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len);
@@ -132,6 +137,16 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf)
}
ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
{
int err = 0;
ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err);
if (err)
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, err);
return ret;
}
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
int *perr)
{
ASN1_TYPE *ret;
tag_exp_arg asn1_tags;
@@ -152,17 +167,22 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
asn1_tags.imp_class = -1;
asn1_tags.format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
asn1_tags.exp_count = 0;
if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0)
if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) {
*perr = ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG;
return NULL;
}
if ((asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
|| (asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SET)) {
if (!cnf) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3,
ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG);
*perr = ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG;
return NULL;
}
ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf);
if (depth >= ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH) {
*perr = ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING;
return NULL;
}
ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf, depth, perr);
} else
ret = asn1_str2type(asn1_tags.str, asn1_tags.format, asn1_tags.utype);
@@ -280,7 +300,7 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
int tmp_tag, tmp_class;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
return -1;
for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) {
/* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */
@@ -353,7 +373,7 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
break;
case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT:
if(!vstart) {
if (!vstart) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT);
return -1;
}
@@ -435,7 +455,8 @@ static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass)
/* Handle multiple types: SET and SEQUENCE */
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
int depth, int *perr)
{
ASN1_TYPE *ret = NULL;
STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *sk = NULL;
@@ -454,7 +475,8 @@ static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
ASN1_TYPE *typ =
ASN1_generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf);
generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf,
depth + 1, perr);
if (!typ)
goto bad;
if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(sk, typ))

View File

@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) {
/* We want multipart/signed */
/* Generate a random boundary */
RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
c = bound[i] & 0xf;
if (c < 10)

View File

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
if(!p)
if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
if(!p)
if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;

View File

@@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
else
asn1_cb = 0;
if (!combine)
*pval = NULL;
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname);

View File

@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1);
if(!seqtt)
if (!seqtt)
return 0;
tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt);
if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld,

View File

@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
/* Save start position */
q = *pp;
if(!a || *a == NULL) {
if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
goto err;
return ret;
err:
if(freeret) {
if (freeret) {
X509_free(ret);
if (a)
*a = NULL;

View File

@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -704,32 +704,29 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
/* If we haven't at least one buffer, someone has doe a big booboo */
assert(*sbuffer != NULL || buffer != NULL);
if (buffer) {
while (*currlen >= *maxlen) {
if (*buffer == NULL) {
if (*maxlen == 0)
*maxlen = 1024;
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
if(!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
if (*currlen > 0) {
assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
}
*sbuffer = NULL;
} else {
*maxlen += 1024;
*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
if(!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
/* |currlen| must always be <= |*maxlen| */
assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
*maxlen += 1024;
if (*buffer == NULL) {
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
if (*currlen > 0) {
assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
}
*sbuffer = NULL;
} else {
*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
}
/* What to do if *buffer is NULL? */
assert(*sbuffer != NULL || *buffer != NULL);
}
if (*currlen < *maxlen) {

View File

@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
#if 1
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 0x07);
if (outl > num)
@@ -178,7 +179,8 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = nt->lwn;
nt->lwn = 0;
} else {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 7);
}

View File

@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
* BIO_CB_RETURN flag indicates if it is after the call
*/
# define BIO_CB_RETURN 0x80
# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN))
# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN)
# define BIO_cb_pre(a) (!((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN))
# define BIO_cb_post(a) ((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN)

View File

@@ -536,8 +536,10 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
/* copy app data */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data,
&bio->ex_data))
&bio->ex_data)) {
BIO_free(new_bio);
goto err;
}
if (ret == NULL) {
eoc = new_bio;
@@ -549,8 +551,8 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
}
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != NULL)
BIO_free(ret);
BIO_free_all(ret);
return (NULL);
}

View File

@@ -303,16 +303,17 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
memcpy(&timeleft, &(data->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
if (timeleft.tv_usec < 0) {
if (timeleft.tv_usec < timenow.tv_usec) {
timeleft.tv_usec = 1000000 - timenow.tv_usec + timeleft.tv_usec;
timeleft.tv_sec--;
timeleft.tv_usec += 1000000;
} else {
timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
}
if (timeleft.tv_sec < 0) {
if (timeleft.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec) {
timeleft.tv_sec = 0;
timeleft.tv_usec = 1;
} else {
timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
}
/*
@@ -896,7 +897,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
perror("setsockopt");
ret = -1;
}
# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTUDISCOVER)
# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined (IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE)
if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT),
(ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER,
&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
@@ -1012,7 +1013,7 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
*/
sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
if(!authchunks) {
if (!authchunks) {
BIO_vfree(bio);
return (NULL);
}
@@ -1352,7 +1353,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
(socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen);
if (!authchunks) {
BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR);
BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(optlen));
@@ -1423,8 +1424,8 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b)) {
char *tmp;
data->saved_message.bio = b;
if(!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_ERROR);
if (!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
if (data->saved_message.data)

View File

@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: bn_prime.h depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
@@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h
bn_exp.o: rsaz_exp.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h

View File

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ld [$ap+12], $t3
or $t0, $aj, $aj
add $ap, 16, $ap
stxa $aj, [$anp]0xe2 ! converted ap[0]
stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[0]
mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0]
umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
sllx $t1, 32, $aj
add $ap, 8, $ap
or $t0, $aj, $aj
stxa $aj, [$anp]0xe2 ! converted ap[j]
stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[j]
ld [$np+0], $t2 ! np[j]
addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj
addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1
stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1]
stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1]
add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++
brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st
@@ -182,12 +182,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1
addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1
stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1]
stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1]
add $tp, 8, $tp
addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1
addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit
stxa $hi1, [$tp]0xe2
stx $hi1, [$tp]
add $tp, 8, $tp
ba .Louter

View File

@@ -3226,11 +3226,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_get_bits5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
bn_get_bits5:
mov $inp,%r10
lea 0($inp),%r10
lea 1($inp),%r11
mov $num,%ecx
shr \$3,$num
movzw (%r10,$num),%eax
and \$7,%ecx
shr \$4,$num
and \$15,%ecx
lea -8(%ecx),%eax
cmp \$11,%ecx
cmova %r11,%r10
cmova %eax,%ecx
movzw (%r10,$num,2),%eax
shrl %cl,%eax
and \$31,%eax
ret

View File

@@ -779,6 +779,7 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
* wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \
BN_ULONG *_not_const; \
memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG*)); \
/* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */ \
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); \
memset((unsigned char *)(_not_const + _bnum1->top), _tmp_char, \
(_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); \
@@ -892,6 +893,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR 135
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR 136
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT 137
# define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT 145
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT 118
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT 109
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME 124
@@ -907,12 +909,14 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_F_BN_NEW 113
# define BN_F_BN_RAND 114
# define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122
# define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT 146
# define BN_F_BN_USUB 115
/* Reason codes. */
# define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3 100
# define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL 101
# define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG 114
# define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL 118
# define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS 102
# define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO 103
# define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR 104
@@ -920,6 +924,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110
# define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106
# define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115
# define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT 119
# define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111
# define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107
# define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/bn/bn_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT), "BN_lshift"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT), "BN_mod_exp2_mont"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT), "BN_mod_exp_mont"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME), "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"},
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_NEW), "BN_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND), "BN_rand"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE), "BN_rand_range"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT), "BN_rshift"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_USUB), "BN_usub"},
{0, NULL}
};
@@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3), "arg2 lt arg3"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL), "bad reciprocal"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG), "bignum too long"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL), "bits too small"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS), "called with even modulus"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO), "div by zero"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR), "encoding error"},
@@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED), "input not reduced"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_RANGE), "invalid range"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT), "invalid shift"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE), "not a square"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_INVERSE), "no inverse"},

View File

@@ -126,13 +126,7 @@
# include <alloca.h>
#endif
#undef RSAZ_ENABLED
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && \
(defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
# include "rsaz_exp.h"
# define RSAZ_ENABLED
#endif
#include "rsaz_exp.h"
#undef SPARC_T4_MONT
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (defined(__sparc__) || defined(__sparc))

View File

@@ -450,8 +450,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[])
d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2;
d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
z[n] ^= (zz << d0);
tmp_ulong = zz >> d1;
if (d0 && tmp_ulong)
if (d0 && (tmp_ulong = zz >> d1))
z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong;
}
@@ -694,9 +693,10 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
# else
{
int i, ubits = BN_num_bits(u), vbits = BN_num_bits(v), /* v is copy
* of p */
top = p->top;
int i;
int ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */
int top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
bn_wexpand(u, top);
@@ -740,8 +740,12 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
ubits--;
}
if (ubits <= BN_BITS2 && udp[0] == 1)
break;
if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) {
if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */
goto err;
if (udp[0] == 1)
break;
}
if (ubits < vbits) {
i = ubits;

View File

@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
# endif
# elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
# if __GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4
# if __GNUC__>4 || (__GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4)
/* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */
# define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64)
# define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({ \

View File

@@ -71,7 +71,12 @@ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
char *buf;
char *p;
buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) {
/* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
} else {
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
}
if (buf == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;

View File

@@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
time_t tim;
if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (bits == 0) {
BN_zero(rnd);
return 1;
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
unsigned char c;
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1) < 0)
goto err;
if (c >= 128 && i > 0)
buf[i] = buf[i - 1];
else if (c < 42)
@@ -168,7 +174,7 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
#endif
if (top != -1) {
if (top >= 0) {
if (top) {
if (bit == 0) {
buf[0] = 1;

View File

@@ -137,6 +137,11 @@ int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
bn_check_top(r);
bn_check_top(a);
if (n < 0) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
return 0;
}
r->neg = a->neg;
nw = n / BN_BITS2;
if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL)
@@ -174,6 +179,11 @@ int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
bn_check_top(r);
bn_check_top(a);
if (n < 0) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
return 0;
}
nw = n / BN_BITS2;
rb = n % BN_BITS2;
lb = BN_BITS2 - rb;

View File

@@ -1042,7 +1042,6 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *p, *m, *d, *e;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont;
a = BN_new();
@@ -1050,7 +1049,6 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
m = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
BN_bntest_rand(m, 1024, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
@@ -1099,6 +1097,7 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
BN_free(a);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(m);

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
#include "rsaz_exp.h"
#ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED
/*
* See crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl for further details.
*/
@@ -334,3 +336,11 @@ void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8],
OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, sizeof(storage));
}
#else
# if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(__DECC) || defined(__clang__)
static void *dummy = &dummy;
# endif
#endif

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,13 @@
#ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
# define RSAZ_EXP_H
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# undef RSAZ_ENABLED
# if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && \
(defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
# define RSAZ_ENABLED
# include <openssl/bn.h>
void RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(BN_ULONG result[16],
const BN_ULONG base_norm[16],
@@ -44,4 +50,7 @@ void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8],
const BN_ULONG base_norm[8], const BN_ULONG exponent[8],
const BN_ULONG m_norm[8], BN_ULONG k0,
const BN_ULONG RR[8]);
# endif
#endif

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a)
return;
if (a->data != NULL) {
memset(a->data, 0, (unsigned int)a->max);
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->max);
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
}
OPENSSL_free(a);

View File

@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
return;
CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier)
/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
@@ -362,6 +363,9 @@ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
return 0;
if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
return 0;
} else {

View File

@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
return 0;
}
tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
if(!tmp)
if (!tmp)
return 0;
/* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
@@ -297,8 +297,9 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
/* Add random padding to end */
if (olen > inlen + 4)
RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen);
if (olen > inlen + 4
&& RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0)
return 0;
/* Encrypt twice */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);

View File

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f != upto);
while (f && f != upto);
} else
BIO_free_all(f);
}
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
if (tmpin == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
goto err2;
}
} else
tmpin = dcont;
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
else
BIO_free_all(cmsbio);
err2:
if (cms_certs)
sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
if (crls)

View File

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -825,8 +825,6 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1)
return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) ();
(void)GetDesktopWindow(); /* return value is ignored */
h = GetProcessWindowStation();
if (h == NULL)
return -1;

View File

@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -455,8 +455,10 @@ void doencryption(void)
rem = l % 8;
len = l - rem;
if (feof(DES_IN)) {
for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--)
RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1);
for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0)
goto problems;
}
buf[l++] = rem;
ex = 1;
len += rem;

View File

@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
const unsigned char *cp;
static int start = 1;
if (len < 0)
return -1;
if (outbuf == NULL) {
outbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BSIZE + HDRSIZE);
if (outbuf == NULL)
@@ -132,7 +135,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
if (len < 8) {
cp = shortbuf;
memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) {
return -1;
}
rnum = 8;
} else {
cp = buf;

View File

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if(!str) {
if (!str) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}

View File

@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
ret = 0;
Zlen = DH_size(dh);
Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen);
if(!Z) {
if (!Z) {
goto err;
}
if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0)

View File

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
goto err;
if (!seed_len) {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;
} else {
seed_is_random = 0;

View File

@@ -106,23 +106,23 @@ static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
#define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
if((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \
(a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \
(m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
#define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
if((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \
(m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)

View File

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
* honest. For one thing, I think I have to return a negative value for any
* error because possible DSO_ctrl() commands may return values such as
* "size"s that can legitimately be zero (making the standard
* "if(DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
* "if (DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
* times. I'd prefer "output" values to be passed by reference and the return
* value as success/failure like usual ... but we conform when we must... :-)
*/

View File

@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ static char *vms_name_converter(DSO *dso, const char *filename)
{
int len = strlen(filename);
char *not_translated = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
if(not_translated)
if (not_translated)
strcpy(not_translated, filename);
return (not_translated);
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
# if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(__DECC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX)
# if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(__DECC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACOSX) || defined(__clang__)
static void *dummy = &dummy;
# endif

View File

@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -30,20 +30,24 @@
# Further optimization by <appro@openssl.org>:
#
# this/original
# Opteron +12-49%
# Bulldozer +14-45%
# P4 +18-46%
# Westmere +12-34%
# Sandy Bridge +9-35%
# Ivy Bridge +9-35%
# Haswell +8-37%
# Broadwell +18-58%
# Atom +15-50%
# VIA Nano +43-160%
# this/original with/without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM(*)
# Opteron +12-49% +110-150%
# Bulldozer +14-45% +175-210%
# P4 +18-46% n/a :-(
# Westmere +12-34% +80-87%
# Sandy Bridge +9-35% +110-120%
# Ivy Bridge +9-35% +110-125%
# Haswell +8-37% +140-160%
# Broadwell +18-58% +145-210%
# Atom +15-50% +130-180%
# VIA Nano +43-160% +300-480%
#
# (*) "without -DECP_NISTZ256_ASM" refers to build with
# "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128";
#
# Ranges denote minimum and maximum improvement coefficients depending
# on benchmark.
# on benchmark. Lower coefficients are for ECDSA sign, relatively fastest
# server-side operation. Keep in mind that +100% means 2x improvement.
$flavour = shift;
$output = shift;

View File

@@ -1097,6 +1097,12 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 148
# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT 149
# define EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP 150
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE 240
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE 243
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL 241
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW 244
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_SET_WORDS 245
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL 242
# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_192 203
# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_224 204
# define EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_256 205
@@ -1208,11 +1214,6 @@ void ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW 227
# define EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW 236
# define EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW 237
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE 240
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL 241
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL 242
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE 243
# define EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW 244
# define EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY 152
# define EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE 222
# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL 197

View File

@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
}
/* test required by X9.62 */
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) {
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}

View File

@@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
{
int ret = 0, ok = 0;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len;
size_t buf_len = 0, tmp_len, bn_len;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL ||
@@ -1130,18 +1130,32 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
priv_key->version = a->version;
buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key);
bn_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(a->priv_key);
/* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
buf_len = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(a->group) + 7) / 8;
if (bn_len > buf_len) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len);
if (buffer == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer)) {
if (!BN_bn2bin(a->priv_key, buffer + buf_len - bn_len)) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (buf_len - bn_len > 0) {
memset(buffer, 0, buf_len - bn_len);
}
if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(priv_key->privateKey, buffer, buf_len)) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;

View File

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx)) {
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/ec/ec_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -89,6 +89,13 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECParameters_print_fp"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT), "ECPKParameters_print"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECPKPARAMETERS_PRINT_FP), "ECPKParameters_print_fp"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE), "ecp_nistz256_get_affine"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE),
"ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_points_mul"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_SET_WORDS), "ecp_nistz256_set_words"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_192), "ECP_NIST_MOD_192"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_224), "ECP_NIST_MOD_224"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NIST_MOD_256), "ECP_NIST_MOD_256"},
@@ -239,12 +246,6 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW), "NISTP224_PRE_COMP_NEW"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "NISTP256_PRE_COMP_NEW"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW), "NISTP521_PRE_COMP_NEW"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE), "ecp_nistz256_get_affine"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_points_mul"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_WINDOWED_MUL), "ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE),
"ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_PRE_COMP_NEW), "ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY), "o2i_ECPublicKey"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE), "OLD_EC_PRIV_DECODE"},
{ERR_FUNC(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL), "PKEY_EC_CTRL"},

View File

@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
goto err;
/* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) {
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}

View File

@@ -459,14 +459,6 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
/* method functions in ec2_mult.c */
int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
BN_CTX *);
int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
/* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */
int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group);

View File

@@ -970,6 +970,13 @@ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point);
}
/*
* Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return
* value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values:
* 1: The point is on the curve
* 0: The point is not on the curve
* -1: An error occurred
*/
int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{

View File

@@ -346,12 +346,14 @@ static int print_bin(BIO *fp, const char *name, const unsigned char *buf,
if (buf == NULL)
return 1;
if (off) {
if (off > 0) {
if (off > 128)
off = 128;
memset(str, ' ', off);
if (BIO_write(fp, str, off) <= 0)
return 0;
} else {
off = 0;
}
if (BIO_printf(fp, "%s", name) <= 0)

View File

@@ -222,6 +222,18 @@ static BN_ULONG is_one(const BN_ULONG a[P256_LIMBS])
return is_zero(res);
}
static int ecp_nistz256_set_words(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG words[P256_LIMBS])
{
if (bn_wexpand(a, P256_LIMBS) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_SET_WORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memcpy(a->d, words, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * P256_LIMBS);
a->top = P256_LIMBS;
bn_correct_top(a);
return 1;
}
#ifndef ECP_NISTZ256_REFERENCE_IMPLEMENTATION
void ecp_nistz256_point_double(P256_POINT *r, const P256_POINT *a);
void ecp_nistz256_point_add(P256_POINT *r,
@@ -557,13 +569,14 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(BN_ULONG out[P256_LIMBS],
}
/* r = sum(scalar[i]*point[i]) */
static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
static int ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
P256_POINT *r,
const BIGNUM **scalar,
const EC_POINT **point,
int num, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, j;
int i, j, ret = 0;
unsigned int index;
unsigned char (*p_str)[33] = NULL;
const unsigned int window_size = 5;
@@ -589,6 +602,7 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
P256_POINT *row = table[i];
/* This is an unusual input, we don't guarantee constant-timeness. */
if ((BN_num_bits(scalar[i]) > 256) || BN_is_negative(scalar[i])) {
BIGNUM *mod;
@@ -697,6 +711,7 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
ecp_nistz256_point_add(r, r, &h);
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (table_storage)
OPENSSL_free(table_storage);
@@ -704,6 +719,7 @@ static void ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
OPENSSL_free(p_str);
if (scalars)
OPENSSL_free(scalars);
return ret;
}
/* Coordinates of G, for which we have precomputed tables */
@@ -742,6 +758,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
EC_POINT *P = NULL, *T = NULL;
const EC_POINT *generator;
EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
int i, j, k, ret = 0;
size_t w;
@@ -771,7 +788,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
}
@@ -802,30 +819,41 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
P = EC_POINT_new(group);
T = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (P == NULL || T == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* The zero entry is implicitly infinity, and we skip it, storing other
* values with -1 offset.
*/
EC_POINT_copy(T, generator);
if (!EC_POINT_copy(T, generator))
goto err;
for (k = 0; k < 64; k++) {
EC_POINT_copy(P, T);
if (!EC_POINT_copy(P, T))
goto err;
for (j = 0; j < 37; j++) {
/*
* It would be faster to use
* ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine and make multiple
* points affine at the same time.
* It would be faster to use EC_POINTs_make_affine and
* make multiple points affine at the same time.
*/
ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(group, P, ctx);
ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j]
[k].X, &P->X);
ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j]
[k].Y, &P->Y);
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
ec_GFp_simple_dbl(group, P, P, ctx);
if (!EC_POINT_make_affine(group, P, ctx))
goto err;
if (!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j][k].X,
&P->X) ||
!ecp_nistz256_bignum_to_field_elem(preComputedTable[j][k].Y,
&P->Y)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_MULT_PRECOMPUTE,
EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
}
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
goto err;
}
}
ec_GFp_simple_add(group, T, T, generator, ctx);
if (!EC_POINT_add(group, T, T, generator, ctx))
goto err;
}
pre_comp->group = group;
@@ -849,6 +877,8 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_mult_precompute(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
err:
if (ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
if (pre_comp)
ecp_nistz256_pre_comp_free(pre_comp);
if (precomp_storage)
@@ -1102,6 +1132,9 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
const EC_PRE_COMP *pre_comp = NULL;
const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
unsigned int index = 0;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
const BIGNUM **new_scalars = NULL;
const EC_POINT **new_points = NULL;
const unsigned int window_size = 7;
const unsigned int mask = (1 << (window_size + 1)) - 1;
unsigned int wvalue;
@@ -1115,6 +1148,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
if ((scalar == NULL) && (num == 0))
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
@@ -1125,13 +1159,13 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
}
/* Need 256 bits for space for all coordinates. */
bn_wexpand(&r->X, P256_LIMBS);
bn_wexpand(&r->Y, P256_LIMBS);
bn_wexpand(&r->Z, P256_LIMBS);
r->X.top = P256_LIMBS;
r->Y.top = P256_LIMBS;
r->Z.top = P256_LIMBS;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (scalar) {
generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
@@ -1156,8 +1190,10 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
goto err;
if (!ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine
(pre_comp_generator, group, pre_comp->precomp[0], ctx))
(pre_comp_generator, group, pre_comp->precomp[0], ctx)) {
EC_POINT_free(pre_comp_generator);
goto err;
}
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, pre_comp_generator, ctx))
preComputedTable = (const PRECOMP256_ROW *)pre_comp->precomp;
@@ -1255,20 +1291,16 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
* Without a precomputed table for the generator, it has to be
* handled like a normal point.
*/
const BIGNUM **new_scalars;
const EC_POINT **new_points;
new_scalars = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(BIGNUM *));
if (!new_scalars) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
goto err;
}
new_points = OPENSSL_malloc((num + 1) * sizeof(EC_POINT *));
if (!new_points) {
OPENSSL_free(new_scalars);
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
goto err;
}
memcpy(new_scalars, scalars, num * sizeof(BIGNUM *));
@@ -1286,27 +1318,31 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
if (p_is_infinity)
out = &p.p;
ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, scalars, points, num, ctx);
if (!ecp_nistz256_windowed_mul(group, out, scalars, points, num, ctx))
goto err;
if (!p_is_infinity)
ecp_nistz256_point_add(&p.p, &p.p, out);
}
if (no_precomp_for_generator) {
OPENSSL_free(points);
OPENSSL_free(scalars);
/* Not constant-time, but we're only operating on the public output. */
if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->X, p.p.X) ||
!ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->Y, p.p.Y) ||
!ecp_nistz256_set_words(&r->Z, p.p.Z)) {
goto err;
}
memcpy(r->X.d, p.p.X, sizeof(p.p.X));
memcpy(r->Y.d, p.p.Y, sizeof(p.p.Y));
memcpy(r->Z.d, p.p.Z, sizeof(p.p.Z));
bn_correct_top(&r->X);
bn_correct_top(&r->Y);
bn_correct_top(&r->Z);
r->Z_is_one = is_one(p.p.Z) & 1;
ret = 1;
err:
err:
if (ctx)
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
if (new_points)
OPENSSL_free(new_points);
if (new_scalars)
OPENSSL_free(new_scalars);
return ret;
}
@@ -1319,6 +1355,7 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group,
BN_ULONG x_aff[P256_LIMBS];
BN_ULONG y_aff[P256_LIMBS];
BN_ULONG point_x[P256_LIMBS], point_y[P256_LIMBS], point_z[P256_LIMBS];
BN_ULONG x_ret[P256_LIMBS], y_ret[P256_LIMBS];
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, point)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_GET_AFFINE, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
@@ -1337,19 +1374,17 @@ static int ecp_nistz256_get_affine(const EC_GROUP *group,
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(x_aff, z_inv2, point_x);
if (x != NULL) {
bn_wexpand(x, P256_LIMBS);
x->top = P256_LIMBS;
ecp_nistz256_from_mont(x->d, x_aff);
bn_correct_top(x);
ecp_nistz256_from_mont(x_ret, x_aff);
if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(x, x_ret))
return 0;
}
if (y != NULL) {
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(z_inv3, z_inv3, z_inv2);
ecp_nistz256_mul_mont(y_aff, z_inv3, point_y);
bn_wexpand(y, P256_LIMBS);
y->top = P256_LIMBS;
ecp_nistz256_from_mont(y->d, y_aff);
bn_correct_top(y);
ecp_nistz256_from_mont(y_ret, y_aff);
if (!ecp_nistz256_set_words(y, y_ret))
return 0;
}
return 1;

View File

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
}
/* test required by X9.62 */
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) {
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}

View File

@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) {
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
ABORT;
fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x");
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "0100000000000000000001F4C8F927AED3CA752257"))
ABORT;
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831"))
ABORT;
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn
(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D"))
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E"
"84F3B9CAC2FC632551"))
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
"FFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973"))
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5"
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
ABORT; /* P = -2Q */
@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
# define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static void prime_field_tests(void)
if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
ABORT;
# endif
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) {
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
/* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
# ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ static void char2_field_tests(void)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
ABORT; /* P = -2Q */

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

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