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274 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
7b560c174d Prepare for 1.0.2b release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:55:38 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c26bfada81 make update
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:55:38 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
40b8eb792d bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4924b37ee0)
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
ab17f6b746 Update CHANGES and NEWS
Updates to CHANGES and NEWS to take account of the latest security fixes.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
7bc2aee4f1 PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent.
CVE-2015-1790

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
9bc3665ac9 Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.

CVE-2015-1789

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aa5ab40860 Fix infinite loop in CMS
Fix loop in do_free_upto if cmsbio is NULL: this will happen when attempting
to verify and a digest is not recognised. Reported by Johannes Bauer.

CVE-2015-1792

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 14:52:39 +01:00
Richard Levitte
8aa556e1c3 make update
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 15:51:16 +02:00
Richard Levitte
5ef5b9ffa9 Correction of make depend merge error
$(PROGS) was mistakenly removed, adding it back.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 15:51:16 +02:00
Matt Caswell
d44f89c990 More ssl_session_dup fixes
Fix error handling in ssl_session_dup, as well as incorrect setting up of
the session ticket. Follow on from CVE-2015-1791.

Thanks to LibreSSL project for reporting these issues.

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_sess.c

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-06-11 10:04:00 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
c35e138a58 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha*.c: address linker warning about OPENSSL_ia32cap_P size mismatch.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f0fa5c8306)
2015-06-11 10:14:01 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
57e477b9ec Only allow a temporary rsa key exchange when they key is larger than 512.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #838
2015-06-11 00:06:06 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
39a298a1c0 Properly check certificate in case of export ciphers.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #838
2015-06-11 00:06:06 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
1fdf36f511 gcm.c: address linker warning about OPENSSL_ia32cap_P size mismatch.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 75c4827dfe)
2015-06-10 23:58:07 +02:00
Matt Caswell
9dcab127e1 DTLS handshake message fragments musn't span packets
It should not be possible for DTLS message fragments to span multiple
packets. However previously if the message header fitted exactly into one
packet, and the fragment body was in the next packet then this would work.
Obviously this would fail if packets get re-ordered mid-flight.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-06-10 12:10:18 +01:00
Matt Caswell
3e8f9dc1a0 Fix leak in HMAC error path
In the event of an error in the HMAC function, leaks can occur because the
HMAC_CTX does not get cleaned up.

Thanks to the BoringSSL project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e43a13c807)
2015-06-10 11:06:05 +01:00
Matt Caswell
7cb79c7afb EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean
The function EC_POINT_is_on_curve does not return a boolean value.
It returns 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if it is not, and -1
on error. Many usages within OpenSSL were incorrectly using this
function and therefore not correctly handling error conditions.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68886be7e2)
2015-06-10 10:49:06 +01:00
Matt Caswell
d272599277 Tighten extension handling
This adds additional checks to the processing of extensions in a ClientHello
to ensure that either no extensions are present, or if they are then they
take up the exact amount of space expected.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c
2015-06-10 10:24:49 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b3c02473f7 Fix memory leaks in BIO_dup_chain()
This fixes a memory leak that can occur whilst duplicating a BIO chain if
the call to CRYPTO_dup_ex_data() fails. It also fixes a second memory leak
where if a failure occurs after successfully creating the first BIO in the
chain, then the beginning of the new chain was not freed.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/bio/bio_lib.c
2015-06-10 10:24:49 +01:00
Matt Caswell
23cd01ef61 Replace memset with OPENSSL_cleanse()
BUF_MEM_free() attempts to cleanse memory using memset immediately prior
to a free. This is at risk of being optimised away by the compiler, so
replace with a call to OPENSSL_cleanse() instead.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-10 10:24:30 +01:00
Matt Caswell
dcad51bc13 Fix Kerberos issue in ssl_session_dup
The fix for CVE-2015-1791 introduced an error in ssl_session_dup for
Kerberos.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-06-10 09:37:01 +01:00
Richard Levitte
80d586d97f When making libcrypto from apps or test, make sure to include engines
For librypto to be complete, the stuff in both crypto/ and engines/
have to be built.  Doing 'make test' or 'make apps' from a clean
source tree failed to do so.
Corrected by using the new 'build_libcrypto' in the top Makefile.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit acaff3b797)
2015-06-10 02:09:49 +02:00
Richard Levitte
cbfec68a79 Add and rearrange building of libraries
There's a need for a target that will build all of libcrypto, so let's
add 'build_libcrypto' that does this.  For ortogonality, let's also
add 'build_libssl'.  Have both also depend on 'libcrypto.pc' and
'libssl.pc' so those get built together with the libraries.
This makes 'all' depend on fewer things directly.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 177b5f9c82)

Conflicts:
	Makefile.org
2015-06-10 02:09:39 +02:00
Jeffrey Walton
31909e7968 Explicitly mention PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC in EVP doc.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82c4d79318)
2015-06-08 20:21:23 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
34cdff92e9 return correct NID for undefined object
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0fb9990480)
2015-06-08 21:46:42 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
05627d57e5 Use CRYPTO_memcmp in s3_cbc.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-08 15:04:28 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
ac32a77cd6 Use CRYPTO_memcmp when comparing authenticators
Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1e4a355dca)
2015-06-08 15:01:14 +02:00
Ben Laurie
f877da9ced Use cc instead of gcc so either clang or gcc is used as appropriate. Add clang
flags needed to keep it happy.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-06-05 11:15:11 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
ba9d44b28d Allow all curves when the client doesn't send an supported elliptic curves extension
At least in the case of SSLv3 we can't send an extention.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #811

(cherry picked from commit 3c06513f38)
2015-06-04 21:12:33 +02:00
Matt Caswell
da5fab7325 Remove misleading comment
Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f3d889523e)
2015-06-04 12:53:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
efd89aa9cc Clean premaster_secret for GOST
Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7ee4815f2)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2015-06-04 12:53:43 +01:00
Matt Caswell
4e3dbe37ca Clean Kerberos pre-master secret
Ensure the Kerberos pre-master secret has OPENSSL_cleanse called on it.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-04 11:44:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
3610719931 Fix off-by-one error in BN_bn2hex
A BIGNUM can have the value of -0. The function BN_bn2hex fails to account
for this and can allocate a buffer one byte too short in the event of -0
being used, leading to a one byte buffer overrun. All usage within the
OpenSSL library is considered safe. Any security risk is considered
negligible.

With thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and
Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c56353071d)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn_print.c
2015-06-04 09:26:43 +01:00
Matt Caswell
af3aa2b5ef Fix DTLS session resumption
The session object on the client side is initially created during
construction of the ClientHello. If the client is DTLS1.2 capable then it
will store 1.2 as the version for the session. However if the server is only
DTLS1.0 capable then when the ServerHello comes back the client switches to
using DTLS1.0 from then on. However the session version does not get
updated. Therefore when the client attempts to resume that session the
server throws an alert because of an incorrect protocol version.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7322abf5ce)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
2015-06-04 09:16:55 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
adba3b3bf1 make update
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-06-03 15:18:20 +01:00
Sergey Agievich
ad0fb7f498 Add funtions to set item_sign and item_verify
PR#3872

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-06-03 15:18:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b1d5b8a4a4 Fix compilation failure for some tool chains
Some tool chains (e.g. android) do not define IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and so
this build breaks.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 133dce447b)
2015-06-02 23:38:03 +01:00
Annie Yousar
fb22f74064 RT3230: Better test for C identifier
objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be
used as a C identifier.  Improve the test to match the real C
rules.

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 591b7aef05)
2015-06-02 17:17:43 -04:00
Richard Levitte
858de8718f Add the macro OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64
This is for consistency.
Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f131556d6)

Conflicts:
	e_os2.h
2015-06-02 18:03:36 +02:00
Olaf Johansson
bd5b5b4c4b GH249: Fix bad regexp in arg parsing.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8846adbd36)
2015-06-02 11:25:24 -04:00
Per Allansson
188f3f9767 Fix IP_MTU_DISCOVER typo
The code in bss_dgram.c checks if IP_MTUDISCOVER is defined, where it
should test for IP_MTU_DISCOVER

RT#3888

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0baaff1a76)
2015-06-02 12:59:11 +01:00
Matt Caswell
27c76b9b80 Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.

CVE-2015-1791

This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.

Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
c0bf69a791

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-06-02 09:30:31 +01:00
Matt Caswell
8744ba5e42 Check the message type requested is the type received in DTLS
dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c2b1d872b)
2015-06-01 00:30:56 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4d9dc0c269 check for error when creating PKCS#8 structure
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2849707fa6)
2015-05-28 18:01:52 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7e365298ea PEM doc fixes
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f097f81c89)
2015-05-28 18:01:52 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
b6f33dce3b Fix ssltest to use 1024-bit DHE parameters
Also add more ciphersuite test coverage, and a negative test for
512-bit DHE.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ee85aab75)
2015-05-26 12:42:40 +02:00
Matt Caswell
cdc47dcf19 Don't check for a negative SRP extension size
The size of the SRP extension can never be negative (the variable
|size| is unsigned). Therefore don't check if it is less than zero.

RT#3862

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9c89d29083)
2015-05-26 10:38:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9cab86ee0a Fix error check in GOST engine
The return value of i2d functions can be negative if an error occurs.
Therefore don't assign the return value to an unsigned type and *then*
check if it is negative.

RT#3862

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 90e7cdff3a)
2015-05-26 10:38:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e40d7c1f3a Handle unsigned struct timeval members
The members of struct timeval on OpenVMS are unsigned. The logic for
calculating timeouts needs adjusting to deal with this.

RT#3862

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fc52ac9028)
2015-05-26 10:38:56 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3ae6186564 Housekeeping 'make TABLE' update.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-26 10:23:21 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
aa1e42215b Configure: replace -mv8 with -mcpu=v8 in SPARC config lines.
RT#3860

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-26 10:22:01 +02:00
Billy Brumley
bec1093cce fix copy paste error in ec_GF2m function prototypes
RT#3858

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 71f6130b7a)
2015-05-26 10:14:19 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
78ac7fa18d bn/bn_lcl.h: fix MIPS-specific gcc version check.
RT#3859

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 60c268b21a)
2015-05-26 10:07:59 +02:00
Matt Caswell
11414f17d9 Don't send an alert if we've just received one
If the record received is for a version that we don't support, previously we
were sending an alert back. However if the incoming record already looks
like an alert then probably we shouldn't do that. So suppress an outgoing
alert if it looks like we've got one incoming.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-05-25 17:52:27 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
0a59e2dc30 bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix valgrind error.
bn_get_bits5 was overstepping array boundary by 1 byte. It was exclusively
read overstep and data could not have been used. The only potential problem
would be if array happens to end on the very edge of last accesible page.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69567687b0)
2015-05-24 21:31:49 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
0945bfcb22 bn/bn_gf2m.c: appease STACK, unstable code detector.
RT#3852

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86e5d1e32b)
2015-05-24 21:27:32 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
f5d840a079 bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl: fix intermittent EC failures on SPARC T3.
BLKINIT optimization worked on T4, but for some reason appears "too
aggressive" for T3 triggering intermiitent EC failures. It's not clear
why only EC is affected...

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 579734ced6)
2015-05-24 13:26:37 +02:00
Richard Levitte
886ef2b650 Fix update and depend in engines/
The update: target in engines/ didn't recurse into engines/ccgost.
The update: and depend: targets in engines/ccgost needed a fixup.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b822d2566)
2015-05-23 11:08:12 +02:00
Richard Levitte
8b89cb3307 Missed a couple of spots in the update change
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6f45032f67)

Conflicts:
	apps/Makefile
2015-05-23 06:25:12 +02:00
Richard Levitte
bf42354620 Fix the update target and remove duplicate file updates
We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the
Makefile in the directory the header file lived in.  This is error
prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually
just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was
done.

This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds
an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or
local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a
double run through the whole file tree.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0f539dc1a2)

Conflicts:
	Makefile.org
	apps/Makefile
	test/Makefile
2015-05-23 06:25:12 +02:00
Matt Caswell
e4731f76e2 Fix typo setting up certificate masks
The certificate masks are used to select which ciphersuite we are going to
use. The variables |emask_k| and |emask_a| relate to export grade key
exchange and authentication respecitively. The variables |mask_k| and
|mask_a| are the equivalent versions for non-export grade. This fixes an
instance where the two usages of export/non-export were mixed up. In
practice it makes little difference since it still works!

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdfe8b06ae)
2015-05-23 00:01:48 +01:00
Matt Caswell
595487ea19 Remove export static DH ciphersuites
Remove support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites. These two
ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH
ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked
since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new
export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to
fix them.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 13f8eb4730)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
2015-05-23 00:01:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c6eb1cbd1e Fix off-by-one in BN_rand
If BN_rand is called with |bits| set to 1 and |top| set to 1 then a 1 byte
buffer overflow can occur. There are no such instances within the OpenSSL at
the moment.

Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke, Filip Palian for
discovering and reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-05-22 23:43:07 +01:00
Matt Caswell
1a9499cf23 Reject negative shifts for BN_rshift and BN_lshift
The functions BN_rshift and BN_lshift shift their arguments to the right or
left by a specified number of bits. Unpredicatable results (including
crashes) can occur if a negative number is supplied for the shift value.

Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and Filip Palian
for discovering and reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7cc18d8158)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn.h
	crypto/bn/bn_err.c
2015-05-22 23:19:34 +01:00
Lubom
254c01ed54 Lost alert in DTLS
If a client receives a bad hello request in DTLS then the alert is not
sent correctly.

RT#2801

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4dc1aa0436)
2015-05-22 09:44:44 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
2d8e705b2a Correctly check for export size limit
40 bit ciphers are limited to 512 bit RSA, 56 bit ciphers to 1024 bit.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac38115c1a)
2015-05-20 22:19:34 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
f4d1fb7769 Only support >= 256-bit elliptic curves with ecdh_auto (server) or by default (client).
Also reorder preferences to prefer prime curves to binary curves, and P-256 to everything else.

The result:

$ openssl s_server -named_curves "auto"

This command will negotiate an ECDHE ciphersuite with P-256:

$ openssl s_client

This command will negotiate P-384:

$ openssl s_client -curves "P-384"

This command will not negotiate ECDHE because P-224 is disabled with "auto":

$ openssl s_client -curves "P-224"

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 16:04:37 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
10a70da729 client: reject handshakes with DH parameters < 768 bits.
Since the client has no way of communicating her supported parameter
range to the server, connections to servers that choose weak DH will
simply fail.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
dcbc03ede7 Update documentation with Diffie-Hellman best practices.
- Do not advise generation of DH parameters with dsaparam to save
computation time.
- Promote use of custom parameters more, and explicitly forbid use of
built-in parameters weaker than 2048 bits.
- Advise the callback to ignore <keylength> - it is currently called
with 1024 bits, but this value can and should be safely ignored by
servers.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
b32aa8e63e dhparam: fix documentation
The default bitlength is now 2048. Also clarify that either the number
of bits or the generator must be present:

$ openssl dhparam -2
and
$ openssl dhparam 2048
generate parameters but
$ openssl dhparam
does not.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
82697bc2b9 s_server: Use 2048-bit DH parameters by default.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 14:54:51 +02:00
StudioEtrange
17b753f23a GitHub284: Fix typo in xx-32.pl scripts.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-20 04:34:42 -04:00
Robert Swiecki
cdcb94eea7 Don't add write errors into bytecounts
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 00d565cfbe)
2015-05-19 07:20:18 -04:00
Andy Polyakov
051b41df41 mk1mf.pl: replace chop for windows.
Backport old patch to make it work in mixture of perls for Windows.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Cherry-picked from 7bb98eee3c
2015-05-15 14:18:21 -04:00
Rich Salz
c59bd61b2e RT1207: document SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c490a5512e)
2015-05-13 13:03:32 -04:00
Rich Salz
f34b095fab Add NULL checks from master
The big "don't check for NULL" cleanup requires backporting some
of the lowest-level functions to actually do nothing if NULL is
given.  This will make it easier to backport fixes to release
branches, where master assumes those lower-level functions are "safe"

This commit addresses those tickets: 3798 3799 3801.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-05-13 12:55:03 -04:00
Andy Polyakov
d3bb25e30a aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl: fix Windows compilation failure with old assembler.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82c4a07939)
2015-05-13 17:00:06 +02:00
Hanno Böck
eba8bf485a Call of memcmp with null pointers in obj_cmp()
The function obj_cmp() (file crypto/objects/obj_dat.c) can in some
situations call memcmp() with a null pointer and a zero length.

This is invalid behaviour. When compiling openssl with undefined
behaviour sanitizer (add -fsanitize=undefined to compile flags) this
can be seen. One example that triggers this behaviour is the pkcs7
command (but there are others, e.g. I've seen it with the timestamp
function):
apps/openssl pkcs7 -in test/testp7.pem

What happens is that obj_cmp takes objects of the type ASN1_OBJECT and
passes their ->data pointer to memcmp. Zero-sized ASN1_OBJECT
structures can have a null pointer as data.

RT#3816

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b8dc08b74)
2015-05-13 15:28:48 +01:00
Matt Caswell
464774d75f Don't allow a CCS when expecting a CertificateVerify
Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.

Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.

RT#2958

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0bd649336)
2015-05-13 11:21:01 +01:00
Kurt Cancemi
833518cf0e Add missing NULL check in X509V3_parse_list()
Matt's note: I added a call to X509V3err to Kurt's original patch.

RT#3840

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 344c271eb3)
2015-05-11 12:19:54 +01:00
Bjoern D. Rasmussen
8a73e3a0e8 Fix for memcpy() and strcmp() being undefined.
clang says: "s_cb.c:958:9: error: implicitly declaring library function
'memcpy'"

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f744cceff)

Conflicts:
	apps/s_cb.c
2015-05-11 12:03:12 +01:00
Matt Caswell
edc2a76ade Check sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null return value
If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list()
should also return NULL.

Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 14def5f537)
2015-05-11 11:53:50 +01:00
Viktor Dukhovni
8dfe1e4dd2 Fix typo in valid_star
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
2015-05-07 14:00:38 -04:00
Matt Caswell
feb96e914a Add more error state transitions (DTLS)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cefc93910c)

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_srvr.c
2015-05-05 20:05:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
67fb63e9b7 Add more error state transitions (client)
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client
side.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc273a9361)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
2015-05-05 20:05:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
eecc697b65 Add more error state transitions
Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf9b0b6fb2)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2015-05-05 19:52:26 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e4f77bf183 Add Error state
Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a89db885e0)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
	ssl/ssl_stat.c
2015-05-05 19:50:12 +01:00
Matt Caswell
cd5f206c2f Remove libcrypto to libssl dependency
Remove dependency on ssl_locl.h from v3_scts.c, and incidentally fix a build problem with
kerberos (the dependency meant v3_scts.c was trying to include krb5.h, but without having been
passed the relevanant -I flags to the compiler)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d13bd6130b)

Conflicts:
	crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
2015-05-05 09:09:56 +01:00
Richard Levitte
3cf40601b7 RT2943: Check sizes if -iv and -K arguments
RT2943 only complains about the incorrect check of -K argument size,
we might as well do the same thing with the -iv argument.

Before this, we only checked that the given argument wouldn't give a
bitstring larger than EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH.  we can be more precise and
check against the size of the actual cipher used.

(cherry picked from commit 8920a7cd04)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-05-04 20:21:21 +02:00
Rich Salz
82e586a90b Fix cut/paste error
Was memset with wrong sizeof.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23b0fa5ab6)
2015-05-04 10:54:18 -04:00
Gilles Khouzam
a659386639 RT3820: Don't call GetDesktopWindow()
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bed2edf1cb)
2015-05-02 08:01:52 -04:00
Rich Salz
5b38d54753 RT3776: Wrong size for malloc
Use sizeof *foo parameter, to avoid these errors.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53ba0a9e91)
2015-05-02 07:55:17 -04:00
Hanno Böck
6b3a315003 Fix uninitialized variable.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 539ed89f68)
2015-05-02 07:45:35 -04:00
Matt Caswell
f296e411ef Fix buffer overrun in RSA signing
The problem occurs in EVP_PKEY_sign() when using RSA with X931 padding.
It is only triggered if the RSA key size is smaller than the digest length.
So with SHA512 you can trigger the overflow with anything less than an RSA
512 bit key. I managed to trigger a 62 byte overflow when using a 16 bit RSA
key. This wasn't sufficient to cause a crash, although your mileage may
vary.

In practice RSA keys of this length are never used and X931 padding is very
rare. Even if someone did use an excessively short RSA key, the chances of
them combining that with a longer digest and X931 padding is very
small. For these reasons I do not believe there is a security implication to
this. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34166d4189)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5bea7975a6 Add sanity check to print_bin function
Add a sanity check to the print_bin function to ensure that the |off|
argument is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3deeeeb61b)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9c5efc9c65 Add sanity check to ssl_get_prev_session
Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb0f400b0c)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
75862f7741 Sanity check the return from final_finish_mac
The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c427570e50)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_locl.h
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
99ceb2d40c Add sanity check in ssl3_cbc_digest_record
For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29b0a15a48)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
abc7a266a3 Clarify logic in BIO_*printf functions
The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output
grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original
logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is
incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original
logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the
size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to
make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in
the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d9e37744c)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
33c99f2c81 Sanity check EVP_EncodeUpdate buffer len
There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69)
2015-04-30 23:21:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
1a3701f4fe Sanity check EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD
The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c826988109)

Conflicts:
	ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
2015-04-30 23:21:50 +01:00
Matt Caswell
4ce06271aa Sanity check DES_enc_write buffer length
Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 873fb39f20)
2015-04-30 23:14:55 +01:00
Matt Caswell
c5f8cd7bc6 Add length sanity check in SSLv2 n_do_ssl_write()
Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.

Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-29 17:23:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
937a766982 Revert "Fix verify algorithm."
This reverts commit 47daa155a3.

The above commit was backported to the 1.0.2 branch as part of backporting
the alternative chain verify algorithm changes. However it has been pointed
out (credit to Shigeki Ohtsu) that this is unnecessary in 1.0.2 as this
commit is a work around for loop checking that only exists in master.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-04-29 15:44:03 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
07977739f0 NISTZ256: use EC_POINT API and check errors.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6038354cf8)
2015-04-27 19:50:19 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
c7e78b6bed NISTZ256: don't swallow malloc errors
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a4d5269e6d)
2015-04-27 18:06:01 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
df6c736fbd NISTZ256: set Z_is_one to boolean 0/1 as is customary.
Cosmetic, no real effect.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4446044a79)
2015-04-27 16:50:05 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
c30a1b3b33 Error checking and memory leak fixes in NISTZ256.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-04-27 16:37:19 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
9ed55313a7 Fix error checking and memory leaks in NISTZ256 precomputation.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53dd4ddf71)
2015-04-24 17:47:01 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
7238a82c8a Correctly set Z_is_one on the return value in the NISTZ256 implementation.
Also add a few comments about constant-timeness.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-24 17:35:56 +02:00
Loganaden Velvindron
6e5d130765 Fix CRYPTO_strdup
The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
This patch adds a NULL check.

RT3786

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)
2015-04-22 17:20:38 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
8f0f9ffda3 Repair EAP-FAST session resumption
EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec61
and
7b3ba508af
removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.

This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.

Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.

Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3d015363)
2015-04-21 19:31:09 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
5c4fd8b515 Initialize variable
newsig may be used (freed) uninitialized on a malloc error.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6824941440)
2015-04-21 19:27:24 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
496c79f60c make update
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-21 17:50:36 +02:00
Richard Levitte
186578be45 Initialised 'ok' and redo the logic.
The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok",
so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06affe3dac)
2015-04-21 01:45:47 +02:00
Matt Caswell
f4c5cd3085 Fix return checks in GOST engine
Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and
added appropriate error handling.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8817e2e0c9)
2015-04-20 23:10:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
0ddf91c5f3 Fix misc NULL derefs in sureware engine
Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b611e5fe8)
2015-04-20 23:10:56 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
73824ba8fe aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl: fix typo affecting Windows build.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7be6bc68c6)
2015-04-20 18:40:46 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e95e22af50 aes/asm/aesni-x86[_64].pl update.
This addresses

- request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576;
- clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to
see if there will be some traction from compiler side);
- more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout
(desired when RT#3553 was reviewed);
- minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around);

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23f6eec71d)
2015-04-20 15:44:36 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
47daa155a3 Fix verify algorithm.
Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5991ec528)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
be856c0391 Add documentation for the -no_alt_chains option for various apps, as well as
the X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag.

Conflicts:
	doc/apps/cms.pod
	doc/apps/ocsp.pod
	doc/apps/s_client.pod
	doc/apps/s_server.pod
	doc/apps/smime.pod
	doc/apps/verify.pod

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
017a06c7d1 Add -no_alt_chains option to apps to implement the new
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.

Conflicts:
	apps/cms.c
	apps/ocsp.c
	apps/s_client.c
	apps/s_server.c
	apps/smime.c
	apps/verify.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
dfd3322d72 Add flag to inhibit checking for alternate certificate chains. Setting this
behaviour will force behaviour as per previous versions of OpenSSL

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Matt Caswell
6281abc796 In certain situations the server provided certificate chain may no longer be
valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact
in the trust store.

When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.

RT3637
RT3621

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-20 13:42:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3661bb4e79 Fix encoding bug in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.

Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0eed48d37)
2015-04-18 14:43:33 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
e697a4c3d7 Error out immediately on empty ciphers list.
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb32)
2015-04-17 18:44:35 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
5613feaacc Use -Wall -Wextra with clang
The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions.
Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-04-17 18:26:09 +02:00
Viktor Dukhovni
3b38646d13 Code style: space after 'if'
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab@openssl.org>
2015-04-16 13:50:01 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf5b8ff17d Limit depth of nested sequences when generating ASN.1
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c4137b5e82)
2015-04-16 16:06:11 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a696708ae6 Reject empty generation strings.
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 111b60bea0)
2015-04-16 16:06:10 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5101c35c91 Fix ssl_get_prev_session overrun
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.

This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.

With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1c9)
2015-04-14 14:59:40 +01:00
Matt Caswell
35bac91676 Check for ClientHello message overruns
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.

With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
2015-04-14 14:48:24 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
ea9de25f2f do_dirname: Don't change gen on failures
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ec5c5dd36)
2015-04-11 20:35:13 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
f6cddcccc8 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free: Check param for NULL
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit f49baeff50)
2015-04-11 20:35:13 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6df777ed50 Don't set *pval to NULL in ASN1_item_ex_new.
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.

*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.

Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f617b4969a)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
2015-04-10 19:52:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
07395b7a6d Fix ECDH key identifier support.
PR#3789

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a317fa07c)
2015-04-10 18:52:49 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
784f155e0d Fix ECDH detection, add ECDH keyid test.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9fdbc9df76)
2015-04-10 18:52:49 +01:00
Richard Levitte
42802a94be Have mkerr.pl treat already existing multiline string defs properly
Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines.  That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:

    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
     "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},

However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:

    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
     "No gost certificate sent by peer"},

Clearly not what we wanted.  This change fixes this problem.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2cfdfe0918)
2015-04-08 21:46:15 +02:00
Richard Levitte
9e63eeaf76 Ignore the non-dll windows specific build directories
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37d92b1b2b)
2015-04-08 18:00:47 +02:00
Richard Levitte
700c0eb8d9 Appease clang -Wshadow
The macros BSWAP4 and BSWAP8 have statetemnt expressions
implementations that use local variable names that shadow variables
outside the macro call, generating warnings like this

e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:263:14: warning: declaration shadows a local variable
      [-Wshadow]
    seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
             ^
../modes/modes_lcl.h:41:29: note: expanded from macro 'BSWAP8'
                            ^
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:223:12: note: previous declaration is here
    size_t ret = 0;
           ^

Have clang be quiet by modifying the macro variable names slightly
(suffixing them with an underscore).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2da2a4349c)
2015-04-08 17:59:41 +02:00
Richard Levitte
a4ba716333 Appease clang -Wgnu-statement-expression
We use GNU statement expressions in crypto/md32_common.h, surrounded
by checks that GNU C is indeed used to compile.  It seems that clang,
at least on Linux, pretends to be GNU C, therefore finds the statement
expressions and then warns about them.

The solution is to have clang be quiet about it.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 04958e84d8)
2015-04-08 17:59:41 +02:00
Richard Levitte
d21cbd7d5e Appease clang -Wempty-translation-unit
ebcdic.c:284:7: warning: ISO C requires a translation unit to contain at least one
      declaration [-Wempty-translation-unit]
      ^
1 warning generated.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c25dea53e9)
2015-04-08 17:59:40 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
ae50d82700 Harden SSLv2-supporting servers against Bleichenbacher's attack.
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c

Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-04-08 16:28:42 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
ff864ffef3 modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl: up to 90% performance improvement.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7eeeb49e11)
2015-04-02 10:04:37 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
0a1f31f7ba sha/asm/sha*-armv8.pl: add Denver and X-Gene esults.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be5a87a1b0)
2015-04-02 09:51:32 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
5a27a20be3 aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl: optimize for Cortex-A5x.
ARM has optimized Cortex-A5x pipeline to favour pairs of complementary
AES instructions. While modified code improves performance of post-r0p0
Cortex-A53 performance by >40% (for CBC decrypt and CTR), it hurts
original r0p0. We favour later revisions, because one can't prevent
future from coming. Improvement on post-r0p0 Cortex-A57 exceeds 50%,
while new code is not slower on r0p0, or Apple A7 for that matter.

[Update even SHA results for latest Cortex-A53.]

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 94376cccb4)
2015-04-02 09:51:24 +02:00
Douglas E Engert
3d5bb773ec Ensure EC private keys retain leading zeros
RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30cd4ff294)

Conflicts:
	crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
2015-03-31 16:38:20 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
c8ece537e3 ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: update commentary with before-after performance data.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b06a6f7cc44baa0c17207a8f72c4ac360be7b555)
2015-03-28 15:56:28 +01:00
Matt Caswell
8338cf0bdb Fix bug in s_client. Previously default verify locations would only be loaded
if CAfile or CApath were also supplied and successfully loaded first.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 13:07:31 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ddbf312fb4 Fix HMAC to pass invalid key len test
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:58:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
e7c2ad508d Add HMAC test for invalid key len
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:58:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
929b0d70c1 Ensure that both the MD and key have been initialised before attempting to
create an HMAC

Inspired by BoringSSL commit 2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/hmac/hmac.c
2015-03-25 12:58:53 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b7279ed55c Add more HMAC tests
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:56:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8f8e4e4f52 Fix RAND_(pseudo_)?_bytes returns
Ensure all calls to RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes have their return
value checked correctly

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-25 12:41:28 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a20718fa2c Add ticket length before buffering DTLS message
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4f9fab6bd0)

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2015-03-25 12:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4285b85163 Ensure last_write_sequence is saved in DTLS1.2
In DTLS, immediately prior to epoch change, the write_sequence is supposed
to be stored in s->d1->last_write_sequence. The write_sequence is then reset
back to 00000000. In the event of retransmits of records from the previous
epoch, the last_write_sequence is restored. This commit fixes a bug in
DTLS1.2 where the write_sequence was being reset before last_write_sequence
was saved, and therefore retransmits are sent with incorrect sequence
numbers.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d5d0a1cb13)
2015-03-25 12:28:45 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
fe82be2b33 Don't send a for ServerKeyExchange for kDHr and kDHd
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 93f1c13619)
2015-03-24 22:42:30 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8509128179 Fix OCSP tests.
OCSP verification changes mean the OCSP tests now need -trusted_first

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-03-24 21:22:00 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d3a9eaccc1 Configuration file examples.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b68c30da0)
2015-03-24 12:27:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4ba9a4265b Make OCSP response verification more flexible.
If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.

PR#3668

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ca5efc287)
2015-03-24 12:14:04 +00:00
Mike Frysinger
bc0eb82b85 Fix malloc define typo
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.

Reported-by: Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828

RT#3758
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 7c82e339a6)
2015-03-24 11:34:20 +00:00
Matt Caswell
bd891f098b Don't check curves that haven't been sent
Don't check that the curve appears in the list of acceptable curves for the
peer, if they didn't send us such a list (RFC 4492 does not require that the
extension be sent).

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b79d24101e)
2015-03-23 14:06:17 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c45dfdc68a sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl: adapt for use in Linux kernel context.
In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google).

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ecd32a1f8)
2015-03-23 13:38:46 +01:00
Matt Caswell
b5dc90121c Fix no-ec with no-ec2m
Fix builds config'd with no-ec and no-ec2m. Technically this combination is
redundant - but the fix is straight forward. Fix from OpenWrt.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-03-22 20:32:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b0b7232877 Add DTLS tests to make test
Updated test/testssl script to include the new DTLS capability in ssltest.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c381e5423)
2015-03-20 12:09:24 +00:00
David Woodhouse
ece8574ae6 Add DTLS support to ssltest
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 98b8cdd322)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssltest.c
2015-03-20 12:09:22 +00:00
David Woodhouse
3edf1b98e0 Add DTLS to SSL_get_version
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 504e643e09)

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_lib.c
2015-03-20 12:06:12 +00:00
Matt Caswell
0d6d10d97d Prepare for 1.0.2b-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 13:34:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
3df69d3aef Prepare for 1.0.2a release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 13:31:16 +00:00
Matt Caswell
921095d4d3 make update
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 13:31:16 +00:00
Matt Caswell
5cc6509dae Fix unsigned/signed warnings
Fix some unsigned/signed warnings introduced as part of the fix
for CVE-2015-0293

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:36 +00:00
Matt Caswell
18029a3d07 Fix a failure to NULL a pointer freed on error.
Reported by the LibreSSL project as a follow on to CVE-2015-0209

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Matt Caswell
7b22e8d01f Update NEWS file
Update the NEWS file with the latest entries from CHANGES ready for the
release.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Matt Caswell
da947c9758 Update CHANGES for release
Update CHANGES file with all the latest fixes ready for the release.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Matt Caswell
128b271c8d Fix discrepancy in NEWS file
There was a discrepancy between the 1.0.2 version of NEWS and the 1.0.1
version. This fixes it.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a8b1e52ff4 Fix CHANGES discrepancies
There were some discrepancies in the CHANGES file between the 1.0.1 version
and 1.0.2. This corrects it.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Matt Caswell
d6e903d188 Remove overlapping CHANGES/NEWS entries
Remove entries from CHANGES and NEWS from letter releases that occur *after*
the next point release. Without this we get duplicate entries for the same
issue appearing multiple times.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Emilia Kasper
86f8fb0e34 Fix reachable assert in SSLv2 servers.
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.

Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.

CVE-2015-0293

This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Emilia Kasper
c0334c2c92 PKCS#7: avoid NULL pointer dereferences with missing content
In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional.
This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures),
however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content
correctly.

This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing,
decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated
with reading potentially untrusted data.

Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work.

CVE-2015-0289

Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c3c7fb07dc Fix ASN1_TYPE_cmp
Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.

CVE-2015-0286

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b19d814321 Fix DHE Null CKE vulnerability
If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
cipher being used and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent
by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.

CVE-2015-1787

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
76343947ad Fix for CVE-2015-0291
If a client renegotiates using an invalid signature algorithms extension
it will crash a server with a NULL pointer dereference.

Thanks to David Ramos of Stanford University for reporting this bug.

CVE-2015-0291

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4b22cce381 Reject invalid PSS parameters.
Fix a bug where invalid PSS parameters are not rejected resulting in a
NULL pointer exception. This can be triggered during certificate
verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server
enabling client authentication.

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issues.

CVE-2015-0208

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 12:58:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b717b08307 Free up ADB and CHOICE if already initialised.
CVE-2015-0287

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 11:11:22 +00:00
Matt Caswell
819418110b Fix Seg fault in DTLSv1_listen
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes
the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to
loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received
with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen
means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invokation to the
next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Erorrs processing the initial
ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could
be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
server.

CVE-2015-0207

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 11:11:22 +00:00
Matt Caswell
77c77f0a1b Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.

CVE-2015-0290

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2015-03-19 11:11:22 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8b84495380 Add support for ServerInfo SSL_CONF option.
Add support for ServerInfo SSL_CONF option and update documentation. This
was wrongly omitted from the 1.0.2 release.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-18 12:31:06 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c1559f5046 Dead code removal from apps
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from apps. Also fix an issue with
error handling with pkcs7.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 11abf92259)
2015-03-17 14:49:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
d8d2e50359 Remove dead code from crypto
Some miscellaneous removal of dead code from lib crypto.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b7573c597c)
2015-03-17 14:49:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
6c4ce00753 Fix seg fault in s_time
Passing a negative value for the "-time" option to s_time results in a seg
fault. This commit fixes it so that time has to be greater than 0.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dfef52f6f2)
2015-03-17 13:48:04 +00:00
Matt Caswell
fcb61b6c92 Add sanity check to PRF
The function tls1_PRF counts the number of digests in use and partitions
security evenly between them. There always needs to be at least one digest
in use, otherwise this is an internal error. Add a sanity check for this.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 668f6f08c6)
2015-03-17 13:48:04 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b2b8163964 Fix memset call in stack.c
The function sk_zero is supposed to zero the elements held within a stack.
It uses memset to do this. However it calculates the size of each element
as being sizeof(char **) instead of sizeof(char *). This probably doesn't
make much practical difference in most cases, but isn't a portable
assumption.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7132ac830f)
2015-03-17 13:48:04 +00:00
Matt Caswell
56490fc26f Move malloc fail checks closer to malloc
Move memory allocation failure checks closer to the site of the malloc in
dgst app. Only a problem if the debug flag is set...but still should be
fixed.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be1477adc9)
2015-03-17 13:48:04 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f2e95a02b1 Add malloc failure checks
Add some missing checks for memory allocation failures in ca app.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a561bfe944)
2015-03-17 13:48:04 +00:00
Carl Jackson
912c8c92b5 Fix regression in ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t
Previously, ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t would return 1 if s > t, -1 if
s < t, and 0 if s == t.

This behavior was broken in a refactor [0], resulting in the opposite
time comparison behavior.

[0]: 904348a492

PR#3706

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit da27006df0)
2015-03-15 19:47:08 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
94be83127b Avoid reading an unused byte after the buffer
Other curves don't have this problem.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9fbbdd73c5)
2015-03-14 18:24:58 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
be109b9eec Fix undefined behaviour in shifts.
Td4 and Te4 are arrays of u8. A u8 << int promotes the u8 to an int first then shifts.
If the mathematical result of a shift (as modelled by lhs * 2^{rhs}) is not representable
in an integer, behaviour is undefined. In other words, you can't shift into the sign bit
of a signed integer. Fix this by casting to u32 whenever we're shifting left by 24.

(For consistency, cast other shifts, too.)

Caught by -fsanitize=shift

Submitted by Nick Lewycky (Google)

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b37e5c14f)
2015-03-13 21:14:20 -07:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c0d69ddb33 additional configuration documentation
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3d764db7a2)
2015-03-12 13:45:24 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8cd6714084 ASN.1 print fix.
When printing out an ASN.1 structure if the type is an item template don't
fall thru and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dc1247a74)
2015-03-12 13:45:24 +00:00
Matt Caswell
327de270d5 SSL_check_chain fix
If SSL_check_chain is called with a NULL X509 object or a NULL EVP_PKEY
or the type of the public key is unrecognised then the local variable
|cpk| in tls1_check_chain does not get initialised. Subsequently an
attempt is made to deref it (after the "end" label), and a seg fault will
result.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d813f9eb38)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8e91b3d991 Fix missing return checks in v3_cpols.c
Fixed assorted missing return value checks in c3_cpols.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c5f2b5336a)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
20223855e4 Fix dsa_pub_encode
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0c7ca4033d)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
563fc239d2 Fix dh_pub_encode
The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6aa8dab2bb)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
15919ecadc Fix asn1_item_print_ctx
The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34a7ed0c39)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
289c06823e ASN1_primitive_new NULL param handling
ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e488fd6ab)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ff2459b918 Fix EVP_DigestInit_ex with NULL digest
Calling EVP_DigestInit_ex which has already had the digest set up for it
should be possible. You are supposed to be able to pass NULL for the type.
However currently this seg faults.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a01087027b)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8944d10e2d Fix error handling in bn_exp
In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c5a7b33c6)
2015-03-12 09:29:48 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
df57e42baa evp/e_aes.c: fix SPARC T4-specific problem:
- SIGSEGV/ILL in CCM (RT#3688);

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-03-12 09:07:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9c5c18500b Fix seg fault in ASN1_generate_v3/ASN1_generate_nconf
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac5a110621)
2015-03-11 11:21:09 +00:00
Matt Caswell
35fafc4dbc Cleanse buffers
Cleanse various intermediate buffers used by the PRF (backported version
from master).

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-11 10:45:23 +00:00
Emilia Kasper
0c14565c5b Harmonize return values in dtls1_buffer_record
Ensure all malloc failures return -1.

Reported by Adam Langley (Google).

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06c6a2b4a3)
2015-03-10 13:52:32 -07:00
Richard Godbee
5a9e9669d8 BIO_debug_callback: Fix output on 64-bit machines
BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
a pointer fits in 8 characters.

Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 460e920d8a)
2015-03-10 12:34:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2b31fcc0b5 Prevent handshake with unseeded PRNG
Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)

If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.

For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:

openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA

CVE-2015-0285

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e1b568dd24)
2015-03-10 10:45:52 +00:00
Dmitry-Me
b65b4c3481 Fix wrong numbers being passed as string lengths
Signed-off-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0b142f022e)
2015-03-09 21:05:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ef116b0003 update ordinals
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-03-09 16:57:24 +00:00
David Woodhouse
0d691e0e27 Wrong SSL version in DTLS1_BAD_VER ClientHello
Since commit 741c9959 ("DTLS revision."), we put the wrong protocol
version into our ClientHello for DTLS1_BAD_VER. The old DTLS
code which used ssl->version was replaced by the more generic SSL3 code
which uses ssl->client_version. The Cisco ASA no longer likes our
ClientHello.

RT#3711

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7683aaf36)
2015-03-09 11:07:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ae3fcdf1e5 Fix DTLS1_BAD_VER regression
Commit 9cf0f187 in HEAD, and 68039af3 in 1.0.2, removed a version check
from dtls1_buffer_message() which was needed to distinguish between DTLS
1.x and Cisco's pre-standard version of DTLS (DTLS1_BAD_VER).

Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3703

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5178a16c43)
2015-03-09 10:54:06 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d6ca1cee8b fix warning
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-08 17:31:48 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bfa34f551c Cleanse PKCS#8 private key components.
New function ASN1_STRING_clear_free which cleanses an ASN1_STRING
structure before freeing it.

Call ASN1_STRING_clear_free on PKCS#8 private key components.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a8ae0891d4)
2015-03-08 16:29:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f9aa27dc78 Additional CMS documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e3013932df)
2015-03-08 16:19:24 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
f417997a32 Remove export ciphers from the DEFAULT cipher list
They are moved to the COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT instead.
This also fixes SSLv2 to be part of COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-03-07 23:02:19 +01:00
Matt Caswell
6ee3997134 Update mkerr.pl for new format
Make the output from mkerr.pl consistent with the newly reformatted code.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-03-06 14:07:05 +00:00
Kurt Cancemi
f9a21ed069 Use constants not numbers
This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c

RT#3725

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd865cadcb)
2015-03-05 09:28:37 +00:00
Matt Caswell
d6b4a41d10 Unchecked malloc fixes
Miscellaneous unchecked malloc fixes. Also fixed some mem leaks on error
paths as I spotted them along the way.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 918bb86529)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
2015-03-05 09:15:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9fdbaf3a32 Check public key is not NULL.
CVE-2015-0288
PR#3708

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 28a00bcd8e)
2015-03-02 15:26:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6fff54b0ce Fix format script.
The format script didn't correctly recognise some ASN.1 macros and
didn't reformat some files as a result. Fix script and reformat
affected files.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 437b14b533)
2015-03-02 13:43:17 +00:00
Matt Caswell
6e20f55646 Fix d2i_SSL_SESSION for DTLS1_BAD_VER
Some Cisco appliances use a pre-standard version number for DTLS. We support
this as DTLS1_BAD_VER within the code.

This change fixes d2i_SSL_SESSION for that DTLS version.

Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

RT#3704

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl_asn1.c
2015-02-27 20:31:28 +00:00
Matt Caswell
87cd297d14 Fixed missing return value checks.
Added various missing return value checks in tls1_change_cipher_state.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-02-27 15:18:21 +00:00
Matt Caswell
195f6302bb Fix missing return value checks.
Fixed various missing return value checks in ssl3_send_newsession_ticket.
Also a mem leak on error.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2015-02-27 15:18:20 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8f51c206b3 Fix evp_extra_test.c with no-ec
When OpenSSL is configured with no-ec, then the new evp_extra_test fails to
pass. This change adds appropriate OPENSSL_NO_EC guards around the code.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a988036259)
2015-02-26 23:34:54 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f2aff60f6f Update the SHA* documentation
Updates to include SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512. In particular note
the restriction on setting md to NULL with regards to thread safety.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7812493a0)
2015-02-25 22:57:19 +00:00
Rainer Jung
fbabc6c06e Fix NAME section of d2i_ECPKParameters to prevent broken symlinks when using
the extract-names.pl script.

RT#3718

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-02-25 20:47:42 +00:00
Matt Caswell
bfb14d724b Fix some minor documentation issues
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-02-25 17:22:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4d2207f097 Remove pointless free, and use preferred way of calling d2i_* functions
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-02-25 17:22:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b42e4a9f6b Add dire warnings about the "reuse" capability of the d2i_* functions.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-02-25 17:22:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
78a6b77976 Provide documentation for i2d_ECPrivateKey and d2i_ECPrivateKey
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-02-25 17:22:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ba5d0113e8 Fix a failure to NULL a pointer freed on error.
Inspired by BoringSSL commit 517073cd4b by Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>

CVE-2015-0209

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-02-25 17:22:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f747572547 Import evp_test.c from BoringSSL. Unfortunately we already have a file
called evp_test.c, so I have called this one evp_extra_test.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/Makefile
	test/Makefile
2015-02-25 17:21:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
36b619a06e Document -no_explicit
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 384dee5124)
2015-02-24 15:28:38 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
13c1807041 Fix crash in SPARC T4 XTS.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 775b669de3)
2015-02-24 10:12:57 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
f243def213 sha/asm/sha1-586.pl: fix typo.
The typo doesn't affect supported configuration, only unsupported masm.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3372c4fffa)
2015-02-22 19:22:09 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1f956f9cda typo
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 15b5d6585d)
2015-02-22 14:44:21 +00:00
Edgar Pek
98e6f07901 Fix null-pointer dereference
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bcfa19a8d1)
2015-02-22 13:23:53 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
f95519538a Fix memory leak
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit edac5dc220)
2015-02-22 13:23:53 +01:00
Doug Hogan
79e2e927e6 Avoid a double-free in an error path.
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1549a26520)
2015-02-22 13:23:52 +01:00
Richard Levitte
7f3563b576 Restore -DTERMIO/-DTERMIOS on Windows platforms.
The previous defaulting to TERMIOS took away -DTERMIOS / -DTERMIO a
bit too enthusiastically.  Windows/DOSish platforms of all sorts get
identified as OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS, and they get a different treatment
altogether UNLESS -DTERMIO or -DTERMIOS is explicitely given with the
configuration.  The answer is to restore those macro definitions for
the affected configuration targets.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ba4bdee718)

Conflicts:
	Configure
2015-02-22 09:38:20 +01:00
Richard Levitte
458a55af16 Assume TERMIOS is default, remove TERMIO on all Linux.
The rationale for this move is that TERMIOS is default, supported by
POSIX-1.2001, and most definitely on Linux.  For a few other systems,
TERMIO may still be the termnial interface of preference, so we keep
-DTERMIO on those in Configure.

crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c is simplified in this regard, and will define
TERMIOS for all systems except a select few exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 64e6bf64b3)

Conflicts:
	Configure
	crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
2015-02-22 08:10:29 +01:00
Richard Levitte
681da86ebb Transfer a fix from 1.0.1
manually picked from e7b85bc402
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 774ccae63c)
2015-02-13 13:40:47 +01:00
Rich Salz
872f91c403 RT3684: rand_egd needs stddef.h
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2015-02-12 14:23:28 -05:00
Graeme Perrow
ee1ccd0a41 RT3670: Check return from BUF_MEM_grow_clean
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b0333e697c)
2015-02-12 13:01:33 -05:00
Eric Dequin
62bfff2d99 Missing OPENSSL_free on error path.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1d2932de4c)
2015-02-12 11:15:29 -05:00
Emilia Kasper
95929797a0 Fix hostname validation in the command-line tool to honour negative return values.
Specifically, an ASN.1 NumericString in the certificate CN will fail UTF-8 conversion
and result in a negative return value, which the "x509 -checkhost" command-line option
incorrectly interpreted as success.

Also update X509_check_host docs to reflect reality.

Thanks to Sean Burford (Google) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0923e7df9e)
2015-02-10 15:36:03 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
bcfaa4eeee objects/obj_xref.h: revert reformat.
obj_xref.h was erroneously restored to pre-reformat state.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-02-10 08:55:30 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
cb43fd0467 Bring objects.pl output even closer to new format.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 849037169d)
2015-02-09 16:00:25 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ba25221226 Fix memory leak reporting.
Free up bio_err after memory leak data has been printed to it.

In int_free_ex_data if ex_data is NULL there is nothing to free up
so return immediately and don't reallocate it.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 9c7a780bbe)
2015-02-09 13:01:15 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
506805e708 Harmonize objects.pl output with new format.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7ce3862319)
2015-02-09 09:57:23 +01:00
Matt Caswell
04222b630e Fix error handling in ssltest
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ae632974f9)
2015-02-06 10:08:58 +00:00
Rich Salz
16064539ad Fixed bad formatting in crypto/des/spr.h
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7e35f06ea9)
2015-02-05 09:45:25 -05:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
75c77a71fa Make objxref.pl output in correct format
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6922ddee1b)
2015-02-04 13:35:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3b740cebd5 Preliminary ASN1_TIME documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a724e79ed7)
2015-02-03 16:50:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f17a4ad7d7 Check PKCS#8 pkey field is valid before cleansing.
PR:3683
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 52e028b9de)
2015-02-03 14:02:12 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
79e0285755 cms-test.pl: "localize" /dev/null even further [as follow-up to VMS].
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5da05a26f2)
2015-02-02 15:29:10 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
8d5d455988 modes/gcm128.c: fix OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT compile failure
on affected platforms (PowerPC and AArch64).

For reference, minimalistic #ifdef GHASH is sufficient, because
it's never defined with OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT and ctx->ghash
is never referred.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b2991c081a)
2015-01-30 16:38:42 +01:00
Richard Levitte
1d5668c258 VMS exit codes weren't handled well enough and were unclear
Making a specific variable $failure_code and a bit of commenting in the
VMS section should help clear things up.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e00ab250c8)
2015-01-30 14:47:37 +01:00
Richard Levitte
bc1544d8c5 dso_vms needs to add the .EXE extension if there is none already
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be7b1097e2)
2015-01-30 05:02:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
6ca1dc9737 Provide documentation for all SSL(_CTX)?_(get|set)(_default)?_read_ahead
functions.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8507474564)
2015-01-27 14:30:25 +00:00
Matt Caswell
0ed9ca21ae Remove explicit setting of read_ahead for DTLS. It never makes sense not to
use read_ahead with DTLS because it doesn't work. Therefore read_ahead needs
to be the default.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f400241251)
2015-01-27 14:30:25 +00:00
Matt Caswell
11b32d6e29 Make DTLS always act as if read_ahead is set. The actual value of read_ahead
is ignored for DTLS.

RT#3657

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8dd4ad0ff5)
2015-01-27 14:30:25 +00:00
Rich Salz
63ac16ccac Remove obsolete support for old code.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3d0cf91807)
2015-01-26 11:06:28 -05:00
Rich Salz
db7cb7ab9a Remove unused eng_rsax and related asm file
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2015-01-26 10:46:26 -05:00
Rich Salz
6d09851694 Make OPENSSL_config truly ignore errors.
Per discussion: should not exit. Should not print to stderr.
Errors are ignored.  Updated doc to reflect that, and the fact
that this function is to be avoided.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit abdd677125)
2015-01-25 21:12:01 -05:00
Kurt Roeckx
63c1d16bb8 Fix segfault with empty fields as last in the config.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-01-24 14:52:58 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6fa805f516 FIPS build fixes.
PR#3673

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2015-01-23 00:12:39 +00:00
Matt Caswell
06aab26874 Prepare for 1.0.2a-dev
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-22 16:16:24 +00:00
309 changed files with 6874 additions and 5096 deletions

4
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -100,8 +100,12 @@ tags
TAGS
# Windows
/tmp32
/tmp32.dbg
/tmp32dll
/tmp32dll.dbg
/out32
/out32.dbg
/out32dll
/out32dll.dbg
/inc32

622
CHANGES
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@@ -2,47 +2,255 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
*) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
field.
This can be used to perform denial of service against any
system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
client authentication enabled.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
(CVE-2015-1788)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
time string.
An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
callbacks.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
independently by Hanno B<>ck.
(CVE-2015-1789)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
servers are not affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-1790)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
the CMS code.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
(CVE-2015-1792)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
a double free of the ticket data.
(CVE-2015-1791)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites
EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites
were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to
1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were
introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export
ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
curves, prefer P-256 (both).
[Emilia Kasper]
*) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
[Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
*) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will
occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.
This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford
University.
(CVE-2015-0291)
[Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell]
*) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller.
(CVE-2015-0290)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the
initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop
over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with
an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means
that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next
that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial
ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be
that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
server.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson.
(CVE-2015-0207)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
(CVE-2015-0286)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix
The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any
certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter.
(CVE-2015-0208)
[Stephen Henson]
*) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
not affected.
(CVE-2015-0287)
[Stephen Henson]
*) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-0289)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K<>sper
(OpenSSL development team).
(CVE-2015-0293)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message
being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
(CVE-2015-1787)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix
Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake
with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded
automatically, and the user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from
the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA).
If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the
output may be predictable.
For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:
openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
(CVE-2015-0285)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
sources. This scenario is considered rare.
This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
commit 517073cd4b.
(CVE-2015-0209)
[Matt Caswell]
*) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
(CVE-2015-0288)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
[Kurt Roeckx]
Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
*) SRTP Memory Leak.
A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
(CVE-2014-3513)
[OpenSSL team]
*) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
attack.
(CVE-2014-3567)
[Steve Henson]
*) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
configured to send them.
(CVE-2014-3568)
[Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
*) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Client applications doing fallback retries should call
SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
(CVE-2014-3566)
[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
*) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
@@ -378,6 +586,29 @@
Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015]
*) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2014-3571)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0206)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2014-3569)
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
ECDH ciphersuites.
@@ -395,6 +626,17 @@
(CVE-2015-0204)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
this issue.
(CVE-2015-0205)
[Steve Henson]
*) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
@@ -439,6 +681,17 @@
(CVE-2014-8275)
[Steve Henson]
*) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
the OpenSSL core team.
(CVE-2014-3570)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
@@ -598,18 +851,6 @@
bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
[Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
*) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
@@ -1107,63 +1348,6 @@
Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]
*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
[NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
@@ -2154,228 +2338,6 @@
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]
*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
*) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
[Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
an MMA defence is not necessary.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
differences arising during decryption processing. A research
paper describing this attack can be found at:
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
[Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
*) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
[Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
*) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
(CVE-2011-4576)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
[Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
[Emilia K<>sper (Google)]
*) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
the last update always remained unused).
[Emilia K<>sper (Google)]
*) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
[Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
*) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
[Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
*) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
ambiguous.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
*) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
[Steve Henson]
*) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
[Ben Laurie]
Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
*) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
[Steve Henson]
*) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
some broken encodings work correctly.
[Steve Henson]
*) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
is also one of the inputs.
[Emilia K<>sper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
*) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
etc are non-op.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
[NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
*) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
[Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
*) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
common in certificates and some applications which only call
SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
[Steve Henson]
*) VMS fixes:
Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
[Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
*) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never

151
Configure
View File

@@ -105,7 +105,24 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimenta
my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED";
my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Wno-padded -Wno-shorten-64-to-32 -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wno-missing-noreturn -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-sign-conversion -Wno-unreachable-code -Wno-conversion -Wno-documentation -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-cast-align -Wno-incompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-unused-macros -Wno-disabled-macro-expansion -Wno-conditional-uninitialized -Wno-switch-enum";
# TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the following
# warnings can also be enabled:
# -Wconditional-uninitialized, -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros,
# -Wmissing-field-initializers, -Wmissing-variable-declarations,
# -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
# -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
# -Wextended-offsetof
my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof";
# These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang.
# TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the
# following warnings can also be enabled: -Wconditional-uninitialized,
# -Wswitch-enum, -Wunused-macros, -Wmissing-field-initializers,
# -Wmissing-variable-declarations,
# -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers, -Wcast-align,
# -Wunreachable-code -Wunused-parameter -Wlanguage-extension-token
# -Wextended-offsetof
my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
my $strict_warnings = 0;
@@ -188,18 +205,18 @@ my %table=(
"debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
"debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
"debug-linux-elf","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-lefence -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-elf-noefence","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-ia32-aes", "gcc:-DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o::des-586.o crypt586.o:aes_x86core.o aes_cbc.o aesni-x86.o:bf-586.o:md5-586.o:sha1-586.o sha256-586.o sha512-586.o:cast-586.o:rc4-586.o:rmd-586.o:rc5-586.o:wp_block.o wp-mmx.o::ghash-x86.o::elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-generic64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"dist", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
# Basic configs that should work on any (32 and less bit) box
@@ -233,12 +250,12 @@ my %table=(
#### SPARC Solaris with GNU C setups
"solaris-sparcv7-gcc","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mv8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# -m32 should be safe to add as long as driver recognizes -mcpu=ultrasparc
"solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris64-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -O3 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-m64 -shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
####
"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mv8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-solaris-sparcv9-gcc","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -O -g -mcpu=ultrasparc -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wno-long-long -D__EXTENSIONS__ -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### SPARC Solaris with Sun C setups
@@ -255,20 +272,20 @@ my %table=(
#### SunOS configs, assuming sparc for the gcc one.
#"sunos-cc", "cc:-O4 -DNOPROTO -DNOCONST::(unknown):SUNOS::DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}::",
"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
"sunos-gcc","gcc:-O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int::(unknown):SUNOS::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_PTR DES_RISC1:${no_asm}::",
#### IRIX 5.x configs
# -mips2 flag is added by ./config when appropriate.
"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"irix-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"irix-cc", "cc:-O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:irix-shared:::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### IRIX 6.x configs
# Only N32 and N64 ABIs are supported. If you need O32 ABI build, invoke
# './Configure irix-cc -o32' manually.
"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
"irix-mips3-gcc","gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_UNROLL DES_RISC2 DES_PTR BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
"irix-mips3-cc", "cc:-n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::DES_PTR RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:irix-shared::-n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
# N64 ABI builds.
"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"irix64-mips4-gcc","gcc:-mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"irix64-mips4-cc", "cc:-64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W::-D_SGI_MP_SOURCE:::RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC2 DES_UNROLL SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:irix-shared::-64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
#### Unified HP-UX ANSI C configs.
# Special notes:
@@ -348,8 +365,8 @@ my %table=(
####
# *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to
# throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate...
"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#######################################################################
# Note that -march is not among compiler options in below linux-armv4
@@ -378,30 +395,30 @@ my %table=(
#
# ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8
#
"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-aarch64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-armv4", "gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-aarch64","gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support,
# if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below
# refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and
# MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness.
"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
#### IA-32 targets...
"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
####
"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
#### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
# "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
# /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
@@ -415,16 +432,16 @@ my %table=(
# ldconfig and run-time linker to autodiscover. Unfortunately it
# doesn't work just yet, because of couple of bugs in glibc
# sysdeps/s390/dl-procinfo.c affecting ldconfig and ld.so.1...
"linux32-s390x", "gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs",
"linux32-s390x", "gcc:-m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$s390x_asm;$asm=~s/bn\-s390x\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":31:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m31:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/highgprs",
#### SPARC Linux setups
# Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently
# assisted with debugging of following two configs.
"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-sparcv8","gcc:-mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# it's a real mess with -mcpu=ultrasparc option under Linux, but
# -Wa,-Av8plus should do the trick no matter what.
"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-sparcv9","gcc:-m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# GCC 3.1 is a requirement
"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux64-sparcv9","gcc:-m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
#### Alpha Linux with GNU C and Compaq C setups
# Special notes:
# - linux-alpha+bwx-gcc is ment to be used from ./config only. If you
@@ -438,31 +455,31 @@ my %table=(
#
# <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
#
"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
"linux-alpha-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-alpha+bwx-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
"linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${alpha_asm}",
# Android: linux-* but without -DTERMIO and pointers to headers and libs.
# Android: linux-* but without pointers to headers and libs.
"android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
"BSD-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -mv8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-BSD-x86-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-sparcv8", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# -DMD32_REG_T=int doesn't actually belong in sparc64 target, it
# simply *happens* to work around a compiler bug in gcc 3.3.3,
# triggered by RIPEMD160 code.
"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86_64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-sparc64", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC2 BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"BSD-x86_64", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"bsdi-elf-gcc", "gcc:-DPERL5 -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown)::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -474,8 +491,8 @@ my %table=(
# QNX
"qnx4", "cc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::(unknown):::${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:",
"QNX6", "gcc:-DTERMIOS::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"QNX6-i386", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"QNX6", "gcc:::::-lsocket::${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"QNX6-i386", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::::-lsocket:${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# BeOS
"beos-x86-r5", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:BEOS:-lbe -lnet:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:beos:beos-shared:-fPIC -DPIC:-shared:.so",
@@ -548,7 +565,7 @@ my %table=(
"SINIX-N","/usr/ucb/cc:-O2 -misaligned::(unknown)::-lucb:RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR:::",
# SIEMENS BS2000/OSD: an EBCDIC-based mainframe
"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
"BS2000-OSD","c89:-O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC::(unknown)::-lsocket -lnsl:THIRTY_TWO_BIT DES_PTR DES_UNROLL MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR BF_PTR:::",
# OS/390 Unix an EBCDIC-based Unix system on IBM mainframe
# You need to compile using the c89.sh wrapper in the tools directory, because the
@@ -607,7 +624,7 @@ my %table=(
"netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc", "i586-netware-gcc:-nostdinc -I/ndk/libc/include -DNETWARE_BSDSOCK -DL_ENDIAN -DNETWARE_LIBC -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_NETWARE -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall:::::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_opts}::",
# DJGPP
"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:",
"DJGPP", "gcc:-I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall:::MSDOS:-L/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/lib -lwatt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out:",
# Ultrix from Bernhard Simon <simon@zid.tuwien.ac.at>
"ultrix-cc","cc:-std1 -O -Olimit 2500 -DL_ENDIAN::(unknown):::::::",
@@ -634,7 +651,7 @@ my %table=(
"newsos4-gcc","gcc:-O -DB_ENDIAN::(unknown):NEWS4:-lmld -liberty:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR::::",
##### GNU Hurd
"hurd-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC",
"hurd-x86", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC",
##### OS/2 EMX
"OS2-EMX", "gcc::::::::",
@@ -1195,6 +1212,7 @@ my $cc = $fields[$idx_cc];
if($ENV{CC}) {
$cc = $ENV{CC};
}
my $cflags = $fields[$idx_cflags];
my $unistd = $fields[$idx_unistd];
my $thread_cflag = $fields[$idx_thread_cflag];
@@ -1630,12 +1648,21 @@ if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
if ($strict_warnings)
{
my $ecc = $cc;
$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
my $wopt;
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($cc =~ /gcc$/ or $cc =~ /clang$/);
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
}
if ($ecc eq "clang")
{
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
}
}
}
open(IN,'<Makefile.org') || die "unable to read Makefile.org:$!\n";

View File

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
all: Makefile build_all openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc
all: Makefile build_all
# as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower
# Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn
@@ -271,7 +271,10 @@ reflect:
sub_all: build_all
build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools
build_libs: build_crypto build_ssl build_engines
build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
build_libcrypto: build_crypto build_engines libcrypto.pc
build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc
build_crypto:
@dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
@@ -457,6 +460,9 @@ tests: rehash
report:
@$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
@set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
depend:
@set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
@@ -481,26 +487,10 @@ util/libeay.num::
util/ssleay.num::
$(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
crypto/objects/obj_dat.h: crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
$(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
crypto/objects/obj_mac.h: crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
$(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
crypto/objects/obj_xref.h: crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
$(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt >crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
apps/openssl-vms.cnf: apps/openssl.cnf
$(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf
crypto/bn/bn_prime.h: crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
$(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl >crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
TABLE: Configure
(echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
$(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h crypto/objects/obj_xref.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE depend
# Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
# pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file

94
NEWS
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,30 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015]
o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291)
o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290)
o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207)
o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286)
o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208)
o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287)
o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289)
o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293)
o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787)
o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285)
o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209)
o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288)
o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]:
o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
@@ -54,6 +78,7 @@
o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
@@ -113,19 +138,6 @@
o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
o SRP support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]:
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]:
o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
@@ -198,62 +210,6 @@
o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
o Various DTLS fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
o Various DTLS fixes.
o Recognise SHA2 certificates if only SSL algorithms added.
o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
o CFB cipher definition fixes.

2
README
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.2 22 Jan 2015
OpenSSL 1.0.2b 11 Jun 2015
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

118
TABLE
View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BS2000-OSD
$cc = c89
$cflags = -O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -DCHARSET_EBCDIC
$cflags = -O -XLLML -XLLMK -XL -DB_ENDIAN -DCHARSET_EBCDIC
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-generic32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-generic64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-ia64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-sparc64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -DMD32_REG_T=int -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-sparcv8
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -mv8 -Wall
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-x86
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-x86-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ $multilib =
*** BSD-x86_64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ $multilib =
*** DJGPP
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall
$cflags = -I/dev/env/WATT_ROOT/inc -DTERMIO -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O2 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag =
$sys_id = MSDOS
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ $multilib =
*** QNX6
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIOS
$cflags =
$unistd =
$thread_cflag =
$sys_id =
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ $multilib =
*** QNX6-i386
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O2 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag =
$sys_id =
@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-BSD-x86-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -Wall -g
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -g
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2348,7 +2348,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2416,7 +2416,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$cflags = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2450,7 +2450,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2484,7 +2484,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-elf-noefence
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2518,7 +2518,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-generic32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DTERMIO -g -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-ia32-aes
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DAES_EXPERIMENTAL -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2620,7 +2620,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-pentium
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2654,7 +2654,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-ppro
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2688,7 +2688,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-linux-x86_64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -Wall
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -2790,7 +2790,7 @@ $multilib =
*** debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mv8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN
$cflags = -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -O -g -mcpu=v8 -Wall -DB_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -3708,7 +3708,7 @@ $multilib = /pa20_64
*** hurd-x86
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -3776,7 +3776,7 @@ $multilib =
*** irix-cc
$cc = cc
$cflags = -O2 -use_readonly_const -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN
$cflags = -O2 -use_readonly_const -DB_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -3810,7 +3810,7 @@ $multilib =
*** irix-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN
$cflags = -O3 -DB_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -3844,7 +3844,7 @@ $multilib =
*** irix-mips3-cc
$cc = cc
$cflags = -n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -n32 -mips3 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3878,7 +3878,7 @@ $multilib = 32
*** irix-mips3-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3912,7 +3912,7 @@ $multilib = 32
*** irix64-mips4-cc
$cc = cc
$cflags = -64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -64 -mips4 -O2 -use_readonly_const -G0 -rdata_shared -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3946,7 +3946,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** irix64-mips4-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DTERMIOS -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=64 -mips4 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_SGI_MP_SOURCE
$sys_id =
@@ -3980,7 +3980,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-aarch64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4014,7 +4014,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha+bwx-ccc
$cc = ccc
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4048,7 +4048,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha+bwx-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4082,7 +4082,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha-ccc
$cc = ccc
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4116,7 +4116,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-alpha-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO
$cflags = -O3 -DL_ENDIAN
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4150,7 +4150,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-aout
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id =
@@ -4184,7 +4184,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-armv4
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4218,7 +4218,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-elf
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4252,7 +4252,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-generic32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4286,7 +4286,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-generic64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4320,7 +4320,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-ia32-icc
$cc = icc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4388,7 +4388,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-ia64-icc
$cc = icc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4422,7 +4422,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-mips32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4456,7 +4456,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-mips64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4490,7 +4490,7 @@ $multilib = 32
*** linux-ppc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4524,7 +4524,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-ppc64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4558,7 +4558,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-ppc64le
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4592,7 +4592,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-sparcv8
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mv8 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W
$cflags = -mcpu=v8 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DBN_DIV2W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4626,7 +4626,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-sparcv9
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W
$cflags = -m32 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -Wa,-Av8plus -DBN_DIV2W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id = ULTRASPARC
@@ -4660,7 +4660,7 @@ $multilib =
*** linux-x32
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4694,7 +4694,7 @@ $multilib = x32
*** linux-x86_64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4728,7 +4728,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-x86_64-clang
$cc = clang
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Wno-padded -Wno-shorten-64-to-32 -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wno-missing-noreturn -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-sign-conversion -Wno-unreachable-code -Wno-conversion -Wno-documentation -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-cast-align -Wno-incompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers -Wno-missing-variable-declarations -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-unused-macros -Wno-disabled-macro-expansion -Wno-conditional-uninitialized -Wno-switch-enum -Qunused-arguments
$cflags = -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4762,7 +4762,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux-x86_64-icc
$cc = icc
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2
$cflags = -DL_ENDIAN -O2
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4796,7 +4796,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux32-s390x
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m31 -Wa,-mzarch -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4830,7 +4830,7 @@ $multilib = /highgprs
*** linux64-mips64
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$cflags = -mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4864,7 +4864,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux64-s390x
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -4898,7 +4898,7 @@ $multilib = 64
*** linux64-sparcv9
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$cflags = -m64 -mcpu=ultrasparc -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id = ULTRASPARC
@@ -5748,7 +5748,7 @@ $multilib =
*** solaris-sparcv8-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -mv8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W
$cflags = -mcpu=v8 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
$sys_id =
@@ -6054,7 +6054,7 @@ $multilib = /64
*** sunos-gcc
$cc = gcc
$cflags = -O3 -mv8 -Dssize_t=int
$cflags = -O3 -mcpu=v8 -Dssize_t=int
$unistd =
$thread_cflag = (unknown)
$sys_id = SUNOS

View File

@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ req: sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
sreq.o: req.c
$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) -o sreq.o req.c
openssl-vms.cnf: openssl.cnf
$(PERL) $(TOP)/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < openssl.cnf > openssl-vms.cnf
files:
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
@@ -127,12 +130,12 @@ links:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
depend:
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
$(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
else \
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
fi
update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
depend: local_depend
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
local_depend:
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
@@ -144,10 +147,10 @@ clean:
rm -f req
$(DLIBSSL):
(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=ssl all)
(cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libssl)
$(DLIBCRYPTO):
(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto all)
(cd ..; $(MAKE) build_libcrypto)
$(EXE): progs.h $(E_OBJ) $(PROGRAM).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) $(DLIBSSL)
$(RM) $(EXE)

View File

@@ -574,6 +574,11 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
char *prompt = NULL;
prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info);
if (!prompt) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
return 0;
}
ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD;
UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0);
@@ -583,6 +588,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp)
PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1);
if (ok >= 0 && verify) {
buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
if (!buff) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
UI_free(ui);
OPENSSL_free(prompt);
return 0;
}
ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff,
PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf);
}
@@ -2360,6 +2371,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-no_alt_chains"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS;
else
return 0;
@@ -2775,7 +2788,7 @@ void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x,
return;
if (checkhost) {
BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n",
checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL)
checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) == 1
? "" : " NOT");
}

View File

@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)
{
CONF *cnf = NULL;
int len;
long errline;
long errline = 0;
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL;

View File

@@ -563,10 +563,18 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
strcpy(tofree, s);
#else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len);
BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len);
#endif
@@ -2813,6 +2821,11 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *comp_time = NULL;
tmp = BUF_strdup(str);
if (!tmp) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
p = strchr(tmp, ',');
rtime_str = tmp;
@@ -2830,6 +2843,10 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
if (prevtm) {
*prevtm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
if (!*prevtm) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(*prevtm, rtime_str)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid revocation date %s\n", rtime_str);
goto err;
@@ -2870,6 +2887,10 @@ int unpack_revinfo(ASN1_TIME **prevtm, int *preason, ASN1_OBJECT **phold,
goto err;
}
comp_time = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
if (!comp_time) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n");
goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(comp_time, arg_str)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid compromised time %s\n", arg_str);
goto err;

View File

@@ -463,6 +463,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx) {
cms_key_param *nparam;
nparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(cms_key_param));
if (!nparam) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto argerr;
}
nparam->idx = keyidx;
nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
nparam->next = NULL;
@@ -641,6 +645,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,

View File

@@ -293,6 +293,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
bmd = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (debug) {
BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback);
/* needed for windows 3.1 */
@@ -304,11 +309,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (out_bin == -1) {
if (keyfile)
out_bin = 1;
@@ -460,6 +460,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (!sigbuf) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
siglen = BIO_read(sigbio, sigbuf, siglen);
BIO_free(sigbio);
if (siglen <= 0) {

View File

@@ -548,9 +548,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else
OPENSSL_cleanse(str, strlen(str));
}
if ((hiv != NULL) && !set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
goto end;
if (hiv != NULL) {
int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (siz == 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n");
} else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, sizeof iv)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
goto end;
}
}
if ((hiv == NULL) && (str == NULL)
&& EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) != 0) {
@@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "iv undefined\n");
goto end;
}
if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, sizeof key)) {
if ((hkey != NULL) && !set_hex(hkey, key, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher))) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex key value\n");
goto end;
}

View File

@@ -535,6 +535,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,

View File

@@ -428,10 +428,6 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
if (arg.data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(arg.data);
if (bio_err != NULL) {
BIO_free(bio_err);
bio_err = NULL;
}
#if defined( OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (__INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64)
/* Free any duplicate Argv[] storage. */
if (free_Argv) {
@@ -440,6 +436,10 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
#endif
apps_shutdown();
CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
if (bio_err != NULL) {
BIO_free(bio_err);
bio_err = NULL;
}
OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
}

View File

@@ -189,11 +189,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (infile == NULL)
BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
else {
if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0)
if (in == NULL) {
perror(infile);
goto end;
}
if (BIO_read_filename(in, infile) <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load input file\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
if (informat == FORMAT_ASN1)

View File

@@ -268,6 +268,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
rsa_in = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize * 2);
rsa_out = OPENSSL_malloc(keysize);
if (!rsa_in || !rsa_out) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
/* Read the input data */
rsa_inlen = BIO_read(in, rsa_in, keysize * 2);

View File

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h> /* for memcpy() and strcmp() */
#define USE_SOCKETS
#define NON_MAIN
#include "apps.h"
@@ -456,8 +457,13 @@ int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
if (ncurves <= 0)
return 1;
curves = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int));
if (!curves) {
BIO_puts(out, "Malloc error getting supported curves\n");
return 0;
}
SSL_get1_curves(s, curves);
BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: ");
for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
if (i)
@@ -1007,7 +1013,7 @@ int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie,
/* Initialize a random secret */
if (!cookie_initialized) {
if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n");
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
" -pass arg - private key file pass phrase source\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -560,6 +562,11 @@ static char *MS_CALLBACK ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp;
int l;
if (!pass) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Malloc failure\n");
return NULL;
}
cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin;
cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user";
if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) {
@@ -1295,12 +1302,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
if (exc)
ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc);
/*
* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( Setting
* read ahead solves this problem.
*/
if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
@@ -1337,13 +1338,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback);
if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) ||
(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx))) {
/*
* BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting default verify locations\n");
*/
if ((CAfile || CApath)
&& !SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
}
if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
/* goto end; */
}
ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download);

View File

@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx);
static void free_sessions(void);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile);
static DH *get_dh512(void);
static DH *get_dh2048(void);
#endif
#ifdef MONOLITH
@@ -230,30 +230,48 @@ static void s_server_init(void);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
0xDA, 0x58, 0x3C, 0x16, 0xD9, 0x85, 0x22, 0x89, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xAF, 0x75,
0x6F, 0x4C, 0xCA, 0x92, 0xDD, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x04, 0xFB, 0x0F,
0xED, 0x94, 0xEF, 0x9C, 0x8A, 0x44, 0x03, 0xED, 0x57, 0x46, 0x50, 0xD3,
0x69, 0x99, 0xDB, 0x29, 0xD7, 0x76, 0x27, 0x6B, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0x12,
0xE2, 0x18, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1E, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7C,
0x47, 0x74, 0xE8, 0x33,
static unsigned char dh2048_p[] = {
0xF6,0x42,0x57,0xB7,0x08,0x7F,0x08,0x17,0x72,0xA2,0xBA,0xD6,
0xA9,0x42,0xF3,0x05,0xE8,0xF9,0x53,0x11,0x39,0x4F,0xB6,0xF1,
0x6E,0xB9,0x4B,0x38,0x20,0xDA,0x01,0xA7,0x56,0xA3,0x14,0xE9,
0x8F,0x40,0x55,0xF3,0xD0,0x07,0xC6,0xCB,0x43,0xA9,0x94,0xAD,
0xF7,0x4C,0x64,0x86,0x49,0xF8,0x0C,0x83,0xBD,0x65,0xE9,0x17,
0xD4,0xA1,0xD3,0x50,0xF8,0xF5,0x59,0x5F,0xDC,0x76,0x52,0x4F,
0x3D,0x3D,0x8D,0xDB,0xCE,0x99,0xE1,0x57,0x92,0x59,0xCD,0xFD,
0xB8,0xAE,0x74,0x4F,0xC5,0xFC,0x76,0xBC,0x83,0xC5,0x47,0x30,
0x61,0xCE,0x7C,0xC9,0x66,0xFF,0x15,0xF9,0xBB,0xFD,0x91,0x5E,
0xC7,0x01,0xAA,0xD3,0x5B,0x9E,0x8D,0xA0,0xA5,0x72,0x3A,0xD4,
0x1A,0xF0,0xBF,0x46,0x00,0x58,0x2B,0xE5,0xF4,0x88,0xFD,0x58,
0x4E,0x49,0xDB,0xCD,0x20,0xB4,0x9D,0xE4,0x91,0x07,0x36,0x6B,
0x33,0x6C,0x38,0x0D,0x45,0x1D,0x0F,0x7C,0x88,0xB3,0x1C,0x7C,
0x5B,0x2D,0x8E,0xF6,0xF3,0xC9,0x23,0xC0,0x43,0xF0,0xA5,0x5B,
0x18,0x8D,0x8E,0xBB,0x55,0x8C,0xB8,0x5D,0x38,0xD3,0x34,0xFD,
0x7C,0x17,0x57,0x43,0xA3,0x1D,0x18,0x6C,0xDE,0x33,0x21,0x2C,
0xB5,0x2A,0xFF,0x3C,0xE1,0xB1,0x29,0x40,0x18,0x11,0x8D,0x7C,
0x84,0xA7,0x0A,0x72,0xD6,0x86,0xC4,0x03,0x19,0xC8,0x07,0x29,
0x7A,0xCA,0x95,0x0C,0xD9,0x96,0x9F,0xAB,0xD0,0x0A,0x50,0x9B,
0x02,0x46,0xD3,0x08,0x3D,0x66,0xA4,0x5D,0x41,0x9F,0x9C,0x7C,
0xBD,0x89,0x4B,0x22,0x19,0x26,0xBA,0xAB,0xA2,0x5E,0xC3,0x55,
0xE9,0x32,0x0B,0x3B,
};
static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
static unsigned char dh2048_g[] = {
0x02,
};
static DH *get_dh512(void)
DH *get_dh2048()
{
DH *dh = NULL;
DH *dh;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
return (NULL);
dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
return (NULL);
return (dh);
return NULL;
dh->p=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_p, sizeof(dh2048_p), NULL);
dh->g=BN_bin2bn(dh2048_g, sizeof(dh2048_g), NULL);
if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) {
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
return dh;
}
#endif
@@ -347,7 +365,7 @@ static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
}
if (s_debug)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n",
identity ? (int)strlen(identity) : 0, identity);
(int)strlen(identity), identity);
/* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */
if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) {
@@ -553,6 +571,8 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -state - Print the SSL states\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -no_alt_chains - only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -nocert - Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -696,6 +716,8 @@ static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi)
EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf;
wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + 1024);
if (!wbuf)
return 0;
wbuf->alloced = 1024;
wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
@@ -750,9 +772,11 @@ static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = num + num; /* double the size */
if (num < inl)
num = inl;
OPENSSL_free(wbuf);
wbuf =
(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EBCDIC_OUTBUFF) + num);
if (!wbuf)
return 0;
OPENSSL_free(b->ptr);
wbuf->alloced = num;
wbuf->buff[0] = '\0';
@@ -1736,12 +1760,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
if (exc)
ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc);
/*
* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-( Setting
* read ahead solves this problem.
*/
if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1);
if (state)
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
@@ -1821,12 +1839,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx2, SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG);
if (exc)
ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx2, exc);
/*
* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-(
* Setting read ahead solves this problem.
*/
if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx2, 1);
if (state)
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback);
@@ -1873,7 +1885,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n");
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n");
dh = get_dh512();
dh = get_dh2048();
if (dh == NULL) {
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
(void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
@@ -2461,8 +2477,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
ret = 1;
goto err;
}
l += k;
i -= k;
if (k > 0) {
l += k;
i -= k;
}
if (i <= 0)
break;
}
@@ -2877,7 +2895,7 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
/* else we have data */
if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) ||
((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 10) == 0))) {
((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) {
char *p;
X509 *peer;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
@@ -3289,7 +3307,8 @@ static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
{
unsigned int count = 0;
do {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) < 0)
return 0;
/*
* Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
* is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg.
@@ -3331,6 +3350,10 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
unsigned char *p;
sess = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(simple_ssl_session));
if (!sess) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
return 0;
}
SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &sess->idlen);
sess->derlen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL);
@@ -3338,6 +3361,16 @@ static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
sess->id = BUF_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen);
sess->der = OPENSSL_malloc(sess->derlen);
if (!sess->id || !sess->der) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding session to external cache\n");
if (sess->id)
OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
if (sess->der)
OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
OPENSSL_free(sess);
return 0;
}
p = sess->der;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &p);

View File

@@ -302,6 +302,10 @@ static int parseArgs(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
maxTime = atoi(*(++argv));
if (maxTime <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "time must be > 0\n");
badop = 1;
}
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "unknown option %s\n", *argv);
badop = 1;
@@ -550,7 +554,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
nConn, totalTime, ((double)nConn / totalTime), bytes_read);
printf
("%d connections in %ld real seconds, %ld bytes read per connection\n",
nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxTime, bytes_read / nConn);
nConn, (long)time(NULL) - finishtime + maxTime,
bytes_read / (nConn?nConn:1));
ret = 0;
end:

View File

@@ -441,6 +441,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-no_alt_chains only ever use the first certificate chain found\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-crl_check check revocation status of signer's certificate using CRLs\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,

View File

@@ -2775,6 +2775,11 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
inp = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1]);
out = OPENSSL_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024);
if (!inp || !out) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Out of memory\n");
goto end;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, no_key, no_iv);
@@ -2786,7 +2791,7 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
print_message(alg_name, 0, mblengths[j]);
Time_F(START);
for (count = 0, run = 1; run && count < 0x7fffffff; count++) {
unsigned char aad[13];
unsigned char aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
size_t len = mblengths[j];
int packlen;
@@ -2821,7 +2826,8 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
aad[11] = len >> 8;
aad[12] = len;
pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx,
EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, aad);
EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, aad);
EVP_Cipher(&ctx, out, inp, len + pad);
}
}
@@ -2859,7 +2865,10 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
}
OPENSSL_free(inp);
OPENSSL_free(out);
end:
if (inp)
OPENSSL_free(inp);
if (out)
OPENSSL_free(out);
}
#endif

View File

@@ -435,10 +435,18 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE);
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
strcpy(tofree, s);
# else
len = strlen(s) + sizeof(CONFIG_FILE) + 1;
tofree = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!tofree) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
goto err;
}
BUF_strlcpy(tofree, s, len);
BUF_strlcat(tofree, "/", len);
# endif

View File

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (ret == 1) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-attime timestamp]");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-no_alt_chains] [-attime timestamp]");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err, " [-engine e]");
#endif

View File

@@ -829,6 +829,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
z = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
m = OPENSSL_malloc(z);
if (!m) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
d = (unsigned char *)m;
z = i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_subject_name(x), &d);

View File

@@ -125,12 +125,17 @@ install:
lint:
@target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE)
depend:
update: local_depend
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
depend: local_depend
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
local_depend:
@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
clean:
rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff

View File

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ aesni-mb-x86_64.s: asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
aes-sparcv9.s: asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
$(PERL) asm/aes-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
aest4-sparcv9.s: asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl
aest4-sparcv9.s: asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl ../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
$(PERL) asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
aes-ppc.s: asm/aes-ppc.pl
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -1130,31 +1130,31 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
* map cipher state to byte array block:
*/
s0 =
(Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
(Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^
rk[0];
PUTU32(out , s0);
s1 =
(Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
(Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^
rk[1];
PUTU32(out + 4, s1);
s2 =
(Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
(Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^
rk[2];
PUTU32(out + 8, s2);
s3 =
(Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
(Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^
rk[3];
PUTU32(out + 12, s3);
}
@@ -1233,10 +1233,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
while (1) {
temp = rk[3];
rk[4] = rk[0] ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^
rcon[i];
rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
@@ -1253,10 +1253,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
while (1) {
temp = rk[ 5];
rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^
rcon[i];
rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
@@ -1275,10 +1275,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
while (1) {
temp = rk[ 7];
rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 24) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ]) ^
rcon[i];
rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
@@ -1288,10 +1288,10 @@ int private_AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
}
temp = rk[11];
rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff]);
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff]);
rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];

View File

@@ -499,10 +499,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
while (1) {
temp = rk[3];
rk[4] = rk[0] ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
rcon[i];
rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
@@ -519,10 +519,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
while (1) {
temp = rk[ 5];
rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
rcon[i];
rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
@@ -541,10 +541,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
while (1) {
temp = rk[ 7];
rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] ) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] << 24) ^
rcon[i];
rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
@@ -554,10 +554,10 @@ int AES_set_encrypt_key(const unsigned char *userKey, const int bits,
}
temp = rk[11];
rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
(Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] ) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24);
((u32)Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] ) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Te4[(temp >> 24) ] << 24);
rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
@@ -676,22 +676,22 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS)
prefetch256(Te4);
t[0] = Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
/* now do the linear transform using words */
{ int i;
@@ -742,22 +742,22 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
*/
for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) {
#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS)
t[0] = Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[0] = (u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = (u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = (u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = (u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
/* now do the linear transform using words */
{
@@ -812,28 +812,28 @@ void AES_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
prefetch256(Te4);
*(u32*)(out+0) =
Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
rk[0];
*(u32*)(out+4) =
Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
rk[1];
*(u32*)(out+8) =
Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
rk[2];
*(u32*)(out+12) =
Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
(u32)Te4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Te4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Te4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Te4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24 ^
rk[3];
#else
*(u32*)(out+0) =
@@ -890,22 +890,22 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_OUTER_ROUNDS)
prefetch256(Td4);
t[0] = Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
/* now do the linear transform using words */
{
@@ -967,22 +967,22 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
*/
for (rk+=8,r=key->rounds-2; r>0; rk+=4,r--) {
#if defined(AES_COMPACT_IN_INNER_ROUNDS)
t[0] = Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[0] = (u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[1] = (u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[2] = (u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24;
t[3] = (u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^
(u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8 ^
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
/* now do the linear transform using words */
{
@@ -1046,27 +1046,27 @@ void AES_decrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
prefetch256(Td4);
*(u32*)(out+0) =
(Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff]) ^
(Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(s0 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
rk[0];
*(u32*)(out+4) =
(Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff]) ^
(Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(s1 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
rk[1];
*(u32*)(out+8) =
(Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff]) ^
(Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(s2 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(s3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
rk[2];
*(u32*)(out+12) =
(Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff]) ^
(Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
(Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
(Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
((u32)Td4[(s3 ) & 0xff]) ^
((u32)Td4[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^
((u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
((u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^
rk[3];
}

View File

@@ -1499,13 +1499,13 @@ ___
# EXCEPTION_DISPOSITION handler (EXCEPTION_RECORD *rec,ULONG64 frame,
# CONTEXT *context,DISPATCHER_CONTEXT *disp)
if ($win64) {
if ($win64 && $avx) {
$rec="%rcx";
$frame="%rdx";
$context="%r8";
$disp="%r9";
$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
$code.=<<___;
.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
.type se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
@@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($shaext);
.rva .LSEH_end_${func}_shaext
.rva .LSEH_info_${func}_shaext
___
$code.=<<___ if ($avx);
$code.=<<___;
.section .xdata
.align 8
.LSEH_info_${func}_xop:

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
# Westmere 3.77/1.37 1.37 1.52 1.27
# * Bridge 5.07/0.98 0.99 1.09 0.91
# Haswell 4.44/0.80 0.97 1.03 0.72
# Atom 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46
# Silvermont 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46
# Bulldozer 5.80/0.98 1.05 1.24 0.93
$PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ require "x86asm.pl";
&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
&external_label("OPENSSL_ia32cap_P");
&static_label("key_const");
if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=\&movups; }
else { $movekey=\&movups; }
@@ -181,7 +184,10 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
else
{ &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_encrypt");
@@ -197,7 +203,10 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("dec"); }
else
{ &call ("_aesni_decrypt1"); }
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0); # clear register bank
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,"eax"),$inout0);
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_decrypt");
@@ -349,17 +358,15 @@ sub aesni_generate6
&neg ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,16);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"));
&jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner"));
&set_label("${p}6_loop",16);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_inner");
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
@@ -615,6 +622,14 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&set_label("ecb_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ecb_encrypt");
######################################################################
@@ -704,6 +719,15 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
&mov ($out,&wparam(5));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks");
&function_begin("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
@@ -804,6 +828,15 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
&mov ($out,&wparam(5));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$cmac);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&function_end("aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks");
}
@@ -1053,6 +1086,17 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&set_label("ctr32_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(80,"esp"));
&function_end("aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks");
@@ -1394,6 +1438,20 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(-16,$out),$inout0); # write output
&set_label("xts_enc_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
&function_end("aesni_xts_encrypt");
@@ -1756,6 +1814,20 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0); # write output
&set_label("xts_dec_ret");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0"); # clear register bank
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*0,"esp"),"xmm0"); # clear stack
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*1,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*2,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*3,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm6");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*4,"esp"),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm7","xmm7");
&movdqa (&QWP(16*5,"esp"),"xmm0");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16*7+4,"esp")); # restore %esp
&function_end("aesni_xts_decrypt");
}
@@ -1808,6 +1880,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&add ($len,16);
&jnz (&label("cbc_enc_tail"));
&movaps ($ivec,$inout0);
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
&set_label("cbc_enc_tail");
@@ -1871,7 +1944,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movaps ($inout0,$inout5);
&movaps ($ivec,$rndkey0);
&add ($len,0x50);
&jle (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
&jle (&label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected"));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail");
@@ -1910,10 +1983,14 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout4,$rndkey0);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x40,$out));
&movaps ($inout0,$inout4);
&pxor ($inout4,$inout4);
&sub ($len,0x50);
&jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
@@ -1933,6 +2010,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout1,$in0);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movaps ($inout0,$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x10,$out));
&movaps ($ivec,$in1);
&sub ($len,0x20);
@@ -1945,7 +2023,9 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout2,$in1);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movaps ($inout0,$inout2);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x20,$out));
&movups ($ivec,&QWP(0x20,$inp));
&sub ($len,0x30);
@@ -1961,29 +2041,44 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&xorps ($inout3,$rndkey0);
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x30,$out));
&movaps ($inout0,$inout3);
&pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&sub ($len,0x40);
&jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
&set_label("cbc_dec_clear_tail_collected",16);
&pxor ($inout1,$inout1);
&pxor ($inout2,$inout2);
&pxor ($inout3,$inout3);
&pxor ($inout4,$inout4);
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_collected");
&and ($len,15);
&jnz (&label("cbc_dec_tail_partial"));
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
&jmp (&label("cbc_ret"));
&set_label("cbc_dec_tail_partial",16);
&movaps (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
&mov ("ecx",16);
&mov ($inp,"esp");
&sub ("ecx",$len);
&data_word(0xA4F3F689); # rep movsb
&movdqa (&QWP(0,"esp"),$inout0);
&set_label("cbc_ret");
&mov ("esp",&DWP(16,"esp")); # pull original %esp
&mov ($key_,&wparam(4));
&pxor ($inout0,$inout0);
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movups (&QWP(0,$key_),$ivec); # output IV
&pxor ($ivec,$ivec);
&set_label("cbc_abort");
&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
@@ -2000,14 +2095,24 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
# $round rounds
&function_begin_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
&push ("ebp");
&push ("ebx");
&test ("eax","eax");
&jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
&test ($key,$key);
&jz (&label("bad_pointer"));
&call (&label("pic"));
&set_label("pic");
&blindpop("ebx");
&lea ("ebx",&DWP(&label("key_const")."-".&label("pic"),"ebx"));
&picmeup("ebp","OPENSSL_ia32cap_P","ebx",&label("key_const"));
&movups ("xmm0",&QWP(0,"eax")); # pull first 128 bits of *userKey
&xorps ("xmm4","xmm4"); # low dword of xmm4 is assumed 0
&mov ("ebp",&DWP(4,"ebp"));
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
&and ("ebp",1<<28|1<<11); # AVX and XOP bits
&cmp ($rounds,256);
&je (&label("14rounds"));
&cmp ($rounds,192);
@@ -2016,6 +2121,9 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jne (&label("bad_keybits"));
&set_label("10rounds",16);
&cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
&je (&label("10rounds_alt"));
&mov ($rounds,9);
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm0",0x01); # round 1
@@ -2040,8 +2148,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&call (&label("key_128"));
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(80,$key),$rounds);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&ret();
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_128",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
@@ -2055,8 +2163,76 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ("xmm0","xmm1");
&ret();
&set_label("10rounds_alt",16);
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
&mov ($rounds,8);
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&set_label("loop_key128");
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
&dec ($rounds);
&jnz (&label("loop_key128"));
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x30,"ebx"));
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm0");
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm0","xmm4");
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2");
&pslldq ("xmm2",4);
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm0");
&mov ($rounds,9);
&mov (&DWP(96,$key),$rounds);
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("12rounds",16);
&movq ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining 1/3 of *userKey
&cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
&je (&label("12rounds_alt"));
&mov ($rounds,11);
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 1,2
@@ -2077,8 +2253,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&call (&label("key_192b"));
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(48,$key),$rounds);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&ret();
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_192a",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
@@ -2108,10 +2284,52 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&jmp (&label("key_192b_warm"));
&set_label("12rounds_alt",16);
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x10,"ebx"));
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
&mov ($rounds,8);
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&set_label("loop_key192");
&movq (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&lea ($key,&DWP(24,$key));
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm3");
&pshufd ("xmm3","xmm0",0xff);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm3");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0");
&dec ($rounds);
&jnz (&label("loop_key192"));
&mov ($rounds,11);
&mov (&DWP(32,$key),$rounds);
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("14rounds",16);
&movups ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining half of *userKey
&mov ($rounds,13);
&lea ($key,&DWP(16,$key));
&cmp ("ebp",1<<28);
&je (&label("14rounds_alt"));
&mov ($rounds,13);
&$movekey (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2"); # round 1
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 2
@@ -2143,7 +2361,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&ret();
&jmp (&label("good_key"));
&set_label("key_256a",16);
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm2");
@@ -2169,11 +2388,77 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ("xmm2","xmm1");
&ret();
&set_label("14rounds_alt",16);
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP(0x00,"ebx"));
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,"ebx"));
&mov ($rounds,7);
&movdqu (&QWP(-32,$key),"xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm2");
&set_label("loop_key256");
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm5");
&aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm4");
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0");
&pslldq ("xmm0",4);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm3");
&pslld ("xmm4",1);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&movdqu (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&dec ($rounds);
&jz (&label("done_key256"));
&pshufd ("xmm2","xmm0",0xff);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&aesenclast ("xmm2","xmm3");
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm1")
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1");
&pslldq ("xmm1",4);
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm1");
&movdqu (&QWP(16,$key),"xmm2");
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm2");
&jmp (&label("loop_key256"));
&set_label("done_key256");
&mov ($rounds,13);
&mov (&DWP(16,$key),$rounds);
&set_label("good_key");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm2");
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm3");
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm4");
&pxor ("xmm5","xmm5");
&xor ("eax","eax");
&pop ("ebx");
&pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&set_label("bad_pointer",4);
&mov ("eax",-1);
&pop ("ebx");
&pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&set_label("bad_keybits",4);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
&mov ("eax",-2);
&pop ("ebx");
&pop ("ebp");
&ret ();
&function_end_B("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
@@ -2223,10 +2508,18 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&aesimc ("xmm0","xmm0");
&$movekey (&QWP(0,$key),"xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm0");
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&xor ("eax","eax"); # return success
&set_label("dec_key_ret");
&ret ();
&function_end_B("${PREFIX}_set_decrypt_key");
&set_label("key_const",64);
&data_word(0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d);
&data_word(0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605,0x04070605);
&data_word(1,1,1,1);
&data_word(0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b);
&asciz("AES for Intel AES-NI, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>");
&asm_finish();

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -24,8 +24,12 @@
#
# CBC enc CBC dec CTR
# Apple A7 2.39 1.20 1.20
# Cortex-A53 2.45 1.87 1.94
# Cortex-A57 3.64 1.34 1.32
# Cortex-A53 1.32 1.29 1.46
# Cortex-A57(*) 1.95 0.85 0.93
# Denver 1.96 0.86 0.80
#
# (*) original 3.64/1.34/1.32 results were for r0p0 revision
# and are still same even for updated module;
$flavour = shift;
open STDOUT,">".shift;
@@ -308,17 +312,17 @@ ${prefix}_${dir}crypt:
.Loop_${dir}c:
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
aes$mc $inout,$inout
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key],#16
subs $rounds,$rounds,#2
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
aes$mc $inout,$inout
vld1.32 {$rndkey1},[$key],#16
b.gt .Loop_${dir}c
aes$e $inout,$rndkey0
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key]
aes$mc $inout,$inout
vld1.32 {$rndkey0},[$key]
aes$e $inout,$rndkey1
veor $inout,$inout,$rndkey0
@@ -336,6 +340,7 @@ my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step,$step1)=($enc,"w6","x7","x8","x12");
my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
my ($dat,$tmp,$rndzero_n_last)=($dat0,$tmp0,$tmp1);
my ($key4,$key5,$key6,$key7)=("x6","x12","x14",$key);
### q8-q15 preloaded key schedule
@@ -385,16 +390,42 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor $rndzero_n_last,q8,$rndlast
b.eq .Lcbc_enc128
vld1.32 {$in0-$in1},[$key_]
add $key_,$key,#16
add $key4,$key,#16*4
add $key5,$key,#16*5
aese $dat,q8
aesmc $dat,$dat
add $key6,$key,#16*6
add $key7,$key,#16*7
b .Lenter_cbc_enc
.align 4
.Loop_cbc_enc:
aese $dat,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat,$dat
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
.Lenter_cbc_enc:
aese $dat,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat,$dat
b.gt .Loop_cbc_enc
aese $dat,$in0
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q8},[$key4]
cmp $rounds,#4
aese $dat,$in1
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q9},[$key5]
b.eq .Lcbc_enc192
aese $dat,q8
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q8},[$key6]
aese $dat,q9
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q9},[$key7]
nop
.Lcbc_enc192:
aese $dat,q8
aesmc $dat,$dat
subs $len,$len,#16
@@ -403,7 +434,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
cclr $step,eq
aese $dat,q10
aesmc $dat,$dat
add $key_,$key,#16
aese $dat,q11
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.8 {q8},[$inp],$step
@@ -412,16 +442,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor q8,q8,$rndzero_n_last
aese $dat,q13
aesmc $dat,$dat
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_] // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
aese $dat,q14
aesmc $dat,$dat
aese $dat,q15
mov $cnt,$rounds
veor $ivec,$dat,$rndlast
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop_cbc_enc
vst1.8 {$ivec},[$out],#16
b .Lcbc_done
.align 5
@@ -483,79 +511,78 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Loop3x_cbc_dec:
aesd $dat0,q8
aesd $dat1,q8
aesd $dat2,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat0,q9
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_cbc_dec
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp0,$ivec,$rndlast
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp1,$in0,$rndlast
aesd $dat0,q9
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
subs $len,$len,#0x30
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
veor $tmp1,$in0,$rndlast
mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
aesd $dat0,q12
aesd $dat1,q12
aesd $dat2,q12
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2
// are loaded with last "words"
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vorr $ivec,$in2,$in2
mov $key_,$key
aesd $dat0,q13
aesd $dat1,q13
aesd $dat2,q13
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q12
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q13
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q14
aesd $dat1,q14
aesd $dat2,q14
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q15
aesd $dat1,q15
aesd $dat2,q15
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
veor $tmp0,$tmp0,$dat0
veor $tmp1,$tmp1,$dat1
veor $dat2,$dat2,$tmp2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vst1.8 {$dat2},[$out],#16
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
b.hs .Loop3x_cbc_dec
@@ -566,39 +593,39 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Lcbc_dec_tail:
aesd $dat1,q8
aesd $dat2,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lcbc_dec_tail
aesd $dat1,q8
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q9
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q12
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
cmn $len,#0x20
aesd $dat1,q13
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp1,$ivec,$rndlast
aesd $dat1,q14
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
veor $tmp2,$in1,$rndlast
aesd $dat1,q15
@@ -699,70 +726,69 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 4
.Loop3x_ctr32:
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
aese $dat2,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
aese $dat1,q9
aese $dat2,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_ctr32
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
aese $dat2,q8
mov $key_,$key
aesmc $tmp0,$dat0
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $tmp1,$dat1
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
vorr $dat0,$ivec,$ivec
aese $tmp0,q9
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aese $tmp1,q9
aese $dat2,q9
vorr $dat1,$ivec,$ivec
aese $tmp0,q9
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aese $tmp1,q9
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
mov $key_,$key
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $tmp2,$dat2
vorr $dat2,$ivec,$ivec
add $tctr0,$ctr,#1
aese $tmp0,q12
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q12
aese $tmp2,q12
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
add $tctr1,$ctr,#2
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
aese $tmp2,q12
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
add $ctr,$ctr,#3
aese $tmp0,q13
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q13
aese $tmp2,q13
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
veor $in2,$in2,$rndlast
rev $tctr0,$tctr0
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
aese $tmp2,q13
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
vmov.32 ${dat0}[3], $tctr0
rev $tctr1,$tctr1
aese $tmp0,q14
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aese $tmp1,q14
aese $tmp2,q14
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
vmov.32 ${dat1}[3], $tctr1
rev $tctr2,$ctr
aesmc $tmp0,$tmp0
aesmc $tmp1,$tmp1
aese $tmp2,q14
aesmc $tmp2,$tmp2
vmov.32 ${dat2}[3], $tctr2
subs $len,$len,#3
@@ -770,13 +796,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
aese $tmp1,q15
aese $tmp2,q15
mov $cnt,$rounds
veor $in0,$in0,$tmp0
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
veor $in1,$in1,$tmp1
mov $cnt,$rounds
vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16
veor $in2,$in2,$tmp2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {$in0},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$in1},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$in2},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop3x_ctr32
@@ -788,40 +815,40 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Lctr32_tail:
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
aese $dat1,q9
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lctr32_tail
aese $dat0,q8
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat0,q9
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],$step
aese $dat0,q12
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q12
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp]
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat0,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat0,q14
aese $dat1,q14
veor $in0,$in0,$rndlast
aese $dat0,q14
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q14
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
veor $in1,$in1,$rndlast
aese $dat0,q15

View File

@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
else {
ret = a->length;
i = a->data[0];
if (ret == 1 && i == 0)
neg = 0;
if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
pad = 1;
pb = 0;
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
p += a->length - 1;
i = a->length;
/* Copy zeros to destination as long as source is zero */
while (!*n) {
while (!*n && i > 1) {
*(p--) = 0;
n--;
i--;
@@ -419,7 +421,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_negative(bn))
if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn))
ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
else
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;

View File

@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
break;
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
break;
case V_ASN1_NULL:
result = 0; /* They do not have content. */
break;

View File

@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &ttm))
return -2;
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &stm, &ttm))
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &ttm, &stm))
return -2;
if (day > 0)

View File

@@ -464,3 +464,21 @@ void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
{
ameth->pkey_ctrl = pkey_ctrl;
}
void EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item(EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth,
int (*item_verify) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *a,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
EVP_PKEY *pkey),
int (*item_sign) (EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *alg1,
X509_ALGOR *alg2,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig))
{
ameth->item_sign = item_sign;
ameth->item_verify = item_verify;
}

View File

@@ -795,6 +795,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_OBJECT)
ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void);
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str);
ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *a);
ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type);

View File

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
#define ASN1_GEN_STR(str,val) {str, sizeof(str) - 1, val}
#define ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX 20
/* Maximum number of nested sequences */
#define ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH 50
/* Input formats */
@@ -110,13 +112,16 @@ typedef struct {
int exp_count;
} tag_exp_arg;
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
int *perr);
static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class,
int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok);
static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag,
int *pclass);
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf);
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
int depth, int *perr);
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype);
static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len);
@@ -132,6 +137,16 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf)
}
ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
{
int err = 0;
ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err);
if (err)
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, err);
return ret;
}
static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
int *perr)
{
ASN1_TYPE *ret;
tag_exp_arg asn1_tags;
@@ -152,17 +167,22 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
asn1_tags.imp_class = -1;
asn1_tags.format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
asn1_tags.exp_count = 0;
if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0)
if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) {
*perr = ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG;
return NULL;
}
if ((asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
|| (asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SET)) {
if (!cnf) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3,
ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG);
*perr = ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG;
return NULL;
}
ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf);
if (depth >= ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH) {
*perr = ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING;
return NULL;
}
ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf, depth, perr);
} else
ret = asn1_str2type(asn1_tags.str, asn1_tags.format, asn1_tags.utype);
@@ -279,6 +299,9 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
int tmp_tag, tmp_class;
if (elem == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) {
/* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */
if (*p == ':') {
@@ -350,13 +373,17 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
break;
case ASN1_GEN_FLAG_FORMAT:
if (!vstart) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT);
return -1;
}
if (!strncmp(vstart, "ASCII", 5))
arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
else if (!strncmp(vstart, "UTF8", 4))
arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_UTF8;
else if (!strncmp(vstart, "HEX", 3))
arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_HEX;
else if (!strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 3))
else if (!strncmp(vstart, "BITLIST", 7))
arg->format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_BITLIST;
else {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB, ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT);
@@ -428,7 +455,8 @@ static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass)
/* Handle multiple types: SET and SEQUENCE */
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
int depth, int *perr)
{
ASN1_TYPE *ret = NULL;
STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *sk = NULL;
@@ -447,7 +475,8 @@ static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
ASN1_TYPE *typ =
ASN1_generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf);
generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf,
depth + 1, perr);
if (!typ)
goto bad;
if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(sk, typ))

View File

@@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
{
if (a && a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->length);
ASN1_STRING_free(a);
}
int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
{
int i;

View File

@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
goto end;
}
} else {
if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 11) <= 0)
if (BIO_write(bp, "BAD ENUMERATED", 14) <= 0)
goto end;
}
M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs);

View File

@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int SMIME_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags,
if ((flags & SMIME_DETACHED) && data) {
/* We want multipart/signed */
/* Generate a random boundary */
RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)bound, 32) < 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
c = bound[i] & 0xf;
if (c < 10)

View File

@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ static int ndef_prefix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
*pbuf = p;
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it);
@@ -229,6 +232,9 @@ static int ndef_suffix(BIO *b, unsigned char **pbuf, int *plen, void *parg)
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, NULL, ndef_aux->it);
p = OPENSSL_malloc(derlen);
if (!p)
return 0;
ndef_aux->derbuf = p;
*pbuf = p;
derlen = ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ndef_aux->val, &p, ndef_aux->it);

View File

@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
/* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
if (key->pkey->value.octet_string)
if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING
&& key->pkey->value.octet_string != NULL)
OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
}

View File

@@ -304,9 +304,16 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Allocate structure */
if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
if (*pval) {
/* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
tt = it->templates + i;
pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
}
} else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
@@ -386,6 +393,17 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
/* Free up and zero any ADB found */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
}
}
/* Get each field entry */
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;

View File

@@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
else
asn1_cb = 0;
if (!combine)
*pval = NULL;
#ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
if (it->sname)
CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname);
@@ -315,13 +312,16 @@ int ASN1_primitive_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
ASN1_STRING *str;
int utype;
if (it && it->funcs) {
if (!it)
return 0;
if (it->funcs) {
const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf = it->funcs;
if (pf->prim_new)
return pf->prim_new(pval, it);
}
if (!it || (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING))
if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING)
utype = -1;
else
utype = it->utype;

View File

@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, fld, indent,
it->templates, pctx))
return 0;
break;
}
/* fall thru */
case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
@@ -289,6 +290,8 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
seqtt = asn1_do_adb(fld, tt, 1);
if (!seqtt)
return 0;
tmpfld = asn1_get_field_ptr(fld, seqtt);
if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, tmpfld,
indent + 2, seqtt, pctx))

View File

@@ -98,46 +98,55 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM)
static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
if(*pval) return 1;
else return 0;
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
if (*pval)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
if(!*pval) return;
if(it->size & BN_SENSITIVE) BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
else BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
*pval = NULL;
if (!*pval)
return;
if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE)
BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
else
BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
*pval = NULL;
}
static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
BIGNUM *bn;
int pad;
if(!*pval) return -1;
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
/* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
if(BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7) pad = 0;
else pad = 1;
if(cont) {
if(pad) *cont++ = 0;
BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
}
return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
BIGNUM *bn;
int pad;
if (!*pval)
return -1;
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
/* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7)
pad = 0;
else
pad = 1;
if (cont) {
if (pad)
*cont++ = 0;
BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
}
return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
}
static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
BIGNUM *bn;
if(!*pval) bn_new(pval, it);
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
if(!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
bn_free(pval, it);
return 0;
}
return 1;
BIGNUM *bn;
if (!*pval)
bn_new(pval, it);
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
bn_free(pval, it);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -97,87 +97,100 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(ZLONG)
static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
*(long *)pval = it->size;
return 1;
*(long *)pval = it->size;
return 1;
}
static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
*(long *)pval = it->size;
*(long *)pval = it->size;
}
static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
long ltmp;
unsigned long utmp;
int clen, pad, i;
/* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
char *cp = (char *)pval;
long ltmp;
unsigned long utmp;
int clen, pad, i;
/* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
char *cp = (char *)pval;
/* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */
memcpy(&ltmp, cp, sizeof(long));
/* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */
memcpy(&ltmp, cp, sizeof(long));
if(ltmp == it->size) return -1;
/* Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so
* we can cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading
* octet is set.
*/
if(ltmp < 0) utmp = -ltmp - 1;
else utmp = ltmp;
clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp);
/* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */
if(!(clen & 0x7)) pad = 1;
else pad = 0;
if (ltmp == it->size)
return -1;
/*
* Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so we can
* cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading octet is
* set.
*/
if (ltmp < 0)
utmp = -ltmp - 1;
else
utmp = ltmp;
clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp);
/* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */
if (!(clen & 0x7))
pad = 1;
else
pad = 0;
/* Convert number of bits to number of octets */
clen = (clen + 7) >> 3;
/* Convert number of bits to number of octets */
clen = (clen + 7) >> 3;
if(cont) {
if(pad) *cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0;
for(i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff);
if(ltmp < 0) cont[i] ^= 0xff;
utmp >>= 8;
}
if (cont) {
if (pad)
*cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0;
for (i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff);
if (ltmp < 0)
cont[i] ^= 0xff;
utmp >>= 8;
}
return clen + pad;
}
return clen + pad;
}
static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
int neg, i;
long ltmp;
unsigned long utmp = 0;
char *cp = (char *)pval;
if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
return 0;
}
/* Is it negative? */
if(len && (cont[0] & 0x80)) neg = 1;
else neg = 0;
utmp = 0;
for(i = 0; i < len; i++) {
utmp <<= 8;
if(neg) utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff;
else utmp |= cont[i];
}
ltmp = (long)utmp;
if(neg) {
ltmp++;
ltmp = -ltmp;
}
if(ltmp == it->size) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
return 0;
}
memcpy(cp, &ltmp, sizeof(long));
return 1;
int neg, i;
long ltmp;
unsigned long utmp = 0;
char *cp = (char *)pval;
if (len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
return 0;
}
/* Is it negative? */
if (len && (cont[0] & 0x80))
neg = 1;
else
neg = 0;
utmp = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
utmp <<= 8;
if (neg)
utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff;
else
utmp |= cont[i];
}
ltmp = (long)utmp;
if (neg) {
ltmp++;
ltmp = -ltmp;
}
if (ltmp == it->size) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
return 0;
}
memcpy(cp, &ltmp, sizeof(long));
return 1;
}
static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
{
return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval);
}
int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
{
return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval);
}

View File

@@ -172,8 +172,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
{
const unsigned char *q;
X509 *ret;
int freeret = 0;
/* Save start position */
q = *pp;
if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
if (!ret)
@@ -186,7 +192,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
goto err;
return ret;
err:
X509_free(ret);
if (freeret) {
X509_free(ret);
if (a)
*a = NULL;
}
return NULL;
}

View File

@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -592,7 +592,6 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
int fplace = 0;
int padlen = 0;
int zpadlen = 0;
int caps = 0;
long intpart;
long fracpart;
long max10;
@@ -630,8 +629,7 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
/* convert integer part */
do {
iconvert[iplace++] =
(caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef")[intpart % 10];
iconvert[iplace++] = "0123456789"[intpart % 10];
intpart = (intpart / 10);
} while (intpart && (iplace < (int)sizeof(iconvert)));
if (iplace == sizeof iconvert)
@@ -640,8 +638,7 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
/* convert fractional part */
do {
fconvert[fplace++] =
(caps ? "0123456789ABCDEF" : "0123456789abcdef")[fracpart % 10];
fconvert[fplace++] = "0123456789"[fracpart % 10];
fracpart = (fracpart / 10);
} while (fplace < max);
if (fplace == sizeof fconvert)
@@ -707,24 +704,29 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
/* If we haven't at least one buffer, someone has doe a big booboo */
assert(*sbuffer != NULL || buffer != NULL);
if (buffer) {
while (*currlen >= *maxlen) {
if (*buffer == NULL) {
if (*maxlen == 0)
*maxlen = 1024;
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
if (*currlen > 0) {
assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
}
*sbuffer = NULL;
} else {
*maxlen += 1024;
*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
/* |currlen| must always be <= |*maxlen| */
assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
*maxlen += 1024;
if (*buffer == NULL) {
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
if (*currlen > 0) {
assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
}
*sbuffer = NULL;
} else {
*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
}
/* What to do if *buffer is NULL? */
assert(*sbuffer != NULL || *buffer != NULL);
}
if (*currlen < *maxlen) {

View File

@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
#if 1
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 0x07);
if (outl > num)
@@ -178,7 +179,8 @@ static int nbiof_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
num = nt->lwn;
nt->lwn = 0;
} else {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&n, 1) < 0)
return -1;
num = (n & 7);
}

View File

@@ -833,6 +833,7 @@ void ERR_load_BIO_strings(void);
# define BIO_F_CONN_CTRL 127
# define BIO_F_CONN_STATE 115
# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ 132
# define BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE 133
# define BIO_F_FILE_CTRL 116
# define BIO_F_FILE_READ 130
# define BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL 129

View File

@@ -70,14 +70,17 @@ long MS_CALLBACK BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
MS_STATIC char buf[256];
char *p;
long r = 1;
int len;
size_t p_maxlen;
if (BIO_CB_RETURN & cmd)
r = ret;
BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "BIO[%08lX]:", (unsigned long)bio);
p = &(buf[14]);
p_maxlen = sizeof buf - 14;
len = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"BIO[%p]: ",(void *)bio);
p = buf + len;
p_maxlen = sizeof(buf) - len;
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_CB_FREE:
BIO_snprintf(p, p_maxlen, "Free - %s\n", bio->method->name);

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/bio/bio_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BIO_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_CTRL), "CONN_CTRL"},
{ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_CONN_STATE), "CONN_STATE"},
{ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ), "DGRAM_SCTP_READ"},
{ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE), "DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE"},
{ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_CTRL), "FILE_CTRL"},
{ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_FILE_READ), "FILE_READ"},
{ERR_FUNC(BIO_F_LINEBUFFER_CTRL), "LINEBUFFER_CTRL"},

View File

@@ -536,8 +536,10 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
/* copy app data */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data,
&bio->ex_data))
&bio->ex_data)) {
BIO_free(new_bio);
goto err;
}
if (ret == NULL) {
eoc = new_bio;
@@ -549,8 +551,8 @@ BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
}
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != NULL)
BIO_free(ret);
BIO_free_all(ret);
return (NULL);
}

View File

@@ -303,16 +303,17 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
/* Calculate time left until timer expires */
memcpy(&timeleft, &(data->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
if (timeleft.tv_usec < 0) {
if (timeleft.tv_usec < timenow.tv_usec) {
timeleft.tv_usec = 1000000 - timenow.tv_usec + timeleft.tv_usec;
timeleft.tv_sec--;
timeleft.tv_usec += 1000000;
} else {
timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
}
if (timeleft.tv_sec < 0) {
if (timeleft.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec) {
timeleft.tv_sec = 0;
timeleft.tv_usec = 1;
} else {
timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
}
/*
@@ -896,7 +897,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
perror("setsockopt");
ret = -1;
}
# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTUDISCOVER)
# elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined (IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE)
if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT),
(ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER,
&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) {
@@ -1012,6 +1013,10 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
*/
sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len);
if (!authchunks) {
BIO_vfree(bio);
return (NULL);
}
memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
ret =
getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks,
@@ -1347,6 +1352,10 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
optlen =
(socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t));
authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen);
if (!authchunks) {
BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(optlen));
ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS,
authchunks, &optlen);
@@ -1413,10 +1422,15 @@ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
* yet, we have to save it and send it as soon as the socket gets dry.
*/
if (data->save_shutdown && !BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b)) {
char *tmp;
data->saved_message.bio = b;
if (!(tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inl))) {
BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_WRITE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
if (data->saved_message.data)
OPENSSL_free(data->saved_message.data);
data->saved_message.data = OPENSSL_malloc(inl);
data->saved_message.data = tmp;
memcpy(data->saved_message.data, in, inl);
data->saved_message.length = inl;
return inl;

View File

@@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ x86_64-mont5.s: asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
$(PERL) asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
x86_64-gf2m.s: asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
$(PERL) asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
modexp512-x86_64.s: asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
rsaz-x86_64.s: asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
rsaz-avx2.s: asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
@@ -178,6 +176,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: bn_prime.h depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ld [$ap+12], $t3
or $t0, $aj, $aj
add $ap, 16, $ap
stxa $aj, [$anp]0xe2 ! converted ap[0]
stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[0]
mulx $aj, $m0, $lo0 ! ap[0]*bp[0]
umulxhi $aj, $m0, $hi0
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
sllx $t1, 32, $aj
add $ap, 8, $ap
or $t0, $aj, $aj
stxa $aj, [$anp]0xe2 ! converted ap[j]
stx $aj, [$anp] ! converted ap[j]
ld [$np+0], $t2 ! np[j]
addcc $nlo, $hi1, $lo1
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
umulxhi $nj, $m1, $nj ! nhi=nj
addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1
stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1]
stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1]
add $tp, 8, $tp ! tp++
brnz,pt $cnt, .L1st
@@ -182,12 +182,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
addxc $nj, %g0, $hi1
addcc $lo0, $lo1, $lo1 ! np[j]*m1+ap[j]*bp[0]
addxc %g0, $hi1, $hi1
stxa $lo1, [$tp]0xe2 ! tp[j-1]
stx $lo1, [$tp] ! tp[j-1]
add $tp, 8, $tp
addcc $hi0, $hi1, $hi1
addxc %g0, %g0, $ovf ! upmost overflow bit
stxa $hi1, [$tp]0xe2
stx $hi1, [$tp]
add $tp, 8, $tp
ba .Louter

View File

@@ -3226,11 +3226,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_get_bits5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
bn_get_bits5:
mov $inp,%r10
lea 0($inp),%r10
lea 1($inp),%r11
mov $num,%ecx
shr \$3,$num
movzw (%r10,$num),%eax
and \$7,%ecx
shr \$4,$num
and \$15,%ecx
lea -8(%ecx),%eax
cmp \$11,%ecx
cmova %r11,%r10
cmova %eax,%ecx
movzw (%r10,$num,2),%eax
shrl %cl,%eax
and \$31,%eax
ret

View File

@@ -779,6 +779,7 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
* wouldn't be constructed with top!=dmax. */ \
BN_ULONG *_not_const; \
memcpy(&_not_const, &_bnum1->d, sizeof(BN_ULONG*)); \
/* Debug only - safe to ignore error return */ \
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&_tmp_char, 1); \
memset((unsigned char *)(_not_const + _bnum1->top), _tmp_char, \
(_bnum1->dmax - _bnum1->top) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); \
@@ -892,6 +893,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR 135
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR 136
# define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT 137
# define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT 145
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT 118
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT 109
# define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME 124
@@ -907,12 +909,14 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_F_BN_NEW 113
# define BN_F_BN_RAND 114
# define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE 122
# define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT 146
# define BN_F_BN_USUB 115
/* Reason codes. */
# define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3 100
# define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL 101
# define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG 114
# define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL 118
# define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS 102
# define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO 103
# define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR 104
@@ -920,6 +924,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
# define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED 110
# define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH 106
# define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE 115
# define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT 119
# define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE 111
# define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED 107
# define BN_R_NO_INVERSE 108

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/bn/bn_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT), "BN_lshift"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT), "BN_mod_exp2_mont"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT), "BN_mod_exp_mont"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME), "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"},
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_NEW), "BN_new"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND), "BN_rand"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE), "BN_rand_range"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT), "BN_rshift"},
{ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_USUB), "BN_usub"},
{0, NULL}
};
@@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3), "arg2 lt arg3"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL), "bad reciprocal"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG), "bignum too long"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL), "bits too small"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS), "called with even modulus"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO), "div by zero"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR), "encoding error"},
@@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED), "input not reduced"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_RANGE), "invalid range"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT), "invalid shift"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE), "not a square"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"},
{ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_INVERSE), "no inverse"},

View File

@@ -185,10 +185,10 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (r != rr)
BN_copy(r, rr);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
bn_check_top(r);
return (ret);

View File

@@ -450,8 +450,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[])
d0 = p[k] % BN_BITS2;
d1 = BN_BITS2 - d0;
z[n] ^= (zz << d0);
tmp_ulong = zz >> d1;
if (d0 && tmp_ulong)
if (d0 && (tmp_ulong = zz >> d1))
z[n + 1] ^= tmp_ulong;
}
@@ -694,9 +693,10 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
# else
{
int i, ubits = BN_num_bits(u), vbits = BN_num_bits(v), /* v is copy
* of p */
top = p->top;
int i;
int ubits = BN_num_bits(u);
int vbits = BN_num_bits(v); /* v is copy of p */
int top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
bn_wexpand(u, top);
@@ -740,8 +740,12 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
ubits--;
}
if (ubits <= BN_BITS2 && udp[0] == 1)
break;
if (ubits <= BN_BITS2) {
if (udp[0] == 0) /* poly was reducible */
goto err;
if (udp[0] == 1)
break;
}
if (ubits < vbits) {
i = ubits;

View File

@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ unsigned __int64 _umul128(unsigned __int64 a, unsigned __int64 b,
# endif
# elif defined(__mips) && (defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG))
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
# if __GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4
# if __GNUC__>4 || (__GNUC__>=4 && __GNUC_MINOR__>=4)
/* "h" constraint is no more since 4.4 */
# define BN_UMULT_HIGH(a,b) (((__uint128_t)(a)*(b))>>64)
# define BN_UMULT_LOHI(low,high,a,b) ({ \

View File

@@ -71,7 +71,12 @@ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
char *buf;
char *p;
buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) {
/* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
} else {
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
}
if (buf == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;

View File

@@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
time_t tim;
if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
if (bits == 0) {
BN_zero(rnd);
return 1;
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
unsigned char c;
for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(&c, 1) < 0)
goto err;
if (c >= 128 && i > 0)
buf[i] = buf[i - 1];
else if (c < 42)
@@ -168,7 +174,7 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
#endif
if (top != -1) {
if (top >= 0) {
if (top) {
if (bit == 0) {
buf[0] = 1;

View File

@@ -137,6 +137,11 @@ int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
bn_check_top(r);
bn_check_top(a);
if (n < 0) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
return 0;
}
r->neg = a->neg;
nw = n / BN_BITS2;
if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL)
@@ -174,6 +179,11 @@ int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
bn_check_top(r);
bn_check_top(a);
if (n < 0) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
return 0;
}
nw = n / BN_BITS2;
rb = n % BN_BITS2;
lb = BN_BITS2 - rb;

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a)
return;
if (a->data != NULL) {
memset(a->data, 0, (unsigned int)a->max);
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->max);
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
}
OPENSSL_free(a);

View File

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ cmll-x86.s: asm/cmll-x86.pl ../perlasm/x86asm.pl
$(PERL) asm/cmll-x86.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@
cmll-x86_64.s: asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/cmll-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
cmllt4-sparcv9.s: asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl
cmllt4-sparcv9.s: asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl ../perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl
$(PERL) asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
files:
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
void CMAC_CTX_free(CMAC_CTX *ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
return;
CMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier)
/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
@@ -362,6 +363,9 @@ int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
return 0;
if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
return 0;
} else {

View File

@@ -231,6 +231,8 @@ static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
return 0;
}
tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
if (!tmp)
return 0;
/* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2);
@@ -295,8 +297,9 @@ static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
/* Add random padding to end */
if (olen > inlen + 4)
RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen);
if (olen > inlen + 4
&& RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen) < 0)
return 0;
/* Encrypt twice */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);

View File

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
BIO_free(f);
f = tbio;
}
while (f != upto);
while (f && f != upto);
} else
BIO_free_all(f);
}

View File

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -585,7 +585,11 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, CONF_R_VARIABLE_HAS_NO_VALUE);
goto err;
}
BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from)));
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,
(strlen(p) + buf->length - (e - from)))) {
CONFerr(CONF_F_STR_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
while (*p)
buf->data[to++] = *(p++);

View File

@@ -86,23 +86,10 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
/* Need to load ENGINEs */
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
#endif
/* Add others here? */
ERR_clear_error();
if (CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE) <= 0) {
BIO *bio_err;
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
if ((bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE)) != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Auto configuration failed\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
BIO_free(bio_err);
}
exit(1);
}
return;
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
}
void OPENSSL_no_config()

View File

@@ -825,8 +825,6 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1)
return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) ();
(void)GetDesktopWindow(); /* return value is ignored */
h = GetProcessWindowStation();
if (h == NULL)
return -1;

View File

@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -455,8 +455,10 @@ void doencryption(void)
rem = l % 8;
len = l - rem;
if (feof(DES_IN)) {
for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--)
RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1);
for (i = 7 - rem; i > 0; i--) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf + l++, 1) < 0)
goto problems;
}
buf[l++] = rem;
ex = 1;
len += rem;

View File

@@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
const unsigned char *cp;
static int start = 1;
if (len < 0)
return -1;
if (outbuf == NULL) {
outbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(BSIZE + HDRSIZE);
if (outbuf == NULL)
@@ -132,7 +135,9 @@ int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *_buf, int len,
if (len < 8) {
cp = shortbuf;
memcpy(shortbuf, buf, len);
RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(shortbuf + len, 8 - len) < 0) {
return -1;
}
rnum = 8;
} else {
cp = buf;

View File

@@ -58,180 +58,155 @@
OPENSSL_GLOBAL const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64] = {
{
/* nibble 0 */
0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L,
0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L,
0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L,
0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L,
0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L,
0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L,
0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L,
0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L,
0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L,
0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L,
0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L,
0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L,
0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L,
0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L,
}, {
/* nibble 1 */
0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L,
0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L,
0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L,
0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L,
0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L,
0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L,
0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L,
0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L,
0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L,
0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L,
0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L,
0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L,
0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L,
0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L,
}, {
/* nibble 2 */
0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L,
0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L,
0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L,
0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L,
0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L,
0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L,
0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L,
0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L,
0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L,
0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L,
0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L,
0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L,
0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L,
0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L,
}, {
/* nibble 3 */
0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L,
0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L,
0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L,
0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L,
0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L,
0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L,
0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L,
0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L,
0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L,
0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L,
0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L,
0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L,
0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L,
0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L,
0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L,
0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L,
}, {
/* nibble 4 */
0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L,
0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L,
0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L,
0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L,
0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L,
0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L,
0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L,
0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L,
0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L,
0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L,
0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L,
0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L,
0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L,
0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L,
0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L,
0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L,
}, {
/* nibble 5 */
0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L,
0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L,
0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L,
0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L,
0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L,
0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L,
0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L,
0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L,
0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L,
0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L,
0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L,
0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L,
0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L,
0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L,
0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L,
0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L,
}, {
/* nibble 6 */
0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L,
0x01000004L,
0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L,
0x00000000L,
0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L,
0x01004000L,
0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L,
0x00000204L,
0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L,
0x01004204L,
0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L,
0x00004200L,
0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L,
0x00000004L,
0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L,
0x01000000L,
0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L,
0x00000204L,
0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L,
0x01004004L,
0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L,
0x00000000L,
0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L,
0x01000200L,
0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L,
0x00004200L,
0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L,
0x01000000L,
0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L,
0x01004204L,
0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L,
0x00004004L,
}, {
/* nibble 7 */
0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L,
0x00000000L,
0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L,
0x20820080L,
0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L,
0x00020080L,
0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L,
0x20800000L,
0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L,
0x20020000L,
0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L,
0x00820000L,
0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L,
0x20800080L,
0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L,
0x00000080L,
0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L,
0x20820080L,
0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L,
0x00820000L,
0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L,
0x00800080L,
0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L,
0x20020000L,
0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L,
0x20000080L,
0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L,
0x20800000L,
0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L,
0x00000000L,
0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L,
0x00820080L,
}
/* nibble 0 */
0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L,
0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L,
0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L,
0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L,
0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L,
0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L,
0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L,
0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L,
0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L,
0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L,
0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L,
0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L,
0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L,
0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L,
},
{
/* nibble 1 */
0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L,
0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L,
0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L,
0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L,
0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L,
0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L,
0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L,
0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L,
0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L,
0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L,
0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L,
0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L,
0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L,
0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L,
},
{
/* nibble 2 */
0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L,
0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L,
0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L,
0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L,
0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L,
0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L,
0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L,
0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L,
0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L,
0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L,
0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L,
0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L,
0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L,
0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L,
},
{
/* nibble 3 */
0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L,
0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L,
0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L,
0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L,
0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L,
0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L,
0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L,
0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L,
0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L,
0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L,
0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L,
0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L,
0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L,
0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L,
0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L,
0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L,
},
{
/* nibble 4 */
0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L,
0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L,
0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L,
0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L,
0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L,
0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L,
0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L,
0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L,
0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L,
0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L,
0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L,
0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L,
0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L,
0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L,
0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L,
0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L,
},
{
/* nibble 5 */
0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L,
0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L,
0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L,
0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L,
0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L,
0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L,
0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L,
0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L,
0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L,
0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L,
0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L,
0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L,
0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L,
0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L,
0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L,
0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L,
},
{
/* nibble 6 */
0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L,
0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, 0x01004000L,
0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000204L,
0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00004200L,
0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L,
0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L,
0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000204L,
0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004004L,
0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, 0x01000200L,
0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, 0x00004200L,
0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000000L,
0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00004004L,
},
{
/* nibble 7 */
0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00000000L,
0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, 0x20820080L,
0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L,
0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, 0x20800000L,
0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800080L,
0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L,
0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, 0x20820080L,
0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L,
0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, 0x20000080L,
0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800000L,
0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00000000L,
0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L,
}
};

View File

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static int dh_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DH *dh;
void *pval = NULL;
int ptype;
unsigned char *penc = NULL;
int penclen;
@@ -161,12 +160,15 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dh = pkey->pkey.dh;
str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (!str) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
str->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, dh, &str->data);
if (str->length <= 0) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pval = str;
ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh->pub_key, NULL);
@@ -183,14 +185,14 @@ static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
}
if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id),
ptype, pval, penc, penclen))
ptype, str, penc, penclen))
return 1;
err:
if (penc)
OPENSSL_free(penc);
if (pval)
ASN1_STRING_free(pval);
if (str)
ASN1_STRING_free(str);
return 0;
}
@@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
return 1;
@@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
dherr:
DH_free(dh);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
return 0;
}
@@ -282,7 +285,8 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
prkey = NULL;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
@@ -296,7 +300,7 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
if (params != NULL)
ASN1_STRING_free(params);
if (prkey != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -462,6 +462,9 @@ static int pkey_dh_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
ret = 0;
Zlen = DH_size(dh);
Z = OPENSSL_malloc(Zlen);
if (!Z) {
goto err;
}
if (DH_compute_key_padded(Z, dhpub, dh) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!DH_KDF_X9_42(key, *keylen, Z, Zlen, dctx->kdf_oid,

View File

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
lint:
lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
update: depend
depend:
@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

View File

@@ -129,21 +129,23 @@ static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
DSA *dsa;
void *pval = NULL;
int ptype;
unsigned char *penc = NULL;
int penclen;
ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
ASN1_STRING *str;
str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (!str) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
str->length = i2d_DSAparams(dsa, &str->data);
if (str->length <= 0) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pval = str;
ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
} else
ptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
@@ -158,14 +160,14 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
}
if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
ptype, pval, penc, penclen))
ptype, str, penc, penclen))
return 1;
err:
if (penc)
OPENSSL_free(penc);
if (pval)
ASN1_STRING_free(pval);
if (str)
ASN1_STRING_free(str);
return 0;
}
@@ -226,7 +228,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
goto decerr;
if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)))
goto decerr;
}
@@ -264,7 +266,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
if (ndsa)
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
else
ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
return 1;
@@ -273,7 +275,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
dsaerr:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (privkey)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
DSA_free(dsa);
return 0;
@@ -315,7 +317,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
@@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
if (params != NULL)
ASN1_STRING_free(params);
if (prkey != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
goto err;
if (!seed_len) {
RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;
} else {
seed_is_random = 0;

View File

@@ -106,23 +106,23 @@ static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
#define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
if((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \
(a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \
(m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
#define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \
do { \
int _tmp_res53; \
if((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
_tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \
(m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
else \
_tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
} while(0)
const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)

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