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170 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
872e681c00 Prepare for 1.0.1j release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 13:54:46 +01:00
Matt Caswell
38b71ba8ff Updates to NEWS
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:51:50 -04:00
Matt Caswell
f8cf36c298 Add updates to CHANGES file
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:51:50 -04:00
Geoff Thorpe
26a59d9b46 Fix no-ssl3 configuration option
CVE-2014-3568

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:51:50 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7fd4ce6a99 Fix for session tickets memory leak.
CVE-2014-3567

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dc6070a03779cd524f0e67f76c945cb0ac38320)
2014-10-15 08:51:50 -04:00
Matt Caswell
d9d09a8d0f Fix SRTP compile issues for windows
Related to CVE-2014-3513

This fix was developed by the OpenSSL Team

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:51:50 -04:00
Matt Caswell
2b0532f398 Fix for SRTP Memory Leak
CVE-2014-3513

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an origi
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the i
was performed by the OpenSSL team.

The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:51:49 -04:00
Bodo Moeller
7d07c75c5b Fix SSL_R naming inconsistency.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 14:47:39 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
f34297db80 aesni-x86_64.pl: make ECB subroutine Windows ABI compliant.
RT: 3553
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69d5747f90)
2014-10-15 11:13:14 +02:00
Tim Hudson
e2e5326e5b Add constant_time_locl.h to HEADERS,
so the Win32 compile picks it up correctly.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 10:49:51 +02:00
Richard Levitte
592c6e1191 Add the constant time test to the VMS build and tests
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	test/maketests.com
	test/tests.com
2014-10-15 10:49:44 +02:00
Richard Levitte
8202802fad Include "constant_time_locl.h" rather than "../constant_time_locl.h".
The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 10:49:35 +02:00
Richard Levitte
f79bb32926 Spaces were added in some strings for better readability. However, those spaces do not belong in file names, so when picking out the individual parts, remove the spaces
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 10:49:24 +02:00
Richard Levitte
7a3809fd97 Adjust VMS build to Unix build. Most of all, make it so the disabled
algorithms MD2 and RC5 don't get built.
Also, disable building the test apps in crypto/des and crypto/pkcs7, as
they have no support at all.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 10:49:08 +02:00
Richard Levitte
f13a149088 Make sure test/tests.com exit gracefully, even when openssl.exe wasn't properly built.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 10:48:55 +02:00
Richard Levitte
fc586d2955 Update the VMS build according to the latest unixly build. Partly provided by Zoltan Arpadffy <arpadffy@polarhome.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 10:48:32 +02:00
Richard Levitte
17d45dec4d Make sure that disabling the MAYLOSEDATA3 warning is only done when the compiler supports it. Otherwise, there are warnings about it lacking everywhere, which is quite tedious to read through while trying to check for other warnings.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 10:47:12 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
6bfe55380a Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 04:05:42 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4e05aedbca Preserve digests for SNI.
SSL_set_SSL_CTX is normally called for SNI after ClientHello has
received and the digest to use for each certificate has been decided.
The original ssl->cert contains the negotiated digests and is now
copied to the new ssl->cert.

PR: 3560
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-10 23:21:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
bf3e200eb4 Removed duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_encrypted
Patch supplied by Matthieu Patou <mat@matws.net>, and modified to also
remove duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_digest.

PR#3551

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fdea3e49)
2014-10-06 23:46:25 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
55614f89f0 Add additional DigestInfo checks.
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.

Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-09-29 12:22:32 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
b1620443f3 Add missing tests
Accidentally omitted from commit 455b65dfab

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdc35a9d3e)
2014-09-25 13:47:16 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4ed98b6e25 Use correct function name: CMS_add1_signer()
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5886354dcc)
2014-09-25 00:06:59 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3a33923515 crypto/bn/bn_nist.c: work around MSC ARM compiler bug.
RT: 3541
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b07c005fe)
2014-09-25 00:47:18 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
f2df488a1c RT3425: constant-time evp_enc
Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to
avoid a timing leak from padding failure.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aac102f75)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

(cherry picked from commit 738911cde6)
2014-09-24 16:25:54 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
8d507aee7c RT3067: simplify patch
(Original commit adb46dbc6d)

Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab)
2014-09-24 15:52:41 +02:00
Adam Langley
133145686e This change alters the processing of invalid, RSA pre-master secrets so
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.

(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6d)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-09-24 15:46:26 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
0f04b004ac RT3066: rewrite RSA padding checks to be slightly more constant time.
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1

This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
2014-09-24 14:17:41 +02:00
Tim Hudson
81e3a6055c Fixed error introduced in commit f2be92b94d
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit

Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff9)
2014-09-22 06:34:25 +10:00
Rich Salz
bea9a17726 RT2560: missing NULL check in ocsp_req_find_signer
If we don't find a signer in the internal list, then fall
through and look at the internal list; don't just return NULL.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b2aa38a980)
2014-09-10 12:20:25 -04:00
Erik Auerswald
b537ea9ce4 RT3301: Discard too-long heartbeat requests
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit af4c6e348e)
2014-09-08 11:23:10 -04:00
Adam Langley
13ce52be1b psk_client_callback, 128-byte id bug.
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.

OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.

This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.

(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d851732)
2014-09-05 12:22:50 +02:00
Adam Langley
11853c50ec Ensure that x**0 mod 1 = 0.
(cherry picked from commit 2b0180c37f)

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
2014-09-04 16:06:51 +02:00
Richard Levitte
a60aa7e008 Followup on RT3334 fix: make sure that a directory that's the empty
string returns 0 with errno = ENOENT.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 360928b7d0)
2014-09-03 22:26:05 +02:00
Phil Mesnier
a49256a349 RT3334: Fix crypto/LPdir_win.c
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6a14fe7576)
2014-09-03 22:26:05 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
e517dfd3d1 Make the inline const-time functions static.
"inline" without static is not correct as the compiler may choose to ignore it
and will then either emit an external definition, or expect one.

Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86f50b36e6)
2014-09-02 15:24:59 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
74687f5979 md5-x86_64.pl: work around warning.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4d86e8df6b)
2014-08-30 19:19:01 +02:00
Rich Salz
8dc6617ad5 Add tags/TAGS
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d6253cfd3)
2014-08-30 10:09:30 -04:00
Rich Salz
c2119214c2 RT2119,3407: Updated to dgst.pod
Re-order algorithm list.
Be consistent in command synopsis.
Add content about signing.
Add EXAMPLE section
Add some missing options: -r, -fips-fingerprint -non-fips-allow
Various other fixes.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6aa9dbab0f)
2014-08-30 10:06:07 -04:00
James Westby
22387f00b6 RT1941: c_rehash.pod is missing
Add the file written by James Westby, graciously contributed
under the terms of the OpenSSL license.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf2239b3b3)
2014-08-30 09:51:56 -04:00
Rich Salz
4d16915381 RT2379: Bug in BIO_set_accept_port.pod
The doc says that port can be "*" to mean any port.
That's wrong.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07e3b31fae)
2014-08-29 16:46:28 -04:00
Emilia Kasper
e7169a5835 Constant-time utilities
Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9a9b0c0401)

Conflicts:
	test/Makefile
2014-08-28 17:07:07 +02:00
Raphael Spreitzer
abc2dfbcc3 RT2400: ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 missing initializer
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f9fb43e176)
2014-08-27 22:59:52 -04:00
Rich Salz
23ea9f6f03 RT2308: Add extern "C" { ... } wrapper
Add the wrapper to all public header files (Configure
generates one).  Don't bother for those that are just
lists of #define's that do renaming.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 089f10e69e)
2014-08-27 21:47:12 -04:00
Emilia Kasper
3e5df37861 Explicitly check for empty ASN.1 strings in d2i_ECPrivateKey
The old code implicitly relies on the ASN.1 code returning a \0-prefixed buffer
when the buffer length is 0. Change this to verify explicitly that the ASN.1 string
has positive length.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82dc08de54ce443c2a9ac478faffe79e76157795)
2014-08-27 19:50:36 +02:00
Matt Caswell
4e5f9f8a9a RT3065: automatically generate a missing EC public key
When d2i_ECPrivateKey reads a private key with a missing (optional) public key,
generate one automatically from the group and private key.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed383f847156940e93f256fed78599873a4a9b28)

Conflicts:
	doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
2014-08-27 19:50:36 +02:00
Adam Langley
9446ecfb3a RT3065: ec_private_key_dont_crash
This change saves several EC routines from crashing when an EC_KEY is
missing a public key. The public key is optional in the EC private key
format and, without this patch, running the following through `openssl
ec` causes a crash:

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MBkCAQEECAECAwQFBgcIoAoGCCqGSM49AwEH
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b391570bdeb386d4fd325917c248d593d3c43930)
2014-08-27 19:50:36 +02:00
Mihai Militaru
48ecdec7a0 RT2210: Add missing EVP_cleanup to example
I also removed some trailing whitespace and cleaned
up the "see also" list.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3e11c544)
2014-08-27 13:27:06 -04:00
David Gatwood
8f5f782253 RT1744: SSL_CTX_set_dump_dh() doc feedback
The description of when the server creates a DH key is
confusing.  This cleans it up.
(rsalz: also removed trailing whitespace.)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2014-08-26 13:40:45 -04:00
Jan Schaumann
228a77a4ad RT1804: fix EXAMPLE in EVP_EncryptInit.pod
The EXAMPLE that used FILE and RC2 doesn't compile due to a
few minor errors.  Tweak to use IDEA and AES-128. Remove
examples about RC2 and RC5.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-25 10:26:57 -04:00
Matt Caswell
03b17a5789 Typo fixes to evp documentation.
This patch was submitted by user "Kox" via the wiki

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2dd8cb3b95)
2014-08-24 21:26:40 +01:00
Adam Langley
391f3b5708 RT3060: Limit the number of empty records.
Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.

Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3aac17a82f)
2014-08-22 15:53:14 +02:00
Adam Langley
fe9b9a880f RT3061: Don't SEGFAULT when trying to export a public DSA key as a private key.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e19c93811f)
2014-08-22 15:25:18 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
9f96ea4c2b Improve EVP_PKEY_sign documentation
Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a20)
2014-08-22 15:06:09 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
41a765182f define inline for Visual Studio
In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a73)
2014-08-21 16:07:55 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
bcdd904c6c Fix build when BSAES_ASM is defined but VPAES_ASM is not
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit da92be4d68)
2014-08-21 15:48:23 +02:00
Adam Langley
a90b1e32d2 Add volatile qualifications to two blocks of inline asm to stop GCC from
eliminating them as dead code.

Both volatile and "memory" are used because of some concern that the compiler
may still cache values across the asm block without it, and because this was
such a painful debugging session that I wanted to ensure that it's never
repeated.

(cherry picked from commit 7753a3a684)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-08-19 17:09:27 +02:00
Matt Caswell
0ed8e95c4b Fixed out-of-bounds read errors in ssl3_get_key_exchange.
PR#3450

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-15 23:29:28 +01:00
Bodo Moeller
6b5b85f4f6 Further improve/fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (ecp_smpl.c) and
group_order_tests (ectest.c).  Also fix the EC_POINTs_mul documentation (ec.h).

Reviewed-by: emilia@openssl.org
2014-08-13 17:44:53 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
03ebf85f77 Fix SRP ciphersuites.
Add patch missed from backport of SRP ciphersuite fix.
PR#3490
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2014-08-12 20:42:27 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
30fbe92c78 Fix SRP authentication ciphersuites.
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:

A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)

Conflicts:

	ssl/s3_clnt.c
	ssl/s3_lib.c
2014-08-09 00:13:27 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1241e77f15 Test SRP authentication ciphersuites.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 193c1c07165b0042abd217274a084b49459d4443)
2014-08-09 00:10:26 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1433cac53c Only use FIPS EC methods in FIPS mode.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-08-07 01:08:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
204fb36a0e Prepare for 1.0.1j-dev
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 22:19:10 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2b45603445 Prepare for 1.0.1i release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 22:18:45 +01:00
Matt Caswell
d70c0be4c1 make update
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 22:18:45 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9b649d9a73 update NEWS
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:33:25 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
abbd58559e update CHANGES
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:33:25 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d15d17bb64 Check SRP parameters early.
Check SRP parameters when they are received so we can send back an
appropriate alert.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
966fe81f9b Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability.
Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal
buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code.

Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
83764a989d Fix SRP ciphersuite DoS vulnerability.
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.

Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-5139
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Gabor Tyukasz
86788e1ee6 Fix race condition in ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext
CVE-2014-3509
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
03b04ddac1 Fix OID handling:
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.

CVE-2014-3508

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Emilia Käsper
88ae012c80 Fix DTLS anonymous EC(DH) denial of service
CVE-2014-3510

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
David Benjamin
fc4f4cdb8b Fix protocol downgrade bug in case of fragmented packets
CVE-2014-3511

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Adam Langley
4e0fbdc4ec Remove some duplicate DTLS code.
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.

Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Matt Caswell
0c37aed3f3 Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.
Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Adam Langley
099ccdb808 Fix return code for truncated DTLS fragment.
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.

I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Adam Langley
9871417fb7 Fix memory leak from zero-length DTLS fragments.
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.

This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.

Fixes CVE-2014-3507

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Matt Caswell
fc7804ec39 Fix DTLS handshake message size checks.
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.

In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.

Fixes CVE-2014-3506

Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e7b9d9be48 Added comment for the frag->reassembly == NULL case as per feedback from Emilia
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Adam Langley
2172d4f63c Avoid double free when processing DTLS packets.
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.

Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).

Fixes CVE-2014-3505

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 20:27:51 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c34091d47e make update
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-08-01 21:23:49 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a9f4ebd753 Fix error discrepancy.
We can't rename ssleay_rand_bytes to md_rand_bytes_lock as this will cause
an error code discrepancy. Instead keep ssleay_rand_bytes and add an
extra parameter: since ssleay_rand_bytes is not part of the public API
this wont cause any binary compatibility issues.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org >
(cherry picked from commit 8068a675a7d1a657c54546f24e673e59e6707f03)
2014-08-01 18:42:40 +01:00
Bodo Moeller
604c9948a8 Update $default_depflags to match current defaults. 2014-08-01 19:07:57 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
281720c2a3 Simplify and fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine
(which didn't always handle value 0 correctly).

Reviewed-by: emilia@openssl.org

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
2014-08-01 17:50:26 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2a9023f7b4 Avoid multiple lock using FIPS DRBG.
Don't use multiple locks when SP800-90 DRBG is used outside FIPS mode.

PR#3176
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a3efe1b6e9)
2014-07-30 21:09:20 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
36e8c39899 Add conditional unit testing interface.
Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.

By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test".
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961c4)

Conflicts:

	ssl/Makefile
	util/mkdef.pl
2014-07-24 19:43:25 +01:00
Billy Brumley
e3f009c595 "EC_POINT_invert" was checking "dbl" function pointer instead of "invert".
PR#2569

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cba11f57ce)
2014-07-21 22:28:40 +01:00
Tim Hudson
fbe3baa773 Remove old unused and unmaintained demonstration code.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 62352b8138)
2014-07-22 07:26:35 +10:00
Tim Hudson
690998f904 Minor documentation update removing "really" and a
statement of opinion rather than a fact.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8d133e4b6)
2014-07-21 20:24:47 +10:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3221da845f Fix documentation for RSA_set_method(3)
PR#1675
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 197400c3f0d617d71ad8167b52fb73046d334320)
2014-07-19 18:26:12 +01:00
Jeffrey Walton
9aeb410419 Fix typo, add reference.
PR#3456
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d48e78f0cf)
2014-07-17 12:08:52 +01:00
Matt Caswell
bf4519cde5 Disabled XTS mode in enc utility as it is not supported
PR#3442

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2097a17c57)
2014-07-16 21:05:10 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e967b94356 Add Matt Caswell's fingerprint, and general update on the fingerprints file to bring it up to date
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3bd548192a)
2014-07-15 23:24:26 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2316286c0e Clarify -Verify and PSK.
PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit ca2015a617)
2014-07-15 20:23:35 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
67bde7d465 Fix DTLS certificate requesting code.
Use same logic when determining when to expect a client
certificate for both TLS and DTLS.

PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit c8d710dc5f)
2014-07-15 18:23:44 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cd63f94d4d Don't allow -www etc options with DTLS.
The options which emulate a web server don't make sense when doing DTLS.
Exit with an error if an attempt is made to use them.

PR#3453
(cherry picked from commit 58a2aaeade8bdecd0f9f0df41927f7cff3012547)
2014-07-15 12:25:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2054eb771e Add ECC extensions with DTLS.
PR#3449
2014-07-15 12:20:30 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ea0ceb11a0 Use case insensitive compare for servername.
PR#3445
(cherry picked from commit 1c3e9a7c67)
2014-07-15 00:00:03 +01:00
Hubert Kario
00579b98c4 document -nextprotoneg option in man pages
Add description of the option to advertise support of
Next Protocol Negotiation extension (-nextprotoneg) to
man pages of s_client and s_server.

PR#3444
(cherry picked from commit 7efd0e777e)

Conflicts:

	doc/apps/s_server.pod
2014-07-14 23:43:58 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ee5a8d3e31 Use more common name for GOST key exchange.
(cherry picked from commit 7aabd9c92fe6f0ea2a82869e5171dcc4518cee85)
2014-07-14 18:31:54 +01:00
Matt Caswell
72370164c3 Fixed valgrind complaint due to BN_consttime_swap reading uninitialised data.
This is actually ok for this function, but initialised to zero anyway if
PURIFY defined.

This does have the impact of masking any *real* unitialised data reads in bn though.

Patch based on approach suggested by Rich Salz.

PR#3415

(cherry picked from commit 77747e2d9a5573b1dbc15e247ce18c03374c760c)
2014-07-13 22:23:10 +01:00
Peter Mosmans
704422ce1e Add names of GOST algorithms.
PR#3440
(cherry picked from commit 924e5eda2c)
2014-07-13 18:31:36 +01:00
Richard Levitte
8e8d7e1b26 * crypto/ui/ui_lib.c: misplaced brace in switch statement.
Detected by dcruette@qualitesys.com

(cherry picked from commit 8b5dd34091)
2014-07-13 19:15:30 +02:00
Ben Laurie
3ed6327571 Don't clean up uninitialised EVP_CIPHER_CTX on error (CID 483259).
(cherry picked from commit c1d1b0114e)
2014-07-10 17:52:37 +01:00
Matt Caswell
efd4f1dfd3 Fix memory leak in BIO_free if there is no destroy function.
Based on an original patch by Neitrino Photonov <neitrinoph@gmail.com>

PR#3439

(cherry picked from commit 66816c53be)
2014-07-09 23:34:35 +01:00
David Lloyd
00032b0ba1 Prevent infinite loop loading config files.
PR#2985
(cherry picked from commit 9d23f422a3)
2014-07-07 13:50:00 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a07f514fc0 Usage for -hack and -prexit -verify_return_error
(cherry picked from commit ee724df75d)
2014-07-06 22:48:57 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b197c770a6 Document certificate status request options.
(cherry picked from commit cba3f1c739)

Conflicts:

	doc/apps/s_client.pod
	doc/apps/s_server.pod
2014-07-06 22:48:52 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b7c9762598 s_server usage for certificate status requests
(cherry picked from commit a44f219c00)
2014-07-06 22:45:44 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a414bc8c3e Update ticket callback docs.
(cherry picked from commit a23a6e85d8)
2014-07-06 12:42:27 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
98a3c3c514 Sanity check keylength in PVK files.
PR#2277
(cherry picked from commit 733a6c882e92f8221bd03a51643bb47f5f81bb81)
2014-07-06 00:36:11 +01:00
Jeffrey Walton
157fd05aad Added reference to platform specific cryptographic acceleration such as AES-NI 2014-07-06 00:04:32 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9f510ceb5d Fixed error in pod files with latest versions of pod2man
(cherry picked from commit 07255f0a76d9d349d915e14f969b9ff2ee0d1953)
2014-07-06 00:04:32 +01:00
Alan Hryngle
675b1c2fce Return smaller of ret and f.
PR#3418.
(cherry picked from commit fdea4fff8f)
2014-07-05 22:38:44 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c923132e9d Don't limit message sizes in ssl3_get_cert_verify.
PR#319 (reoponed version).
(cherry picked from commit 7f6e957864)
2014-07-05 13:30:55 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1864e3bed3 typo
(cherry picked from commit 2cfbec1cae)
(cherry picked from commit a9661e45ac)
2014-07-04 18:43:55 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
af7bcd7daa Add license info.
(cherry picked from commit 55707a36cc)
2014-07-04 18:43:50 +01:00
Rich Salz
3fa2fff86f Merge branch 'rsalz-docfixes' 2014-07-03 12:53:36 -04:00
Rich Salz
b372a64e10 Close 3170, remove reference to Ariel Glenn's old 0.9.8 doc
(cherry picked from commit f1112985e8)
2014-07-03 12:51:33 -04:00
Andy Polyakov
e432336433 bn_exp.c: fix x86_64-specific crash with one-word modulus.
PR: #3397
(cherry picked from commit eca441b2b4)
2014-07-02 21:21:02 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f3b0e0215c update release notes 2014-07-02 18:32:03 +01:00
Matt Smart
a6cc0e0a0d Fix doc typo.
ERR_get_error(3) references the non-existent
ERR_get_last_error_line_data instead of the one that does exist,
ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.

PR#3283
(cherry picked from commit 5cc99c6cf5)
2014-07-02 03:45:07 +01:00
Thijs Alkemade
b2cb6dc1ef Make disabling last cipher work.
(cherry picked from commit 7cb472bd0d)
2014-07-02 03:32:50 +01:00
Geoff Thorpe
f87f88a69f util/mkerr.pl: fix perl warning
Gets rid of this;

defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 792.
        (Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)
defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 800.
        (Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)

Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 647f360e2e)
2014-07-02 01:50:51 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6d87cd2f03 ASN1 sanity check.
Primitive encodings shouldn't use indefinite length constructed
form.

PR#2438 (partial).
(cherry picked from commit 398e99fe5e)
2014-07-02 01:00:18 +01:00
Ben Laurie
2db3ea2929 Fix possible buffer overrun. 2014-07-01 23:39:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c28b055a0c Fix copy for CCM, GCM and XTS.
Internal pointers in CCM, GCM and XTS contexts should either be
NULL or set to point to the appropriate key schedule. This needs
to be adjusted when copying contexts.
(cherry picked from commit c2fd5d79ff)
2014-06-30 14:00:00 +01:00
Jeffrey Walton
02e8d46119 Clarified that the signature's buffer size, s, is not used as an
IN parameter.

Under the old docs, the only thing stated was "at most
EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes will be written". It was kind of misleading
since it appears EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) WILL be written regardless of the
signature's buffer size.

(cherry picked from commit 6e6ba36d98)
2014-06-29 23:36:51 +01:00
ZNV
105a3db56e Make EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy work in GCM mode.
PR#3272
(cherry picked from commit 370bf1d708)
2014-06-29 22:02:42 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
295befec25 Fix memory leak.
PR#2531
(cherry picked from commit 44724beead)
2014-06-29 13:52:03 +01:00
Ken Ballou
cb34cb1f23 Typo.
PR#3173
(cherry picked from commit 76ed5a42ea)
2014-06-29 13:39:24 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
86f393ceb7 Show errors on CSR verification failure.
If CSR verify fails in ca utility print out error messages.
Otherwise some errors give misleading output: for example
if the key size exceeds the library limit.

PR#2875
(cherry picked from commit a30bdb55d1)
2014-06-29 13:34:44 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d6d324374e Make no-ssl3 no-ssl2 do more sensible things.
(cherry picked from commit 7ae6a4b659)
2014-06-29 03:05:37 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
14999bcc59 Clarify protocols supported.
Update protocols supported and note that SSLv2 is effectively disabled
by default.

PR#3184
(cherry picked from commit 1b13a4f38dfc385d5e776f6b3e06c5795874cf9b)
2014-06-29 00:04:43 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
046e288edf Typo.
PR#3107
(cherry picked from commit 7c206db928)
2014-06-28 12:43:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d8b11e75cb Don't disable state strings with no-ssl2
Some state strings were erronously not compiled when no-ssl2
was set.

PR#3295
(cherry picked from commit 0518a3e19e)
2014-06-28 00:56:42 +01:00
yogesh nagarkar
0df7959d43 Fix compilation with -DSSL_DEBUG -DTLS_DEBUG -DKSSL_DEBUG
PR#3141
(cherry picked from commit d183545d45)
2014-06-28 00:41:49 +01:00
Andreas Westfeld
5894eb1f33 Fix typo in ideatest.c
(cherry picked from commit d1d4382dcb)
2014-06-28 00:06:40 +01:00
Ken Ballou
6daba1dc6a Remove redundant check.
PR#3174
(cherry picked from commit fd331c0bb9b557903dd2ce88398570a3327b5ef0)
2014-06-27 23:18:21 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
69b8f2895b Fix for EVP_PBE_alg_add().
In EVP_PBE_alg_add don't use the underlying NID for the cipher
as it may have a non-standard key size.

PR#3206
(cherry picked from commit efb7caef637a1de8468ca109efd355a9d0e73a45)
2014-06-27 22:58:55 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0ace876730 Tolerate critical AKID in CRLs.
PR#3014
(cherry picked from commit 11da66f8b1)
2014-06-27 18:50:33 +01:00
Tom Greenslade
e9daf8a9ce Handle IPv6 addresses in OCSP_parse_url.
PR#2783
(cherry picked from commit b36f35cda9)
2014-06-27 17:31:44 +01:00
Tomas Mraz
cf0156622a Don't advertise ECC ciphersuits in SSLv2 compatible client hello.
PR#3374
(cherry picked from commit 0436369fcc)
2014-06-27 16:52:05 +01:00
Jeffrey Walton
86cac6d3b2 Clarify docs.
Document that the certificate passed to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert()
should not be freed by the application.

PR#3409
(cherry picked from commit 0535c2d67c)

Add restrictions section present in other branches.

Conflicts:

	doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
2014-06-27 16:41:45 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f46ea1d8e2 Remove ancient obsolete files under pkcs7.
(cherry picked from commit 7be6b27aaf)
2014-06-27 13:54:45 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0980992d44 Memory leak and NULL derefernce fixes.
PR#3403
2014-06-27 03:21:10 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
38a503fb8a Fix OID encoding for one component.
OIDs with one component don't have an encoding.

PR#2556 (Bug#1)
2014-06-27 03:17:15 +01:00
Huzaifa Sidhpurwala
fef58ce79e Make sure BN_sqr can never return a negative value.
PR#3410
(cherry picked from commit e14e764c0d5d469da63d0819c6ffc0e1e9e7f0bb)
2014-06-26 23:50:36 +01:00
Jenny Yung
da0d5e78bc Memory allocation checks.
PR#3399.
2014-06-26 23:32:17 +01:00
Miod Vallat
ad212c1ed1 Fix off-by-one errors in ssl_cipher_get_evp()
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.

Bug discovered and fixed by Miod Vallat from the OpenBSD team.

PR#3375
2014-06-22 23:20:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e1bce59fd3 Revert "Fix off-by-one errors in ssl_cipher_get_evp()"
This reverts commit 29411a0c7a.

Incorrect attribution.
2014-06-22 23:20:19 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9beb75d3c4 Accept CCS after sending finished.
Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point
keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from
server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail.

PR#3400
(cherry picked from commit 99cd6a91fcb0931feaebbb4832681d40a66fad41)
2014-06-14 22:26:10 +01:00
Matt Caswell
042ef467ee Fixed incorrect return code handling in ssl3_final_finish_mac.
Based on an original patch by Joel Sing (OpenBSD) who also originally identified the issue.
2014-06-13 15:53:29 +01:00
Matt Caswell
01736e6c41 Revert "Fixed incorrect return code handling in ssl3_final_finish_mac"
This reverts commit 9ab788aa23.

Missing attribution
2014-06-13 15:53:08 +01:00
Kurt Cancemi
29411a0c7a Fix off-by-one errors in ssl_cipher_get_evp()
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.

PR#3375
2014-06-12 21:15:54 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b66f59adfa Fix compilation with no-comp
(cherry picked from commit 7239a09c7b5757ed8d0e9869f3e9b03c0e11f4d1)
2014-06-11 14:33:32 +01:00
Matt Caswell
9ab788aa23 Fixed incorrect return code handling in ssl3_final_finish_mac 2014-06-10 23:28:10 +01:00
Hubert Kario
87887a7a65 backport changes to ciphers(1) man page
Backport of the patch:
add ECC strings to ciphers(1), point out difference between DH and ECDH
and few other changes applicable to the 1.0.1 code base.

 * Make a clear distinction between DH and ECDH key exchange.
 * Group all key exchange cipher suite identifiers, first DH then ECDH
 * add descriptions for all supported *DH* identifiers
 * add ECDSA authentication descriptions
 * add example showing how to disable all suites that offer no
   authentication or encryption
 * backport listing of elliptic curve cipher suites.
 * backport listing of TLS 1.2 cipher suites, add note that DH_RSA
   and DH_DSS is not implemented in this version
 * backport of description of PSK and listing of PSK cipher suites
 * backport description of AES128, AES256 and AESGCM options
 * backport description of CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA256 options
2014-06-10 20:56:39 +01:00
Mike Bland
5a0d057e49 Create test/testutil.h for unit test helper macros
Defines SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE and EXECUTE_TEST, and updates ssl/heartbeat_test.c
using these macros. SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE makes use of the new TEST_CASE_NAME
macro, defined to use __func__ or __FUNCTION__ on platforms that support those
symbols, or to use the file name and line number otherwise. This should fix
several reported build problems related to lack of C99 support.
2014-06-10 19:27:45 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aa59369b4c Fix null pointer errors.
PR#3394
(cherry picked from commit 7a9d59c148)
2014-06-10 14:48:07 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
18c7f2fce8 SRP ciphersuite correction.
SRP ciphersuites do not have no authentication. They have authentication
based on SRP. Add new SRP authentication flag and cipher string.
(cherry picked from commit a86b88acc373ac1fb0ca709a5fb8a8fa74683f67)
2014-06-09 12:09:49 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6a8d6f039a Update strength_bits for 3DES.
Fix strength_bits to 112 for 3DES.
(cherry picked from commit 837c203719205ab19b5609b2df7151be8df05687)
2014-06-09 12:09:49 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
5ff9c21f72 Link heartbeat_test with the static version of the libraries
It's using an internal API that that might not be available in the shared
library.
2014-06-09 00:13:06 +01:00
Jakub Wilk
5c52c04650 Create ~/.rnd with mode 0600 instead of 0666
Because of a missing include <fcntl.h> we don't have O_CREATE and don't create
the file with open() using mode 0600 but fall back to using fopen() with the
default umask followed by a chmod().

Problem found by Jakub Wilk <jwilk@debian.org>.
2014-06-08 21:25:43 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6c86bf7a1e update NEWS 2014-06-07 18:19:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0d4d2e02eb Make tls_session_secret_cb work with CVE-2014-0224 fix.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag.
(cherry picked from commit 953c592572e8811b7956cc09fbd8e98037068b58)
2014-06-07 15:27:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
151399a944 Fixed minor duplication in docs 2014-06-07 12:32:00 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
049615e35d Prepare for 1.0.1i-dev 2014-06-05 10:45:50 +01:00
234 changed files with 5430 additions and 6678 deletions

2
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -75,3 +75,5 @@
lib
Makefile.save
*.bak
tags
TAGS

137
CHANGES
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,143 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
*) SRTP Memory Leak.
A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
(CVE-2014-3513)
[OpenSSL team]
*) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
attack.
(CVE-2014-3567)
[Steve Henson]
*) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
configured to send them.
(CVE-2014-3568)
[Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
*) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Client applications doing fallback retries should call
SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
(CVE-2014-3566)
[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
*) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
*) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
g, A, B < N to SRP code.
Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for discovering this issue.
(CVE-2014-3512)
[Steve Henson]
*) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3511)
[David Benjamin]
*) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3510)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3507)
[Adam Langley]
*) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3506)
[Adam Langley]
*) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
this issue.
(CVE-2014-3505)
[Adam Langley]
*) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3509)
[Gabor Tyukasz]
*) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam<61>ki (Codenomicon) for
discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-5139)
[Steve Henson]
*) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
output to the attacker.
Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
(CVE-2014-3508)
[Emilia K<>sper, and Steve Henson]
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
[Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
*) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted

View File

@@ -720,6 +720,7 @@ my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental
"sctp" => "default",
"shared" => "default",
"store" => "experimental",
"unit-test" => "default",
"zlib" => "default",
"zlib-dynamic" => "default"
);
@@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ my @experimental = ();
# This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults
# (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"):
my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE";
my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST";
# Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
# To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental).
@@ -1766,6 +1767,9 @@ open(OUT,'>crypto/opensslconf.h.new') || die "unable to create crypto/opensslcon
print OUT "/* opensslconf.h */\n";
print OUT "/* WARNING: Generated automatically from opensslconf.h.in by Configure. */\n\n";
print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n";
print OUT "extern \"C\" {\n";
print OUT "#endif\n";
print OUT "/* OpenSSL was configured with the following options: */\n";
my $openssl_algorithm_defines_trans = $openssl_algorithm_defines;
$openssl_experimental_defines =~ s/^\s*#\s*define\s+OPENSSL_NO_(.*)/#ifndef OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$1\n# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# define OPENSSL_NO_$1\n# endif\n#endif/mg;
@@ -1870,6 +1874,9 @@ while (<IN>)
{ print OUT $_; }
}
close(IN);
print OUT "#ifdef __cplusplus\n";
print OUT "}\n";
print OUT "#endif\n";
close(OUT);
rename("crypto/opensslconf.h","crypto/opensslconf.h.bak") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h\n" if -e "crypto/opensslconf.h";
rename("crypto/opensslconf.h.new","crypto/opensslconf.h") || die "unable to rename crypto/opensslconf.h.new\n";

5
FAQ
View File

@@ -113,11 +113,6 @@ that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
directory.
For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
predecessor, at <URL: http://www.columbia.edu/~ariel/ssleay/>. Much
of this still applies to OpenSSL.
There is some documentation about certificate extensions and PKCS#12
in doc/openssl.txt

20
NEWS
View File

@@ -5,10 +5,30 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
o Fix for CVE-2014-3513
o Fix for CVE-2014-3567
o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability)
o Fix for CVE-2014-3568
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
o Fix for CVE-2014-3512
o Fix for CVE-2014-3511
o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
o Fix for CVE-2014-3509
o Fix for CVE-2014-5139
o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
o Fix for CVE-2010-5298

2
README
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.1h 5 Jun 2014
OpenSSL 1.0.1j 15 Oct 2014
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

View File

@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@ int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[])
{
arg->count=20;
arg->data=(char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *)*arg->count);
if (arg->data == NULL)
return 0;
}
for (i=0; i<arg->count; i++)
arg->data[i]=NULL;
@@ -1542,6 +1544,8 @@ char *make_config_name()
len=strlen(t)+strlen(OPENSSL_CONF)+2;
p=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (p == NULL)
return NULL;
BUF_strlcpy(p,t,len);
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
BUF_strlcat(p,"/",len);

View File

@@ -1620,12 +1620,14 @@ static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
{
ok=0;
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature verification problems....\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
ok=0;
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto err;
}
else
@@ -2777,6 +2779,9 @@ char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg)
revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
if (!revtm)
return NULL;
i = revtm->length + 1;
if (reason) i += strlen(reason) + 1;

View File

@@ -96,13 +96,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char buf[512];
BIO *STDout=NULL;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
meth=SSLv23_server_method();
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
meth=SSLv3_server_method();
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
meth=SSLv2_server_method();
#endif
apps_startup();

View File

@@ -141,7 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
if(!certflst) certflst = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv));
if (!certflst)
goto end;
if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv)))
{
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(certflst);
goto end;
}
}
else
{

View File

@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
#include <openssl/comp.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
int set_hex(char *in,unsigned char *out,int size);
@@ -337,6 +339,12 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
if (cipher && (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphers in XTS mode are not supported by the enc utility\n");
goto end;
}
if (md && (dgst=EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s is an unsupported message digest type\n",md);

View File

@@ -773,9 +773,12 @@ $ CCDEFS = "MONOLITH"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
$ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. ""
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ ENDIF
$!
$! Check To See If We Have A ZLIB Option.
$!
@@ -1064,6 +1067,18 @@ $! Finish up the definition of CC.
$!
$ IF COMPILER .EQS. "DECC"
$ THEN
$! Not all compiler versions support MAYLOSEDATA3.
$ OPT_TEST = "MAYLOSEDATA3"
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$ERROR NL:
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$OUTPUT NL:
$ 'CC' /NOCROSS_REFERENCE /NOLIST /NOOBJECT -
/WARNINGS = DISABLE = ('OPT_TEST', EMPTYFILE) NL:
$ IF ($SEVERITY)
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ OPT_TEST
$ ENDIF
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. ""
$ THEN
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = " /WARNING=(DISABLE=(" + CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "))"

View File

@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
}
resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, headers, req, req_timeout);
if (!resp)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responsder\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n");
end:
if (cbio)
BIO_free_all(cbio);

View File

@@ -107,16 +107,16 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"gendsa",gendsa_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"genpkey",genpkey_main},
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_server",s_server_main},
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_client",s_client_main},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SPEED
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"speed",speed_main},
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_time",s_time_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"version",version_main},
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"crl2pkcs7",crl2pkcs7_main},
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"sess_id",sess_id_main},
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ciphers",ciphers_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"nseq",nseq_main},

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV)
push(@files,$_);
$str="\t{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,\"$_\",${_}_main},\n";
if (($_ =~ /^s_/) || ($_ =~ /^ciphers$/))
{ print "#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))\n${str}#endif\n"; }
{ print "#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)\n${str}#endif\n"; }
elsif ( ($_ =~ /^speed$/))
{ print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SPEED\n${str}#endif\n"; }
elsif ( ($_ =~ /^engine$/))

View File

@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",SSL_HOST_NAME,PORT_STR);
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert arg - certificate file to use, PEM format assumed\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -key arg - Private key file to use, in cert file if\n");
@@ -300,6 +301,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -prexit - print session information even on connection failure\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -showcerts - show all certificates in the chain\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -debug - extra output\n");
#ifdef WATT32
@@ -335,6 +337,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
@@ -615,6 +618,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char *sess_out = NULL;
struct sockaddr peer;
int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
int fallback_scsv = 0;
int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
long socket_mtu = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
@@ -821,6 +825,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
meth=DTLSv1_client_method();
socket_type=SOCK_DGRAM;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
{
fallback_scsv = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-timeout") == 0)
enable_timeouts=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-mtu") == 0)
@@ -1233,6 +1241,10 @@ bad:
SSL_set_session(con, sess);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
}
if (fallback_scsv)
SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (servername != NULL)
{

View File

@@ -463,6 +463,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -context arg - set session ID context\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -Verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert.\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert arg - certificate file to use\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," (default is %s)\n",TEST_CERT);
BIO_printf(bio_err," -crl_check - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.\n" \
@@ -534,6 +535,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ecdhe - Disable ephemeral ECDH\n");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Turn on SSL bug compatibility\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -hack - workaround for early Netscape code\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -www - Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -WWW - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -HTTP - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
@@ -562,6 +564,10 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - respond to certificate status requests\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_verbose - enable status request verbose printout\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_timeout n - status request responder timeout\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_url URL - status request fallback URL\n");
}
static int local_argc=0;
@@ -739,7 +745,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
if (servername)
{
if (strcmp(servername,p->servername))
if (strcasecmp(servername,p->servername))
return p->extension_error;
if (ctx2)
{
@@ -1356,6 +1362,14 @@ bad:
sv_usage();
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n");
goto end;
}
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
if (jpake_secret)

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
/* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir_vms.c,v 1.20 2004/08/26 13:36:05 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -88,6 +87,12 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
size_t filespeclen = strlen(directory);
char *filespec = NULL;
if (filespeclen == 0)
{
errno = ENOENT;
return 0;
}
/* MUST be a VMS directory specification! Let's estimate if it is. */
if (directory[filespeclen-1] != ']'
&& directory[filespeclen-1] != '>'

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
/* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir_win.c,v 1.10 2004/08/26 13:36:05 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -63,6 +62,16 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
errno = 0;
if (*ctx == NULL)
{
const char *extdir = directory;
char *extdirbuf = NULL;
size_t dirlen = strlen (directory);
if (dirlen == 0)
{
errno = ENOENT;
return 0;
}
*ctx = (LP_DIR_CTX *)malloc(sizeof(LP_DIR_CTX));
if (*ctx == NULL)
{
@@ -71,15 +80,35 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
}
memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(LP_DIR_CTX));
if (directory[dirlen-1] != '*')
{
extdirbuf = (char *)malloc(dirlen + 3);
if (extdirbuf == NULL)
{
free(*ctx);
*ctx = NULL;
errno = ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
if (directory[dirlen-1] != '/' && directory[dirlen-1] != '\\')
extdir = strcat(strcpy (extdirbuf,directory),"/*");
else
extdir = strcat(strcpy (extdirbuf,directory),"*");
}
if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char))
{
TCHAR *wdir = NULL;
/* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */
size_t index = 0,len_0 = strlen(directory) + 1;
size_t index = 0,len_0 = strlen(extdir) + 1;
wdir = (TCHAR *)malloc(len_0 * sizeof(TCHAR));
wdir = (TCHAR *)calloc(len_0, sizeof(TCHAR));
if (wdir == NULL)
{
if (extdirbuf != NULL)
{
free (extdirbuf);
}
free(*ctx);
*ctx = NULL;
errno = ENOMEM;
@@ -87,17 +116,23 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
}
#ifdef LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE
if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, directory, len_0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0))
if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, extdir, len_0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0))
#endif
for (index = 0; index < len_0; index++)
wdir[index] = (TCHAR)directory[index];
wdir[index] = (TCHAR)extdir[index];
(*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile(wdir, &(*ctx)->ctx);
free(wdir);
}
else
(*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)directory, &(*ctx)->ctx);
{
(*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)extdir, &(*ctx)->ctx);
}
if (extdirbuf != NULL)
{
free (extdirbuf);
}
if ((*ctx)->handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
{
@@ -114,7 +149,6 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
return 0;
}
}
if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char))
{
TCHAR *wdir = (*ctx)->ctx.cFileName;

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ CPUID_OBJ=mem_clr.o
LIBS=
GENERAL=Makefile README crypto-lib.com install.com
TEST=constant_time_test.c
LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a
SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
@@ -43,7 +44,8 @@ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
EXHEADER= crypto.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \
ossl_typ.h
HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h $(EXHEADER)
HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \
constant_time_locl.h $(EXHEADER)
ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)

View File

@@ -525,6 +525,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni_ecb_encrypt,\@function,5
.align 16
aesni_ecb_encrypt:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp
movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
.Lecb_enc_body:
___
$code.=<<___;
and \$-16,$len
jz .Lecb_ret
@@ -805,6 +815,16 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout5,0x50($out)
.Lecb_ret:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
lea 0x58(%rsp),%rsp
.Lecb_enc_ret:
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.size aesni_ecb_encrypt,.-aesni_ecb_encrypt
___
@@ -2730,28 +2750,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
.extern __imp_RtlVirtualUnwind
___
$code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
.type ecb_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
.type ecb_ccm64_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
ecb_se_handler:
push %rsi
push %rdi
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
pushfq
sub \$64,%rsp
mov 152($context),%rax # pull context->Rsp
jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail
.size ecb_se_handler,.-ecb_se_handler
.type ccm64_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
ccm64_se_handler:
ecb_ccm64_se_handler:
push %rsi
push %rdi
push %rbx
@@ -2788,7 +2789,7 @@ ccm64_se_handler:
lea 0x58(%rax),%rax # adjust stack pointer
jmp .Lcommon_seh_tail
.size ccm64_se_handler,.-ccm64_se_handler
.size ecb_ccm64_se_handler,.-ecb_ccm64_se_handler
.type ctr32_se_handler,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
@@ -2993,14 +2994,15 @@ ___
$code.=<<___ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
.LSEH_info_ecb:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva ecb_se_handler
.rva ecb_ccm64_se_handler
.rva .Lecb_enc_body,.Lecb_enc_ret # HandlerData[]
.LSEH_info_ccm64_enc:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva ccm64_se_handler
.rva ecb_ccm64_se_handler
.rva .Lccm64_enc_body,.Lccm64_enc_ret # HandlerData[]
.LSEH_info_ccm64_dec:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva ccm64_se_handler
.rva ecb_ccm64_se_handler
.rva .Lccm64_dec_body,.Lccm64_dec_ret # HandlerData[]
.LSEH_info_ctr32:
.byte 9,0,0,0

View File

@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
return(NULL);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *data;
int i;
/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
* subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
int i, length;
/* Sanity check OID encoding.
* Need at least one content octet.
* MSB must be clear in the last octet.
* can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
p[len - 1] & 0x80)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
return NULL;
}
/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
length = (int)len;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
{
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
{
@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
ret->data = NULL;
/* once detached we can change it */
if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
{
ret->length=0;
if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (data == NULL)
{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
}
memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
memcpy(data,p,length);
/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
ret->data =data;
ret->length=(int)len;
ret->length=length;
ret->sn=NULL;
ret->ln=NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
p+=len;
p+=length;
if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
*pp=p;

View File

@@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
stmp.data = NULL;
stmp.length = 0;
stmp.flags = 0;
ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
if(ret < 0) return ret;
*out = stmp.data;

View File

@@ -196,24 +196,29 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
struct tm *ts;
struct tm data;
size_t len = 20;
int free_s = 0;
if (s == NULL)
{
free_s = 1;
s=M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
}
if (s == NULL)
return(NULL);
goto err;
ts=OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
if (ts == NULL)
return(NULL);
goto err;
if (offset_day || offset_sec)
{
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec))
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if((ts->tm_year < 50) || (ts->tm_year >= 150))
return NULL;
goto err;
p=(char *)s->data;
if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)s->length < len))
@@ -222,7 +227,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
if (p == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
goto err;
}
if (s->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->data);
@@ -237,6 +242,10 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
ebcdic2ascii(s->data, s->data, s->length);
#endif
return(s);
err:
if (free_s && s)
M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
return NULL;
}
@@ -261,6 +270,11 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
t -= offset*60; /* FIXME: may overflow in extreme cases */
tm = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
/* NB: -1, 0, 1 already valid return values so use -2 to
* indicate error.
*/
if (tm == NULL)
return -2;
#define return_cmp(a,b) if ((a)<(b)) return -1; else if ((a)>(b)) return 1
year = g2(s->data);

View File

@@ -258,7 +258,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from)
if (!ameth)
return 0;
ameth->pkey_base_id = to;
return EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth);
if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth))
{
EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *ppkey_base_id, int *ppkey_flags,

View File

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
*pclass=xclass;
if (!asn1_get_length(&p,&inf,plength,(int)max)) goto err;
if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
goto err;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"p=%d + *plength=%ld > omax=%ld + *pp=%d (%d > %d)\n",
(int)p,*plength,omax,(int)*pp,(int)(p+ *plength),

View File

@@ -667,6 +667,8 @@ static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio)
int len, state, save_state = 0;
headers = sk_MIME_HEADER_new(mime_hdr_cmp);
if (!headers)
return NULL;
while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) {
/* If whitespace at line start then continuation line */
if(mhdr && isspace((unsigned char)linebuf[0])) state = MIME_NAME;

View File

@@ -134,15 +134,23 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d, ASN1_STRING **oct)
if (!(octmp->length = i2d(obj, NULL))) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!(p = OPENSSL_malloc (octmp->length))) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
octmp->data = p;
i2d (obj, &p);
return octmp;
err:
if (!oct || !*oct)
{
ASN1_STRING_free(octmp);
if (oct)
*oct = NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
#endif

View File

@@ -154,7 +154,10 @@ static int asn1_bio_new(BIO *b)
if (!ctx)
return 0;
if (!asn1_bio_init(ctx, DEFAULT_ASN1_BUF_SIZE))
{
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
b->init = 1;
b->ptr = (char *)ctx;
b->flags = 0;

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
#!/usr/local/bin/perl -w
# Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org).
# Licensed under the terms of the OpenSSL license.
use strict;
my ($i, @arr);

View File

@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len)
ASN1_STRING *os;
if ((os=M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) return(0);
if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len)) return(0);
if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len))
{
M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
return 0;
}
ASN1_TYPE_set(a,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,os);
return(1);
}

View File

@@ -475,6 +475,8 @@ int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase)
l=80-2-obase;
b=X509_NAME_oneline(name,NULL,0);
if (!b)
return 0;
if (!*b)
{
OPENSSL_free(b);

View File

@@ -453,9 +453,14 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
{
derlst = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk)
* sizeof(*derlst));
tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
if (!derlst || !tmpdat)
if (!derlst)
return 0;
tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
if (!tmpdat)
{
OPENSSL_free(derlst);
return 0;
}
}
}
/* If not sorting just output each item */

View File

@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
{
/* We handle IDP and deltas */
if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
|| (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier)
|| (nid == NID_delta_crl))
break;;
crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;

View File

@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ int BIO_free(BIO *a)
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, a, &a->ex_data);
if ((a->method == NULL) || (a->method->destroy == NULL)) return(1);
a->method->destroy(a);
if ((a->method != NULL) && (a->method->destroy != NULL))
a->method->destroy(a);
OPENSSL_free(a);
return(1);
}

View File

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
if (n <= 0) return 0;
asm (
asm volatile (
" subq %2,%2 \n"
".p2align 4 \n"
"1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
" sbbq %0,%0 \n"
: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
: "cc"
: "cc", "memory"
);
return ret&1;
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
if (n <= 0) return 0;
asm (
asm volatile (
" subq %2,%2 \n"
".p2align 4 \n"
"1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
" sbbq %0,%0 \n"
: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
: "cc"
: "cc", "memory"
);
return ret&1;

View File

@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/* Dedicated window==4 case improves 512-bit RSA sign by ~15%, but as
* 512-bit RSA is hardly relevant, we omit it to spare size... */
if (window==5)
if (window==5 && top>1)
{
void bn_mul_mont_gather5(BN_ULONG *rp,const BN_ULONG *ap,
const void *table,const BN_ULONG *np,
@@ -874,7 +874,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0)
{
ret = BN_one(rr);
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m))
{
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
}
else
ret = BN_one(rr);
return ret;
}
if (a == 0)

View File

@@ -320,6 +320,15 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
#ifdef PURIFY
/* Valgrind complains in BN_consttime_swap because we process the whole
* array even if it's not initialised yet. This doesn't matter in that
* function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not
* actually going to use the data)
*/
memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG)*words);
#endif
#if 1
B=b->d;
/* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */

View File

@@ -1088,9 +1088,9 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
/* ... and right shift */
for (val=t_d[0],i=0; i<BN_NIST_521_TOP-1; i++)
{
tmp = val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
val = t_d[i+1];
t_d[i] = (tmp | val<<BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) & BN_MASK2;
t_d[i] = ( val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT |
(tmp=t_d[i+1])<<BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT ) & BN_MASK2;
val=tmp;
}
t_d[i] = val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
/* lower 521 bits */

View File

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (al <= 0)
{
r->top=0;
r->neg = 0;
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -71,6 +71,43 @@
static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
/* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success. */
static int test_exp_mod_zero() {
BIGNUM a, p, m;
BIGNUM r;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
int ret = 1;
BN_init(&m);
BN_one(&m);
BN_init(&a);
BN_one(&a);
BN_init(&p);
BN_zero(&p);
BN_init(&r);
BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (BN_is_zero(&r))
ret = 0;
else
{
printf("1**0 mod 1 = ");
BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
printf(", should be 0\n");
}
BN_free(&r);
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&p);
BN_free(&m);
return ret;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
BN_CTX *ctx;
@@ -190,7 +227,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out);
BIO_free(out);
printf(" done\n");
printf("\n");
if (test_exp_mod_zero() != 0)
goto err;
printf("done\n");
EXIT(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();

View File

@@ -93,9 +93,10 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
int ivlen;
env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
if (!env)
goto err;
return NULL;
if (wrap_nid <= 0)
wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;

View File

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ again:
p=eat_ws(conf, end);
if (*p != ']')
{
if (*p != '\0')
if (*p != '\0' && ss != p)
{
ss=p;
goto again;

216
crypto/constant_time_locl.h Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
/* crypto/constant_time_locl.h */
/*
* Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
*
* Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
* Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
* (Google).
* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
#define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
#include "e_os.h" /* For 'inline' */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/*
* The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
* and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result
* of a conditional in constant time. For example,
*
* if (a < b) {
* c = a;
* } else {
* c = b;
* }
*
* can be written as
*
* unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
* c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
*/
/*
* Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
* bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
* However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to
* replace this with something else on odd CPUs.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Signed integers. */
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b);
/*
* Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b).
*
* When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above),
* the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b|
* (if |mask| is zero).
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
unsigned char a, unsigned char b);
/* Convenience method for signed integers. */
static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b);
static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
{
return (unsigned int)((int)(a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
unsigned int lt;
/* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of a - b is set.*/
lt = ~(a ^ b) & (a - b);
/* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of b is set. */
lt |= ~a & b;
return constant_time_msb(lt);
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
unsigned int ge;
/* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a - b is not set.*/
ge = ~((a ^ b) | (a - b));
/* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a is set. */
ge |= a & ~b;
return constant_time_msb(ge);
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a)
{
return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b)
{
return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
{
return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b));
}
inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
{
return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
}
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */

330
crypto/constant_time_test.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
/* crypto/constant_time_test.c */
/*
* Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
*
* Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
* Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
* (Google).
* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_TRUE = (unsigned)(~0);
static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_FALSE = 0;
static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_TRUE_8 = 0xff;
static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_FALSE_8 = 0;
static int test_binary_op(unsigned int (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
{
unsigned c = op(a, b);
if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
"(TRUE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
return 1;
}
else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
"(FALSE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_binary_op_8(unsigned char (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
{
unsigned char c = op(a, b);
if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
"(TRUE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
return 1;
}
else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
"(FALSE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_is_zero(unsigned int a)
{
unsigned int c = constant_time_is_zero(a);
if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %du (TRUE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
return 1;
}
else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %du (FALSE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
{
unsigned char c = constant_time_is_zero_8(a);
if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %u (TRUE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
return 1;
}
else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %u (FALSE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_select(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
unsigned int selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
if (selected != a)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
"%du): expected %du(first value), got %du\n",
CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
return 1;
}
selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
if (selected != b)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
"%du): expected %du(second value), got %du\n",
CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_select_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
unsigned char selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, a, b);
if (selected != a)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
"%u): expected %u(first value), got %u\n",
CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
return 1;
}
selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, a, b);
if (selected != b)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
"%u): expected %u(second value), got %u\n",
CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_select_int(int a, int b)
{
int selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
if (selected != a)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
"%d): expected %d(first value), got %d\n",
CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
return 1;
}
selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
if (selected != b)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
"%d): expected %d(second value), got %d\n",
CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_eq_int(int a, int b)
{
unsigned int equal = constant_time_eq_int(a, b);
if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
"expected %du(TRUE), got %du\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, equal);
return 1;
}
else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
"expected %du(FALSE), got %du\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, equal);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
{
unsigned char equal = constant_time_eq_int_8(a, b);
if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
"expected %u(TRUE), got %u\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, equal);
return 1;
}
else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
"expected %u(FALSE), got %u\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, equal);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static unsigned int test_values[] = {0, 1, 1024, 12345, 32000, UINT_MAX/2-1,
UINT_MAX/2, UINT_MAX/2+1, UINT_MAX-1,
UINT_MAX};
static unsigned char test_values_8[] = {0, 1, 2, 20, 32, 127, 128, 129, 255};
static int signed_test_values[] = {0, 1, -1, 1024, -1024, 12345, -12345,
32000, -32000, INT_MAX, INT_MIN, INT_MAX-1,
INT_MIN+1};
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
unsigned int a, b, i, j;
int c, d;
unsigned char e, f;
int num_failed = 0, num_all = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "Testing constant time operations...\n");
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
{
a = test_values[i];
num_failed += test_is_zero(a);
num_failed += test_is_zero_8(a);
num_all += 2;
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
{
b = test_values[j];
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
"constant_time_lt", a, b, a < b);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
"constant_time_lt_8", a, b, a < b);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
"constant_time_ge", a, b, a >= b);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
"constant_time_ge_8", a, b, a >= b);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
"constant_time_ge", b, a, b >= a);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
"constant_time_ge_8", b, a, b >= a);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
"constant_time_eq", a, b, a == b);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
"constant_time_eq_8", a, b, a == b);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
"constant_time_eq", b, a, b == a);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
"constant_time_eq_8", b, a, b == a);
num_failed += test_select(a, b);
num_all += 13;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
{
c = signed_test_values[i];
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
{
d = signed_test_values[j];
num_failed += test_select_int(c, d);
num_failed += test_eq_int(c, d);
num_failed += test_eq_int_8(c, d);
num_all += 3;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values_8); ++i)
{
e = test_values_8[i];
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values_8); ++j)
{
f = test_values_8[j];
num_failed += test_select_8(e, f);
num_all += 1;
}
}
if (!num_failed)
{
fprintf(stdout, "ok (ran %d tests)\n", num_all);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
else
{
fprintf(stdout, "%d of %d tests failed!\n", num_failed, num_all);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}

View File

@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ $ ET_WHIRLPOOL = "WHRLPOOL"
$ IF ARCH .EQS. "VAX" THEN ET_WHIRLPOOL = ""
$ ENCRYPT_TYPES = "Basic,"+ -
"OBJECTS,"+ -
"MD2,MD4,MD5,SHA,MDC2,HMAC,RIPEMD,"+ET_WHIRLPOOL+","+ -
"DES,AES,RC2,RC4,RC5,IDEA,BF,CAST,CAMELLIA,SEED,MODES,"+ -
"MD4,MD5,SHA,MDC2,HMAC,RIPEMD,"+ET_WHIRLPOOL+","+ -
"DES,AES,RC2,RC4,IDEA,BF,CAST,CAMELLIA,SEED,MODES,"+ -
"BN,EC,RSA,DSA,ECDSA,DH,ECDH,DSO,ENGINE,"+ -
"BUFFER,BIO,STACK,LHASH,RAND,ERR,"+ -
"EVP,EVP_2,EVP_3,ASN1,ASN1_2,PEM,X509,X509V3,"+ -
@@ -204,11 +204,18 @@ $ GOSUB CHECK_OPT_FILE
$!
$! Define The Different Encryption "library" Strings.
$!
$ APPS_DES = "DES/DES,CBC3_ENC"
$ APPS_PKCS7 = "ENC/ENC;DEC/DEC;SIGN/SIGN;VERIFY/VERIFY,EXAMPLE"
$!!! Test apps disabled, as they aren't supported at all,
$!!! not even in the unix build
$!!! APPS_DES = "DES/DES,CBC3_ENC"
$!!! APPS_PKCS7 = "ENC/ENC;DEC/DEC;SIGN/SIGN;VERIFY/VERIFY,EXAMPLE"
$
$ LIB_ = "cryptlib,mem,mem_clr,mem_dbg,cversion,ex_data,cpt_err,"+ -
"ebcdic,uid,o_time,o_str,o_dir,o_fips.c,o_init,fips_ers"
$! These variables are ordered as the SDIRS variable from the top Makefile.org
$! The contents of these variables are copied from the LIBOBJ variable in the
$! corresponding Makefile from each corresponding subdirectory, with .o stripped
$! and spaces replaced with commas.
$ LIB_ = "cryptlib,mem,mem_dbg,cversion,ex_data,cpt_err,ebcdic,"+ -
"uid,o_time,o_str,o_dir,o_fips.c,o_init,fips_ers,mem_clr"
$ LIB_OBJECTS = "o_names,obj_dat,obj_lib,obj_err,obj_xref"
$ LIB_MD2 = "md2_dgst,md2_one"
$ LIB_MD4 = "md4_dgst,md4_one"
$ LIB_MD5 = "md5_dgst,md5_one"
@@ -225,13 +232,13 @@ $ LIB_DES = "set_key,ecb_enc,cbc_enc,"+ -
"fcrypt,xcbc_enc,rpc_enc,cbc_cksm,"+ -
"ede_cbcm_enc,des_old,des_old2,read2pwd"
$ LIB_RC2 = "rc2_ecb,rc2_skey,rc2_cbc,rc2cfb64,rc2ofb64"
$ LIB_RC4 = "rc4_skey,rc4_enc,rc4_utl"
$ LIB_RC4 = "rc4_enc,rc4_skey,rc4_utl"
$ LIB_RC5 = "rc5_skey,rc5_ecb,rc5_enc,rc5cfb64,rc5ofb64"
$ LIB_IDEA = "i_cbc,i_cfb64,i_ofb64,i_ecb,i_skey"
$ LIB_BF = "bf_skey,bf_ecb,bf_enc,bf_cfb64,bf_ofb64"
$ LIB_CAST = "c_skey,c_ecb,c_enc,c_cfb64,c_ofb64"
$ LIB_CAMELLIA = "camellia,cmll_misc,cmll_ecb,cmll_cbc,cmll_ofb,"+ -
"cmll_cfb,cmll_ctr,cmll_utl"
$ LIB_CAMELLIA = "cmll_ecb,cmll_ofb,cmll_cfb,cmll_ctr,cmll_utl,"+ -
"camellia,cmll_misc,cmll_cbc"
$ LIB_SEED = "seed,seed_ecb,seed_cbc,seed_cfb,seed_ofb"
$ LIB_MODES = "cbc128,ctr128,cts128,cfb128,ofb128,gcm128,"+ -
"ccm128,xts128"
@@ -264,24 +271,23 @@ $ LIB_ENGINE = "eng_err,eng_lib,eng_list,eng_init,eng_ctrl,"+ -
"eng_table,eng_pkey,eng_fat,eng_all,"+ -
"tb_rsa,tb_dsa,tb_ecdsa,tb_dh,tb_ecdh,tb_rand,tb_store,"+ -
"tb_cipher,tb_digest,tb_pkmeth,tb_asnmth,"+ -
"eng_openssl,eng_dyn,eng_cnf,eng_cryptodev,"+ -
"eng_openssl,eng_cnf,eng_dyn,eng_cryptodev,"+ -
"eng_rsax,eng_rdrand"
$ LIB_AES = "aes_core,aes_misc,aes_ecb,aes_cbc,aes_cfb,aes_ofb,aes_ctr,"+ -
"aes_ige,aes_wrap"
$ LIB_AES = "aes_misc,aes_ecb,aes_cfb,aes_ofb,aes_ctr,aes_ige,aes_wrap,"+ -
"aes_core,aes_cbc"
$ LIB_BUFFER = "buffer,buf_str,buf_err"
$ LIB_BIO = "bio_lib,bio_cb,bio_err,"+ -
"bss_mem,bss_null,bss_fd,"+ -
"bss_file,bss_sock,bss_conn,"+ -
"bf_null,bf_buff,b_print,b_dump,"+ -
"b_sock,bss_acpt,bf_nbio,bss_rtcp,bss_bio,bss_log,"+ -
"b_sock,bss_acpt,bf_nbio,bss_log,bss_bio,"+ -
"bss_dgram,"+ -
"bf_lbuf"
"bf_lbuf,bss_rtcp" ! The last two are VMS specific
$ LIB_STACK = "stack"
$ LIB_LHASH = "lhash,lh_stats"
$ LIB_RAND = "md_rand,randfile,rand_lib,rand_err,rand_egd,"+ -
"rand_vms"
"rand_vms" ! The last one is VMS specific
$ LIB_ERR = "err,err_all,err_prn"
$ LIB_OBJECTS = "o_names,obj_dat,obj_lib,obj_err,obj_xref"
$ LIB_EVP = "encode,digest,evp_enc,evp_key,evp_acnf,evp_cnf,"+ -
"e_des,e_bf,e_idea,e_des3,e_camellia,"+ -
"e_rc4,e_aes,names,e_seed,"+ -
@@ -345,7 +351,7 @@ $ LIB_TS = "ts_err,ts_req_utils,ts_req_print,ts_rsp_utils,ts_rsp_print,"+ -
$ LIB_JPAKE = "jpake,jpake_err"
$ LIB_SRP = "srp_lib,srp_vfy"
$ LIB_STORE = "str_err,str_lib,str_meth,str_mem"
$ LIB_CMAC = "cmac,cm_ameth.c,cm_pmeth"
$ LIB_CMAC = "cmac,cm_ameth,cm_pmeth"
$!
$! Setup exceptional compilations
$!
@@ -381,7 +387,7 @@ $ MODULE_NEXT:
$!
$! Extract The Module Name From The Encryption List.
$!
$ MODULE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(MODULE_COUNTER,",",ENCRYPT_TYPES)
$ MODULE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(MODULE_COUNTER,",",ENCRYPT_TYPES),"COLLAPSE")
$ IF MODULE_NAME.EQS."Basic" THEN MODULE_NAME = ""
$ MODULE_NAME1 = MODULE_NAME
$!
@@ -465,7 +471,7 @@ $ THEN
$!
$! O.K, Extract The File Name From The File List.
$!
$ FILE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",'LIB_MODULE')
$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",'LIB_MODULE'),"COLLAPSE")
$!
$! else
$!
@@ -492,7 +498,7 @@ $! SHOW SYMBOL APPLICATION*
$!
$ IF APPLICATION .NES. ";"
$ THEN
$ FILE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",APPLICATION_OBJECTS)
$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",APPLICATION_OBJECTS),"COLLAPSE")
$ IF FILE_NAME .EQS. ","
$ THEN
$ APPLICATION = ""
@@ -1132,9 +1138,12 @@ $ CCDEFS = "TCPIP_TYPE_''P4',DSO_VMS"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
$ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. ""
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ ENDIF
$!
$! Check To See If We Have A ZLIB Option.
$!
@@ -1299,6 +1308,18 @@ $! Finish up the definition of CC.
$!
$ IF COMPILER .EQS. "DECC"
$ THEN
$! Not all compiler versions support MAYLOSEDATA3.
$ OPT_TEST = "MAYLOSEDATA3"
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$ERROR NL:
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$OUTPUT NL:
$ 'CC' /NOCROSS_REFERENCE /NOLIST /NOOBJECT -
/WARNINGS = DISABLE = ('OPT_TEST', EMPTYFILE) NL:
$ IF ($SEVERITY)
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ OPT_TEST
$ ENDIF
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .EQS. ""
$ THEN
$ CC4DISABLEWARNINGS = "DOLLARID"

View File

@@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
unsigned char *dp = NULL;
int dplen;
if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key)
{
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
params = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (!params)
@@ -701,4 +707,3 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[] =
old_dsa_priv_encode
}
};

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/* Avoid name clashes with other applications */
#define os_toascii _openssl_os_toascii
#define os_toebcdic _openssl_os_toebcdic
@@ -16,4 +20,7 @@ extern const unsigned char os_toebcdic[256];
void *ebcdic2ascii(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count);
void *ascii2ebcdic(void *dest, const void *srce, size_t count);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif

View File

@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx);
int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx);
/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^num p[i] * m[i]
/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i]
* \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
* \param r EC_POINT object for the result
* \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)

View File

@@ -80,9 +80,6 @@
const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
return fips_ec_gf2m_simple_method();
#else
static const EC_METHOD ret = {
EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field,
@@ -125,8 +122,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
0 /* field_decode */,
0 /* field_set_to_one */ };
return &ret;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return fips_ec_gf2m_simple_method();
#endif
return &ret;
}

View File

@@ -453,14 +453,16 @@ static int do_EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off, int ktype)
if (ktype > 0)
{
public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(x);
if ((pub_key = EC_POINT_point2bn(group, public_key,
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), NULL, ctx)) == NULL)
if (public_key != NULL)
{
reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
goto err;
}
if (pub_key)
if ((pub_key = EC_POINT_point2bn(group, public_key,
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), NULL, ctx)) == NULL)
{
reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
goto err;
}
buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
}
}
if (ktype == 2)

View File

@@ -1183,30 +1183,47 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
goto err;
}
if (ret->pub_key)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
if (ret->pub_key == NULL)
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (priv_key->publicKey)
{
const unsigned char *pub_oct;
size_t pub_oct_len;
int pub_oct_len;
if (ret->pub_key)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
if (ret->pub_key == NULL)
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
/* save the point conversion form */
/* The first byte - point conversion form - must be present. */
if (pub_oct_len <= 0)
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
/* Save the point conversion form. */
ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL))
pub_oct, (size_t)(pub_oct_len), NULL))
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
if (!EC_POINT_mul(ret->group, ret->pub_key, ret->priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL))
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */
ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
}
ok = 1;
err:
@@ -1230,7 +1247,8 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
size_t buf_len=0, tmp_len;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key=NULL;
if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL)
if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL ||
(!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL))
{
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY,
ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);

View File

@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *
int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->dbl == 0)
if (group->meth->invert == 0)
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;

View File

@@ -72,9 +72,6 @@
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
return fips_ec_gfp_mont_method();
#else
static const EC_METHOD ret = {
EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
NID_X9_62_prime_field,
@@ -114,8 +111,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void)
ec_GFp_mont_field_decode,
ec_GFp_mont_field_set_to_one };
return &ret;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return fips_ec_gfp_mont_method();
#endif
return &ret;
}

View File

@@ -73,9 +73,6 @@
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
return fips_ec_gfp_nist_method();
#else
static const EC_METHOD ret = {
EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
NID_X9_62_prime_field,
@@ -115,8 +112,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void)
0 /* field_decode */,
0 /* field_set_to_one */ };
return &ret;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return fips_ec_gfp_nist_method();
#endif
return &ret;
}
int ec_GFp_nist_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)

View File

@@ -73,9 +73,6 @@
const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
return fips_ec_gfp_simple_method();
#else
static const EC_METHOD ret = {
EC_FLAGS_DEFAULT_OCT,
NID_X9_62_prime_field,
@@ -115,8 +112,12 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void)
0 /* field_decode */,
0 /* field_set_to_one */ };
return &ret;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return fips_ec_gfp_simple_method();
#endif
return &ret;
}
@@ -1181,9 +1182,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ct
int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp0, *tmp1;
size_t pow2 = 0;
BIGNUM **heap = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z;
BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL;
size_t i;
int ret = 0;
@@ -1198,124 +1198,104 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp0 == NULL || tmp1 == NULL) goto err;
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err;
/* Before converting the individual points, compute inverses of all Z values.
* Modular inversion is rather slow, but luckily we can do with a single
* explicit inversion, plus about 3 multiplications per input value.
*/
pow2 = 1;
while (num > pow2)
pow2 <<= 1;
/* Now pow2 is the smallest power of 2 satifsying pow2 >= num.
* We need twice that. */
pow2 <<= 1;
heap = OPENSSL_malloc(pow2 * sizeof heap[0]);
if (heap == NULL) goto err;
/* The array is used as a binary tree, exactly as in heapsort:
*
* heap[1]
* heap[2] heap[3]
* heap[4] heap[5] heap[6] heap[7]
* heap[8]heap[9] heap[10]heap[11] heap[12]heap[13] heap[14] heap[15]
*
* We put the Z's in the last line;
* then we set each other node to the product of its two child-nodes (where
* empty or 0 entries are treated as ones);
* then we invert heap[1];
* then we invert each other node by replacing it by the product of its
* parent (after inversion) and its sibling (before inversion).
*/
heap[0] = NULL;
for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
heap[i] = NULL;
prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]);
if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
heap[pow2/2 + i] = &points[i]->Z;
for (i = pow2/2 + num; i < pow2; i++)
heap[i] = NULL;
/* set each node to the product of its children */
for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
{
heap[i] = BN_new();
if (heap[i] == NULL) goto err;
if (heap[2*i] != NULL)
{
if ((heap[2*i + 1] == NULL) || BN_is_zero(heap[2*i + 1]))
{
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i])) goto err;
}
else
{
if (BN_is_zero(heap[2*i]))
{
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i + 1])) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, heap[i],
heap[2*i], heap[2*i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
}
}
}
prod_Z[i] = BN_new();
if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err;
}
/* invert heap[1] */
if (!BN_is_zero(heap[1]))
{
if (!BN_mod_inverse(heap[1], heap[1], &group->field, ctx))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
{
/* in the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H)
* into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H);
* i.e. we have need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice */
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
}
/* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z,
* skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */
/* set other heap[i]'s to their inverses */
for (i = 2; i < pow2/2 + num; i += 2)
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
{
/* i is even */
if ((heap[i + 1] != NULL) && !BN_is_zero(heap[i + 1]))
if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp0, heap[i/2], heap[i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, heap[i/2], heap[i], ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], tmp0)) goto err;
if (!BN_copy(heap[i + 1], tmp1)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[i/2])) goto err;
if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) goto err;
}
}
/* we have replaced all non-zero Z's by their inverses, now fix up all the points */
for (i = 1; i < num; i++)
{
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
{
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err;
}
}
/* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every
* non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
{
/* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H)
* into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H);
* i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
}
for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i)
{
/* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of
* points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
{
/* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product
* of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err;
/* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
/* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_copy(&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
{
/* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_copy(&points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err;
}
/* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
EC_POINT *p = points[i];
if (!BN_is_zero(&p->Z))
{
/* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
@@ -1329,20 +1309,19 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
if (heap != NULL)
if (prod_Z != NULL)
{
/* heap[pow2/2] .. heap[pow2-1] have not been allocated locally! */
for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
if (heap[i] != NULL)
BN_clear_free(heap[i]);
if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) break;
BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]);
}
OPENSSL_free(heap);
OPENSSL_free(prod_Z);
}
return ret;
}

View File

@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ static void group_order_tests(EC_GROUP *group)
EC_POINT *P = EC_POINT_new(group);
EC_POINT *Q = EC_POINT_new(group);
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
int i;
n1 = BN_new(); n2 = BN_new(); order = BN_new();
fprintf(stdout, "verify group order ...");
@@ -212,21 +213,56 @@ static void group_order_tests(EC_GROUP *group)
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, order, NULL, NULL, ctx)) ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;
fprintf(stdout, " ok\n");
fprintf(stdout, "long/negative scalar tests ... ");
if (!BN_one(n1)) ABORT;
/* n1 = 1 - order */
if (!BN_sub(n1, n1, order)) ABORT;
if(!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n1, ctx)) ABORT;
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
/* n2 = 1 + order */
if (!BN_add(n2, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
if(!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
/* n2 = (1 - order) * (1 + order) */
if (!BN_mul(n2, n1, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
if(!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
fprintf(stdout, "long/negative scalar tests ");
for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
{
const BIGNUM *scalars[6];
const EC_POINT *points[6];
fprintf(stdout, i == 1 ?
"allowing precomputation ... " :
"without precomputation ... ");
if (!BN_set_word(n1, i)) ABORT;
/* If i == 1, P will be the predefined generator for which
* EC_GROUP_precompute_mult has set up precomputation. */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, P, n1, NULL, NULL, ctx)) ABORT;
if (!BN_one(n1)) ABORT;
/* n1 = 1 - order */
if (!BN_sub(n1, n1, order)) ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n1, ctx)) ABORT;
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
/* n2 = 1 + order */
if (!BN_add(n2, order, BN_value_one())) ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
/* n2 = (1 - order) * (1 + order) = 1 - order^2 */
if (!BN_mul(n2, n1, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(group, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
/* n2 = order^2 - 1 */
BN_set_negative(n2, 0);
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, Q, NULL, P, n2, ctx)) ABORT;
/* Add P to verify the result. */
if (!EC_POINT_add(group, Q, Q, P, ctx)) ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, Q)) ABORT;
/* Exercise EC_POINTs_mul, including corner cases. */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;
scalars[0] = n1; points[0] = Q; /* => infinity */
scalars[1] = n2; points[1] = P; /* => -P */
scalars[2] = n1; points[2] = Q; /* => infinity */
scalars[3] = n2; points[3] = Q; /* => infinity */
scalars[4] = n1; points[4] = P; /* => P */
scalars[5] = n2; points[5] = Q; /* => infinity */
if (!EC_POINTs_mul(group, P, NULL, 6, points, scalars, ctx)) ABORT;
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, P)) ABORT;
}
fprintf(stdout, "ok\n");
EC_POINT_free(P);
EC_POINT_free(Q);
BN_free(n1);

View File

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110

View File

@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
evp_enc.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h
evp_enc.o: ../constant_time_locl.h ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h
evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h

View File

@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2];
#define VPAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
#endif
#ifdef BSAES_ASM
#define BSAES_CAPABLE VPAES_CAPABLE
#define BSAES_CAPABLE (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1]&(1<<(41-32)))
#endif
/*
* AES-NI section
@@ -808,6 +808,28 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = out->cipher_data;
if (gctx->gcm.key)
{
if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
return 0;
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
else
{
gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
if (!gctx_out->iv)
return 0;
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
}
default:
return -1;
@@ -1032,7 +1054,8 @@ static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
#define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT)
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes,128,1,12,gcm,GCM,
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER|CUSTOM_FLAGS)
@@ -1044,7 +1067,25 @@ BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes,256,1,12,gcm,GCM,
static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = c->cipher_data;
if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT)
if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = out->cipher_data;
if (xctx->xts.key1)
{
if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
return 0;
xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1;
}
if (xctx->xts.key2)
{
if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2)
return 0;
xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2;
}
return 1;
}
else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT)
return -1;
/* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */
xctx->xts.key1 = NULL;
@@ -1153,7 +1194,8 @@ static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
#define aes_xts_cleanup NULL
#define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT)
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes,128,1,16,xts,XTS,EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS|XTS_FLAGS)
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes,256,1,16,xts,XTS,EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS|XTS_FLAGS)
@@ -1203,6 +1245,19 @@ static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
cctx->len_set = 0;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = out->cipher_data;
if (cctx->ccm.key)
{
if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks)
return 0;
cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks;
}
return 1;
}
default:
return -1;

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
#include "constant_time_locl.h"
#include "evp_locl.h"
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
@@ -500,21 +501,21 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
int i,n;
unsigned int b;
unsigned int i, b;
unsigned char pad, padding_good;
*outl=0;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
{
i = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
if (i < 0)
int ret = M_do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
else
*outl = i;
*outl = ret;
return 1;
}
b=ctx->cipher->block_size;
b=(unsigned int)(ctx->cipher->block_size);
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
{
if(ctx->buf_len)
@@ -533,28 +534,34 @@ int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
return(0);
}
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
n=ctx->final[b-1];
if (n == 0 || n > (int)b)
pad=ctx->final[b-1];
padding_good = (unsigned char)(~constant_time_is_zero_8(pad));
padding_good &= constant_time_ge_8(b, pad);
for (i = 1; i < b; ++i)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return(0);
unsigned char is_pad_index = constant_time_lt_8(i, pad);
unsigned char pad_byte_good = constant_time_eq_8(ctx->final[b-i-1], pad);
padding_good &= constant_time_select_8(is_pad_index, pad_byte_good, 0xff);
}
for (i=0; i<n; i++)
{
if (ctx->final[--b] != n)
{
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
return(0);
}
}
n=ctx->cipher->block_size-n;
for (i=0; i<n; i++)
out[i]=ctx->final[i];
*outl=n;
/*
* At least 1 byte is always padding, so we always write b - 1
* bytes to avoid a timing leak. The caller is required to have |b|
* bytes space in |out| by the API contract.
*/
for (i = 0; i < b - 1; ++i)
out[i] = ctx->final[i] & padding_good;
/* Safe cast: for a good padding, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH >= b >= pad */
*outl = padding_good & ((unsigned char)(b - pad));
return padding_good & 1;
}
else
*outl=0;
return(1);
{
*outl = 0;
return 1;
}
}
void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
@@ -678,4 +685,3 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
return in->cipher->ctrl((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)in, EVP_CTRL_COPY, 0, out);
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
{
int cipher_nid, md_nid;
if (cipher)
cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher);
cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
else
cipher_nid = -1;
if (md)

View File

@@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher)
}
memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,8);
n=0;
idea_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)17,&eks,
idea_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)13,&eks,
cfb_tmp,&n,IDEA_DECRYPT);
idea_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]),&(cfb_buf2[17]),
(long)CFB_TEST_SIZE-17,&dks,
idea_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[13]),&(cfb_buf2[13]),
(long)CFB_TEST_SIZE-13,&eks,
cfb_tmp,&n,IDEA_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(plain,cfb_buf2,CFB_TEST_SIZE) != 0)
{

View File

@@ -75,13 +75,13 @@ $!
$ sdirs := , -
'archd', -
objects, -
md2, md4, md5, sha, mdc2, hmac, ripemd, whrlpool, -
des, aes, rc2, rc4, rc5, idea, bf, cast, camellia, seed, -
md4, md5, sha, mdc2, hmac, ripemd, whrlpool, -
des, aes, rc2, rc4, idea, bf, cast, camellia, seed, -
bn, ec, rsa, dsa, ecdsa, dh, ecdh, dso, engine, -
buffer, bio, stack, lhash, rand, err, -
evp, asn1, pem, x509, x509v3, conf, txt_db, pkcs7, pkcs12, comp, ocsp, -
ui, krb5, -
store, cms, pqueue, ts, jpake
cms, pqueue, ts, jpake, srp, store, cmac
$!
$ exheader_ := crypto.h, opensslv.h, ebcdic.h, symhacks.h, ossl_typ.h
$ exheader_'archd' := opensslconf.h
@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ $ exheader_cms := cms.h
$ exheader_pqueue := pqueue.h
$ exheader_ts := ts.h
$ exheader_jpake := jpake.h
$ exheader_srp := srp.h
$ exheader_store := store.h
$ exheader_cmac := cmac.h
$ libs := ssl_libcrypto
$!
$ exe_dir := [-.'archd'.exe.crypto]

View File

@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ sub round4_step
EOF
}
no warnings qw(uninitialized);
my $flavour = shift;
my $output = shift;
if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
@@ -119,7 +120,6 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
no warnings qw(uninitialized);
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
typedef void (*block128_f)(const unsigned char in[16],
unsigned char out[16],
const void *key);
@@ -133,3 +136,6 @@ typedef struct xts128_context XTS128_CONTEXT;
int CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(const XTS128_CONTEXT *ctx, const unsigned char iv[16],
const unsigned char *inp, unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View File

@@ -471,11 +471,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
const unsigned char *p;
char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
buf[0]='\0';
return(0);
}
/* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
if (buf && buf_len > 0)
buf[0] = '\0';
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return(0);
if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
{
@@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
i=(int)(l/40);
l-=(long)(i*40);
}
if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
{
*buf++ = i + '0';
*buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
n++;
@@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
i = strlen(bndec);
if (buf)
{
if (buf_len > 0)
if (buf_len > 1)
{
*buf++ = '.';
*buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(ok);
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ for ($i=0; $i<$n; $i++)
$out.="\"$sn\"";
$out.=","."\"$ln\"";
$out.=",NID_$nid{$i},";
if (defined($obj{$nid{$i}}))
if (defined($obj{$nid{$i}}) && $objd{$obj{$nid{$i}}} =~ /,/)
{
$v=$objd{$obj{$nid{$i}}};
$v =~ s/L//g;

View File

@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx;
rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(OCSP_REQ_CTX));
if (!rctx)
return NULL;
rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
rctx->mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
rctx->io = io;
@@ -167,18 +169,21 @@ OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
else
rctx->iobuflen = OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN;
rctx->iobuf = OPENSSL_malloc(rctx->iobuflen);
if (!rctx->iobuf)
return 0;
if (!rctx->mem || !rctx->iobuf)
goto err;
if (!path)
path = "/";
if (BIO_printf(rctx->mem, post_hdr, path) <= 0)
return 0;
goto err;
if (req && !OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(rctx, req))
return 0;
goto err;
return rctx;
err:
OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx);
return NULL;
}
/* Parse the HTTP response. This will look like this:
@@ -490,6 +495,9 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req)
ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(b, path, req, -1);
if (!ctx)
return NULL;
do
{
rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx);

View File

@@ -222,8 +222,19 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, int *pss
if (!*ppath) goto mem_err;
p = host;
if(host[0] == '[')
{
/* ipv6 literal */
host++;
p = strchr(host, ']');
if(!p) goto parse_err;
*p = '\0';
p++;
}
/* Look for optional ':' for port number */
if ((p = strchr(host, ':')))
if ((p = strchr(p, ':')))
{
*p = 0;
port = p + 1;

View File

@@ -436,8 +436,11 @@ static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm
if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN))
{
signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
*psigner = signer;
return 1;
if (signer)
{
*psigner = signer;
return 1;
}
}
signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
#ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
#define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/* Numeric release version identifier:
* MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
* The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas
@@ -25,11 +29,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000108fL
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100010afL
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1h-fips 5 Jun 2014"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1j-fips 15 Oct 2014"
#else
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1h 5 Jun 2014"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1j 15 Oct 2014"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
@@ -86,4 +90,7 @@
#define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */

View File

@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
#ifndef HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H
#define HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
#ifdef NO_ASN1_TYPEDEFS
@@ -199,4 +203,7 @@ typedef struct ocsp_req_ctx_st OCSP_REQ_CTX;
typedef struct ocsp_response_st OCSP_RESPONSE;
typedef struct ocsp_responder_id_st OCSP_RESPID;
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* def HEADER_OPENSSL_TYPES_H */

View File

@@ -759,6 +759,11 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
/* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
p += 8;
if (keylen < 8)
{
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
return NULL;
}
inlen = keylen - 8;
q = enctmp + 8;
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&cctx, EVP_rc4(), NULL, keybuf, NULL))

View File

@@ -39,20 +39,6 @@ test:
all: lib
testapps: enc dec sign verify
enc: enc.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o enc enc.o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
dec: dec.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o dec dec.o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
sign: sign.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o sign sign.o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
verify: verify.o example.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o verify verify.o $(PEX_LIBS) example.o $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
lib: $(LIBOBJ)
$(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
$(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.

View File

@@ -1,466 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/evp/bio_ber.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
static int ber_write(BIO *h,char *buf,int num);
static int ber_read(BIO *h,char *buf,int size);
/*static int ber_puts(BIO *h,char *str); */
/*static int ber_gets(BIO *h,char *str,int size); */
static long ber_ctrl(BIO *h,int cmd,long arg1,char *arg2);
static int ber_new(BIO *h);
static int ber_free(BIO *data);
static long ber_callback_ctrl(BIO *h,int cmd,void *(*fp)());
#define BER_BUF_SIZE (32)
/* This is used to hold the state of the BER objects being read. */
typedef struct ber_struct
{
int tag;
int class;
long length;
int inf;
int num_left;
int depth;
} BER_CTX;
typedef struct bio_ber_struct
{
int tag;
int class;
long length;
int inf;
/* most of the following are used when doing non-blocking IO */
/* reading */
long num_left; /* number of bytes still to read/write in block */
int depth; /* used with indefinite encoding. */
int finished; /* No more read data */
/* writting */
char *w_addr;
int w_offset;
int w_left;
int buf_len;
int buf_off;
unsigned char buf[BER_BUF_SIZE];
} BIO_BER_CTX;
static BIO_METHOD methods_ber=
{
BIO_TYPE_CIPHER,"cipher",
ber_write,
ber_read,
NULL, /* ber_puts, */
NULL, /* ber_gets, */
ber_ctrl,
ber_new,
ber_free,
ber_callback_ctrl,
};
BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ber(void)
{
return(&methods_ber);
}
static int ber_new(BIO *bi)
{
BIO_BER_CTX *ctx;
ctx=(BIO_BER_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_BER_CTX));
if (ctx == NULL) return(0);
memset((char *)ctx,0,sizeof(BIO_BER_CTX));
bi->init=0;
bi->ptr=(char *)ctx;
bi->flags=0;
return(1);
}
static int ber_free(BIO *a)
{
BIO_BER_CTX *b;
if (a == NULL) return(0);
b=(BIO_BER_CTX *)a->ptr;
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->ptr,sizeof(BIO_BER_CTX));
OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
a->ptr=NULL;
a->init=0;
a->flags=0;
return(1);
}
int bio_ber_get_header(BIO *bio, BIO_BER_CTX *ctx)
{
char buf[64];
int i,j,n;
int ret;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long length
int tag;
int class;
long max;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
/* Pack the buffer down if there is a hole at the front */
if (ctx->buf_off != 0)
{
p=ctx->buf;
j=ctx->buf_off;
n=ctx->buf_len-j;
for (i=0; i<n; i++)
{
p[0]=p[j];
p++;
}
ctx->buf_len-j;
ctx->buf_off=0;
}
/* If there is more room, read some more data */
i=BER_BUF_SIZE-ctx->buf_len;
if (i)
{
i=BIO_read(bio->next_bio,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]),i);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
else
ctx->buf_len+=i;
}
max=ctx->buf_len;
p=ctx->buf;
ret=ASN1_get_object(&p,&length,&tag,&class,max);
if (ret & 0x80)
{
if ((ctx->buf_len < BER_BUF_SIZE) &&
(ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ASN1_R_TOO_LONG))
{
ERR_clear_error(); /* clear the error */
BIO_set_retry_read(b);
}
return(-1);
}
/* We have no error, we have a header, so make use of it */
if ((ctx->tag >= 0) && (ctx->tag != tag))
{
BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_BER_GET_HEADER,BIO_R_TAG_MISMATCH);
sprintf(buf,"tag=%d, got %d",ctx->tag,tag);
ERR_add_error_data(1,buf);
return(-1);
}
if (ret & 0x01)
if (ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
}
static int ber_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
{
int ret=0,i,n;
BIO_BER_CTX *ctx;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
if (out == NULL) return(0);
ctx=(BIO_BER_CTX *)b->ptr;
if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL)) return(0);
if (ctx->finished) return(0);
again:
/* First see if we are half way through reading a block */
if (ctx->num_left > 0)
{
if (ctx->num_left < outl)
n=ctx->num_left;
else
n=outl;
i=BIO_read(b->next_bio,out,n);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
ctx->num_left-=i;
outl-=i;
ret+=i;
if (ctx->num_left <= 0)
{
ctx->depth--;
if (ctx->depth <= 0)
ctx->finished=1;
}
if (outl <= 0)
return(ret);
else
goto again;
}
else /* we need to read another BER header */
{
}
}
static int ber_write(BIO *b, char *in, int inl)
{
int ret=0,n,i;
BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
ret=inl;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
n=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
while (n > 0)
{
i=BIO_write(b->next_bio,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),n);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
ctx->buf_off+=i;
n-=i;
}
/* at this point all pending data has been written */
if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return(0);
ctx->buf_off=0;
while (inl > 0)
{
n=(inl > ENC_BLOCK_SIZE)?ENC_BLOCK_SIZE:inl;
EVP_CipherUpdate(&(ctx->cipher),
(unsigned char *)ctx->buf,&ctx->buf_len,
(unsigned char *)in,n);
inl-=n;
in+=n;
ctx->buf_off=0;
n=ctx->buf_len;
while (n > 0)
{
i=BIO_write(b->next_bio,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),n);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
n-=i;
ctx->buf_off+=i;
}
ctx->buf_len=0;
ctx->buf_off=0;
}
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(ret);
}
static long ber_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, char *ptr)
{
BIO *dbio;
BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx,*dctx;
long ret=1;
int i;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
switch (cmd)
{
case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
ctx->ok=1;
ctx->finished=0;
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&(ctx->cipher),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,
ctx->cipher.berrypt);
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_EOF: /* More to read */
if (ctx->cont <= 0)
ret=1;
else
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
ret=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
if (ret <= 0)
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: /* More to read in buffer */
ret=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
if (ret <= 0)
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
/* do a final write */
again:
while (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off)
{
i=ber_write(b,NULL,0);
if (i < 0)
{
ret=i;
break;
}
}
if (!ctx->finished)
{
ctx->finished=1;
ctx->buf_off=0;
ret=EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&(ctx->cipher),
(unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
&(ctx->buf_len));
ctx->ok=(int)ret;
if (ret <= 0) break;
/* push out the bytes */
goto again;
}
/* Finally flush the underlying BIO */
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS:
ret=(long)ctx->ok;
break;
case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
dctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)dbio->ptr;
memcpy(&(dctx->cipher),&(ctx->cipher),sizeof(ctx->cipher));
dbio->init=1;
break;
default:
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
}
return(ret);
}
static long ber_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, void *(*fp)())
{
long ret=1;
if (b->next_bio == NULL) return(0);
switch (cmd)
{
default:
ret=BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,fp);
break;
}
return(ret);
}
/*
void BIO_set_cipher_ctx(b,c)
BIO *b;
EVP_CIPHER_ctx *c;
{
if (b == NULL) return;
if ((b->callback != NULL) &&
(b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,0L) <= 0))
return;
b->init=1;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
memcpy(ctx->cipher,c,sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
if (b->callback != NULL)
b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,1L);
}
*/
void BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *k, unsigned char *i,
int e)
{
BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
if (b == NULL) return;
if ((b->callback != NULL) &&
(b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,0L) <= 0))
return;
b->init=1;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&(ctx->cipher),c,NULL,k,i,e);
if (b->callback != NULL)
b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,1L);
}

View File

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/pkcs7/verify.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
BIO *bio_err=NULL;
int main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
char *keyfile=NULL;
BIO *in;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
X509 *x509;
PKCS7 *p7;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
X509_STORE *cert_store=NULL;
BIO *data,*detached=NULL,*p7bio=NULL;
char buf[1024*4];
unsigned char *pp;
int i,printit=0;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sk;
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
bio_err=BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE);
data=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
pp=NULL;
while (argc > 1)
{
argc--;
argv++;
if (strcmp(argv[0],"-p") == 0)
{
printit=1;
}
else if ((strcmp(argv[0],"-k") == 0) && (argc >= 2)) {
keyfile = argv[1];
argc-=1;
argv+=1;
} else if ((strcmp(argv[0],"-d") == 0) && (argc >= 2))
{
detached=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (!BIO_read_filename(detached,argv[1]))
goto err;
argc-=1;
argv+=1;
}
else break;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(data,argv[0])) goto err;
if(!keyfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "No private key file specified\n");
goto err;
}
if ((in=BIO_new_file(keyfile,"r")) == NULL) goto err;
if ((x509=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_reset(in);
if ((pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL)
goto err;
BIO_free(in);
if (pp == NULL)
BIO_set_fp(data,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
/* Load the PKCS7 object from a file */
if ((p7=PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(data,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
/* This stuff is being setup for certificate verification.
* When using SSL, it could be replaced with a
* cert_stre=SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx); */
cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
X509_STORE_set_default_paths(cert_store);
X509_STORE_load_locations(cert_store,NULL,"../../certs");
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(cert_store,verify_callback);
ERR_clear_error();
/* We need to process the data */
/* We cannot support detached encryption */
p7bio=PKCS7_dataDecode(p7,pkey,detached,x509);
if (p7bio == NULL)
{
printf("problems decoding\n");
goto err;
}
/* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(p7bio,buf,sizeof(buf));
/* print it? */
if (i <= 0) break;
fwrite(buf,1, i, stdout);
}
/* We can now verify signatures */
sk=PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
if (sk == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "there are no signatures on this data\n");
}
else
{
/* Ok, first we need to, for each subject entry,
* see if we can verify */
ERR_clear_error();
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sk); i++)
{
si=sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sk,i);
i=PKCS7_dataVerify(cert_store,&cert_ctx,p7bio,p7,si);
if (i <= 0)
goto err;
else
fprintf(stderr,"Signature verified\n");
}
}
X509_STORE_free(cert_store);
exit(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}
/* should be X509 * but we can just have them as char *. */
int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
char buf[256];
X509 *err_cert;
int err,depth;
err_cert=X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),buf,256);
BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d %s\n",depth,buf);
if (!ok)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
if (depth < 6)
{
ok=1;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,X509_V_OK);
}
else
{
ok=0;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
}
}
switch (ctx->error)
{
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),buf,256);
BIO_printf(bio_err,"issuer= %s\n",buf);
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"notBefore=");
ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"notAfter=");
ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
break;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify return:%d\n",ok);
return(ok);
}

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@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View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
int PKCS7_set_content_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type);
Call to set the type of PKCS7 object we are working on
int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
EVP_MD *dgst);
Use this to setup a signer info
There will also be functions to add signed and unsigned attributes.
int PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i);
Add a signer info to the content.
int PKCS7_add_certificae(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509);
int PKCS7_add_crl(PKCS7 *p7, X509_CRL *x509);
----
p7=PKCS7_new();
PKCS7_set_content_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_signed);
signer=PKCS7_SINGNER_INFO_new();
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(signer,x509,pkey,EVP_md5());
PKCS7_add_signer(py,signer);
we are now setup.

View File

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/pkcs7/enc.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
int main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
X509 *x509;
PKCS7 *p7;
BIO *in;
BIO *data,*p7bio;
char buf[1024*4];
int i;
int nodetach=1;
char *keyfile = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *recips=NULL;
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
data=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
while(argc > 1)
{
if (strcmp(argv[1],"-nd") == 0)
{
nodetach=1;
argv++; argc--;
}
else if ((strcmp(argv[1],"-c") == 0) && (argc >= 2)) {
if(!(cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(argv[2]))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher %s\n", argv[2]);
goto err;
}
argc-=2;
argv+=2;
} else if ((strcmp(argv[1],"-k") == 0) && (argc >= 2)) {
keyfile = argv[2];
argc-=2;
argv+=2;
if (!(in=BIO_new_file(keyfile,"r"))) goto err;
if (!(x509=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)))
goto err;
if(!recips) recips = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(recips, x509);
BIO_free(in);
} else break;
}
if(!recips) {
fprintf(stderr, "No recipients\n");
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(data,argv[1])) goto err;
p7=PKCS7_new();
#if 0
BIO_reset(in);
if ((pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_free(in);
PKCS7_set_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped);
if (PKCS7_add_signature(p7,x509,pkey,EVP_sha1()) == NULL) goto err;
/* we may want to add more */
PKCS7_add_certificate(p7,x509);
#else
PKCS7_set_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_enveloped);
#endif
if(!cipher) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
#else
fprintf(stderr, "No cipher selected\n");
goto err;
#endif
}
if (!PKCS7_set_cipher(p7,cipher)) goto err;
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(recips); i++) {
if (!PKCS7_add_recipient(p7,sk_X509_value(recips, i))) goto err;
}
sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free);
/* Set the content of the signed to 'data' */
/* PKCS7_content_new(p7,NID_pkcs7_data); not used in envelope */
/* could be used, but not in this version :-)
if (!nodetach) PKCS7_set_detached(p7,1);
*/
if ((p7bio=PKCS7_dataInit(p7,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(data,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(p7bio,buf,i);
}
BIO_flush(p7bio);
if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7,p7bio)) goto err;
BIO_free(p7bio);
PEM_write_PKCS7(stdout,p7);
PKCS7_free(p7);
exit(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}

View File

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----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Gh4d/Z0EUMCVHs/HZ/bWgiyhtHpvuVAzidm8D81p1LJ5BQX5/5f/m+q5+fS/npL27dTEbNqs
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CHW5o1hXJWJiTkZK2qWFcEMzTINSj5EpYFySr8aVBjkRnI7vxegRT/+XZZXoYedQ3UNsnGI3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-----END PKCS7-----

View File

@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
int add_signed_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
{
ASN1_UTCTIME *sign_time;
/* The last parameter is the amount to add/subtract from the current
* time (in seconds) */
sign_time=X509_gmtime_adj(NULL,0);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
V_ASN1_UTCTIME,(char *)sign_time);
return(1);
}
ASN1_UTCTIME *get_signed_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si,NID_pkcs9_signingTime);
if (so->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return so->value.utctime;
return NULL;
}
static int signed_string_nid= -1;
void add_signed_string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *str)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
/* To a an object of OID 1.2.3.4.5, which is an octet string */
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
os=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,(unsigned char*)str,strlen(str));
/* When we add, we do not free */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,signed_string_nid,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,(char *)os);
}
int get_signed_string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *buf, int len)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
int i;
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si,signed_string_nid);
if (so != NULL)
{
if (so->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
{
os=so->value.octet_string;
i=os->length;
if ((i+1) > len)
i=len-1;
memcpy(buf,os->data,i);
return(i);
}
}
return(0);
}
static int signed_seq2string_nid= -1;
/* ########################################### */
int add_signed_seq2string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *str1, char *str2)
{
/* To add an object of OID 1.9.999, which is a sequence containing
* 2 octet strings */
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
ASN1_STRING *seq;
unsigned char *data;
int i,total;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
os1=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
os2=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os1,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os2,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
i =i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,NULL);
i+=i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,NULL);
total=ASN1_object_size(1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
data=malloc(total);
p=data;
ASN1_put_object(&p,1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,&p);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,&p);
seq=ASN1_STRING_new();
ASN1_STRING_set(seq,data,total);
free(data);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,signed_seq2string_nid,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,(char *)seq);
return(1);
}
/* For this case, I will malloc the return strings */
int get_signed_seq2string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char **str1, char **str2)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si,signed_seq2string_nid);
if (so && (so->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
{
ASN1_const_CTX c;
ASN1_STRING *s;
long length;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
s=so->value.sequence;
c.p=ASN1_STRING_data(s);
c.max=c.p+ASN1_STRING_length(s);
if (!asn1_GetSequence(&c,&length)) goto err;
/* Length is the length of the seqence */
c.q=c.p;
if ((os1=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
c.q=c.p;
if ((os2=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
if (!asn1_const_Finish(&c)) goto err;
*str1=malloc(os1->length+1);
*str2=malloc(os2->length+1);
memcpy(*str1,os1->data,os1->length);
memcpy(*str2,os2->data,os2->length);
(*str1)[os1->length]='\0';
(*str2)[os2->length]='\0';
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
return(1);
}
err:
return(0);
}
/* #######################################
* THE OTHER WAY TO DO THINGS
* #######################################
*/
X509_ATTRIBUTE *create_time(void)
{
ASN1_UTCTIME *sign_time;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
/* The last parameter is the amount to add/subtract from the current
* time (in seconds) */
sign_time=X509_gmtime_adj(NULL,0);
ret=X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
V_ASN1_UTCTIME,(char *)sign_time);
return(ret);
}
ASN1_UTCTIME *sk_get_time(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO si;
si.auth_attr=sk;
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(&si,NID_pkcs9_signingTime);
if (so->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return so->value.utctime;
return NULL;
}
X509_ATTRIBUTE *create_string(char *str)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
/* To a an object of OID 1.2.3.4.5, which is an octet string */
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
os=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,(unsigned char*)str,strlen(str));
/* When we add, we do not free */
ret=X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(signed_string_nid,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,(char *)os);
return(ret);
}
int sk_get_string(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, char *buf, int len)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
int i;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO si;
si.auth_attr=sk;
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(&si,signed_string_nid);
if (so != NULL)
{
if (so->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
{
os=so->value.octet_string;
i=os->length;
if ((i+1) > len)
i=len-1;
memcpy(buf,os->data,i);
return(i);
}
}
return(0);
}
X509_ATTRIBUTE *add_seq2string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *str1, char *str2)
{
/* To add an object of OID 1.9.999, which is a sequence containing
* 2 octet strings */
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
ASN1_STRING *seq;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
unsigned char *data;
int i,total;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
os1=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
os2=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os1,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os2,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
i =i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,NULL);
i+=i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,NULL);
total=ASN1_object_size(1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
data=malloc(total);
p=data;
ASN1_put_object(&p,1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,&p);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,&p);
seq=ASN1_STRING_new();
ASN1_STRING_set(seq,data,total);
free(data);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
ret=X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(signed_seq2string_nid,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,(char *)seq);
return(ret);
}
/* For this case, I will malloc the return strings */
int sk_get_seq2string(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, char **str1, char **str2)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO si;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
si.auth_attr=sk;
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(&si,signed_seq2string_nid);
if (so->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
{
ASN1_const_CTX c;
ASN1_STRING *s;
long length;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
s=so->value.sequence;
c.p=ASN1_STRING_data(s);
c.max=c.p+ASN1_STRING_length(s);
if (!asn1_GetSequence(&c,&length)) goto err;
/* Length is the length of the seqence */
c.q=c.p;
if ((os1=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
c.q=c.p;
if ((os2=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
if (!asn1_const_Finish(&c)) goto err;
*str1=malloc(os1->length+1);
*str2=malloc(os2->length+1);
memcpy(*str1,os1->data,os1->length);
memcpy(*str2,os2->data,os2->length);
(*str1)[os1->length]='\0';
(*str2)[os2->length]='\0';
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
return(1);
}
err:
return(0);
}

View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
issuer :/C=AU/SP=Queensland/L=Brisbane/O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd/OU=DEMONSTRATION AND TESTING/CN=DEMO ZERO VALUE CA
subject:/C=AU/SP=Queensland/L=Brisbane/O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd/OU=SMIME 003/CN=Information/Email=info@cryptsoft.com
serial :047D
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1149 (0x47d)
Signature Algorithm: md5withRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=AU, SP=Queensland, L=Brisbane, O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd, OU=DEMONSTRATION AND TESTING, CN=DEMO ZERO VALUE CA
Validity
Not Before: May 13 05:40:58 1998 GMT
Not After : May 12 05:40:58 2000 GMT
Subject: C=AU, SP=Queensland, L=Brisbane, O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd, OU=SMIME 003, CN=Information/Email=info@cryptsoft.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Modulus:
00:ad:e7:23:89:ee:0d:87:b7:9c:32:44:4b:95:81:
73:dd:22:80:4b:2d:c5:60:b8:fe:1e:18:63:ef:dc:
89:89:22:df:95:3c:7a:db:3d:9a:06:a8:08:d6:29:
fd:ef:41:09:91:ed:bc:ad:98:f9:f6:28:90:62:6f:
e7:e7:0c:4d:0b
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
Netscape Comment:
Generated with SSLeay
Signature Algorithm: md5withRSAEncryption
52:15:ea:88:f4:f0:f9:0b:ef:ce:d5:f8:83:40:61:16:5e:55:
f9:ce:2d:d1:8b:31:5c:03:c6:2d:10:7c:61:d5:5c:0a:42:97:
d1:fd:65:b6:b6:84:a5:39:ec:46:ec:fc:e0:0d:d9:22:da:1b:
50:74:ad:92:cb:4e:90:e5:fa:7d
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBOgIBAAJBAK3nI4nuDYe3nDJES5WBc90igEstxWC4/h4YY+/ciYki35U8ets9
mgaoCNYp/e9BCZHtvK2Y+fYokGJv5+cMTQsCAwEAAQJBAIHpvXvqEcOEoDRRHuIG
fkcB4jPHcr9KE9TpxabH6xs9beN6OJnkePXAHwaz5MnUgSnbpOKq+cw8miKjXwe/
zVECIQDVLwncT2lRmXarEYHzb+q/0uaSvKhWKKt3kJasLNTrAwIhANDUc/ghut29
p3jJYjurzUKuG774/5eLjPLsxPPIZzNZAiA/10hSq41UnGqHLEUIS9m2/EeEZe7b
bm567dfRU9OnVQIgDo8ROrZXSchEGbaog5J5r/Fle83uO8l93R3GqVxKXZkCIFfk
IPD5PIYQAyyod3hyKKza7ZP4CGY4oOfZetbkSGGG
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBOgIBAAJBAK3nI4nuDYe3nDJES5WBc90igEstxWC4/h4YY+/ciYki35U8ets9
mgaoCNYp/e9BCZHtvK2Y+fYokGJv5+cMTQsCAwEAAQJBAIHpvXvqEcOEoDRRHuIG
fkcB4jPHcr9KE9TpxabH6xs9beN6OJnkePXAHwaz5MnUgSnbpOKq+cw8miKjXwe/
zVECIQDVLwncT2lRmXarEYHzb+q/0uaSvKhWKKt3kJasLNTrAwIhANDUc/ghut29
p3jJYjurzUKuG774/5eLjPLsxPPIZzNZAiA/10hSq41UnGqHLEUIS9m2/EeEZe7b
bm567dfRU9OnVQIgDo8ROrZXSchEGbaog5J5r/Fle83uO8l93R3GqVxKXZkCIFfk
IPD5PIYQAyyod3hyKKza7ZP4CGY4oOfZetbkSGGG
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
j,H>_<15><>_<>D<EFBFBD>zE<>L<EFBFBD> VJ<56><4A><10><><1D>E3<45><33>Y<08>x%_<>k
3<EFBFBD>)DLSc<53>8% <0C>M

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
k~@a<>,N<>M͹<> <O( KP<4B><EFBFBD>K<EFBFBD>><3E><>U<>o_<6F>Bqrm<72>?٠t?t<><74>ρ<EFBFBD>Id2<><32>

Binary file not shown.

Binary file not shown.

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View File

@@ -233,10 +233,6 @@ DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF(PKCS7)
(OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped)
#define PKCS7_type_is_data(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_data)
#define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest)
#define PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(a) \
(OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_encrypted)
#define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest)
#define PKCS7_set_detached(p,v) \
PKCS7_ctrl(p,PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE,v,NULL)

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
issuer= /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
subject=/C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Server test cert (512 bit)
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBPAIBAAJBAJ+zw4Qnlf8SMVIPFe9GEcStgOY2Ww/dgNdhjeD8ckUJNP5VZkVD
TGiXav6ooKXfX3j/7tdkuD8Ey2//Kv7+ue0CAwEAAQJAN6W31vDEP2DjdqhzCDDu
OA4NACqoiFqyblo7yc2tM4h4xMbC3Yx5UKMN9ZkCtX0gzrz6DyF47bdKcWBzNWCj
gQIhANEoojVt7hq+SQ6MCN6FTAysGgQf56Q3TYoJMoWvdiXVAiEAw3e3rc+VJpOz
rHuDo6bgpjUAAXM+v3fcpsfZSNO6V7kCIQCtbVjanpUwvZkMI9by02oUk9taki3b
PzPfAfNPYAbCJQIhAJXNQDWyqwn/lGmR11cqY2y9nZ1+5w3yHGatLrcDnQHxAiEA
vnlEGo8K85u+KwIOimM48ZG8oTk7iFdkqLJR1utT3aU=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

View File

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/pkcs7/sign.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
int main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
X509 *x509;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
PKCS7 *p7;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
BIO *in;
BIO *data,*p7bio;
char buf[1024*4];
int i;
int nodetach=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
EVP_add_digest(EVP_mdc2());
#endif
data=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
again:
if (argc > 1)
{
if (strcmp(argv[1],"-nd") == 0)
{
nodetach=1;
argv++; argc--;
goto again;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(data,argv[1]))
goto err;
}
else
BIO_set_fp(data,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
if ((in=BIO_new_file("server.pem","r")) == NULL) goto err;
if ((x509=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_reset(in);
if ((pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_free(in);
p7=PKCS7_new();
PKCS7_set_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_signed);
si=PKCS7_add_signature(p7,x509,pkey,EVP_sha1());
if (si == NULL) goto err;
/* If you do this then you get signing time automatically added */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT,
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data));
/* we may want to add more */
PKCS7_add_certificate(p7,x509);
/* Set the content of the signed to 'data' */
PKCS7_content_new(p7,NID_pkcs7_data);
if (!nodetach)
PKCS7_set_detached(p7,1);
if ((p7bio=PKCS7_dataInit(p7,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(data,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(p7bio,buf,i);
}
if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7,p7bio)) goto err;
BIO_free(p7bio);
PEM_write_PKCS7(stdout,p7);
PKCS7_free(p7);
exit(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
MIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHA6CAMIACAQAxggHmMIHwAgEAMIGZMIGSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEG
A1UECBMKUXVlZW5zbGFuZDERMA8GA1UEBxMIQnJpc2JhbmUxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUNyeXB0c29m
dCBQdHkgTHRkMSIwIAYDVQQLExlERU1PTlNUUkFUSU9OIEFORCBURVNUSU5HMRswGQYDVQQD
ExJERU1PIFpFUk8gVkFMVUUgQ0ECAgR+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABEC2vXI1xQDW6lUHM3zQ
/9uBEBOO5A3TtkrklAXq7v01gsIC21t52qSk36REXY+slhNZ0OQ349tgkTsoETHFLoEwMIHw
AgEAMIGZMIGSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECBMKUXVlZW5zbGFuZDERMA8GA1UEBxMI
QnJpc2JhbmUxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUNyeXB0c29mdCBQdHkgTHRkMSIwIAYDVQQLExlERU1PTlNU
UkFUSU9OIEFORCBURVNUSU5HMRswGQYDVQQDExJERU1PIFpFUk8gVkFMVUUgQ0ECAgR9MA0G
CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABEB8ujxbabxXUYJhopuDm3oDq4JNqX6Io4p3ro+ShqfIndsXTZ1v5a2N
WtLLCWlHn/habjBwZ/DgQgcKASbZ7QxNMIAGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAaBggqhkiG9w0DAjAOAgIA
oAQIbsL5v1wX98KggAQoAaJ4WHm68fXY1WE5OIjfVBIDpO1K+i8dmKhjnAjrjoyZ9Bwc8rDL
lgQg4CXb805h5xl+GfvSwUaHJayte1m2mcOhs3J2YyqbQ+MEIMIiJQccmhO3oDKm36CFvYR8
5PjpclVcZyX2ngbwPFMnBAgy0clOAE6UKAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
-----END PKCS7-----

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----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-----END PKCS7-----

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
issuer :/C=AU/SP=Queensland/L=Brisbane/O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd/OU=DEMONSTRATION AND TESTING/CN=DEMO ZERO VALUE CA
subject:/C=AU/SP=Queensland/L=Brisbane/O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd/OU=SMIME 003/CN=Information/Email=info@cryptsoft.com
serial :047D
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1149 (0x47d)
Signature Algorithm: md5withRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=AU, SP=Queensland, L=Brisbane, O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd, OU=DEMONSTRATION AND TESTING, CN=DEMO ZERO VALUE CA
Validity
Not Before: May 13 05:40:58 1998 GMT
Not After : May 12 05:40:58 2000 GMT
Subject: C=AU, SP=Queensland, L=Brisbane, O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd, OU=SMIME 003, CN=Information/Email=info@cryptsoft.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Modulus:
00:ad:e7:23:89:ee:0d:87:b7:9c:32:44:4b:95:81:
73:dd:22:80:4b:2d:c5:60:b8:fe:1e:18:63:ef:dc:
89:89:22:df:95:3c:7a:db:3d:9a:06:a8:08:d6:29:
fd:ef:41:09:91:ed:bc:ad:98:f9:f6:28:90:62:6f:
e7:e7:0c:4d:0b
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
Netscape Comment:
Generated with SSLeay
Signature Algorithm: md5withRSAEncryption
52:15:ea:88:f4:f0:f9:0b:ef:ce:d5:f8:83:40:61:16:5e:55:
f9:ce:2d:d1:8b:31:5c:03:c6:2d:10:7c:61:d5:5c:0a:42:97:
d1:fd:65:b6:b6:84:a5:39:ec:46:ec:fc:e0:0d:d9:22:da:1b:
50:74:ad:92:cb:4e:90:e5:fa:7d
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----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-----END PKCS7-----

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
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