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755 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dr. Stephen Henson
94f4166017 Prepare for 1.0.2-beta1 release 2014-02-24 13:51:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a74c9c9e10 OpenSSL 1.0.2 is now in beta 2014-02-24 13:50:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d2a3c4497f make update 2014-02-24 13:50:38 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
a129850922 config: recognize ARMv8/AArch64 target.
(cherry picked from commit d099f0ed6c)
2014-02-24 13:21:14 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c3f5d3d93a Only set current certificate to valid values.
When setting the current certificate check that it has a corresponding
private key.
(cherry picked from commit 358d352aa2)
2014-02-23 13:49:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c5ea65b157 New chain building flags.
New flags to build certificate chains. The can be used to rearrange
the chain so all an application needs to do is add all certificates
in arbitrary order and then build the chain to check and correct them.

Add verify error code when building chain.

Update docs.
(cherry picked from commit 13dc3ce9ab)
2014-02-23 13:49:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
58b86e4235 Option to set current cert to server certificate.
(cherry picked from commit daddd9a950)
2014-02-23 13:49:21 +00:00
Ben Laurie
a466be6243 Fix typo. 2014-02-23 11:21:39 +00:00
Ben Laurie
60327ce41a Add debug flag. 2014-02-23 11:21:28 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
2d4d9623da aes/asm/aesni-x86[_64].pl: minor Atom-specific performance tweak.
(cherry picked from commit 214368ffee)
2014-02-21 12:15:07 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
6b3b6beaa1 ssl/ssl_cert.c: DANE update. 2014-02-21 12:12:25 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7743be3aac make update 2014-02-20 22:57:24 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b709f8ef54 fix WIN32 warnings 2014-02-20 22:41:06 +00:00
Rob Stradling
c74ce24cd2 Show the contents of the RFC6962 Signed Certificate Timestamp List Certificate/OCSP Extensions.
Add the RFC6962 OIDs to the objects table.
(backport from master branch)
2014-02-20 21:43:54 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
612566e752 Don't use CRYPTO_AES_CTR if it isn't defined.
(cherry picked from commit 6ecbc2bb62)
2014-02-18 22:21:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3ecce3dbeb Don't use getcwd in non-copy builds.
(cherry picked from commit f3a3903260)
2014-02-15 20:17:59 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
71eca86c30 Don't override $srcd for non copy builds. 2014-02-15 20:16:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
dd1e3bd8d4 recognise multiblock 2014-02-15 18:19:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c55fef76f7 Add /fixed flag for FIPS links where appropriate. 2014-02-15 17:16:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
eb70d4407f Remove duplicate statement.
(cherry picked from commit 5a7652c3e5)
2014-02-15 01:29:24 +00:00
Klaus-Peter Junghanns
b335b5440a Add support for aes-128/192/256-ctr to the cryptodev engine.
This can be used to speed up SRTP with libsrtp, e.g. on TI omap/sitara based devices.
(cherry picked from commit be2c4d9bd9)
2014-02-15 00:06:43 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
a8eeedb603 Use defaults bits in req when not given
If you use "-newkey rsa" it's supposed to read the default number of bits from the
config file.  However the value isn't used to generate the key, but it does
print it's generating such a key.  The set_keygen_ctx() doesn't call
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits() and you end up with the default set in
pkey_rsa_init() (1024).  Afterwards the number of bits gets read from the config
file, but nothing is done with that anymore.

We now read the config first and use the value from the config file when no size
is given.

PR: 2592
(cherry picked from commit 3343220327)
2014-02-14 22:35:15 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
b3d8de7903 Fix additional pod errors with numbered items.
(cherry picked from commit e547c45f1c)
2014-02-14 22:35:15 +00:00
Scott Schaefer
0413ea5801 Fix various spelling errors
(cherry picked from commit 2b4ffc659e)
2014-02-14 22:35:15 +00:00
Scott Schaefer
2f6fba6772 Document pkcs12 -password behavior
apps/pkcs12.c accepts -password as an argument.  The document author
almost certainly meant to write "-password, -passin".

However, that is not correct, either.  Actually the code treats
-password as equivalent to -passin, EXCEPT when -export is also
specified, in which case -password as equivalent to -passout.
(cherry picked from commit 856c6dfb09)
2014-02-14 22:35:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d69acceca9 Fix error discrepancy with 1.0.1 2014-02-14 17:50:20 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
aff78bb39a ssl/s3_pkt.c: detect RAND_bytes error in multi-block.
(cherry picked from commit 701134320a)
2014-02-14 17:45:33 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
104c032b7b x86[_64]cpuid.pl: add low-level RDSEED.
(cherry picked from commit f4d456408d)
2014-02-14 17:25:14 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
b347341c75 aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl: further optimization for Atom Silvermont.
Improve CBC decrypt and CTR by ~13/16%, which adds up to ~25/33%
improvement over "pre-Silvermont" version. [Add performance table to
aesni-x86.pl].
(cherry picked from commit 5599c7331b)
2014-02-14 17:17:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c00f8d697a Include self-signed flag in certificates by checking SKID/AKID as well
as issuer and subject names. Although this is an incompatible change
it should have little impact in pratice because self-issued certificates
that are not self-signed are rarely encountered.
(cherry picked from commit b1efb7161f)
2014-02-14 15:27:30 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b07e4f2f46 Include TA in checks/callback with partial chains.
When a chain is complete and ends in a trusted root checks are also
performed on the TA and the callback notified with ok==1. For
consistency do the same for chains where the TA is not self signed.
(cherry picked from commit 385b348666)
2014-02-14 15:12:53 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ced6dc5cef Add cert_self_signed function to simplify verify
(from master)
2014-02-14 15:12:52 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf2d129194 Simplify X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain (from master). 2014-02-14 15:12:52 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
d59d0b7c21 ssl/ssl[3].h: retain binary compatibility. 2014-02-13 17:03:14 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
dbd512e1b7 Configure: restore binary compatibility in darwin64-x86_64-cc.
(and remove duplicates).
2014-02-13 15:23:36 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
fcc6f699e3 evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha*.c: improve cache locality.
(cherry picked from commit 9587429fa0)
2014-02-13 14:41:10 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
7078d93307 ghash-x86[_64].pl: ~15% improvement on Atom Silvermont
(other processors unaffected).
(cherry picked from commit 98e143f118)
2014-02-13 14:38:59 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a2317c3ffd fix error discrepancy 2014-02-09 21:12:12 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
75917fac8e Make upate.
Revert libssl ordinals to OpenSSL 1.0.1 values first to tidy up and
avoid entries for deleted functions.
2014-02-09 19:59:54 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
295fd057ce fix error number clash 2014-02-09 19:57:27 +00:00
Ben Laurie
8c4e09f74f Whitespace fixes. 2014-02-09 19:31:07 +00:00
Ben Laurie
e32cbae224 Merge branch '102_stable_tlsext_suppdata_changes' of git://github.com/scottdeboy/openssl into scottdeboy-102_stable_tlsext_suppdata_changes 2014-02-09 19:17:42 +00:00
Scott Deboy
f6fd8db2a4 Restore copyright symbol - ISO-8859-1 encoding for Configure file 2014-02-09 08:26:04 -08:00
Ben Laurie
d65db21976 Const fix. 2014-02-09 08:07:16 -08:00
Ben Laurie
8acf1ff4b4 More cleanup.
(cherry picked from commit 5eda213ebe)
Conflicts:
	apps/s_client.c
	apps/s_server.c
2014-02-09 08:07:04 -08:00
Ben Laurie
8b41df41c2 Make it build.
(cherry picked from commit a6a48e87bc)
Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
	ssl/t1_lib.c
2014-02-09 08:02:40 -08:00
Scott Deboy
c32ebefaa8 Reverting 1.0.2-only changes supporting the prior authz RFC5878-based tests from commit 835d104f46 2014-02-09 07:49:44 -08:00
Ben Laurie
ed0dc93d89 Add new asm modules. 2014-02-09 12:18:16 +00:00
Scott Deboy
5a32dd8930 Don't break out of the custom extension callback loop - continue instead
The contract for custom extension callbacks has changed - all custom extension callbacks are triggered
2014-02-08 16:19:30 -08:00
Ben Laurie
130ebe34c8 Fix whitespace, new-style comments. 2014-02-08 16:19:30 -08:00
Scott Deboy
7612511b3b Re-add alert variables removed during rebase
Whitespace fixes

(cherry picked from commit e9add063b5)
Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c
2014-02-08 16:19:01 -08:00
Scott Deboy
19a28a8aa3 Updating DTCP authorization type to expected value 2014-02-08 16:18:11 -08:00
Scott Deboy
fc213217e8 Update custom TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks to support sending an alert.
If multiple TLS extensions are expected but not received, the TLS extension and supplemental data 'generate' callbacks are the only chance for the receive-side to trigger a specific TLS alert during the handshake.

Removed logic which no-op'd TLS extension generate callbacks (as the generate callbacks need to always be called in order to trigger alerts), and updated the serverinfo-specific custom TLS extension callbacks to track which custom TLS extensions were received by the client, where no-ops for 'generate' callbacks are appropriate.

(cherry picked from commit ac20719d99)
Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c
2014-02-08 16:17:24 -08:00
Trevor Perrin
7198c5af1f Redo deletion of some serverinfo code that supplemental data code mistakenly reinstated. 2014-02-08 16:15:10 -08:00
Scott Deboy
40632f6b77 Free generated supp data after handshake completion, add comment regarding use of num_renegotiations in TLS and supp data generation callbacks
(cherry picked from commit 67c408cee9)
Conflicts:
	apps/s_client.c
	apps/s_server.c
2014-02-08 16:14:23 -08:00
Scott Deboy
038bec784e Add callbacks supporting generation and retrieval of supplemental data entries, facilitating RFC 5878 (TLS auth extensions)
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.

(cherry picked from commit 36086186a9)
Conflicts:
	Configure
	apps/s_client.c
	apps/s_server.c
	ssl/ssl.h
	ssl/ssl3.h
	ssl/ssltest.c
2014-02-08 16:12:15 -08:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f407eec799 make update 2014-02-06 14:31:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bd618bebbe update default depflags 2014-02-06 14:28:49 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
e2884b3e9a Configure: recognize experimental-multiblock.
(cherry picked from commit 2d752737c5)
2014-02-06 14:26:01 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c41e242e5c Return previous compression methods when setting them.
(cherry picked from commit b45e874d7c)
2014-02-06 13:58:18 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
9578319394 ssl/s3_pkt.c: add multi-block processing [from master]. 2014-02-05 21:43:17 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
16eaca2c79 config: recognize little-endian Linux PPC64. 2014-02-05 20:36:11 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3bff195dca Oops, get selection logic right.
(cherry picked from commit 3880579240d476d21f68fd01a391dd325920f479)
2014-02-05 18:57:23 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
41cf2d2518 evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha[1|256].c: add multi-block implementations [from master]. 2014-02-05 19:52:38 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e0d4272a58 Return per-certificate chain if extra chain is NULL.
If an application calls the macro SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
return either the old "shared" extra certificates or those associated
with the current certificate.

This means applications which call SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file
and retrieve the additional chain using SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs
will still work. An application which only wants to check the shared
extra certificates can call the new macro
SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs_only
(cherry picked from commit a51f767645)
2014-02-05 17:06:56 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
41c373fa3e [aesni|sha*]-mb-x86_64.pl: add multi-block assembly modules [from master]. 2014-02-05 14:33:44 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7f6e09b531 Add quotes as CC can contain spaces.
PR#3253
2014-02-03 14:13:04 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e2f06800bc New ctrl to set current certificate.
New ctrl sets current certificate based on certain criteria. Currently
two options: set the first valid certificate as current and set the
next valid certificate as current. Using these an application can
iterate over all certificates in an SSL_CTX or SSL structure.
(cherry picked from commit 0f78819c8c)
2014-02-02 23:12:06 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1180833643 Fix various typos.
(cherry picked from commit f3efeaad54)
2014-02-02 23:12:06 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
130eed01cc Update demo.
(cherry picked from commit 88c21c47a3)
2014-02-02 23:06:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2ded87355f Update demos/bio/README
(cherry picked from commit ea131a0644)
2014-02-02 23:05:52 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b1ae02e2ff Modify sample accept.cnf
(cherry picked from commit d80b0eeee5)
2014-02-02 23:05:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
381417089a Add demo for SSL server using SSL_CONF.
(cherry picked from commit ebd14bfce9)
2014-02-02 23:05:15 +00:00
Ben Laurie
984a30423d Add extension free function. 2014-02-02 15:22:47 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
2ad673c611 engines/e_capi.c: TCHAR support (cumilative update from master). 2014-02-02 00:17:38 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
0693dd954e modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl: +15% performance improvement on z10.
(cherry picked from commit d162584b11)
2014-02-02 00:10:41 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
9071b36d9a Add AES-NI+SHA256 stitch registrations (from master). 2014-02-02 00:05:02 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
eb6af20d2e dso/dso_win32.c: fix compiler warning.
(cherry picked from commit 0a2d5003df)
2014-02-01 23:32:19 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
8087969c5b crypto/cryptlib.c: remove stdio dependency (update from master). 2014-02-01 23:27:49 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
cb437c66d1 camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl: fix symptomless bugs (update from master). 2014-02-01 23:14:33 +01:00
Ben Laurie
40b0d0765e Remove redundant accessor (you can do the same thing, and more, with
X509_ALGOR_[gs]et0()).
2014-02-01 22:03:40 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
41235f30fb util/pl/VC-32.pl fix typo.
(cherry picked from commit fb0a520897)
2014-02-01 22:55:25 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
130c15ef5a util/pl/VC-32.pl: refresh, switch to ws2, add crypt32, fix typo (based on
suggestions from Pierre Delaage).
(cherry picked from commit 668bcfd5ca)

Resolved conflicts:

	util/pl/VC-32.pl
2014-02-01 22:53:24 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
2cc5142fb1 Improve WINCE support.
Submitted by: Pierre Delaage
(cherry picked from commit a006fef78e)

Resolved conflicts:

	crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
	ssl/d1_lib.c
	util/pl/VC-32.pl
2014-02-01 22:48:56 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
d451ece4e7 b_sock.c: make getsockopt work in cases when optlen is 64-bit value.
(cherry picked from commit 80c42f3e0c)
2014-02-01 22:33:02 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
1121ba1b74 wp-mmx.pl: ~10% performance improvement.
(cherry picked from commit ae007d4d09)
2014-02-01 22:27:07 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
1fb039fde2 wp-x86_64.pl: ~10% performance improvement.
(cherry picked from commit 701d593f70)
2014-02-01 22:26:45 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3073927e42 sha512-ia64.pl: 15-20% performance improvement.
(cherry picked from commit 46a2b3387a)
2014-02-01 22:21:57 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
b6c2029931 objxref.pl: improve portability.
(cherry picked from commit 71fa3bc5ec)
2014-02-01 22:17:36 +01:00
Adam Langley
45d010255f Add volatile qualifications to two blocks of inline asm to stop GCC from
eliminating them as dead code.

Both volatile and "memory" are used because of some concern that the compiler
may still cache values across the asm block without it, and because this was
such a painful debugging session that I wanted to ensure that it's never
repeated.
(cherry picked from commit 7753a3a684)
2014-02-01 22:01:46 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
7e569022c5 PPC assembly pack: ppc64-mont update from master. 2014-02-01 21:51:51 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
50f1b47c7f PPC assembly pack: jumbo update from master.
Add Vector Permutation AES and little-endian support.
2014-02-01 21:48:31 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
5572bc4e2f crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86[_64].pl: jumbo update from master. 2014-02-01 21:27:46 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
729d334106 crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl: jumbo update from master. 2014-02-01 21:24:55 +01:00
Ben Laurie
cacdfcb247 Add more accessors. 2014-02-01 18:30:23 +00:00
Ben Laurie
519ad9b384 Add accessor for x509.cert_info. 2014-02-01 18:30:23 +00:00
Ben Laurie
7b2d785d20 Fix warning. 2014-01-29 17:57:32 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f2d678e6e8 Clarify docs.
Remove reference to ERR_TXT_MALLOCED in the error library as that is
only used internally. Indicate that returned error data must not be
freed.
2014-01-29 00:59:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
448e9b7cf1 typo
(cherry picked from commit cb2182676b)
2014-01-28 15:36:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2c4c9867e7 Fix demo comment: 0.9.9 never released.
(cherry picked from commit 717cc85895)
2014-01-28 15:17:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a99540a6de Check i before r[i].
PR#3244
(cherry picked from commit 9614d2c676)
2014-01-28 15:14:47 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9614ed695d Add loaded dynamic ENGINEs to list.
Always add a dynamically loaded ENGINE to list. Otherwise it can cause
problems when multiply loaded, especially if it adds new public key methods.
For all current engines we only want a single implementation anyway.
(cherry picked from commit e933f91f50)
2014-01-28 13:57:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aabfee601e Certificate callback doc.
(cherry picked from commit 46ab9bbd7f)
2014-01-28 13:38:55 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cee1d9e02f make update 2014-01-27 14:59:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
285f7fb0f9 Add cert callback retry test.
(cherry picked from commit 3323314fc1)
2014-01-27 14:41:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ede90b1121 Support retries in certificate callback
(cherry picked from commit 0ebc965b9c)

Conflicts:

	ssl/s3_srvr.c
	ssl/ssl3.h
2014-01-27 14:41:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5e7329d156 Compare encodings in X509_cmp as well as hash.
(cherry picked from commit ec492c8a5a)
2014-01-27 14:33:10 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9f1979b94a New function to set compression methods so they can be safely freed.
(cherry picked from commit cbb6744827)
2014-01-27 14:32:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3fcf327e26 Add -engine_impl option to dgst which will use an implementation of
an algorithm from the supplied engine instead of just the default one.
(cherry picked from commit bb845ee044)
2014-01-23 18:35:42 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3f4742b48c make update 2014-01-23 17:13:37 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c4f01c533b Add new function SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method().
Partial fix for PR#3183.
(cherry picked from commit ba168244a1)
2014-01-16 14:08:42 +00:00
Kaspar Brand
b7a8550988 Omit initial status request callback check.
PR#3178
(cherry picked from commit d0b039d4a3)
2014-01-16 13:48:23 +00:00
Zoltan Arpadffy
e775891708 VMS fixes 2014-01-11 22:44:04 +00:00
Jeff Trawick
ae6fbb5df0 typo
(cherry picked from commit 5edce5685f)
2014-01-10 23:02:46 +00:00
Jeff Trawick
f9c1f03754 typo
(cherry picked from commit 4b64e0cbdb)
2014-01-10 23:02:20 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
50701af9d5 Fix bug in X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL CRL handling.
(cherry picked from commit 8f4077ca69)
2014-01-09 22:53:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1d6af3d430 update NEWS 2014-01-09 22:50:07 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
392fd8f89c bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix compilation error on Solaris.
(cherry picked from commit eedab5241e)
2014-01-09 13:47:53 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
802db0fab2 Sync CHANGES 2014-01-07 15:41:11 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2f972419a3 Add fix for CVE-2013-4353 2014-01-07 15:41:11 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a05a2c67ef Update NEWS. 2014-01-07 15:41:04 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
e34140620e sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl: add NEON code path.
(and shave off cycle even from integer-only code)
(cherry picked from commit ad0d2579cf)
2014-01-04 18:06:36 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
acd9121085 aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl: harmonize [Atom-specific optimizations] with master branch. 2014-01-04 17:42:13 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b17d6b8d1d Restore SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
The flag SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING hasn't done anything since OpenSSL
0.9.7h but deleting it will break source compatibility with any software
that references it. Restore it but #define to zero.
2014-01-04 13:58:51 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b9fa413a08 Use algorithm specific chains for certificates.
Fix a limitation in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): use algorithm
specific chains instead of the shared chain.

Update docs.
(cherry picked from commit a4339ea3ba)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES
2014-01-03 22:45:20 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
4abe148444 ssl/t1_enc.c: optimize PRF (suggested by Intel).
(cherry picked from commit e8b0dd57c0)
2014-01-03 21:56:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
04d6940436 update NEWS 2014-01-02 19:12:47 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8511b5f594 Don't change version number if session established
When sending an invalid version number alert don't change the
version number to the client version if a session is already
established.

Thanks to Marek Majkowski for additional analysis of this issue.

PR#3191
(cherry picked from commit b77b58a398)
2014-01-02 15:07:51 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
546d6760b9 Update curve list size. 2013-12-29 16:30:34 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
ccbb8d5e95 sparcv9cap.c: omit random detection.
PR: 3202
(cherry picked from commit 926725b3d7)
2013-12-28 13:32:45 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
d7d7e7b038 ARM assembly pack: make it work with older toolchain.
(cherry picked from commit 2218c296b4)
2013-12-28 12:18:11 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
80b6d97585 Fix DTLS retransmission from previous session.
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
(cherry picked from commit 34628967f1)
2013-12-20 23:25:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ff64ab32ae Ignore NULL parameter in EVP_MD_CTX_destroy.
(cherry picked from commit a6c62f0c25)
2013-12-20 23:24:26 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
fc9c9e47f7 sha1-x86_64.pl: harmonize Win64 SE handlers for SIMD code pathes.
(and ensure stack alignment in the process)
(cherry picked from commit fc0503a25c)
2013-12-18 22:57:14 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
68e6ac4379 evp/e_[aes|camellia].c: fix typo in CBC subroutine.
It worked because it was never called.
(cherry picked from commit e9c80e04c1)
2013-12-18 22:56:24 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
e34b7e99fd sha512.c: fullfull implicit API contract in SHA512_Transform.
SHA512_Transform was initially added rather as tribute to tradition
than for practucal reasons. But use was recently found in ssl/s3_cbc.c
and it turned to be problematic on platforms that don't tolerate
misasligned references to memory and lack assembly subroutine.
(cherry picked from commit cdd1acd788)
2013-12-18 22:56:00 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a32ba49352 Check EVP errors for handshake digests.
Partial mitigation of PR#3200
(cherry picked from commit 0294b2be5f)
2013-12-18 13:27:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3a0c71541b verify parameter enumeration functions
(cherry picked from commit 9b3d75706e)

Conflicts:

	crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
2013-12-13 15:52:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
adc6bd73e3 Add opaque ID structure.
Move the IP, email and host checking fields from the public
X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure into an opaque X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
structure. By doing this the structure can be modified in future
without risk of breaking any applications.
2013-12-13 15:36:31 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8c6d8c2a49 Backport TLS padding extension from master. 2013-12-13 15:29:26 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
53a8f8c26d Fix for partial chain notification.
For consistency with other cases if we are performing
partial chain verification with just one certificate
notify the callback with ok==1.
2013-12-13 15:29:26 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf4863b3f5 Verify parameter retrieval functions.
New functions to retrieve internal pointers to X509_VERIFY_PARAM
for SSL_CTX and SSL structures.
2013-12-13 15:29:26 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8f68678989 Don't use rdrand engine as default unless explicitly requested. 2013-12-13 15:29:26 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
57c4e42d75 Get FIPS checking logic right.
We need to lock when *not* in FIPS mode.
2013-12-10 12:52:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ff672cf8dd remove obsolete STATUS file 2013-12-10 00:10:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d43b040773 Add release dates to NEWS 2013-12-10 00:08:33 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
422c8c36e5 ARM assembly pack: SHA update from master. 2013-12-09 23:53:42 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
b76310ba74 ARM assembly pack: AES update from master (including bit-sliced module). 2013-12-09 23:44:45 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
c012f6e576 bn/asm/armv4-mont.pl: add NEON code path.
(cherry picked from commit d1671f4f1a)
2013-12-09 22:46:29 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
cf6d55961c crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont*.pl: update from master.
Add MULX/AD*X code paths and optimize even original code path.
2013-12-09 22:40:53 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3aa1b1ccbb x86_64-xlate.pl: fix jrcxz in nasm case.
(cherry picked from commit 667053a2f3)
2013-12-09 22:19:34 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3dcae82fa9 x86_64-xlate.pl: minor update.
(cherry picked from commit 41965a84c4)
2013-12-09 21:53:41 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
86b81ecb73 update $default_depflags 2013-12-08 13:21:02 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c43dc3dd77 Avoid multiple locks in FIPS mode.
PR: 3176.

In FIPS mode ssleay_rand_bytes is only used for PRNG seeding and is
performed in either a single threaded context (when the PRNG is first
initialised) or under a lock (reseeding). To avoid multiple locks disable
use of CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND in FIPS mode in ssleay_rand_bytes.
2013-12-08 13:21:02 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
e5eab8a199 bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: comply with Win64 ABI.
PR: 3189
Submitted by: Oscar Ciurana
(cherry picked from commit c5d5f5bd0f)
2013-12-04 00:02:18 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
7bab6eb6f0 crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl: make it work on Win64.
(cherry picked from commit 8bd7ca9996)
2013-12-03 22:30:00 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
87d9526d0c crypto/bn/rsaz*: fix licensing note.
rsaz_exp.c: harmonize line terminating;
asm/rsaz-*.pl: minor optimizations.
asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl: sync from master.
(cherry picked from commit 31ed9a2131)
2013-12-03 22:17:55 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
36982f056a bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl: fix prototype.
(cherry picked from commit 6efef384c6)
2013-12-03 09:44:24 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c97ec5631b Fix warning. 2013-12-01 23:30:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
fdb0d5dd8f Change header order to pick up OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 2013-12-01 23:29:40 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
81b6dfe40d Recongnise no-dane and no-libunbound 2013-12-01 23:12:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bc35b8e435 make update 2013-12-01 23:09:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6859f3fc12 Fix warnings. 2013-12-01 23:08:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8b2d5cc4a7 WIN32 fixes. 2013-12-01 23:07:18 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
74184b6f21 RSAX no longer compiled. 2013-12-01 23:06:33 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6416aed586 Simplify and update openssl.spec 2013-11-27 15:35:02 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2a1b7bd380 New functions to retrieve certificate from SSL_CTX
New functions to retrieve current certificate or private key
from an SSL_CTX.

Constify SSL_get_private_key().
(cherry picked from commit a25f9adc77)
2013-11-18 18:59:18 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4bba0bda61 Don't define SSL_select_next_proto if OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT set
(cherry picked from commit 60aeb18750)
2013-11-18 18:59:03 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
27baa8317a Use correct header length in ssl3_send_certifcate_request
(cherry picked from commit fdeaf55bf9)
2013-11-17 17:50:11 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1abfa78a8b Constify. 2013-11-14 21:00:40 +00:00
Piotr Sikora
edc687ba0f Fix compilation with no-nextprotoneg.
PR#3106
2013-11-14 01:20:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ff0bdbed85 Allow match selecting of current certificate.
If pointer comparison for current certificate fails check
to see if a match using X509_cmp succeeds for the current
certificate: this is useful for cases where the certificate
pointer is not available.
(cherry picked from commit 6856b288a6e66edd23907b7fa264f42e05ac9fc7)
2013-11-13 23:47:49 +00:00
Rob Stradling
dc4bdf592f Additional "chain_cert" functions.
PR#3169

This patch, which currently applies successfully against master and
1_0_2, adds the following functions:

SSL_[CTX_]select_current_cert() - set the current certificate without
disturbing the existing structure.

SSL_[CTX_]get0_chain_certs() - get the current certificate's chain.

SSL_[CTX_]clear_chain_certs() - clear the current certificate's chain.

The patch also adds these functions to, and fixes some existing errors
in, SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert.pod.
(cherry picked from commit 2f56c9c015dbca45379c9a725915b3b8e765a119)
2013-11-13 23:47:37 +00:00
Krzysztof Kwiatkowski
b03d0513d0 Delete duplicate entry.
PR#3172
(cherry picked from commit 4f055e34c3598cad00fca097d812fa3e6436d967)
2013-11-13 23:47:26 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
0de70011ad srp/srp_grps.h: make it Compaq C-friendly.
PR: 3165
Submitted by: Daniel Richard G.
(cherry picked from commit 2df9ec01d5)
2013-11-12 22:19:40 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
220d1e5353 modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl: update from HEAD.
PR: 3165
2013-11-12 21:59:01 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
ca44f72938 Make Makefiles OSF-make-friendly.
PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit d1cf23ac86)
2013-11-12 21:53:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
18f49508a5 Fix memory leak.
(cherry picked from commit 16bc45ba95)
2013-11-11 23:55:18 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5c50462e1e Typo. 2013-11-11 22:24:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a257865303 Fix for some platforms where "char" is unsigned.
(cherry picked from commit 08b433540416c5bc9a874ba0343e35ba490c65f1)
2013-11-11 22:18:07 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
60adefa610 Makefile.org: make FIPS build work with BSD make. 2013-11-10 23:06:41 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b5dde6bcc6 Check for missing components in RSA_check.
(cherry picked from commit 01be36ef70525e81fc358d2e559bdd0a0d9427a5)
2013-11-09 15:09:22 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
024dbfd44c Document RSAPublicKey_{in,out} options.
(cherry picked from commit 7040d73d22987532faa503630d6616cf2788c975)
2013-11-09 15:09:22 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
233069f8db Add CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signature function.
Add function to retrieve the signature from a CMS_SignerInfo structure:
applications can then read or modify it.
(cherry picked from commit e8df6cec4c09b9a94c4c07abcf0402d31ec82cc1)
2013-11-09 15:09:22 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c76d6922b1 engines/ccgost/gost89.h: make word32 defintion unconditional.
Original definition depended on __LONG_MAX__ that is not guaranteed to
be present. As we don't support platforms with int narrower that 32 bits
it's appropriate to make defition inconditional.

PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit 96180cac04)
2013-11-08 23:10:21 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3241496144 modes/asm/ghash-alpha.pl: make it work with older assembler.
PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit d24d1d7daf)
2013-11-08 23:10:09 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
63fe69c12e Enable PSK in FIPS mode.
Enable PSK ciphersuites with AES or DES3 in FIPS mode.
(cherry picked from commit e0ffd129c1)
2013-11-06 14:39:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a4947e4e06 Initialise context before using it. 2013-11-06 13:16:50 +00:00
Ben Laurie
262f1c524e PBKDF2 should be efficient. Contributed by Christian Heimes
<christian@python.org>.
2013-11-03 17:27:12 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bd80d0229c Add brainpool curves to trace output. 2013-11-02 14:07:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
163d794845 Fix warning.
(cherry picked from commit 96e16bddb4)
2013-11-02 14:02:00 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0b33466b3f Add SSL_CONF command to set DH Parameters.
(cherry picked from commit c557f921dc)
2013-11-02 13:42:03 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bed27f4db3 Fix argument processing.
(cherry picked from commit abf840e4f7)
2013-11-02 13:41:51 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
738a224bd0 Constification.
(cherry picked from commit 27f3b65f49)
2013-11-02 13:41:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
044f8ca87d Extend SSL_CONF
Extend SSL_CONF to return command value types.

Add certificate and key options.

Update documentation.
(cherry picked from commit ec2f7e568e)
2013-11-02 13:41:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
45ee08d99b Typo.
(cherry picked from commit 13af145159)
2013-11-02 13:41:06 +00:00
Piotr Sikora
5ff68e8f6d Fix SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
Don't require a public key in tls1_set_ec_id if compression status is
not needed. This fixes a bug where SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE wouldn't work.
2013-11-01 21:37:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f14a4a861d Add -ecdh_single option.
Add -ecdh_single option to set SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE on the command line.
2013-11-01 21:35:00 +00:00
Robin Seggelmann
f596e3c491 DTLS/SCTP struct authchunks Bug
PR: 2809

DTLS/SCTP requires DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks to be protected with
SCTP-AUTH.  It is checked if this has been activated successfully for
the local and remote peer. Due to a bug, however, the
gauth_number_of_chunks field of the authchunks struct is missing on
FreeBSD, and was therefore not considered in the OpenSSL implementation.
This patch sets the corresponding pointer for the check correctly
whether or not this bug is present.
2013-10-30 14:37:22 +00:00
Robin Seggelmann
9fb523adce DTLS/SCTP Finished Auth Bug
PR: 2808

With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key.  Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
2013-10-30 14:37:22 +00:00
Ben Laurie
cecf4d98d0 Remove unused variable. 2013-10-21 03:34:00 +01:00
Nick Mathewson
070e40e2f5 Fix another gmt_unix_time case in server_random 2013-10-20 15:08:58 -07:00
Nick Mathewson
d757097bbc Do not include a timestamp in the Client/ServerHello Random field.
Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE
is set.

This is a forward-port of commits:
  4af793036f
  f4c93b46ed
  3da721dac9
  2583270191

While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear.  This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:

    * It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.

    * If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
      handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
2013-10-20 15:03:24 -07:00
Steve Marquess
7b112c2766 Remove gratuitous patent references 2013-10-20 22:19:47 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
03ee8c2ed7 Fix no-ssl-trace 2013-10-20 22:07:33 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3495842bb0 Prevent use of RSA+MD5 in TLS 1.2 by default.
Removing RSA+MD5 from the default signature algorithm list
prevents its use by default.

If a broken implementation attempts to use RSA+MD5 anyway the sanity
checking of signature algorithms will cause a fatal alert.
(cherry picked from commit 77a0f740d00ecf8f6b01c0685a2f858c3f65a3dd)
2013-10-20 22:07:33 +01:00
Ben Laurie
face65dab8 Add clang debug target. 2013-10-20 13:23:14 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
e41a49c625 PPC assembly pack: make new .size directives profiler-friendly.
Suggested by: Anton Blanchard
(cherry picked from commit 76c15d790e)
2013-10-15 23:42:18 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3a55a42bff Add brainpool curves to NID table too.
(cherry picked from commit 6699cb8491)
2013-10-15 12:09:54 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
72550c52ed Fix warning.
(cherry picked from commit f6983769c1bcd6c3c6b6bbfbbc41848f6dccf127)
2013-10-15 11:33:58 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a9d0c56de1 Add test vectors from RFC7027
(cherry picked from commit 8ba2d4ed7f128e400693562efd35985068c45e4d)
2013-10-15 11:33:58 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
469bcb0c24 RFC7027 (Brainpool for TLS) support.
(cherry picked from commit 695e8c36528f9c3275f5f56e9633ac6a0c11f2e3)
2013-10-15 11:33:58 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
43ce9cdde9 PPC assembly pack: update from master branch.
Includes multiple updates: AES module to comply with more ABI
flavors, SHA512 for PPC32, .size directives.
2013-10-15 00:31:45 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
011f89893c Add support for Cygwin-x86_64.
PR: 3110
Submitted by Corinna Vinschen.
(cherry picked from commit b3ef742cbb)
2013-10-14 16:59:05 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
958608ca1c Initial aarch64 bits.
(cherry picked from commit 039081b809)
2013-10-13 19:24:22 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
1aecb23f5b MIPS assembly pack: get rid of deprecated instructions.
Latest MIPS ISA specification declared 'branch likely' instructions
obsolete. To makes code future-proof replace them with equivalent.
(cherry picked from commit 0c2adb0a9b)
2013-10-13 13:18:21 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
9ed6fba2b4 aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl: update from master.
Performance improvement and Windows-specific bugfix (PR#3139).
2013-10-12 21:47:54 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
df5c435c0b bn/asm/rsax-avx2.pl: minor optimization [for Decoded ICache].
(cherry picked from commit fa104be35e)
2013-10-10 23:09:54 +02:00
Ben Laurie
1ebaf97c44 Constification. 2013-10-07 12:44:40 +01:00
Ben Laurie
c8c6914aac Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' into pre-aead 2013-10-05 21:20:24 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
c99028f252 evp/e_des3.c: fix typo with potential integer overflow on 32-bit platforms.
Submitted by: Yuriy Kaminskiy
(cherry picked from commit 524b00c0da)
2013-10-05 21:09:50 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
90d8c5862b perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl: make it work even with seasoned perl.
PR: 3130
(cherry picked from commit 6b2cae0c16)
2013-10-05 21:09:39 +01:00
Ben Laurie
2d5dd00f9e Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' into agl-1.0.2aead 2013-10-04 12:59:03 +01:00
Ben Laurie
cb52183836 Tidy. 2013-10-04 12:58:08 +01:00
Ben Laurie
ab3b624b0c Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' into agl-1.0.2aead 2013-10-04 12:48:24 +01:00
Ben Laurie
7c81de9a91 Make it build and test. 2013-10-03 19:02:58 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
4dfac659ff evp/e_des3.c: fix typo with potential integer overflow on 32-bit platforms.
Submitted by: Yuriy Kaminskiy
(cherry picked from commit 524b00c0da)
2013-10-03 10:57:45 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
66e0f9db08 perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl: make it work even with seasoned perl.
PR: 3130
(cherry picked from commit 6b2cae0c16)
2013-10-03 10:45:36 +02:00
Adam Langley
a2eef41993 AEAD Tests.
Add tests for AEAD functions: AES-128-GCM, AES-256-GCM and
ChaCha20+Poly1305.
2013-10-01 15:34:44 -04:00
Adam Langley
9a8646510b chacha20poly1305
Add support for Chacha20 + Poly1305.
2013-10-01 14:59:22 -04:00
Adam Langley
fa03d0117a Use AEAD for AES-GCM.
Switches AES-GCM ciphersuites to use AEAD interfaces.
2013-10-01 13:09:12 -04:00
Adam Langley
03614034e9 AEAD support in ssl/
This change allows AEADs to be used in ssl/ to implement SSL/TLS
ciphersuites.
2013-10-01 12:49:50 -04:00
Adam Langley
444b1d416b AEAD support.
This change adds an AEAD interface to EVP and an AES-GCM implementation
suitable for use in TLS.
2013-10-01 12:30:52 -04:00
Adam Langley
4055ca1f9e Rework tls1_change_cipher_state.
The previous version of the function made adding AEAD changes very
difficult. This change should be a semantic no-op - it should be purely
a cleanup.
2013-10-01 11:31:30 -04:00
Ben Laurie
7a216dfee5 Constification. 2013-10-01 14:51:04 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a78b21fc67 Update cms docs.
(cherry picked from commit dfcb42c68e)
2013-10-01 14:01:19 +01:00
Ben Laurie
a808002bc3 Correctly test for no-ec.
(cherry picked from commit d5605699a1)
2013-10-01 14:01:19 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2fc368c111 Don't run ECDH CMS tests if EC disabled.
(cherry picked from commit b85f8afe37)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6ed3af7d50 Add X9.42 DH test.
(cherry picked from commit bbc098ffb3)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d037e0d30c New CMS tests.
Add some ECDH CMS tests.
(cherry picked from commit 5cdc25a754)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
51cb950904 Add X9.42 DH certificate to S/MIME test
(cherry picked from commit 75787fd833)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4bfa88bb4c Scripts to recreate S/MIME test certificates.
Add a script to generate keys and certificates for the S/MIME and CMS
tests.

Update certificates and add EC examples.
(cherry picked from commit a0957d5505)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9d1e475db6 Custom key wrap option for cms utility.
(cherry picked from commit 5711885a2b)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3e792793f6 add cofactor ECDH support from fips branch
(cherry picked from commit a3a2e3a43d)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Ben Laurie
ac5cb33356 Fix compile errors.
(cherry picked from commit a0aaa5660a)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aaf74259ec CMS RFC2631 X9.42 DH enveloped data support.
(cherry picked from commit bd59f2b91d)

Conflicts:

	crypto/dh/dh.h
	crypto/dh/dh_err.c

Sync error codes with 1.0.1.
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ecf9ceb90d Minor optimisation to KDF algorithm.
Don't need to use temporary buffer if remaining length equals digest length.
(cherry picked from commit 3f6b6f0b8c)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5c4ff8ad37 Add KDF for DH.
Add X9.42 DH KDF. Move sharedinfo generation code to CMS library as the
same structure is used by DH and ECDH.

Move ASN1_OBJECT typedef to ossl_typ.h so it can be picked up by dh headers
without the need to use ASN1.
(cherry picked from commit dc1ce3bc64)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
dc427fc8e2 Return correct enveloped data type in ASN1 methods.
For RSA and DSA keys return an appropriate RecipientInfo type. By setting
CMS_RECIPINFO_NONE for DSA keys an appropriate error is returned if
an attempt is made to use DSA with enveloped data.
(cherry picked from commit 41b920ef01)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e1e6c4dae7 Algorithm parameter support.
Check and set AlgorithmIdenfier parameters for key wrap algorithms.
Currently these just set parameters to NULL.
(cherry picked from commit e61f5d55bc)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1747fd1cc6 Add support for ECDH KARI.
Add support for ECDH in enveloped data. The CMS ctrls for the EC ASN1
method decode/encode the appropriate parameters from the CMS ASN1 data
and send appropriate data to the EC public key method.
(cherry picked from commit 88e20b8584)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a119822b90 Add support for X9.62 KDF.
Add X9.62 KDF to EC EVP_PKEY_METHOD.
(cherry picked from commit 25af7a5dbc)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8c798690ce CMS support for key agreeement recipient info.
Add hooks to support key agreement recipient info type (KARI) using
algorithm specific code in the relevant public key ASN1 method.
(cherry picked from commit 17c2764d2e)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ea6bf26657 Add new CMS tests.
Add new tests to cms-test.pl covering PSS and OAEP.
(cherry picked from commit 32b18e0338)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4a26fd6e3b Add -keyopt option to cms utility.
Add support for custom public key parameters in the cms utility using
the -keyopt switch. Works for -sign and also -encrypt if -recip is used.
(cherry picked from commit 02498cc885)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
dddb38834e Update cms docs.
Document use of -keyopt to use RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP modes.
(cherry picked from commit 4bf4a6501c)
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
af7d6b936b CMS RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS support.
Extend RSA ASN1 method to support CMS PSS signatures for both sign
and verify.

For signing the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are read and the appropriate
CMS structures set up.

For verification the CMS structures are analysed and the corresponding
parameters in the EVP_PKEY_CTX set.

Also add RSA-OAEP support.

For encrypt the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are used.

For decrypt the CMS structure is uses to set the appropriate EVP_PKEY_CTX
parameters.
(cherry picked from commit 0574cadf85)

Also sync error codes with OpenSSL 1.0.1 and add new ones.
2013-10-01 14:01:18 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a64b8786b5 Update to OAEP support.
Add OAEP ctrls to retrieve MD and label. Return errors if
an attempt is made to set or retrieve OAEP parameters when
padding mode is not OAEP.
(cherry picked from commit 211a14f627)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
25f93585a7 Exetended OAEP support.
Extend OAEP support. Generalise the OAEP padding functions to support
arbitrary digests. Extend EVP_PKEY RSA method to handle the new OAEP
padding functions and add ctrls to set the additional parameters.
(cherry picked from commit 271fef0ef3)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0d5a49e150 Add FIPS RSA error code.
Add some RSA error codes used by the FIPS module.
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5c49a98c5e Set CMS EnvelopedData version correctly.
(cherry picked from commit ff7b6ce9db)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
869772ff08 Initialise CMS signature buffer length properly.
(cherry picked from commit e0f7cfda68)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f2edf3181e CMS public key parameter support.
Add support for customisation of CMS handling of signed and enveloped
data from custom public key parameters.

This will provide support for RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP but could also be
applied to other algorithms.
(cherry picked from commit e365352d6a)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d6dc5c506a Add control to retrieve signature MD.
(cherry picked from commit 810639536c)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
eebd5e5dd7 Add new OIDs from RFC5753
Add OIDs for KDF schemes from RFC5753 and add cross references for
each type and the appropriate digest to use.
(cherry picked from commit 6af440ced4)

Conflicts:

	crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
	crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
868b266451 Add new OID to pSpecified from PKCS#1
(cherry picked from commit e423c360fd)

Conflicts:

	crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
	crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3fa23ff0f1 Add FIPS 186-2 DSA parameter generation algorithm.
Backport support for FIPS 186-2 DSA parameter generation from
HEAD. Redirect to FIPS in FIPS mode and workaround prototype error.
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c275fb091e Extend DH parameter generation support.
Add support for DH parameter generation using DSA methods including
FIPS 186-3.
(cherry picked from commit 3909087801)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
90c341c601 Enhance DH dup functions.
Make DHparams_dup work properly with X9.42 DH parameters.
(cherry picked from commit d3cc91eee2)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
52d0e1ca4e If present print j, seed and counter values for DH
(cherry picked from commit c9577ab5ea)

Conflicts:

	crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c6f3386577 EVP support for wrapping algorithms.
Add support for key wrap algorithms via EVP interface.

Generalise AES wrap algorithm and add to modes, making existing
AES wrap algorithm a special case.

Move test code to evptests.txt
(cherry picked from commit 97cf1f6c28)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
cf65a07256 evptests.txt: add XTS test vectors
(cherry picked from commit c9a8e3d1c7)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
051dc9db2b evptests.txt: additional GCM test vectors.
(cherry picked from commit ca303d333b)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Ben Laurie
93a886b45a Fix warnings.
(cherry picked from commit 282a480a35)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ec19082ecc GCM and CCM test support
Add code to support GCM an CCM modes in evp_test. On encrypt this
will compare the expected ciphertext and tag. On decrypt it will
compare the expected plaintext: tag comparison is done internally.

Add a simple CCM test case and convert all tests from crypto/modes/gcm128.c
(cherry picked from commit 15652f9825)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0eff7c7c88 Add CCM ciphers to tables.
(cherry picked from commit 95248de327)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6c4b3514d7 New SP 800-56A compliant version of DH_compute_key().
(cherry picked from commit bc91494e06)
2013-10-01 14:01:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d84cca7447 Typo.
(cherry picked from commit 415ece7301)
2013-10-01 14:01:16 +01:00
Ben Laurie
3a8b23bfd9 Re-add accidentally deleted #endif. 2013-10-01 12:34:44 +01:00
Ben Laurie
63fe322160 Merge remote-tracking branch 'agl/1.0.2alpn' into agl-alpn
Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl3.h
	ssl/t1_lib.c
2013-10-01 12:20:02 +01:00
Ben Laurie
c808798013 Produce PEM we would consume. 2013-09-25 13:55:06 +01:00
Ben Laurie
379f21ce5c Show useful errors. 2013-09-24 23:13:22 +01:00
Ben Laurie
4f3b1b3eb9 Merge remote-tracking branch 'trevp/pempick' into OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable 2013-09-24 12:47:54 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b49df9502e Disable Dual EC DRBG.
Return an error if an attempt is made to enable the Dual EC DRBG: it
is not used by default.
(cherry picked from commit a4870de5aa)
2013-09-22 18:25:58 +01:00
Ben Laurie
4f8a706dc7 Merge remote-tracking branch 'trevp/pemfix' into trev-pem-fix 2013-09-20 15:39:08 -07:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7560f63909 Fix warning. 2013-09-18 15:10:22 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1dfb1b103c DTLS version usage fixes.
Make DTLS behave like TLS when negotiating version: record layer has
DTLS 1.0, message version is 1.2.

Tolerate different version numbers if version hasn't been negotiated
yet.
(cherry picked from commit 40088d8b81)
2013-09-18 13:47:05 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6e1987ca1d DTLS trace support.
Add DTLS record header parsing, different client hello format and add
HelloVerifyRequest message type.

Add code to d1_pkt.c to send message headers to the message callback.
(cherry picked from commit 890f2f8b92)

Conflicts:

	ssl/ssl_locl.h
2013-09-18 13:46:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d307176931 Suite B support for DTLS 1.2
Check for Suite B support using method flags instead of version numbers:
anything supporting TLS 1.2 cipher suites will also support Suite B.

Return an error if an attempt to use DTLS 1.0 is made in Suite B mode.
(cherry picked from commit 4544f0a691)
2013-09-18 13:46:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c391a74266 Always return errors in ssl3_get_client_hello
If we successfully match a cookie don't set return value to 2 as this
results in other error conditions returning 2 as well.

Instead set return value to -2 which can be checked later if everything
else is OK.
(cherry picked from commit c56f5b8edf)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
65a87d3cc3 Dual DTLS version methods.
Add new methods DTLS_*_method() which support both DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 and
pick the highest version the peer supports during negotiation.

As with SSL/TLS options can change this behaviour specifically
SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 and SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2.
(cherry picked from commit c6913eeb76)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b60b9e7afe Enable TLS 1.2 ciphers in DTLS 1.2.
Port TLS 1.2 GCM code to DTLS. Enable use of TLS 1.2 only ciphers when in
DTLS 1.2 mode too.
(cherry picked from commit 4221c0dd30)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
919834dc84 Update fixed DH requirements.
The relaxed signing requirements for fixed DH certificates apply to DTLS 1.2
too.
(cherry picked from commit fbbaaccaca)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
efc17286f8 DTLS 1.2 cached record support.
Add DTLS1.2 support for cached records when computing handshake macs
instead of the MD5+SHA1 case for DTLS < 1.2 (this is a port of the
equivalent TLS 1.2 code to DTLS).
(cherry picked from commit 04fac50045)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
acec5a6244 Provisional DTLS 1.2 support.
Add correct flags for DTLS 1.2, update s_server and s_client to handle
DTLS 1.2 methods.

Currently no support for version negotiation: i.e. if client/server selects
DTLS 1.2 it is that or nothing.
(cherry picked from commit c3b344e36a)

Conflicts:

	apps/s_server.c
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
68039af3e7 Remove versions test from dtls1_buffer_message
Since this is always called from DTLS code it is safe to assume the header
length should be the DTLS value. This avoids the need to check the version
number and should work with any version of DTLS (not just 1.0).
(cherry picked from commit 9cf0f18754)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
da1247d653 Extend DTLS method macros.
Extend DTLS method creation macros to support version numbers and encryption
methods. Update existing code.
(cherry picked from commit cfd298b7ae)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
052d0358f2 Enable various DTLS extensions.
Some TLS extensions were disabled for DTLS. Possibly because they caused
problems with the old duplicated code. Enable them again.
(cherry picked from commit 874a18cfad)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1b6ab411d3 Use enc_flags when deciding protocol variations.
Use the enc_flags field to determine whether we should use explicit IV,
signature algorithms or SHA256 default PRF instead of hard coding which
versions support each requirement.
(cherry picked from commit cbd64894ec)

Conflicts:

	ssl/ssl_locl.h
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d88d98edd3 Use appropriate versions of SSL3_ENC_METHOD
(cherry picked from commit 6de2649a6b)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
741c9959f6 DTLS revision.
Revise DTLS code. There was a *lot* of code duplication in the
DTLS code that generates records. This makes it harder to maintain and
sometimes a TLS update is omitted by accident from the DTLS code.

Specifically almost all of the record generation functions have code like
this:

some_pointer = buffer + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LENGTH;
... Record creation stuff ...
set_handshake_header(ssl, SSL_MT_SOMETHING, message_len);

...

write_handshake_message(ssl);

Where the "Record creation stuff" is identical between SSL/TLS and DTLS or
in some cases has very minor differences.

By adding a few fields to SSL3_ENC to include the header length, some flags
and function pointers for handshake header setting and handshake writing the
code can cope with both cases.

(cherry picked from commit 173e72e64c)
2013-09-18 13:46:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7c23127fde Add functions to set ECDSA_METHOD structure.
Add various functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
structure.
(cherry picked from commit 94c2f77a62)
2013-09-18 01:23:40 +01:00
Bodo Moeller
8b9722a3c0 Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' of openssl.net:openssl into OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable 2013-09-17 09:59:14 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
8c149cfd83 Sync with version from master. 2013-09-17 09:55:27 +02:00
Trevor Perrin
6da498991c Various custom extension fixes.
Force no SSL2 when custom extensions in use.
Don't clear extension state when cert is set.
Clear on renegotiate.

Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c
2013-09-16 18:40:53 +01:00
Rob Stradling
86a66deb7e Update CHANGES. 2013-09-16 14:03:22 +01:00
Rob Stradling
9409e18179 Tidy up comments. 2013-09-16 14:03:21 +01:00
Rob Stradling
6a0b803fc0 Use TLS version supplied by client when fingerprinting Safari. 2013-09-16 14:03:21 +01:00
Rob Stradling
5fa3b54788 Fix compilation with no-ec and/or no-tlsext. 2013-09-16 14:03:21 +01:00
Rob Stradling
07df5018be Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.
2013-09-16 14:03:21 +01:00
Bodo Moeller
1b9a59c36a Sync CHANGES and NEWS files. 2013-09-16 14:54:34 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
8f89c33451 Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' of /usr/local/google/home/bmoeller/openssl/openssl into OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable 2013-09-16 14:51:10 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
485d7d5904 Fix overly lenient comparisons:
- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
      the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
      in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
      which could be misused.)

    - EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
      or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
      equality (not an error).

    Reported by: king cope

(cherry picked from commit 312a46791ab465cfa3bf26764361faed0e5df014)
2013-09-16 14:50:48 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
e3720888c7 Fix overly lenient comparisons:
- EC_GROUP_cmp shouldn't consider curves equal just because
      the curve name is the same. (They really *should* be the same
      in this case, but there's an EC_GROUP_set_curve_name API,
      which could be misused.)

    - EC_POINT_cmp shouldn't return 0 for ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
      or EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS errors because in a cmp API, 0 indicates
      equality (not an error).

    Reported by: king cope

(cherry picked from commit 312a46791ab465cfa3bf26764361faed0e5df014)
2013-09-16 13:06:30 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
d75e384ff8 Extend OPENSSL_ia32cap_P (backport from HEAD). 2013-09-15 22:13:54 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
c340c7a88c crypto/armcap.c: fix typo in rdtsc subroutine.
PR: 3125
Submitted by: Kyle McMartin
(cherry picked from commit 8e52a9063a)
2013-09-15 22:10:49 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9ecf6e93af add -badsig option to corrupt CRL signatures for testing too
(cherry picked from commit 139cd16cc5)
2013-09-14 13:53:44 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a41735288c Add missing code from SSL_CONF backport. 2013-09-14 13:53:44 +01:00
Scott Deboy
8ae78c6bd9 Initialize next_proto in s_server - resolves incorrect attempts to free
Cherry pick of b0d27cb902.
2013-09-13 11:31:39 -04:00
Adam Langley
cb3cec4adf Add tests for ALPN functionality.
Cherry-picked from a898936218.
2013-09-13 11:27:26 -04:00
Adam Langley
b0d6f3c58f Support ALPN.
This change adds support for ALPN[1] in OpenSSL. ALPN is the IETF
blessed version of NPN and we'll be supporting both ALPN and NPN for
some time yet.

Cherry-picked from 6f017a8f9d.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-applayerprotoneg-00
2013-09-13 11:27:22 -04:00
Ben Laurie
0338648426 Constification. 2013-09-10 17:58:44 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
c7dc404188 crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl: minor optimization.
Avoid occasional up to 8% performance drops.
(cherry picked from commit 7a1a12232a)
2013-09-09 21:46:02 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
08853158b6 crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl: minor optimization.
(cherry picked from commit 72a158703b)
2013-09-09 21:42:48 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
74e0187663 Revert "x86cpuid.pl: fix extended feature flags detection."
This reverts commit 514f1a7835.
2013-09-09 21:35:15 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bb4aa95c81 Remove ancient PATENTS section and FAQ reference.
(cherry picked from commit ce4555967e)
2013-09-08 21:25:38 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5117d50b7e Partial path fix.
When verifying a partial path always check to see if the EE certificate
is explicitly trusted: the path could contain other untrusted certificates.
(cherry picked from commit 52073b7675)
2013-09-08 21:25:10 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
593605d3ec Document supported curve functions.
(cherry picked from commit c3eb33763b)
2013-09-03 15:43:59 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c9ea4df8f9 Document -force_pubkey option.
(cherry picked from commit b093a06866bf632a97a9a0286e2d08f69c3cf7dd)
2013-08-21 13:41:17 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
89ff56faf1 Correct ECDSA example.
(cherry picked from commit 3a918ea2bbf4175d9461f81be1403d3781b2c0dc)
2013-08-20 17:30:16 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9855026c43 fix printout of expiry days if -enddate is used in ca
(cherry picked from commit f7ac0ec89d)
2013-08-19 21:55:07 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
904348a492 Time difference functions.
Backport of ASN1_TIME_diff and OPENSSL_gmtime_diff functions from master
branch.
2013-08-19 21:55:07 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aaaa18392d new command line option -stdname to ciphers utility
(cherry picked from commit 51b9115b6d)
2013-08-19 20:25:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8c33e40d2e Add new test option set the version in generated certificates: this
is needed to test some profiles/protocols which reject certificates
with unsupported versions.
(cherry picked from commit df316fd43c)
2013-08-19 18:10:04 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0d04af1e72 option to output corrupted signature in certificates for testing purposes
(cherry picked from commit 96cfba0fb4)
2013-08-19 18:09:44 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8f17495800 update usage messages
(cherry picked from commit 7c8ac50504)
2013-08-19 18:09:26 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
95c1a24853 add -naccept <n> option to s_server to automatically exit after <n> connections
(cherry picked from commit b5cadfb564)
2013-08-19 17:42:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
08374de10f with -rev close connection if client sends "CLOSE"
(cherry picked from commit 685755937a)
2013-08-19 14:14:05 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
506e70a216 Add simple external session cache to s_server. This serialises sessions
just like a "real" server making it easier to trace any problems.

(manually applied from commit 35b0ea4efe)
2013-08-19 14:13:56 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0cca92cdd3 Remove commented out debug line. 2013-08-19 14:13:38 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5b430cfc44 Make no-ec compilation work.
(cherry picked from commit 14536c8c9c)
2013-08-19 14:13:38 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
171c4da568 Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters received
by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated summary of
the connection parameters.
(cherry picked from commit 4f3df8bea2)
2013-08-19 14:13:38 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
04611fb0f1 Add -brief option to s_client and s_server to summarise connection details.
New option -verify_quiet to shut up the verify callback unless there is
an error.

(manually applied from commit 2a7cbe77b3)
2013-08-19 14:13:24 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
df430489cf Add documentation.
Preliminary documentation for chain and verify stores and certificate chain
setting functions.
(cherry picked from commit eeb15452a0)
2013-08-18 13:53:32 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5085e57fb5 Return 1 when setting ECDH auto mode.
(cherry picked from commit 42082eda6f)
2013-08-18 13:53:00 +01:00
Michael Tuexen
75b81247a0 DTLS message_sequence number wrong in rehandshake ServerHello
This fix ensures that
* A HelloRequest is retransmitted if not responded by a ClientHello
* The HelloRequest "consumes" the sequence number 0. The subsequent
ServerHello uses the sequence number 1.
* The client also expects the sequence number of the ServerHello to
be 1 if a HelloRequest was received earlier.
This patch fixes the RFC violation.
(cherry picked from commit b62f4daac0)
2013-08-13 18:55:16 +01:00
Michael Tuexen
2c1a5c1039 DTLS handshake fix.
Reported by: Prashant Jaikumar <rmstar@gmail.com>

Fix handling of application data received before a handshake.
(cherry picked from commit 0c75eeacd3)
2013-08-08 13:31:54 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
71c34b7f2d Fix verify loop with CRL checking.
PR #3090
Reported by: Franck Youssef <fry@open.ch>

If no new reason codes are obtained after checking a CRL exit with an
error to avoid repeatedly checking the same CRL.

This will only happen if verify errors such as invalid CRL scope are
overridden in a callback.
(cherry picked from commit 4b26645c1a)
2013-08-06 16:08:04 +01:00
Kaspar Brand
b0cfaf58ad Fix for PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio.
PR: 3028
Fix bug introduced in PEM_X509_INFO_bio which wouldn't process RSA keys
correctly if they appeared first.
(cherry picked from commit 5ae8d6bcba)
2013-08-06 16:04:52 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
9dc07f04c3 crypto/evp/e_aes.c: fix logical pre-processor bug and formatting.
Bug would emerge when XTS is added to bsaes-armv7.pl. Pointed out by
Ard Biesheuvel of Linaro.
(cherry picked from commit 044f63086051d7542fa9485a1432498c39c4d8fa)
2013-08-03 17:09:37 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
f15c16200b crypto/bn/asm/rsax-x86_64.pl: make it work on Darwin.
(cherry picked from commit fd8ad019e1)
2013-08-03 16:30:40 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
4e09add6f8 crypto/sha/asm/sha*-x86_64.pl: comply with Win64 ABI.
(cherry picked from commit 006784378d)
2013-07-31 23:52:21 +02:00
Trevor
355a6236be Cosmetic touchups. 2013-07-31 16:38:43 +01:00
Ben Laurie
6d7fa9c25c Support new rsaz asm stuff. 2013-07-31 16:37:19 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
82ae22ef4d bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl: Windows-specific fix.
(cherry picked from commit 5c57c69f9e)
2013-07-12 19:01:23 +02:00
Ben Laurie
b56bae5126 s/rsaz_eligible/rsaz_avx2_eligible/.
(cherry picked from commit 852f837f5e)
2013-07-12 18:53:05 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
2d3f31e0a1 sha512-586.pl: fix typo.
Submitted by: Gisle Vanem
(cherry picked from commit 241fba4ea9)
2013-07-10 10:02:34 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
ae74191e38 Remove RSAX engine, superseded by RSAZ module.
(cherry picked from commit f5b132d652)

Conflicts [resloved]:

	Configure
2013-07-05 22:16:10 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
ab8233ab81 Take RSAZ modules into build loop, add glue and engage.
RT: 2582, 2850
(cherry picked from commit ca48ace5c5)

Conflicts:

	Configure
2013-07-05 21:53:05 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
d5572bdc64 Add RSAZ assembly modules.
RT: 2582, 2850
(cherry picked from commit 0b4bb91db6)
2013-07-05 21:49:19 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e3990db59c bn/asm/x86_86-mont.pl: optimize reduction for Intel Core family.
(cherry picked from commit 26e43b48a3)
2013-07-05 21:15:16 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
87d90528ac bn/bn_exp.c: harmonize.
(cherry picked from commit cbce8c4644)
2013-07-05 21:01:51 +02:00
Trevor
e27711cfdd Trying cherrypick:
Add support for arbitrary TLS extensions.

Contributed by Trevor Perrin.

Conflicts:

	CHANGES
	ssl/ssl.h
	ssl/ssltest.c
	test/testssl

Fix compilation due to #endif.

Cherrypicking more stuff.

Cleanup of custom extension stuff.

serverinfo rejects non-empty extensions.

Omit extension if no relevant serverinfo data.

Improve error-handling in serverinfo callback.

Cosmetic cleanups.

s_client documentation.

s_server documentation.

SSL_CTX_serverinfo documentation.

Cleaup -1 and NULL callback handling for custom extensions, add tests.

Cleanup ssl_rsa.c serverinfo code.

Whitespace cleanup.

Improve comments in ssl.h for serverinfo.

Whitespace.

Cosmetic cleanup.

Reject non-zero-len serverinfo extensions.

Whitespace.

Make it build.

Conflicts:

	test/testssl
2013-07-03 11:53:30 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
28c08222c0 config: fix executable format detection on latest FreeBSD.
Submitted by: Bryan Drewery
PR: 3075
(cherry picked from commit c256e69d3f)
2013-06-30 23:59:30 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
8508a80998 bn/bn_exp.c: Solaris-specific fix, T4 MONTMUL relies on alloca.
(cherry picked from commit b74ce8d948)
2013-06-30 23:14:31 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
7850a8bc04 x86_64-xlate.pl: Windows fixes.
(cherry picked from commit a9d14832fd)
2013-06-30 23:14:19 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
fccec89084 aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl: fix typo in Windows SEH.
(cherry picked from commit 42386fdb62)
2013-06-30 23:14:04 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
6c7fa27404 PA-RISC assembler pack: switch to bve in 64-bit builds.
PR: 3074
(cherry picked from commit 02450ec69d)
2013-06-30 23:13:23 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e7f9c08ab8 SPARC T4 DES support: fix typo.
(cherry picked from commit 8ee3c7e676)
2013-06-18 11:07:24 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
03c8441b14 Optimize SPARC T4 MONTMUL support.
Improve RSA sing performance by 20-30% by:
- switching from floating-point to integer conditional moves;
- daisy-chaining sqr-sqr-sqr-sqr-sqr-mul sequences;
- using MONTMUL even during powers table setup;
(cherry picked from commit 4ddacd9921)
2013-06-18 11:07:16 +02:00
Ben Laurie
e887c4187e Backport single makefile from master. 2013-06-13 15:09:48 +01:00
Ben Laurie
933aee6199 Wrong include path. 2013-06-13 13:26:22 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
90e7f983b5 Typo: don't call RAND_cleanup during app startup. 2013-06-12 21:16:31 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
f00962aaf3 aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl: update performance data.
(cherry picked from commit 3b848d3401)
2013-06-10 22:52:06 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
3eccd2e53a aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl: harmonize with latest sha512-x86_64.pl.
(cherry picked from commit 42b9a4177b)
2013-06-10 22:51:55 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
fcd0e61c24 sha1-x86_64.pl: add AVX2+BMI code path.
(cherry picked from commit cd8d7335af)
2013-06-10 22:51:47 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e7a02b24c1 sha512-x86_64.pl: upcoming-Atom-specific optimization.
(cherry picked from commit c7f690c243)
2013-06-10 22:51:31 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
cbe6bb54e6 sha[256|512]-586.pl: add more SIMD code paths.
(cherry picked from commit 32213d8d77)
2013-06-10 22:50:32 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
23966faca4 ghash-x86_64.pl: add Haswell performance data.
(cherry picked from commit b42759158d)
2013-06-10 22:50:23 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
514f1a7835 x86cpuid.pl: fix extended feature flags detection.
(cherry picked from commit 1bc0b68d7b)
2013-06-10 22:49:35 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
af908bc48b Don't use RC2 with PKCS#12 files in FIPS mode.
(cherry picked from commit cdb6c48445)
2013-06-05 15:06:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
233ebcb543 Fix PSS signature printing.
Fix PSS signature printing: consistently use 0x prefix for hex values for
padding length and trailer fields.
(cherry picked from commit deb24ad53147f5a8dd63416224a5edd7bbc0e74a)
2013-06-05 15:06:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
da0c007254 Reencode with X509_CRL_ctx_sign too.
(cherry picked from commit 96940f4f2d0300c033379a87db0ff19e598c6264)
2013-06-05 15:06:02 +01:00
Ben Laurie
01bc7dcafc Header needed for SOCK_STREAM on FreeBSD. 2013-06-04 16:27:05 +01:00
Ben Laurie
83e2ff8c51 Fix missing/incorrect prototype. 2013-06-04 16:17:30 +01:00
Ben Laurie
e3120586fb Missing prototypes. 2013-06-04 15:14:18 +01:00
Ben Laurie
3941aa12f1 Remove added ;. 2013-06-04 15:05:18 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
0c10cf0ad6 crypto/modes: even more strict aliasing fixes [and fix bug in cbc128.c from
previous cbc128.c commit].
2013-06-04 14:31:23 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
62874a5a69 cbc128.c: fix strict aliasing warning. 2013-06-04 14:30:49 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
8c1f9c56fd crypto/bn/bn_exp.c: SPARC portability fix.
(cherry picked from commit b69437e1e5)
2013-06-01 09:59:54 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
75063c1527 aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl: Atom-specific optimization.
(cherry picked from commit 4df2280b4f)
2013-05-25 19:09:47 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
5de583aa91 sha512-x86_64.pl: +16% optimization for Atom.
(and pending AVX2 changes).
(cherry picked from commit 504bbcf3cd)
2013-05-25 19:04:48 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
a0675d8149 vpaes-x86[_64].pl: minor Atom-specific optimization.
(cherry picked from commit 988d11b641)
2013-05-25 18:58:54 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
a7e9ed95ec evp/e_aes.c: engage SPARC T4 AES support [from master]. 2013-05-20 16:36:53 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
615d0edf1f evp/e_aes.c: engage AES-NI GCM stitch. 2013-05-20 16:30:21 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e775755dec evp/evp_err.c: update from master. 2013-05-20 16:16:34 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
a1bf7de5a7 evp/e_camellia.c: engage SPARC T5 Camellia support [from master]. 2013-05-20 16:09:13 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
047c02e8db evp/e_des[3].c: engage SPARC T4 DES support. 2013-05-20 16:08:39 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
c92989d2b7 Add BN support for SPARC VIS3 and T4 [from master]. 2013-05-20 15:48:13 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
039e7875ff md5_locl.h: enable assembly support on SPARC [from master]. 2013-05-20 00:33:09 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
48b7b96bd0 sparcv9cap.c: update from master. 2013-05-20 00:16:18 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
747b7a636a Add MD5 SPARC T4 code from master. 2013-05-20 00:08:15 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
635f56fabd Add SHA SPARC T4 code from master. 2013-05-20 00:04:38 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
c617bc0054 Add Camellia SPARC T4 module from master. 2013-05-19 23:58:54 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
d215724753 Add AES SPARC T4 module from master. 2013-05-19 23:54:34 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
9c1ee1bed5 Add DES SPARC T4 module from master. 2013-05-19 23:51:22 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
14ef63c15e Add perlasm/sparcv9_modes.pl from master. 2013-05-19 23:47:38 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
5a456140c1 des_enc.m4: update from master. 2013-05-19 23:43:12 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
1ff546737b evp/Makefile: fix typo. 2013-05-19 23:11:03 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
56f0b25754 Add EVP glue to AES-NI SHA256 stich [from master]. 2013-05-19 22:35:37 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
b0f78dc018 Add AES-NI SHA256 stitch and take it into build loop [from master]. 2013-05-19 22:23:18 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
1f2d194acf aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 22:18:52 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
aacfb2a2c6 Add AES-NI GCM stich and take it into build loop [from master]. 2013-05-19 22:06:18 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
0ba304dd31 gcm128.c: update from master (add AVX and VIS3 support). 2013-05-19 21:55:30 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
8eb2da5fbb ghash-sparcv9.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:53:14 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
d1896e8ccd ghash-x86_64.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:51:19 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
0edcb7a556 ghash-x86.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:46:03 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
ecc2c5d81a sha512-x86_64.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:36:54 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
441dec8e9f sha512-586.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:36:38 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
4f566c360b sha256-598.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:35:55 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e10cd58090 sha1-x86_64.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:33:04 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
5c8ae6d93e sha1-586.pl: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:32:29 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e72f7677bf crypto/perlasm: update from master. 2013-05-19 21:27:59 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
e815d72b1f RFC6689 support: add missing commit (git noob alert). 2013-05-15 20:41:51 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
ddf918673d ssl/dnssec.c: compilation errors. 2013-05-15 20:38:58 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
8517d0c00d Initial support for RFC6689, a.k.a. DANE.
Note that it initially applies to 1.0.2, and not to HEAD. This is
in order to allow development with existing libunbound installations
that are dependent on OpenSSL 1.0.x. More details in RT.

RT: 3003
2013-05-13 15:36:06 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8659dc73f4 Reencode certificates in X509_sign_ctx.
Reencode certificates in X509_sign_ctx as well as X509_sign.

This was causing a problem in the x509 application when it modified an
existing certificate.
(cherry picked from commit c6d8adb8a4)
2013-05-02 12:24:33 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
07464787a8 crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h: let STRICT_ALIGNMENT be on ARMv7.
While ARMv7 in general is capable of unaligned access, not all instructions
actually are. And trouble is that compiler doesn't seem to differentiate
those capable and incapable of unaligned access. Side effect is that kernel
goes into endless loop retrying same instruction triggering unaligned trap.
Problem was observed in xts128.c and ccm128.c modules. It's possible to
resolve it by using (volatile u32*) casts, but letting STRICT_ALIGNMENT
be feels more appropriate.
(cherry picked from commit 3bdd80521a)
2013-04-13 21:19:16 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e9a3aa9721 Set s->d1 to NULL after freeing it.
(cherry picked from commit 04638f2fc3)
2013-04-08 18:39:52 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a8cc9f1873 Typo.
(cherry picked from commit 0ded2a0689)
2013-03-31 17:43:42 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f25c3c0542 Call RAND_cleanup in openssl application.
(cherry picked from commit 944bc29f90)
2013-03-28 14:29:11 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4e5b9645e8 Make binary curve ASN.1 work in FIPS mode.
Don't check for binary curves by checking methods: the values will
be different in FIPS mode as they are redirected to the validated module
version.
(cherry picked from commit 94782e0e9c)
2013-03-26 16:58:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
04347839ea enhance EC method to support setting curve type when generating keys and add parameter encoding option
(cherry picked from commit 24edfa9df9)
2013-03-20 15:54:05 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e14b8410ca Disable compression for DTLS.
The only standard compression method is stateful and is incompatible with
DTLS.
2013-03-19 13:46:57 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
2a1ab7b438 x86cpuid.pl: make it work with older CPUs.
PR: 3005
(cherry picked from commit 5702e965d7)
2013-03-18 19:50:09 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
dd1e4fbcc0 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c: fix rare bad record mac on AES-NI plaforms.
PR: 3002
(cherry picked from commit 5c60046553)
2013-03-18 19:35:20 +01:00
Michael Tuexen
3f84d34c37 Avoid unnecessary fragmentation.
(cherry picked from commit 80ccc66d7e)
2013-03-18 14:32:59 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d7e429b91d Encode INTEGER correctly.
If an ASN1_INTEGER structure is allocated but not explicitly set encode
it as zero: don't generate an invalid zero length INTEGER.
(cherry picked from commit 1643edc63c)
2013-03-18 14:22:01 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
155ef13c67 Typo.
(cherry picked from commit 1546fb780b)
2013-03-18 13:59:57 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c3466040ec Update ordinals. 2013-03-04 19:28:57 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
2d9be79407 x86_64-gf2m.pl: fix typo.
(cherry picked from commit 342dbbbe4e)
2013-03-01 22:37:53 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
2e4b7eede3 x86_64-gf2m.pl: add missing Windows build fix for #2963.
PR: 3004
(cherry picked from commit 7c43601d44)
2013-03-01 21:57:25 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e1dee801b9 Add function CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt
Add CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt: this function encrypts an existing content
encryption key to match the key in the RecipientInfo structure: this is
useful if a new recpient is added to and existing enveloped data structure.

Add documentation.
(cherry picked from commit e1f1d28f34)
2013-02-26 17:06:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3c53fd892c Fix error codes.
(cherry picked from commit 388aff08dc)
2013-02-26 17:05:39 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c46990b13b Demo code for SSL_CONF API
Two example programs one for command line argument processing and
one for configuration file processing.
(cherry picked from commit 3646578ae7)
2013-02-26 16:34:23 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1510b1f4c2 Update SSL_CONF docs.
Fix some typos and update version number first added: it has now been
backported to OpenSSL 1.0.2.
(cherry picked from commit 4365e4aad9)
2013-02-26 15:29:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f8a69166ed New -force_pubkey option to x509 utility to supply a different public
key to the one in a request. This is useful for cases where the public
key cannot be used for signing e.g. DH.
(cherry picked from commit 43206a2d7c)
2013-02-25 15:25:27 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
b9eef98883 bn_nist.c: work around clang 3.0 bug.
(cherry picked from commit 750398acd8)
2013-02-16 11:37:38 +01:00
Nick Alcock
ae5c1ca377 Fix POD errors to stop make install_docs dying with pod2man 2.5.0+
podlators 2.5.0 has switched to dying on POD syntax errors. This means
that a bunch of long-standing erroneous POD in the openssl documentation
now leads to fatal errors from pod2man, halting installation.

Unfortunately POD constraints mean that you have to sort numeric lists
in ascending order if they start with 1: you cannot do 1, 0, 2 even if
you want 1 to appear first. I've reshuffled such (alas, I wish there
were a better way but I don't know of one).
(cherry picked from commit 5cc2707742)
2013-02-15 19:39:59 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
188ab7df98 cms-test.pl: make it work with not-so-latest perl.
(cherry picked from commit 9c437e2fad)
2013-02-14 16:39:06 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2e3d02fe1a Upate FAQ.
Add description of "allocate and encode" operation for ASN1 routines.

Document how versioning will for after the letter release reaches
y.
(cherry picked from commit 2527b94fec)
2013-02-12 16:05:02 +00:00
David Woodhouse
3a3a1af1da Check DTLS_BAD_VER for version number.
The version check for DTLS1_VERSION was redundant as
DTLS1_VERSION > TLS1_1_VERSION, however we do need to
check for DTLS1_BAD_VER for compatibility.

PR:2984
(cherry picked from commit d980abb22e)
2013-02-12 15:15:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0ced72c608 Fix in ssltest is no-ssl2 configured
(cherry picked from commit cbf9b4aed3)
2013-02-11 18:28:48 +00:00
Lutz Jaenicke
5584a95490 FAQ/README: we are now using Git instead of CVS
(cherry picked from commit f88dbb8385)
2013-02-11 11:33:19 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
a3e66779d3 sparccpuid.S: work around emulator bug on T1.
(cherry picked from commit 3caeef94bd)
2013-02-11 10:41:22 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
919eab8a8b s3_cbc.c: make CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE universal.
(cherry picked from commit f93a41877d)
2013-02-08 21:36:06 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
e9baceab5a s3_cbc.c: get rid of expensive divisions [from master]. 2013-02-08 16:59:26 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
b05561c4b7 ssl/[d1|s3]_pkt.c: harmomize orig_len handling.
(cherry picked from commit 8545f73b89)
2013-02-08 10:40:51 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b7355af421 Fix IV check and padding removal.
Fix the calculation that checks there is enough room in a record
after removing padding and optional explicit IV. (by Steve)

For AEAD remove the correct number of padding bytes (by Andy)
(cherry picked from commit 32cc2479b4)
2013-02-08 10:40:39 +01:00
Adam Langley
0462eedf5e Fix for EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
MD5 should use little endian order. Fortunately the only ciphersuite
affected is EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 (TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5) which
is a rarely used export grade ciphersuite.
(cherry picked from commit f306b87d76)
2013-02-08 10:40:13 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
82425f2c28 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c: align calculated MAC at cache line.
It also ensures that valgring is happy.
(cherry picked from commit 2141e6f30b)
2013-02-08 10:35:02 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
af010edd55 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c: cleanse temporary copy of HMAC secret.
(cherry picked from commit 529d27ea47)
2013-02-06 13:56:15 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
5966f4d973 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c: address the CBC decrypt timing issues.
Address CBC decrypt timing issues and reenable the AESNI+SHA1 stitch.
(cherry picked from commit 125093b59f)
2013-02-06 13:56:15 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
eeb486a5f4 ssl/*: remove SSL3_RECORD->orig_len to restore binary compatibility.
Kludge alert. This is arranged by passing padding length in unused
bits of SSL3_RECORD->type, so that orig_len can be reconstructed.
(cherry picked from commit 8bfd4c659f)
2013-02-06 13:56:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d7f55e76f2 Don't access EVP_MD_CTX internals directly.
(cherry picked from commit 04e45b52ee)
2013-02-06 13:56:14 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
7d9e781a1d s3/s3_cbc.c: allow for compilations with NO_SHA256|512.
(cherry picked from commit d5371324d9)
2013-02-06 13:56:14 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
e0c21a0b6b ssl/s3_cbc.c: md_state alignment portability fix.
RISCs are picky and alignment granted by compiler for md_state can be
insufficient for SHA512.
(cherry picked from commit 36260233e7)
2013-02-06 13:56:14 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
1dfb4b9400 ssl/s3_cbc.c: uint64_t portability fix.
Break dependency on uint64_t. It's possible to declare bits as
unsigned int, because TLS packets are limited in size and 32-bit
value can't overflow.
(cherry picked from commit cab13fc847)
2013-02-06 13:56:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e5cb774323 typo.
(cherry picked from commit 34ab3c8c71)
2013-02-06 13:56:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
73390e6ba5 Add ordinal for CRYPTO_memcmp: since this will affect multiple
branches it needs to be in a "gap".
(cherry picked from commit 81ce0e14e7)
2013-02-06 13:56:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d91d9acc58 Timing fix mitigation for FIPS mode.
We have to use EVP in FIPS mode so we can only partially mitigate
timing differences.

Make an extra call to EVP_DigestSignUpdate to hash additonal blocks
to cover any timing differences caused by removal of padding.
(cherry picked from commit b908e88ec1)
2013-02-06 13:56:13 +00:00
Ben Laurie
820988a0c0 Oops. Add missing file.
(cherry picked from commit 014265eb02)
2013-02-06 13:56:13 +00:00
Ben Laurie
1326a64a33 Update DTLS code to match CBC decoding in TLS.
This change updates the DTLS code to match the constant-time CBC
behaviour in the TLS.
(cherry picked from commit 9f27de170d)
2013-02-06 13:56:13 +00:00
Ben Laurie
e0da2c2ed2 Don't crash when processing a zero-length, TLS >= 1.1 record.
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681)
2013-02-06 13:56:13 +00:00
Ben Laurie
fb0a59cc58 Make CBC decoding constant time.
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.

This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.

In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bcc)
2013-02-06 13:56:12 +00:00
Ben Laurie
f5cd3561ba Add and use a constant-time memcmp.
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a)
2013-02-06 13:56:12 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
115f7fa562 Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' of /home/steve/src/git/openssl into OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable 2013-02-04 15:14:11 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c867d87180 Fix for trace code: SSL3 doesn't include a length value for
encrypted premaster secret value.
(cherry picked from commit ea34a58385)
2013-02-04 15:14:00 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
2a713eadc3 bn_word.c: fix overflow bug in BN_add_word.
(cherry picked from commit 134c00659a)
2013-02-02 22:37:35 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
2e7900b624 x86_64 assembly pack: keep making Windows build more robust.
PR: 2963 and a number of others
(cherry picked from commit 4568182a8b)
2013-02-02 19:56:43 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f8435919a1 Fix warning: lenmax isn't used any more. 2013-01-24 14:08:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1db4354b53 Don't include comp.h in cmd_cd.c if OPENSSL_NO_COMP set 2013-01-23 01:11:05 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
3f233a1e77 x86_64 assembly pack: make Windows build more robust [from master].
PR: 2963 and a number of others
2013-01-22 22:51:29 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
25917e972d TABLE update. 2013-01-22 21:22:20 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
8812a81bdd Configure: update linux-mips* lines [from master]. 2013-01-22 21:21:44 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
b17ffba915 bn/asm/mips.pl: hardwire local call to bn_div_words. 2013-01-22 21:16:02 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3619e34f50 Don't include comp.h if no-comp set. 2013-01-20 01:10:03 +00:00
Ben Laurie
6924686b78 Merge branch 'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable' of openssl.net:openssl into OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable 2013-01-19 18:36:44 +00:00
Ben Laurie
92745f8116 Remove extraneous brackets (clang doesn't like them). 2013-01-19 18:24:00 +00:00
Ben Laurie
17cf9864e0 Add MacOS 64-bit debug target. 2013-01-19 18:23:36 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
5cfefd3ce3 engines/ccgost: GOST fixes [from master].
Submitted by: Dmitry Belyavsky, Seguei Leontiev
PR: 2821
2013-01-19 18:24:03 +01:00
Ben Laurie
9ccc6f4382 Can't check a size_t for < 0. 2013-01-19 15:01:18 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
3c92471723 .gitignore adjustments 2013-01-19 13:31:29 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1a932ae094 -named_curve option handled automatically now. 2013-01-18 15:41:06 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
57912ed329 Add code to download CRLs based on CRLDP extension.
Just a sample, real world applications would have to be cleverer.
2013-01-18 15:38:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e998f8aeb8 cipher is not used in s_server any more. 2013-01-18 15:05:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e318431e54 New option to add CRLs for s_client and s_server. 2013-01-18 14:37:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6a10f38daa initial support for delta CRL generations by diffing two full CRLs 2013-01-17 18:51:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c095078890 Typo (PR2959). 2013-01-17 18:21:54 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c644b83227 constify 2013-01-17 16:35:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
75f535315a New functions to set lookup_crls callback and to retrieve internal X509_STORE
from X509_STORE_CTX.
2013-01-17 16:32:33 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7c283d9e97 add option to get a certificate or CRL from a URL 2013-01-17 16:08:02 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2aa3ef78b6 print out issuer and subject unique identifier fields in certificates 2013-01-16 15:08:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1c0964e87f add wrapper function for certificate download 2013-01-15 18:01:54 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5c8d41be85 Generalise OCSP I/O functions to support dowloading of other ASN1
structures using HTTP. Add wrapper function to handle CRL download.
2013-01-15 18:01:31 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b286640360 Update default dependency flags. 2013-01-15 16:26:04 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
75a8ff9263 make update 2013-01-15 16:24:07 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
50b5966e57 Add support for broken protocol tests (backport from master branch) 2013-01-15 16:18:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8eb4456f93 Make whitespace consistent with master branch. 2013-01-15 15:55:54 +00:00
Ben Laurie
24c45faba0 Fix some clang warnings. 2013-01-13 21:06:36 +00:00
Ben Laurie
010ac38a98 Correct EVP_PKEY_verifyrecover to EVP_PKEY_verify_recover (RT 2955). 2013-01-12 12:51:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1c25ed5dbb In FIPS mode use PKCS#8 format when writing private keys:
traditional format uses MD5 which is prohibited in FIPS mode.
2013-01-07 16:16:43 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf1d32e52a Change default bits to 1024 2013-01-07 16:13:48 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6c86b69729 Add .gitignore from master branch. 2013-01-06 21:34:51 +00:00
Ben Laurie
72dfff2d5e Fix warning. 2013-01-06 21:03:05 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3341b820cc add support for separate verify can chain stores to s_client (backport from HEAD) 2012-12-30 16:27:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ede5f6cf74 add -chain options to s_client (backrpot from HEAD) 2012-12-30 16:17:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
321a9fea75 make no-comp compile 2012-12-30 16:05:03 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2e00f46b51 stop warning when compiling with no-comp 2012-12-30 01:12:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8c3f868983 remove unused cipher functionality from s_client 2012-12-30 00:03:40 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d03cc94f47 Update debug-steve* options. 2012-12-29 23:59:18 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5477ff9ba2 make JPAKE work again, fix memory leaks 2012-12-29 23:58:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
46b11600b0 update ordinals 2012-12-29 14:18:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
15387e4ce0 Delegate command line handling for many common options in s_client/s_server to
the SSL_CONF APIs.

This is complicated a little because the SSL_CTX structure is not available
when the command line is processed: so just check syntax of commands initially
and store them, ready to apply later.

(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-29 14:16:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
49ef33fa34 add SSL_CONF functions and documentation (backport from HEAD) 2012-12-29 13:30:56 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1166323530 Update ordinals. 2012-12-26 23:53:52 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
29113688a1 Portability fix: use BIO_snprintf and pick up strcasecmp alternative
definitions from e_os.h
2012-12-26 23:51:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
44c970746f typo 2012-12-26 22:43:43 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bc200e691c SSL/TLS record tracing code (backport from HEAD). 2012-12-26 22:40:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a08f8d73cc Reject zero length ec point format list.
Give more meaningful error is attempt made to use incorrect curve.

(from HEAD)
2012-12-26 18:26:11 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b52f12b3ba handle point format list retrieval for clients too (from HEAD) 2012-12-26 18:20:07 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
78b5d89ddf Add support for printing out and retrieving EC point formats extension.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 18:13:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b79df62eff return error if Suite B mode is selected and TLS 1.2 can't be used.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 17:39:02 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e3c76874ad set auto ecdh parameter selction for Suite B
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 17:35:02 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4347394a27 add Suite B 128 bit mode offering only combination 2
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 17:34:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
53bb723834 Use client version when deciding which cipher suites to disable.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 17:09:39 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
684a2264c5 Use default point formats extension for server side as well as client
side, if possible.

Don't advertise compressed char2 for SuiteB as it is not supported.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 17:09:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
fde8dc1798 add Suite B verification flags 2012-12-26 16:57:39 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3c87a2bdfa contify
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:49:59 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1520e6c084 Add ctrl and utility functions to retrieve raw cipher list sent by client in
client hello message. Previously this could only be retrieved on an initial
connection and it was impossible to determine the cipher IDs of any uknown
ciphersuites.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:25:06 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2001129f09 new ctrl to retrive value of received temporary key in server key exchange message, print out details in s_client
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:23:36 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a50ecaee56 store and print out message digest peer signed with in TLS 1.2
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:23:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
67d9dcf003 perform sanity checks on server certificate type as soon as it is received instead of waiting until server key exchange
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:22:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
79dcae32ef give more meaningful error if presented with wrong certificate type by server
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:18:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ccf6a19e2d Add three Suite B modes to TLS code, supporting RFC6460.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:17:40 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
28fbbe3b1b Add missing prototype to x509.h 2012-12-26 16:11:10 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8d2dbe6ac0 New function X509_chain_up_ref to dup and up the reference count of
a STACK_OF(X509): replace equivalent functionality in several places
by the equivalent call.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:04:03 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ba8bdea771 add suite B chain validation flags and associated verify errors
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 16:01:31 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3d9916298a Oops, add missing v3nametest.c 2012-12-26 15:59:57 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
87054c4f0e New -valid option to add a certificate to the ca index.txt that is valid and not revoked
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 15:32:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6660baee66 Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
comparison.

Print out results of checks for each candidate chain tested in
s_server/s_client.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 15:27:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
25d4c9254c Abort handshake if signature algorithm used not supported by peer.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 15:27:24 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
44adfeb6c0 check EC tmp key matches preferences
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 15:27:04 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5ff2ef79e6 typo 2012-12-26 15:23:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b762acadeb Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
to test if a chain is correctly configured.

Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 15:21:53 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7d779eefb4 add ssl_locl.h to err header files, rebuild ssl error strings
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 15:09:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
35b7757f9b set ciphers to NULL before calling cert_cb
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:56:40 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
23195e4dcc stop warning
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:56:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b28fbdfa7d New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set masks for any ciphersuites
that are disabled for this session (as opposed to always disabled by
configuration).
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:55:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a897502cd9 Add new ctrl to retrieve client certificate types, print out
details in s_client.

Also add ctrl to set client certificate types. If not used sensible values
will be included based on supported signature algorithms: for example if
we don't include any DSA signing algorithms the DSA certificate type is
omitted.

Fix restriction in old code where certificate types would be truncated
if it exceeded TLS_CT_NUMBER.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:51:37 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8546add692 cert_flags is unsigned
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:48:05 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aa5c5eb4c1 add support for client certificate callbak, fix memory leak
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:47:31 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
731abd3bd7 new function SSL_is_server to which returns 1 is the corresponding SSL context is for a server
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:45:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7531dd18dc no need to check s->server as default_nid is never used for TLS 1.2 client authentication
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:45:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
04c32cddaa Separate client and server permitted signature algorithm support: by default
the permitted signature algorithms for server and client authentication
are the same but it is now possible to set different algorithms for client
authentication only.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:44:56 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
623a5e24cb Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
is required by client or server. An application can decide which
certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
certificate callback: for example you can now clear existing certificates
and specify the whole chain.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:43:51 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bd9fc1d667 New functions to retrieve certificate signatures and signature OID NID.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:31:05 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c550f2e37b Function tls1_check_ec_server_key is now redundant as we make
appropriate checks in tls1_check_chain.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:27:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
484f876235 Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
to have similar checks in it.

Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:26:53 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c70a1fee71 Reorganise supported signature algorithm extension processing.
Only store encoded versions of peer and configured signature algorithms.
Determine shared signature algorithms and cache the result along with NID
equivalents of each algorithm.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:26:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0b362de5f5 Add support for application defined signature algorithms for use with
TLS v1.2. These are sent as an extension for clients and during a certificate
request for servers.

TODO: add support for shared signature algorithms, respect shared algorithms
when deciding which ciphersuites and certificates to permit.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:25:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d312f7be37 Make it possible to delete all certificates from an SSL structure.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:18:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2b5e5c3d08 Revert incompatible OCSP_basic_verify changes.
Make partial chain chekcing work with EE certificates only.
Remove unneeded -trust_other option from tocsp.
(Backport from HEAD)
2012-12-26 14:12:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
708454f010 add missing \n 2012-12-23 18:12:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f1aec4dec3 fix typo 2012-12-21 18:33:53 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1c53a72f17 update/fix tocsp script (from HEAD) 2012-12-20 19:15:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9b157602e0 Backport enhancements to OCSP utility from HEAD:
Support - as a file for standard input or output.

Add -badsig option to generate invalid signatures for testing.

New -rmd option to specify digest to sign OCSP responses with.
2012-12-20 19:06:39 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
67e217c84c revert, missing commit message 2012-12-20 19:01:55 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e6b650df0a oops, revert 2012-12-20 19:01:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7b7b667ddc apps/ocsp.c 2012-12-20 18:59:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
70cd3c6b95 Integrate host, email and IP address checks into X509_verify.
Add new verify options to set checks.

(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-19 15:14:10 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
db05bc512d Return success when the responder is active.
Don't verify our own responses.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-19 15:02:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
45da1efcdb Backport X509 hostname, IP address and email checking code from HEAD. 2012-12-19 15:01:59 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
54a0076e94 Check chain is not NULL before assuming we have a validated chain. The
modification to the OCSP helper purpose breaks normal OCSP verification. It is
no longer needed now we can trust partial chains.
2012-12-19 15:01:32 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
f8cab37bc1 VC-32.pl: fix typo [from HEAD].
Submitted by: Pierre Delaage
2012-12-16 19:40:51 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2e65277695 Use new partial chain flag instead of modifying input parameters.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-12-14 14:31:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9a1f59cd31 New verify flag to return success if we have any certificate in the trusted
store instead of the default which is to return an error if we can't build
the complete chain. [backport from HEAD]
2012-12-14 14:30:46 +00:00
Ben Laurie
4e72220fd6 Documentation improvements by Chris Palmer (Google). 2012-12-14 13:29:17 +00:00
Ben Laurie
d65b8b2162 Backport OCSP fixes. 2012-12-14 12:53:53 +00:00
Ben Laurie
5dca1e338c Document -pubkey option. 2012-12-13 16:16:48 +00:00
Ben Laurie
5f4cf08864 Make verify return errors. 2012-12-13 15:49:15 +00:00
Ben Laurie
2a2e537983 Ignore more. 2012-12-13 12:43:18 +00:00
Ben Laurie
d79fc8da02 Add my 64-bit debug target. 2012-12-12 13:45:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e04ccbc5cc Fix two bugs which affect delta CRL handling:
Use -1 to check all extensions in CRLs.
Always set flag for freshest CRL.
2012-12-06 18:24:47 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
bc946bfb97 aes-s390x.pl: fix XTS bugs in z196-specific code path [from HEAD]. 2012-12-05 17:45:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
38680fa466 check mval for NULL too 2012-12-04 17:26:04 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a902b6bd98 fix leak 2012-12-03 16:33:15 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c5e91a9ae9 aes-s390x.pl: harmonize software-only path [from HEAD]. 2012-12-01 11:09:13 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b5f57f455a PR: 2803
Submitted by: jean-etienne.schwartz@bull.net

In OCSP_basic_varify return an error if X509_STORE_CTX_init fails.
2012-11-29 19:15:27 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
ad00a52f2d Intel compiler support update from HEAD. 2012-11-28 13:12:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e08c7f15b4 change inaccurate error message 2012-11-26 15:47:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7469af4484 reject zero length point format list or supported curves extensions 2012-11-22 14:15:36 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ec76d850af PR: 2908
Submitted by: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>

Fix DH double free if parameter generation fails.
2012-11-21 14:02:30 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cedf19f356 fix leaks 2012-11-20 00:28:22 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1d5f3f4640 correct docs 2012-11-19 20:06:57 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
a060fc3b8e x86_64-gcc.c: resore early clobber constraint [from HEAD].
Submitted by: Florian Weimer
2012-11-19 15:02:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bda5153703 PR: 2880
Submitted by: "Florian Rüchel" <florian.ruechel@ruhr-uni-bochum.de>

Correctly handle local machine keys in the capi ENGINE.
2012-11-18 15:21:12 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6f539399ef add "missing" TLSv1.2 cipher alias 2012-11-15 19:15:07 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
d90bf2ab21 [vp]aes-x86[_64].pl: update from HEAD. 2012-11-12 18:11:17 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
02620cfcd5 Cumulative updates from HEAD. 2012-10-29 22:29:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
74daafaa94 use correct year automatically 2012-10-22 13:03:31 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
aa963813ed linux-ppc: make it more robust [from HEAD]. 2012-10-21 18:25:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9a6aff50ff Don't require tag before ciphertext in AESGCM mode 2012-10-16 22:46:32 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c7d16ac8da aix[64]-cc: get MT support right [from HEAD].
PR: 2896
2012-10-16 08:09:20 +00:00
Bodo Möller
b626f0396c Fix EC_KEY initialization race.
Submitted by: Adam Langley
2012-10-05 20:50:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9d2006d8ed add -trusted_first option and verify flag (backport from HEAD) 2012-09-26 13:50:42 +00:00
Bodo Möller
abf1e32f2f Fix Valgrind warning.
Submitted by: Adam Langley
2012-09-24 19:49:25 +00:00
Richard Levitte
fc1e09bf81 * Configure: make the debug-levitte-linux{elf,noasm} less extreme. 2012-09-24 18:49:07 +00:00
Richard Levitte
451cec33df * ssl/t1_enc.c (tls1_change_cipher_state): Stupid bug. Fortunately in
debugging code that's seldom used.
2012-09-21 13:08:30 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
16c92916c7 Configure: allow for compiler options starting with double dash [from HEAD]. 2012-09-19 21:00:35 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
988037fe18 MIPS assembly pack: jumbo update from HEAD. 2012-09-19 20:59:18 +00:00
Bodo Möller
9a7f80c869 Fix warning.
Submitted by: Chromium Authors
2012-09-17 17:23:43 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
507e5c3a61 e_aes.c: uninitialized variable in aes_ccm_init_key [from HEAD].
PR: 2874
Submitted by: Tomas Mraz
2012-09-15 08:46:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f8b90b5a5d fix memory leak 2012-09-11 13:44:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
dc14441757 Minor enhancement to PR#2836 fix. Instead of modifying SSL_get_certificate
change the current certificate (in s->cert->key) to the one used and then
SSL_get_certificate and SSL_get_privatekey will automatically work.
2012-09-11 13:35:14 +00:00
Ben Laurie
da8512aaff Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the
right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it
returns the certificate actually sent.  See
http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
2012-09-11 12:00:25 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
d46a1a6178 bn_lcl.h: gcc removed support for "h" constraint, which broke inline
assembler [from HEAD].
2012-09-01 13:21:24 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
957c7c0e88 Don't load GOST ENGINE if it is already loaded.
Multiple copies of the ENGINE will cause problems when it is cleaned up as
the methods are stored in static structures which will be overwritten and
freed up more than once.

Set static methods to NULL when the ENGINE is freed so it can be reloaded.
2012-09-01 11:30:35 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
3ebe87473c x86cpuid.pl: hide symbols [backport from x86_64, from HEAD]. 2012-08-29 14:24:18 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
0e05b51fe5 Add linux-x32 target [from HEAD]. 2012-08-29 14:12:10 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c759e453bc PR: 2786
Reported by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>

Treat a NULL value passed to drbg_free_entropy callback as non-op. This
can happen if the call to fips_get_entropy fails.
2012-08-22 22:43:03 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
40ce8fca73 sha1-armv4-large.pl: comply with ABI [from HEAD]. 2012-08-17 19:58:34 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
8e1c33e160 MIPS assembly pack updates from HEAD. 2012-08-17 09:41:30 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
13b0cae256 aes-mips.pl: harmonize with fips module.
PR: 2863
Submitted by: Duane Sand
2012-08-17 09:03:57 +00:00
Bodo Möller
6d78a93b5b Enable message names for TLS 1.1, 1.2 with -msg. 2012-08-16 13:42:37 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
ae92994645 bss_dgram.c: fix compilation failure and warning on Windows with
contemporary SDK [from HEAD].
2012-08-14 09:53:41 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c4aa6b041b gosthash.c: use memmove in circle_xor8, as input pointers can be equal
[from HEAD].

PR: 2858
2012-08-13 16:37:58 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
80158304f0 ./Configure: libcrypto.a can grow to many GB on Solaris 10, because of ar bug
[from HEAD].

PR: 2838
2012-08-13 16:16:24 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
f0a069c1a2 gcm128.c: fix AAD-only case with AAD length not divisible by 16 [from HEAD].
PR: 2859
Submitted by: John Foley
2012-08-13 15:31:10 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5b4b9ce976 Don't ignore (!) reference count in X509_STORE_free. 2012-07-19 12:48:02 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7fbcc2f24a type 2012-07-13 11:17:56 +00:00
Richard Levitte
e4be79a383 Add the missing dh_rfc5114 and evp_cnf. 2012-07-05 13:00:45 +00:00
Richard Levitte
658604473f Added aliases for symbols longer than 31 chars. 2012-07-05 09:08:18 +00:00
Richard Levitte
86bea6455c remove duplicate symbol in crypto/symhacks.h
Have the new names start in column 48, that makes it easy to see when
the 31 character limit is reached (on a 80 column display, do the math)
2012-07-05 08:53:43 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1e4a6e7b7f add missing evp_cnf.c file 2012-07-04 13:14:44 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
fd6a72fa1c crypto/bn/*.h: move PTR_SIZE_INT to private header [from HEAD]. 2012-07-04 08:51:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ccffdb3fdc revert unrelated test code 2012-07-03 20:21:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
74d89b0d93 PR: 2840
Reported by: David McCullough <david_mccullough@mcafee.com>

Restore fips configuration module from 0.9.8.
2012-07-03 20:20:11 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f142a71c3d Fix memory leak.
Always perform nexproto callback argument initialisation in s_server
otherwise we use uninitialised data if -nocert is specified.
2012-07-03 16:37:31 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
5b7af6de43 bn_nist.c: harmonize buf in BN_nist_mod_256 with other mod functions and
compensate for VC buf [from HEAD].

PR: 2837
2012-07-02 14:38:22 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
ae414a0e42 bss_dgram.c: fix typos in Windows code [from HEAD]. 2012-07-01 09:12:03 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a240ea8ab8 don't use pseudo digests for default values of keys 2012-06-27 14:12:01 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
8b654459be x86_64 assembly pack: make it possible to compile with Perl located
on path with spaces [from HEAD].

PR: 2835
2012-06-27 12:48:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
93cf058334 oops, add -debug_decrypt option which was accidenatally left out 2012-06-19 13:39:17 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
3e8b4b5055 bss_dgram.c: add BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG, fix bugs [from HEAD].
PR: 2830, 2833
2012-06-19 12:28:47 +00:00
Ben Laurie
3c56d65a41 Fix memory leak. 2012-06-11 09:23:38 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e51ec51af9 revert more "version skew" changes that break FIPS builds 2012-06-10 23:02:06 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ff1c55e983 Revert "version skew" patches that break FIPS compilation 2012-06-09 23:36:38 +00:00
Ben Laurie
835d104f46 Rearrange and test authz extension. 2012-06-07 13:20:20 +00:00
Ben Laurie
aeba1ef352 Fix memory leak. 2012-06-06 12:58:35 +00:00
Ben Laurie
49e9f751a4 Fix authz parsing. 2012-06-06 12:45:14 +00:00
Ben Laurie
ff46820da6 Version skew reduction. 2012-06-06 12:41:46 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
6fba65e20d x86gas.pl: update from HEAD. 2012-06-04 22:14:25 +00:00
Ben Laurie
68d2cf51bc Reduce version skew: trivia (I hope). 2012-06-03 22:03:37 +00:00
Ben Laurie
19eedffcaf Don't insert in the middle. 2012-05-29 18:58:43 +00:00
Ben Laurie
4e14996e8a Missing from previous commit. 2012-05-29 18:39:32 +00:00
Ben Laurie
8a02a46a5c RFC 5878 support. 2012-05-29 17:27:48 +00:00
Ben Laurie
0de5a0feee Work around macro issue with FreeBSD and gcc 4.6. 2012-05-18 12:40:28 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
4d321e0767 s2_clnt.c: compensate for compiler bug [from HEAD]. 2012-05-16 18:22:15 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
67fda0c12e ppccap.c: assume no features under 32-bit AIX kernel [from HEAD].
PR: 2810
2012-05-16 18:18:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1dded7f7e8 Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
(often lower perfomance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
2012-05-13 18:40:12 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
482f238069 PR: 2813
Reported by: Constantine Sapuntzakis <csapuntz@gmail.com>

Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
2012-05-11 13:53:23 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5e145e54cc PR: 2811
Reported by: Phil Pennock <openssl-dev@spodhuis.org>

Make renegotiation work for TLS 1.2, 1.1 by not using a lower record
version client hello workaround if renegotiating.
2012-05-11 13:33:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
df73e68a43 PR: 2806
Submitted by: PK <runningdoglackey@yahoo.com>

Correct ciphersuite signature algorithm definitions.
2012-05-10 18:25:31 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e7c8483891 Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and
DTLS to fix DoS attack.

Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
2012-05-10 16:03:36 +00:00
Richard Levitte
712d523484 Don't forget to install srtp.h as well 2012-05-10 15:01:26 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
24547c23ca Reported by: Solar Designer of Openwall
Make sure tkeylen is initialised properly when encrypting CMS messages.
2012-05-10 13:44:24 +00:00
Richard Levitte
8baf604a39 Correct environment variable is OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS. 2012-05-04 10:43:24 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
95416ce5b3 ppccpuid.pl: branch hints in OPENSSL_cleanse impact small block performance
of digest algorithms, mosty SHA, on Power7. Mystery of century, why SHA,
why slower algorithm are affected more... [from HEAD].
PR: 2794
Submitted by: Ashley Lai
2012-04-27 20:19:23 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a56f9a612b Don't try to use unvalidated composite ciphers in FIPS mode 2012-04-26 18:51:26 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
0ae89cf32e CHANGES: clarify. 2012-04-26 07:34:09 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
7e0c9630a3 CHANGES: fix typos and clarify. 2012-04-26 07:24:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a6df6702c6 Change value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to avoid clash with SSL_OP_ALL and
OpenSSL 1.0.0. Add CHANGES entry noting the consequences.
2012-04-25 23:06:31 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
f69abd5321 s23_clnt.c: ensure interoperability by maitaining client "version capability"
vector contiguous [from HEAD].
PR: 2802
2012-04-25 22:07:03 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
fe9ce2b7d6 Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Reviewed by: steve
Improved localisation of TLS extension handling and code tidy.
2012-04-24 12:15:17 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
8e7ccf6ff7 objxref.pl: improve portability [from HEAD]. 2012-04-22 21:19:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
51b77c0337 correct error code 2012-04-22 13:31:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
85d179d4eb check correctness of errors before updating them so we don't get bogus errors added 2012-04-22 13:25:41 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
890f5ada82 correct old FAQ answers, sync with HEAD 2012-04-22 13:21:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1cc8410e36 PR: 2239
Submitted by: Dominik Oepen <oepen@informatik.hu-berlin.de>

Add Brainpool curves from RFC5639.

Original patch by Annie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>
2012-04-22 13:11:48 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
6ca7af9ec0 e_rc4_hmac_md5.c: reapply commit#21726, which was erroneously omitted [from 1.0.1].
PR: 2797, 2792
2012-04-20 21:45:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bc2c8efc80 call OPENSSL_init when calling FIPS_mode too 2012-04-20 14:43:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
00bb875240 make ciphers work again for FIPS builds 2012-04-20 00:08:32 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c3cb563d87 e_rc4_hmac_md5.c: last commit was inappropriate for non-x86[_64] platforms
[from HEAD].
PR: 2792
2012-04-19 20:42:24 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d6ef8165bb update date 2012-04-19 16:21:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
564a503b1b Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.

Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)
2012-04-19 16:19:07 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
56eeb1b28c Makefile.org: clear yet another environment variable [from HEAD].
PR: 2793
2012-04-19 06:40:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
068fc255ac only call FIPS_cipherinit in FIPS mode 2012-04-18 22:42:06 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
cc8f2fb917 e_rc4_hmac_md5.c: update from HEAD, fixes crash on legacy Intel CPUs.
PR: 2792
2012-04-18 17:51:26 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b583ebb7dd recognise X9.42 DH certificates on servers 2012-04-18 17:03:45 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f897fe4146 correct error code 2012-04-18 15:17:39 +00:00
Bodo Möller
bb3add20f3 Disable SHA-2 ciphersuites in < TLS 1.2 connections.
(TLS 1.2 clients could end up negotiating these with an OpenSSL server
with TLS 1.2 disabled, which is problematic.)

Submitted by: Adam Langley
2012-04-17 15:21:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
48e0f6667b Additional workaround for PR#2771
If OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH is set then limit the size of client
ciphersuites to this value. A value of 50 should be sufficient.

Document workarounds in CHANGES.
2012-04-17 14:47:14 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
32213fb25a Partial workaround for PR#2771.
Some servers hang when presented with a client hello record length exceeding
255 bytes but will work with longer client hellos if the TLS record version
in client hello does not exceed TLS v1.0. Unfortunately this doesn't fix all
cases...
2012-04-17 13:20:37 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
f6a1939f0f OPENSSL_NO_SOCK fixes [from HEAD].
PR: 2791
Submitted by: Ben Noordhuis
2012-04-16 17:43:02 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
94c666479d Minor compatibility fixes [from HEAD].
PR: 2790
Submitted by: Alexei Khlebnikov
2012-04-16 17:35:48 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
09f17419a6 s3_srvr.c: fix typo [from HEAD].
PR: 2538
2012-04-15 17:23:54 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
eb8a65db16 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c: handle zero-length payload and engage empty frag
countermeasure [from HEAD].

PR: 2778
2012-04-15 14:23:26 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
e6255a7d1e s390x asm pack: fix typos. 2012-04-12 06:46:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
65a0f68484 Add options to set additional type specific certificate chains to
s_server.
2012-04-11 16:54:07 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e1a7db8fdd use different variable for chain iteration 2012-04-11 16:01:20 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
65331f225a oops, macro not present in OpenSSL 1.0.2 2012-04-11 15:10:48 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
64e8dc7981 fix reset fix 2012-04-11 15:05:33 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
737fe7ea29 make reinitialisation work for CMAC 2012-04-11 12:26:27 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b344a826ad update rather ancient EVP digest documentation 2012-04-10 22:28:13 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
bc0f56d6d7 aes-s390x.pl: fix crash in AES_set_decrypt_key in linux32-s390x build [from HEAD]. 2012-04-09 15:12:30 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3a89e9f106 update year 2012-04-07 22:14:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
79e75e04ea recognise DECLARE_PEM_write_const, update ordinals
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-07 20:48:12 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c3cb069108 transparently handle X9.42 DH parameters
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-07 20:42:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cdb41713a4 Document RFC5114 "generation" options.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-07 20:42:17 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
491734eb21 Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format to handle
RFC5114 parameters and X9.42 DH public and private keys.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-07 20:22:11 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4e891a191d branches: 1.2.2;
Correct some parameter values.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-07 17:41:51 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b73a69a9c2 Update DH_check() to peform sensible checks when q parameter is present.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-07 17:40:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e811eff5a9 Add RFC5114 DH parameters to OpenSSL. Add test data to dhtest.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-07 12:19:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1d0c47fd55 Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
Localize client hello extension parsing in t1_lib.c
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 20:16:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e46c807e4f Add support for automatic ECDH temporary key parameter selection. When
enabled instead of requiring an application to hard code a (possibly
inappropriate) parameter set and delve into EC internals we just
automatically use the preferred curve.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 20:15:50 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c132ca95c0 Tidy up EC parameter check code: instead of accessing internal structures
add utility functions to t1_lib.c to check if EC certificates and parameters
are consistent with peer.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 20:14:53 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6b870763ac Initial revision of ECC extension handling.
Tidy some code up.

Don't allocate a structure to handle ECC extensions when it is used for
default values.

Make supported curves configurable.

Add ctrls to retrieve shared curves: not fully integrated with rest of
ECC code yet.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 20:12:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5505818199 New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and curves and
extensions to s_client and s_server to print out retrieved valued.

Extend CERT structure to cache supported signature algorithm data.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 19:29:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7493bcc659 initialise i if n == 0
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 17:36:40 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a068a1d0e3 Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 17:35:01 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
37b16c84bb Add support for distinct certificate chains per key type and per SSL
structure.

Before this the only way to add a custom chain was in the parent SSL_CTX
(which is shared by all key types and SSL structures) or rely on auto
chain building (which is performed on each handshake) from the trust store.
(backport from HEAD)
2012-04-06 17:22:48 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0ac89e8f54 Backport: code tidy (from HEAD) 2012-04-06 12:02:43 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7e65b21a24 Backport: Revise ssl code to use CERT_PKEY structure when outputting a certificate chain (from HEAD) 2012-04-06 12:00:24 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
736d69750d Backport: tidy/enhance certificate chain output code (from HEAD) 2012-04-06 11:58:17 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0cb9dbed4e Backport: allow key agreement in SSL/TLS certificates (from HEAD) 2012-04-06 11:36:35 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6cfccfec33 Backport: initialise dh_clnt (from HEAD) 2012-04-06 11:35:45 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c523eb98d1 Backport DH client certificate support (from HEAD) 2012-04-06 11:34:42 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0ffa49970b Backport support for fixed DH ciphersuites (from HEAD) 2012-04-06 11:33:12 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
8cd2ea552e aes-armv4.pl: make it more foolproof [inspired by aes-s390x.pl in 1.0.1]. 2012-04-05 08:32:08 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
3f0becbf75 aes-s390x.pl: fix endless loop in linux32-s390x build [from 1.0.1]. 2012-04-05 08:17:47 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
1b0ae81f4a ssl/ssl_ciph.c: interim solution for assertion in d1_pkt.c(444) [from HEAD].
PR: 2778
2012-04-04 20:50:58 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
54543b954c CHANGES: harmonize with 1.0.0 and 1.0.1. 2012-03-31 18:56:07 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
5e2187f7ee PR: 2778(part)
Submitted by: John Fitzgibbon <john_fitzgibbon@yahoo.com>

Time is always encoded as 4 bytes, not sizeof(Time).
2012-03-31 18:02:53 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
7b087bf4a9 modes_lcl.h: make it work on i386 [from HEAD].
PR: 2780
2012-03-31 17:03:43 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
9df9c9d102 vpaes-x86[_64].pl: handle zero length in vpaes_cbc_encrypt [from HEAD].
PR: 2775
2012-03-31 16:55:34 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
7e8b5493a4 util/cygwin.sh update [from HEAD].
PR: 2761
Submitted by: Corinna Vinschen
2012-03-31 11:07:09 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
265863c6a4 bn/bn_gf2m.c: make new BN_GF2m_mod_inv work with BN_DEBUG_RAND [from HEAD]. 2012-03-30 17:41:00 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
2fee1e0666 ans1/tasn_prn.c: avoid bool in variable names [from HEAD].
PR: 2776
2012-03-29 19:11:59 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
b4ff166cbc perlasm/x86masm.pl: fix last fix [from HEAD]. 2012-03-29 19:11:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
861a0722c2 fix leak 2012-03-22 16:28:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b1cef8d984 Submitted by: Markus Friedl <mfriedl@gmail.com>
Fix memory leaks in 'goto err' cases.
2012-03-22 15:43:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b911523977 set version to 1.0.2-dev 2012-03-22 15:29:21 +00:00
cvs2svn
247c3f6049 This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch
'OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable'.
2012-03-21 21:32:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bd5770c6b1 file evp_cnf.c was added on branch OpenSSL_1_0_2-stable on 2012-07-04 13:14:44 +0000 2007-04-08 17:50:58 +00:00
614 changed files with 72130 additions and 11604 deletions

82
.gitignore vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
# Object files
*.o
# editor artefacts
*.swp
.#*
#*#
*~
# Top level excludes
/Makefile.bak
/Makefile
/MINFO
/*.a
/include
/*.pc
/rehash.time
/inc.*
/makefile.*
/out.*
/tmp.*
# Most *.c files under test/ are symlinks
/test/*.c
# Apart from these
!/test/asn1test.c
!/test/methtest.c
!/test/dummytest.c
!/test/igetest.c
!/test/r160test.c
!/test/fips_algvs.c
/test/*.ss
/test/*.srl
/test/.rnd
/test/test*.pem
/test/newkey.pem
# Certificate symbolic links
*.0
# Links under apps
/apps/CA.pl
/apps/md4.c
# Auto generated headers
/crypto/buildinf.h
/crypto/opensslconf.h
# Auto generated assembly language source files
*.s
!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s
!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s
# Executables
/apps/openssl
/test/sha256t
/test/sha512t
/test/*test
/test/fips_aesavs
/test/fips_desmovs
/test/fips_dhvs
/test/fips_drbgvs
/test/fips_dssvs
/test/fips_ecdhvs
/test/fips_ecdsavs
/test/fips_rngvs
/test/fips_test_suite
*.so*
*.dylib*
*.dll*
# Exceptions
!/test/bctest
!/crypto/des/times/486-50.sol
# Misc auto generated files
/tools/c_rehash
/test/evptests.txt
lib
Makefile.save
*.bak

590
CHANGES
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,444 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
[Steve Henson]
*) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-02
Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
is at least 512 bytes long.
To enable it use an unused extension number (for example chrome uses
35655) using:
e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_padding=35655
Since the extension is ignored the actual number doesn't matter as long
as it doesn't clash with any existing extension.
This will be updated when the extension gets an official number.
[Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
*) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add callbacks supporting generation and retrieval of supplemental
data entries.
[Scott Deboy <sdeboy@apache.org>, Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie]
*) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
algorithms and include tests cases.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
structure.
[Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson]
*) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
[Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
*) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
summary of the connection parameters.
[Steve Henson]
*) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
of connection parameters.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
[Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
*) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
from CRLDP extension in certificates.
[Steve Henson]
*) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
[Steve Henson]
*) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
[Steve Henson]
*) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
[Steve Henson]
*) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
certificates.
[Steve Henson]
*) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
CRLs using the OCSP API.
[Steve Henson]
*) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
[Steve Henson]
*) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
configuration using configuration files or command lines.
[Steve Henson]
*) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
"enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
tracing.
[Steve Henson]
*) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
[Steve Henson]
*) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
OID NID.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
client to OpenSSL.
[Steve Henson]
*) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
[Steve Henson]
*) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
[Steve Henson]
*) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
comparison.
[Steve Henson]
*) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
use the certificate.
[Steve Henson]
*) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
to test if a chain is correctly configured.
Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
[Steve Henson]
*) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
[Steve Henson]
*) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
supported signature algorithms.
[Steve Henson]
*) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
is required by client or server. An application can decide which
certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
certificate and specify the whole chain.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
to have similar checks in it.
Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
[Steve Henson]
*) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
shared signature algorithms.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
to support them.
[Steve Henson]
*) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
it couldn't be removed.
[Steve Henson]
*) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
functions. Add manual page.
[Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
*) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
a certificate.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix OCSP checking.
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]
*) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
utility) or reject.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
[Steve Henson]
*) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
platform support for Linux and Android.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) RFC 5878 (TLS Authorization Extensions) support.
[Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)]
*) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
(often lower perfomance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
[Steve Henson]
*) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
the new parameter format automatically.
[Steve Henson]
*) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
[Steve Henson]
*) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
[Steve Henson]
*) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
to set list of supported curves.
[Steve Henson]
*) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and
supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
to print out received values.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
[Steve Henson]
*) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
[Steve Henson]
*) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
[Steve Henson]
*) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
certificates.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
*) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
(CVE-2013-4353)
*) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
[Steve Henson]
*) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
[Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
*) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
[Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
<wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
(CVE-2012-2686)
[Adam Langley]
*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]
*) Make openssl verify return errors.
[Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
*) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
if renegotiating.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
*) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
approved.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
*) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
[Steve Henson]
*) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
client side.
[Andy Polyakov]
Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
*) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
[Adam Langley]
*) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
record length exceeds 255 bytes.
1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
-DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
Most broken servers should now work.
3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
[Andy Polyakov]
Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]
*) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
@@ -285,7 +723,75 @@
Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]
*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
[NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
an MMA defence is not necessary.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
@@ -1264,6 +1770,86 @@
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
[Steve Henson]
*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
so it returns the certificate actually sent.
See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
(This is a backport)
[Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
*) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
[Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
(CVE-2012-2110)
[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
an MMA defence is not necessary.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
@@ -1271,7 +1857,7 @@
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension

102
Configure
View File

@@ -128,19 +128,19 @@ my $x86_asm="x86cpuid.o:bn-586.o co-586.o x86-mont.o x86-gf2m.o:des-586.o crypt5
my $x86_elf_asm="$x86_asm:elf";
my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o modexp512-x86_64.o::aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o:::wp-x86_64.o:cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o:ghash-x86_64.o:";
my $x86_64_asm="x86_64cpuid.o:x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o x86_64-mont5.o x86_64-gf2m.o rsaz_exp.o rsaz-x86_64.o rsaz-avx2.o::aes-x86_64.o vpaes-x86_64.o bsaes-x86_64.o aesni-x86_64.o aesni-sha1-x86_64.o aesni-sha256-x86_64.o aesni-mb-x86_64.o::md5-x86_64.o:sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o sha1-mb-x86_64.o sha256-mb-x86_64.o::rc4-x86_64.o rc4-md5-x86_64.o:::wp-x86_64.o:cmll-x86_64.o cmll_misc.o:ghash-x86_64.o aesni-gcm-x86_64.o:";
my $ia64_asm="ia64cpuid.o:bn-ia64.o ia64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ia64.o::md5-ia64.o:sha1-ia64.o sha256-ia64.o sha512-ia64.o::rc4-ia64.o rc4_skey.o:::::ghash-ia64.o::void";
my $sparcv9_asm="sparcv9cap.o sparccpuid.o:bn-sparcv9.o sparcv9-mont.o sparcv9a-mont.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-sparcv9.o:::sha1-sparcv9.o sha256-sparcv9.o sha512-sparcv9.o:::::::ghash-sparcv9.o::void";
my $sparcv9_asm="sparcv9cap.o sparccpuid.o:bn-sparcv9.o sparcv9-mont.o sparcv9a-mont.o vis3-mont.o sparct4-mont.o sparcv9-gf2m.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o dest4-sparcv9.o:aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-sparcv9.o aest4-sparcv9.o::md5-sparcv9.o:sha1-sparcv9.o sha256-sparcv9.o sha512-sparcv9.o::::::camellia.o cmll_misc.o cmll_cbc.o cmllt4-sparcv9.o:ghash-sparcv9.o::void";
my $sparcv8_asm=":sparcv8.o:des_enc-sparc.o fcrypt_b.o:::::::::::::void";
my $alpha_asm="alphacpuid.o:bn_asm.o alpha-mont.o:::::sha1-alpha.o:::::::ghash-alpha.o::void";
my $mips32_asm=":bn-mips.o::aes_cbc.o aes-mips.o:::sha1-mips.o sha256-mips.o::::::::";
my $mips64_asm=":bn-mips.o mips-mont.o::aes_cbc.o aes-mips.o:::sha1-mips.o sha256-mips.o sha512-mips.o::::::::";
my $mips32_asm=$mips64_asm; $mips32_asm =~ s/\s*sha512\-mips\.o//;
my $s390x_asm="s390xcap.o s390xcpuid.o:bn-s390x.o s390x-mont.o s390x-gf2m.o::aes-s390x.o aes-ctr.o aes-xts.o:::sha1-s390x.o sha256-s390x.o sha512-s390x.o::rc4-s390x.o:::::ghash-s390x.o:";
my $armv4_asm="armcap.o armv4cpuid.o:bn_asm.o armv4-mont.o armv4-gf2m.o::aes_cbc.o aes-armv4.o:::sha1-armv4-large.o sha256-armv4.o sha512-armv4.o:::::::ghash-armv4.o::void";
my $armv4_asm="armcap.o armv4cpuid.o:bn_asm.o armv4-mont.o armv4-gf2m.o::aes_cbc.o aes-armv4.o bsaes-armv7.o:::sha1-armv4-large.o sha256-armv4.o sha512-armv4.o:::::::ghash-armv4.o::void";
my $parisc11_asm="pariscid.o:bn_asm.o parisc-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::32";
my $parisc20_asm="pariscid.o:pa-risc2W.o parisc-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o:::sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o::rc4-parisc.o:::::ghash-parisc.o::64";
my $ppc32_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o::::::::";
my $ppc64_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o sha512-ppc.o::::::::";
my $ppc64_asm="ppccpuid.o ppccap.o:bn-ppc.o ppc-mont.o ppc64-mont.o::aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-ppc.o vpaes-ppc.o:::sha1-ppc.o sha256-ppc.o sha512-ppc.o::::::::";
my $ppc32_asm=$ppc64_asm;
my $no_asm=":::::::::::::::void";
# As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags,
@@ -171,20 +171,23 @@ my %table=(
"debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
"debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
"debug-ben-debug", "gcc44:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-ben-debug-64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-ben-macos", "cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -arch i386 -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::-Wl,-search_paths_first::::",
"debug-ben-macos-gcc46", "gcc-mp-4.6:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wconversion -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -g3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-ben-darwin64","cc:$gcc_devteam_warn -g -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
"debug-ben-debug-64-clang", "clang:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -Wno-error=extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-ben-no-opt", "gcc: -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -Werror -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -Wall -g3::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-ben-strict", "gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
"debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"debug-bodo", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -Wno-overlength-strings -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-geoff32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-geoff64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
@@ -243,7 +246,7 @@ my %table=(
"solaris-sparcv7-cc","cc:-xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-xarch=v8 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):/usr/ccs/bin/ar rs::/64",
"solaris64-sparcv9-cc","cc:-xtarget=ultra -xarch=v9 -xO5 -xstrconst -xdepend -Xa -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-xarch=v9 -G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/64",
####
"debug-solaris-sparcv8-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xarch=v8 -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv8_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"debug-solaris-sparcv9-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -xtarget=ultra -xarch=v8plus -g -O -xstrconst -Xa -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT:ULTRASPARC:-lsocket -lnsl -ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${sparcv9_asm}:dlfcn:solaris-shared:-KPIC:-G -dy -z text:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -348,17 +351,26 @@ my %table=(
# It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march.
# If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one!
"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
# Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support,
# if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below
# refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and
# MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness.
"linux-mips32", "gcc:-mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
"linux64-mips64", "gcc:-mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
#### IA-32 targets...
"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
####
"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
#### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
# "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
@@ -405,6 +417,7 @@ my %table=(
"android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"android-x86","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:".eval{my $asm=${x86_elf_asm};$asm=~s/:elf/:android/;$asm}.":dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"android-armv7","gcc:-march=armv7-a -mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"android-mips","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
#### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
"BSD-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -464,8 +477,8 @@ my %table=(
"aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
# Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
# at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
"aix-cc", "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc32_asm}:aix32:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR:${ppc64_asm}:aix64:dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
#
# Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)
@@ -547,6 +560,7 @@ my %table=(
# Cygwin
"Cygwin-pre1.3", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -m486 -Wall::(unknown):CYGWIN32::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
"Cygwin", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -fomit-frame-pointer -O3 -march=i486 -Wall:::CYGWIN32::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:coff:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a",
"Cygwin-x86_64", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall:::CYGWIN32::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:mingw64:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a",
"debug-Cygwin", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:dlfcn:cygwin-shared:-D_WINDLL:-shared:.dll.a",
# NetWare from David Ward (dsward@novell.com)
@@ -579,7 +593,8 @@ my %table=(
"darwin64-ppc-cc","cc:-arch ppc64 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc64_asm}:osx64:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch ppc64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
"darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:".eval{my $asm=$x86_asm;$asm=~s/cast\-586\.o//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
"debug-darwin-i386-cc","cc:-arch i386 -g3 -DL_ENDIAN::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_INT RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${x86_asm}:macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch i386 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
"darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
"debug-darwin64-x86_64-cc","cc:-arch x86_64 -ggdb -g2 -O0 -DL_ENDIAN -Wall::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/rc4\-[^:]+//;$asm}.":macosx:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-arch x86_64 -dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
"debug-darwin-ppc-cc","cc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DB_ENDIAN -g -Wall -O::-D_REENTRANT:MACOSX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${ppc32_asm}:osx32:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
# iPhoneOS/iOS
"iphoneos-cross","llvm-gcc:-O3 -isysroot \$(CROSS_TOP)/SDKs/\$(CROSS_SDK) -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-common::-D_REENTRANT:iOS:-Wl,-search_paths_first%:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:darwin-shared:-fPIC -fno-common:-dynamiclib:.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR).dylib",
@@ -709,14 +724,18 @@ if (exists $ENV{FIPSDIR})
# All of the following is disabled by default (RC5 was enabled before 0.9.8):
my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental"]
"dane" => "experimental",
"ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default",
"gmp" => "default",
"jpake" => "experimental",
"libunbound" => "experimental",
"md2" => "default",
"multiblock" => "experimental",
"rc5" => "default",
"rfc3779" => "default",
"sctp" => "default",
"shared" => "default",
"ssl-trace" => "default",
"store" => "experimental",
"zlib" => "default",
"zlib-dynamic" => "default"
@@ -725,7 +744,7 @@ my @experimental = ();
# This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults
# (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"):
my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE";
my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_DANE -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_LIBUNBOUND -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE";
# Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
# To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental).
@@ -865,16 +884,7 @@ PROCESS_ARGS:
}
elsif (/^[-+]/)
{
if (/^-[lL](.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/)
{
$libs.=$_." ";
}
elsif (/^-[^-]/ or /^\+/)
{
$_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
$flags.=$_." ";
}
elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
{
$prefix=$1;
}
@@ -918,10 +928,14 @@ PROCESS_ARGS:
{
$cross_compile_prefix=$1;
}
else
elsif (/^-[lL](.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/)
{
print STDERR $usage;
exit(1);
$libs.=$_." ";
}
else # common if (/^[-+]/), just pass down...
{
$_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei;
$flags.=$_." ";
}
}
elsif ($_ =~ /^([^:]+):(.+)$/)
@@ -1201,6 +1215,12 @@ if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$cc --target-help 2>&1` !~ m/\-mno\-cygwin/m)
$shared_ldflag =~ s/\-mno\-cygwin\s*//;
}
if ($target =~ /linux.*\-mips/ && !$no_asm && $flags !~ /\-m(ips|arch=)/) {
# minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules
$cflags="-mips2 $cflags" if ($target =~ /mips32/);
$cflags="-mips3 $cflags" if ($target =~ /mips64/);
}
my $no_shared_warn=0;
my $no_user_cflags=0;
@@ -1408,6 +1428,7 @@ if ($target =~ /\-icc$/) # Intel C compiler
}
if ($iccver>=8)
{
$cflags=~s/\-KPIC/-fPIC/;
# Eliminate unnecessary dependency from libirc.a. This is
# essential for shared library support, as otherwise
# apps/openssl can end up in endless loop upon startup...
@@ -1415,12 +1436,17 @@ if ($target =~ /\-icc$/) # Intel C compiler
}
if ($iccver>=9)
{
$cflags.=" -i-static";
$cflags=~s/\-no_cpprt/-no-cpprt/;
$lflags.=" -i-static";
$lflags=~s/\-no_cpprt/-no-cpprt/;
}
if ($iccver>=10)
{
$cflags=~s/\-i\-static/-static-intel/;
$lflags=~s/\-i\-static/-static-intel/;
}
if ($iccver>=11)
{
$cflags.=" -no-intel-extensions"; # disable Cilk
$lflags=~s/\-no\-cpprt/-no-cxxlib/;
}
}
@@ -1983,7 +2009,7 @@ BEGIN
VALUE "ProductVersion", "$version\\0"
// Optional:
//VALUE "Comments", "\\0"
VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright <20> 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright <20> 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
VALUE "LegalCopyright", "Copyright <EFBFBD> 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. Copyright <20> 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson. All rights reserved.\\0"
//VALUE "LegalTrademarks", "\\0"
//VALUE "PrivateBuild", "\\0"
//VALUE "SpecialBuild", "\\0"

62
FAQ
View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions
* Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
* What is an 'engine' version?
* How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
* How does the versioning scheme work?
[LEGAL] Legal questions
@@ -82,11 +83,11 @@ OpenSSL - Frequently Asked Questions
* Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
OpenSSL 1.0.1 was released on Mar 14th, 2012.
OpenSSL 1.0.1a was released on Apr 19th, 2012.
In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous CVS access.
ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous Git access.
* Where is the documentation?
@@ -108,7 +109,9 @@ In addition, you can read the most current versions at
<URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using.
that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
directory.
For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
@@ -173,14 +176,31 @@ just do:
pgp TARBALL.asc
* How does the versioning scheme work?
After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter
releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no
new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and
can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to
the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor
binary compatibility is guaranteed.
Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be
backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear
in the next minor release.
* What happens when the letter release reaches z?
It was decided after the release of OpenSSL 0.9.8y the next version should
be 0.9.8za then 0.9.8zb and so on.
[LEGAL] =======================================================================
* Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
The patents section of the README file lists patents that may apply to
you if you want to use OpenSSL. For information on intellectual
property rights, please consult a lawyer. The OpenSSL team does not
offer legal advice.
For information on intellectual property rights, please consult a lawyer.
The OpenSSL team does not offer legal advice.
You can configure OpenSSL so as not to use IDEA, MDC2 and RC5 by using
./config no-idea no-mdc2 no-rc5
@@ -284,7 +304,7 @@ current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check
out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate
extensions documentation (currently in doc/openssl.txt).
extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) )
* Why can't I create certificate requests?
@@ -597,8 +617,8 @@ valid for the current DOS session.
* What is special about OpenSSL on Redhat?
Red Hat Linux (release 7.0 and later) include a preinstalled limited
version of OpenSSL. For patent reasons, support for IDEA, RC5 and MDC2
is disabled in this version. The same may apply to other Linux distributions.
version of OpenSSL. Red Hat has chosen to disable support for IDEA, RC5 and
MDC2 in this version. The same may apply to other Linux distributions.
Users may therefore wish to install more or all of the features left out.
To do this you MUST ensure that you do not overwrite the openssl that is in
@@ -621,11 +641,6 @@ relevant updates in packages up to and including 0.9.6b.
A possible way around this is to persuade Red Hat to produce a non-US
version of Red Hat Linux.
FYI: Patent numbers and expiry dates of US patents:
MDC-2: 4,908,861 13/03/2007
IDEA: 5,214,703 25/05/2010
RC5: 5,724,428 03/03/2015
* Why does the OpenSSL compilation fail on MacOS X?
@@ -848,7 +863,7 @@ The opposite assumes we already have len bytes in buf:
p = buf;
p7 = d2i_PKCS7(NULL, &p, len);
At this point p7 contains a valid PKCS7 structure of NULL if an error
At this point p7 contains a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error
occurred. If an error occurred ERR_print_errors(bio) should give more
information.
@@ -860,6 +875,21 @@ that has been read or written. This may well be uninitialized data
and attempts to free the buffer will have unpredictable results
because it no longer points to the same address.
Memory allocation and encoding can also be combined in a single
operation by the ASN1 routines:
unsigned char *buf = NULL; /* mandatory */
int len;
len = i2d_PKCS7(p7, &buf);
if (len < 0)
/* Error */
/* Do some things with 'buf' */
/* Finished with buf: free it */
OPENSSL_free(buf);
In this special case the "buf" parameter is *not* incremented, it points
to the start of the encoding.
* OpenSSL uses DER but I need BER format: does OpenSSL support BER?

8
GitConfigure Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/sh
BRANCH=`git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD`
./Configure $@ no-symlinks
make files
util/mk1mf.pl OUT=out.$BRANCH TMP=tmp.$BRANCH INC=inc.$BRANCH copy > makefile.$BRANCH
make -f makefile.$BRANCH init

5
GitMake Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
#!/bin/sh
BRANCH=`git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD`
make -f makefile.$BRANCH $@

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
is required if you intend to utilize assembler modules. Note that NASM
is now the only supported assembler.
If you are compiling from a tarball or a CVS snapshot then the Win32 files
If you are compiling from a tarball or a Git snapshot then the Win32 files
may well be not up to date. This may mean that some "tweaking" is required to
get it all to work. See the trouble shooting section later on for if (when?)
it goes wrong.
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
then ms\do_XXX should not give a warning any more. However the numbers that
get assigned by this technique may not match those that eventually get
assigned in the CVS tree: so anything linked against this version of the
assigned in the Git tree: so anything linked against this version of the
library may need to be recompiled.
If you get errors about unresolved symbols there are several possible

View File

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
$${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \
$${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \
$${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \
$${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} \
$${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} $${SCRIPTS+SCRIPTS} \
$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT)
FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=$(FIPSDIR)/bin/fipsld; \
export CC FIPSLD_CC FIPSLD_LIBCRYPTO; \
fi; \
$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto build-shared; \
$(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS=crypto CC="$${CC:-$(CC)}" build-shared; \
touch -c fips_premain_dso$(EXE_EXT); \
else \
echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \
exit 1; \
@@ -325,7 +326,7 @@ clean-shared:
done; \
fi; \
( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \
if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \
if expr "$(PLATFORM)" : "Cygwin" >/dev/null; then \
( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \
fi; \
done
@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ rehash.time: certs apps
[ -x "apps/openssl.exe" ] && OPENSSL="apps/openssl.exe" || :; \
OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \
export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \
$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs) && \
$(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs/demo) && \
touch rehash.time; \
else :; fi
@@ -469,9 +470,9 @@ tags:
find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a
errors:
$(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
$(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write
(cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors)
$(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl -strict */*.c */*/*.c
stacks:
$(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write
@@ -570,7 +571,7 @@ install_sw:
do \
if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \
( echo installing $$i; \
if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \
if ! expr "$(PLATFORM)" : "Cygwin" >/dev/null; then \
cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \
mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \
@@ -642,9 +643,9 @@ install_docs:
@pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
here="`pwd`"; \
filecase=; \
if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \
case "$(PLATFORM)" in DJGPP|Cygwin*|mingw*) \
filecase=-i; \
fi; \
esac; \
set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \
fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \
sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \

215
NEWS
View File

@@ -5,7 +5,54 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [under development]:
o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
o Support for DTLS 1.2
o TLS automatic EC curve selection.
o API to set TLS supported signature algorithms and curves
o SSL_CONF configuration API.
o TLS Brainpool support.
o ALPN support.
o CMS support for RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP, ECDH and X9.42 DH.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values
o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353
o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449
o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]:
o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]:
o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version.
o Include the fips configuration module.
o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]:
o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]:
o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms.
o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode.
o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos.
o Fix SEGV in AES code.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]:
o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
o SCTP support.
@@ -18,17 +65,30 @@
o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
o SRP support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0j and OpenSSL 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]:
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0i and OpenSSL 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]:
o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]:
o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
o Various DTLS fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
@@ -36,7 +96,7 @@
o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]:
o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207
o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210
@@ -44,11 +104,11 @@
o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms.
o Various DTLS fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
@@ -56,18 +116,18 @@
o Fix various platform compilation issues.
o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
o Fix for CVE-2010-2939
o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633.
o GOST MAC and CFB fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]:
o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.
o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.
@@ -90,20 +150,55 @@
o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
o Various DTLS fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
o Various DTLS fixes.
@@ -111,12 +206,12 @@
o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
o CFB cipher definition fixes.
o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
o Cipher definition fixes.
o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
@@ -128,33 +223,33 @@
o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
o Many fixes to DTLS handling.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
o Fix various build issues.
o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
o Various precautionary measures.
o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
o Add gcc 4.2 support.
o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
@@ -165,23 +260,23 @@
o RFC4507bis support.
o TLS Extensions support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
o RFC3779 support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
o New cipher Camellia
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
o Cipher string fixes.
o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
@@ -191,12 +286,12 @@
o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
o Extended Windows CE support
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This
@@ -270,36 +365,36 @@
o Added initial support for Win64.
o Added alternate pkg-config files.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940)
o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
o More compilation issues fixed.
o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
@@ -308,7 +403,7 @@
o More constification.
o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
o Several compilation issues fixed.
o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
@@ -316,12 +411,12 @@
o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
o Performance improvements.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
@@ -329,14 +424,14 @@
o Multiple X509 verification fixes
o Speed up HMAC and other operations
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichbacher's attack
@@ -347,7 +442,7 @@
o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
o Documentation: fixes and additions.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
@@ -358,7 +453,7 @@
o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
o New library section OCSP.
o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
@@ -404,23 +499,23 @@
o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichbacher's attack
o Security: make RSA blinding default.
o Build: shared library support fixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
o Important security related bugfixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
@@ -434,25 +529,25 @@
o Fixes for smaller building problems.
o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
o Important building fixes on Unix.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
o Various important bugfixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
o Important security related bugfixes.
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
o BIGNUM library fixes.
@@ -465,7 +560,7 @@
Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
[in 0.9.6c-engine release].
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
@@ -482,7 +577,7 @@
o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
environment variables when running as root.
@@ -507,7 +602,7 @@
o New function BN_rand_range().
o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
@@ -522,7 +617,7 @@
[1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
distribution. See the file README.ENGINE.
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8
o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
@@ -531,7 +626,7 @@
o New 'rand' application
o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
@@ -567,7 +662,7 @@
o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
o Experimental MacOS support
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
@@ -578,7 +673,7 @@
o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
o RSA OEAP related fixes
o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
@@ -592,7 +687,7 @@
o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
o Option to disable selected ciphers
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b:
Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
@@ -614,7 +709,7 @@
o Lots of memory leak fixes.
o Lots of bug fixes.
Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c:
Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality

View File

@@ -197,3 +197,17 @@ reconfigure with additional no-sse2 [or 386] option passed to ./config.
We don't have framework to associate -ldl with no-dso, therefore the only
way is to edit Makefile right after ./config no-dso and remove -ldl from
EX_LIBS line.
* hpux-parisc2-cc no-asm build fails with SEGV in ECDSA/DH.
Compiler bug, presumably at particular patch level. Remaining
hpux*-parisc*-cc configurations can be affected too. Drop optimization
level to +O2 when compiling bn_nist.o.
* solaris64-sparcv9-cc link failure
Solaris 8 ar can fail to maintain symbol table in .a, which results in
link failures. Apply 109147-09 or later or modify Makefile generated
by ./Configure solaris64-sparcv9-cc and replace RANLIB assignment with
RANLIB= /usr/ccs/bin/ar rs

30
README
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 Mar 2012
OpenSSL 1.0.2-beta1 24 Feb 2014
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -90,32 +90,6 @@
SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
PATENTS
-------
Various companies hold various patents for various algorithms in various
locations around the world. _YOU_ are responsible for ensuring that your use
of any algorithms is legal by checking if there are any patents in your
country. The file contains some of the patents that we know about or are
rumored to exist. This is not a definitive list.
RSA Security holds software patents on the RC5 algorithm. If you
intend to use this cipher, you must contact RSA Security for
licensing conditions. Their web page is http://www.rsasecurity.com/.
RC4 is a trademark of RSA Security, so use of this label should perhaps
only be used with RSA Security's permission.
The IDEA algorithm is patented by Ascom in Austria, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA. They
should be contacted if that algorithm is to be used; their web page is
http://www.ascom.ch/.
NTT and Mitsubishi have patents and pending patents on the Camellia
algorithm, but allow use at no charge without requiring an explicit
licensing agreement: http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html
INSTALLATION
------------
@@ -190,7 +164,7 @@
reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
current CVS or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable

155
STATUS
View File

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
OpenSSL STATUS Last modified at
______________ $Date: 2012/03/14 12:14:06 $
DEVELOPMENT STATE
o OpenSSL 1.1.0: Under development...
o OpenSSL 1.0.1: Released on March 14th, 2012
o OpenSSL 1.0.0h: Released on March 12th, 2012
o OpenSSL 1.0.0g: Released on January 18th, 2012
o OpenSSL 1.0.0f: Released on January 4th, 2012
o OpenSSL 1.0.0e: Released on September 6th, 2011
o OpenSSL 1.0.0d: Released on February 8nd, 2011
o OpenSSL 1.0.0c: Released on December 2nd, 2010
o OpenSSL 1.0.0b: Released on November 16th, 2010
o OpenSSL 1.0.0a: Released on June 1st, 2010
o OpenSSL 1.0.0: Released on March 29th, 2010
o OpenSSL 0.9.8u: Released on March 12th, 2012
o OpenSSL 0.9.8t: Released on January 18th, 2012
o OpenSSL 0.9.8s: Released on January 4th, 2012
o OpenSSL 0.9.8r: Released on February 8nd, 2011
o OpenSSL 0.9.8q: Released on December 2nd, 2010
o OpenSSL 0.9.8p: Released on November 16th, 2010
o OpenSSL 0.9.8o: Released on June 1st, 2010
o OpenSSL 0.9.8n: Released on March 24th, 2010
o OpenSSL 0.9.8m: Released on February 25th, 2010
o OpenSSL 0.9.8l: Released on November 5th, 2009
o OpenSSL 0.9.8k: Released on March 25th, 2009
o OpenSSL 0.9.8j: Released on January 7th, 2009
o OpenSSL 0.9.8i: Released on September 15th, 2008
o OpenSSL 0.9.8h: Released on May 28th, 2008
o OpenSSL 0.9.8g: Released on October 19th, 2007
o OpenSSL 0.9.8f: Released on October 11th, 2007
o OpenSSL 0.9.8e: Released on February 23rd, 2007
o OpenSSL 0.9.8d: Released on September 28th, 2006
o OpenSSL 0.9.8c: Released on September 5th, 2006
o OpenSSL 0.9.8b: Released on May 4th, 2006
o OpenSSL 0.9.8a: Released on October 11th, 2005
o OpenSSL 0.9.8: Released on July 5th, 2005
o OpenSSL 0.9.7m: Released on February 23rd, 2007
o OpenSSL 0.9.7l: Released on September 28th, 2006
o OpenSSL 0.9.7k: Released on September 5th, 2006
o OpenSSL 0.9.7j: Released on May 4th, 2006
o OpenSSL 0.9.7i: Released on October 14th, 2005
o OpenSSL 0.9.7h: Released on October 11th, 2005
o OpenSSL 0.9.7g: Released on April 11th, 2005
o OpenSSL 0.9.7f: Released on March 22nd, 2005
o OpenSSL 0.9.7e: Released on October 25th, 2004
o OpenSSL 0.9.7d: Released on March 17th, 2004
o OpenSSL 0.9.7c: Released on September 30th, 2003
o OpenSSL 0.9.7b: Released on April 10th, 2003
o OpenSSL 0.9.7a: Released on February 19th, 2003
o OpenSSL 0.9.7: Released on December 31st, 2002
o OpenSSL 0.9.6m: Released on March 17th, 2004
o OpenSSL 0.9.6l: Released on November 4th, 2003
o OpenSSL 0.9.6k: Released on September 30th, 2003
o OpenSSL 0.9.6j: Released on April 10th, 2003
o OpenSSL 0.9.6i: Released on February 19th, 2003
o OpenSSL 0.9.6h: Released on December 5th, 2002
o OpenSSL 0.9.6g: Released on August 9th, 2002
o OpenSSL 0.9.6f: Released on August 8th, 2002
o OpenSSL 0.9.6e: Released on July 30th, 2002
o OpenSSL 0.9.6d: Released on May 9th, 2002
o OpenSSL 0.9.6c: Released on December 21st, 2001
o OpenSSL 0.9.6b: Released on July 9th, 2001
o OpenSSL 0.9.6a: Released on April 5th, 2001
o OpenSSL 0.9.6: Released on September 24th, 2000
o OpenSSL 0.9.5a: Released on April 1st, 2000
o OpenSSL 0.9.5: Released on February 28th, 2000
o OpenSSL 0.9.4: Released on August 09th, 1999
o OpenSSL 0.9.3a: Released on May 29th, 1999
o OpenSSL 0.9.3: Released on May 25th, 1999
o OpenSSL 0.9.2b: Released on March 22th, 1999
o OpenSSL 0.9.1c: Released on December 23th, 1998
[See also http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html]
RELEASE SHOWSTOPPERS
o The Makefiles fail with some SysV makes.
o
AVAILABLE PATCHES
o
IN PROGRESS
o Steve is currently working on (in no particular order):
ASN1 code redesign, butchery, replacement.
OCSP
EVP cipher enhancement.
Enhanced certificate chain verification.
Private key, certificate and CRL API and implementation.
Developing and bugfixing PKCS#7 (S/MIME code).
Various X509 issues: character sets, certificate request extensions.
o Richard is currently working on:
Constification
Attribute Certificate support
Certificate Pair support
Storage Engines (primarly an LDAP storage engine)
Certificate chain validation with full RFC 3280 compatibility
NEEDS PATCH
o 0.9.8-dev: COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT do not
handle ECCdraft cipher suites correctly.
o apps/ca.c: "Sign the certificate?" - "n" creates empty certificate file
o "OpenSSL STATUS" is never up-to-date.
OPEN ISSUES
o The Makefile hierarchy and build mechanism is still not a round thing:
1. The config vs. Configure scripts
It's the same nasty situation as for Apache with APACI vs.
src/Configure. It confuses.
Suggestion: Merge Configure and config into a single configure
script with a Autoconf style interface ;-) and remove
Configure and config. Or even let us use GNU Autoconf
itself. Then we can avoid a lot of those platform checks
which are currently in Configure.
o Support for Shared Libraries has to be added at least
for the major Unix platforms. The details we can rip from the stuff
Ralf has done for the Apache src/Configure script. Ben wants the
solution to be really simple.
Status: Ralf will look how we can easily incorporate the
compiler PIC and linker DSO flags from Apache
into the OpenSSL Configure script.
Ulf: +1 for using GNU autoconf and libtool (but not automake,
which apparently is not flexible enough to generate
libcrypto)
WISHES
o Add variants of DH_generate_parameters() and BN_generate_prime() [etc?]
where the callback function can request that the function be aborted.
[Gregory Stark <ghstark@pobox.com>, <rayyang2000@yahoo.com>]
o SRP in TLS.
[wished by:
Dj <derek@yo.net>, Tom Wu <tom@arcot.com>,
Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>]
See http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-srp-00.txt
as well as http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/srp/.
Tom Holroyd tells us there is a SRP patch for OpenSSH at
http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/, that could
be useful.

683
TABLE

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -577,14 +577,15 @@ openssl.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/ocsp.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/txt_db.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/txt_db.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
openssl.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../include/openssl/x509v3.h apps.h
openssl.o: openssl.c progs.h s_apps.h
passwd.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
passwd.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
passwd.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/des.h

View File

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINCE) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
#include <strings.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
@@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ int str2fmt(char *s)
return(FORMAT_PKCS12);
else if ((*s == 'E') || (*s == 'e'))
return(FORMAT_ENGINE);
else if ((*s == 'H') || (*s == 'h'))
return FORMAT_HTTP;
else if ((*s == 'P') || (*s == 'p'))
{
if (s[1] == 'V' || s[1] == 'v')
@@ -783,12 +785,80 @@ static int load_pkcs12(BIO *err, BIO *in, const char *desc,
return ret;
}
int load_cert_crl_http(const char *url, BIO *err,
X509 **pcert, X509_CRL **pcrl)
{
char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = NULL;
int use_ssl, rv = 0;
if (!OCSP_parse_url(url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl))
goto err;
if (use_ssl)
{
if (err)
BIO_puts(err, "https not supported\n");
goto err;
}
bio = BIO_new_connect(host);
if (!bio || !BIO_set_conn_port(bio, port))
goto err;
rctx = OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(bio, 1024);
if (!rctx)
goto err;
if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(rctx, "GET", path))
goto err;
if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(rctx, "Host", host))
goto err;
if (pcert)
{
do
{
rv = X509_http_nbio(rctx, pcert);
}
while (rv == -1);
}
else
{
do
{
rv = X509_CRL_http_nbio(rctx, pcrl);
} while (rv == -1);
}
err:
if (host)
OPENSSL_free(host);
if (path)
OPENSSL_free(path);
if (port)
OPENSSL_free(port);
if (bio)
BIO_free_all(bio);
if (rctx)
OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx);
if (rv != 1)
{
if (bio && err)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading %s from %s\n",
pcert ? "certificate" : "CRL", url);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
}
return rv;
}
X509 *load_cert(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *cert_descrip)
{
X509 *x=NULL;
BIO *cert;
if (format == FORMAT_HTTP)
{
load_cert_crl_http(file, err, &x, NULL);
return x;
}
if ((cert=BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL)
{
ERR_print_errors(err);
@@ -859,6 +929,55 @@ end:
return(x);
}
X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format)
{
X509_CRL *x=NULL;
BIO *in=NULL;
if (format == FORMAT_HTTP)
{
load_cert_crl_http(infile, bio_err, NULL, &x);
return x;
}
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL)
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (infile == NULL)
BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
else
{
if (BIO_read_filename(in,infile) <= 0)
{
perror(infile);
goto end;
}
}
if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
x=d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in,NULL);
else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
x=PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in,NULL,NULL,NULL);
else {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad input format specified for input crl\n");
goto end;
}
if (x == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"unable to load CRL\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
end:
BIO_free(in);
return(x);
}
EVP_PKEY *load_key(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip)
{
@@ -2132,7 +2251,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
X509_NAME *n = NULL;
int nid;
if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values)
if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
goto error;
@@ -2236,6 +2355,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
OPENSSL_free(mval);
return n;
error:
@@ -2244,6 +2364,8 @@ error:
OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
if (ne_types)
OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
if (mval)
OPENSSL_free(mval);
if (buf)
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return NULL;
@@ -2259,6 +2381,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
char **oldargs = *pargs;
char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
time_t at_time = 0;
const unsigned char *hostname = NULL, *email = NULL;
char *ipasc = NULL;
if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy"))
{
if (!argn)
@@ -2332,6 +2456,27 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
}
(*pargs)++;
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-verify_hostname") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
*badarg = 1;
hostname = (unsigned char *)argn;
(*pargs)++;
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-verify_email") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
*badarg = 1;
email = (unsigned char *)argn;
(*pargs)++;
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-verify_ip") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
*badarg = 1;
ipasc = argn;
(*pargs)++;
}
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-ignore_critical"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-issuer_checks"))
@@ -2358,6 +2503,16 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-trusted_first"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-suiteB_128_only"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-suiteB_128"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-suiteB_192"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
else if (!strcmp(arg, "-partial_chain"))
flags |= X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN;
else
return 0;
@@ -2389,6 +2544,15 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
if (at_time)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(*pm, at_time);
if (hostname && !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(*pm, hostname, 0))
*badarg = 1;
if (email && !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email(*pm, email, 0))
*badarg = 1;
if (ipasc && !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(*pm, ipasc))
*badarg = 1;
end:
(*pargs)++;
@@ -2681,6 +2845,9 @@ void jpake_client_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n");
if (psk_key)
OPENSSL_free(psk_key);
psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx));
BIO_pop(bconn);
@@ -2710,6 +2877,9 @@ void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
BIO_puts(out, "JPAKE authentication succeeded, setting PSK\n");
if (psk_key)
OPENSSL_free(psk_key);
psk_key = BN_bn2hex(JPAKE_get_shared_key(ctx));
BIO_pop(bconn);
@@ -2720,7 +2890,7 @@ void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret)
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string
* in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised.
* outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success.
@@ -2762,7 +2932,113 @@ unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in)
*outlen = len + 1;
return out;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x,
const unsigned char *checkhost,
const unsigned char *checkemail,
const char *checkip)
{
if (x == NULL)
return;
if (checkhost)
{
BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n",
checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0)
? "" : " NOT");
}
if (checkemail)
{
BIO_printf(bio, "Email %s does%s match certificate\n",
checkemail, X509_check_email(x, checkemail, 0,
0) ? "" : " NOT");
}
if (checkip)
{
BIO_printf(bio, "IP %s does%s match certificate\n",
checkip, X509_check_ip_asc(x, checkip,
0) ? "" : " NOT");
}
}
/* Get first http URL from a DIST_POINT structure */
static const char *get_dp_url(DIST_POINT *dp)
{
GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
int i, gtype;
ASN1_STRING *uri;
if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0)
return NULL;
gens = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
{
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
uri = GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(gen, &gtype);
if (gtype == GEN_URI && ASN1_STRING_length(uri) > 6)
{
char *uptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(uri);
if (!strncmp(uptr, "http://", 7))
return uptr;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* Look through a CRLDP structure and attempt to find an http URL to downloads
* a CRL from.
*/
static X509_CRL *load_crl_crldp(STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp)
{
int i;
const char *urlptr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp); i++)
{
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, i);
urlptr = get_dp_url(dp);
if (urlptr)
return load_crl(urlptr, FORMAT_HTTP);
}
return NULL;
}
/* Example of downloading CRLs from CRLDP: not usable for real world
* as it always downloads, doesn't support non-blocking I/O and doesn't
* cache anything.
*/
static STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls_http_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
{
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
X509_CRL *crl;
STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp;
x = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp);
sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free);
if (!crl)
return NULL;
crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl);
/* Try to download delta CRL */
crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_freshest_crl, NULL, NULL);
crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp);
sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free);
if (crl)
sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl);
return crls;
}
void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st)
{
X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(st, crls_http_cb);
}
/*
* Platform-specific sections

View File

@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); ENGINE_cleanup(); \
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
RAND_cleanup(); \
ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup();} while(0)
# else
# define apps_startup() \
@@ -198,11 +199,12 @@ extern BIO *bio_err;
do { CONF_modules_unload(1); destroy_ui_method(); \
OBJ_cleanup(); EVP_cleanup(); \
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); \
RAND_cleanup(); \
ERR_free_strings(); zlib_cleanup(); } while(0)
# endif
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINCE)
# define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET((unsigned int)a, b)
#else
# define openssl_fdset(a,b) FD_SET(a, b)
@@ -245,6 +247,9 @@ int app_passwd(BIO *err, char *arg1, char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2);
int add_oid_section(BIO *err, CONF *conf);
X509 *load_cert(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *cert_descrip);
X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format);
int load_cert_crl_http(const char *url, BIO *err,
X509 **pcert, X509_CRL **pcrl);
EVP_PKEY *load_key(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip);
EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
@@ -260,9 +265,10 @@ ENGINE *setup_engine(BIO *err, const char *engine, int debug);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
char *host, char *path, char *port, int use_ssl,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
int req_timeout);
const char *host, const char *path,
const char *port, int use_ssl,
const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
int req_timeout);
#endif
int load_config(BIO *err, CONF *cnf);
@@ -331,9 +337,16 @@ void jpake_client_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret);
void jpake_server_auth(BIO *out, BIO *conn, const char *secret);
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x,
const unsigned char *checkhost,
const unsigned char *checkemail,
const char *checkip);
void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st);
#define FORMAT_UNDEF 0
#define FORMAT_ASN1 1
@@ -349,6 +362,7 @@ unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in);
#define FORMAT_ASN1RSA 10 /* DER RSAPubicKey format */
#define FORMAT_MSBLOB 11 /* MS Key blob format */
#define FORMAT_PVK 12 /* MS PVK file format */
#define FORMAT_HTTP 13 /* Download using HTTP */
#define EXT_COPY_NONE 0
#define EXT_COPY_ADD 1

View File

@@ -501,6 +501,12 @@ EF_ALIGNMENT=0;
infile= *(++argv);
dorevoke=1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-valid") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
infile= *(++argv);
dorevoke=2;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-extensions") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -1408,6 +1414,7 @@ bad:
if (!NCONF_get_number(conf,section,
ENV_DEFAULT_CRL_HOURS, &crlhours))
crlhours = 0;
ERR_clear_error();
}
if ((crldays == 0) && (crlhours == 0) && (crlsec == 0))
{
@@ -1522,6 +1529,8 @@ bad:
NULL, e, infile);
if (revcert == NULL)
goto err;
if (dorevoke == 2)
rev_type = -1;
j=do_revoke(revcert,db, rev_type, rev_arg);
if (j <= 0) goto err;
X509_free(revcert);
@@ -2043,7 +2052,13 @@ again2:
if (enddate == NULL)
X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(ret),days, 0, NULL);
else ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notAfter(ret),enddate);
else
{
int tdays;
ASN1_TIME_set_string(X509_get_notAfter(ret),enddate);
ASN1_TIME_diff(&tdays, NULL, NULL, X509_get_notAfter(ret));
days = tdays;
}
if (!X509_set_subject_name(ret,subject)) goto err;
@@ -2485,7 +2500,10 @@ static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int type, char *value)
}
/* Revoke Certificate */
ok = do_revoke(x509,db, type, value);
if (type == -1)
ok = 1;
else
ok = do_revoke(x509,db, type, value);
goto err;
@@ -2496,6 +2514,12 @@ static int do_revoke(X509 *x509, CA_DB *db, int type, char *value)
row[DB_name]);
goto err;
}
else if (type == -1)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"ERROR:Already present, serial number %s\n",
row[DB_serial]);
goto err;
}
else if (rrow[DB_type][0]=='R')
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"ERROR:Already revoked, serial number %s\n",

View File

@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
int ret=1,i;
int verbose=0,Verbose=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
int stdname = 0;
#endif
const char **pp;
const char *p;
int badops=0;
@@ -126,6 +129,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
verbose=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-V") == 0)
verbose=Verbose=1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-stdname") == 0)
stdname=verbose=1;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ssl2") == 0)
meth=SSLv2_client_method();
@@ -209,7 +216,15 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else
BIO_printf(STDout, "0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X - ", id0, id1, id2, id3); /* whatever */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
if (stdname)
{
const char *nm = SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(c);
if (nm == NULL)
nm = "UNKNOWN";
BIO_printf(STDout, "%s - ", nm);
}
#endif
BIO_puts(STDout,SSL_CIPHER_description(c,buf,sizeof buf));
}
}

View File

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ static void receipt_request_print(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
static CMS_ReceiptRequest *make_receipt_request(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_to,
int rr_allorfirst,
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_from);
static int cms_set_pkey_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param);
#define SMIME_OP 0x10
#define SMIME_IP 0x20
@@ -97,6 +99,15 @@ static CMS_ReceiptRequest *make_receipt_request(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_to,
int verify_err = 0;
typedef struct cms_key_param_st cms_key_param;
struct cms_key_param_st
{
int idx;
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING)*param;
cms_key_param *next;
};
int MAIN(int, char **);
int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
@@ -111,7 +122,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sksigners = NULL, *skkeys = NULL;
char *certfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *contfile=NULL;
char *certsoutfile = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL, *wrap_cipher = NULL;
CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL, *rcms = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL, *recip = NULL, *signer = NULL;
@@ -139,6 +150,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
unsigned char *pwri_pass = NULL, *pwri_tmp = NULL;
size_t secret_keylen = 0, secret_keyidlen = 0;
cms_key_param *key_first = NULL, *key_param = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *econtent_type = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
@@ -204,6 +217,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-des"))
cipher = EVP_des_cbc();
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-des3-wrap"))
wrap_cipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-seed"))
@@ -224,6 +239,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
cipher = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-aes256"))
cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-aes128-wrap"))
wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-aes192-wrap"))
wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-aes256-wrap"))
wrap_cipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia128"))
@@ -233,6 +254,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
#endif
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt"))
flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text"))
flags |= CMS_TEXT;
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern"))
@@ -410,7 +433,20 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (!args[1])
goto argerr;
recipfile = *++args;
if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT)
{
if (!encerts)
encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
cert = load_cert(bio_err,*++args,FORMAT_PEM,
NULL, e,
"recipient certificate file");
if (!cert)
goto end;
sk_X509_push(encerts, cert);
cert = NULL;
}
else
recipfile = *++args;
}
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-certsout"))
{
@@ -458,6 +494,43 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto argerr;
keyform = str2fmt(*++args);
}
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-keyopt"))
{
int keyidx = -1;
if (!args[1])
goto argerr;
if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT)
{
if (encerts)
keyidx += sk_X509_num(encerts);
}
else
{
if (keyfile || signerfile)
keyidx++;
if (skkeys)
keyidx += sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(skkeys);
}
if (keyidx < 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "No key specified\n");
goto argerr;
}
if (key_param == NULL || key_param->idx != keyidx)
{
cms_key_param *nparam;
nparam = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(cms_key_param));
nparam->idx = keyidx;
nparam->param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
nparam->next = NULL;
if (key_first == NULL)
key_first = nparam;
else
key_param->next = nparam;
key_param = nparam;
}
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(key_param->param, *++args);
}
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-rctform"))
{
if (!args[1])
@@ -575,7 +648,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT)
{
if (!*args && !secret_key && !pwri_pass)
if (!*args && !secret_key && !pwri_pass && !encerts)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "No recipient(s) certificate(s) specified\n");
badarg = 1;
@@ -631,6 +704,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyform arg input private key format (PEM or ENGINE)\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyopt nm:v set public key parameters\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-out file output file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-outform arg output format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-content file supply or override content for detached signature\n");
@@ -716,7 +790,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
if (*args)
if (*args && !encerts)
encerts = sk_X509_new_null();
while (*args)
{
@@ -910,10 +984,45 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
else if (operation == SMIME_ENCRYPT)
{
int i;
flags |= CMS_PARTIAL;
cms = CMS_encrypt(encerts, in, cipher, flags);
cms = CMS_encrypt(NULL, in, cipher, flags);
if (!cms)
goto end;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(encerts); i++)
{
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
cms_key_param *kparam;
int tflags = flags;
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(encerts, i);
for(kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next)
{
if(kparam->idx == i)
{
tflags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM;
break;
}
}
ri = CMS_add1_recipient_cert(cms, x, tflags);
if (!ri)
goto end;
if (kparam)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
if (!cms_set_pkey_param(pctx, kparam->param))
goto end;
}
if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE
&& wrap_cipher)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *wctx;
wctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(wctx, wrap_cipher,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
}
if (secret_key)
{
if (!CMS_add0_recipient_key(cms, NID_undef,
@@ -1002,8 +1111,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sksigners); i++)
{
CMS_SignerInfo *si;
cms_key_param *kparam;
int tflags = flags;
signerfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sksigners, i);
keyfile = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(skkeys, i);
signer = load_cert(bio_err, signerfile,FORMAT_PEM, NULL,
e, "signer certificate");
if (!signer)
@@ -1012,9 +1124,24 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
"signing key file");
if (!key)
goto end;
si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signer, key, sign_md, flags);
for(kparam = key_first; kparam; kparam = kparam->next)
{
if(kparam->idx == i)
{
tflags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM;
break;
}
}
si = CMS_add1_signer(cms, signer, key, sign_md, tflags);
if (!si)
goto end;
if (kparam)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
pctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
if (!cms_set_pkey_param(pctx, kparam->param))
goto end;
}
if (rr && !CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest(si, rr))
goto end;
X509_free(signer);
@@ -1039,6 +1166,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
ret = 4;
if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
{
if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
if (secret_key)
{
@@ -1206,6 +1335,14 @@ end:
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(rr_to);
if (rr_from)
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(rr_from);
for(key_param = key_first; key_param;)
{
cms_key_param *tparam;
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(key_param->param);
tparam = key_param->next;
OPENSSL_free(key_param);
key_param = tparam;
}
X509_STORE_free(store);
X509_free(cert);
X509_free(recip);
@@ -1390,4 +1527,25 @@ static CMS_ReceiptRequest *make_receipt_request(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rr_to,
return NULL;
}
static int cms_set_pkey_param(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx,
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *param)
{
char *keyopt;
int i;
if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param) <= 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param); i++)
{
keyopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param, i);
if (pkey_ctrl_string(pctx, keyopt) <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n",
keyopt);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif

View File

@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ static const char *crl_usage[]={
NULL
};
static X509_CRL *load_crl(char *file, int format);
static BIO *bio_out=NULL;
int MAIN(int, char **);
@@ -103,10 +102,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
unsigned long nmflag = 0;
X509_CRL *x=NULL;
char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL;
int ret=1,i,num,badops=0;
int ret=1,i,num,badops=0,badsig=0;
BIO *out=NULL;
int informat,outformat;
char *infile=NULL,*outfile=NULL;
int informat,outformat, keyformat;
char *infile=NULL,*outfile=NULL, *crldiff = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
int hash=0,issuer=0,lastupdate=0,nextupdate=0,noout=0,text=0;
int fingerprint = 0, crlnumber = 0;
const char **pp;
@@ -141,6 +140,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
informat=FORMAT_PEM;
outformat=FORMAT_PEM;
keyformat=FORMAT_PEM;
argc--;
argv++;
@@ -169,6 +169,21 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
infile= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-gendelta") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
crldiff= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-key") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
keyfile= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
keyformat=str2fmt(*(++argv));
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-out") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -209,6 +224,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
fingerprint= ++num;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-crlnumber") == 0)
crlnumber= ++num;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-badsig") == 0)
badsig = 1;
else if ((md_alg=EVP_get_digestbyname(*argv + 1)))
{
/* ok */
@@ -276,6 +293,39 @@ bad:
else BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify OK\n");
}
if (crldiff)
{
X509_CRL *newcrl, *delta;
if (!keyfile)
{
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Missing CRL signing key\n");
goto end;
}
newcrl = load_crl(crldiff,informat);
if (!newcrl)
goto end;
pkey = load_key(bio_err, keyfile, keyformat, 0, NULL, NULL,
"CRL signing key");
if (!pkey)
{
X509_CRL_free(newcrl);
goto end;
}
delta = X509_CRL_diff(x, newcrl, pkey, digest, 0);
X509_CRL_free(newcrl);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (delta)
{
X509_CRL_free(x);
x = delta;
}
else
{
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error creating delta CRL\n");
goto end;
}
}
if (num)
{
for (i=1; i<=num; i++)
@@ -378,6 +428,9 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
if (badsig)
x->signature->data[x->signature->length - 1] ^= 0x1;
if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
i=(int)i2d_X509_CRL_bio(out,x);
else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
@@ -390,6 +443,8 @@ bad:
if (!i) { BIO_printf(bio_err,"unable to write CRL\n"); goto end; }
ret=0;
end:
if (ret != 0)
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
BIO_free_all(out);
BIO_free_all(bio_out);
bio_out=NULL;
@@ -401,46 +456,3 @@ end:
apps_shutdown();
OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
}
static X509_CRL *load_crl(char *infile, int format)
{
X509_CRL *x=NULL;
BIO *in=NULL;
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (in == NULL)
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (infile == NULL)
BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
else
{
if (BIO_read_filename(in,infile) <= 0)
{
perror(infile);
goto end;
}
}
if (format == FORMAT_ASN1)
x=d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in,NULL);
else if (format == FORMAT_PEM)
x=PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in,NULL,NULL,NULL);
else {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad input format specified for input crl\n");
goto end;
}
if (x == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"unable to load CRL\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
end:
BIO_free(in);
return(x);
}

View File

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
ENGINE *e = NULL;
ENGINE *e = NULL, *impl = NULL;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
int i,err=1;
const EVP_MD *md=NULL,*m;
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char *passargin = NULL, *passin = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
char *engine=NULL;
int engine_impl = 0;
#endif
char *hmac_key=NULL;
char *mac_name=NULL;
@@ -209,6 +210,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
engine= *(++argv);
e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-engine_impl") == 0)
engine_impl = 1;
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-hex") == 0)
out_bin = 0;
@@ -216,10 +219,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
out_bin = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-d") == 0)
debug=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
non_fips_allow=1;
else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-fips-fingerprint"))
hmac_key = "etaonrishdlcupfm";
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
non_fips_allow=1;
else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-hmac"))
{
if (--argc < 1)
@@ -291,6 +294,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (engine_impl)
impl = e;
#endif
in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
bmd=BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
if (debug)
@@ -368,7 +376,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL;
int r = 0;
if (!init_gen_str(bio_err, &mac_ctx, mac_name,e, 0))
if (!init_gen_str(bio_err, &mac_ctx, mac_name, impl, 0))
goto mac_end;
if (macopts)
{
@@ -409,7 +417,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (hmac_key)
{
sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, e,
sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, impl,
(unsigned char *)hmac_key, -1);
if (!sigkey)
goto end;
@@ -427,9 +435,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
if (do_verify)
r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey);
else
r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, e, sigkey);
r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey);
if (!r)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting context\n");
@@ -456,9 +464,16 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
/* we use md as a filter, reading from 'in' */
else
{
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
if (!BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting context\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (md == NULL)
md = EVP_md5();
if (!BIO_set_md(bmd,md))
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, impl))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting digest %s\n", pname);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);

View File

@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ bad:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"This is going to take a long time\n");
if(!dh || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, &cb))
{
if(dh) DH_free(dh);
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
@@ -513,7 +512,12 @@ bad:
if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
i=i2d_DHparams_bio(out,dh);
else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
i=PEM_write_bio_DHparams(out,dh);
{
if (dh->q)
i=PEM_write_bio_DHxparams(out,dh);
else
i=PEM_write_bio_DHparams(out,dh);
}
else {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad output format specified for outfile\n");
goto end;

View File

@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
#endif
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Error, DSA key generation failed\n");
goto end;
}
@@ -429,13 +430,19 @@ bad:
assert(need_rand);
if ((dsakey=DSAparams_dup(dsa)) == NULL) goto end;
if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey)) goto end;
if (!DSA_generate_key(dsakey))
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
DSA_free(dsakey);
goto end;
}
if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
i=i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(out,dsakey);
else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
i=PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(out,dsakey,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL);
else {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad output format specified for outfile\n");
DSA_free(dsakey);
goto end;
}
DSA_free(dsakey);

View File

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
* in the asn1 der encoding
* possible values: named_curve (default)
* explicit
* -no_seed - if 'explicit' parameters are choosen do not use the seed
* -no_seed - if 'explicit' parameters are chosen do not use the seed
* -genkey - generate ec key
* -rand file - files to use for random number input
* -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ bad:
BIO_printf(bio_err, " "
" explicit\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -no_seed if 'explicit'"
" parameters are choosen do not"
" parameters are chosen do not"
" use the seed\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, " -genkey generate ec"
" key\n");
@@ -402,6 +402,9 @@ bad:
}
else
nid = OBJ_sn2nid(curve_name);
if (nid == 0)
nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(curve_name);
if (nid == 0)
{

View File

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#define DEFBITS 512
#define DEFBITS 1024
#undef PROG
#define PROG genrsa_main

View File

@@ -105,17 +105,17 @@ static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
long maxage);
static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req, CA_DB *db,
X509 *ca, X509 *rcert, EVP_PKEY *rkey,
X509 *ca, X509 *rcert, EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *md,
STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags,
int nmin, int ndays);
int nmin, int ndays, int badsig);
static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser);
static BIO *init_responder(char *port);
static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio, char *port);
static BIO *init_responder(const char *port);
static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio, const char *port);
static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp);
static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout);
static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, const char *path,
const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout);
#undef PROG
#define PROG ocsp_main
@@ -148,12 +148,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1;
char *CAfile = NULL, *CApath = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *sign_other = NULL, *verify_other = NULL, *rother = NULL;
char *sign_certfile = NULL, *verify_certfile = NULL, *rcertfile = NULL;
unsigned long sign_flags = 0, verify_flags = 0, rflags = 0;
int ret = 1;
int accept_count = -1;
int badarg = 0;
int badsig = 0;
int i;
int ignore_err = 0;
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *reqnames = NULL;
@@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char *rca_filename = NULL;
CA_DB *rdb = NULL;
int nmin = 0, ndays = -1;
const EVP_MD *cert_id_md = NULL;
const EVP_MD *cert_id_md = NULL, *rsign_md = NULL;
if (bio_err == NULL) bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
@@ -271,6 +273,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
verify_flags |= OCSP_TRUSTOTHER;
else if (!strcmp(*args, "-no_intern"))
verify_flags |= OCSP_NOINTERN;
else if (!strcmp(*args, "-badsig"))
badsig = 1;
else if (!strcmp(*args, "-text"))
{
req_text = 1;
@@ -353,6 +357,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
else badarg = 1;
}
else if (args_verify(&args, NULL, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm))
{
if (badarg)
goto end;
continue;
}
else if (!strcmp (*args, "-validity_period"))
{
if (args[1])
@@ -558,6 +568,17 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
else badarg = 1;
}
else if (!strcmp(*args, "-rmd"))
{
if (args[1])
{
args++;
rsign_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(*args);
if (!rsign_md)
badarg = 1;
}
else badarg = 1;
}
else if ((cert_id_md = EVP_get_digestbyname((*args)+1))==NULL)
{
badarg = 1;
@@ -617,7 +638,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-ndays n number of days before next update\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_key_id identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nrequest n number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg> use specified digest in the request");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg> use specified digest in the request\n");
goto end;
}
@@ -634,7 +655,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (!req && reqin)
{
derbio = BIO_new_file(reqin, "rb");
if (!strcmp(reqin, "-"))
derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
else
derbio = BIO_new_file(reqin, "rb");
if (!derbio)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP request file\n");
@@ -736,7 +760,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (reqout)
{
derbio = BIO_new_file(reqout, "wb");
if (!strcmp(reqout, "-"))
derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
else
derbio = BIO_new_file(reqout, "wb");
if(!derbio)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", reqout);
@@ -761,7 +788,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (rdb)
{
i = make_ocsp_response(&resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey, rother, rflags, nmin, ndays);
i = make_ocsp_response(&resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey,rsign_md, rother, rflags, nmin, ndays, badsig);
if (cbio)
send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
}
@@ -779,7 +806,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
else if (respin)
{
derbio = BIO_new_file(respin, "rb");
if (!strcmp(respin, "-"))
derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
else
derbio = BIO_new_file(respin, "rb");
if (!derbio)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Opening OCSP response file\n");
@@ -804,7 +834,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (respout)
{
derbio = BIO_new_file(respout, "wb");
if (!strcmp(respout, "-"))
derbio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
else
derbio = BIO_new_file(respout, "wb");
if(!derbio)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening file %s\n", respout);
@@ -844,6 +877,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
resp = NULL;
goto redo_accept;
}
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
else if (ridx_filename)
{
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
@@ -851,6 +890,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
store = setup_verify(bio_err, CAfile, CApath);
if (!store)
goto end;
if (vpm)
X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm);
if (verify_certfile)
{
verify_other = load_certs(bio_err, verify_certfile, FORMAT_PEM,
@@ -866,6 +907,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
ret = 0;
if (!noverify)
{
if (req && ((i = OCSP_check_nonce(req, bs)) <= 0))
@@ -875,17 +918,17 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
else
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Nonce Verify error\n");
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
}
i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, verify_other, store, verify_flags);
if (i < 0) i = OCSP_basic_verify(bs, NULL, store, 0);
if(i <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response Verify Failure\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
ret = 1;
}
else
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Response verify OK\n");
@@ -893,14 +936,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (!print_ocsp_summary(out, bs, req, reqnames, ids, nsec, maxage))
goto end;
ret = 0;
ret = 1;
end:
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
X509_free(signer);
X509_STORE_free(store);
if (vpm)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
EVP_PKEY_free(rkey);
X509_free(issuer);
@@ -1051,9 +1094,10 @@ static int print_ocsp_summary(BIO *out, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req, CA_DB *db,
X509 *ca, X509 *rcert, EVP_PKEY *rkey,
X509 *ca, X509 *rcert,
EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *rmd,
STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags,
int nmin, int ndays)
int nmin, int ndays, int badsig)
{
ASN1_TIME *thisupd = NULL, *nextupd = NULL;
OCSP_CERTID *cid, *ca_id = NULL;
@@ -1142,7 +1186,10 @@ static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req, CA_DB *db
OCSP_copy_nonce(bs, req);
OCSP_basic_sign(bs, rcert, rkey, NULL, rother, flags);
OCSP_basic_sign(bs, rcert, rkey, rmd, rother, flags);
if (badsig)
bs->signature->data[bs->signature->length -1] ^= 0x1;
*resp = OCSP_response_create(OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL, bs);
@@ -1176,7 +1223,7 @@ static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser)
/* Quick and dirty OCSP server: read in and parse input request */
static BIO *init_responder(char *port)
static BIO *init_responder(const char *port)
{
BIO *acbio = NULL, *bufbio = NULL;
bufbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
@@ -1207,7 +1254,8 @@ static BIO *init_responder(char *port)
return NULL;
}
static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio, char *port)
static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio,
const char *port)
{
int have_post = 0, len;
OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL;
@@ -1273,9 +1321,9 @@ static int send_ocsp_response(BIO *cbio, OCSP_RESPONSE *resp)
return 1;
}
static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout)
static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, const char *path,
const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
OCSP_REQUEST *req, int req_timeout)
{
int fd;
int rv;
@@ -1371,9 +1419,10 @@ static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
}
OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
char *host, char *path, char *port, int use_ssl,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
int req_timeout)
const char *host, const char *path,
const char *port, int use_ssl,
const STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers,
int req_timeout)
{
BIO *cbio = NULL;
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;

View File

@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
#include "apps.h"
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>

View File

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
int maciter = PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER;
int twopass = 0;
int keytype = 0;
int cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
int cert_pbe;
int key_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
int ret = 1;
int macver = 1;
@@ -130,6 +130,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
apps_startup();
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
else
#endif
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
if (bio_err == NULL ) bio_err = BIO_new_fp (stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);

View File

@@ -644,6 +644,11 @@ bad:
if (inrand)
app_RAND_load_files(inrand);
if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
{
newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
}
if (keyalg)
{
genctx = set_keygen_ctx(bio_err, keyalg, &pkey_type, &newkey,
@@ -652,12 +657,6 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
if (newkey <= 0)
{
if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,SECTION,BITS, &newkey))
newkey=DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH;
}
if (newkey < MIN_KEY_LENGTH && (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_DSA))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"private key length is too short,\n");
@@ -1649,6 +1648,8 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *set_keygen_ctx(BIO *err, const char *gstr, int *pkey_type,
keylen = atol(p + 1);
*pkeylen = keylen;
}
else
keylen = *pkeylen;
}
else if (p)
paramfile = p + 1;

View File

@@ -148,14 +148,19 @@ typedef fd_mask fd_set;
#define PORT_STR "4433"
#define PROTOCOL "tcp"
int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context);
int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb) (char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context, int naccept);
#ifdef HEADER_X509_H
int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
#endif
#ifdef HEADER_SSL_H
int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file);
int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key);
int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain);
int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s);
int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s);
int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared);
#endif
int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s);
int init_client(int *sock, char *server, int port, int type);
int should_retry(int i);
int extract_port(char *str, short *port_ptr);
@@ -174,3 +179,23 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len);
int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len);
typedef struct ssl_excert_st SSL_EXCERT;
void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc);
void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc);
int args_excert(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
int *badarg, BIO *err, SSL_EXCERT **pexc);
int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc, BIO *err);
void print_ssl_summary(BIO *bio, SSL *s);
#ifdef HEADER_SSL_H
int args_ssl(char ***pargs, int *pargc, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
int *badarg, BIO *err, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **pstr);
int args_ssl_call(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *err, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, int no_ecdhe, int no_jpake);
int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download);
int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx,
const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile,
const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download);
#endif

View File

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
#define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16
int verify_depth=0;
int verify_quiet=0;
int verify_error=X509_V_OK;
int verify_return_error=0;
unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
@@ -139,15 +140,19 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
err= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d ",depth);
if (err_cert)
if (!verify_quiet || !ok)
{
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d ",depth);
if (err_cert)
{
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err,
X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
}
else
BIO_puts(bio_err, "<no cert>\n");
}
else
BIO_puts(bio_err, "<no cert>\n");
if (!ok)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
@@ -185,13 +190,14 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
if (!verify_quiet)
policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
break;
}
if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2)
if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2 && !verify_quiet)
policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify return:%d\n",ok);
if (ok && !verify_quiet)
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify return:%d\n",ok);
return(ok);
}
@@ -237,8 +243,8 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
/* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
* the private key */
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
* the SSL context */
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
@@ -250,9 +256,11 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
return(1);
}
int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key)
int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain)
{
if (cert == NULL)
int chflags = chain ? SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK : 0;
if (cert == NULL)
return 1;
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,cert) <= 0)
{
@@ -260,24 +268,291 @@ int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key)
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,key) <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting private key\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return 0;
}
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
* the SSL context */
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,key) <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting private key\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return 0;
}
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
* the SSL context */
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Private key does not match the certificate public key\n");
return 0;
}
if (chain && !SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx, chain))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting certificate chain\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return 0;
}
if (build_chain && !SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, chflags))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error building certificate chain\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void ssl_print_client_cert_types(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int i;
int cert_type_num = SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, &p);
if (!cert_type_num)
return;
BIO_puts(bio, "Client Certificate Types: ");
for (i = 0; i < cert_type_num; i++)
{
unsigned char cert_type = p[i];
char *cname;
switch(cert_type)
{
case TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN:
cname = "RSA sign";
break;
case TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN:
cname = "DSA sign";
break;
case TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH:
cname = "RSA fixed DH";
break;
case TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH:
cname = "DSS fixed DH";
break;
case TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN:
cname = "ECDSA sign";
break;
case TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH:
cname = "RSA fixed ECDH";
break;
case TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH:
cname = "ECDSA fixed ECDH";
break;
case TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN:
cname = "GOST94 Sign";
break;
case TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN:
cname = "GOST01 Sign";
break;
default:
cname = NULL;
}
if (i)
BIO_puts(bio, ", ");
if (cname)
BIO_puts(bio, cname);
else
BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN (%d),", cert_type);
}
BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
}
static int do_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s, int shared)
{
int i, nsig, client;
client = SSL_is_server(s) ? 0 : 1;
if (shared)
nsig = SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
else
nsig = SSL_get_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (nsig == 0)
return 1;
if (shared)
BIO_puts(out, "Shared ");
if (client)
BIO_puts(out, "Requested ");
BIO_puts(out, "Signature Algorithms: ");
for (i = 0; i < nsig; i++)
{
int hash_nid, sign_nid;
unsigned char rhash, rsign;
const char *sstr = NULL;
if (shared)
SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL,
&rsign, &rhash);
else
SSL_get_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL,
&rsign, &rhash);
if (i)
BIO_puts(out, ":");
if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
sstr = "RSA";
else if(sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
sstr = "DSA";
else if(sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_EC)
sstr = "ECDSA";
if (sstr)
BIO_printf(out,"%s+", sstr);
else
BIO_printf(out,"0x%02X+", (int)rsign);
if (hash_nid != NID_undef)
BIO_printf(out, "%s", OBJ_nid2sn(hash_nid));
else
BIO_printf(out,"0x%02X", (int)rhash);
}
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
}
int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s)
{
int mdnid;
if (!SSL_is_server(s))
ssl_print_client_cert_types(out, s);
do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 0);
do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 1);
if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &mdnid))
BIO_printf(out, "Peer signing digest: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(mdnid));
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s)
{
int i, nformats;
const char *pformats;
nformats = SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, &pformats);
if (nformats <= 0)
return 1;
BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curve Point Formats: ");
for (i = 0; i < nformats; i++, pformats++)
{
if (i)
BIO_puts(out, ":");
switch(*pformats)
{
case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed:
BIO_puts(out, "uncompressed");
break;
case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime:
BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_prime");
break;
case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2:
BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_char2");
break;
default:
BIO_printf(out, "unknown(%d)", (int)*pformats);
break;
}
}
if (nformats <= 0)
BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
}
int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared)
{
int i, ncurves, *curves, nid;
const char *cname;
ncurves = SSL_get1_curves(s, NULL);
if (ncurves <= 0)
return 1;
curves = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int));
SSL_get1_curves(s, curves);
BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: ");
for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
{
if (i)
BIO_puts(out, ":");
nid = curves[i];
/* If unrecognised print out hex version */
if (nid & TLSEXT_nid_unknown)
BIO_printf(out, "0x%04X", nid & 0xFFFF);
else
{
/* Use NIST name for curve if it exists */
cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
if (!cname)
cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
}
}
if (ncurves == 0)
BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
OPENSSL_free(curves);
if (noshared)
{
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
}
BIO_puts(out, "\nShared Elliptic curves: ");
ncurves = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, -1);
for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
{
if (i)
BIO_puts(out, ":");
nid = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, i);
cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
if (!cname)
cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
}
if (ncurves == 0)
BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
BIO_puts(out, "\n");
return 1;
}
#endif
int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *key;
if (!SSL_get_server_tmp_key(s, &key))
return 1;
BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: ");
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key))
{
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
BIO_printf(out, "RSA, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
BIO_printf(out, "DH, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
{
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key);
int nid;
const char *cname;
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
EC_KEY_free(ec);
cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
if (!cname)
cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
BIO_printf(out, "ECDH, %s, %d bits\n",
cname, EVP_PKEY_bits(key));
}
#endif
}
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 1;
}
long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
int argi, long argl, long ret)
{
@@ -436,6 +711,8 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_1_VERSION ||
version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
@@ -603,6 +880,9 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
case 20:
str_details1 = ", Finished";
break;
case 23:
str_details1 = ", SupplementalData";
break;
}
}
}
@@ -926,3 +1206,551 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned
return 0;
}
/* Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support
* of one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application
* can decide which certificate(s) to use at runtime based on whatever
* criteria it deems appropriate.
*/
/* Linked list of certificates, keys and chains */
struct ssl_excert_st
{
int certform;
const char *certfile;
int keyform;
const char *keyfile;
const char *chainfile;
X509 *cert;
EVP_PKEY *key;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
int build_chain;
struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev;
};
struct chain_flags
{
int flag;
const char *name;
};
struct chain_flags chain_flags_list[] =
{
{CERT_PKEY_VALID, "Overall Validity"},
{CERT_PKEY_SIGN, "Sign with EE key"},
{CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE, "EE signature"},
{CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE, "CA signature"},
{CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM, "EE key parameters"},
{CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM, "CA key parameters"},
{CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN, "Explicity sign with EE key"},
{CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME, "Issuer Name"},
{CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE, "Certificate Type"},
{0, NULL}
};
static void print_chain_flags(BIO *out, int flags)
{
struct chain_flags *ctmp = chain_flags_list;
while(ctmp->name)
{
BIO_printf(out, "\t%s: %s\n", ctmp->name,
flags & ctmp->flag ? "OK" : "NOT OK");
ctmp++;
}
}
/* Very basic selection callback: just use any certificate chain
* reported as valid. More sophisticated could prioritise according
* to local policy.
*/
static int set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
{
int i, rv;
SSL_EXCERT *exc = arg;
#ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY
static int retry_cnt;
if (retry_cnt < 5)
{
retry_cnt++;
fprintf(stderr, "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n",
retry_cnt);
return -1;
}
#endif
SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
if (!exc)
return 1;
/* Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend
* newer entries this retains the original order.
*/
while (exc->next)
exc = exc->next;
i = 0;
while(exc)
{
i++;
rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i);
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0,
XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
print_chain_flags(bio_err, rv);
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
{
SSL_use_certificate(ssl, exc->cert);
SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, exc->key);
/* NB: we wouldn't normally do this as it is
* not efficient building chains on each connection
* better to cache the chain in advance.
*/
if (exc->build_chain)
{
if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0))
return 0;
}
else if (exc->chain)
SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain);
}
exc = exc->prev;
}
return 1;
}
void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc)
{
SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, set_cert_cb, exc);
}
static int ssl_excert_prepend(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
{
SSL_EXCERT *exc;
exc = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_EXCERT));
if (!exc)
return 0;
exc->certfile = NULL;
exc->keyfile = NULL;
exc->chainfile = NULL;
exc->cert = NULL;
exc->key = NULL;
exc->chain = NULL;
exc->prev = NULL;
exc->build_chain = 0;
exc->next = *pexc;
*pexc = exc;
if (exc->next)
{
exc->certform = exc->next->certform;
exc->keyform = exc->next->keyform;
exc->next->prev = exc;
}
else
{
exc->certform = FORMAT_PEM;
exc->keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
}
return 1;
}
void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc)
{
SSL_EXCERT *curr;
while (exc)
{
if (exc->cert)
X509_free(exc->cert);
if (exc->key)
EVP_PKEY_free(exc->key);
if (exc->chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(exc->chain, X509_free);
curr = exc;
exc = exc->next;
OPENSSL_free(curr);
}
}
int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc, BIO *err)
{
SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
if (!exc)
return 1;
/* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */
if (!exc->certfile && !exc->next)
{
ssl_excert_free(exc);
*pexc = NULL;
return 1;
}
for(; exc; exc=exc->next)
{
if (!exc->certfile)
{
BIO_printf(err, "Missing filename\n");
return 0;
}
exc->cert = load_cert(err, exc->certfile, exc->certform,
NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
if (!exc->cert)
return 0;
if (exc->keyfile)
exc->keyfile = exc->certfile;
exc->key = load_key(err, exc->certfile, exc->certform, 0,
NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
if (!exc->key)
return 0;
if (exc->chainfile)
{
exc->chain = load_certs(err,
exc->chainfile, FORMAT_PEM,
NULL, NULL,
"Server Chain");
if (!exc->chainfile)
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int args_excert(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
int *badarg, BIO *err, SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
{
char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
int narg = 2;
if (!exc)
{
if (ssl_excert_prepend(&exc))
*pexc = exc;
else
{
BIO_printf(err, "Error initialising xcert\n");
*badarg = 1;
goto err;
}
}
if (strcmp(arg, "-xcert") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
{
*badarg = 1;
return 1;
}
if (exc->certfile && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc))
{
BIO_printf(err, "Error adding xcert\n");
*badarg = 1;
goto err;
}
exc->certfile = argn;
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-xkey") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
{
*badarg = 1;
return 1;
}
if (exc->keyfile)
{
BIO_printf(err, "Key already specified\n");
*badarg = 1;
return 1;
}
exc->keyfile = argn;
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-xchain") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
{
*badarg = 1;
return 1;
}
if (exc->chainfile)
{
BIO_printf(err, "Chain already specified\n");
*badarg = 1;
return 1;
}
exc->chainfile = argn;
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-xchain_build") == 0)
{
narg = 1;
exc->build_chain = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-xcertform") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
{
*badarg = 1;
goto err;
}
exc->certform = str2fmt(argn);
}
else if (strcmp(arg,"-xkeyform") == 0)
{
if (!argn)
{
*badarg = 1;
goto err;
}
exc->keyform = str2fmt(argn);
}
else
return 0;
(*pargs) += narg;
if (pargc)
*pargc -= narg;
*pexc = exc;
return 1;
err:
ERR_print_errors(err);
ssl_excert_free(exc);
*pexc = NULL;
return 1;
}
static void print_raw_cipherlist(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
{
const unsigned char *rlist;
static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = {0, 0, 0xFF};
size_t i, rlistlen, num;
if (!SSL_is_server(s))
return;
num = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, NULL);
rlistlen = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, &rlist);
BIO_puts(bio, "Client cipher list: ");
for (i = 0; i < rlistlen; i += num, rlist += num)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, rlist);
if (i)
BIO_puts(bio, ":");
if (c)
BIO_puts(bio, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
else if (!memcmp(rlist, scsv_id - num + 3, num))
BIO_puts(bio, "SCSV");
else
{
size_t j;
BIO_puts(bio, "0x");
for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", rlist[j]);
}
}
BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
}
void print_ssl_summary(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
X509 *peer;
/*const char *pnam = SSL_is_server(s) ? "client" : "server";*/
BIO_printf(bio, "Protocol version: %s\n", SSL_get_version(s));
print_raw_cipherlist(bio, s);
c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
BIO_printf(bio,"Ciphersuite: %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
do_print_sigalgs(bio, s, 0);
peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
if (peer)
{
int nid;
BIO_puts(bio, "Peer certificate: ");
X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, X509_get_subject_name(peer),
0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid))
BIO_printf(bio, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
}
else
BIO_puts(bio, "No peer certificate\n");
if (peer)
X509_free(peer);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
ssl_print_point_formats(bio, s);
if (SSL_is_server(s))
ssl_print_curves(bio, s, 1);
else
ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s);
#else
if (!SSL_is_server(s))
ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s);
#endif
}
int args_ssl(char ***pargs, int *pargc, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
int *badarg, BIO *err, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **pstr)
{
char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
int rv;
/* Attempt to run SSL configuration command */
rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(cctx, pargc, pargs);
/* If parameter not recognised just return */
if (rv == 0)
return 0;
/* see if missing argument error */
if (rv == -3)
{
BIO_printf(err, "%s needs an argument\n", arg);
*badarg = 1;
goto end;
}
/* Check for some other error */
if (rv < 0)
{
BIO_printf(err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n",
arg, argn ? argn : "");
*badarg = 1;
goto end;
}
/* Store command and argument */
/* If only one argument processed store value as NULL */
if (rv == 1)
argn = NULL;
if (!*pstr)
*pstr = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
if (!*pstr || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*pstr, arg) ||
!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*pstr, argn))
{
BIO_puts(err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
goto end;
}
end:
if (*badarg)
ERR_print_errors(err);
return 1;
}
int args_ssl_call(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *err, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, int no_ecdhe, int no_jpake)
{
int i;
SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(str); i+= 2)
{
const char *param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i);
const char *value = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i + 1);
/* If no_ecdhe or named curve already specified don't need
* a default.
*/
if (!no_ecdhe && !strcmp(param, "-named_curve"))
no_ecdhe = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
if (!no_jpake && !strcmp(param, "-cipher"))
{
BIO_puts(err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
return 0;
}
#endif
if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, param, value) <= 0)
{
BIO_printf(err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n",
param, value ? value : "");
ERR_print_errors(err);
return 0;
}
}
/* This is a special case to keep existing s_server functionality:
* if we don't have any curve specified *and* we haven't disabled
* ECDHE then use P-256.
*/
if (!no_ecdhe)
{
if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-named_curve", "P-256") <= 0)
{
BIO_puts(err, "Error setting EC curve\n");
ERR_print_errors(err);
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
if (!no_jpake)
{
if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-cipher", "PSK") <= 0)
{
BIO_puts(err, "Error setting cipher to PSK\n");
ERR_print_errors(err);
return 0;
}
}
#endif
if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx))
{
BIO_puts(err, "Error finishing context\n");
ERR_print_errors(err);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int add_crls_store(X509_STORE *st, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
X509_CRL *crl;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
{
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
X509_STORE_add_crl(st, crl);
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
{
X509_STORE *st;
st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
add_crls_store(st, crls);
if (crl_download)
store_setup_crl_download(st);
return 1;
}
int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx,
const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile,
const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
{
X509_STORE *vfy = NULL, *ch = NULL;
int rv = 0;
if (vfyCApath || vfyCAfile)
{
vfy = X509_STORE_new();
if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(vfy, vfyCAfile, vfyCApath))
goto err;
add_crls_store(vfy, crls);
SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx, vfy);
if (crl_download)
store_setup_crl_download(vfy);
}
if (chCApath || chCAfile)
{
ch = X509_STORE_new();
if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(ch, chCAfile, chCApath))
goto err;
SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx, ch);
}
rv = 1;
err:
if (vfy)
X509_STORE_free(vfy);
if (ch)
X509_STORE_free(ch);
return rv;
}

View File

@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ typedef unsigned int u_int;
extern int verify_depth;
extern int verify_error;
extern int verify_return_error;
extern int verify_quiet;
#ifdef FIONBIO
static int c_nbio=0;
@@ -213,10 +214,45 @@ static void sc_usage(void);
static void print_stuff(BIO *berr,SSL *con,int full);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg);
static int c_auth = 0;
static int c_auth_require_reneg = 0;
#endif
static BIO *bio_c_out=NULL;
static BIO *bio_c_msg=NULL;
static int c_quiet=0;
static int c_ign_eof=0;
static int c_brief=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
static unsigned char *generated_supp_data = NULL;
static const unsigned char *most_recent_supplemental_data = NULL;
static size_t most_recent_supplemental_data_length = 0;
static int server_provided_server_authz = 0;
static int server_provided_client_authz = 0;
static const unsigned char auth_ext_data[]={TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_dtcp};
static int suppdata_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short supp_data_type,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned short inlen, int *al,
void *arg);
static int auth_suppdata_generate_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short supp_data_type,
const unsigned char **out,
unsigned short *outlen, int *al, void *arg);
static int authz_tlsext_generate_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short ext_type,
const unsigned char **out, unsigned short *outlen,
int *al, void *arg);
static int authz_tlsext_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short ext_type,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned short inlen, int *al,
void *arg);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* Default PSK identity and key */
@@ -288,6 +324,9 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -host host - use -connect instead\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -port port - use -connect instead\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",SSL_HOST_NAME,PORT_STR);
BIO_printf(bio_err," -checkhost host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -checkemail email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -checkip ipaddr - check peer certificate matches \"ipaddr\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert arg - certificate file to use, PEM format assumed\n");
@@ -357,10 +396,14 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -tlsextdebug - hex dump of all TLS extensions received\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - request certificate status from server\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -serverinfo types - send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -auth - send and receive RFC 5878 TLS auth extensions and supplemental data\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -auth_require_reneg - Do not send TLS auth extensions until renegotiation\n");
#endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
# endif
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -alpn arg - enable ALPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
@@ -536,7 +579,28 @@ static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, con
ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len);
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
}
# endif
# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
static int serverinfo_cli_cb(SSL* s, unsigned short ext_type,
const unsigned char* in, unsigned short inlen,
int* al, void* arg)
{
char pem_name[100];
unsigned char ext_buf[4 + 65536];
/* Reconstruct the type/len fields prior to extension data */
ext_buf[0] = ext_type >> 8;
ext_buf[1] = ext_type & 0xFF;
ext_buf[2] = inlen >> 8;
ext_buf[3] = inlen & 0xFF;
memcpy(ext_buf+4, in, inlen);
BIO_snprintf(pem_name, sizeof(pem_name), "SERVERINFO FOR EXTENSION %d",
ext_type);
PEM_write_bio(bio_c_out, pem_name, "", ext_buf, 4 + inlen);
return 1;
}
#endif
enum
@@ -553,7 +617,7 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
unsigned int off=0, clr=0;
int build_chain = 0;
SSL *con=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_CTX *kctx;
@@ -566,13 +630,16 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
short port=PORT;
int full_log=1;
char *host=SSL_HOST_NAME;
char *cert_file=NULL,*key_file=NULL;
char *cert_file=NULL,*key_file=NULL,*chain_file=NULL;
int cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, key_format = FORMAT_PEM;
char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL,*cipher=NULL;
int reconnect=0,badop=0,verify=SSL_VERIFY_NONE,bugs=0;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
char *CApath=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
char *chCApath=NULL,*chCAfile=NULL;
char *vfyCApath=NULL,*vfyCAfile=NULL;
int reconnect=0,badop=0,verify=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
int crlf=0;
int write_tty,read_tty,write_ssl,read_ssl,tty_on,ssl_pending;
SSL_CTX *ctx=NULL;
@@ -606,6 +673,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL;
# endif
const char *alpn_in = NULL;
# define MAX_SI_TYPES 100
unsigned short serverinfo_types[MAX_SI_TYPES];
int serverinfo_types_count = 0;
#endif
char *sess_in = NULL;
char *sess_out = NULL;
@@ -614,13 +685,25 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
long socket_mtu = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
char *jpake_secret = NULL;
static char *jpake_secret = NULL;
#define no_jpake !jpake_secret
#else
#define no_jpake 1
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
char * srppass = NULL;
int srp_lateuser = 0;
SRP_ARG srp_arg = {NULL,NULL,0,0,0,1024};
#endif
SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL;
SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL;
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL;
char *crl_file = NULL;
int crl_format = FORMAT_PEM;
int crl_download = 0;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
meth=SSLv23_client_method();
@@ -638,6 +721,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
goto end;
cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new();
if (!cctx)
goto end;
SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT);
SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE);
if ( ((cbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
((sbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL) ||
((mbuf=OPENSSL_malloc(BUFSIZZ)) == NULL))
@@ -678,13 +767,21 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
verify=SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
verify_depth=atoi(*(++argv));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify depth is %d\n",verify_depth);
if (!c_quiet)
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify depth is %d\n",verify_depth);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cert") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
cert_file= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-CRL") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
crl_file= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-crl_download") == 0)
crl_download = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-sess_out") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -700,6 +797,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
cert_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-CRLform") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
crl_format = str2fmt(*(++argv));
}
else if (args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &vpm))
{
if (badarg)
@@ -708,6 +810,26 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-verify_return_error") == 0)
verify_return_error = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-verify_quiet") == 0)
verify_quiet = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-brief") == 0)
{
c_brief = 1;
verify_quiet = 1;
c_quiet = 1;
}
else if (args_excert(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &exc))
{
if (badarg)
goto bad;
continue;
}
else if (args_ssl(&argv, &argc, cctx, &badarg, bio_err, &ssl_args))
{
if (badarg)
goto bad;
continue;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-prexit") == 0)
prexit=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-crlf") == 0)
@@ -730,6 +852,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
c_tlsextdebug=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-status") == 0)
c_status_req=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-auth") == 0)
c_auth = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-auth_require_reneg") == 0)
c_auth_require_reneg = 1;
#endif
#ifdef WATT32
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-wdebug") == 0)
@@ -737,6 +863,15 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-msg") == 0)
c_msg=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-msgfile") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
bio_c_msg = BIO_new_file(*(++argv), "w");
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-trace") == 0)
c_msg=2;
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-showcerts") == 0)
c_showcerts=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nbio_test") == 0)
@@ -812,11 +947,21 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
meth=TLSv1_client_method();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-dtls") == 0)
{
meth=DTLS_client_method();
socket_type=SOCK_DGRAM;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-dtls1") == 0)
{
meth=DTLSv1_client_method();
socket_type=SOCK_DGRAM;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-dtls1_2") == 0)
{
meth=DTLSv1_2_client_method();
socket_type=SOCK_DGRAM;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-timeout") == 0)
enable_timeouts=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-mtu") == 0)
@@ -825,8 +970,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
}
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
bugs=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -837,6 +980,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
passarg = *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cert_chain") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
chain_file= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-key") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -851,26 +999,34 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
CApath= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-chainCApath") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
chCApath= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-verifyCApath") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
vfyCApath= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-build_chain") == 0)
build_chain = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-CAfile") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
CAfile= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_tls1_2") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_tls1_1") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_tls1") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ssl3") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ssl2") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_comp") == 0)
{ off|=SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-chainCAfile") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
chCAfile= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-verifyCAfile") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
vfyCAfile= *(++argv);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_ticket") == 0)
{ off|=SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; }
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nextprotoneg") == 0)
{
@@ -878,20 +1034,35 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
next_proto_neg_in = *(++argv);
}
# endif
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverpref") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_renegotiation") == 0)
off|=SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-legacy_server_connect") == 0)
{ off|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-no_legacy_server_connect") == 0)
{ clr|=SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-cipher") == 0)
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-alpn") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
cipher= *(++argv);
alpn_in = *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-serverinfo") == 0)
{
char *c;
int start = 0;
int len;
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
c = *(++argv);
serverinfo_types_count = 0;
len = strlen(c);
for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i)
{
if (i == len || c[i] == ',')
{
serverinfo_types[serverinfo_types_count]
= atoi(c+start);
serverinfo_types_count++;
start = i+1;
}
if (serverinfo_types_count == MAX_SI_TYPES)
break;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef FIONBIO
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-nbio") == 0)
{ c_nbio=1; }
@@ -987,12 +1158,6 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
psk_identity = "JPAKE";
if (cipher)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
goto end;
}
cipher = "PSK";
}
#endif
@@ -1065,6 +1230,37 @@ bad:
}
}
if (chain_file)
{
chain = load_certs(bio_err, chain_file,FORMAT_PEM,
NULL, e, "client certificate chain");
if (!chain)
goto end;
}
if (crl_file)
{
X509_CRL *crl;
crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format);
if (!crl)
{
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
if (!crls || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl))
{
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
X509_CRL_free(crl);
goto end;
}
}
if (!load_excert(&exc, bio_err))
goto end;
if (!app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, 1) && inrand == NULL
&& !RAND_status())
{
@@ -1076,9 +1272,11 @@ bad:
if (bio_c_out == NULL)
{
if (c_quiet && !c_debug && !c_msg)
if (c_quiet && !c_debug)
{
bio_c_out=BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
if (c_msg && !bio_c_msg)
bio_c_msg=BIO_new_fp(stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE);
}
else
{
@@ -1105,6 +1303,20 @@ bad:
if (vpm)
SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm);
if (!args_ssl_call(ctx, bio_err, cctx, ssl_args, 1, no_jpake))
{
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile,
crls, crl_download))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (ssl_client_engine)
{
@@ -1133,38 +1345,52 @@ bad:
if (srtp_profiles != NULL)
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles);
#endif
if (bugs)
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,SSL_OP_ALL|off);
else
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,off);
if (clr)
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, clr);
if (exc) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc);
/* DTLS: partial reads end up discarding unread UDP bytes :-(
* Setting read ahead solves this problem.
*/
if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx, 1);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (next_proto.data)
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto);
# endif
if (alpn_in)
{
unsigned short alpn_len;
unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_in);
if (alpn == NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn argument\n");
goto end;
}
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, alpn, alpn_len);
OPENSSL_free(alpn);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (serverinfo_types_count)
{
for (i = 0; i < serverinfo_types_count; i++)
{
SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext(ctx,
serverinfo_types[i],
NULL,
serverinfo_cli_cb,
NULL);
}
}
#endif
if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx,apps_ssl_info_callback);
if (cipher != NULL)
if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,cipher)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting cipher list\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
#if 0
else
SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx,getenv("SSL_CIPHER"));
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,verify,verify_callback);
if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,cert,key))
goto end;
if ((!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx,CAfile,CApath)) ||
(!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)))
@@ -1174,6 +1400,10 @@ bad:
/* goto end; */
}
ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download);
if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx,cert,key,chain,build_chain))
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (servername != NULL)
{
@@ -1199,6 +1429,12 @@ bad:
}
#endif
if (c_auth)
{
SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz, authz_tlsext_generate_cb, authz_tlsext_cb, bio_err);
SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, authz_tlsext_generate_cb, authz_tlsext_cb, bio_err);
SSL_CTX_set_cli_supp_data(ctx, TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, suppdata_cb, auth_suppdata_generate_cb, bio_err);
}
#endif
con=SSL_new(ctx);
@@ -1225,6 +1461,9 @@ bad:
SSL_set_session(con, sess);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
SSL_pull_tlsa_record(con,host,port);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (servername != NULL)
{
@@ -1274,7 +1513,7 @@ re_start:
#endif
if (c_Pause & 0x01) SSL_set_debug(con, 1);
if ( SSL_version(con) == DTLS1_VERSION)
if (socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
{
sbio=BIO_new_dgram(s,BIO_NOCLOSE);
@@ -1327,8 +1566,13 @@ re_start:
}
if (c_msg)
{
SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_out);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
if (c_msg == 2)
SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace);
else
#endif
SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb);
SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_msg ? bio_c_msg : bio_c_out);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (c_tlsextdebug)
@@ -1528,6 +1772,19 @@ SSL_set_tlsext_status_ids(con, ids);
else
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n", sess_out);
}
if (c_brief)
{
BIO_puts(bio_err,
"CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n");
print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con);
}
/*handshake is complete - free the generated supp data allocated in the callback */
if (generated_supp_data)
{
OPENSSL_free(generated_supp_data);
generated_supp_data = NULL;
}
print_stuff(bio_c_out,con,full_log);
if (full_log > 0) full_log--;
@@ -1790,7 +2047,10 @@ printf("read=%d pending=%d peek=%d\n",k,SSL_pending(con),SSL_peek(con,zbuf,10240
break;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
ret=get_last_socket_error();
BIO_printf(bio_err,"read:errno=%d\n",ret);
if (c_brief)
BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED BY SERVER\n");
else
BIO_printf(bio_err,"read:errno=%d\n",ret);
goto shut;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
BIO_printf(bio_c_out,"closed\n");
@@ -1890,13 +2150,32 @@ end:
print_stuff(bio_c_out,con,1);
SSL_free(con);
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (next_proto.data)
OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data);
#endif
if (ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
if (crls)
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
if (key)
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
if (chain)
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
if (pass)
OPENSSL_free(pass);
if (vpm)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
ssl_excert_free(exc);
if (ssl_args)
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args);
if (cctx)
SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
if (jpake_secret && psk_key)
OPENSSL_free(psk_key);
#endif
if (cbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(cbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(cbuf); }
if (sbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(sbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(sbuf); }
if (mbuf != NULL) { OPENSSL_cleanse(mbuf,BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_free(mbuf); }
@@ -1905,6 +2184,11 @@ end:
BIO_free(bio_c_out);
bio_c_out=NULL;
}
if (bio_c_msg != NULL)
{
BIO_free(bio_c_msg);
bio_c_msg=NULL;
}
apps_shutdown();
OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
}
@@ -2011,6 +2295,9 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
BIO_write(bio,"\n",1);
}
ssl_print_sigalgs(bio, s);
ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s);
BIO_printf(bio,"---\nSSL handshake has read %ld bytes and written %ld bytes\n",
BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)),
BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s)));
@@ -2050,7 +2337,8 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
}
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
if (next_proto.status != -1) {
const unsigned char *proto;
unsigned int proto_len;
@@ -2059,6 +2347,20 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
}
# endif
{
const unsigned char *proto;
unsigned int proto_len;
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(s, &proto, &proto_len);
if (proto_len > 0)
{
BIO_printf(bio, "ALPN protocol: ");
BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len);
BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
}
else
BIO_printf(bio, "No ALPN negotiated\n");
}
#endif
{
@@ -2132,4 +2434,74 @@ static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
return 1;
}
static int authz_tlsext_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short ext_type,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned short inlen, int *al,
void *arg)
{
if (TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz == ext_type)
server_provided_server_authz
= (memchr(in, TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_dtcp, inlen) != NULL);
if (TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz == ext_type)
server_provided_client_authz
= (memchr(in, TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_dtcp, inlen) != NULL);
return 1;
}
static int authz_tlsext_generate_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short ext_type,
const unsigned char **out, unsigned short *outlen,
int *al, void *arg)
{
if (c_auth)
{
/*if auth_require_reneg flag is set, only send extensions if
renegotiation has occurred */
if (!c_auth_require_reneg || (c_auth_require_reneg && SSL_num_renegotiations(s)))
{
*out = auth_ext_data;
*outlen = 1;
return 1;
}
}
/* no auth extension to send */
return -1;
}
static int suppdata_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short supp_data_type,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned short inlen, int *al,
void *arg)
{
if (supp_data_type == TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data)
{
most_recent_supplemental_data = in;
most_recent_supplemental_data_length = inlen;
}
return 1;
}
static int auth_suppdata_generate_cb(SSL *s, unsigned short supp_data_type,
const unsigned char **out,
unsigned short *outlen, int *al, void *arg)
{
if (c_auth && server_provided_client_authz && server_provided_server_authz)
{
/*if auth_require_reneg flag is set, only send supplemental data if
renegotiation has occurred */
if (!c_auth_require_reneg
|| (c_auth_require_reneg && SSL_num_renegotiations(s)))
{
generated_supp_data = OPENSSL_malloc(10);
memcpy(generated_supp_data, "5432154321", 10);
*out = generated_supp_data;
*outlen = 10;
return 1;
}
}
/* no supplemental data to send */
return -1;
}
#endif

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int init_client_ip(int *sock, unsigned char ip[4], int port, int type)
return(1);
}
int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb)(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context)
int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb)(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context), unsigned char *context, int naccept)
{
int sock;
char *name = NULL;
@@ -310,11 +310,13 @@ int do_server(int port, int type, int *ret, int (*cb)(char *hostname, int s, uns
}
else
sock = accept_socket;
i=(*cb)(name,sock, context);
i=(*cb)(name,sock, type, context);
if (name != NULL) OPENSSL_free(name);
if (type==SOCK_STREAM)
SHUTDOWN2(sock);
if (i < 0)
if (naccept != -1)
naccept--;
if (i < 0 || naccept == 0)
{
SHUTDOWN2(accept_socket);
return(i);

View File

@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static const char *names[ALGOR_NUM]={
"aes-128 cbc","aes-192 cbc","aes-256 cbc",
"camellia-128 cbc","camellia-192 cbc","camellia-256 cbc",
"evp","sha256","sha512","whirlpool",
"aes-128 ige","aes-192 ige","aes-256 ige","ghash"};
"aes-128 ige","aes-192 ige","aes-256 ige","ghash" };
static double results[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM];
static int lengths[SIZE_NUM]={16,64,256,1024,8*1024};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static SIGRETTYPE sig_done(int sig)
#if defined(_WIN32)
#if !defined(SIGALRM)
#define SIGALRM
# define SIGALRM
#endif
static unsigned int lapse,schlock;
static void alarm_win32(unsigned int secs) { lapse = secs*1000; }

View File

@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ static int get_index(CA_DB *db, char* id, char type)
if (type == DB_SRP_INDEX)
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
{
pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX && !strcmp(id, pp[DB_srpid]))
pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX && !strcmp(id,pp[DB_srpid]))
return i;
}
else for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
{
pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != DB_SRP_INDEX && !strcmp(id,pp[DB_srpid]))
return i;
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static void print_entry(CA_DB *db, BIO *bio, int indx, int verbose, char *s)
if (indx >= 0 && verbose)
{
int j;
char **pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx);
char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, indx);
BIO_printf(bio, "%s \"%s\"\n", s, pp[DB_srpid]);
for (j = 0; j < DB_NUMBER; j++)
{
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static void print_user(CA_DB *db, BIO *bio, int userindex, int verbose)
{
if (verbose > 0)
{
char **pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
char **pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] != 'I')
{
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ bad:
/* Lets check some fields */
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
{
pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX)
{
@@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ bad:
if (gNindex >= 0)
{
gNrow = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, gNindex);
print_entry(db, bio_err, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N") ;
gNrow = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,gNindex);
print_entry(db, bio_err, gNindex, verbose > 1, "Default g and N");
}
else if (maxgN > 0 && !SRP_get_default_gN(gN))
{
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ bad:
if (userindex >= 0)
{
/* reactivation of a new user */
char **row = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" reactivated.\n", user);
row[DB_srptype][0] = 'V';
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ bad:
else
{
char **row = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
char **row = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
char type = row[DB_srptype][0];
if (type == 'v')
{
@@ -664,9 +664,9 @@ bad:
if (!(gNid=srp_create_user(user,&(row[DB_srpverifier]), &(row[DB_srpsalt]),gNrow?gNrow[DB_srpsalt]:NULL, gNrow?gNrow[DB_srpverifier]:NULL, passout, bio_err,verbose)))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user);
errors++;
goto err;
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot create srp verifier for user \"%s\", operation abandoned.\n", user);
errors++;
goto err;
}
row[DB_srptype][0] = 'v';
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ bad:
}
else
{
char **xpp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, userindex);
char **xpp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,userindex);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "user \"%s\" revoked. t\n", user);
xpp[DB_srptype][0] = 'R';
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ bad:
/* Lets check some fields */
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(db->db->data); i++)
{
pp = (char **)sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data, i);
pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(db->db->data,i);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == 'v')
{

View File

@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
X509_STORE *cert_ctx=NULL;
X509_LOOKUP *lookup=NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
int crl_download = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
char *engine=NULL;
#endif
@@ -145,6 +146,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (argc-- < 1) goto end;
crlfile= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-crl_download") == 0)
crl_download = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-engine") == 0)
{
@@ -222,11 +225,22 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
if (argc < 1) check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
ret = 0;
if (crl_download)
store_setup_crl_download(cert_ctx);
if (argc < 1)
{
if (1 != check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
ret = -1;
}
else
{
for (i=0; i<argc; i++)
check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e);
ret=0;
if (1 != check(cert_ctx,argv[i], untrusted, trusted, crls, e))
ret = -1;
}
end:
if (ret == 1) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,"usage: verify [-verbose] [-CApath path] [-CAfile file] [-purpose purpose] [-crl_check]");
@@ -235,13 +249,16 @@ end:
BIO_printf(bio_err," [-engine e]");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," cert1 cert2 ...\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"recognized usages:\n");
for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++)
{
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n", X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%-10s\t%s\n",
X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
}
}
if (vpm) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
if (cert_ctx != NULL) X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx);
@@ -249,7 +266,7 @@ end:
sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);
apps_shutdown();
OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
OPENSSL_EXIT(ret < 0 ? 2 : ret);
}
static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file,

View File

@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ static const char *x509_usage[]={
" -engine e - use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n",
#endif
" -certopt arg - various certificate text options\n",
" -checkhost host - check certificate matches \"host\"\n",
" -checkemail email - check certificate matches \"email\"\n",
" -checkip ipaddr - check certificate matches \"ipaddr\"\n",
NULL
};
@@ -163,6 +166,9 @@ static int x509_certify (X509_STORE *ctx,char *CAfile,const EVP_MD *digest,
CONF *conf, char *section, ASN1_INTEGER *sno);
static int purpose_print(BIO *bio, X509 *cert, X509_PURPOSE *pt);
static int reqfile=0;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
static int force_version=2;
#endif
int MAIN(int, char **);
@@ -174,15 +180,16 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
X509 *x=NULL,*xca=NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *objtmp;
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *Upkey=NULL,*CApkey=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *Upkey=NULL,*CApkey=NULL, *fkey = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *sno = NULL;
int i,num,badops=0;
int i,num,badops=0, badsig=0;
BIO *out=NULL;
BIO *STDout=NULL;
STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust = NULL, *reject = NULL;
int informat,outformat,keyformat,CAformat,CAkeyformat;
char *infile=NULL,*outfile=NULL,*keyfile=NULL,*CAfile=NULL;
char *CAkeyfile=NULL,*CAserial=NULL;
char *fkeyfile=NULL;
char *alias=NULL;
int text=0,serial=0,subject=0,issuer=0,startdate=0,enddate=0;
int next_serial=0;
@@ -207,6 +214,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
int need_rand = 0;
int checkend=0,checkoffset=0;
unsigned long nmflag = 0, certflag = 0;
unsigned char *checkhost = NULL, *checkemail = NULL;
char *checkip = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
char *engine=NULL;
#endif
@@ -282,13 +291,20 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, *(++argv)))
goto bad;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-force_version") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
force_version=atoi(*(++argv)) - 1;
}
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-days") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
days=atoi(*(++argv));
if (days == 0)
{
BIO_printf(STDout,"bad number of days\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"bad number of days\n");
goto bad;
}
}
@@ -347,6 +363,11 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (!(sno = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, *(++argv))))
goto bad;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-force_pubkey") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
fkeyfile= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-addtrust") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
@@ -450,6 +471,21 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
checkoffset=atoi(*(++argv));
checkend=1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-checkhost") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
checkhost=(unsigned char *)*(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-checkemail") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
checkemail=(unsigned char *)*(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-checkip") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
checkip=*(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-noout") == 0)
noout= ++num;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-trustout") == 0)
@@ -473,6 +509,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-ocspid") == 0)
ocspid= ++num;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-badsig") == 0)
badsig = 1;
else if ((md_alg=EVP_get_digestbyname(*argv + 1)))
{
/* ok */
@@ -517,6 +555,13 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
if (fkeyfile)
{
fkey = load_pubkey(bio_err, fkeyfile, keyformat, 0,
NULL, e, "Forced key");
if (fkey == NULL) goto end;
}
if ((CAkeyfile == NULL) && (CA_flag) && (CAformat == FORMAT_PEM))
{ CAkeyfile=CAfile; }
else if ((CA_flag) && (CAkeyfile == NULL))
@@ -653,10 +698,14 @@ bad:
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x),0);
X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(x),days, 0, NULL);
pkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req);
X509_set_pubkey(x,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (fkey)
X509_set_pubkey(x, fkey);
else
{
pkey = X509_REQ_get_pubkey(req);
X509_set_pubkey(x,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
else
x=load_cert(bio_err,infile,informat,NULL,e,"Certificate");
@@ -912,7 +961,7 @@ bad:
}
else if (text == i)
{
X509_print_ex(out,x,nmflag, certflag);
X509_print_ex(STDout,x,nmflag, certflag);
}
else if (startdate == i)
{
@@ -1044,12 +1093,17 @@ bad:
goto end;
}
print_cert_checks(STDout, x, checkhost, checkemail, checkip);
if (noout)
{
ret=0;
goto end;
}
if (badsig)
x->signature->data[x->signature->length - 1] ^= 0x1;
if (outformat == FORMAT_ASN1)
i=i2d_X509_bio(out,x);
else if (outformat == FORMAT_PEM)
@@ -1093,6 +1147,7 @@ end:
X509_free(xca);
EVP_PKEY_free(Upkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(CApkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(fkey);
if (sigopts)
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts);
X509_REQ_free(rq);
@@ -1202,7 +1257,11 @@ static int x509_certify(X509_STORE *ctx, char *CAfile, const EVP_MD *digest,
if (conf)
{
X509V3_CTX ctx2;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
X509_set_version(x, force_version);
#else
X509_set_version(x,2); /* version 3 certificate */
#endif
X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx2, xca, x, NULL, NULL, 0);
X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx2, conf);
if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx2, section, x)) goto end;
@@ -1280,7 +1339,11 @@ static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext, const EVP_MD *dig
if (conf)
{
X509V3_CTX ctx;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
X509_set_version(x, force_version);
#else
X509_set_version(x,2); /* version 3 certificate */
#endif
X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, x, x, NULL, NULL, 0);
X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf);
if (!X509V3_EXT_add_nconf(conf, &ctx, section, x)) goto err;

27
config
View File

@@ -587,15 +587,33 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
fi
;;
ppc64-*-linux2)
if [ -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then
echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
echo " invoke './Configure linux-ppc64' *manually*."
if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
(trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
fi
fi
if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then
OUT="linux-ppc64"
else
OUT="linux-ppc"
(echo "__LP64__" | gcc -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null) || options="$options -m32"
fi
;;
ppc64le-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc64le" ;;
ppc-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc" ;;
mips64*-*-linux2)
echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to"
echo " invoke './Configure linux-ppc64' *manually*."
echo " invoke './Configure linux64-mips64' *manually*."
if [ "$TEST" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then
echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort."
(trap "stty `stty -g`" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1
fi
OUT="linux-ppc"
OUT="linux-mips64"
;;
ppc-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc" ;;
mips*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-mips32" ;;
ppc60x-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppc60x" ;;
ppcgen-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppcgen" ;;
pentium-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-pentium" ;;
@@ -644,6 +662,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
armv[1-3]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32" ;;
armv[7-9]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4"; options="$options -march=armv7-a" ;;
arm*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4" ;;
aarch64-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic64" ;;
sh*b-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;;
sh*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DL_ENDIAN" ;;
m68k*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; options="$options -DB_ENDIAN" ;;
@@ -739,7 +758,7 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
libc=/usr/lib/libc.so
else # OpenBSD
# ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we
libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null`
fi
case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in
*ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;;

View File

@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@
ppccpuid.s: ppccpuid.pl; $(PERL) ppccpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
pariscid.s: pariscid.pl; $(PERL) pariscid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
alphacpuid.s: alphacpuid.pl
$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
$(PERL) alphacpuid.pl > $$preproc && \
$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
testapps:
[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( if echo $(SDIRS) | fgrep ' des '; \
@@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ subdirs:
@target=all; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE)
files:
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl "CPUID_OBJ=$(CPUID_OBJ)" Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
@target=files; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE)
links:

View File

@@ -3,3 +3,6 @@ Makefile.save
*.flc
semantic.cache
aes-*.s
aesni-*.s
bsaes-*.s
vpaes-*.s

View File

@@ -65,12 +65,20 @@ aesni-x86_64.s: asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/aesni-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
aesni-sha1-x86_64.s: asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
aesni-sha256-x86_64.s: asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
aesni-mb-x86_64.s: asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
aes-sparcv9.s: asm/aes-sparcv9.pl
$(PERL) asm/aes-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
aest4-sparcv9.s: asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl
$(PERL) asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
aes-ppc.s: asm/aes-ppc.pl
$(PERL) asm/aes-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
vpaes-ppc.s: asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
$(PERL) asm/vpaes-ppc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
aes-parisc.s: asm/aes-parisc.pl
$(PERL) asm/aes-parisc.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
@@ -81,9 +89,11 @@ aes-mips.S: asm/aes-mips.pl
# GNU make "catch all"
aes-%.S: asm/aes-%.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
aes-armv4.o: aes-armv4.S
bsaes-%.S: asm/bsaes-%.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
bsaes-armv7.o: bsaes-armv7.S
files:
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl "AES_ENC=$(AES_ENC)" Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
links:
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
@@ -147,7 +157,7 @@ aes_wrap.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/modes.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
aes_wrap.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h aes_wrap.c

View File

@@ -53,207 +53,18 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
static const unsigned char default_iv[] = {
0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6,
};
#include <openssl/modes.h>
int AES_wrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
unsigned char *A, B[16], *R;
unsigned int i, j, t;
if ((inlen & 0x7) || (inlen < 8))
return -1;
A = B;
t = 1;
memcpy(out + 8, in, inlen);
if (!iv)
iv = default_iv;
memcpy(A, iv, 8);
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
{
R = out + 8;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t++, R += 8)
{
memcpy(B + 8, R, 8);
AES_encrypt(B, B, key);
A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
if (t > 0xff)
{
A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
}
memcpy(R, B + 8, 8);
}
}
memcpy(out, A, 8);
return inlen + 8;
return CRYPTO_128_wrap(key, iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f)AES_encrypt);
}
int AES_unwrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
unsigned char *A, B[16], *R;
unsigned int i, j, t;
inlen -= 8;
if (inlen & 0x7)
return -1;
if (inlen < 8)
return -1;
A = B;
t = 6 * (inlen >> 3);
memcpy(A, in, 8);
memcpy(out, in + 8, inlen);
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
{
R = out + inlen - 8;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t--, R -= 8)
{
A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
if (t > 0xff)
{
A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
}
memcpy(B + 8, R, 8);
AES_decrypt(B, B, key);
memcpy(R, B + 8, 8);
}
}
if (!iv)
iv = default_iv;
if (memcmp(A, iv, 8))
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, inlen);
return 0;
}
return inlen;
return CRYPTO_128_unwrap(key, iv, out, in, inlen, (block128_f)AES_decrypt);
}
#ifdef AES_WRAP_TEST
int AES_wrap_unwrap_test(const unsigned char *kek, int keybits,
const unsigned char *iv,
const unsigned char *eout,
const unsigned char *key, int keylen)
{
unsigned char *otmp = NULL, *ptmp = NULL;
int r, ret = 0;
AES_KEY wctx;
otmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
if (!otmp || !ptmp)
return 0;
if (AES_set_encrypt_key(kek, keybits, &wctx))
goto err;
r = AES_wrap_key(&wctx, iv, otmp, key, keylen);
if (r <= 0)
goto err;
if (eout && memcmp(eout, otmp, keylen))
goto err;
if (AES_set_decrypt_key(kek, keybits, &wctx))
goto err;
r = AES_unwrap_key(&wctx, iv, ptmp, otmp, r);
if (memcmp(key, ptmp, keylen))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
if (otmp)
OPENSSL_free(otmp);
if (ptmp)
OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
return ret;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
static const unsigned char kek[] = {
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f
};
static const unsigned char key[] = {
0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77,
0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff,
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
};
static const unsigned char e1[] = {
0x1f, 0xa6, 0x8b, 0x0a, 0x81, 0x12, 0xb4, 0x47,
0xae, 0xf3, 0x4b, 0xd8, 0xfb, 0x5a, 0x7b, 0x82,
0x9d, 0x3e, 0x86, 0x23, 0x71, 0xd2, 0xcf, 0xe5
};
static const unsigned char e2[] = {
0x96, 0x77, 0x8b, 0x25, 0xae, 0x6c, 0xa4, 0x35,
0xf9, 0x2b, 0x5b, 0x97, 0xc0, 0x50, 0xae, 0xd2,
0x46, 0x8a, 0xb8, 0xa1, 0x7a, 0xd8, 0x4e, 0x5d
};
static const unsigned char e3[] = {
0x64, 0xe8, 0xc3, 0xf9, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x5b, 0xa2,
0x63, 0xe9, 0x77, 0x79, 0x05, 0x81, 0x8a, 0x2a,
0x93, 0xc8, 0x19, 0x1e, 0x7d, 0x6e, 0x8a, 0xe7
};
static const unsigned char e4[] = {
0x03, 0x1d, 0x33, 0x26, 0x4e, 0x15, 0xd3, 0x32,
0x68, 0xf2, 0x4e, 0xc2, 0x60, 0x74, 0x3e, 0xdc,
0xe1, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xdd, 0xee, 0x72, 0x5a, 0x93,
0x6b, 0xa8, 0x14, 0x91, 0x5c, 0x67, 0x62, 0xd2
};
static const unsigned char e5[] = {
0xa8, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x16, 0x12, 0xc6, 0x8b, 0x3f,
0xf6, 0xe6, 0xf4, 0xfb, 0xe3, 0x0e, 0x71, 0xe4,
0x76, 0x9c, 0x8b, 0x80, 0xa3, 0x2c, 0xb8, 0x95,
0x8c, 0xd5, 0xd1, 0x7d, 0x6b, 0x25, 0x4d, 0xa1
};
static const unsigned char e6[] = {
0x28, 0xc9, 0xf4, 0x04, 0xc4, 0xb8, 0x10, 0xf4,
0xcb, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x5c, 0xfb, 0x87, 0xf8, 0x26,
0x3f, 0x57, 0x86, 0xe2, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xd3, 0x26,
0xcb, 0xc7, 0xf0, 0xe7, 0x1a, 0x99, 0xf4, 0x3b,
0xfb, 0x98, 0x8b, 0x9b, 0x7a, 0x02, 0xdd, 0x21
};
AES_KEY wctx, xctx;
int ret;
ret = AES_wrap_unwrap_test(kek, 128, NULL, e1, key, 16);
fprintf(stderr, "Key test result %d\n", ret);
ret = AES_wrap_unwrap_test(kek, 192, NULL, e2, key, 16);
fprintf(stderr, "Key test result %d\n", ret);
ret = AES_wrap_unwrap_test(kek, 256, NULL, e3, key, 16);
fprintf(stderr, "Key test result %d\n", ret);
ret = AES_wrap_unwrap_test(kek, 192, NULL, e4, key, 24);
fprintf(stderr, "Key test result %d\n", ret);
ret = AES_wrap_unwrap_test(kek, 256, NULL, e5, key, 24);
fprintf(stderr, "Key test result %d\n", ret);
ret = AES_wrap_unwrap_test(kek, 256, NULL, e6, key, 32);
fprintf(stderr, "Key test result %d\n", ret);
}
#endif

View File

@@ -89,8 +89,10 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;
#endif
#undef ROTATE
#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__ICC)
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
# define ROTATE(a,n) _lrotl(a,n)
#elif defined(__ICC)
# define ROTATE(a,n) _rotl(a,n)
#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
# if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
# define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
# but exhibits up to 10% improvement on other cores.
#
# Second version is "monolithic" replacement for aes_core.c, which in
# addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements private_AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key.
# addition to AES_[de|en]crypt implements AES_set_[de|en]cryption_key.
# This made it possible to implement little-endian variant of the
# algorithm without modifying the base C code. Motivating factor for
# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
@@ -103,11 +103,12 @@
# byte for 128-bit key.
#
# ECB encrypt ECB decrypt CBC large chunk
# P4 56[60] 84[100] 23
# AMD K8 48[44] 70[79] 18
# PIII 41[50] 61[91] 24
# Core 2 32[38] 45[70] 18.5
# Pentium 120 160 77
# P4 52[54] 83[95] 23
# AMD K8 46[41] 66[70] 18
# PIII 41[50] 60[77] 24
# Core 2 31[36] 45[64] 18.5
# Atom 76[100] 96[138] 60
# Pentium 115 150 77
#
# Version 4.1 switches to compact S-box even in key schedule setup.
#
@@ -242,7 +243,7 @@ $vertical_spin=0; # shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of
sub encvert()
{ my ($te,@s) = @_;
my $v0 = $acc, $v1 = $key;
my ($v0,$v1) = ($acc,$key);
&mov ($v0,$s[3]); # copy s3
&mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$s[2]); # save s2
@@ -299,7 +300,7 @@ sub encvert()
# Another experimental routine, which features "horizontal spin," but
# eliminates one reference to stack. Strangely enough runs slower...
sub enchoriz()
{ my $v0 = $key, $v1 = $acc;
{ my ($v0,$v1) = ($key,$acc);
&movz ($v0,&LB($s0)); # 3, 2, 1, 0*
&rotr ($s2,8); # 8,11,10, 9
@@ -427,7 +428,7 @@ sub sse_encbody()
######################################################################
sub enccompact()
{ my $Fn = mov;
{ my $Fn = \&mov;
while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
my ($i,$te,@s)=@_;
my $tmp = $key;
@@ -476,24 +477,25 @@ sub enctransform()
my $tmp = $tbl;
my $r2 = $key ;
&mov ($acc,$s[$i]);
&and ($acc,0x80808080);
&mov ($tmp,$acc);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&and ($tmp,$s[$i]);
&lea ($r2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&and ($r2,0xfefefefe);
&and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&mov ($tmp,$s[$i]);
&and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
&rotr ($tmp,16);
&xor ($acc,$r2); # r2
&mov ($r2,$s[$i]);
&xor ($s[$i],$acc); # r0 ^ r2
&rotr ($r2,16+8);
&xor ($acc,$tmp);
&rotl ($s[$i],24);
&xor ($s[$i],$acc) # ROTATE(r2^r0,24) ^ r2
&rotr ($tmp,16);
&xor ($s[$i],$tmp);
&rotr ($tmp,8);
&xor ($s[$i],$tmp);
&xor ($acc,$r2);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080) if ($i!=1);
&xor ($s[$i],$acc); # ROTATE(r2^r0,24) ^ r2
}
&function_begin_B("_x86_AES_encrypt_compact");
@@ -526,6 +528,7 @@ sub enctransform()
&enccompact(1,$tbl,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s0,1);
&enccompact(2,$tbl,$s2,$s3,$s0,$s1,1);
&enccompact(3,$tbl,$s3,$s0,$s1,$s2,1);
&mov ($tbl,0x80808080);
&enctransform(2);
&enctransform(3);
&enctransform(0);
@@ -607,82 +610,84 @@ sub sse_enccompact()
&pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x0d); # 15,14,11,10
&movd ("eax","mm1"); # 5, 4, 1, 0
&movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 15,14,11,10
&mov ($__key,$key);
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
&pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
&movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
&pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x0d); # 7, 6, 3, 2
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 10
&movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1
&shl ("edx",8); # 1
&shr ("eax",16); # 5, 4
&shl ("edx",8); # 1
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 10
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 10
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 11
&shl ($acc,16); # 10
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
&pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x08); # 13,12, 9, 8
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 11
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 11
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 5
&shl ($acc,24); # 11
&or ("edx",$acc); # 11
&shr ("ebx",16); # 15,14
&or ("edx",$acc); # 11
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 5
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 5
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 15
&shl ($acc,8); # 5
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 5
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 15
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 15
&movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 4
&shl ($acc,24); # 15
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 15
&movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 4
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 4
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 14
&movd ("eax","mm2"); # 7, 6, 3, 2
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 14
&shl ($acc,16); # 14
&movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 14
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 3
&shl ("ecx",16); # 14
&movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 14
&movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 13,12, 9, 8
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 3
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 3
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 3
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 9
&shl ($acc,24); # 3
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 3
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 9
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 9
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 8
&shl ($acc,8); # 9
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
&movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 8
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 8
&shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 2
&shl ($acc,16); # 2
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 2
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 8
&movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 2
&shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
&movd ("mm1","ecx"); # t[1] collected
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 2
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 7
&shl ("ecx",16); # 2
&and ("eax",0xff); # 6
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 2
&punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 7
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 7
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 13
&shl ($acc,24); # 7
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
&and ("eax",0xff); # 6
&movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 6
&shl ("eax",16); # 6
&or ("edx","eax"); # 6
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 13
&shl ($acc,8); # 13
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
&movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
&and ("ebx",0xff); # 12
&movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 6
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
&shl ("eax",16); # 6
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 13
&or ("edx","eax"); # 6
&shl ($acc,8); # 13
&movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 12
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
&or ("edx","ebx"); # 12
&mov ($key,$__key);
&movd ("mm4","ecx"); # t[2] collected
&movd ("mm5","edx"); # t[3] collected
&punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
@@ -1222,7 +1227,7 @@ sub enclast()
######################################################################
sub deccompact()
{ my $Fn = mov;
{ my $Fn = \&mov;
while ($#_>5) { pop(@_); $Fn=sub{}; }
my ($i,$td,@s)=@_;
my $tmp = $key;
@@ -1270,30 +1275,30 @@ sub dectransform()
my $tp4 = @s[($i+3)%4]; $tp4 = @s[3] if ($i==1);
my $tp8 = $tbl;
&mov ($acc,$s[$i]);
&and ($acc,0x80808080);
&mov ($tmp,$acc);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080);
&and ($tmp,$s[$i]);
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$s[$i],$s[$i]));
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&and ($tp2,0xfefefefe);
&and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
&xor ($acc,$tp2);
&mov ($tp2,$acc);
&xor ($tp2,$acc);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080);
&and ($acc,0x80808080);
&mov ($tmp,$acc);
&and ($tmp,$tp2);
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&and ($tp4,0xfefefefe);
&and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
&xor ($tp2,$s[$i]); # tp2^tp1
&xor ($acc,$tp4);
&mov ($tp4,$acc);
&xor ($tp4,$acc);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080);
&and ($acc,0x80808080);
&mov ($tmp,$acc);
&and ($tmp,$tp4);
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
@@ -1305,13 +1310,13 @@ sub dectransform()
&xor ($s[$i],$tp2);
&xor ($tp2,$tp8);
&rotl ($tp2,24);
&xor ($s[$i],$tp4);
&xor ($tp4,$tp8);
&rotl ($tp4,16);
&rotl ($tp2,24);
&xor ($s[$i],$tp8); # ^= tp8^(tp4^tp1)^(tp2^tp1)
&rotl ($tp8,8);
&rotl ($tp4,16);
&xor ($s[$i],$tp2); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp2^tp1,24)
&rotl ($tp8,8);
&xor ($s[$i],$tp4); # ^= ROTATE(tp8^tp4^tp1,16)
&mov ($s[0],$__s0) if($i==2); #prefetch $s0
&mov ($s[1],$__s1) if($i==3); #prefetch $s1
@@ -1389,85 +1394,87 @@ sub dectransform()
sub sse_deccompact()
{
&pshufw ("mm1","mm0",0x0c); # 7, 6, 1, 0
&movd ("eax","mm1"); # 7, 6, 1, 0
&pshufw ("mm5","mm4",0x09); # 13,12,11,10
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
&movd ("eax","mm1"); # 7, 6, 1, 0
&movd ("ebx","mm5"); # 13,12,11,10
&mov ($__key,$key);
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 0
&movz ("edx",&HB("eax")); # 1
&pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x06); # 3, 2, 5, 4
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 0
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 10
&movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"edx",1)); # 1
&shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
&shl ("edx",8); # 1
&pshufw ("mm2","mm0",0x06); # 3, 2, 5, 4
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 10
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 10
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 10
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 11
&shl ($acc,16); # 10
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
&shr ("eax",16); # 7, 6
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 11
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 11
&shl ($acc,24); # 11
&or ("edx",$acc); # 11
&shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
&pshufw ("mm6","mm4",0x03); # 9, 8,15,14
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 7
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 7
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 10
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 11
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 7
&shl ($acc,24); # 11
&shr ("ebx",16); # 13,12
&or ("edx",$acc); # 11
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 7
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 13
&shl ($acc,24); # 7
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 7
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 13
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 13
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 13
&movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 6
&shl ($acc,8); # 13
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
&movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 6
&movd ("eax","mm2"); # 3, 2, 5, 4
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 6
&shl ("ecx",16); # 6
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 12
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 13
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 6
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 12
&shl ($acc,16); # 6
&movd ("ebx","mm6"); # 9, 8,15,14
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 12
&movd ("mm0","ecx"); # t[0] collected
&movz ("ecx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 12
&movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 4
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 12
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 4
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 4
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 4
&movz ($key,&LB("ebx")); # 14
&or ("edx",$acc); # 4
&movz ($acc,&LB("ebx")); # 14
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 14
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 14
&movz ($key,&HB("eax")); # 5
&shl ($acc,16); # 14
&or ("edx",$acc); # 14
&movd ("mm1","edx"); # t[1] collected
&movz ($acc,&HB("eax")); # 5
&movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 5
&shl ("edx",8); # 5
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 15
&shr ("eax",16); # 3, 2
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 15
&shl ($acc,24); # 15
&or ("edx",$acc); # 15
&or ("edx",$acc); # 14
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 5
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 15
&shr ("ebx",16); # 9, 8
&shl ($acc,8); # 5
&movd ("mm1","edx"); # t[1] collected
&movz ("edx",&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 15
&movz ($key,&HB("ebx")); # 9
&shl ("edx",24); # 15
&and ("ebx",0xff); # 8
&or ("edx",$acc); # 15
&punpckldq ("mm0","mm1"); # t[0,1] collected
&movz ($acc,&HB("ebx")); # 9
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 9
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 9
&movz ($key,&LB("eax")); # 2
&shl ($acc,8); # 9
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
&and ("ebx",0xff); # 8
&movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 8
&or ("edx","ebx"); # 8
&movz ($acc,&LB("eax")); # 2
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$acc,1)); # 2
&shl ($acc,16); # 2
&or ("edx",$acc); # 2
&movd ("mm4","edx"); # t[2] collected
&movz ("eax",&HB("eax")); # 3
&movz ("ebx",&BP(-128,$tbl,"ebx",1)); # 8
&or ("ecx",$acc); # 9
&movz ($acc,&BP(-128,$tbl,$key,1)); # 2
&or ("edx","ebx"); # 8
&shl ($acc,16); # 2
&movz ("eax",&BP(-128,$tbl,"eax",1)); # 3
&or ("edx",$acc); # 2
&shl ("eax",24); # 3
&or ("ecx","eax"); # 3
&mov ($key,$__key);
&movd ("mm4","edx"); # t[2] collected
&movd ("mm5","ecx"); # t[3] collected
&punpckldq ("mm4","mm5"); # t[2,3] collected
@@ -2181,8 +2188,8 @@ my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp"); # copy of aes_key->rounds
&mov ("ecx",240/4);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&align (4);
&data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
&set_label("skip_ezero")
&data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
&set_label("skip_ezero");
&mov ("esp",$_esp);
&popf ();
&set_label("drop_out");
@@ -2301,8 +2308,8 @@ my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp"); # copy of aes_key->rounds
&mov ("ecx",240/4);
&xor ("eax","eax");
&align (4);
&data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
&set_label("skip_dzero")
&data_word(0xABF3F689); # rep stosd
&set_label("skip_dzero");
&mov ("esp",$_esp);
&popf ();
&function_end_A();
@@ -2865,32 +2872,32 @@ sub deckey()
{ my ($i,$key,$tp1,$tp2,$tp4,$tp8) = @_;
my $tmp = $tbl;
&mov ($acc,$tp1);
&and ($acc,0x80808080);
&mov ($tmp,$acc);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080);
&and ($tmp,$tp1);
&lea ($tp2,&DWP(0,$tp1,$tp1));
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&and ($tp2,0xfefefefe);
&and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
&xor ($acc,$tp2);
&mov ($tp2,$acc);
&xor ($tp2,$acc);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080);
&and ($acc,0x80808080);
&mov ($tmp,$acc);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&and ($tmp,$tp2);
&lea ($tp4,&DWP(0,$tp2,$tp2));
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&and ($tp4,0xfefefefe);
&and ($acc,0x1b1b1b1b);
&xor ($tp2,$tp1); # tp2^tp1
&xor ($acc,$tp4);
&mov ($tp4,$acc);
&xor ($tp4,$acc);
&mov ($tmp,0x80808080);
&and ($acc,0x80808080);
&mov ($tmp,$acc);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&and ($tmp,$tp4);
&lea ($tp8,&DWP(0,$tp4,$tp4));
&mov ($acc,$tmp);
&shr ($tmp,7);
&xor ($tp4,$tp1); # tp4^tp1
&sub ($acc,$tmp);
&and ($tp8,0xfefefefe);

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
# ====================================================================
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
@@ -51,9 +51,23 @@ $key="r11";
$rounds="r12";
$code=<<___;
#include "arm_arch.h"
#ifndef __KERNEL__
# include "arm_arch.h"
#else
# define __ARM_ARCH__ __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__
#endif
.text
#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
.code 32
#else
.syntax unified
# ifdef __thumb2__
.thumb
# else
.code 32
# endif
#endif
.type AES_Te,%object
.align 5
@@ -167,7 +181,11 @@ AES_Te:
.type AES_encrypt,%function
.align 5
AES_encrypt:
#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
sub r3,pc,#8 @ AES_encrypt
#else
adr r3,AES_encrypt
#endif
stmdb sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr}
mov $rounds,r0 @ inp
mov $key,r2
@@ -408,11 +426,22 @@ _armv4_AES_encrypt:
.type private_AES_set_encrypt_key,%function
.align 5
private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key:
#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
sub r3,pc,#8 @ AES_set_encrypt_key
#else
adr r3,private_AES_set_encrypt_key
#endif
teq r0,#0
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
#endif
moveq r0,#-1
beq .Labrt
teq r2,#0
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
#endif
moveq r0,#-1
beq .Labrt
@@ -421,11 +450,14 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
teq r1,#192
beq .Lok
teq r1,#256
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
itt ne @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
#endif
movne r0,#-1
bne .Labrt
.Lok: stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
sub $tbl,r3,#private_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024 @ Te4
sub $tbl,r3,#_armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key-AES_Te-1024 @ Te4
mov $rounds,r0 @ inp
mov lr,r1 @ bits
@@ -575,6 +607,9 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
str $s2,[$key,#-16]
subs $rounds,$rounds,#1
str $s3,[$key,#-12]
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
#endif
subeq r2,$key,#216
beq .Ldone
@@ -644,6 +679,9 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
str $s2,[$key,#-24]
subs $rounds,$rounds,#1
str $s3,[$key,#-20]
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
itt eq @ Thumb2 thing, sanity check in ARM
#endif
subeq r2,$key,#256
beq .Ldone
@@ -673,11 +711,17 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
str $i3,[$key,#-4]
b .L256_loop
.align 2
.Ldone: mov r0,#0
ldmia sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
.Labrt: tst lr,#1
.Labrt:
#if defined(__thumb2__) && __ARM_ARCH__>=7
.short 0x4770 @ bx lr in Thumb2 encoding
#else
tst lr,#1
moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
#endif
.size private_AES_set_encrypt_key,.-private_AES_set_encrypt_key
.global private_AES_set_decrypt_key
@@ -685,36 +729,59 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
.align 5
private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
str lr,[sp,#-4]! @ push lr
bl private_AES_set_encrypt_key
bl _armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key
teq r0,#0
ldrne lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr
ldr lr,[sp],#4 @ pop lr
bne .Labrt
stmdb sp!,{r4-r12}
mov r0,r2 @ AES_set_encrypt_key preserves r2,
mov r1,r2 @ which is AES_KEY *key
b _armv4_AES_set_enc2dec_key
.size private_AES_set_decrypt_key,.-private_AES_set_decrypt_key
ldr $rounds,[r2,#240] @ AES_set_encrypt_key preserves r2,
mov $key,r2 @ which is AES_KEY *key
mov $i1,r2
add $i2,r2,$rounds,lsl#4
@ void AES_set_enc2dec_key(const AES_KEY *inp,AES_KEY *out)
.global AES_set_enc2dec_key
.type AES_set_enc2dec_key,%function
.align 5
AES_set_enc2dec_key:
_armv4_AES_set_enc2dec_key:
stmdb sp!,{r4-r12,lr}
.Linv: ldr $s0,[$i1]
ldr $rounds,[r0,#240]
mov $i1,r0 @ input
add $i2,r0,$rounds,lsl#4
mov $key,r1 @ ouput
add $tbl,r1,$rounds,lsl#4
str $rounds,[r1,#240]
.Linv: ldr $s0,[$i1],#16
ldr $s1,[$i1,#-12]
ldr $s2,[$i1,#-8]
ldr $s3,[$i1,#-4]
ldr $t1,[$i2],#-16
ldr $t2,[$i2,#16+4]
ldr $t3,[$i2,#16+8]
ldr $i3,[$i2,#16+12]
str $s0,[$tbl],#-16
str $s1,[$tbl,#16+4]
str $s2,[$tbl,#16+8]
str $s3,[$tbl,#16+12]
str $t1,[$key],#16
str $t2,[$key,#-12]
str $t3,[$key,#-8]
str $i3,[$key,#-4]
teq $i1,$i2
bne .Linv
ldr $s0,[$i1]
ldr $s1,[$i1,#4]
ldr $s2,[$i1,#8]
ldr $s3,[$i1,#12]
ldr $t1,[$i2]
ldr $t2,[$i2,#4]
ldr $t3,[$i2,#8]
ldr $i3,[$i2,#12]
str $s0,[$i2],#-16
str $s1,[$i2,#16+4]
str $s2,[$i2,#16+8]
str $s3,[$i2,#16+12]
str $t1,[$i1],#16
str $t2,[$i1,#-12]
str $t3,[$i1,#-8]
str $i3,[$i1,#-4]
teq $i1,$i2
bne .Linv
str $s0,[$key]
str $s1,[$key,#4]
str $s2,[$key,#8]
str $s3,[$key,#12]
sub $key,$key,$rounds,lsl#3
___
$mask80=$i1;
$mask1b=$i2;
@@ -772,7 +839,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
#endif
.size private_AES_set_decrypt_key,.-private_AES_set_decrypt_key
.size AES_set_enc2dec_key,.-AES_set_enc2dec_key
.type AES_Td,%object
.align 5
@@ -882,7 +949,11 @@ AES_Td:
.type AES_decrypt,%function
.align 5
AES_decrypt:
#if __ARM_ARCH__<7
sub r3,pc,#8 @ AES_decrypt
#else
adr r3,AES_decrypt
#endif
stmdb sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr}
mov $rounds,r0 @ inp
mov $key,r2
@@ -1079,8 +1150,9 @@ _armv4_AES_decrypt:
ldrb $t3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s0>>0]
and $i3,lr,$s1,lsr#8
add $s1,$tbl,$s1,lsr#24
ldrb $i1,[$tbl,$i1] @ Td4[s1>>0]
ldrb $s1,[$tbl,$s1,lsr#24] @ Td4[s1>>24]
ldrb $s1,[$s1] @ Td4[s1>>24]
ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] @ Td4[s1>>16]
eor $s0,$i1,$s0,lsl#24
ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s1>>8]
@@ -1093,7 +1165,8 @@ _armv4_AES_decrypt:
ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] @ Td4[s2>>0]
and $i3,lr,$s2,lsr#16
ldrb $s2,[$tbl,$s2,lsr#24] @ Td4[s2>>24]
add $s2,$tbl,$s2,lsr#24
ldrb $s2,[$s2] @ Td4[s2>>24]
eor $s0,$s0,$i1,lsl#8
ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s2>>16]
eor $s1,$i2,$s1,lsl#16
@@ -1105,8 +1178,9 @@ _armv4_AES_decrypt:
ldrb $i2,[$tbl,$i2] @ Td4[s3>>8]
and $i3,lr,$s3 @ i2
add $s3,$tbl,$s3,lsr#24
ldrb $i3,[$tbl,$i3] @ Td4[s3>>0]
ldrb $s3,[$tbl,$s3,lsr#24] @ Td4[s3>>24]
ldrb $s3,[$s3] @ Td4[s3>>24]
eor $s0,$s0,$i1,lsl#16
ldr $i1,[$key,#0]
eor $s1,$s1,$i2,lsl#8
@@ -1129,5 +1203,14 @@ _armv4_AES_decrypt:
___
$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
open SELF,$0;
while(<SELF>) {
next if (/^#!/);
last if (!s/^#/@/ and !/^$/);
print;
}
close SELF;
print $code;
close STDOUT; # enforce flush

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1015,7 +1015,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
$SIZE_T==4 ? sprintf("extru%s,%d,8,",$1,31-$2)
: sprintf("extrd,u%s,%d,8,",$1,63-$2)/e;
s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
s/,\*/,/ if ($SIZE_T==4);
s/\bbv\b(.*\(%r2\))/bve$1/ if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}
close STDOUT;

View File

@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
$PUSH ="stw";
} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? $SIZE_T : 0;
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
@@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ $key="r5";
$Tbl0="r3";
$Tbl1="r6";
$Tbl2="r7";
$Tbl3="r2";
$Tbl3=$out; # stay away from "r2"; $out is offloaded to stack
$s0="r8";
$s1="r9";
@@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ $s2="r10";
$s3="r11";
$t0="r12";
$t1="r13";
$t1="r0"; # stay away from "r13";
$t2="r14";
$t3="r15";
@@ -100,9 +102,6 @@ $acc13="r29";
$acc14="r30";
$acc15="r31";
# stay away from TLS pointer
if ($SIZE_T==8) { die if ($t1 ne "r13"); $t1="r0"; }
else { die if ($Tbl3 ne "r2"); $Tbl3=$t0; $t0="r0"; }
$mask80=$Tbl2;
$mask1b=$Tbl3;
@@ -337,8 +336,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
$STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp)
mflr r0
$PUSH $toc,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*20`($sp)
$PUSH r13,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
$PUSH $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
$PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
$PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
$PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
@@ -365,16 +363,61 @@ $code.=<<___;
bne Lenc_unaligned
Lenc_unaligned_ok:
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
lwz $s0,0($inp)
lwz $s1,4($inp)
lwz $s2,8($inp)
lwz $s3,12($inp)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
lwz $t0,0($inp)
lwz $t1,4($inp)
lwz $t2,8($inp)
lwz $t3,12($inp)
rotlwi $s0,$t0,8
rotlwi $s1,$t1,8
rotlwi $s2,$t2,8
rotlwi $s3,$t3,8
rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,0,7
rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,0,7
rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,0,7
rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,0,7
rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,16,23
rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,16,23
rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,16,23
rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,16,23
___
$code.=<<___;
bl LAES_Te
bl Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact
$POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
rotlwi $t0,$s0,8
rotlwi $t1,$s1,8
rotlwi $t2,$s2,8
rotlwi $t3,$s3,8
rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,0,7
rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,0,7
rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,0,7
rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,0,7
rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,16,23
rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,16,23
rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,16,23
rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,16,23
stw $t0,0($out)
stw $t1,4($out)
stw $t2,8($out)
stw $t3,12($out)
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
stw $s0,0($out)
stw $s1,4($out)
stw $s2,8($out)
stw $s3,12($out)
___
$code.=<<___;
b Lenc_done
Lenc_unaligned:
@@ -417,6 +460,7 @@ Lenc_xpage:
bl LAES_Te
bl Lppc_AES_encrypt_compact
$POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
extrwi $acc00,$s0,8,0
extrwi $acc01,$s0,8,8
@@ -449,8 +493,6 @@ Lenc_xpage:
Lenc_done:
$POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
$POP $toc,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*20`($sp)
$POP r13,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
$POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
$POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
$POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
@@ -764,6 +806,7 @@ Lenc_compact_done:
blr
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
.size .AES_encrypt,.-.AES_encrypt
.globl .AES_decrypt
.align 7
@@ -771,8 +814,7 @@ Lenc_compact_done:
$STU $sp,-$FRAME($sp)
mflr r0
$PUSH $toc,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*20`($sp)
$PUSH r13,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
$PUSH $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
$PUSH r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
$PUSH r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
$PUSH r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
@@ -799,16 +841,61 @@ Lenc_compact_done:
bne Ldec_unaligned
Ldec_unaligned_ok:
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
lwz $s0,0($inp)
lwz $s1,4($inp)
lwz $s2,8($inp)
lwz $s3,12($inp)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
lwz $t0,0($inp)
lwz $t1,4($inp)
lwz $t2,8($inp)
lwz $t3,12($inp)
rotlwi $s0,$t0,8
rotlwi $s1,$t1,8
rotlwi $s2,$t2,8
rotlwi $s3,$t3,8
rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,0,7
rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,0,7
rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,0,7
rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,0,7
rlwimi $s0,$t0,24,16,23
rlwimi $s1,$t1,24,16,23
rlwimi $s2,$t2,24,16,23
rlwimi $s3,$t3,24,16,23
___
$code.=<<___;
bl LAES_Td
bl Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact
$POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($LITTLE_ENDIAN);
rotlwi $t0,$s0,8
rotlwi $t1,$s1,8
rotlwi $t2,$s2,8
rotlwi $t3,$s3,8
rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,0,7
rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,0,7
rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,0,7
rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,0,7
rlwimi $t0,$s0,24,16,23
rlwimi $t1,$s1,24,16,23
rlwimi $t2,$s2,24,16,23
rlwimi $t3,$s3,24,16,23
stw $t0,0($out)
stw $t1,4($out)
stw $t2,8($out)
stw $t3,12($out)
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$LITTLE_ENDIAN);
stw $s0,0($out)
stw $s1,4($out)
stw $s2,8($out)
stw $s3,12($out)
___
$code.=<<___;
b Ldec_done
Ldec_unaligned:
@@ -851,6 +938,7 @@ Ldec_xpage:
bl LAES_Td
bl Lppc_AES_decrypt_compact
$POP $out,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
extrwi $acc00,$s0,8,0
extrwi $acc01,$s0,8,8
@@ -883,8 +971,6 @@ Ldec_xpage:
Ldec_done:
$POP r0,`$FRAME+$LRSAVE`($sp)
$POP $toc,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*20`($sp)
$POP r13,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*19`($sp)
$POP r14,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*18`($sp)
$POP r15,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*17`($sp)
$POP r16,`$FRAME-$SIZE_T*16`($sp)
@@ -1355,6 +1441,7 @@ Ldec_compact_done:
blr
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,0,0
.size .AES_decrypt,.-.AES_decrypt
.asciz "AES for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 7

View File

@@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type private_AES_set_encrypt_key,\@function
.align 16
private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key:
lghi $t0,0
cl${g}r $inp,$t0
je .Lminus1
@@ -836,7 +837,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
je 1f
lg %r1,24($inp)
stg %r1,24($key)
1: st $bits,236($key) # save bits
1: st $bits,236($key) # save bits [for debugging purposes]
lgr $t0,%r5
st %r5,240($key) # save km code
lghi %r2,0
br %r14
@@ -844,7 +846,7 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
.align 16
.Lekey_internal:
stm${g} %r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp) # all non-volatile regs
stm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp) # all non-volatile regs and $key
larl $tbl,AES_Te+2048
@@ -904,8 +906,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
la $key,16($key) # key+=4
la $t3,4($t3) # i++
brct $rounds,.L128_loop
lghi $t0,10
lghi %r2,0
lm${g} %r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
lm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
br $ra
.align 16
@@ -952,8 +955,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
st $s2,32($key)
st $s3,36($key)
brct $rounds,.L192_continue
lghi $t0,12
lghi %r2,0
lm${g} %r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
lm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
br $ra
.align 16
@@ -1014,8 +1018,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
st $s2,40($key)
st $s3,44($key)
brct $rounds,.L256_continue
lghi $t0,14
lghi %r2,0
lm${g} %r6,%r13,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
lm${g} %r4,%r13,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
br $ra
.align 16
@@ -1066,34 +1071,26 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type private_AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function
.align 16
private_AES_set_decrypt_key:
st${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp) # I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to
st${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp) # save non-volatile registers!
bras $ra,AES_set_encrypt_key
l${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
#st${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp) # I rely on AES_set_encrypt_key to
st${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp) # save non-volatile registers and $key!
bras $ra,_s390x_AES_set_encrypt_key
#l${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
l${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
ltgr %r2,%r2
bnzr $ra
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
l $t0,240($key)
#l $t0,240($key)
lhi $t1,16
cr $t0,$t1
jl .Lgo
oill $t0,0x80 # set "decrypt" bit
st $t0,240($key)
br $ra
.align 16
.Ldkey_internal:
st${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
st${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
bras $ra,.Lekey_internal
l${g} $key,4*$SIZE_T($sp)
l${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
___
$code.=<<___;
.Lgo: llgf $rounds,240($key)
.align 16
.Lgo: lgr $rounds,$t0 #llgf $rounds,240($key)
la $i1,0($key)
sllg $i2,$rounds,4
la $i2,0($i2,$key)
@@ -1601,11 +1598,11 @@ $code.=<<___ if(1);
lghi $s1,0x7f
nr $s1,%r0
lghi %r0,0 # query capability vector
la %r1,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
la %r1,$tweak-16($sp)
.long 0xb92e0042 # km %r4,%r2
llihh %r1,0x8000
srlg %r1,%r1,32($s1) # check for 32+function code
ng %r1,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
ng %r1,$tweak-16($sp)
lgr %r0,$s0 # restore the function code
la %r1,0($key1) # restore $key1
jz .Lxts_km_vanilla
@@ -1631,7 +1628,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if(1);
lrvg $s0,$tweak+0($sp) # load the last tweak
lrvg $s1,$tweak+8($sp)
stmg %r0,%r3,$tweak-32(%r1) # wipe copy of the key
stmg %r0,%r3,$tweak-32($sp) # wipe copy of the key
nill %r0,0xffdf # switch back to original function code
la %r1,0($key1) # restore pointer to $key1
@@ -1687,11 +1684,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi $i1,0x87
srag $i2,$s1,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr $i1,$i2 # rem
srlg $i2,$s0,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s0,$s0,1
sllg $s1,$s1,1
algr $s0,$s0
alcgr $s1,$s1
xgr $s0,$i1
ogr $s1,$i2
.Lxts_km_start:
lrvgr $i1,$s0 # flip byte order
lrvgr $i2,$s1
@@ -1748,11 +1743,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi $i1,0x87
srag $i2,$s1,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr $i1,$i2 # rem
srlg $i2,$s0,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s0,$s0,1
sllg $s1,$s1,1
algr $s0,$s0
alcgr $s1,$s1
xgr $s0,$i1
ogr $s1,$i2
ltr $len,$len # clear zero flag
br $ra
@@ -1784,8 +1777,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
clr %r0,%r1
jl .Lxts_enc_software
st${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
stm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
st${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
sllg $len,$len,4 # $len&=~15
slgr $out,$inp
@@ -1833,9 +1826,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
stg $i2,8($i3)
.Lxts_enc_km_done:
l${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
st${g} $sp,$tweak($sp) # wipe tweak
st${g} $sp,$tweak($sp)
stg $sp,$tweak+0($sp) # wipe tweak
stg $sp,$tweak+8($sp)
l${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
lm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
br $ra
.align 16
@@ -1846,12 +1839,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
slgr $out,$inp
xgr $s0,$s0 # clear upper half
xgr $s1,$s1
lrv $s0,$stdframe+4($sp) # load secno
lrv $s1,$stdframe+0($sp)
xgr $s2,$s2
xgr $s3,$s3
l${g} $s3,$stdframe($sp) # ivp
llgf $s0,0($s3) # load iv
llgf $s1,4($s3)
llgf $s2,8($s3)
llgf $s3,12($s3)
stm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
la $key,0($key2)
larl $tbl,AES_Te
@@ -1867,11 +1859,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi %r1,0x87
srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr %r1,%r0 # rem
srlg %r0,$s1,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s1,$s1,1
sllg $s3,$s3,1
algr $s1,$s1
alcgr $s3,$s3
xgr $s1,%r1
ogr $s3,%r0
lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order
lrvgr $s3,$s3
srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits
@@ -1920,11 +1910,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi %r1,0x87
srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr %r1,%r0 # rem
srlg %r0,$s1,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s1,$s1,1
sllg $s3,$s3,1
algr $s1,$s1
alcgr $s3,$s3
xgr $s1,%r1
ogr $s3,%r0
lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order
lrvgr $s3,$s3
srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits
@@ -1959,7 +1947,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
.size AES_xts_encrypt,.-AES_xts_encrypt
___
# void AES_xts_decrypt(const char *inp,char *out,size_t len,
# const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,u64 secno);
# const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
# const unsigned char iv[16]);
#
$code.=<<___;
.globl AES_xts_decrypt
@@ -1991,8 +1980,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
clr %r0,%r1
jl .Lxts_dec_software
st${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
stm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
st${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
nill $len,0xfff0 # $len&=~15
slgr $out,$inp
@@ -2031,11 +2020,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
lghi $i1,0x87
srag $i2,$s1,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr $i1,$i2 # rem
srlg $i2,$s0,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s0,$s0,1
sllg $s1,$s1,1
algr $s0,$s0
alcgr $s1,$s1
xgr $s0,$i1
ogr $s1,$i2
lrvgr $i1,$s0 # flip byte order
lrvgr $i2,$s1
@@ -2078,9 +2065,9 @@ $code.=<<___ if (!$softonly);
stg $s2,0($i3)
stg $s3,8($i3)
.Lxts_dec_km_done:
l${g} $ra,14*$SIZE_T($sp)
st${g} $sp,$tweak($sp) # wipe tweak
st${g} $sp,$tweak($sp)
stg $sp,$tweak+0($sp) # wipe tweak
stg $sp,$tweak+8($sp)
l${g} $ra,5*$SIZE_T($sp)
lm${g} %r6,$s3,6*$SIZE_T($sp)
br $ra
.align 16
@@ -2092,12 +2079,11 @@ $code.=<<___;
srlg $len,$len,4
slgr $out,$inp
xgr $s0,$s0 # clear upper half
xgr $s1,$s1
lrv $s0,$stdframe+4($sp) # load secno
lrv $s1,$stdframe+0($sp)
xgr $s2,$s2
xgr $s3,$s3
l${g} $s3,$stdframe($sp) # ivp
llgf $s0,0($s3) # load iv
llgf $s1,4($s3)
llgf $s2,8($s3)
llgf $s3,12($s3)
stm${g} %r2,%r5,2*$SIZE_T($sp)
la $key,0($key2)
larl $tbl,AES_Te
@@ -2116,11 +2102,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi %r1,0x87
srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr %r1,%r0 # rem
srlg %r0,$s1,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s1,$s1,1
sllg $s3,$s3,1
algr $s1,$s1
alcgr $s3,$s3
xgr $s1,%r1
ogr $s3,%r0
lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order
lrvgr $s3,$s3
srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits
@@ -2159,11 +2143,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi %r1,0x87
srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr %r1,%r0 # rem
srlg %r0,$s1,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s1,$s1,1
sllg $s3,$s3,1
algr $s1,$s1
alcgr $s3,$s3
xgr $s1,%r1
ogr $s3,%r0
lrvgr $i2,$s1 # flip byte order
lrvgr $i3,$s3
stmg $i2,$i3,$tweak($sp) # save the 1st tweak
@@ -2179,11 +2161,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi %r1,0x87
srag %r0,$s3,63 # broadcast upper bit
ngr %r1,%r0 # rem
srlg %r0,$s1,63 # carry bit from lower half
sllg $s1,$s1,1
sllg $s3,$s3,1
algr $s1,$s1
alcgr $s3,$s3
xgr $s1,%r1
ogr $s3,%r0
lrvgr $s1,$s1 # flip byte order
lrvgr $s3,$s3
srlg $s0,$s1,32 # smash the tweak to 4x32-bits

View File

@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@
# Performance in number of cycles per processed byte for 128-bit key:
#
# ECB encrypt ECB decrypt CBC large chunk
# AMD64 33 41 13.0
# EM64T 38 59 18.6(*)
# Core 2 30 43 14.5(*)
# AMD64 33 43 13.0
# EM64T 38 56 18.6(*)
# Core 2 30 42 14.5(*)
# Atom 65 86 32.1(*)
#
# (*) with hyper-threading off
@@ -36,7 +37,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
$verticalspin=1; # unlike 32-bit version $verticalspin performs
# ~15% better on both AMD and Intel cores
@@ -365,68 +367,66 @@ $code.=<<___;
movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t0
movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$t1
movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$t2
movzb ($sbox,$t0,1),$t0
movzb ($sbox,$t1,1),$t1
movzb ($sbox,$t2,1),$t2
movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t3
movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
movzb ($sbox,$t3,1),$t3
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4 #$t0
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5 #$t1
movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc2
movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc0
shr \$16,$s2
movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc2
movzb ($sbox,$t0,1),$t0
movzb ($sbox,$t1,1),$t1
movzb ($sbox,$t2,1),$t2
movzb ($sbox,$t3,1),$t3
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4 #$t0
movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc0
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5 #$t1
movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc1
movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t2
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t3
shr \$16,$s3
movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc1
shl \$8,$t4
shr \$16,$s3
shl \$8,$t5
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0
xor $t4,$t0
xor $t5,$t1
movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t4
shr \$16,$s0
movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t4
shr \$16,$s1
movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t5
xor $t5,$t1
shl \$8,$acc2
shl \$8,$acc0
movzb ($sbox,$t4,1),$t4 #$t1
movzb ($sbox,$t5,1),$t5 #$t2
movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t5
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0
xor $acc2,$t2
xor $acc0,$t3
shl \$8,$acc0
movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc2
movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
shl \$16,$acc1
movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t3
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t0
xor $acc0,$t3
movzb ($sbox,$t4,1),$t4 #$t1
movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
movzb ($sbox,$t5,1),$t5 #$t2
xor $acc1,$t0
movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
shr \$8,$s2
movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
shl \$16,$t4
shr \$8,$s1
shl \$16,$t5
xor $t4,$t1
movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t3
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t0
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t1
movzb ($sbox,$s2,1),$s3 #$t3
movzb ($sbox,$s1,1),$s2 #$t2
shl \$16,$t4
shl \$16,$t5
shl \$16,$acc2
xor $t4,$t1
xor $t5,$t2
xor $acc2,$t3
shl \$16,$acc2
xor $t5,$t2
shl \$24,$acc0
xor $acc2,$t3
shl \$24,$acc1
shl \$24,$s3
xor $acc0,$t0
shl \$24,$s2
shl \$24,$s3
xor $acc1,$t1
shl \$24,$s2
mov $t0,$s0
mov $t1,$s1
xor $t2,$s2
@@ -465,12 +465,12 @@ sub enctransform()
{ my ($t3,$r20,$r21)=($acc2,"%r8d","%r9d");
$code.=<<___;
mov $s0,$acc0
mov $s1,$acc1
and \$0x80808080,$acc0
and \$0x80808080,$acc1
mov $acc0,$t0
mov $acc1,$t1
mov \$0x80808080,$t0
mov \$0x80808080,$t1
and $s0,$t0
and $s1,$t1
mov $t0,$acc0
mov $t1,$acc1
shr \$7,$t0
lea ($s0,$s0),$r20
shr \$7,$t1
@@ -488,25 +488,25 @@ $code.=<<___;
xor $r20,$s0
xor $r21,$s1
mov $s2,$acc0
mov $s3,$acc1
mov \$0x80808080,$t2
rol \$24,$s0
mov \$0x80808080,$t3
rol \$24,$s1
and \$0x80808080,$acc0
and \$0x80808080,$acc1
and $s2,$t2
and $s3,$t3
xor $r20,$s0
xor $r21,$s1
mov $acc0,$t2
mov $acc1,$t3
mov $t2,$acc0
ror \$16,$t0
mov $t3,$acc1
ror \$16,$t1
shr \$7,$t2
lea ($s2,$s2),$r20
shr \$7,$t2
xor $t0,$s0
xor $t1,$s1
shr \$7,$t3
lea ($s3,$s3),$r21
xor $t1,$s1
ror \$8,$t0
lea ($s3,$s3),$r21
ror \$8,$t1
sub $t2,$acc0
sub $t3,$acc1
@@ -522,23 +522,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
xor $acc0,$r20
xor $acc1,$r21
ror \$16,$t2
xor $r20,$s2
ror \$16,$t3
xor $r21,$s3
rol \$24,$s2
mov 0($sbox),$acc0 # prefetch Te4
rol \$24,$s3
xor $r20,$s2
xor $r21,$s3
mov 0($sbox),$acc0 # prefetch Te4
ror \$16,$t2
ror \$16,$t3
mov 64($sbox),$acc1
xor $t2,$s2
xor $t3,$s3
xor $r21,$s3
mov 128($sbox),$r20
ror \$8,$t2
ror \$8,$t3
mov 192($sbox),$r21
xor $t2,$s2
ror \$8,$t2
xor $t3,$s3
ror \$8,$t3
xor $t2,$s2
mov 192($sbox),$r21
xor $t3,$s3
___
}
@@ -935,70 +935,69 @@ $code.=<<___;
movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t0
movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$t1
movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$t2
movzb ($sbox,$t0,1),$t0
movzb ($sbox,$t1,1),$t1
movzb ($sbox,$t2,1),$t2
movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t3
movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc0
movzb `&hi("$s0")`,$acc1
movzb ($sbox,$t3,1),$t3
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4 #$t0
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5 #$t1
shr \$16,$s3
movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc2
movzb ($sbox,$t0,1),$t0
movzb ($sbox,$t1,1),$t1
movzb ($sbox,$t2,1),$t2
movzb ($sbox,$t3,1),$t3
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$t4 #$t0
movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc0
shr \$16,$s2
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$t5 #$t1
movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t2
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t3
shr \$16,$s3
movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc1
shl \$8,$t4
shr \$16,$s2
shl \$8,$t5
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0
xor $t4,$t0
xor $t5,$t1
movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t4
shl \$8,$t4
movzb `&lo("$s2")`,$acc1
shr \$16,$s0
xor $t4,$t0
shr \$16,$s1
movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t5
movzb `&lo("$s3")`,$t4
shl \$8,$acc2
xor $t5,$t1
shl \$8,$acc0
movzb ($sbox,$t4,1),$t4 #$t1
movzb ($sbox,$t5,1),$t5 #$t2
movzb `&lo("$s0")`,$t5
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$acc1 #$t0
xor $acc2,$t2
xor $acc0,$t3
movzb `&lo("$s1")`,$acc2
movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
shl \$16,$acc1
movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t3
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t0
xor $acc1,$t0
shl \$16,$acc1
xor $acc0,$t3
movzb ($sbox,$t4,1),$t4 #$t1
movzb `&hi("$s1")`,$acc0
movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$acc2 #$t3
xor $acc1,$t0
movzb ($sbox,$t5,1),$t5 #$t2
movzb `&hi("$s2")`,$acc1
shl \$16,$acc2
shl \$16,$t4
shl \$16,$t5
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$s1 #$t1
xor $acc2,$t3
movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc2
xor $t4,$t1
shr \$8,$s0
xor $t5,$t2
movzb `&hi("$s3")`,$acc1
shr \$8,$s0
shl \$16,$acc2
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$s2 #$t2
movzb ($sbox,$acc0,1),$acc0 #$t0
movzb ($sbox,$acc1,1),$s1 #$t1
movzb ($sbox,$acc2,1),$s2 #$t2
movzb ($sbox,$s0,1),$s3 #$t3
xor $acc2,$t3
mov $t0,$s0
shl \$24,$acc0
shl \$24,$s1
shl \$24,$s2
xor $acc0,$t0
xor $acc0,$s0
shl \$24,$s3
xor $t1,$s1
mov $t0,$s0
xor $t2,$s2
xor $t3,$s3
___
@@ -1013,12 +1012,12 @@ sub dectransform()
my $prefetch = shift;
$code.=<<___;
mov $tp10,$acc0
mov $tp18,$acc8
and $mask80,$acc0
and $mask80,$acc8
mov $acc0,$tp40
mov $acc8,$tp48
mov $mask80,$tp40
mov $mask80,$tp48
and $tp10,$tp40
and $tp18,$tp48
mov $tp40,$acc0
mov $tp48,$acc8
shr \$7,$tp40
lea ($tp10,$tp10),$tp20
shr \$7,$tp48
@@ -1029,15 +1028,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
and $maskfe,$tp28
and $mask1b,$acc0
and $mask1b,$acc8
xor $tp20,$acc0
xor $tp28,$acc8
mov $acc0,$tp20
mov $acc8,$tp28
xor $acc0,$tp20
xor $acc8,$tp28
mov $mask80,$tp80
mov $mask80,$tp88
and $mask80,$acc0
and $mask80,$acc8
mov $acc0,$tp80
mov $acc8,$tp88
and $tp20,$tp80
and $tp28,$tp88
mov $tp80,$acc0
mov $tp88,$acc8
shr \$7,$tp80
lea ($tp20,$tp20),$tp40
shr \$7,$tp88
@@ -1048,15 +1047,15 @@ $code.=<<___;
and $maskfe,$tp48
and $mask1b,$acc0
and $mask1b,$acc8
xor $tp40,$acc0
xor $tp48,$acc8
mov $acc0,$tp40
mov $acc8,$tp48
xor $acc0,$tp40
xor $acc8,$tp48
mov $mask80,$tp80
mov $mask80,$tp88
and $mask80,$acc0
and $mask80,$acc8
mov $acc0,$tp80
mov $acc8,$tp88
and $tp40,$tp80
and $tp48,$tp88
mov $tp80,$acc0
mov $tp88,$acc8
shr \$7,$tp80
xor $tp10,$tp20 # tp2^=tp1
shr \$7,$tp88
@@ -1081,51 +1080,51 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $tp10,$acc0
mov $tp18,$acc8
xor $tp80,$tp40 # tp4^tp1^=tp8
xor $tp88,$tp48 # tp4^tp1^=tp8
shr \$32,$acc0
xor $tp88,$tp48 # tp4^tp1^=tp8
shr \$32,$acc8
xor $tp20,$tp80 # tp8^=tp8^tp2^tp1=tp2^tp1
xor $tp28,$tp88 # tp8^=tp8^tp2^tp1=tp2^tp1
rol \$8,`&LO("$tp10")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
xor $tp28,$tp88 # tp8^=tp8^tp2^tp1=tp2^tp1
rol \$8,`&LO("$tp18")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
xor $tp40,$tp80 # tp2^tp1^=tp8^tp4^tp1=tp8^tp4^tp2
rol \$8,`&LO("$acc0")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
xor $tp48,$tp88 # tp2^tp1^=tp8^tp4^tp1=tp8^tp4^tp2
rol \$8,`&LO("$acc0")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
rol \$8,`&LO("$acc8")` # ROTATE(tp1^tp8,8)
xor `&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$tp10")`
xor `&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$tp18")`
shr \$32,$tp80
xor `&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$tp18")`
shr \$32,$tp88
xor `&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$acc0")`
xor `&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$acc8")`
mov $tp20,$tp80
mov $tp28,$tp88
shr \$32,$tp80
shr \$32,$tp88
rol \$24,`&LO("$tp20")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
mov $tp28,$tp88
rol \$24,`&LO("$tp28")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
rol \$24,`&LO("$tp80")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
rol \$24,`&LO("$tp88")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
shr \$32,$tp80
xor `&LO("$tp20")`,`&LO("$tp10")`
shr \$32,$tp88
xor `&LO("$tp28")`,`&LO("$tp18")`
rol \$24,`&LO("$tp80")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
mov $tp40,$tp20
rol \$24,`&LO("$tp88")` # ROTATE(tp2^tp1^tp8,24)
mov $tp48,$tp28
shr \$32,$tp20
xor `&LO("$tp80")`,`&LO("$acc0")`
shr \$32,$tp28
xor `&LO("$tp88")`,`&LO("$acc8")`
`"mov 0($sbox),$mask80" if ($prefetch)`
shr \$32,$tp20
shr \$32,$tp28
`"mov 64($sbox),$maskfe" if ($prefetch)`
rol \$16,`&LO("$tp40")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
`"mov 64($sbox),$maskfe" if ($prefetch)`
rol \$16,`&LO("$tp48")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
`"mov 128($sbox),$mask1b" if ($prefetch)`
rol \$16,`&LO("$tp20")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
rol \$16,`&LO("$tp28")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
`"mov 192($sbox),$tp80" if ($prefetch)`
xor `&LO("$tp40")`,`&LO("$tp10")`
rol \$16,`&LO("$tp28")` # ROTATE(tp4^tp1^tp8,16)
xor `&LO("$tp48")`,`&LO("$tp18")`
`"mov 256($sbox),$tp88" if ($prefetch)`
xor `&LO("$tp20")`,`&LO("$acc0")`
@@ -1301,10 +1300,6 @@ private_AES_set_encrypt_key:
call _x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
mov 8(%rsp),%r15
mov 16(%rsp),%r14
mov 24(%rsp),%r13
mov 32(%rsp),%r12
mov 40(%rsp),%rbp
mov 48(%rsp),%rbx
add \$56,%rsp

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View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
# ====================================================================
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@
# Add aesni_xts_[en|de]crypt. Westmere spends 1.50 cycles processing
# one byte out of 8KB with 128-bit key, Sandy Bridge - 1.09.
######################################################################
# Current large-block performance in cycles per byte processed with
# 128-bit key (less is better).
#
# CBC en-/decrypt CTR XTS ECB
# Westmere 3.77/1.37 1.37 1.52 1.27
# * Bridge 5.07/0.98 0.99 1.09 0.91
# Haswell 4.44/0.80 0.97 1.03 0.72
# Atom 5.77/3.56 3.67 4.03 3.46
# Bulldozer 5.80/0.98 1.05 1.24 0.93
$PREFIX="aesni"; # if $PREFIX is set to "AES", the script
# generates drop-in replacement for
# crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl:-)
@@ -54,8 +65,8 @@ require "x86asm.pl";
&asm_init($ARGV[0],$0);
if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=*movups; }
else { $movekey=*movups; }
if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") { $movekey=\&movups; }
else { $movekey=\&movups; }
$len="eax";
$rounds="ecx";
@@ -196,37 +207,71 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
# every *2nd* cycle. Thus 3x interleave was the one providing optimal
# utilization, i.e. when subroutine's throughput is virtually same as
# of non-interleaved subroutine [for number of input blocks up to 3].
# This is why it makes no sense to implement 2x subroutine.
# aes[enc|dec] latency in next processor generation is 8, but the
# instructions can be scheduled every cycle. Optimal interleave for
# new processor is therefore 8x, but it's unfeasible to accommodate it
# in XMM registers addreassable in 32-bit mode and therefore 6x is
# used instead...
# This is why it originally made no sense to implement 2x subroutine.
# But times change and it became appropriate to spend extra 192 bytes
# on 2x subroutine on Atom Silvermont account. For processors that
# can schedule aes[enc|dec] every cycle optimal interleave factor
# equals to corresponding instructions latency. 8x is optimal for
# * Bridge, but it's unfeasible to accommodate such implementation
# in XMM registers addreassable in 32-bit mode and therefore maximum
# of 6x is used instead...
sub aesni_generate2
{ my $p=shift;
&function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt2");
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&shl ($rounds,4);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&neg ($rounds);
&add ($rounds,16);
&set_label("${p}2_loop");
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,32);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jnz (&label("${p}2_loop"));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p}last ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p}last ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
&ret();
&function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt2");
}
sub aesni_generate3
{ my $p=shift;
&function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt3");
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&shr ($rounds,1);
&shl ($rounds,4);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&neg ($rounds);
&add ($rounds,16);
&set_label("${p}3_loop");
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
&dec ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,32);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jnz (&label("${p}3_loop"));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
@@ -248,27 +293,29 @@ sub aesni_generate4
&function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt4");
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&shr ($rounds,1);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&shl ($rounds,4);
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&neg ($rounds);
&data_byte (0x0f,0x1f,0x40,0x00);
&add ($rounds,16);
&set_label("${p}4_loop");
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
&dec ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,32);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jnz (&label("${p}4_loop"));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
@@ -289,43 +336,43 @@ sub aesni_generate6
&function_begin_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
&static_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter");
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&shr ($rounds,1);
&shl ($rounds,4);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0); # pxor does better here
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
&pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
&pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
&dec ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&neg ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
&add ($rounds,16);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jmp (&label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter"));
&set_label("${p}6_loop",16);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey1)";
&dec ($rounds);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey1)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey1)";
&set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter",16);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&set_label("_aesni_${p}rypt6_enter");
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,32);
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout1,$rndkey0)";
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout2,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout3,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout4,$rndkey0)";
eval"&aes${p} ($inout5,$rndkey0)";
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jnz (&label("${p}6_loop"));
eval"&aes${p} ($inout0,$rndkey1)";
@@ -343,6 +390,8 @@ sub aesni_generate6
&ret();
&function_end_B("_aesni_${p}rypt6");
}
&aesni_generate2("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
&aesni_generate2("dec");
&aesni_generate3("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
&aesni_generate3("dec");
&aesni_generate4("enc") if ($PREFIX eq "aesni");
@@ -446,8 +495,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
&set_label("ecb_enc_two",16);
&xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
&call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
&call ("_aesni_encrypt2");
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
@@ -547,8 +595,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
&set_label("ecb_dec_two",16);
&xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
&call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
&call ("_aesni_decrypt2");
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&jmp (&label("ecb_ret"));
@@ -610,11 +657,13 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov (&DWP(24,"esp"),$key_);
&mov (&DWP(28,"esp"),$key_);
&shr ($rounds,1);
&shl ($rounds,4);
&mov ($rounds_,16);
&lea ($key_,&DWP(0,$key));
&movdqa ($inout3,&QWP(0,"esp"));
&movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
&mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&sub ($rounds_,$rounds);
&pshufb ($ivec,$inout3);
&set_label("ccm64_enc_outer");
@@ -625,33 +674,31 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
&xorps ($rndkey0,$in0);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
&xorps ($cmac,$rndkey0); # cmac^=inp
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
&set_label("ccm64_enc2_loop");
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&dec ($rounds);
&aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,32);
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jnz (&label("ccm64_enc2_loop"));
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
&paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
&dec ($len);
&aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0);
&dec ($len);
&lea ($inp,&DWP(16,$inp));
&xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp^=E(ivec)
&movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output
&lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
&pshufb ($inout0,$inout3);
&lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
&jnz (&label("ccm64_enc_outer"));
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
@@ -700,15 +747,19 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("enc"); }
else
{ &call ("_aesni_encrypt1"); }
&shl ($rounds_,4);
&mov ($rounds,16);
&movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp
&paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
&lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
&sub ($rounds,$rounds_);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_,$rounds_));
&mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
&jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
&set_label("ccm64_dec_outer",16);
&xorps ($in0,$inout0); # inp ^= E(ivec)
&movdqa ($inout0,$ivec);
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$in0); # save output
&lea ($out,&DWP(16,$out));
&pshufb ($inout0,$inout3);
@@ -717,34 +768,33 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jz (&label("ccm64_dec_break"));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
&shr ($rounds,1);
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
&xorps ($in0,$rndkey0);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&xorps ($cmac,$in0); # cmac^=out
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
&set_label("ccm64_dec2_loop");
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&dec ($rounds);
&aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(0,$key,$rounds));
&add ($rounds,32);
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key));
&aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(-16,$key,$rounds));
&jnz (&label("ccm64_dec2_loop"));
&movups ($in0,&QWP(0,$inp)); # load inp
&paddq ($ivec,&QWP(16,"esp"));
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($cmac,$rndkey1);
&lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
&aesenclast ($inout0,$rndkey0);
&aesenclast ($cmac,$rndkey0);
&lea ($inp,&QWP(16,$inp));
&jmp (&label("ccm64_dec_outer"));
&set_label("ccm64_dec_break",16);
&mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_));
&mov ($key,$key_);
if ($inline)
{ &aesni_inline_generate1("enc",$cmac,$in0); }
@@ -763,7 +813,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
# const char *ivec);
#
# Handles only complete blocks, operates on 32-bit counter and
# does not update *ivec! (see engine/eng_aesni.c for details)
# does not update *ivec! (see crypto/modes/ctr128.c for details)
#
# stack layout:
# 0 pshufb mask
@@ -810,66 +860,61 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
# compose 2 vectors of 3x32-bit counters
&bswap ($rounds_);
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($rndkey0,$rndkey0);
&pxor ($rndkey1,$rndkey1);
&movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte-swap mask
&pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,0);
&pinsrd ($rndkey0,$rounds_,0);
&lea ($key_,&DWP(3,$rounds_));
&pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,0);
&pinsrd ($rndkey1,$key_,0);
&inc ($rounds_);
&pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,1);
&pinsrd ($rndkey0,$rounds_,1);
&inc ($key_);
&pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,1);
&pinsrd ($rndkey1,$key_,1);
&inc ($rounds_);
&pinsrd ($rndkey1,$rounds_,2);
&pinsrd ($rndkey0,$rounds_,2);
&inc ($key_);
&pinsrd ($rndkey0,$key_,2);
&movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 1st triplet
&pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
&movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 2nd triplet
&pinsrd ($rndkey1,$key_,2);
&movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 1st triplet
&pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap
&movdqu ($inout4,&QWP(0,$key)); # key[0]
&movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 2nd triplet
&pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
&pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey1,3<<6); # place counter to upper dword
&pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey1,2<<6);
&pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey0,3<<6); # place counter to upper dword
&pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey0,2<<6);
&cmp ($len,6);
&jb (&label("ctr32_tail"));
&movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),$inout5); # save counter-less ivec
&shr ($rounds,1);
&pxor ($inout5,$inout4); # counter-less ivec^key[0]
&shl ($rounds,4);
&mov ($rounds_,16);
&movdqa (&QWP(32,"esp"),$inout5); # save counter-less ivec^key[0]
&mov ($key_,$key); # backup $key
&mov ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup $rounds
&sub ($rounds_,$rounds); # backup twisted $rounds
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&sub ($len,6);
&jmp (&label("ctr32_loop6"));
&set_label("ctr32_loop6",16);
&pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey1,1<<6);
&movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull counter-less ivec
&pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey0,3<<6);
&por ($inout0,$rndkey1); # merge counter-less ivec
&pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey0,2<<6);
&por ($inout1,$rndkey1);
&pshufd ($inout5,$rndkey0,1<<6);
&por ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&por ($inout3,$rndkey1);
&por ($inout4,$rndkey1);
&por ($inout5,$rndkey1);
# inlining _aesni_encrypt6's prologue gives ~4% improvement...
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key_));
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
&dec ($rounds);
&pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0);
# inlining _aesni_encrypt6's prologue gives ~6% improvement...
&pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey0,1<<6);
&movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull counter-less ivec
&pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey1,3<<6);
&pxor ($inout0,$rndkey0); # merge counter-less ivec
&pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey1,2<<6);
&pxor ($inout1,$rndkey0);
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&pshufd ($inout5,$rndkey1,1<<6);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
&pxor ($inout2,$rndkey0);
&aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout3,$rndkey0);
&aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout4,$rndkey0);
&aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
&aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
&aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1);
&call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
@@ -882,12 +927,12 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
&movdqa ($rndkey0,&QWP(16,"esp")); # load increment
&xorps ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(48,"esp")); # load 1st triplet
&movdqa ($rndkey1,&QWP(64,"esp")); # load 2nd triplet
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
&paddd ($rndkey1,$rndkey0); # 1st triplet increment
&paddd ($rndkey0,&QWP(64,"esp")); # 2nd triplet increment
&paddd ($rndkey1,$rndkey0); # 2nd triplet increment
&paddd ($rndkey0,&QWP(48,"esp")); # 1st triplet increment
&movdqa ($inout0,&QWP(0,"esp")); # load byte swap mask
&movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x30,$inp));
@@ -895,44 +940,44 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout3,$inout1);
&movups ($inout1,&QWP(0x50,$inp));
&lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
&movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 1st triplet
&pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
&movdqa (&QWP(48,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 1st triplet
&pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap
&xorps ($inout4,$inout2);
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&xorps ($inout5,$inout1);
&movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey0); # save 2nd triplet
&pshufb ($rndkey0,$inout0); # byte swap
&movdqa (&QWP(64,"esp"),$rndkey1); # save 2nd triplet
&pshufb ($rndkey1,$inout0); # byte swap
&movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
&pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey1,3<<6);
&pshufd ($inout0,$rndkey0,3<<6);
&movups (&QWP(0x50,$out),$inout5);
&lea ($out,&DWP(0x60,$out));
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
&pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey1,2<<6);
&pshufd ($inout1,$rndkey0,2<<6);
&sub ($len,6);
&jnc (&label("ctr32_loop6"));
&add ($len,6);
&jz (&label("ctr32_ret"));
&movdqu ($inout5,&QWP(0,$key_));
&mov ($key,$key_);
&lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
&movdqa ($inout5,&QWP(32,"esp")); # pull count-less ivec
&pxor ($inout5,&QWP(32,"esp")); # restore count-less ivec
&mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_)); # restore $rounds
&set_label("ctr32_tail");
&por ($inout0,$inout5);
&cmp ($len,2);
&jb (&label("ctr32_one"));
&pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey1,1<<6);
&pshufd ($inout2,$rndkey0,1<<6);
&por ($inout1,$inout5);
&je (&label("ctr32_two"));
&pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey0,3<<6);
&pshufd ($inout3,$rndkey1,3<<6);
&por ($inout2,$inout5);
&cmp ($len,4);
&jb (&label("ctr32_three"));
&pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey0,2<<6);
&pshufd ($inout4,$rndkey1,2<<6);
&por ($inout3,$inout5);
&je (&label("ctr32_four"));
@@ -970,7 +1015,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jmp (&label("ctr32_ret"));
&set_label("ctr32_two",16);
&call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
&call ("_aesni_encrypt2");
&movups ($inout3,&QWP(0,$inp));
&movups ($inout4,&QWP(0x10,$inp));
&xorps ($inout0,$inout3);
@@ -1057,8 +1102,10 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&sub ($len,16*6);
&jc (&label("xts_enc_short"));
&shr ($rounds,1);
&mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
&shl ($rounds,4);
&mov ($rounds_,16);
&sub ($rounds_,$rounds);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&jmp (&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
&set_label("xts_enc_loop6",16);
@@ -1080,6 +1127,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
# inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
&movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0]
&movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
@@ -1096,19 +1144,17 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
&pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
&aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
&dec ($rounds);
&aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
&aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($inout1,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
&aesenc ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($inout3,$rndkey1);
&aesenc ($inout4,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&aesenc ($inout5,$rndkey1);
&call (&label("_aesni_encrypt6_enter"));
@@ -1135,13 +1181,12 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
&pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
&pxor ($tweak,$twres);
&sub ($len,16*6);
&jnc (&label("xts_enc_loop6"));
&lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
&mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_)); # restore $rounds
&mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
&mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
@@ -1241,9 +1286,8 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&lea ($inp,&DWP(16*2,$inp));
&xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
&xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
&xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
&call ("_aesni_encrypt3");
&call ("_aesni_encrypt2");
&xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
&xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
@@ -1399,8 +1443,10 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&sub ($len,16*6);
&jc (&label("xts_dec_short"));
&shr ($rounds,1);
&mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
&shl ($rounds,4);
&mov ($rounds_,16);
&sub ($rounds_,$rounds);
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key,$rounds));
&jmp (&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
&set_label("xts_dec_loop6",16);
@@ -1422,6 +1468,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&pxor ($inout5,$tweak);
# inline _aesni_encrypt6 prologue and flip xor with tweak and key[0]
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_);
&movdqu ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,$inp));
&xorps ($inout0,$rndkey0); # input^=rndkey[0]
&movdqu ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,$inp));
@@ -1438,19 +1485,17 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey1,&QWP(16,$key_));
&lea ($key,&DWP(32,$key_));
&pxor ($inout1,&QWP(16*1,"esp"));
&aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout2,&QWP(16*2,"esp"));
&aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey1);
&aesdec ($inout0,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout3,&QWP(16*3,"esp"));
&dec ($rounds);
&aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout4,&QWP(16*4,"esp"));
&aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey1);
&aesdec ($inout1,$rndkey1);
&pxor ($inout5,$rndkey0);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(32,$key_));
&aesdec ($inout2,$rndkey1);
&aesdec ($inout3,$rndkey1);
&aesdec ($inout4,$rndkey1);
&$movekey ($rndkey0,&QWP(0,$key));
&aesdec ($inout5,$rndkey1);
&call (&label("_aesni_decrypt6_enter"));
@@ -1477,13 +1522,12 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&paddq ($tweak,$tweak); # &psllq($tweak,1);
&pand ($twres,$twmask); # isolate carry and residue
&pcmpgtd($twtmp,$tweak); # broadcast upper bits
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
&pxor ($tweak,$twres);
&sub ($len,16*6);
&jnc (&label("xts_dec_loop6"));
&lea ($rounds,&DWP(1,"",$rounds,2)); # restore $rounds
&mov ($rounds,&DWP(240,$key_)); # restore $rounds
&mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
&mov ($rounds_,$rounds);
@@ -1584,7 +1628,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # input^=tweak
&xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
&call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
&call ("_aesni_decrypt2");
&xorps ($inout0,$inout3); # output^=tweak
&xorps ($inout1,$inout4);
@@ -1816,7 +1860,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&movups (&QWP(0x10,$out),$inout1);
&lea ($inp,&DWP(0x60,$inp));
&movups (&QWP(0x20,$out),$inout2);
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_) # restore $rounds
&mov ($rounds,$rounds_); # restore $rounds
&movups (&QWP(0x30,$out),$inout3);
&mov ($key,$key_); # restore $key
&movups (&QWP(0x40,$out),$inout4);
@@ -1884,8 +1928,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&jmp (&label("cbc_dec_tail_collected"));
&set_label("cbc_dec_two",16);
&xorps ($inout2,$inout2);
&call ("_aesni_decrypt3");
&call ("_aesni_decrypt2");
&xorps ($inout0,$ivec);
&xorps ($inout1,$in0);
&movups (&QWP(0,$out),$inout0);
@@ -2015,7 +2058,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&set_label("12rounds",16);
&movq ("xmm2",&QWP(16,"eax")); # remaining 1/3 of *userKey
&mov ($rounds,11);
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0") # round 0
&$movekey (&QWP(-16,$key),"xmm0"); # round 0
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x01); # round 1,2
&call (&label("key_192a_cold"));
&aeskeygenassist("xmm1","xmm2",0x02); # round 2,3
@@ -2152,7 +2195,7 @@ if ($PREFIX eq "aesni") {
&mov ($key,&wparam(2));
&call ("_aesni_set_encrypt_key");
&mov ($key,&wparam(2));
&shl ($rounds,4) # rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
&shl ($rounds,4); # rounds-1 after _aesni_set_encrypt_key
&test ("eax","eax");
&jnz (&label("dec_key_ret"));
&lea ("eax",&DWP(16,$key,$rounds)); # end of key schedule

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@@ -0,0 +1,919 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
# ====================================================================
# Written by David S. Miller <davem@devemloft.net> and Andy Polyakov
# <appro@openssl.org>. The module is licensed under 2-clause BSD
# license. October 2012. All rights reserved.
# ====================================================================
######################################################################
# AES for SPARC T4.
#
# AES round instructions complete in 3 cycles and can be issued every
# cycle. It means that round calculations should take 4*rounds cycles,
# because any given round instruction depends on result of *both*
# previous instructions:
#
# |0 |1 |2 |3 |4
# |01|01|01|
# |23|23|23|
# |01|01|...
# |23|...
#
# Provided that fxor [with IV] takes 3 cycles to complete, critical
# path length for CBC encrypt would be 3+4*rounds, or in other words
# it should process one byte in at least (3+4*rounds)/16 cycles. This
# estimate doesn't account for "collateral" instructions, such as
# fetching input from memory, xor-ing it with zero-round key and
# storing the result. Yet, *measured* performance [for data aligned
# at 64-bit boundary!] deviates from this equation by less than 0.5%:
#
# 128-bit key 192- 256-
# CBC encrypt 2.70/2.90(*) 3.20/3.40 3.70/3.90
# (*) numbers after slash are for
# misaligned data.
#
# Out-of-order execution logic managed to fully overlap "collateral"
# instructions with those on critical path. Amazing!
#
# As with Intel AES-NI, question is if it's possible to improve
# performance of parallelizeable modes by interleaving round
# instructions. Provided round instruction latency and throughput
# optimal interleave factor is 2. But can we expect 2x performance
# improvement? Well, as round instructions can be issued one per
# cycle, they don't saturate the 2-way issue pipeline and therefore
# there is room for "collateral" calculations... Yet, 2x speed-up
# over CBC encrypt remains unattaintable:
#
# 128-bit key 192- 256-
# CBC decrypt 1.64/2.11 1.89/2.37 2.23/2.61
# CTR 1.64/2.08(*) 1.89/2.33 2.23/2.61
# (*) numbers after slash are for
# misaligned data.
#
# Estimates based on amount of instructions under assumption that
# round instructions are not pairable with any other instruction
# suggest that latter is the actual case and pipeline runs
# underutilized. It should be noted that T4 out-of-order execution
# logic is so capable that performance gain from 2x interleave is
# not even impressive, ~7-13% over non-interleaved code, largest
# for 256-bit keys.
# To anchor to something else, software implementation processes
# one byte in 29 cycles with 128-bit key on same processor. Intel
# Sandy Bridge encrypts byte in 5.07 cycles in CBC mode and decrypts
# in 0.93, naturally with AES-NI.
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
push(@INC,"${dir}","${dir}../../perlasm");
require "sparcv9_modes.pl";
&asm_init(@ARGV);
$::evp=1; # if $evp is set to 0, script generates module with
# AES_[en|de]crypt, AES_set_[en|de]crypt_key and AES_cbc_encrypt entry
# points. These however are not fully compatible with openssl/aes.h,
# because they expect AES_KEY to be aligned at 64-bit boundary. When
# used through EVP, alignment is arranged at EVP layer. Second thing
# that is arranged by EVP is at least 32-bit alignment of IV.
######################################################################
# single-round subroutines
#
{
my ($inp,$out,$key,$rounds,$tmp,$mask)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
$code.=<<___ if ($::abibits==64);
.register %g2,#scratch
.register %g3,#scratch
___
$code.=<<___;
.text
.globl aes_t4_encrypt
.align 32
aes_t4_encrypt:
andcc $inp, 7, %g1 ! is input aligned?
andn $inp, 7, $inp
ldx [$key + 0], %g4
ldx [$key + 8], %g5
ldx [$inp + 0], %o4
bz,pt %icc, 1f
ldx [$inp + 8], %o5
ldx [$inp + 16], $inp
sll %g1, 3, %g1
sub %g0, %g1, %o3
sllx %o4, %g1, %o4
sllx %o5, %g1, %g1
srlx %o5, %o3, %o5
srlx $inp, %o3, %o3
or %o5, %o4, %o4
or %o3, %g1, %o5
1:
ld [$key + 240], $rounds
ldd [$key + 16], %f12
ldd [$key + 24], %f14
xor %g4, %o4, %o4
xor %g5, %o5, %o5
movxtod %o4, %f0
movxtod %o5, %f2
srl $rounds, 1, $rounds
ldd [$key + 32], %f16
sub $rounds, 1, $rounds
ldd [$key + 40], %f18
add $key, 48, $key
.Lenc:
aes_eround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 0], %f12
ldd [$key + 8], %f14
sub $rounds,1,$rounds
aes_eround01 %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 16], %f16
ldd [$key + 24], %f18
brnz,pt $rounds, .Lenc
add $key, 32, $key
andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned?
aes_eround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01_l %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23_l %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
bnz,pn %icc, 2f
nop
std %f0, [$out + 0]
retl
std %f2, [$out + 8]
2: alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out
mov 0xff, $mask
srl $mask, $tmp, $mask
faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4
faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6
faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8
stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store
std %f6, [$out + 8]
add $out, 16, $out
orn %g0, $mask, $mask
retl
stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store
.type aes_t4_encrypt,#function
.size aes_t4_encrypt,.-aes_t4_encrypt
.globl aes_t4_decrypt
.align 32
aes_t4_decrypt:
andcc $inp, 7, %g1 ! is input aligned?
andn $inp, 7, $inp
ldx [$key + 0], %g4
ldx [$key + 8], %g5
ldx [$inp + 0], %o4
bz,pt %icc, 1f
ldx [$inp + 8], %o5
ldx [$inp + 16], $inp
sll %g1, 3, %g1
sub %g0, %g1, %o3
sllx %o4, %g1, %o4
sllx %o5, %g1, %g1
srlx %o5, %o3, %o5
srlx $inp, %o3, %o3
or %o5, %o4, %o4
or %o3, %g1, %o5
1:
ld [$key + 240], $rounds
ldd [$key + 16], %f12
ldd [$key + 24], %f14
xor %g4, %o4, %o4
xor %g5, %o5, %o5
movxtod %o4, %f0
movxtod %o5, %f2
srl $rounds, 1, $rounds
ldd [$key + 32], %f16
sub $rounds, 1, $rounds
ldd [$key + 40], %f18
add $key, 48, $key
.Ldec:
aes_dround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 0], %f12
ldd [$key + 8], %f14
sub $rounds,1,$rounds
aes_dround01 %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 16], %f16
ldd [$key + 24], %f18
brnz,pt $rounds, .Ldec
add $key, 32, $key
andcc $out, 7, $tmp ! is output aligned?
aes_dround01 %f12, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f14, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01_l %f16, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23_l %f18, %f4, %f2, %f2
bnz,pn %icc, 2f
nop
std %f0, [$out + 0]
retl
std %f2, [$out + 8]
2: alignaddrl $out, %g0, $out
mov 0xff, $mask
srl $mask, $tmp, $mask
faligndata %f0, %f0, %f4
faligndata %f0, %f2, %f6
faligndata %f2, %f2, %f8
stda %f4, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store
std %f6, [$out + 8]
add $out, 16, $out
orn %g0, $mask, $mask
retl
stda %f8, [$out + $mask]0xc0 ! partial store
.type aes_t4_decrypt,#function
.size aes_t4_decrypt,.-aes_t4_decrypt
___
}
######################################################################
# key setup subroutines
#
{
my ($inp,$bits,$out,$tmp)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
$code.=<<___;
.globl aes_t4_set_encrypt_key
.align 32
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key:
.Lset_encrypt_key:
and $inp, 7, $tmp
alignaddr $inp, %g0, $inp
cmp $bits, 192
ldd [$inp + 0], %f0
bl,pt %icc,.L128
ldd [$inp + 8], %f2
be,pt %icc,.L192
ldd [$inp + 16], %f4
brz,pt $tmp, .L256aligned
ldd [$inp + 24], %f6
ldd [$inp + 32], %f8
faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0
faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2
faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4
faligndata %f6, %f8, %f6
.L256aligned:
___
for ($i=0; $i<6; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
std %f0, [$out + `32*$i+0`]
aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f6, $i, %f0
std %f2, [$out + `32*$i+8`]
aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2
std %f4, [$out + `32*$i+16`]
aes_kexpand0 %f4, %f2, %f4
std %f6, [$out + `32*$i+24`]
aes_kexpand2 %f6, %f4, %f6
___
}
$code.=<<___;
std %f0, [$out + `32*$i+0`]
aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f6, $i, %f0
std %f2, [$out + `32*$i+8`]
aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2
std %f4, [$out + `32*$i+16`]
std %f6, [$out + `32*$i+24`]
std %f0, [$out + `32*$i+32`]
std %f2, [$out + `32*$i+40`]
mov 14, $tmp
st $tmp, [$out + 240]
retl
xor %o0, %o0, %o0
.align 16
.L192:
brz,pt $tmp, .L192aligned
nop
ldd [$inp + 24], %f6
faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0
faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2
faligndata %f4, %f6, %f4
.L192aligned:
___
for ($i=0; $i<7; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
std %f0, [$out + `24*$i+0`]
aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f4, $i, %f0
std %f2, [$out + `24*$i+8`]
aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2
std %f4, [$out + `24*$i+16`]
aes_kexpand2 %f4, %f2, %f4
___
}
$code.=<<___;
std %f0, [$out + `24*$i+0`]
aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f4, $i, %f0
std %f2, [$out + `24*$i+8`]
aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2
std %f4, [$out + `24*$i+16`]
std %f0, [$out + `24*$i+24`]
std %f2, [$out + `24*$i+32`]
mov 12, $tmp
st $tmp, [$out + 240]
retl
xor %o0, %o0, %o0
.align 16
.L128:
brz,pt $tmp, .L128aligned
nop
ldd [$inp + 16], %f4
faligndata %f0, %f2, %f0
faligndata %f2, %f4, %f2
.L128aligned:
___
for ($i=0; $i<10; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
std %f0, [$out + `16*$i+0`]
aes_kexpand1 %f0, %f2, $i, %f0
std %f2, [$out + `16*$i+8`]
aes_kexpand2 %f2, %f0, %f2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
std %f0, [$out + `16*$i+0`]
std %f2, [$out + `16*$i+8`]
mov 10, $tmp
st $tmp, [$out + 240]
retl
xor %o0, %o0, %o0
.type aes_t4_set_encrypt_key,#function
.size aes_t4_set_encrypt_key,.-aes_t4_set_encrypt_key
.globl aes_t4_set_decrypt_key
.align 32
aes_t4_set_decrypt_key:
mov %o7, %o5
call .Lset_encrypt_key
nop
mov %o5, %o7
sll $tmp, 4, $inp ! $tmp is number of rounds
add $tmp, 2, $tmp
add $out, $inp, $inp ! $inp=$out+16*rounds
srl $tmp, 2, $tmp ! $tmp=(rounds+2)/4
.Lkey_flip:
ldd [$out + 0], %f0
ldd [$out + 8], %f2
ldd [$out + 16], %f4
ldd [$out + 24], %f6
ldd [$inp + 0], %f8
ldd [$inp + 8], %f10
ldd [$inp - 16], %f12
ldd [$inp - 8], %f14
sub $tmp, 1, $tmp
std %f0, [$inp + 0]
std %f2, [$inp + 8]
std %f4, [$inp - 16]
std %f6, [$inp - 8]
std %f8, [$out + 0]
std %f10, [$out + 8]
std %f12, [$out + 16]
std %f14, [$out + 24]
add $out, 32, $out
brnz $tmp, .Lkey_flip
sub $inp, 32, $inp
retl
xor %o0, %o0, %o0
.type aes_t4_set_decrypt_key,#function
.size aes_t4_set_decrypt_key,.-aes_t4_set_decrypt_key
___
}
{{{
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%i$_",(0..5));
my ($ileft,$iright,$ooff,$omask,$ivoff)=map("%l$_",(1..7));
$code.=<<___;
.align 32
_aes128_encrypt_1x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01_l %f52, %f4, %f2, %f0
retl
aes_eround23_l %f54, %f4, %f2, %f2
.type _aes128_encrypt_1x,#function
.size _aes128_encrypt_1x,.-_aes128_encrypt_1x
.align 32
_aes128_encrypt_2x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_eround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f48, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_eround23 %f50, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_eround01_l %f52, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23_l %f54, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01_l %f52, %f10, %f6, %f4
retl
aes_eround23_l %f54, %f10, %f6, %f6
.type _aes128_encrypt_2x,#function
.size _aes128_encrypt_2x,.-_aes128_encrypt_2x
.align 32
_aes128_loadkey:
ldx [$key + 0], %g4
ldx [$key + 8], %g5
___
for ($i=2; $i<22;$i++) { # load key schedule
$code.=<<___;
ldd [$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i`
___
}
$code.=<<___;
retl
nop
.type _aes128_loadkey,#function
.size _aes128_loadkey,.-_aes128_loadkey
_aes128_load_enckey=_aes128_loadkey
_aes128_load_deckey=_aes128_loadkey
___
&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",128);
if ($::evp) {
&alg_ctr32_implement("aes",128);
&alg_xts_implement("aes",128,"en");
&alg_xts_implement("aes",128,"de");
}
&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",128);
$code.=<<___;
.align 32
_aes128_decrypt_1x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01_l %f52, %f4, %f2, %f0
retl
aes_dround23_l %f54, %f4, %f2, %f2
.type _aes128_decrypt_1x,#function
.size _aes128_decrypt_1x,.-_aes128_decrypt_1x
.align 32
_aes128_decrypt_2x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<4; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f48, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_dround23 %f50, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f48, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_dround23 %f50, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_dround01_l %f52, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23_l %f54, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01_l %f52, %f10, %f6, %f4
retl
aes_dround23_l %f54, %f10, %f6, %f6
.type _aes128_decrypt_2x,#function
.size _aes128_decrypt_2x,.-_aes128_decrypt_2x
___
$code.=<<___;
.align 32
_aes192_encrypt_1x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01_l %f60, %f4, %f2, %f0
retl
aes_eround23_l %f62, %f4, %f2, %f2
.type _aes192_encrypt_1x,#function
.size _aes192_encrypt_1x,.-_aes192_encrypt_1x
.align 32
_aes192_encrypt_2x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_eround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f56, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_eround23 %f58, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_eround01_l %f60, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23_l %f62, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01_l %f60, %f10, %f6, %f4
retl
aes_eround23_l %f62, %f10, %f6, %f6
.type _aes192_encrypt_2x,#function
.size _aes192_encrypt_2x,.-_aes192_encrypt_2x
.align 32
_aes256_encrypt_1x:
aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 208], %f16
ldd [$key + 216], %f18
aes_eround01 %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 224], %f20
ldd [$key + 232], %f22
___
for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 16], %f16
ldd [$key + 24], %f18
aes_eround01_l %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23_l %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 32], %f20
retl
ldd [$key + 40], %f22
.type _aes256_encrypt_1x,#function
.size _aes256_encrypt_1x,.-_aes256_encrypt_1x
.align 32
_aes256_encrypt_2x:
aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_eround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 208], %f16
ldd [$key + 216], %f18
aes_eround01 %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_eround23 %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 224], %f20
ldd [$key + 232], %f22
___
for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_eround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_eround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_eround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_eround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 16], %f16
ldd [$key + 24], %f18
aes_eround01_l %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_eround23_l %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_eround01_l %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_eround23_l %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 32], %f20
retl
ldd [$key + 40], %f22
.type _aes256_encrypt_2x,#function
.size _aes256_encrypt_2x,.-_aes256_encrypt_2x
.align 32
_aes192_loadkey:
ldx [$key + 0], %g4
ldx [$key + 8], %g5
___
for ($i=2; $i<26;$i++) { # load key schedule
$code.=<<___;
ldd [$key + `8*$i`], %f`12+2*$i`
___
}
$code.=<<___;
retl
nop
.type _aes192_loadkey,#function
.size _aes192_loadkey,.-_aes192_loadkey
_aes256_loadkey=_aes192_loadkey
_aes192_load_enckey=_aes192_loadkey
_aes192_load_deckey=_aes192_loadkey
_aes256_load_enckey=_aes192_loadkey
_aes256_load_deckey=_aes192_loadkey
___
&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",256);
&alg_cbc_encrypt_implement("aes",192);
if ($::evp) {
&alg_ctr32_implement("aes",256);
&alg_xts_implement("aes",256,"en");
&alg_xts_implement("aes",256,"de");
&alg_ctr32_implement("aes",192);
}
&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",192);
&alg_cbc_decrypt_implement("aes",256);
$code.=<<___;
.align 32
_aes256_decrypt_1x:
aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 208], %f16
ldd [$key + 216], %f18
aes_dround01 %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 224], %f20
ldd [$key + 232], %f22
___
for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 16], %f16
ldd [$key + 24], %f18
aes_dround01_l %f20, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23_l %f22, %f4, %f2, %f2
ldd [$key + 32], %f20
retl
ldd [$key + 40], %f22
.type _aes256_decrypt_1x,#function
.size _aes256_decrypt_1x,.-_aes256_decrypt_1x
.align 32
_aes256_decrypt_2x:
aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_dround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 208], %f16
ldd [$key + 216], %f18
aes_dround01 %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_dround23 %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 224], %f20
ldd [$key + 232], %f22
___
for ($i=1; $i<6; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f16, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_dround23 %f18, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f16, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_dround23 %f18, %f4, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 16], %f16
ldd [$key + 24], %f18
aes_dround01_l %f20, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23_l %f22, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01_l %f20, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_dround23_l %f22, %f10, %f6, %f6
ldd [$key + 32], %f20
retl
ldd [$key + 40], %f22
.type _aes256_decrypt_2x,#function
.size _aes256_decrypt_2x,.-_aes256_decrypt_2x
.align 32
_aes192_decrypt_1x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f4, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f4, %f2, %f2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f4
aes_dround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01_l %f60, %f4, %f2, %f0
retl
aes_dround23_l %f62, %f4, %f2, %f2
.type _aes192_decrypt_1x,#function
.size _aes192_decrypt_1x,.-_aes192_decrypt_1x
.align 32
_aes192_decrypt_2x:
___
for ($i=0; $i<5; $i++) {
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+0`, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+2`, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f`16+8*$i+4`, %f10, %f6, %f4
aes_dround23 %f`16+8*$i+6`, %f10, %f6, %f6
___
}
$code.=<<___;
aes_dround01 %f56, %f0, %f2, %f8
aes_dround23 %f58, %f0, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01 %f56, %f4, %f6, %f10
aes_dround23 %f58, %f4, %f6, %f6
aes_dround01_l %f60, %f8, %f2, %f0
aes_dround23_l %f62, %f8, %f2, %f2
aes_dround01_l %f60, %f10, %f6, %f4
retl
aes_dround23_l %f62, %f10, %f6, %f6
.type _aes192_decrypt_2x,#function
.size _aes192_decrypt_2x,.-_aes192_decrypt_2x
___
}}}
if (!$::evp) {
$code.=<<___;
.global AES_encrypt
AES_encrypt=aes_t4_encrypt
.global AES_decrypt
AES_decrypt=aes_t4_decrypt
.global AES_set_encrypt_key
.align 32
AES_set_encrypt_key:
andcc %o2, 7, %g0 ! check alignment
bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f
mov -1, %o0
brz,a,pn %o0, 1f
mov -1, %o0
brz,a,pn %o2, 1f
mov -1, %o0
andncc %o1, 0x1c0, %g0
bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f
mov -2, %o0
cmp %o1, 128
bl,a,pn %icc, 1f
mov -2, %o0
b aes_t4_set_encrypt_key
nop
1: retl
nop
.type AES_set_encrypt_key,#function
.size AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key
.global AES_set_decrypt_key
.align 32
AES_set_decrypt_key:
andcc %o2, 7, %g0 ! check alignment
bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f
mov -1, %o0
brz,a,pn %o0, 1f
mov -1, %o0
brz,a,pn %o2, 1f
mov -1, %o0
andncc %o1, 0x1c0, %g0
bnz,a,pn %icc, 1f
mov -2, %o0
cmp %o1, 128
bl,a,pn %icc, 1f
mov -2, %o0
b aes_t4_set_decrypt_key
nop
1: retl
nop
.type AES_set_decrypt_key,#function
.size AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key
___
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivec,$enc)=map("%o$_",(0..5));
$code.=<<___;
.globl AES_cbc_encrypt
.align 32
AES_cbc_encrypt:
ld [$key + 240], %g1
nop
brz $enc, .Lcbc_decrypt
cmp %g1, 12
bl,pt %icc, aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt
nop
be,pn %icc, aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt
nop
ba aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt
nop
.Lcbc_decrypt:
bl,pt %icc, aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt
nop
be,pn %icc, aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt
nop
ba aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt
nop
.type AES_cbc_encrypt,#function
.size AES_cbc_encrypt,.-AES_cbc_encrypt
___
}
$code.=<<___;
.asciz "AES for SPARC T4, David S. Miller, Andy Polyakov"
.align 4
___
&emit_assembler();
close STDOUT;

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@
# Add decryption procedure. Performance in CPU cycles spent to decrypt
# one byte out of 4096-byte buffer with 128-bit key is:
#
# Core 2 11.0
# Nehalem 9.16
# Atom 20.9
# Core 2 9.83
# Nehalem 7.74
# Atom 19.0
#
# November 2011.
#
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx");
my @XMM=map("%xmm$_",(15,0..14)); # best on Atom, +10% over (0..15)
@@ -455,6 +456,7 @@ sub MixColumns {
# modified to emit output in order suitable for feeding back to aesenc[last]
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
my $inv=@_[16]; # optional
$code.=<<___;
pshufd \$0x93, @x[0], @t[0] # x0 <<< 32
pshufd \$0x93, @x[1], @t[1]
@@ -496,7 +498,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @t[4], @t[0]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @x[6]
pxor @t[5], @t[1]
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$inv);
pxor @t[3], @x[4]
pxor @t[7], @x[5]
pxor @t[6], @x[3]
@@ -504,9 +507,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
pxor @t[2], @x[6]
movdqa @t[1], @x[7]
___
$code.=<<___ if ($inv);
pxor @x[4], @t[3]
pxor @t[7], @x[5]
pxor @x[3], @t[6]
movdqa @t[0], @x[3]
pxor @t[2], @x[6]
movdqa @t[6], @x[2]
movdqa @t[1], @x[7]
movdqa @x[6], @x[4]
movdqa @t[3], @x[6]
___
}
sub InvMixColumns {
sub InvMixColumns_orig {
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
@@ -660,6 +674,54 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
}
sub InvMixColumns {
my @x=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
# Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing pointer to
#
# | 0e 0b 0d 09 | | 02 03 01 01 | | 05 00 04 00 |
# | 09 0e 0b 0d | = | 01 02 03 01 | x | 00 05 00 04 |
# | 0d 09 0e 0b | | 01 01 02 03 | | 04 00 05 00 |
# | 0b 0d 09 0e | | 03 01 01 02 | | 00 04 00 05 |
$code.=<<___;
# multiplication by 0x05-0x00-0x04-0x00
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[0], @t[0]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[6], @t[6]
pxor @x[0], @t[0]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[7], @t[7]
pxor @x[6], @t[6]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[1], @t[1]
pxor @x[7], @t[7]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[2], @t[2]
pxor @x[1], @t[1]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[3], @t[3]
pxor @x[2], @t[2]
pxor @t[6], @x[0]
pxor @t[6], @x[1]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[4], @t[4]
pxor @x[3], @t[3]
pxor @t[0], @x[2]
pxor @t[1], @x[3]
pshufd \$0x4E, @x[5], @t[5]
pxor @x[4], @t[4]
pxor @t[7], @x[1]
pxor @t[2], @x[4]
pxor @x[5], @t[5]
pxor @t[7], @x[2]
pxor @t[6], @x[3]
pxor @t[6], @x[4]
pxor @t[3], @x[5]
pxor @t[4], @x[6]
pxor @t[7], @x[4]
pxor @t[7], @x[5]
pxor @t[5], @x[7]
___
&MixColumns (@x,@t,1); # flipped 2<->3 and 4<->6
}
sub aesenc { # not used
my @b=@_[0..7];
my @t=@_[8..15];
@@ -2027,6 +2089,8 @@ ___
# const unsigned char iv[16]);
#
my ($twmask,$twres,$twtmp)=@XMM[13..15];
$arg6=~s/d$//;
$code.=<<___;
.globl bsaes_xts_encrypt
.type bsaes_xts_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent

1507
crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl Normal file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
#
# aes-586.pl vpaes-x86.pl
#
# Core 2(**) 29.1/42.3/18.3 22.0/25.6(***)
# Nehalem 27.9/40.4/18.1 10.3/12.0
# Atom 102./119./60.1 64.5/85.3(***)
# Core 2(**) 28.1/41.4/18.3 21.9/25.2(***)
# Nehalem 27.9/40.4/18.1 10.2/11.9
# Atom 70.7/92.1/60.1 61.1/75.4(***)
#
# (*) "Hyper-threading" in the context refers rather to cache shared
# among multiple cores, than to specifically Intel HTT. As vast
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@
# (**) "Core 2" refers to initial 65nm design, a.k.a. Conroe.
#
# (***) Less impressive improvement on Core 2 and Atom is due to slow
# pshufb, yet it's respectable +32%/65% improvement on Core 2
# and +58%/40% on Atom (as implied, over "hyper-threading-safe"
# pshufb, yet it's respectable +28%/64% improvement on Core 2
# and +15% on Atom (as implied, over "hyper-threading-safe"
# code path).
#
# <appro@openssl.org>
@@ -183,35 +183,35 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6")
&movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_ipt,$const));
&pandn ("xmm1","xmm0");
&movdqu ("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key));
&psrld ("xmm1",4);
&pand ("xmm0","xmm6");
&movdqu ("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key));
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP($k_ipt+16,$const));
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm5");
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&psrld ("xmm1",4);
&add ($key,16);
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1");
&lea ($base,&DWP($k_mc_backward,$const));
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2");
&jmp (&label("enc_entry"));
&set_label("enc_loop",16);
# middle of middle round
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP($k_sb1,$const)); # 4 : sb1u
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sb1u
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 = sb1u + k
&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP($k_sb1+16,$const));# 0 : sb1t
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sb1u
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sb1t
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = A
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 = sb1u + k
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_sb2,$const)); # 4 : sb2u
&pshufb ("xmm5","xmm2"); # 4 = sb2u
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = A
&movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(-0x40,$base,$magic));# .Lk_mc_forward[]
&pshufb ("xmm5","xmm2"); # 4 = sb2u
&movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_sb2+16,$const));# 2 : sb2t
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = sb2t
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm5"); # 2 = 2A
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0,$base,$magic)); # .Lk_mc_backward[]
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = sb2t
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm0"); # 3 = A
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm5"); # 2 = 2A
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = B
&add ($key,16); # next key
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm2"); # 0 = 2A+B
@@ -220,30 +220,30 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm0"); # 3 = 2A+B+D
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = 2B+C
&and ($magic,0x30); # ... mod 4
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
&sub ($round,1); # nr--
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
&set_label("enc_entry");
# top of round
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6"); # 1 : i
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k
&pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); # 1 = i<<4
&psrld ("xmm1",4); # 1 = i
&pand ("xmm0","xmm6"); # 0 = k
&movdqa ("xmm5",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k
&pshufb ("xmm5","xmm0"); # 2 = a/k
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = j
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/i
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = j
&pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = 1/i
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm5"); # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
&movdqa ("xmm4","xmm7"); # 4 : 1/j
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm5"); # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = 1/j
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm7"); # 2 : 1/iak
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm5"); # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = 1/iak
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = io
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/jak
&movdqu ("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key));
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = io
&pshufb ("xmm3","xmm4"); # 3 = 1/jak
&movdqu ("xmm5",&QWP(0,$key));
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = jo
&jnz (&label("enc_loop"));
@@ -265,8 +265,8 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
## Same API as encryption core.
##
&function_begin_B("_vpaes_decrypt_core");
&mov ($round,&DWP(240,$key));
&lea ($base,&DWP($k_dsbd,$const));
&mov ($round,&DWP(240,$key));
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6");
&movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_dipt-$k_dsbd,$base));
&pandn ("xmm1","xmm0");
@@ -292,62 +292,61 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
## Inverse mix columns
##
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(-0x20,$base)); # 4 : sb9u
&movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(-0x10,$base)); # 0 : sb9t
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sb9u
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm0");
&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(-0x10,$base)); # 0 : sb9t
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sb9t
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = ch
&add ($key,16); # next round key
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); # MC ch
&pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sb9t
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4");
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0,$base)); # 4 : sbdu
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x10,$base)); # 0 : sbdt
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbdu
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x10,$base)); # 0 : sbdt
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sbdt
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = ch
&sub ($round,1); # nr--
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); # MC ch
&pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sbdt
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 4 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x20,$base)); # 4 : sbbu
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x30,$base)); # 0 : sbbt
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbbu
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x30,$base)); # 0 : sbbt
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sbbt
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = ch
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); # MC ch
&pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sbbt
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 4 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm4",&QWP(0x40,$base)); # 4 : sbeu
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbeu
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm0",&QWP(0x50,$base)); # 0 : sbet
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm3"); # 0 = sbet
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 0 = ch
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch
&movdqa ("xmm1",&QWP(0x50,$base)); # 0 : sbet
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = sbeu
&pshufb ("xmm0","xmm5"); # MC ch
&pshufb ("xmm1","xmm3"); # 0 = sbet
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm4"); # 4 = ch
&add ($key,16); # next round key
&palignr("xmm5","xmm5",12);
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = ch
&sub ($round,1); # nr--
&set_label("dec_entry");
# top of round
&movdqa ("xmm1","xmm6"); # 1 : i
&pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); # 1 = i<<4
&psrld ("xmm1",4); # 1 = i
&pand ("xmm0","xmm6"); # 0 = k
&movdqa ("xmm2",&QWP($k_inv+16,$const));# 2 : a/k
&pandn ("xmm1","xmm0"); # 1 = i<<4
&pand ("xmm0","xmm6"); # 0 = k
&psrld ("xmm1",4); # 1 = i
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = a/k
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = j
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/i
&pxor ("xmm0","xmm1"); # 0 = j
&pshufb ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = 1/i
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
&movdqa ("xmm4","xmm7"); # 4 : 1/j
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm2"); # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
&pshufb ("xmm4","xmm0"); # 4 = 1/j
&pxor ("xmm4","xmm2"); # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
&movdqa ("xmm2","xmm7"); # 2 : 1/iak
&pshufb ("xmm2","xmm3"); # 2 = 1/iak
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = io
&movdqa ("xmm3","xmm7"); # 3 : 1/jak
&pxor ("xmm2","xmm0"); # 2 = io
&pshufb ("xmm3","xmm4"); # 3 = 1/jak
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = jo
&movdqu ("xmm0",&QWP(0,$key));
&pxor ("xmm3","xmm1"); # 3 = jo
&jnz (&label("dec_loop"));
# middle of last round
@@ -542,12 +541,12 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
## %xmm0: b+c+d b+c b a
##
&function_begin_B("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear");
&pshufd ("xmm0","xmm6",0x80); # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm0"); # -> c+d c 0 0
&pshufd ("xmm1","xmm6",0x80); # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
&pshufd ("xmm0","xmm7",0xFE); # b a _ _ -> b b b a
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm1"); # -> c+d c 0 0
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&pxor ("xmm6","xmm0"); # -> b+c+d b+c b a
&movdqa ("xmm0","xmm6");
&pxor ("xmm1","xmm1");
&movhlps("xmm6","xmm1"); # clobber low side with zeros
&ret ();
&function_end_B("_vpaes_schedule_192_smear");
@@ -843,6 +842,8 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
&mov ($out,&wparam(1)); # out
&mov ($round,&wparam(2)); # len
&mov ($key,&wparam(3)); # key
&sub ($round,16);
&jc (&label("cbc_abort"));
&lea ($base,&DWP(-56,"esp"));
&mov ($const,&wparam(4)); # ivp
&and ($base,-16);
@@ -853,7 +854,6 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
&mov (&DWP(48,"esp"),$base);
&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$out); # save out
&sub ($round,16);
&mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$key) # save key
&mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$const); # save ivp
&mov ($out,$round); # $out works as $len
@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ $k_dsbo=0x2c0; # decryption sbox final output
&mov ($base,&DWP(8,"esp")); # restore ivp
&mov ("esp",&DWP(48,"esp"));
&movdqu (&QWP(0,$base),"xmm1"); # write IV
&set_label("cbc_abort");
&function_end("${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt");
&asm_finish();

View File

@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
#
# aes-x86_64.pl vpaes-x86_64.pl
#
# Core 2(**) 30.5/43.7/14.3 21.8/25.7(***)
# Nehalem 30.5/42.2/14.6 9.8/11.8
# Atom 63.9/79.0/32.1 64.0/84.8(***)
# Core 2(**) 29.6/41.1/14.3 21.9/25.2(***)
# Nehalem 29.6/40.3/14.6 10.0/11.8
# Atom 57.3/74.2/32.1 60.9/77.2(***)
#
# (*) "Hyper-threading" in the context refers rather to cache shared
# among multiple cores, than to specifically Intel HTT. As vast
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
# (**) "Core 2" refers to initial 65nm design, a.k.a. Conroe.
#
# (***) Less impressive improvement on Core 2 and Atom is due to slow
# pshufb, yet it's respectable +40%/78% improvement on Core 2
# pshufb, yet it's respectable +36%/62% improvement on Core 2
# (as implied, over "hyper-threading-safe" code path).
#
# <appro@openssl.org>
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
$PREFIX="vpaes";
@@ -94,8 +95,8 @@ _vpaes_encrypt_core:
movdqa .Lk_ipt+16(%rip), %xmm0 # ipthi
pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0
pxor %xmm5, %xmm2
pxor %xmm2, %xmm0
add \$16, %r9
pxor %xmm2, %xmm0
lea .Lk_mc_backward(%rip),%r10
jmp .Lenc_entry
@@ -103,19 +104,19 @@ _vpaes_encrypt_core:
.Lenc_loop:
# middle of middle round
movdqa %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 : sb1u
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u
pxor %xmm5, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k
movdqa %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 : sb1t
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A
pxor %xmm5, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k
movdqa %xmm15, %xmm5 # 4 : sb2u
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm5 # 4 = sb2u
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A
movdqa -0x40(%r11,%r10), %xmm1 # .Lk_mc_forward[]
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm5 # 4 = sb2u
movdqa (%r11,%r10), %xmm4 # .Lk_mc_backward[]
movdqa %xmm14, %xmm2 # 2 : sb2t
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = sb2t
pxor %xmm5, %xmm2 # 2 = 2A
movdqa (%r11,%r10), %xmm4 # .Lk_mc_backward[]
movdqa %xmm0, %xmm3 # 3 = A
pxor %xmm5, %xmm2 # 2 = 2A
pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = B
add \$16, %r9 # next key
pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+B
@@ -124,30 +125,30 @@ _vpaes_encrypt_core:
pxor %xmm0, %xmm3 # 3 = 2A+B+D
pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = 2B+C
and \$0x30, %r11 # ... mod 4
pxor %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
sub \$1,%rax # nr--
pxor %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D
.Lenc_entry:
# top of round
movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 # 1 : i
movdqa %xmm11, %xmm5 # 2 : a/k
pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 # 1 = i<<4
psrld \$4, %xmm1 # 1 = i
pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k
movdqa %xmm11, %xmm5 # 2 : a/k
pshufb %xmm0, %xmm5 # 2 = a/k
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j
pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i
pxor %xmm5, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j
pxor %xmm5, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j
pxor %xmm5, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak
pxor %xmm5, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak
pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak
movdqu (%r9), %xmm5
pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io
pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak
movdqu (%r9), %xmm5
pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo
jnz .Lenc_loop
@@ -200,62 +201,61 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
## Inverse mix columns
##
movdqa -0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sb9u
movdqa -0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sb9t
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb9u
pxor %xmm0, %xmm4
movdqa -0x10(%r10),%xmm0 # 0 : sb9t
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb9t
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
add \$16, %r9 # next round key
pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sb9t
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0
movdqa 0x00(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbdu
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbdu
pxor %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = ch
movdqa 0x10(%r10),%xmm0 # 0 : sbdt
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sbdt
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
sub \$1,%rax # nr--
pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch
movdqa 0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbbu
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbbu
pxor %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = ch
movdqa 0x30(%r10),%xmm0 # 0 : sbbt
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sbbt
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch
movdqa 0x40(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbeu
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbeu
pxor %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = ch
movdqa 0x50(%r10),%xmm0 # 0 : sbet
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sbet
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
movdqa 0x10(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbdt
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbdu
pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sbdt
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 4 = ch
movdqa 0x20(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbbu
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
movdqa 0x30(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbbt
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbbu
pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sbbt
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 4 = ch
movdqa 0x40(%r10),%xmm4 # 4 : sbeu
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
movdqa 0x50(%r10),%xmm1 # 0 : sbet
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbeu
pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 0 = sbet
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 4 = ch
add \$16, %r9 # next round key
palignr \$12, %xmm5, %xmm5
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = ch
sub \$1,%rax # nr--
.Ldec_entry:
# top of round
movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 # 1 : i
pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 # 1 = i<<4
movdqa %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 : a/k
psrld \$4, %xmm1 # 1 = i
pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k
movdqa %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 : a/k
pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i
pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j
pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i
pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j
pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k
pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j
pxor %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak
pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io
movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak
pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io
pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak
pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo
movdqu (%r9), %xmm0
pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo
jnz .Ldec_loop
# middle of last round
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ _vpaes_decrypt_core:
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou
pxor %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k
movdqa 0x70(%r10), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot
movdqa .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd(%r11), %xmm2
movdqa -0x160(%r11), %xmm2 # .Lk_sr-.Lk_dsbd=-0x160
pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t
pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A
pshufb %xmm2, %xmm0
@@ -463,12 +463,12 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:
.type _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_vpaes_schedule_192_smear:
pshufd \$0x80, %xmm6, %xmm0 # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
pxor %xmm0, %xmm6 # -> c+d c 0 0
pshufd \$0x80, %xmm6, %xmm1 # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0
pshufd \$0xFE, %xmm7, %xmm0 # b a _ _ -> b b b a
pxor %xmm1, %xmm6 # -> c+d c 0 0
pxor %xmm1, %xmm1
pxor %xmm0, %xmm6 # -> b+c+d b+c b a
movdqa %xmm6, %xmm0
pxor %xmm1, %xmm1
movhlps %xmm1, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros
ret
.size _vpaes_schedule_192_smear,.-_vpaes_schedule_192_smear
@@ -869,6 +869,8 @@ ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt:
___
($len,$key)=($key,$len);
$code.=<<___;
sub \$16,$len
jc .Lcbc_abort
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0xb8(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -887,7 +889,6 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
movdqu ($ivp),%xmm6 # load IV
sub $inp,$out
sub \$16,$len
call _vpaes_preheat
cmp \$0,${enc}d
je .Lcbc_dec_loop
@@ -932,6 +933,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
.Lcbc_epilogue:
___
$code.=<<___;
.Lcbc_abort:
ret
.size ${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt,.-${PREFIX}_cbc_encrypt
___

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ unsigned int _armv7_tick(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_rdtsc(void)
{
if (OPENSSL_armcap_P|ARMV7_TICK)
if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK)
return _armv7_tick();
else
return 0;

View File

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ a_gentm.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
a_gentm.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
a_gentm.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
a_gentm.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
a_gentm.o: ../cryptlib.h ../o_time.h a_gentm.c
a_gentm.o: ../cryptlib.h ../o_time.h a_gentm.c asn1_locl.h
a_i2d_fp.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
a_i2d_fp.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
a_i2d_fp.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ a_time.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
a_time.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
a_time.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
a_time.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h ../o_time.h a_time.c
a_time.o: asn1_locl.h
a_type.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
a_type.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
a_type.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ a_utctm.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
a_utctm.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
a_utctm.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
a_utctm.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
a_utctm.o: ../cryptlib.h ../o_time.h a_utctm.c
a_utctm.o: ../cryptlib.h ../o_time.h a_utctm.c asn1_locl.h
a_utf8.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
a_utf8.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
a_utf8.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h

View File

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
BUF_MEM *b;
unsigned char *p;
int i;
int ret=-1;
ASN1_const_CTX c;
int want=HEADER_SIZE;
size_t want=HEADER_SIZE;
int eos=0;
#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64)
/* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */
long off=0;
#else
int off=0;
#endif
int len=0;
size_t off=0;
size_t len=0;
b=BUF_MEM_new();
if (b == NULL)
@@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
{
want-=(len-off);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
goto err;
}
if (i > 0)
{
if (len+i < len)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
len+=i;
}
}
/* else data already loaded */
@@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
{
/* no data body so go round again */
eos++;
if (eos < 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
want=HEADER_SIZE;
}
else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC))
@@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
else
{
/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
want=(int)c.slen;
want=c.slen;
if (want > (len-off))
{
want-=(len-off);
if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
len+want < len)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
goto err;
}
/* This can't overflow because
* |len+want| didn't overflow. */
len+=i;
want -= i;
want-=i;
}
}
off+=(int)c.slen;
if (off + c.slen < off)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
off+=c.slen;
if (eos <= 0)
{
break;
@@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
}
}
if (off > INT_MAX)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
*pb = b;
return off;
err:
if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
return(ret);
return -1;
}

View File

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include "o_time.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#if 0
@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ err:
#endif
int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
{
static const int min[9]={ 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
static const int max[9]={99, 99,12,31,23,59,59,12,59};
@@ -135,7 +136,12 @@ int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
{
if ((i == 6) && ((a[o] == 'Z') ||
(a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-')))
{ i++; break; }
{
i++;
if (tm)
tm->tm_sec = 0;
break;
}
if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err;
n= a[o]-'0';
if (++o > l) goto err;
@@ -145,6 +151,33 @@ int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
if (++o > l) goto err;
if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err;
if (tm)
{
switch(i)
{
case 0:
tm->tm_year = n * 100 - 1900;
break;
case 1:
tm->tm_year += n;
break;
case 2:
tm->tm_mon = n - 1;
break;
case 3:
tm->tm_mday = n;
break;
case 4:
tm->tm_hour = n;
break;
case 5:
tm->tm_min = n;
break;
case 6:
tm->tm_sec = n;
break;
}
}
}
/* Optional fractional seconds: decimal point followed by one
* or more digits.
@@ -163,6 +196,7 @@ int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
o++;
else if ((a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-'))
{
int offsign = a[o] == '-' ? -1 : 1, offset = 0;
o++;
if (o+4 > l) goto err;
for (i=7; i<9; i++)
@@ -173,10 +207,19 @@ int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err;
n=(n*10)+ a[o]-'0';
if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err;
if (tm)
{
if (i == 7)
offset = n * 3600;
else if (i == 8)
offset += n * 60;
}
o++;
}
if (offset && !OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(tm, 0, offset * offsign))
return 0;
}
else
else if (a[o])
{
/* Missing time zone information. */
goto err;
@@ -186,6 +229,11 @@ err:
return(0);
}
int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
{
return asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(NULL, d);
}
int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str)
{
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME t;

View File

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
int pad=0,ret,i,neg;
unsigned char *p,*n,pb=0;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0);
if (a == NULL) return(0);
neg=a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
if (a->length == 0)
ret=1;

View File

@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
stmp.data = NULL;
stmp.length = 0;
ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
if(ret < 0) return ret;
*out = stmp.data;

View File

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include "o_time.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(ASN1_TIME, B_ASN1_TIME)
@@ -196,3 +197,33 @@ int ASN1_TIME_set_string(ASN1_TIME *s, const char *str)
return 1;
}
static int asn1_time_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_TIME *t)
{
if (t == NULL)
{
time_t now_t;
time(&now_t);
if (OPENSSL_gmtime(&now_t, tm))
return 1;
return 0;
}
if (t->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return asn1_utctime_to_tm(tm, t);
else if (t->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
return asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(tm, t);
return 0;
}
int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to)
{
struct tm tm_from, tm_to;
if (!asn1_time_to_tm(&tm_from, from))
return 0;
if (!asn1_time_to_tm(&tm_to, to))
return 0;
return OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(pday, psec, &tm_from, &tm_to);
}

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include "o_time.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#if 0
int i2d_ASN1_UTCTIME(ASN1_UTCTIME *a, unsigned char **pp)
@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ err:
#endif
int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
{
static const int min[8]={ 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
static const int max[8]={99,12,31,23,59,59,12,59};
@@ -129,7 +130,12 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
{
if ((i == 5) && ((a[o] == 'Z') ||
(a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-')))
{ i++; break; }
{
i++;
if (tm)
tm->tm_sec = 0;
break;
}
if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err;
n= a[o]-'0';
if (++o > l) goto err;
@@ -139,11 +145,36 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
if (++o > l) goto err;
if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err;
if (tm)
{
switch(i)
{
case 0:
tm->tm_year = n < 50 ? n + 100 : n;
break;
case 1:
tm->tm_mon = n - 1;
break;
case 2:
tm->tm_mday = n;
break;
case 3:
tm->tm_hour = n;
break;
case 4:
tm->tm_min = n;
break;
case 5:
tm->tm_sec = n;
break;
}
}
}
if (a[o] == 'Z')
o++;
else if ((a[o] == '+') || (a[o] == '-'))
{
int offsign = a[o] == '-' ? -1 : 1, offset = 0;
o++;
if (o+4 > l) goto err;
for (i=6; i<8; i++)
@@ -154,12 +185,26 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
if ((a[o] < '0') || (a[o] > '9')) goto err;
n=(n*10)+ a[o]-'0';
if ((n < min[i]) || (n > max[i])) goto err;
if (tm)
{
if (i == 6)
offset = n * 3600;
else if (i == 7)
offset += n * 60;
}
o++;
}
if (offset && !OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(tm, 0, offset * offsign))
return 0;
}
return(o == l);
return o == l;
err:
return(0);
return 0;
}
int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(const ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
{
return asn1_utctime_to_tm(NULL, d);
}
int ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, const char *str)
@@ -242,39 +287,26 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t)
{
struct tm *tm;
struct tm data;
int offset;
int year;
struct tm stm, ttm;
int day, sec;
#define g2(p) (((p)[0]-'0')*10+(p)[1]-'0')
if (!asn1_utctime_to_tm(&stm, s))
return -2;
if (s->data[12] == 'Z')
offset=0;
else
{
offset = g2(s->data+13)*60+g2(s->data+15);
if (s->data[12] == '-')
offset = -offset;
}
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &ttm))
return -2;
t -= offset*60; /* FIXME: may overflow in extreme cases */
tm = OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
#define return_cmp(a,b) if ((a)<(b)) return -1; else if ((a)>(b)) return 1
year = g2(s->data);
if (year < 50)
year += 100;
return_cmp(year, tm->tm_year);
return_cmp(g2(s->data+2) - 1, tm->tm_mon);
return_cmp(g2(s->data+4), tm->tm_mday);
return_cmp(g2(s->data+6), tm->tm_hour);
return_cmp(g2(s->data+8), tm->tm_min);
return_cmp(g2(s->data+10), tm->tm_sec);
#undef g2
#undef return_cmp
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_diff(&day, &sec, &stm, &ttm))
return -2;
if (day > 0)
return 1;
if (day < 0)
return -1;
if (sec > 0)
return 1;
if (sec < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[];
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[];
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD hmac_asn1_meth;
extern const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD cmac_asn1_meth;
@@ -92,7 +93,10 @@ static const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *standard_methods[] =
&eckey_asn1_meth,
#endif
&hmac_asn1_meth,
&cmac_asn1_meth
&cmac_asn1_meth,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
&dhx_asn1_meth
#endif
};
typedef int sk_cmp_fn_type(const char * const *a, const char * const *b);

View File

@@ -208,14 +208,14 @@ typedef struct asn1_const_ctx_st
#define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_CRITICAL 0x02 /* critical x509v3 object id */
#define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS 0x04 /* internal use */
#define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA 0x08 /* internal use */
typedef struct asn1_object_st
struct asn1_object_st
{
const char *sn,*ln;
int nid;
int length;
const unsigned char *data; /* data remains const after init */
int flags; /* Should we free this one */
} ASN1_OBJECT;
};
#define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT 0x08 /* Set if 0x07 has bits left value */
/* This indicates that the ASN1_STRING is not a real value but just a place
@@ -839,7 +839,7 @@ int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(const ASN1_INTEGER *x, const ASN1_INTEGER *y);
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_ENUMERATED)
int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *a);
int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(const ASN1_UTCTIME *a);
ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_set(ASN1_UTCTIME *s,time_t t);
ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
int offset_day, long offset_sec);
@@ -849,11 +849,13 @@ int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t);
time_t ASN1_UTCTIME_get(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s);
#endif
int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a);
int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a);
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,time_t t);
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,
time_t t, int offset_day, long offset_sec);
int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str);
int ASN1_TIME_diff(int *pday, int *psec,
const ASN1_TIME *from, const ASN1_TIME *to);
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING * ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a);

View File

@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),"unknown public key type"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM),"unknown signature algorithm"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG) ,"unknown tag"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT) ,"unkown format"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT) ,"unknown format"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE),"unsupported any defined by type"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER) ,"unsupported cipher"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported encryption algorithm"},

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@
/* Internal ASN1 structures and functions: not for application use */
int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d);
int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d);
/* ASN1 print context structure */
struct asn1_pctx_st

View File

@@ -225,6 +225,24 @@ int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags, unsigned long cflag)
}
}
if(!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_IDS))
{
if (ci->issuerUID)
{
if (BIO_printf(bp,"%8sIssuer Unique ID: ","") <= 0)
goto err;
if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, ci->issuerUID, 12))
goto err;
}
if (ci->subjectUID)
{
if (BIO_printf(bp,"%8sSubject Unique ID: ","") <= 0)
goto err;
if (!X509_signature_dump(bp, ci->subjectUID, 12))
goto err;
}
}
if (!(cflag & X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS))
X509V3_extensions_print(bp, "X509v3 extensions",
ci->extensions, cflag, 8);

View File

@@ -446,11 +446,11 @@ static int asn1_print_fsname(BIO *out, int indent,
return 1;
}
static int asn1_print_boolean_ctx(BIO *out, const int bool,
static int asn1_print_boolean_ctx(BIO *out, int boolval,
const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
{
const char *str;
switch (bool)
switch (boolval)
{
case -1:
str = "BOOL ABSENT";
@@ -574,10 +574,10 @@ static int asn1_primitive_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld,
{
case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
{
int bool = *(int *)fld;
if (bool == -1)
bool = it->size;
ret = asn1_print_boolean_ctx(out, bool, pctx);
int boolval = *(int *)fld;
if (boolval == -1)
boolval = it->size;
ret = asn1_print_boolean_ctx(out, boolval, pctx);
}
break;

View File

@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL) = {
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REVOKED)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)

View File

@@ -175,12 +175,15 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
if (key->pkey)
{
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
ret = key->pkey;
}
else
{
key->pkey = ret;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
}
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
return ret;

View File

@@ -192,3 +192,17 @@ int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
if(a) length += i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
return length;
}
void X509_get0_signature(ASN1_BIT_STRING **psig, X509_ALGOR **palg,
const X509 *x)
{
if (psig)
*psig = x->signature;
if (palg)
*palg = x->sig_alg;
}
int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
{
return OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
}

View File

@@ -185,3 +185,25 @@ int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *bp, const char *s, int len, int indent)
return BIO_dump_indent_cb(write_bio, bp, s, len, indent);
}
int BIO_hex_string(BIO *out, int indent, int width, unsigned char *data,
int datalen)
{
int i, j = 0;
if (datalen < 1)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < datalen - 1; i++)
{
if (i && !j) BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
BIO_printf(out, "%02X:", data[i]);
j = (j + 1) % width;
if (!j) BIO_printf(out, "\n");
}
if (i && !j) BIO_printf(out, "%*s", indent, "");
BIO_printf(out, "%02X", data[datalen - 1]);
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -233,13 +233,14 @@ int BIO_get_port(const char *str, unsigned short *port_ptr)
int BIO_sock_error(int sock)
{
int j,i;
int size;
union { size_t s; int i; } size;
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_BEOS_R5)
return 0;
#endif
size=sizeof(int);
/* heuristic way to adapt for platforms that expect 64-bit optlen */
size.s=0, size.i=sizeof(j);
/* Note: under Windows the third parameter is of type (char *)
* whereas under other systems it is (void *) if you don't have
* a cast it will choke the compiler: if you do have a cast then
@@ -960,7 +961,6 @@ int BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(int s, int on)
#endif
return(ret == 0);
}
#endif
int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode)
{
@@ -973,3 +973,4 @@ int BIO_socket_nbio(int s, int mode)
#endif
return(ret == 0);
}
#endif

View File

@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT 45 /* Next DTLS handshake timeout to
* adjust socket timeouts */
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG 48
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* SCTP stuff */
@@ -706,6 +707,9 @@ int BIO_dump_indent(BIO *b,const char *bytes,int len,int indent);
int BIO_dump_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len);
int BIO_dump_indent_fp(FILE *fp, const char *s, int len, int indent);
#endif
int BIO_hex_string(BIO *out, int indent, int width, unsigned char *data,
int datalen);
struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name);
/* We might want a thread-safe interface too:
* struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname_r(const char *name,
@@ -738,8 +742,8 @@ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b);
int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b);
#endif
BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag);
BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *host_port);
BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *host_port);
BIO *BIO_new_connect(const char *host_port);
BIO *BIO_new_accept(const char *host_port);
int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1,
BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2);

View File

@@ -521,40 +521,40 @@ void BIO_free_all(BIO *bio)
BIO *BIO_dup_chain(BIO *in)
{
BIO *ret=NULL,*eoc=NULL,*bio,*new;
BIO *ret=NULL,*eoc=NULL,*bio,*new_bio;
for (bio=in; bio != NULL; bio=bio->next_bio)
{
if ((new=BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL) goto err;
new->callback=bio->callback;
new->cb_arg=bio->cb_arg;
new->init=bio->init;
new->shutdown=bio->shutdown;
new->flags=bio->flags;
if ((new_bio=BIO_new(bio->method)) == NULL) goto err;
new_bio->callback=bio->callback;
new_bio->cb_arg=bio->cb_arg;
new_bio->init=bio->init;
new_bio->shutdown=bio->shutdown;
new_bio->flags=bio->flags;
/* This will let SSL_s_sock() work with stdin/stdout */
new->num=bio->num;
new_bio->num=bio->num;
if (!BIO_dup_state(bio,(char *)new))
if (!BIO_dup_state(bio,(char *)new_bio))
{
BIO_free(new);
BIO_free(new_bio);
goto err;
}
/* copy app data */
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new->ex_data,
if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, &new_bio->ex_data,
&bio->ex_data))
goto err;
if (ret == NULL)
{
eoc=new;
eoc=new_bio;
ret=eoc;
}
else
{
BIO_push(eoc,new);
eoc=new;
BIO_push(eoc,new_bio);
eoc=new_bio;
}
}
return(ret);

View File

@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int acpt_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
return(ret);
}
BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *str)
BIO *BIO_new_accept(const char *str)
{
BIO *ret;

View File

@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static int conn_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
return(ret);
}
BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *str)
BIO *BIO_new_connect(const char *str)
{
BIO *ret;

View File

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
#include <sys/timeb.h>
#endif
@@ -77,10 +77,24 @@
#define OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE 0xc0
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && !defined(IP_MTU)
#define IP_MTU 14 /* linux is lame */
#endif
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && !defined(IPPROTO_IPV6)
#define IPPROTO_IPV6 41 /* windows is lame */
#endif
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
/* Standard definition causes type-punning problems. */
#undef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
#define s6_addr32 __u6_addr.__u6_addr32
#define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
(((a)->s6_addr32[0] == 0) && \
((a)->s6_addr32[1] == 0) && \
((a)->s6_addr32[2] == htonl(0x0000ffff)))
#endif
#ifdef WATT32
#define sock_write SockWrite /* Watt-32 uses same names */
#define sock_read SockRead
@@ -255,7 +269,7 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
{
#if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO)
bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr;
int sz = sizeof(int);
union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
/* Is a timer active? */
if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0)
@@ -265,8 +279,10 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
/* Read current socket timeout */
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
int timeout;
sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
(void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
(void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
{ perror("getsockopt"); }
else
{
@@ -274,9 +290,12 @@ static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b)
data->socket_timeout.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
}
#else
sz.i = sizeof(data->socket_timeout);
if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
&(data->socket_timeout), (void *)&sz) < 0)
{ perror("getsockopt"); }
else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(data->socket_timeout));
#endif
/* Get current time */
@@ -445,11 +464,10 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
int *ip;
struct sockaddr *to = NULL;
bio_dgram_data *data = NULL;
#if defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU)
long sockopt_val = 0;
unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
int sockopt_val = 0;
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && (defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU))
socklen_t sockopt_len; /* assume that system supporting IP_MTU is
* modern enough to define socklen_t */
socklen_t addr_len;
union {
struct sockaddr sa;
@@ -531,7 +549,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
break;
/* (Linux)kernel sets DF bit on outgoing IP packets */
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER:
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO)
addr_len = (socklen_t)sizeof(addr);
memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0)
@@ -539,7 +557,6 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = 0;
break;
}
sockopt_len = sizeof(sockopt_val);
switch (addr.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
@@ -548,7 +565,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
perror("setsockopt");
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER)
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO)
case AF_INET6:
sockopt_val = IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO;
if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER,
@@ -565,7 +582,7 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
break;
#endif
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU:
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU)
addr_len = (socklen_t)sizeof(addr);
memset((void *)&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0)
@@ -727,12 +744,15 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
#endif
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT:
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
{
int timeout, sz = sizeof(timeout);
union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
int timeout;
struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
(void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
(void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
else
{
@@ -740,12 +760,20 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
ret = sizeof(*tv);
}
}
#else
sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
ptr, (void *)&ret) < 0)
ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0)
{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
{
OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(struct timeval));
ret = (int)sz.s;
}
else
ret = sz.i;
#endif
}
break;
#endif
#if defined(SO_SNDTIMEO)
@@ -765,12 +793,15 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
#endif
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT:
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
{
int timeout, sz = sizeof(timeout);
union { size_t s; int i; } sz = {0};
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
int timeout;
struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr;
sz.i = sizeof(timeout);
if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO,
(void*)&timeout, &sz) < 0)
(void*)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0)
{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
else
{
@@ -778,12 +809,20 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
ret = sizeof(*tv);
}
}
#else
sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval);
if ( getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO,
ptr, (void *)&ret) < 0)
ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0)
{ perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; }
else if (sizeof(sz.s)!=sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i==0)
{
OPENSSL_assert(sz.s<=sizeof(struct timeval));
ret = (int)sz.s;
}
else
ret = sz.i;
#endif
}
break;
#endif
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP:
@@ -812,6 +851,50 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = 0;
break;
#endif
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG:
sockopt_val = num ? 1 : 0;
switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
#if defined(IP_DONTFRAG)
if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAG,
&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
{ perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; }
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTUDISCOVER)
if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT),
(ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER,
&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
{ perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; }
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(IP_DONTFRAGMENT)
if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAGMENT,
(const char *)&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
{ perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; }
#else
ret = -1;
#endif
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
#if defined(IPV6_DONTFRAG)
if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_DONTFRAG,
(const void *)&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
{ perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; }
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IPV6_MTUDISCOVER)
if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT),
(ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER,
&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0)
{ perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; }
#else
ret = -1;
#endif
break;
#endif
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
break;
default:
ret=0;
break;
@@ -871,8 +954,8 @@ BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag)
memset(authchunks, 0, sizeof(sockopt_len));
ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len);
OPENSSL_assert(ret >= 0);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + sockopt_len;
p += sizeof(uint8_t))
{
@@ -955,7 +1038,6 @@ static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *a)
#ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp)
{
unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
int ret;
struct sctp_authkey_event* authkeyevent = &snp->sn_auth_event;
@@ -965,9 +1047,8 @@ void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp)
/* delete key */
authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyevent->auth_keynumber;
sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid);
ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY,
&authkeyid, sockopt_len);
&authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid));
}
}
#endif
@@ -1164,7 +1245,7 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen);
OPENSSL_assert(ii >= 0);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks + sizeof(sctp_assoc_t);
for (p = (unsigned char*) authchunks->gauth_chunks;
p < (unsigned char*) authchunks + optlen;
p += sizeof(uint8_t))
{
@@ -1298,7 +1379,7 @@ static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
{
long ret=1;
bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL;
unsigned int sockopt_len = 0;
socklen_t sockopt_len = 0;
struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid;
struct sctp_authkey *authkey;
@@ -1814,11 +1895,15 @@ int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err)
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
struct _timeb tb;
_ftime(&tb);
t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
#if defined(_WIN32)
SYSTEMTIME st;
union { unsigned __int64 ul; FILETIME ft; } now;
GetSystemTime(&st);
SystemTimeToFileTime(&st,&now.ft);
now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul/10000000);
t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul%10000000))/10;
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
struct timeb tb;
ftime(&tb);

View File

@@ -63,9 +63,25 @@
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
/*
* One can argue that one should implement dummy placeholder for
* BIO_s_fd here...
* Dummy placeholder for BIO_s_fd...
*/
BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd,int close_flag)
{
return NULL;
}
int BIO_fd_non_fatal_error(int err)
{
return 0;
}
int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i)
{
return 0;
}
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_fd(void)
{
return NULL;
}
#else
/*
* As for unconditional usage of "UPLINK" interface in this module.

View File

@@ -5,3 +5,6 @@ semantic.cache
co-*.s
bn-*.s
*-mont.s
modexp512-x86_64.s
*-gf2m.s
x86_64-mont5.s

View File

@@ -77,6 +77,12 @@ sparcv9a-mont.s: asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl
$(PERL) asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
sparcv9-mont.s: asm/sparcv9-mont.pl
$(PERL) asm/sparcv9-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
vis3-mont.s: asm/vis3-mont.pl
$(PERL) asm/vis3-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
sparct4-mont.S: asm/sparct4-mont.pl
$(PERL) asm/sparct4-mont.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
sparcv9-gf2m.S: asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl
$(PERL) asm/sparcv9-gf2m.pl $(CFLAGS) > $@
bn-mips3.o: asm/mips3.s
@if [ "$(CC)" = "gcc" ]; then \
@@ -104,6 +110,10 @@ x86_64-gf2m.s: asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
$(PERL) asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
modexp512-x86_64.s: asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
rsaz-x86_64.s: asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
$(PERL) asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
rsaz-avx2.s: asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
$(PERL) asm/rsaz-avx2.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@
bn-ia64.s: asm/ia64.S
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E asm/ia64.S > $@
@@ -125,12 +135,15 @@ ppc-mont.s: asm/ppc-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
ppc64-mont.s: asm/ppc64-mont.pl;$(PERL) asm/ppc64-mont.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
alpha-mont.s: asm/alpha-mont.pl
$(PERL) $< | $(CC) -E - | tee $@ > /dev/null
(preproc=/tmp/$$$$.$@; trap "rm $$preproc" INT; \
$(PERL) asm/alpha-mont.pl > $$preproc && \
$(CC) -E $$preproc > $@ && rm $$preproc)
# GNU make "catch all"
%-mont.s: asm/%-mont.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
%-mont.S: asm/%-mont.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
%-gf2m.S: asm/%-gf2m.pl; $(PERL) $< $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $@
armv4-mont.o: armv4-mont.S
armv4-gf2m.o: armv4-gf2m.S
files:

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
# ====================================================================
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
@@ -23,6 +23,21 @@
# than 1/2KB. Windows CE port would be trivial, as it's exclusively
# about decorations, ABI and instruction syntax are identical.
# November 2013
#
# Add NEON code path, which handles lengths divisible by 8. RSA/DSA
# performance improvement on Cortex-A8 is ~45-100% depending on key
# length, more for longer keys. On Cortex-A15 the span is ~10-105%.
# On Snapdragon S4 improvement was measured to vary from ~70% to
# incredible ~380%, yes, 4.8x faster, for RSA4096 sign. But this is
# rather because original integer-only code seems to perform
# suboptimally on S4. Situation on Cortex-A9 is unfortunately
# different. It's being looked into, but the trouble is that
# performance for vectors longer than 256 bits is actually couple
# of percent worse than for integer-only code. The code is chosen
# for execution on all NEON-capable processors, because gain on
# others outweighs the marginal loss on Cortex-A9.
while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
open STDOUT,">$output";
@@ -52,16 +67,40 @@ $_n0="$num,#14*4";
$_num="$num,#15*4"; $_bpend=$_num;
$code=<<___;
#include "arm_arch.h"
.text
.code 32
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
.align 5
.LOPENSSL_armcap:
.word OPENSSL_armcap_P-bn_mul_mont
#endif
.global bn_mul_mont
.type bn_mul_mont,%function
.align 2
.align 5
bn_mul_mont:
ldr ip,[sp,#4] @ load num
stmdb sp!,{r0,r2} @ sp points at argument block
ldr $num,[sp,#3*4] @ load num
cmp $num,#2
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
tst ip,#7
bne .Lialu
adr r0,bn_mul_mont
ldr r2,.LOPENSSL_armcap
ldr r0,[r0,r2]
tst r0,#1 @ NEON available?
ldmia sp, {r0,r2}
beq .Lialu
add sp,sp,#8
b bn_mul8x_mont_neon
.align 4
.Lialu:
#endif
cmp ip,#2
mov $num,ip @ load num
movlt r0,#0
addlt sp,sp,#2*4
blt .Labrt
@@ -195,10 +234,436 @@ bn_mul_mont:
moveq pc,lr @ be binary compatible with V4, yet
bx lr @ interoperable with Thumb ISA:-)
.size bn_mul_mont,.-bn_mul_mont
.asciz "Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
___
{
sub Dlo() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2):""; }
sub Dhi() { shift=~m|q([1]?[0-9])|?"d".($1*2+1):""; }
my ($A0,$A1,$A2,$A3)=map("d$_",(0..3));
my ($N0,$N1,$N2,$N3)=map("d$_",(4..7));
my ($Z,$Temp)=("q4","q5");
my ($A0xB,$A1xB,$A2xB,$A3xB,$A4xB,$A5xB,$A6xB,$A7xB)=map("q$_",(6..13));
my ($Bi,$Ni,$M0)=map("d$_",(28..31));
my $zero=&Dlo($Z);
my $temp=&Dlo($Temp);
my ($rptr,$aptr,$bptr,$nptr,$n0,$num)=map("r$_",(0..5));
my ($tinptr,$toutptr,$inner,$outer)=map("r$_",(6..9));
$code.=<<___;
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
.fpu neon
.type bn_mul8x_mont_neon,%function
.align 5
bn_mul8x_mont_neon:
mov ip,sp
stmdb sp!,{r4-r11}
vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so
ldmia ip,{r4-r5} @ load rest of parameter block
sub $toutptr,sp,#16
vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]!
sub $toutptr,$toutptr,$num,lsl#4
vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]! @ can't specify :32 :-(
and $toutptr,$toutptr,#-64
vld1.32 {${M0}[0]}, [$n0,:32]
mov sp,$toutptr @ alloca
veor $zero,$zero,$zero
subs $inner,$num,#8
vzip.16 $Bi,$zero
vmull.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0]
vmull.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1]
vmull.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0]
vshl.i64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16
vmull.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1]
vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`
veor $zero,$zero,$zero
vmul.u32 $Ni,$temp,$M0
vmull.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0]
vld1.32 {$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]!
vmull.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1]
vmull.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0]
vzip.16 $Ni,$zero
vmull.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1]
bne .LNEON_1st
@ special case for num=8, everything is in register bank...
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0]
sub $outer,$num,#1
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0]
vmov $Temp,$A0xB
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1]
vmov $A0xB,$A1xB
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0]
vmov $A1xB,$A2xB
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1]
vmov $A2xB,$A3xB
vmov $A3xB,$A4xB
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
vmov $A4xB,$A5xB
vmov $A5xB,$A6xB
vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")`
vmov $A6xB,$A7xB
veor $A7xB,$A7xB
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
b .LNEON_outer8
.align 4
.LNEON_outer8:
vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]!
veor $zero,$zero,$zero
vzip.16 $Bi,$zero
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0]
vshl.i64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1]
vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`
veor $zero,$zero,$zero
subs $outer,$outer,#1
vmul.u32 $Ni,$temp,$M0
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0]
vzip.16 $Ni,$zero
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0]
vmov $Temp,$A0xB
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1]
vmov $A0xB,$A1xB
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0]
vmov $A1xB,$A2xB
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1]
vmov $A2xB,$A3xB
vmov $A3xB,$A4xB
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
vmov $A4xB,$A5xB
vmov $A5xB,$A6xB
vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")`
vmov $A6xB,$A7xB
veor $A7xB,$A7xB
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
bne .LNEON_outer8
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp
mov $toutptr,sp
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,#16
mov $inner,$num
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,$temp
add $tinptr,sp,#16
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`
b .LNEON_tail2
.align 4
.LNEON_1st:
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0]
vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]!
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1]
subs $inner,$inner,#8
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0]
vld1.32 {$N0-$N1}, [$nptr]!
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1]
vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1]
vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmull.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0]
vld1.32 {$N2-$N3}, [$nptr]!
vmull.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1]
vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmull.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0]
vmull.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1]
vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmull.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0]
vmull.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1]
vmull.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0]
vmull.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1]
bne .LNEON_1st
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0]
add $tinptr,sp,#16
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1]
sub $aptr,$aptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $aptr
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0]
vld1.64 {$Temp}, [sp,:128]
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1]
sub $outer,$num,#1
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0]
vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1]
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]!
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0]
vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1]
vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")`
veor $Z,$Z,$Z
vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vst1.64 {$Z}, [$toutptr,:128]
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
b .LNEON_outer
.align 4
.LNEON_outer:
vld1.32 {${Bi}[0]}, [$bptr,:32]!
sub $nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $nptr
vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]!
veor $zero,$zero,$zero
mov $toutptr,sp
vzip.16 $Bi,$zero
sub $inner,$num,#8
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0]
vld1.64 {$A3xB-$A4xB},[$tinptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0]
vld1.64 {$A5xB-$A6xB},[$tinptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1]
vshl.i64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16
veor $zero,$zero,$zero
vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`
vld1.64 {$A7xB},[$tinptr,:128]!
vmul.u32 $Ni,$temp,$M0
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0]
vld1.32 {$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]!
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0]
vzip.16 $Ni,$zero
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1]
.LNEON_inner:
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0]
vld1.32 {$A0-$A3}, [$aptr]!
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1]
subs $inner,$inner,#8
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1]
vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0]
vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]!
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1]
vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0]
vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1]
vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Bi,${A0}[0]
vld1.64 {$A3xB-$A4xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Bi,${A0}[1]
vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Bi,${A1}[0]
vld1.64 {$A5xB-$A6xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Bi,${A1}[1]
vld1.32 {$N0-$N3}, [$nptr]!
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Bi,${A2}[0]
vld1.64 {$A7xB}, [$tinptr, :128]!
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Bi,${A2}[1]
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Bi,${A3}[0]
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Bi,${A3}[1]
bne .LNEON_inner
vmlal.u32 $A0xB,$Ni,${N0}[0]
add $tinptr,sp,#16
vmlal.u32 $A1xB,$Ni,${N0}[1]
sub $aptr,$aptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $aptr
vmlal.u32 $A2xB,$Ni,${N1}[0]
vld1.64 {$Temp}, [sp,:128]
vmlal.u32 $A3xB,$Ni,${N1}[1]
subs $outer,$outer,#1
vmlal.u32 $A4xB,$Ni,${N2}[0]
vst1.64 {$A0xB-$A1xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A5xB,$Ni,${N2}[1]
vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]!
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
vst1.64 {$A2xB-$A3xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vmlal.u32 $A6xB,$Ni,${N3}[0]
vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vmlal.u32 $A7xB,$Ni,${N3}[1]
vst1.64 {$A4xB-$A5xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vadd.u64 $temp,$temp,`&Dhi("$Temp")`
vst1.64 {$A6xB-$A7xB}, [$toutptr,:256]!
vshr.u64 $temp,$temp,#16
bne .LNEON_outer
mov $toutptr,sp
mov $inner,$num
.LNEON_tail:
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,$temp
vld1.64 {$A3xB-$A4xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A0xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,$temp
vld1.64 {$A5xB-$A6xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`,#16
vld1.64 {$A7xB}, [$tinptr, :128]!
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A0xB")`,`&Dhi("$A0xB")`
.LNEON_tail2:
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A1xB")`,`&Dlo("$A1xB")`,$temp
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A0xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A1xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A1xB")`,`&Dhi("$A1xB")`,$temp
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A1xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A1xB")`,`&Dhi("$A1xB")`
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A2xB")`,`&Dlo("$A2xB")`,$temp
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A1xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A2xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A2xB")`,`&Dhi("$A2xB")`,$temp
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A2xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A2xB")`,`&Dhi("$A2xB")`
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A3xB")`,`&Dlo("$A3xB")`,$temp
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A2xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A3xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A3xB")`,`&Dhi("$A3xB")`,$temp
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A3xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A3xB")`,`&Dhi("$A3xB")`
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A4xB")`,`&Dlo("$A4xB")`,$temp
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A3xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A4xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A4xB")`,`&Dhi("$A4xB")`,$temp
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A4xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A4xB")`,`&Dhi("$A4xB")`
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A5xB")`,`&Dlo("$A5xB")`,$temp
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A4xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A5xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A5xB")`,`&Dhi("$A5xB")`,$temp
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A5xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A5xB")`,`&Dhi("$A5xB")`
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A6xB")`,`&Dlo("$A6xB")`,$temp
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A5xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A6xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A6xB")`,`&Dhi("$A6xB")`,$temp
vld1.64 {$A0xB}, [$tinptr, :128]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A6xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A6xB")`,`&Dhi("$A6xB")`
vadd.u64 `&Dlo("$A7xB")`,`&Dlo("$A7xB")`,$temp
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A6xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dlo("$A7xB")`,#16
vadd.u64 `&Dhi("$A7xB")`,`&Dhi("$A7xB")`,$temp
vld1.64 {$A1xB-$A2xB}, [$tinptr, :256]!
vshr.u64 $temp,`&Dhi("$A7xB")`,#16
vzip.16 `&Dlo("$A7xB")`,`&Dhi("$A7xB")`
subs $inner,$inner,#8
vst1.32 {`&Dlo("$A7xB")`[0]}, [$toutptr, :32]!
bne .LNEON_tail
vst1.32 {${temp}[0]}, [$toutptr, :32] @ top-most bit
sub $nptr,$nptr,$num,lsl#2 @ rewind $nptr
subs $aptr,sp,#0 @ clear carry flag
add $bptr,sp,$num,lsl#2
.LNEON_sub:
ldmia $aptr!, {r4-r7}
ldmia $nptr!, {r8-r11}
sbcs r8, r4,r8
sbcs r9, r5,r9
sbcs r10,r6,r10
sbcs r11,r7,r11
teq $aptr,$bptr @ preserves carry
stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11}
bne .LNEON_sub
ldr r10, [$aptr] @ load top-most bit
veor q0,q0,q0
sub r11,$bptr,sp @ this is num*4
veor q1,q1,q1
mov $aptr,sp
sub $rptr,$rptr,r11 @ rewind $rptr
mov $nptr,$bptr @ second 3/4th of frame
sbcs r10,r10,#0 @ result is carry flag
.LNEON_copy_n_zap:
ldmia $aptr!, {r4-r7}
ldmia $rptr, {r8-r11}
movcc r8, r4
vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe
movcc r9, r5
movcc r10,r6
vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe
movcc r11,r7
ldmia $aptr, {r4-r7}
stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11}
sub $aptr,$aptr,#16
ldmia $rptr, {r8-r11}
movcc r8, r4
vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$aptr,:256]! @ wipe
movcc r9, r5
movcc r10,r6
vst1.64 {q0-q1}, [$nptr,:256]! @ wipe
movcc r11,r7
teq $aptr,$bptr @ preserves carry
stmia $rptr!, {r8-r11}
bne .LNEON_copy_n_zap
sub sp,ip,#96
vldmia sp!,{d8-d15}
ldmia sp!,{r4-r11}
bx lr
.size bn_mul8x_mont_neon,.-bn_mul8x_mont_neon
#endif
___
}
$code.=<<___;
.asciz "Montgomery multiplication for ARMv4/NEON, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 2
#if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
.comm OPENSSL_armcap_P,4,4
#endif
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;
$code =~ s/\bbx\s+lr\b/.word\t0xe12fff1e/gm; # make it possible to compile with -march=armv4
print $code;
close STDOUT;

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
# ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23));
# ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31));
#
$flavour = shift; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64
$flavour = shift || "o32"; # supported flavours are o32,n32,64,nubi32,nubi64
if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) {
$PTR_ADD="dadd"; # incidentally works even on n32
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
bnez $at,1f
li $t0,0
slt $at,$num,17 # on in-order CPU
bnezl $at,bn_mul_mont_internal
bnez $at,bn_mul_mont_internal
nop
1: jr $ra
li $a0,0

View File

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
# has to content with 40-85% improvement depending on benchmark and
# key length, more for longer keys.
$flavour = shift;
$flavour = shift || "o32";
while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {}
open STDOUT,">$output";
@@ -140,10 +140,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail
.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$a3
$LD $t1,0($a0)
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -200,10 +200,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $v0,$ta2
sltu $at,$ta3,$at
$ST $ta3,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$at
.set noreorder
bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$at
beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return
nop
@@ -300,10 +299,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
.L_bn_mul_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$a3
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
$LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -341,10 +340,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $v0,$at
sltu $ta3,$v0,$at
$ST $v0,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2
.set noreorder
bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2
beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return
nop
@@ -429,10 +427,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $ta0,$a2,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail
.L_bn_sqr_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$MULTU $t0,$t0
$LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1)
$LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -463,11 +461,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
mflo $ta3
mfhi $ta2
$ST $ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0)
$ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
.set noreorder
bgtzl $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop
$ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0)
beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return
nop
@@ -547,10 +544,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $at,$a3,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $at,.L_bn_add_words_tail
.L_bn_add_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$LD $ta0,0($a2)
subu $a3,4
$LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -589,11 +586,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
$ADDU $t3,$ta3,$v0
sltu $v0,$t3,$ta3
$ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$t9
.set noreorder
bgtzl $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$t9
beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return
nop
@@ -679,10 +675,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.set reorder
li $minus4,-4
and $at,$a3,$minus4
$LD $t0,0($a1)
beqz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail
.L_bn_sub_words_loop:
$LD $t0,0($a1)
$LD $ta0,0($a2)
subu $a3,4
$LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1)
@@ -722,11 +718,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
$SUBU $t3,$ta3,$v0
sgtu $v0,$t3,$ta3
$ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0)
$ADDU $v0,$t9
.set noreorder
bgtzl $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
$LD $t0,0($a1)
bgtz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop
$ADDU $v0,$t9
beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return
nop
@@ -819,7 +814,7 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
.set reorder
move $ta3,$ra
bal bn_div_words
bal bn_div_words_internal
move $ra,$ta3
$MULTU $ta2,$v0
$LD $t2,-2*$BNSZ($a3)
@@ -840,8 +835,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
sltu $ta0,$a1,$a2
or $t8,$ta0
.set noreorder
beqzl $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
beqz $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop
$SUBU $v0,1
$ADDU $v0,1
.set reorder
.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done:
.set noreorder
@@ -902,7 +898,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
and $t2,$a0
$SRL $at,$a1,$t1
.set noreorder
bnezl $t2,.+8
beqz $t2,.+12
nop
break 6 # signal overflow
.set reorder
$SLL $a0,$t9
@@ -917,7 +914,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
$SRL $DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ # bits
sgeu $at,$a0,$a2
.set noreorder
bnezl $at,.+8
beqz $at,.+12
nop
$SUBU $a0,$a2
.set reorder

View File

@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
open STDOUT,"| $^X $xlate $flavour $output";
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;
use strict;
my $code=".text\n\n";

View File

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
# of arithmetic operations, most notably multiplications. It requires
# more memory references, most notably to tp[num], but this doesn't
# seem to exhaust memory port capacity. And indeed, dedicated PA-RISC
# 2.0 code path, provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
# 2.0 code path provides virtually same performance as pa-risc2[W].s:
# it's ~10% better for shortest key length and ~10% worse for longest
# one.
#
@@ -988,6 +988,8 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
# assemble 2.0 instructions in 32-bit mode...
s/^\s+([a-z]+)([\S]*)\s+([\S]*)/&assemble($1,$2,$3)/e if ($BN_SZ==4);
s/\bbv\b/bve/gm if ($SIZE_T==8);
print $_,"\n";
}
close STDOUT;

View File

@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ Lcopy: ; copy or in-place refresh
.long 0
.byte 0,12,4,0,0x80,12,6,0
.long 0
.size .bn_mul_mont_int,.-.bn_mul_mont_int
.asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
___

View File

@@ -392,6 +392,7 @@ $data=<<EOF;
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
.long 0
.size .bn_sqr_comba4,.-.bn_sqr_comba4
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -819,6 +820,7 @@ $data=<<EOF;
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,2,0
.long 0
.size .bn_sqr_comba8,.-.bn_sqr_comba8
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -972,6 +974,7 @@ $data=<<EOF;
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
.long 0
.size .bn_mul_comba4,.-.bn_mul_comba4
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -1510,6 +1513,7 @@ $data=<<EOF;
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
.long 0
.size .bn_mul_comba8,.-.bn_mul_comba8
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -1560,6 +1564,7 @@ Lppcasm_sub_adios:
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
.long 0
.size .bn_sub_words,.-.bn_sub_words
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -1605,6 +1610,7 @@ Lppcasm_add_adios:
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
.long 0
.size .bn_add_words,.-.bn_add_words
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -1720,6 +1726,7 @@ Lppcasm_div9:
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
.long 0
.size .bn_div_words,.-.bn_div_words
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -1761,6 +1768,7 @@ Lppcasm_sqr_adios:
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,3,0
.long 0
.size .bn_sqr_words,.-.bn_sqr_words
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -1866,6 +1874,7 @@ Lppcasm_mw_OVER:
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
.long 0
.size bn_mul_words,.-bn_mul_words
#
# NOTE: The following label name should be changed to
@@ -1991,6 +2000,7 @@ Lppcasm_maw_adios:
.long 0
.byte 0,12,0x14,0,0,0,4,0
.long 0
.size .bn_mul_add_words,.-.bn_mul_add_words
.align 4
EOF
$data =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem;

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env perl
# ====================================================================
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
@@ -65,6 +65,14 @@
# others alternative would be to break dependence on upper halves of
# GPRs by sticking to 32-bit integer operations...
# December 2012
# Remove above mentioned dependence on GPRs' upper halves in 32-bit
# build. No signal masking overhead, but integer instructions are
# *more* numerous... It's still "universally" faster than 32-bit
# ppc-mont.pl, but improvement coefficient is not as impressive
# for longer keys...
$flavour = shift;
if ($flavour =~ /32/) {
@@ -110,6 +118,9 @@ $tp="r10";
$j="r11";
$i="r12";
# non-volatile registers
$c1="r19";
$n1="r20";
$a1="r21";
$nap_d="r22"; # interleaved ap and np in double format
$a0="r23"; # ap[0]
$t0="r24"; # temporary registers
@@ -180,8 +191,8 @@ $T3a="f30"; $T3b="f31";
# . .
# +-------------------------------+
# . .
# -12*size_t +-------------------------------+
# | 10 saved gpr, r22-r31 |
# -13*size_t +-------------------------------+
# | 13 saved gpr, r19-r31 |
# . .
# . .
# -12*8 +-------------------------------+
@@ -215,6 +226,9 @@ $code=<<___;
mr $i,$sp
$STUX $sp,$sp,$tp ; alloca
$PUSH r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i)
$PUSH r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i)
$PUSH r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i)
$PUSH r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i)
$PUSH r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i)
$PUSH r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i)
@@ -237,40 +251,26 @@ $code=<<___;
stfd f29,`-3*8`($i)
stfd f30,`-2*8`($i)
stfd f31,`-1*8`($i)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
ld $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0] value
ld $n0,0($n0) ; pull n0[0] value
ld $t3,0($bp) ; bp[0]
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
mr $t1,$n0
lwz $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0,1] value
lwz $t0,4($ap)
lwz $n0,0($t1) ; pull n0[0,1] value
lwz $t1,4($t1)
lwz $t3,0($bp) ; bp[0,1]
lwz $t2,4($bp)
insrdi $a0,$t0,32,0
insrdi $n0,$t1,32,0
insrdi $t3,$t2,32,0
___
$code.=<<___;
addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+64`
li $i,-64
add $nap_d,$tp,$num
and $nap_d,$nap_d,$i ; align to 64 bytes
mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[0]
; nap_d is off by 1, because it's used with stfdu/lfdu
addi $nap_d,$nap_d,-8
srwi $j,$num,`3+1` ; counter register, num/2
mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0
addi $j,$j,-1
addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER-8`
li $carry,0
mtctr $j
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
ld $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0] value
ld $t3,0($bp) ; bp[0]
ld $n0,0($n0) ; pull n0[0] value
mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[0]
; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrdi $t0,$t3,16,48
extrdi $t1,$t3,16,32
@@ -280,6 +280,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0
; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrdi $t4,$t7,16,48
extrdi $t5,$t7,16,32
@@ -289,21 +291,61 @@ $code.=<<___;
std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
lwz $t0,4($ap) ; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t1,0($ap)
lwz $t2,12($ap) ; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
extrdi $t0,$a0,32,32 ; lwz $t0,4($ap)
extrdi $t1,$a0,32,0 ; lwz $t1,0($ap)
lwz $t2,12($ap) ; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t3,8($ap)
lwz $t4,4($np) ; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t4,4($np) ; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t5,0($np)
lwz $t6,12($np) ; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t6,12($np) ; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t7,8($np)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
lwz $t0,0($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
lwz $t1,4($ap)
lwz $t2,8($ap)
lwz $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0,1] value
mr $n1,$n0
lwz $a1,4($ap)
li $c1,0
lwz $t1,0($bp) ; bp[0,1]
lwz $t3,4($bp)
lwz $n0,0($n1) ; pull n0[0,1] value
lwz $n1,4($n1)
mullw $t4,$a0,$t1 ; mulld ap[0]*bp[0]
mulhwu $t5,$a0,$t1
mullw $t6,$a1,$t1
mullw $t7,$a0,$t3
add $t5,$t5,$t6
add $t5,$t5,$t7
; transfer bp[0] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrwi $t0,$t1,16,16
extrwi $t1,$t1,16,0
extrwi $t2,$t3,16,16
extrwi $t3,$t3,16,0
std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build
std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
mullw $t0,$t4,$n0 ; mulld tp[0]*n0
mulhwu $t1,$t4,$n0
mullw $t2,$t5,$n0
mullw $t3,$t4,$n1
add $t1,$t1,$t2
add $t1,$t1,$t3
; transfer (ap[0]*bp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrwi $t4,$t0,16,16
extrwi $t5,$t0,16,0
extrwi $t6,$t1,16,16
extrwi $t7,$t1,16,0
std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build
std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
mr $t0,$a0 ; lwz $t0,0($ap)
mr $t1,$a1 ; lwz $t1,4($ap)
lwz $t2,8($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
lwz $t3,12($ap)
lwz $t4,0($np) ; load n[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
lwz $t5,4($np)
@@ -319,7 +361,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lfd $nb,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
lfd $nc,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
lfd $nd,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ; yes, std even in 32-bit build
std $t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
std $t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp)
std $t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp)
@@ -441,7 +483,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
lwz $t7,12($np)
___
$code.=<<___;
std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
std $t0,`$FRAME+64`($sp) ; yes, std even in 32-bit build
std $t1,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
std $t2,`$FRAME+80`($sp)
std $t3,`$FRAME+88`($sp)
@@ -449,6 +491,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
std $t5,`$FRAME+104`($sp)
std $t6,`$FRAME+112`($sp)
std $t7,`$FRAME+120`($sp)
___
if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
$code.=<<___;
ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
@@ -457,6 +502,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
ld $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
ld $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
ld $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
lfd $A0,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
lfd $A1,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
lfd $A2,`$FRAME+80`($sp)
@@ -488,7 +547,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
fmadd $T0b,$A0,$bb,$dotb
stfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; save a[j+1] in double format
stfd $A3,32($nap_d)
___
if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
$code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b
fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a
@@ -561,11 +622,123 @@ $code.=<<___;
stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
std $t0,8($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stdu $t4,16($tp) ; tp[j]
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$A0,$bc,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$A0,$bd,$T1b
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
fmadd $T2a,$A1,$bc,$T2a
fmadd $T2b,$A1,$bd,$T2b
stfd $N0,40($nap_d) ; save n[j] in double format
stfd $N1,48($nap_d)
srwi $c1,$t1,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
fmadd $T3a,$A2,$bc,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$A2,$bd,$T3b
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
fmul $dota,$A3,$bc
fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd
stfd $N2,56($nap_d) ; save n[j+1] in double format
stfdu $N3,64($nap_d)
insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits
srwi $c1,$t3,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
srwi $c1,$t5,16
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits
srwi $c1,$t7,16
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,8($tp)
srwi $c1,$t3,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits
srwi $c1,$t7,16
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
fctid $T0a,$T0a
fctid $T0b,$T0b
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
fctid $T1a,$T1a
fctid $T1b,$T1b
srwi $c1,$t1,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
fctid $T2a,$T2a
fctid $T2b,$T2b
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
fctid $T3a,$T3a
fctid $T3b,$T3b
insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits
srwi $c1,$t5,16
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j]
stwu $t0,16($tp)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
bdnz- L1st
fctid $dota,$dota
fctid $dotb,$dotb
___
if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
$code.=<<___;
ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
@@ -611,33 +784,117 @@ $code.=<<___;
insrdi $t6,$t7,48,0
srdi $ovf,$t7,48
std $t6,8($tp) ; tp[num-1]
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
srwi $c1,$t1,16
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
srwi $c1,$t3,16
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
srwi $c1,$t5,16
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
srwi $c1,$t7,16
stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,8($tp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
srwi $c1,$t3,16
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
srwi $c1,$t7,16
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
srwi $c1,$t1,16
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
srwi $c1,$t5,16
stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j]
stwu $t0,16($tp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
srwi $c1,$t7,16
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
insrwi $t6,$t4,16,0
srwi $t4,$t4,16
insrwi $t4,$t5,16,0
srwi $ovf,$t5,16
stw $t6,12($tp) ; tp[num-1]
stw $t4,8($tp)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
slwi $t7,$num,2
subf $nap_d,$t7,$nap_d ; rewind pointer
li $i,8 ; i=1
.align 5
Louter:
addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER`
li $carry,0
mtctr $j
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
ldx $t3,$bp,$i ; bp[i]
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
add $t0,$bp,$i
lwz $t3,0($t0) ; bp[i,i+1]
lwz $t0,4($t0)
insrdi $t3,$t0,32,0
___
$code.=<<___;
ldx $t3,$bp,$i ; bp[i]
ld $t6,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp) ; tp[0]
mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[i]
addi $tp,$sp,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER`
add $t7,$t7,$t6 ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
li $carry,0
mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0
mtctr $j
mulld $t7,$a0,$t3 ; ap[0]*bp[i]
add $t7,$t7,$t6 ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrdi $t0,$t3,16,48
extrdi $t1,$t3,16,32
@@ -647,6 +904,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
mulld $t7,$t7,$n0 ; tp[0]*n0
; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrdi $t4,$t7,16,48
extrdi $t5,$t7,16,32
@@ -656,7 +915,50 @@ $code.=<<___;
std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
add $t0,$bp,$i
li $c1,0
lwz $t1,0($t0) ; bp[i,i+1]
lwz $t3,4($t0)
mullw $t4,$a0,$t1 ; ap[0]*bp[i]
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8+4`($sp) ; tp[0]
mulhwu $t5,$a0,$t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+$TRANSFER+8`($sp) ; tp[0]
mullw $t6,$a1,$t1
mullw $t7,$a0,$t3
add $t5,$t5,$t6
add $t5,$t5,$t7
addc $t4,$t4,$t0 ; ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
adde $t5,$t5,$t2
; transfer bp[i] to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrwi $t0,$t1,16,16
extrwi $t1,$t1,16,0
extrwi $t2,$t3,16,16
extrwi $t3,$t3,16,0
std $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build
std $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
std $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
std $t3,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
mullw $t0,$t4,$n0 ; mulld tp[0]*n0
mulhwu $t1,$t4,$n0
mullw $t2,$t5,$n0
mullw $t3,$t4,$n1
add $t1,$t1,$t2
add $t1,$t1,$t3
; transfer (ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0])*n0 to FPU as 4x16-bit values
extrwi $t4,$t0,16,16
extrwi $t5,$t0,16,0
extrwi $t6,$t1,16,16
extrwi $t7,$t1,16,0
std $t4,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; yes, std in 32-bit build
std $t5,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
std $t6,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
std $t7,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
___
$code.=<<___;
lfd $A0,8($nap_d) ; load a[j] in double format
lfd $A1,16($nap_d)
lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format
@@ -769,7 +1071,9 @@ Linner:
fmul $dotb,$A3,$bd
lfd $A2,24($nap_d) ; load a[j+1] in double format
lfd $A3,32($nap_d)
___
if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
$code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
@@ -856,10 +1160,131 @@ $code.=<<___;
addze $carry,$carry
std $t3,-16($tp) ; tp[j-1]
std $t5,-8($tp) ; tp[j]
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
srwi $c1,$t1,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
fmadd $T2a,$N1,$nc,$T2a
fmadd $T2b,$N1,$nd,$T2b
insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits
srwi $c1,$t3,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
lwz $t2,12($tp) ; tp[j]
lwz $t3,8($tp)
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
fmadd $dota,$N3,$nc,$dota
fmadd $dotb,$N3,$nd,$dotb
srwi $c1,$t5,16
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
fctid $T0a,$T0a
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
fctid $T0b,$T0b
insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits
srwi $c1,$t7,16
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
fctid $T1a,$T1a
addc $t0,$t0,$t2
adde $t4,$t4,$t3
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
fctid $T1b,$T1b
addze $carry,$carry
addze $c1,$c1
stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,0($tp)
fctid $T2a,$T2a
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
fctid $T2b,$T2b
srwi $c1,$t3,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
fctid $T3a,$T3a
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
fctid $T3b,$T3b
insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
srwi $c1,$t7,16
lwz $t6,20($tp)
lwzu $t7,16($tp)
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
stfd $T0a,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
stfd $T0b,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
srwi $c1,$t1,16
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
stfd $T1a,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits
stfd $T1b,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
srwi $c1,$t5,16
addc $t2,$t2,$t6
stfd $T2a,`$FRAME+32`($sp)
adde $t0,$t0,$t7
stfd $T2b,`$FRAME+40`($sp)
addze $carry,$carry
stfd $T3a,`$FRAME+48`($sp)
addze $c1,$c1
stfd $T3b,`$FRAME+56`($sp)
stw $t2,-4($tp) ; tp[j]
stw $t0,-8($tp)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
bdnz- Linner
fctid $dota,$dota
fctid $dotb,$dotb
___
if ($SIZE_T==8 or $flavour =~ /osx/) {
$code.=<<___;
ld $t0,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
ld $t1,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
ld $t2,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
@@ -926,7 +1351,116 @@ $code.=<<___;
insrdi $t6,$t7,48,0
srdi $ovf,$t7,48
std $t6,0($tp) ; tp[num-1]
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
srwi $c1,$t1,16
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
insrwi $t0,$t2,16,0 ; 0..31 bits
lwz $t2,12($tp) ; tp[j]
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
srwi $c1,$t3,16
lwz $t3,8($tp)
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
srwi $c1,$t5,16
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
insrwi $t4,$t6,16,0 ; 32..63 bits
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
srwi $c1,$t7,16
addc $t0,$t0,$t2
adde $t4,$t4,$t3
addze $carry,$carry
addze $c1,$c1
stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,0($tp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
srwi $c1,$t3,16
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits
lwz $t6,20($tp)
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
srwi $c1,$t7,16
lwzu $t7,16($tp)
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
srwi $c1,$t1,16
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
insrwi $t0,$t4,16,0 ; 96..127 bits
insrwi $carry,$t5,16,0
srwi $c1,$t5,16
addc $t2,$t2,$t6
adde $t0,$t0,$t7
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
addze $carry,$carry
addze $c1,$c1
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
stw $t2,-4($tp) ; tp[j]
stw $t0,-8($tp)
addc $t6,$t6,$ovf
addze $t7,$t7
srwi $carry,$t6,16
insrwi $carry,$t7,16,0
srwi $c1,$t7,16
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
insrwi $t6,$t4,16,0
srwi $t4,$t4,16
insrwi $t4,$t5,16,0
srwi $ovf,$t5,16
stw $t6,4($tp) ; tp[num-1]
stw $t4,0($tp)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
slwi $t7,$num,2
addi $i,$i,8
subf $nap_d,$t7,$nap_d ; rewind pointer
@@ -994,14 +1528,14 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
mtctr $j
.align 4
Lsub: ld $t0,8($tp) ; load tp[j..j+3] in 64-bit word order
ldu $t2,16($tp)
Lsub: lwz $t0,12($tp) ; load tp[j..j+3] in 64-bit word order
lwz $t1,8($tp)
lwz $t2,20($tp)
lwzu $t3,16($tp)
lwz $t4,4($np) ; load np[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order
lwz $t5,8($np)
lwz $t6,12($np)
lwzu $t7,16($np)
extrdi $t1,$t0,32,0
extrdi $t3,$t2,32,0
subfe $t4,$t4,$t0 ; tp[j]-np[j]
stw $t0,4($ap) ; save tp[j..j+3] in 32-bit word order
subfe $t5,$t5,$t1 ; tp[j+1]-np[j+1]
@@ -1052,6 +1586,9 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
$POP $i,0($sp)
li r3,1 ; signal "handled"
$POP r19,`-12*8-13*$SIZE_T`($i)
$POP r20,`-12*8-12*$SIZE_T`($i)
$POP r21,`-12*8-11*$SIZE_T`($i)
$POP r22,`-12*8-10*$SIZE_T`($i)
$POP r23,`-12*8-9*$SIZE_T`($i)
$POP r24,`-12*8-8*$SIZE_T`($i)
@@ -1077,8 +1614,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
mr $sp,$i
blr
.long 0
.byte 0,12,4,0,0x8c,10,6,0
.byte 0,12,4,0,0x8c,13,6,0
.long 0
.size .$fname,.-.$fname
.asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for PPC64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
___

1875
crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl Executable file

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crypto/bn/asm/sparct4-mont.pl Executable file

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