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67 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Dr. Stephen Henson
08e4c7a967 correct CHANGES 2012-02-23 22:13:59 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
697e4edcad PR: 2711
Submitted by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>

Tolerate bad MIME headers in parser.
2012-02-23 21:50:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b26297ca51 PR: 2696
Submitted by: Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>

Fix inverted range problem in RFC3779 code.

Thanks to Andrew Chi for generating test cases for this bug.
2012-02-23 21:31:22 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6ca7dba0cf PR: 2727
Submitted by: Bruce Stephens <bruce.stephens@isode.com>

Use same construct for EXHEADER in srp/Makefile as other makefiles to cope
with possibly empty EXHEADER.
2012-02-23 13:49:22 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f1fa05b407 ABI compliance fixes.
Move new structure fields to end of structures.

Import library codes from 1.0.0 and recreate new ones.
2012-02-22 14:01:44 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
02e22c35fe update NEWS 2012-02-21 14:21:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
b935714237 typo 2012-02-17 17:31:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a8314df902 Fix bug in CVE-2011-4619: check we have really received a client hello
before rejecting multiple SGC restarts.
2012-02-16 15:25:39 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0cd7a0325f Additional compatibility fix for MDC2 signature format.
Update RSA EVP_PKEY_METHOD to use the OCTET STRING form of MDC2 signature:
this will make all versions of MDC2 signature equivalent.
2012-02-15 14:14:01 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
16b7c81d55 An incompatibility has always existed between the format used for RSA
signatures and MDC2 using EVP or RSA_sign. This has become more apparent
when the dgst utility in OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later switched to using the
EVP_DigestSign functions which call RSA_sign.

This means that the signature format OpenSSL 1.0.0 and later used with
dgst -sign and MDC2 is incompatible with previous versions.

Add detection in RSA_verify so either format works.

Note: MDC2 is disabled by default in OpenSSL and very rarely used in practice.
2012-02-15 14:00:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
424ba8b588 PR: 2708
Submitted by: Bruce Stephens <bruce.stephens@isode.com>

Translate path separators correctly for $fipsdir in util/mk1mf.pl
2012-02-12 23:20:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf493e8d62 PR: 2713
Submitted by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>

Move libraries that are not needed for dynamic linking to Libs.private in
the .pc files
2012-02-12 18:47:36 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c714e43c8d PR: 2717
Submitted by: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>

Make compilation work on OpenServer 5.0.7
2012-02-11 23:38:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cdf9d6f6ed PR: 2716
Submitted by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

Fix handling of exporter return value and use OpenSSL indentation in
s_client, s_server.
2012-02-11 23:21:09 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cc4b48c27c PR: 2703
Submitted by: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>

Fix some memory and resource leaks in CAPI ENGINE.
2012-02-11 23:12:59 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cac9c92cc0 PR: 2705
Submitted by: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>

Only create ex_data indices once for CAPI engine.
2012-02-11 23:07:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d40abf1689 Submitted by: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Further fixes for use_srtp extension.
2012-02-11 22:53:48 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
69e9c69e70 apps/s_cb.c: recognize latest TLS versions [from HEAD]. 2012-02-11 13:31:16 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c489ea7d01 PR: 2704
Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>

Fix srp extension.
2012-02-10 20:08:49 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
26c6857a59 PR: 2710
Submitted by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>

Check return codes for load_certs_crls.
2012-02-10 19:54:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
508bd3d1aa PR: 2714
Submitted by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com>

Make no-srp work.
2012-02-10 19:44:00 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8705846710 only cleanup ctx if we need to, save ctx flags when we do 2012-02-10 16:54:56 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c944a9696e add fips hmac option and fips blocking overrides to command line utilities 2012-02-10 16:46:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
943cc09d8a Submitted by: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Fix encoding of use_srtp extension to be compliant with RFC5764
2012-02-10 00:03:37 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
fc6800d19f Modify client hello version when renegotiating to enhance interop with
some servers.
2012-02-09 15:41:44 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
d06f047b04 bn_nist.c: make new optimized code dependent on BN_LLONG [from HEAD]. 2012-02-02 07:46:19 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
ddc899bada hpux-parisc2-*: engage assembler [from HEAD] and make it link. 2012-02-02 07:42:31 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
bd479e25c7 ghash-x86.pl: engage original MMX version in no-sse2 builds [from HEAD]. 2012-01-25 17:56:25 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
eaf5bd168e x86_64-xlate.pl: 1.0.1-specific typo. 2012-01-25 17:50:23 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d7ecc206ba only include bn.h once 2012-01-24 23:00:36 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
11ea212e8c only include evp.h once 2012-01-24 22:59:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
cb29d8c11f only include string.h once 2012-01-24 22:58:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
adcea5a043 return error if md is NULL 2012-01-22 13:12:50 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
f02f7c2c4a cryptlib.c: make even non-Windows builds "strtoull-agnostic" [from HEAD]. 2012-01-21 12:18:29 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
a1e44cc14f x86_64-xlate.pl: proper solution for RT#2620 [from HEAD]. 2012-01-21 11:35:20 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d2d09bf68c change version to beta3-dev 2012-01-19 17:14:17 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e2dfb655f7 update files for beta2 release 2012-01-19 15:46:43 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
463e76b63c prepare for beta2 2012-01-19 15:37:57 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2dc4b0dbe8 Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
2012-01-18 18:14:56 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7b23c126e6 undef some symbols that cause problems with make depend for fips builds 2012-01-18 01:40:36 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
25e3d2225a fix CHANGES entry 2012-01-17 14:19:09 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c8e0b5d7b6 1.0.1-specific OPNESSL vs. OPENSSL typo.
PR: 2613
Submitted by: Leena Heino
2012-01-15 13:42:50 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
4fb7e2b445 Fix OPNESSL vs. OPENSSL typos [from HEAD].
PR: 2613
Submitted by: Leena Heino
2012-01-15 13:40:21 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9138e3c061 fix warning 2012-01-15 13:30:52 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
9b2a29660b Sanitize usage of <ctype.h> functions. It's important that characters
are passed zero-extended, not sign-extended [from HEAD].
PR: 2682
2012-01-12 16:28:03 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
b7b4a9fa57 sparcv9cap.c: omit unused variable. 2012-01-12 14:19:52 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
1fb07a7de8 doc/apps: formatting fixes [from HEAD].
PR: 2683
Submitted by: Annie Yousar
2012-01-11 21:58:42 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
b9cbcaad58 speed.c: typo in pkey_print_message [from HEAD].
PR: 2681
Submitted by: Annie Yousar
2012-01-11 21:49:16 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c6706a6f6c ecdsa.pod: typo.
PR: 2678
Submitted by: Annie Yousar
2012-01-11 21:41:50 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
958e6a75a1 asn1/t_x509.c: fix serial number print, harmonize with a_int.c [from HEAD].
PR: 2675
Submitted by: Annie Yousar
2012-01-11 21:12:47 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
397977726c aes-sparcv9.pl: clean up regexp [from HEAD].
PR: 2685
2012-01-11 15:32:08 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
285d9189c7 PR: 2652
Submitted by: Arpadffy Zoltan <Zoltan.Arpadffy@scientificgames.se>

OpenVMS fixes.
2012-01-05 14:30:08 +00:00
Bodo Möller
767d3e0054 Update for 0.9.8s and 1.0.0f.
(While the 1.0.0f CHANGES entry on VOS PRNG seeding was missing
in the 1.0.1 branch, the actual code is here already.)
2012-01-05 13:46:27 +00:00
Bodo Möller
409d2a1b71 Fix for builds without DTLS support.
Submitted by: Brian Carlstrom
2012-01-05 10:22:39 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e0b9678d7f PR: 2671
Submitted by: steve

Update maximum message size for certifiate verify messages to support
4096 bit RSA keys again as TLS v1.2 messages is two bytes longer.
2012-01-05 00:28:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
166dea6ac8 Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve

Send fatal alert if heartbeat extension has an illegal value.
2012-01-05 00:23:31 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
52bef4d677 disable heartbeats if tlsext disabled 2012-01-05 00:07:34 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
801e5ef840 update CHANGES 2012-01-04 23:53:52 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0044739ae5 Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>, Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
Reviewed by: steve

Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and
Kenny Paterson.
2012-01-04 23:52:05 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4e44bd3650 Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. (CVE-2011-4576) 2012-01-04 23:13:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0cffb0cd3e fix CHANGES 2012-01-04 23:11:43 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aaa3850ccd Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. (CVE-2011-4619) 2012-01-04 23:07:54 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a17b5d5a4f Check GOST parameters are not NULL (CVE-2012-0027) 2012-01-04 23:03:20 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2f97765bc3 Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure (CVE-2011-4577) 2012-01-04 23:01:19 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3205ca8deb fix warnings 2012-01-04 14:46:04 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1cb4d65b87 Submitted by: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Reviewed by: steve

Fix memory leaks.
2012-01-04 14:25:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
7b2dd292bc only send heartbeat extension from server if client sent one 2012-01-03 22:03:07 +00:00
69 changed files with 783 additions and 314 deletions

112
CHANGES
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,25 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
[Steve Henson]
*) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
[Steve Henson]
*) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted
client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
[Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>]
@@ -267,7 +285,56 @@
Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]
Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
differences arising during decryption processing. A research
paper describing this attack can be found at:
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
[Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
*) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
(CVE-2011-4576)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
[Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>]
*) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
[Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
*) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
[Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>]
*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]
@@ -1196,8 +1263,47 @@
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
differences arising during decryption processing. A research
paper describing this attack can be found at:
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
[Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
*) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
[Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
*) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
(CVE-2011-4576)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
[Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
*) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
[Adam Langley (Google)]

View File

@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ my %table=(
# Since there is mention of this in shlib/hpux10-cc.sh
"hpux-parisc-cc-o4","cc:-Ae +O4 +ESlit -z -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"hpux-parisc-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"hpux-parisc1_1-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"hpux-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-march=2.0 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1::pa-risc2.o::::::::::::::void:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"hpux-parisc1_1-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1",
"hpux-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-march=2.0 -O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:-fPIC:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32",
"hpux64-parisc2-gcc","gcc:-O3 -DB_ENDIAN -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT::pa-risc2W.o::::::::::::::void:dlfcn:hpux-shared:-fpic:-shared:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64",
# More attempts at unified 10.X and 11.X targets for HP C compiler.
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ my %table=(
# Kevin Steves <ks@hp.se>
"hpux-parisc-cc","cc:+O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DBN_DIV2W -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${no_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"hpux-parisc1_1-cc","cc:+DA1.1 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY::-D_REENTRANT::-Wl,+s -ldld:MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc11_asm}:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa1.1",
"hpux-parisc2-cc","cc:+DA2.0 +DS2.0 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT::pa-risc2.o::::::::::::::void:dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"hpux-parisc2-cc","cc:+DA2.0 +DS2.0 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-Wl,+s -ldld:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:".eval{my $asm=$parisc20_asm;$asm=~s/2W\./2\./;$asm=~s/:64/:32/;$asm}.":dl:hpux-shared:+Z:-b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_32",
"hpux64-parisc2-cc","cc:+DD64 +O3 +Optrs_strongly_typed -Ae +ESlit -DB_ENDIAN -DMD32_XARRAY -D_REENTRANT::::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${parisc20_asm}:dlfcn:hpux-shared:+Z:+DD64 -b:.sl.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::/pa20_64",
# HP/UX IA-64 targets
@@ -1019,10 +1019,11 @@ if (defined($disabled{"ec"}) || defined($disabled{"dsa"})
$disabled{"gost"} = "forced";
}
# SRP requires TLSEXT
# SRP and HEARTBEATS require TLSEXT
if (defined($disabled{"tlsext"}))
{
$disabled{"srp"} = "forced";
$disabled{"heartbeats"} = "forced";
}
if ($target eq "TABLE") {

View File

@@ -364,7 +364,8 @@ libcrypto.pc: Makefile
echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
echo 'Requires: '; \
echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \
echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
libssl.pc: Makefile
@@ -377,7 +378,8 @@ libssl.pc: Makefile
echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
echo 'Requires: '; \
echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \
echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
openssl.pc: Makefile
@@ -390,7 +392,8 @@ openssl.pc: Makefile
echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
echo 'Requires: '; \
echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \
echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config

14
NEWS
View File

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.1:
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.1:
o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support.
o SCTP support.
@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@
o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module.
o SRP support.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g:
o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f:
o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027
o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e:
o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207

2
README
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.1-beta1 3 Jan 2012
OpenSSL 1.0.1-beta3 23 Feb 2012
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

4
STATUS
View File

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
OpenSSL STATUS Last modified at
______________ $Date: 2012/01/03 13:30:27 $
______________ $Date: 2012/02/23 22:13:59 $
DEVELOPMENT STATE
o OpenSSL 1.1.0: Under development...
o OpenSSL 1.0.1-beta3: Released on February 23rd, 2011
o OpenSSL 1.0.1-beta2: Released on January 19th, 2011
o OpenSSL 1.0.1-beta1: Released on January 3rd, 2011
o OpenSSL 1.0.0d: Released on February 8nd, 2011
o OpenSSL 1.0.0c: Released on December 2nd, 2010

34
TABLE
View File

@@ -3298,7 +3298,7 @@ $shared_ldflag = -shared
$shared_extension = .sl.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
$ranlib =
$arflags =
$multilib =
$multilib = /pa1.1
*** hpux-parisc2-cc
$cc = cc
@@ -3308,22 +3308,22 @@ $thread_cflag =
$sys_id =
$lflags = -Wl,+s -ldld
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT MD2_CHAR RC4_INDEX RC4_CHAR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1 DES_INT
$cpuid_obj =
$bn_obj = pa-risc2.o
$cpuid_obj = pariscid.o
$bn_obj = pa-risc2.o parisc-mont.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj =
$aes_obj = aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o
$bf_obj =
$md5_obj =
$sha1_obj =
$sha1_obj = sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o
$cast_obj =
$rc4_obj =
$rc4_obj = rc4-parisc.o
$rmd160_obj =
$rc5_obj =
$wp_obj =
$cmll_obj =
$modes_obj =
$modes_obj = ghash-parisc.o
$engines_obj =
$perlasm_scheme = void
$perlasm_scheme = 32
$dso_scheme = dl
$shared_target= hpux-shared
$shared_cflag = +Z
@@ -3331,7 +3331,7 @@ $shared_ldflag = -b
$shared_extension = .sl.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
$ranlib =
$arflags =
$multilib =
$multilib = /pa20_32
*** hpux-parisc2-gcc
$cc = gcc
@@ -3341,22 +3341,22 @@ $thread_cflag =
$sys_id =
$lflags = -Wl,+s -ldld
$bn_ops = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_PTR DES_UNROLL DES_RISC1
$cpuid_obj =
$bn_obj = pa-risc2.o
$cpuid_obj = pariscid.o
$bn_obj = pa-risc2.o parisc-mont.o
$des_obj =
$aes_obj =
$aes_obj = aes_core.o aes_cbc.o aes-parisc.o
$bf_obj =
$md5_obj =
$sha1_obj =
$sha1_obj = sha1-parisc.o sha256-parisc.o sha512-parisc.o
$cast_obj =
$rc4_obj =
$rc4_obj = rc4-parisc.o
$rmd160_obj =
$rc5_obj =
$wp_obj =
$cmll_obj =
$modes_obj =
$modes_obj = ghash-parisc.o
$engines_obj =
$perlasm_scheme = void
$perlasm_scheme = 32
$dso_scheme = dl
$shared_target= hpux-shared
$shared_cflag = -fPIC
@@ -3364,7 +3364,7 @@ $shared_ldflag = -shared
$shared_extension = .sl.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
$ranlib =
$arflags =
$multilib =
$multilib = /pa20_32
*** hpux64-ia64-cc
$cc = cc

View File

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
*
*/
#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 /* On VMS, you need to define this to get
the declaration of fileno(). The value
2 is to make sure no function defined
@@ -1215,7 +1215,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, &certs, NULL);
if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, &certs, NULL))
return NULL;
return certs;
}
@@ -1223,7 +1224,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *load_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
{
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, NULL, &crls);
if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, NULL, &crls))
return NULL;
return crls;
}

View File

@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@ static int get_certificate_status(const char *serial, CA_DB *db)
/* Make it Upper Case */
for (i=0; row[DB_serial][i] != '\0'; i++)
row[DB_serial][i] = toupper(row[DB_serial][i]);
row[DB_serial][i] = toupper((unsigned char)row[DB_serial][i]);
ok=1;

View File

@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file signer certificate file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip file recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid use subject key identifier\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid use subject key identifier\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file input file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");

View File

@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
char *hmac_key=NULL;
char *mac_name=NULL;
int non_fips_allow = 0;
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL, *macopts = NULL;
apps_startup();
@@ -215,6 +216,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
out_bin = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-d") == 0)
debug=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
non_fips_allow=1;
else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-fips-fingerprint"))
hmac_key = "etaonrishdlcupfm";
else if (!strcmp(*argv,"-hmac"))
{
if (--argc < 1)
@@ -395,6 +400,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
if (non_fips_allow)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd,&md_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
}
if (hmac_key)
{
sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, e,

View File

@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char *engine = NULL;
#endif
const EVP_MD *dgst=NULL;
int non_fips_allow = 0;
apps_startup();
@@ -281,6 +282,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
md= *(++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-non-fips-allow") == 0)
non_fips_allow = 1;
else if ((argv[0][0] == '-') &&
((c=EVP_get_cipherbyname(&(argv[0][1]))) != NULL))
{
@@ -589,6 +592,11 @@ bad:
*/
BIO_get_cipher_ctx(benc, &ctx);
if (non_fips_allow)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(ctx,
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting cipher %s\n",

View File

@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ extern int smime_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
extern int rand_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
extern int engine_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
extern int ocsp_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
extern int srp_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
extern int prime_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
extern int ts_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
extern int srp_main(int argc,char *argv[]);
#define FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL 1
#define FUNC_TYPE_MD 2
@@ -146,11 +146,11 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ocsp",ocsp_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"prime",prime_main},
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ts",ts_main},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"srp",srp_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"prime",prime_main},
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ts",ts_main},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
{FUNC_TYPE_MD,"md2",dgst_main},
#endif

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ foreach (@ARGV)
{ print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS\n${str}#endif\n"; }
elsif ( ($_ =~ /^ocsp$/))
{ print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP\n${str}#endif\n"; }
elsif ( ($_ =~ /^srp$/))
{ print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP\n${str}#endif\n"; }
else
{ print $str; }
}

View File

@@ -357,6 +357,12 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
case TLS1_VERSION:
str_version = "TLS 1.0 ";
break;
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
str_version = "TLS 1.1 ";
break;
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
str_version = "TLS 1.2 ";
break;
case DTLS1_VERSION:
str_version = "DTLS 1.0 ";
break;

View File

@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
# endif
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
}
@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
psk_key=*(++argv);
for (j = 0; j < strlen(psk_key); j++)
{
if (isxdigit((int)psk_key[j]))
if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[j]))
continue;
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv);
goto bad;
@@ -2077,30 +2077,33 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
}
SSL_SESSION_print(bio,SSL_get_session(s));
if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
if (keymatexportlabel != NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n");
BIO_printf(bio, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
BIO_printf(bio, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen);
exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
i = SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat,
keymatexportlen,
keymatexportlabel,
strlen(keymatexportlabel),
NULL, 0, 0);
if (i != keymatexportlen) {
BIO_printf(bio,
" Error: return value %i\n", i);
} else {
if (exportedkeymat != NULL)
{
if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat,
keymatexportlen,
keymatexportlabel,
strlen(keymatexportlabel),
NULL, 0, 0))
{
BIO_printf(bio, " Error\n");
}
else
{
BIO_printf(bio, " Keying material: ");
for (i=0; i<keymatexportlen; i++)
BIO_printf(bio, "%02X",
exportedkeymat[i]);
BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
}
}
OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
}
}
}
BIO_printf(bio,"---\n");
if (peer != NULL)
X509_free(peer);

View File

@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
BIO_printf(bio_err," -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
# endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -use_srtp profiles - Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list\n");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexport label - Export keying material using label\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -keymatexportlen len - Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)\n");
@@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
psk_key=*(++argv);
for (i=0; i<strlen(psk_key); i++)
{
if (isxdigit((int)psk_key[i]))
if (isxdigit((unsigned char)psk_key[i]))
continue;
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Not a hex number '%s'\n",*argv);
goto bad;
@@ -2245,6 +2245,7 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
{ static count=0; if (++count == 100) { count=0; SSL_renegotiate(con); } }
#endif
k=SSL_write(con,&(buf[l]),(unsigned int)i);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con,k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP)
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP renego during write\n");
@@ -2255,6 +2256,7 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP not successful\n");
k=SSL_write(con,&(buf[l]),(unsigned int)i);
}
#endif
switch (SSL_get_error(con,k))
{
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
@@ -2302,6 +2304,7 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
{
again:
i=SSL_read(con,(char *)buf,bufsize);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con,i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP)
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP renego during read\n");
@@ -2312,6 +2315,7 @@ again:
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP not successful\n");
i=SSL_read(con,(char *)buf,bufsize);
}
#endif
switch (SSL_get_error(con,i))
{
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
@@ -2389,6 +2393,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
i=SSL_accept(con);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con,i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP)
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP during accept %s\n",srp_callback_parm.login);
@@ -2399,6 +2404,7 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP not successful\n");
i=SSL_accept(con);
}
#endif
if (i <= 0)
{
if (BIO_sock_should_retry(i))
@@ -2469,31 +2475,34 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT");
if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n");
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n",
if (keymatexportlabel != NULL)
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n");
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n",
keymatexportlen);
exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
if (exportedkeymat != NULL) {
i = SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat,
keymatexportlen,
keymatexportlabel,
strlen(keymatexportlabel),
NULL, 0, 0);
if (i != keymatexportlen) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,
" Error: return value %i\n", i);
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: ");
for (i=0; i<keymatexportlen; i++)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X",
exportedkeymat = OPENSSL_malloc(keymatexportlen);
if (exportedkeymat != NULL)
{
if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat,
keymatexportlen,
keymatexportlabel,
strlen(keymatexportlabel),
NULL, 0, 0))
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n");
}
else
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: ");
for (i=0; i<keymatexportlen; i++)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X",
exportedkeymat[i]);
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
}
OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
}
}
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n");
}
OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat);
}
}
return(1);
}
@@ -2623,6 +2632,7 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
if (hack)
{
i=SSL_accept(con);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con,i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP)
{
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP during accept %s\n",srp_callback_parm.login);
@@ -2633,7 +2643,7 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out,"LOOKUP not successful\n");
i=SSL_accept(con);
}
#endif
switch (SSL_get_error(con,i))
{
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:

View File

@@ -2597,7 +2597,7 @@ static void pkey_print_message(const char *str, const char *str2, long num,
BIO_printf(bio_err,mr ? "+DTP:%d:%s:%s:%d\n"
: "Doing %d bit %s %s's for %ds: ",bits,str,str2,tm);
(void)BIO_flush(bio_err);
alarm(RSA_SECONDS);
alarm(tm);
#else
BIO_printf(bio_err,mr ? "+DNP:%ld:%d:%s:%s\n"
: "Doing %ld %d bit %s %s's: ",num,bits,str,str2);

View File

@@ -1176,6 +1176,7 @@ ___
# As UltraSPARC T1, a.k.a. Niagara, has shared FPU, FP nops can have
# undesired effect, so just omit them and sacrifice some portion of
# percent in performance...
$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gem;
$code =~ s/fmovs.*$//gm;
print $code;
close STDOUT; # ensure flush

View File

@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ long ASN1_INTEGER_get(const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
if (a->length > (int)sizeof(long))
{
/* hmm... a bit ugly */
return(0xffffffffL);
/* hmm... a bit ugly, return all ones */
return -1;
}
if (a->data == NULL)
return 0;

View File

@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value)
if(name) {
if(!(tmpname = BUF_strdup(name))) return NULL;
for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) {
c = *p;
c = (unsigned char)*p;
if(isupper(c)) {
c = tolower(c);
*p = c;
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static MIME_HEADER *mime_hdr_new(char *name, char *value)
if(value) {
if(!(tmpval = BUF_strdup(value))) return NULL;
for(p = tmpval ; *p; p++) {
c = *p;
c = (unsigned char)*p;
if(isupper(c)) {
c = tolower(c);
*p = c;
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
tmpname = BUF_strdup(name);
if(!tmpname) return 0;
for(p = tmpname ; *p; p++) {
c = *p;
c = (unsigned char)*p;
if(isupper(c)) {
c = tolower(c);
*p = c;
@@ -858,6 +858,10 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
{
if ((*a)->name == NULL || (*b)->name == NULL)
return (*a)->name - (*b)->name < 0 ? -1 :
(*a)->name - (*b)->name > 0 ? 1 : 0;
return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
}

View File

@@ -138,10 +138,10 @@ int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags, unsigned long cflag)
if (BIO_write(bp," Serial Number:",22) <= 0) goto err;
bs=X509_get_serialNumber(x);
if (bs->length <= 4)
if (bs->length <= (int)sizeof(long))
{
l=ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
if (l < 0)
if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
{
l= -l;
neg="-";

View File

@@ -472,6 +472,10 @@ extern "C" {
}
#endif /* !BN_LLONG */
#if defined(OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND) && defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
#undef bn_div_words
#endif
void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r,BN_ULONG *a,int na,BN_ULONG *b,int nb);
void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r,BN_ULONG *a,BN_ULONG *b);
void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r,BN_ULONG *a,BN_ULONG *b);

View File

@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static void nist_cp_bn(BN_ULONG *buf, BN_ULONG *a, int top)
#define bn_32_set_0(to, n) (to)[n] = (BN_ULONG)0;
# if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__GNUC__)
# define NIST_INT64 __int64
# else
# elif defined(BN_LLONG)
# define NIST_INT64 long long
# endif
#endif /* BN_BITS2 != 64 */

View File

@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
#if defined(_WIN32)
if (!sscanf(env+off,"%I64i",&vec)) vec = strtoul(env+off,NULL,0);
#else
vec = strtoull(env+off,NULL,0);
if (!sscanf(env+off,"%lli",(long long *)&vec)) vec = strtoul(env+off,NULL,0);
#endif
if (off) vec = OPENSSL_ia32_cpuid()&~vec;
}

View File

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "ec_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include "evp_locl.h"
#ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
#define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER 0x200000

View File

@@ -125,10 +125,14 @@ int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *imp
/* Ensure a context left lying around from last time is cleared
* (the previous check attempted to avoid this if the same
* ENGINE and EVP_CIPHER could be used). */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
/* Restore encrypt field: it is zeroed by cleanup */
ctx->encrypt = enc;
if (ctx->cipher)
{
unsigned long flags = ctx->flags;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
/* Restore encrypt and flags */
ctx->encrypt = enc;
ctx->flags = flags;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if(impl)
{

View File

@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
#ifdef OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND
#undef SHA1_Init
#undef SHA1_Update
#undef SHA224_Init
#undef SHA256_Init
#undef SHA384_Init

View File

@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ if (!$x86only) {{{
&static_label("rem_4bit");
if (0) {{ # "May" MMX version is kept for reference...
if (!$sse2) {{ # pure-MMX "May" version...
$S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit

View File

@@ -723,7 +723,11 @@ void CRYPTO_gcm128_init(GCM128_CONTEXT *ctx,void *key,block128_f block)
# endif
gcm_init_4bit(ctx->Htable,ctx->H.u);
# if defined(GHASH_ASM_X86) /* x86 only */
# if defined(OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2)
if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0]&(1<<25)) { /* check SSE bit */
# else
if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0]&(1<<23)) { /* check MMX bit */
# endif
ctx->gmult = gcm_gmult_4bit_mmx;
ctx->ghash = gcm_ghash_4bit_mmx;
} else {

View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ typedef unsigned char u8;
# undef STRICT_ALIGNMENT
#endif
#if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
#if !defined(PEDANTIC) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2
# if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
# define BSWAP8(x) ({ u64 ret=(x); \

View File

@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x10001001L
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x10001003L
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1-fips-beta1 03 Jan 2012"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1-fips-beta3 23 Feb 2012"
#else
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1-beta1 03 Jan 2012"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1-beta3 23 Feb 2012"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

View File

@@ -569,7 +569,8 @@ my %globals;
$v.=" READONLY";
$v.=" ALIGN(".($1 eq "p" ? 4 : 8).")" if ($masm>=$masmref);
} elsif ($line=~/\.CRT\$/i) {
$v.=" READONLY ALIGN(8)";
$v.=" READONLY ";
$v.=$masm>=$masmref ? "ALIGN(8)" : "DWORD";
}
}
$current_segment = $line;

View File

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
in=fopen(file,"rb");
#endif
if (in == NULL) goto err;
#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) {
/* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number
* of bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered

View File

@@ -243,9 +243,9 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
.EXPORT RC4_set_key,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
.EXPORT private_RC4_set_key,ENTRY,ARGW0=GR,ARGW1=GR,ARGW2=GR
.ALIGN 8
RC4_set_key
private_RC4_set_key
.PROC
.CALLINFO NO_CALLS
.ENTRY

View File

@@ -222,7 +222,20 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
return ret;
}
#endif
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2)
{
unsigned int sltmp;
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
return -1;
ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NID_mdc2,
tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = sltmp;
}
else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING)
{
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
return -1;

View File

@@ -199,6 +199,22 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
i=RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen,sigbuf,s,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (i <= 0) goto err;
/* Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING.
* check for correct tag and length octets.
*/
if (dtype == NID_mdc2 && i == 18 && s[0] == 0x04 && s[1] == 0x10)
{
if (rm)
{
memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
*prm_len = 16;
ret = 1;
}
else if(memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
else
ret = 1;
}
/* Special case: SSL signature */
if(dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {

View File

@@ -170,7 +170,6 @@ void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void)
char *e;
struct sigaction common_act,ill_oact,bus_oact;
sigset_t all_masked,oset;
int sig;
static int trigger=0;
if (trigger) return;

View File

@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ links:
@$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
install:
@for i in $(EXHEADER) ; \
@[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
@headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \
do \
(cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \

View File

@@ -192,6 +192,18 @@
#define SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback SSL_CTX_set_srp_vfy_param_cb
#undef SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback
#define SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback SSL_CTX_set_srp_un_cb
#undef ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext
#define ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext ssl_add_clihello_use_srtp_ext
#undef ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext
#define ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext ssl_add_serhello_use_srtp_ext
#undef ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext
#define ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext ssl_parse_clihello_use_srtp_ext
#undef ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext
#define ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext ssl_parse_serhello_use_srtp_ext
#undef SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb
#define SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb
#undef SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb
#define SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb
/* Hack some long ENGINE names */
#undef ENGINE_get_default_BN_mod_exp_crt

View File

@@ -86,9 +86,6 @@
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

View File

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
* sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for
* the intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi.
*/
#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
#endif
#include <signal.h>

View File

@@ -142,12 +142,13 @@ unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
* Expand the bitstring form of an address into a raw byte array.
* At the moment this is coded for simplicity, not speed.
*/
static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
static int addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
const ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs,
const int length,
const unsigned char fill)
{
OPENSSL_assert(bs->length >= 0 && bs->length <= length);
if (bs->length < 0 || bs->length > length)
return 0;
if (bs->length > 0) {
memcpy(addr, bs->data, bs->length);
if ((bs->flags & 7) != 0) {
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void addr_expand(unsigned char *addr,
}
}
memset(addr + bs->length, fill, length - bs->length);
return 1;
}
/*
@@ -181,15 +183,13 @@ static int i2r_address(BIO *out,
return 0;
switch (afi) {
case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
if (bs->length > 4)
if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill))
return 0;
addr_expand(addr, bs, 4, fill);
BIO_printf(out, "%d.%d.%d.%d", addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3]);
break;
case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
if (bs->length > 16)
if (!addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill))
return 0;
addr_expand(addr, bs, 16, fill);
for (n = 16; n > 1 && addr[n-1] == 0x00 && addr[n-2] == 0x00; n -= 2)
;
for (i = 0; i < n; i += 2)
@@ -315,6 +315,12 @@ static int i2r_IPAddrBlocks(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
/*
* Sort comparison function for a sequence of IPAddressOrRange
* elements.
*
* There's no sane answer we can give if addr_expand() fails, and an
* assertion failure on externally supplied data is seriously uncool,
* so we just arbitrarily declare that if given invalid inputs this
* function returns -1. If this messes up your preferred sort order
* for garbage input, tough noogies.
*/
static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
const IPAddressOrRange *b,
@@ -326,22 +332,26 @@ static int IPAddressOrRange_cmp(const IPAddressOrRange *a,
switch (a->type) {
case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
return -1;
prefixlen_a = addr_prefixlen(a->u.addressPrefix);
break;
case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
if (!addr_expand(addr_a, a->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
return -1;
prefixlen_a = length * 8;
break;
}
switch (b->type) {
case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00))
return -1;
prefixlen_b = addr_prefixlen(b->u.addressPrefix);
break;
case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
if (!addr_expand(addr_b, b->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00))
return -1;
prefixlen_b = length * 8;
break;
}
@@ -602,10 +612,10 @@ static IPAddressOrRanges *make_prefix_or_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
return NULL;
switch (afi) {
case IANA_AFI_IPV4:
sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
(void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v4IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
break;
case IANA_AFI_IPV6:
sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
(void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set_cmp_func(aors, v6IPAddressOrRange_cmp);
break;
}
f->ipAddressChoice->type = IPAddressChoice_addressesOrRanges;
@@ -657,22 +667,22 @@ int v3_addr_add_range(IPAddrBlocks *addr,
/*
* Extract min and max values from an IPAddressOrRange.
*/
static void extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
static int extract_min_max(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
unsigned char *min,
unsigned char *max,
int length)
{
OPENSSL_assert(aor != NULL && min != NULL && max != NULL);
if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL)
return 0;
switch (aor->type) {
case IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix:
addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00);
addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF);
return;
return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0x00) &&
addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressPrefix, length, 0xFF));
case IPAddressOrRange_addressRange:
addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00);
addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF);
return;
return (addr_expand(min, aor->u.addressRange->min, length, 0x00) &&
addr_expand(max, aor->u.addressRange->max, length, 0xFF));
}
return 0;
}
/*
@@ -688,9 +698,10 @@ int v3_addr_get_range(IPAddressOrRange *aor,
if (aor == NULL || min == NULL || max == NULL ||
afi_length == 0 || length < afi_length ||
(aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressPrefix &&
aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange))
aor->type != IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) ||
!extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length))
return 0;
extract_min_max(aor, min, max, afi_length);
return afi_length;
}
@@ -772,8 +783,9 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
IPAddressOrRange *b = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j + 1);
extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
!extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
return 0;
/*
* Punt misordered list, overlapping start, or inverted range.
@@ -808,7 +820,8 @@ int v3_addr_is_canonical(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
{
IPAddressOrRange *a = sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(aors, j);
if (a != NULL && a->type == IPAddressOrRange_addressRange) {
extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length))
return 0;
if (memcmp(a_min, a_max, length) > 0 ||
range_should_be_prefix(a_min, a_max, length) >= 0)
return 0;
@@ -844,8 +857,9 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
unsigned char a_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], a_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
unsigned char b_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], b_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length);
extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length);
if (!extract_min_max(a, a_min, a_max, length) ||
!extract_min_max(b, b_min, b_max, length))
return 0;
/*
* Punt inverted ranges.
@@ -870,8 +884,8 @@ static int IPAddressOrRanges_canonize(IPAddressOrRanges *aors,
IPAddressOrRange *merged;
if (!make_addressRange(&merged, a_min, b_max, length))
return 0;
sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
(void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_set(aors, i, merged);
(void) sk_IPAddressOrRange_delete(aors, i + 1);
IPAddressOrRange_free(a);
IPAddressOrRange_free(b);
--i;
@@ -909,7 +923,7 @@ int v3_addr_canonize(IPAddrBlocks *addr)
v3_addr_get_afi(f)))
return 0;
}
sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
(void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
sk_IPAddressFamily_sort(addr);
OPENSSL_assert(v3_addr_is_canonical(addr));
return 1;
@@ -1131,13 +1145,15 @@ static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
p = 0;
for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
c_min, c_max, length);
if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
c_min, c_max, length))
return -1;
for (;; p++) {
if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
return 0;
extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
p_min, p_max, length);
if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
p_min, p_max, length))
return 0;
if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
continue;
if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
@@ -1159,7 +1175,7 @@ int v3_addr_subset(IPAddrBlocks *a, IPAddrBlocks *b)
return 1;
if (b == NULL || v3_addr_inherits(a) || v3_addr_inherits(b))
return 0;
sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
(void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(b, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
for (i = 0; i < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(a); i++) {
IPAddressFamily *fa = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(a, i);
int j = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(b, fa);
@@ -1224,7 +1240,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
}
if (!v3_addr_is_canonical(ext))
validation_err(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION);
sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
(void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(ext, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
if ((child = sk_IPAddressFamily_dup(ext)) == NULL) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V3_ADDR_VALIDATE_PATH_INTERNAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ret = 0;
@@ -1250,7 +1266,7 @@ static int v3_addr_validate_path_internal(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
}
continue;
}
sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
(void) sk_IPAddressFamily_set_cmp_func(x->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_cmp);
for (j = 0; j < sk_IPAddressFamily_num(child); j++) {
IPAddressFamily *fc = sk_IPAddressFamily_value(child, j);
int k = sk_IPAddressFamily_find(x->rfc3779_addr, fc);

View File

@@ -358,6 +358,20 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
goto done;
}
/*
* Check for inverted range.
*/
i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
{
ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
goto done;
}
}
ret = 1;
done:
@@ -392,9 +406,18 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
return 1;
/*
* We have a list. Sort it.
* If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken.
*/
if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges ||
sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* We have a non-empty list. Sort it.
*/
OPENSSL_assert(choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges);
sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges);
/*
@@ -414,6 +437,13 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
*/
OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
/*
* Punt inverted ranges.
*/
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 ||
ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0)
goto done;
/*
* Check for overlaps.
*/
@@ -465,12 +495,26 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
break;
}
ASIdOrRange_free(b);
sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
(void) sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
i--;
continue;
}
}
/*
* Check for final inverted range.
*/
i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
{
ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
goto done;
}
}
OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */
ret = 1;
@@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
{
ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL;
int i;
@@ -508,7 +553,6 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
int i1, i2, i3, is_range, which;
/*
@@ -578,18 +622,19 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2);
OPENSSL_free(s);
if (min == NULL || max == NULL) {
ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) {
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (!v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) {
ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
min = max = NULL;
}
/*
@@ -601,6 +646,8 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
err:
ASIdentifiers_free(asid);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
return NULL;
}

View File

@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ hexadecimal value if preceded by B<0x>. Default value is 65537.
The number of bits in the generated parameters. If not specified 1024 is used.
=back
=head1 DH PARAMETER GENERATION OPTIONS
=over 4

View File

@@ -287,8 +287,6 @@ SHA Digest
SHA-1 Digest
=back
=item B<sha224>
SHA-224 Digest
@@ -305,6 +303,8 @@ SHA-384 Digest
SHA-512 Digest
=back
=head2 ENCODING AND CIPHER COMMANDS
=over 10

View File

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ using the public key B<eckey>.
ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error.
ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or -1
ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or 0
on error.
ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid

View File

@@ -280,6 +280,10 @@ int pkey_GOST01cp_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *key, size_t * key_l
}
param = get_encryption_params(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
if(!param){
goto err;
}
gost_init(&ctx,param->sblock);
OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8);
memcpy(wrappedKey,gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->data,8);

View File

@@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ int pkey_GOST94cp_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *key_len
}
param = get_encryption_params(gkt->key_agreement_info->cipher);
if(!param){
goto err;
}
gost_init(&cctx,param->sblock);
OPENSSL_assert(gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->length==8);
memcpy(wrappedKey,gkt->key_agreement_info->eph_iv->data,8);

View File

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl94_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
}
if (strlen(value) == 1)
{
switch(toupper(value[0]))
switch(toupper((unsigned char)value[0]))
{
case 'A':
param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet;
@@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl94_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
break;
}
}
else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper(value[0]) == 'X'))
else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper((unsigned char)value[0]) == 'X'))
{
switch (toupper(value[1]))
switch (toupper((unsigned char)value[1]))
{
case 'A':
param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet;
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl01_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
}
if (strlen(value) == 1)
{
switch(toupper(value[0]))
switch(toupper((unsigned char)value[0]))
{
case 'A':
param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet;
@@ -217,9 +217,9 @@ static int pkey_gost_ctrl01_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
break;
}
}
else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper(value[0]) == 'X'))
else if ((strlen(value) == 2) && (toupper((unsigned char)value[0]) == 'X'))
{
switch (toupper(value[1]))
switch (toupper((unsigned char)value[1]))
{
case 'A':
param_nid = NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet;

View File

@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ extern int GetThreadID(void);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_AEP

View File

@@ -442,28 +442,36 @@ static int capi_init(ENGINE *e)
CAPI_CTX *ctx;
const RSA_METHOD *ossl_rsa_meth;
const DSA_METHOD *ossl_dsa_meth;
capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (capi_idx < 0)
{
capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (capi_idx < 0)
goto memerr;
cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
/* Setup DSA Method */
dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
}
ctx = capi_ctx_new();
if (!ctx || (capi_idx < 0))
if (!ctx)
goto memerr;
ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, capi_idx, ctx);
/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
/* Setup DSA Method */
dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
#ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG
{
@@ -1156,6 +1164,7 @@ static int capi_list_containers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out)
{
CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR);
capi_addlasterror();
CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
return 0;
}
CAPI_trace(ctx, "Got max container len %d\n", buflen);
@@ -1573,6 +1582,8 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LPSTR pname, DWORD type, int che
}
CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
}
if (ctx->cspname)
OPENSSL_free(ctx->cspname);
ctx->cspname = BUF_strdup(pname);
ctx->csptype = type;
return 1;
@@ -1582,9 +1593,12 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(CAPI_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
LPSTR pname;
DWORD type;
int res;
if (capi_get_provname(ctx, &pname, &type, idx) != 1)
return 0;
return capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
res = capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
OPENSSL_free(pname);
return res;
}
static int cert_issuer_match(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 *x)

View File

@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ $!
$! Copy All The ".H" Files From The [.SSL] Directory.
$!
$! (keep these in the same order as ssl/Makefile)
$ EXHEADER := ssl.h, ssl2.h, ssl3.h, ssl23.h, tls1.h, dtls1.h, kssl.h
$ EXHEADER := ssl.h, ssl2.h, ssl3.h, ssl23.h, tls1.h, dtls1.h, kssl.h, srtp.h
$ copy sys$disk:[.ssl]'exheader' sys$disk:[.include.openssl]
$!
$! Purge the [.include.openssl] header files.

View File

@@ -383,6 +383,8 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned int mac_size;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -417,13 +419,10 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
if (enc_err <= 0)
{
/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
if (enc_err < 0)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
}
goto err;
/* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
* perform all computations before discarding the message.
*/
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -453,28 +452,32 @@ printf("\n");
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
#else
goto err;
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
#endif
}
/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
if (rr->length < mac_size)
if (rr->length >= mac_size)
{
#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
#else
goto err;
#endif
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
}
rr->length-=mac_size;
else
rr->length = 0;
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
{
goto err;
decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
}
if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
{
/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto err;
}
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{

View File

@@ -278,19 +278,25 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
return 1;
}
if((ct*2) > maxlen)
if((2 + ct*2 + 1) > maxlen)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
return 1;
}
/* Add the length */
s2n(ct * 2, p);
for(i=0;i<ct;i++)
{
prof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,i);
s2n(prof->id,p);
}
/* Add an empty use_mki value */
*p++ = 0;
}
*len=ct*2;
*len=2 + ct*2 + 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -300,23 +306,48 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
{
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
int ct;
int mki_len;
int i,j;
int id;
int ret;
if(len%2)
/* Length value + the MKI length */
if(len < 3)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 1;
}
/* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list */
n2s(d, ct);
len -= 2;
/* Check that it is even */
if(ct%2)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 1;
}
/* Check that lengths are consistent */
if(len < (ct + 1))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 1;
}
clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
while(len)
while(ct)
{
n2s(d,id);
len-=2;
ct-=2;
len-=2;
if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
{
@@ -328,6 +359,17 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
}
}
/* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
mki_len = *d;
d++; len--;
if (mki_len != len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 1;
}
srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
/* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
@@ -364,7 +406,7 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
{
if(p)
{
if(maxlen < 2)
if(maxlen < 5)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG);
return 1;
@@ -375,10 +417,11 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED);
return 1;
}
s2n(2, p);
s2n(s->srtp_profile->id,p);
}
*len=2;
*p++ = 0;
}
*len=5;
return 0;
}
@@ -388,10 +431,20 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
{
unsigned id;
int i;
int ct;
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
if(len!=2)
if(len!=5)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 1;
}
n2s(d, ct);
if(ct!=2)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
*al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -399,6 +452,12 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al
}
n2s(d,id);
if (*d) /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
*al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 1;
}
clnt=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);

View File

@@ -689,9 +689,43 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
#if 0
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
s->client_version=s->version;
#else
*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
#endif
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);

View File

@@ -512,6 +512,9 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
/* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
l+=i;
/* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten
* with the padding length. */
memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
rec->length+=i;
rec->input[l-1]=(i-1);
}

View File

@@ -3589,7 +3589,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
if (parg == NULL)
break;
if (strlen((char *)parg) > 254)
if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME);
return 0;

View File

@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
}
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
@@ -881,6 +882,13 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
{
/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
* negotiation. */
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
return -1;
}
/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
* which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
@@ -897,6 +905,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
return 2;
}
return 1;
@@ -2291,6 +2300,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
BN_clear_free(pub);
goto err;
}
@@ -2900,7 +2910,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
514, /* 514? */
516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);

View File

@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ $ LIB_SSL = "s2_meth,s2_srvr,s2_clnt,s2_lib,s2_enc,s2_pkt,"+ -
"s23_meth,s23_srvr,s23_clnt,s23_lib,s23_pkt,"+ -
"t1_meth,t1_srvr,t1_clnt,t1_lib,t1_enc,"+ -
"d1_meth,d1_srvr,d1_clnt,d1_lib,d1_pkt,"+ -
"d1_both,d1_enc,"+ -
"d1_both,d1_enc,d1_srtp,"+ -
"ssl_lib,ssl_err2,ssl_cert,ssl_sess,"+ -
"ssl_ciph,ssl_stat,ssl_rsa,"+ -
"ssl_asn1,ssl_txt,ssl_algs,"+ -

112
ssl/ssl.h
View File

@@ -927,29 +927,9 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
/* Callback for status request */
int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
void *tlsext_status_arg;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* Next protocol negotiation information */
/* (for experimental NPN extension). */
/* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
* advertised protocols can be provided. */
int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
unsigned int *len, void *arg);
void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
/* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
* next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int inlen,
void *arg);
void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
/* draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt information */
int (*tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg);
void *tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg;
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
@@ -972,6 +952,24 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* Next protocol negotiation information */
/* (for experimental NPN extension). */
/* For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
* advertised protocols can be provided. */
int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *s, const unsigned char **buf,
unsigned int *len, void *arg);
void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg;
/* For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
* next protocol from the list provided by the server. */
int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
unsigned char *outlen,
const unsigned char *in,
unsigned int inlen,
void *arg);
void *next_proto_select_cb_arg;
# endif
/* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles;
#endif
@@ -1147,10 +1145,6 @@ struct ssl_st
* NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously
* cached session or even the previous session unless
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
int renegotiate;/* 1 if we are renegotiating.
* 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
* (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */
int quiet_shutdown;/* don't send shutdown packets */
int shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02
* for received */
@@ -1248,10 +1242,6 @@ struct ssl_st
unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
#endif
SSL_CTX *ctx;
/* set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read()
* and SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-) */
@@ -1349,6 +1339,14 @@ struct ssl_st
#else
#define session_ctx ctx
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
int renegotiate;/* 1 if we are renegotiating.
* 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake
* (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */
#endif
};
#endif
@@ -2040,7 +2038,7 @@ int SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, tls_session_secret_cb_fn tls_session_secre
void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug);
int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s);
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
@@ -2068,7 +2066,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 297
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 314
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT 305
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 288
#define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256
@@ -2118,6 +2116,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233
#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129
#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130
#define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 304
#define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131
#define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132
#define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213
@@ -2136,7 +2135,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 305
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO 306
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144
#define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145
@@ -2224,7 +2223,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 306
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_SET1_ID_CONTEXT 312
#define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225
#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191
#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271
@@ -2238,7 +2237,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228
#define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196
#define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224
#define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT 304
#define SSL_F_SSL_SRP_CTX_INIT 313
#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243
#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197
#define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244
@@ -2258,8 +2257,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209
#define SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274
#define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210
#define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 312
#define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT 313
#define SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL 314
#define SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT 315
#define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275
#define SSL_F_TLS1_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276
#define SSL_F_TLS1_PRF 284
@@ -2299,12 +2298,13 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121
#define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122
#define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH 346
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 347
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 348
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 349
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 350
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 360
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH 347
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH 348
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH 349
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH 350
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH 351
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE 352
#define SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 353
#define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124
#define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125
#define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126
@@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE 322
#define SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE 323
#define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310
#define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 361
#define SSL_R_EMPTY_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST 354
#define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150
#define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282
#define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151
@@ -2360,7 +2360,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 341
#define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278
#define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME 351
#define SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME 357
#define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 328
#define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 325
#define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279
@@ -2390,13 +2390,13 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168
#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169
#define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170
#define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM 352
#define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME 353
#define SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM 358
#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171
#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311
#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172
#define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173
#define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174
#define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 346
#define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175
#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176
#define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177
@@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 339
#define SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST 324
#define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193
#define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES 362
#define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES 359
#define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194
#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195
#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196
@@ -2464,12 +2464,12 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 275
#define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277
#define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219
#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 359
#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR 360
#define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220
#define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 354
#define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 363
#define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG 364
#define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 365
#define SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC 361
#define SSL_R_SRTP_COULD_NOT_ALLOCATE_PROFILES 362
#define SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG 363
#define SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE 364
#define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221
#define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299
#define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT 321
@@ -2514,8 +2514,8 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110
#define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232
#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT 368
#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 369
#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT 365
#define SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING 366
#define SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL 367
#define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 157
#define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233
@@ -2538,7 +2538,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 357
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST 368
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251
#define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252
@@ -2553,14 +2553,14 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258
#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259
#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329
#define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 366
#define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 369
#define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260
#define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261
#define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262
#define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263
#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264
#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265
#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 358
#define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE 370
#define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266
#define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267
#define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268

View File

@@ -388,6 +388,17 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
* restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
* from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
* renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
* per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
* attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
* restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
* effected, but we can't prevent that.
*/
#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
@@ -466,11 +477,6 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
void *server_opaque_prf_input;
size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
struct {
/* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
@@ -528,6 +534,11 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
} SSL3_STATE;
#endif

View File

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int SSL_library_init(void)
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_SHA1)
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
#endif

View File

@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL), "SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE), "SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM), "SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO), "SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT), "SSL3_CONNECT"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL), "SSL3_CTRL"},
@@ -327,6 +328,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH) ,"bad srp g length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH) ,"bad srp n length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH) ,"bad srp s length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE) ,"bad srtp mki value"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST),"bad srtp protection profile list"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE) ,"bad ssl filetype"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH),"bad ssl session id length"},
@@ -414,12 +416,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT),"missing rsa encrypting cert"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT),"missing rsa signing cert"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM) ,"can't find SRP server param"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME) ,"missing srp username"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY) ,"missing tmp dh key"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY) ,"missing tmp ecdh key"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY) ,"missing tmp rsa key"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY) ,"missing tmp rsa pkey"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE),"missing verify message"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS) ,"multiple sgc restarts"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET),"non sslv2 initial packet"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED),"no certificates returned"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED),"no certificate assigned"},

View File

@@ -1079,8 +1079,10 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
s->max_cert_list=larg;
return(l);
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
return 0;
#endif
if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)

View File

@@ -432,25 +432,29 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
#define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
/* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
{/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
long lenmax;
{ /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
if (login_len > 255)
int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
}
/* check for enough space.
4 for the srp type type and entension length
1 for the srp user identity
+ srp user identity length
*/
if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
/* fill in the extension */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
s2n(login_len+1,ret);
(*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
(*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
ret+=login_len;
}
#endif
@@ -812,17 +816,21 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension */
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
s2n(1,ret);
/* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
{
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
s2n(1,ret);
/* Set mode:
* 1: peer may send requests
* 2: peer not allowed to send requests
*/
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
else
*(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
@@ -1003,13 +1011,25 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
{
if (size > 0)
if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
{
len = data[0];
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
@@ -1244,6 +1264,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0)
{
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
{
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
&sdata, dsize);
@@ -1273,6 +1299,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
@@ -1544,6 +1572,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
@@ -2231,7 +2261,7 @@ static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
@@ -2265,6 +2295,8 @@ static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
{
int sig_id, md_id;
if (!md)
return 0;
md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
if (md_id == -1)

View File

@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ while(<IN>) {
}
close(IN);
$fipsdir =~ tr/\//${o}/;
$debug = 1 if $mf_platform =~ /^debug-/;
die "Makefile is not the toplevel Makefile!\n" if $ssl_version eq "";
@@ -234,6 +233,8 @@ else
$cflags.=' -DTERMIO';
}
$fipsdir =~ s/\//${o}/g;
$out_dir=(defined($VARS{'OUT'}))?$VARS{'OUT'}:$out_def.($debug?".dbg":"");
$tmp_dir=(defined($VARS{'TMP'}))?$VARS{'TMP'}:$tmp_def.($debug?".dbg":"");
$inc_dir=(defined($VARS{'INC'}))?$VARS{'INC'}:$inc_def;

View File

@@ -310,11 +310,13 @@ SSL_SESSION_get_id_len 351 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
kssl_ctx_get0_client_princ 352 EXIST::FUNCTION:KRB5
SSL_export_keying_material 353 EXIST::FUNCTION:TLSEXT
SSL_set_tlsext_use_srtp 354 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb 355 EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb 355 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_adv_cb 355 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated 356 EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile 357 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp 358 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_select_next_proto 359 EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_get_srtp_profiles 360 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb 361 EXIST::FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb 361 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_sel_cb 361 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:NEXTPROTONEG
SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id 362 EXIST::FUNCTION: