Prepare for 0.9.8za release

Check session_cert is not NULL before dereferencing it.

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Object files
+*.o
+
+# editor artefacts
+*.swp
+.#*
+#*#
+*~
+
+# Top level excludes
+/Makefile.bak
+/Makefile
+/*.a
+/include
+/*.pc
+/rehash.time
+
+# Most *.c files under test/ are symlinks
+/test/*.c
+# Apart from these
+!/test/asn1test.c
+!/test/methtest.c
+!/test/dummytest.c
+!/test/igetest.c
+!/test/r160test.c
+!/test/fips_algvs.c
+
+/test/*.ss
+/test/*.srl
+/test/.rnd
+/test/test*.pem
+/test/newkey.pem
+
+# Certificate symbolic links
+*.0
+
+# Links under apps
+/apps/CA.pl
+/apps/md4.c
+
+
+# Auto generated headers
+/crypto/buildinf.h
+/crypto/opensslconf.h
+
+# Auto generated assembly language source files
+*.s
+!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s
+!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s
+
+# Executables
+/apps/openssl
+/test/sha256t
+/test/sha512t
+/test/*test
+/test/fips_aesavs
+/test/fips_desmovs
+/test/fips_dhvs
+/test/fips_drbgvs
+/test/fips_dssvs
+/test/fips_ecdhvs
+/test/fips_ecdsavs
+/test/fips_rngvs
+/test/fips_test_suite
+*.so*
+*.dylib*
+*.dll*
+# Exceptions
+!/test/bctest
+!/crypto/des/times/486-50.sol
+
+# Misc auto generated files
+/tools/c_rehash
+/test/evptests.txt
+lib
+Makefile.save
+*.bak

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

@@ -10,13 +10,18 @@ OpenSSL project.
 We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
 or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
 
+Major support:
+
+	Qualys		http://www.qualys.com/
+
 Very significant support:
 
-	OpenGear: www.opengear.com
+	OpenGear:	http://www.opengear.com/
 
 Significant support:
 
-	PSW Group: www.psw.net
+	PSW Group:	http://www.psw.net/
+	Acano Ltd.	http://acano.com/
 
 Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
 we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,152 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 0.9.8y and 0.9.8za [5 Jun 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+     handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+     SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+     Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+     researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+     [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+     OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+     in a DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-0221)
+     [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+     be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+     client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+     code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+     Thanks to J<>ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [J<>ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+     are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+     [Felix Gr<47>bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+     ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+     by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+     http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+     Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+     flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+     [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+     Thanks to mancha for backporting the fix to the 0.9.8 branch.
+
+  *) Fix handling of warning-level alerts in SSL23 client mode so they
+     don't cause client-side termination (eg. on SNI unrecognized_name
+     warnings). Add client and server support for six additional alerts
+     per RFC 6066 and RFC 4279.
+     [mancha]
+
+  *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+     avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+     Safari on OS X.  Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+     several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them.  The bug
+     is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+     10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+     [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
+     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
+     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+     [Antonio Martin]
+
  Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
@@ -25,7 +171,9 @@
      (CVE-2011-4576)
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
 
-  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. (CVE-2011-4619)
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
  
   *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.

Configure

@@ -162,20 +162,21 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-debug",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-debug-64",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-ben-debug-noopt",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-ben-strict",	"gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
-"debug-bodo",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -DPEDANTIC -g -march=i486 -pedantic -Wshadow -Wall -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
+"debug-bodo",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
 "debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -m32 -g -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared",
 "debug-steve-linux-pseudo64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -mcpu=i486 -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
 "debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
@@ -428,8 +429,8 @@ my %table=(
 "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
 # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
 # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
-"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
+"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
+"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
 
 #
 # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)

FAQ

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
 * What is an 'engine' version?
 * How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
+* How does the versioning scheme work?
 
 [LEGAL] Legal questions
 
@@ -82,11 +83,11 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.0f was released on Jan 4th, 2012.
+OpenSSL 1.0.1d was released on Feb 5th, 2013.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
-ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous CVS access.
+ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous Git access.
 
 
 * Where is the documentation?
@@ -108,7 +109,9 @@ In addition, you can read the most current versions at
 <URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
 to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
 not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
-that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using.
+that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
+documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
+directory.
 
 For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
 might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
@@ -173,6 +176,19 @@ just do:
 
    pgp TARBALL.asc
 
+* How does the versioning scheme work?
+
+After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter 
+releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no
+new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and 
+can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to
+the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor
+binary compatibility is guaranteed.
+
+Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be
+backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear
+in the next minor release.
+
 [LEGAL] =======================================================================
 
 * Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
@@ -284,7 +300,7 @@ current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
 Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
 the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check
 out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate
-extensions documentation (currently in doc/openssl.txt).
+extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) )
 
 
 * Why can't I create certificate requests?
@@ -752,6 +768,9 @@ openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least
 acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
 more active team members (e.g. Steve).
 
+Note that bugs only present in the openssl utility are not in general
+considered to be security issues. 
+
 [PROG] ========================================================================
 
 * Is OpenSSL thread-safe?

INSTALL.W32

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
   * Borland C
   * GNU C (Cygwin or MinGW)
 
- If you are compiling from a tarball or a CVS snapshot then the Win32 files
+ If you are compiling from a tarball or a Git snapshot then the Win32 files
  may well be not up to date. This may mean that some "tweaking" is required to
  get it all to work. See the trouble shooting section later on for if (when?)
  it goes wrong.
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ To install OpenSSL to the specified location do:
 
  then ms\do_XXX should not give a warning any more. However the numbers that
  get assigned by this technique may not match those that eventually get
- assigned in the CVS tree: so anything linked against this version of the
+ assigned in the Git tree: so anything linked against this version of the
  library may need to be recompiled.
 
  If you get errors about unresolved symbols there are several possible

Makefile.org

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ARD=ar $(ARFLAGS) d
 RANLIB= ranlib
 PERL= perl
 TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
 MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
 LIBDIR=lib
 

NEWS

@@ -5,7 +5,44 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8y and OpenSSL 0.9.8za [5 Jun 2014]:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
+      o Fix to TLS alert handling.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
+
+      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
 
       o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
       o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
@@ -13,20 +50,20 @@
       o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
       o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
       o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
       o Various DTLS fixes.
@@ -34,12 +71,12 @@
       o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
       o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
 
       o CFB cipher definition fixes.
       o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
 
       o Cipher definition fixes.
       o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
@@ -51,33 +88,33 @@
       o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
       o Many fixes to DTLS handling. 
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
 
       o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
 
       o Fix various build issues.
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
 
       o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
       o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
 
       o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
       o Various precautionary measures.
       o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
       o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
 
       o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
       o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
 
       o Add gcc 4.2 support.
       o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
@@ -88,23 +125,23 @@
       o RFC4507bis support.
       o TLS Extensions support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
 
       o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
       o RFC3779 support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
       o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
       o New cipher Camellia
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
 
       o Cipher string fixes.
       o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
@@ -114,12 +151,12 @@
       o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
       o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Extended Windows CE support
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
 
       o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
         make operations more streamlined and less contradictory.  This
@@ -193,36 +230,36 @@
       o Added initial support for Win64.
       o Added alternate pkg-config files.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
 
       o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
       o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
 
       o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
       o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
       o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
 
       o More compilation issues fixed.
       o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
@@ -231,7 +268,7 @@
       o More constification.
       o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
 
       o Several compilation issues fixed.
       o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
@@ -239,12 +276,12 @@
       o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
       o Performance improvements.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
 
       o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
       o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
 
       o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
       o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
@@ -252,14 +289,14 @@
       o Multiple X509 verification fixes
       o Speed up HMAC and other operations
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
 
       o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
       o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
       o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
       o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
         Bleichbacher's attack 
@@ -270,7 +307,7 @@
       o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
       o Documentation: fixes and additions.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
 
       o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
       o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
@@ -281,7 +318,7 @@
       o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
       o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
 
       o New library section OCSP.
       o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
@@ -327,23 +364,23 @@
       o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
       o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
 
       o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
       o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
         Bleichbacher's attack 
       o Security: make RSA blinding default.
       o Build: shared library support fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
 
       o Important security related bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
 
       o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
       o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
@@ -357,25 +394,25 @@
       o Fixes for smaller building problems.
       o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
 
       o Important building fixes on Unix.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
 
       o Various important bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
 
       o Important security related bugfixes.
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
 
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
       o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
 
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
       o BIGNUM library fixes.
@@ -388,7 +425,7 @@
         Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
         [in 0.9.6c-engine release].
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
 
       o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
       o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
@@ -405,7 +442,7 @@
       o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
       o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
 
       o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
         environment variables when running as root.
@@ -430,7 +467,7 @@
       o New function BN_rand_range().
       o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
 
       o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
       o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
@@ -445,7 +482,7 @@
     [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
         distribution.  See the file README.ENGINE.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
 
       o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 
       o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
@@ -454,7 +491,7 @@
       o New 'rand' application
       o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
 
       o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
       o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
@@ -490,7 +527,7 @@
       o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
       o Experimental MacOS support
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
 
       o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
         by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
@@ -501,7 +538,7 @@
       o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
         must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
       o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
       o RSA OEAP related fixes
       o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
@@ -515,7 +552,7 @@
       o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
       o Option to disable selected ciphers
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
       o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
       o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
       o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
@@ -537,7 +574,7 @@
       o Lots of memory leak fixes.
       o Lots of bug fixes.
 
-  Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c:
+  Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
       o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
       o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
       o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 0.9.8s 4 Jan 2012
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8za 5 Jun 2014
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current CVS or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
  OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
  can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
  compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable

STATUS

@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-
-  OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 2012/01/04 19:20:48 $
-
-  DEVELOPMENT STATE
-
-    o  OpenSSL 1.1.0:  Under development...
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.1:  Under development...
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0d: Released on February   8nd, 2011
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0c: Released on December   2nd, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0b: Released on November  16th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0a: Released on June      1st,  2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0:  Released on March     29th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8s: Released on January    4th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8r: Released on February   8nd, 2011
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8q: Released on December   2nd, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8p: Released on November  16th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8o: Released on June       1st, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8n: Released on March     24th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8m: Released on February  25th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8l: Released on November   5th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8k: Released on March     25th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8j: Released on January    7th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8i: Released on September 15th, 2008
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8h: Released on May       28th, 2008
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8g: Released on October   19th, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8f: Released on October   11th, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8e: Released on February  23rd, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8d: Released on September 28th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8c: Released on September  5th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8b: Released on May        4th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8a: Released on October   11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8:  Released on July       5th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7m: Released on February  23rd, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7l: Released on September 28th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7k: Released on September  5th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7j: Released on May        4th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7i: Released on October   14th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7h: Released on October   11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7g: Released on April     11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7f: Released on March     22nd, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7e: Released on October   25th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7d: Released on March     17th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7c: Released on September 30th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7b: Released on April     10th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7a: Released on February  19th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7:  Released on December  31st, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6m: Released on March     17th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6l: Released on November   4th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6k: Released on September 30th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6j: Released on April     10th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6i: Released on February  19th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6h: Released on December   5th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6g: Released on August     9th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6f: Released on August     8th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6e: Released on July      30th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6d: Released on May        9th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6c: Released on December  21st, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6b: Released on July       9th, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6a: Released on April      5th, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6:  Released on September 24th, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.5a: Released on April      1st, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.5:  Released on February  28th, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.4:  Released on August    09th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.3a: Released on May       29th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.3:  Released on May       25th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.2b: Released on March     22th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.1c: Released on December  23th, 1998
-
-  [See also http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html]
-
-  RELEASE SHOWSTOPPERS
-
-    o The Makefiles fail with some SysV makes.
-    o 
-
-  AVAILABLE PATCHES
-
-    o 
-
-  IN PROGRESS
-
-    o Steve is currently working on (in no particular order):
-        ASN1 code redesign, butchery, replacement.
-        OCSP
-        EVP cipher enhancement.
-        Enhanced certificate chain verification.
-	Private key, certificate and CRL API and implementation.
-	Developing and bugfixing PKCS#7 (S/MIME code).
-        Various X509 issues: character sets, certificate request extensions.
-    o Richard is currently working on:
-	Constification
-	Attribute Certificate support
-	Certificate Pair support
-	Storage Engines (primarly an LDAP storage engine)
-	Certificate chain validation with full RFC 3280 compatibility
-
-  NEEDS PATCH
-
-    o  0.9.8-dev: COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT do not
-       handle ECCdraft cipher suites correctly.
-
-    o  apps/ca.c: "Sign the certificate?" - "n" creates empty certificate file
-
-    o  "OpenSSL STATUS" is never up-to-date.
-
-  OPEN ISSUES
-
-    o  The Makefile hierarchy and build mechanism is still not a round thing:
-
-       1. The config vs. Configure scripts
-          It's the same nasty situation as for Apache with APACI vs.
-          src/Configure. It confuses.
-          Suggestion: Merge Configure and config into a single configure
-                      script with a Autoconf style interface ;-) and remove
-                      Configure and config. Or even let us use GNU Autoconf
-                      itself. Then we can avoid a lot of those platform checks
-                      which are currently in Configure.
-
-    o  Support for Shared Libraries has to be added at least
-       for the major Unix platforms. The details we can rip from the stuff
-       Ralf has done for the Apache src/Configure script. Ben wants the
-       solution to be really simple.
-
-       Status: Ralf will look how we can easily incorporate the
-               compiler PIC and linker DSO flags from Apache
-               into the OpenSSL Configure script.
-
-               Ulf: +1 for using GNU autoconf and libtool (but not automake,
-                    which apparently is not flexible enough to generate
-                    libcrypto)
-
-  WISHES
-
-    o  Add variants of DH_generate_parameters() and BN_generate_prime() [etc?]
-       where the callback function can request that the function be aborted.
-       [Gregory Stark <ghstark@pobox.com>, <rayyang2000@yahoo.com>]
-
-    o  SRP in TLS.
-       [wished by:
-        Dj <derek@yo.net>, Tom Wu <tom@arcot.com>,
-        Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>]
-
-       See http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-srp-00.txt
-       as well as http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/srp/.
-
-       Tom Holroyd tells us there is a SRP patch for OpenSSH at
-       http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/, that could
-       be useful.

TABLE

@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ $arflags      =
 $cc           = cc
 $cflags       = -q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst
 $unistd       = 
-$thread_cflag = -qthreaded
+$thread_cflag = -qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE
 $sys_id       = AIX
 $lflags       = 
 $bn_ops       = BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ $arflags      =
 $cc           = cc
 $cflags       = -q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst
 $unistd       = 
-$thread_cflag = -qthreaded
+$thread_cflag = -qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE
 $sys_id       = AIX
 $lflags       = 
 $bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR
@@ -1269,6 +1269,33 @@ $shared_extension =
 $ranlib       = 
 $arflags      = 
 
+*** debug-ben-debug-64
+$cc           = gcc
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe
+$unistd       = 
+$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
+$sys_id       = 
+$lflags       = 
+$bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
+$cpuid_obj    = x86_64cpuid.o
+$bn_obj       = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o
+$des_obj      = 
+$aes_obj      = aes-x86_64.o
+$bf_obj       = 
+$md5_obj      = md5-x86_64.o
+$sha1_obj     = sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o
+$cast_obj     = 
+$rc4_obj      = rc4-x86_64.o
+$rmd160_obj   = 
+$rc5_obj      = 
+$dso_scheme   = elf
+$shared_target= dlfcn
+$shared_cflag = bsd-gcc-shared
+$shared_ldflag = -fPIC
+$shared_extension = 
+$ranlib       = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
+$arflags      = 
+
 *** debug-ben-debug-noopt
 $cc           = gcc
 $cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe
@@ -1379,29 +1406,29 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-bodo
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DL_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -DPEDANTIC -g -march=i486 -pedantic -Wshadow -Wall -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
-$lflags       = 
-$bn_ops       = BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL RC4_INDEX MD2_INT
-$cpuid_obj    = x86cpuid-elf.o
-$bn_obj       = bn86-elf.o co86-elf.o MAYBE-MO86-elf.o
-$des_obj      = dx86-elf.o yx86-elf.o
-$aes_obj      = ax86-elf.o
-$bf_obj       = bx86-elf.o
-$md5_obj      = mx86-elf.o
-$sha1_obj     = sx86-elf.o s512sse2-elf.o
-$cast_obj     = cx86-elf.o
-$rc4_obj      = rx86-elf.o rc4_skey.o
-$rmd160_obj   = rm86-elf.o
-$rc5_obj      = r586-elf.o
-$dso_scheme   = 
-$shared_target= 
-$shared_cflag = 
-$shared_ldflag = 
-$shared_extension = 
-$ranlib       = 
+$lflags       = -ldl
+$bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
+$cpuid_obj    = x86_64cpuid.o
+$bn_obj       = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o
+$des_obj      = 
+$aes_obj      = aes-x86_64.o
+$bf_obj       = 
+$md5_obj      = md5-x86_64.o
+$sha1_obj     = sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o
+$cast_obj     = 
+$rc4_obj      = rc4-x86_64.o
+$rmd160_obj   = 
+$rc5_obj      = 
+$dso_scheme   = elf
+$shared_target= dlfcn
+$shared_cflag = linux-shared
+$shared_ldflag = -fPIC
+$shared_extension = -m64
+$ranlib       = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
 $arflags      = 
 
 *** debug-darwin-i386-cc
@@ -1487,7 +1514,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-elf
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -1514,7 +1541,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -1541,7 +1568,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-noasm
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -1568,7 +1595,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 

apps/apps.c

@@ -558,12 +558,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify,
 
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			ok = UI_add_input_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buf,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1);
 		if (ok >= 0 && verify)
 			{
 			buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
 			ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buff,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1, buf);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1, buf);
 			}
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			do
@@ -2052,7 +2052,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	X509_NAME *n = NULL;
 	int nid;
 
-	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values)
+	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
 		goto error;
@@ -2156,6 +2156,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+	OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	return n;
 
 error:
@@ -2164,6 +2165,8 @@ error:
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	if (ne_types)
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
+	if (mval)
+		OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	if (buf)
 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return NULL;

apps/cms.c

@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
 				cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
 #endif
+		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) 
+				flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) 
 				flags |= CMS_TEXT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) 
@@ -611,7 +613,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file   signer certificate file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip  file   recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid        use subject key identifier\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid         use subject key identifier\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file       input file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg    input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file    input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");
@@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ret = 4;
 	if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
 		{
+		if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+			CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
 
 		if (secret_key)
 			{

apps/dhparam.c

@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"This is going to take a long time\n");
 			if(!dh || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, &cb))
 				{
-				if(dh) DH_free(dh);
 				ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 				goto end;
 				}

apps/ocsp.c

@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ENGINE *e = NULL;
 	char **args;
 	char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/";
+	char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL;
 	char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL;
 	char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL;
 	char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
@@ -173,6 +174,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			}
 		else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url"))
 			{
+			if (thost)
+				OPENSSL_free(thost);
+			if (tport)
+				OPENSSL_free(tport);
+			if (tpath)
+				OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 			if (args[1])
 				{
 				args++;
@@ -181,6 +188,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 					BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
 					badarg = 1;
 					}
+				thost = host;
+				tport = port;
+				tpath = path;
 				}
 			else badarg = 1;
 			}
@@ -871,12 +881,12 @@ end:
 	sk_X509_pop_free(sign_other, X509_free);
 	sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free);
 
-	if (use_ssl != -1)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(host);
-		OPENSSL_free(port);
-		OPENSSL_free(path);
-		}
+	if (thost)
+		OPENSSL_free(thost);
+	if (tport)
+		OPENSSL_free(tport);
+	if (tpath)
+		OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 
 	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 }

apps/req.c

@@ -1574,7 +1574,13 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n,nid, chtype,
 				(unsigned char *) buf, -1,-1,mval)) goto err;
 	ret=1;
@@ -1633,7 +1639,12 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
 
 	if(!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype,
 					(unsigned char *)buf, -1)) {

apps/s_cb.c

@@ -518,6 +518,24 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 				case 100:
 					str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
 					break;
+				case 110:
+					str_details2 = " unsupported_extension";
+					break;
+				case 111:
+					str_details2 = " certificate_unobtainable";
+					break;
+				case 112:
+					str_details2 = " unrecognized_name";
+					break;
+				case 113:
+					str_details2 = " bad_certificate_status_response";
+					break;
+				case 114:
+					str_details2 = " bad_certificate_hash_value";
+					break;
+				case 115:
+					str_details2 = " unknown_psk_identity";
+					break;
 					}
 				}
 			}

apps/s_client.c

@@ -345,13 +345,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	char *jpake_secret = NULL;
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif
 
 	apps_startup();
 	c_Pause=0;

apps/s_server.c

@@ -781,13 +781,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
         tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING};
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#endif
 
 	local_argc=argc;
 	local_argv=argv;
@@ -1556,6 +1550,12 @@ end:
 	if (dpass)
 		OPENSSL_free(dpass);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (tlscstatp.host)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
+	if (tlscstatp.port)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
+	if (tlscstatp.path)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
 	if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
 	if (s_cert2)
 		X509_free(s_cert2);

apps/smime.c

@@ -521,8 +521,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		{
 		if (!cipher)
 			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2			
-			cipher = EVP_rc2_40_cbc();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES			
+			cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 #else
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 			goto end;

crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 	BUF_MEM *b;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	int i;
-	int ret=-1;
 	ASN1_const_CTX c;
-	int want=HEADER_SIZE;
+	size_t want=HEADER_SIZE;
 	int eos=0;
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64)
-	/* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */
-	long off=0;
-#else
-	int off=0;
-#endif
-	int len=0;
+	size_t off=0;
+	size_t len=0;
 
 	b=BUF_MEM_new();
 	if (b == NULL)
@@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			want-=(len-off);
 
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
+			if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 				{
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 				goto err;
@@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 				goto err;
 				}
 			if (i > 0)
+				{
+				if (len+i < len)
+					{
+					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+					goto err;
+					}
 				len+=i;
+				}
 			}
 		/* else data already loaded */
 
@@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			/* no data body so go round again */
 			eos++;
+			if (eos < 0)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			want=HEADER_SIZE;
 			}
 		else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC))
@@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 		else 
 			{
 			/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
-			want=(int)c.slen;
+			want=c.slen;
 			if (want > (len-off))
 				{
 				want-=(len-off);
+				if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
+					len+want < len)
+						{
+						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+						goto err;
+						}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 					{
 					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 						    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
 						goto err;
 						}
+					/* This can't overflow because
+					 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
 					len+=i;
-					want -= i;
+					want-=i;
 					}
 				}
-			off+=(int)c.slen;
+			if (off + c.slen < off)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			off+=c.slen;
 			if (eos <= 0)
 				{
 				break;
@@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (off > INT_MAX)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	*pb = b;
 	return off;
 err:
 	if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
-	return(ret);
+	return -1;
 	}

crypto/asn1/a_int.c

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
 	int pad=0,ret,i,neg;
 	unsigned char *p,*n,pb=0;
 
-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0);
+	if (a == NULL) return(0);
 	neg=a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
 	if (a->length == 0)
 		ret=1;

crypto/asn1/a_strex.c

@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
 	stmp.data = NULL;
+	stmp.length = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
 	if(ret < 0) return ret;
 	*out = stmp.data;

crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int table_cmp(const void *a, const void *b);
  * certain software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them.
  */
 
-static unsigned long global_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL;
+static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
 
 void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask)
 {

crypto/asn1/a_verify.c

@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signat
 	unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
 	int ret= -1,i,inl;
 
+	if (!pkey)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
 	type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));

crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c

@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 
 		if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
 			strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
-			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
 			ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
 static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
 			const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
+		return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
+
 	return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
 }
 
 static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
 			const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
+		return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
 	return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
 }
 

crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c

@@ -208,11 +208,6 @@ int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off)
 
 	if (x->p)
 		buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->p);
-	else
-		{
-		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-		goto err;
-		}
 	if (x->q)
 		if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->q)))
 			buf_len = i;

crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c

@@ -367,7 +367,19 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	key->pkey = ret;
+	/* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+	if (key->pkey)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+		ret = key->pkey;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		key->pkey = ret;
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	return(ret);
 err:

crypto/bio/bio.h

@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /* #endif */
 
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU          40 /* as kernel for current MTU */
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU   47
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU            41 /* get cached value for MTU */
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU            42 /* set cached value for
 					      * MTU. want to use this

crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c

@@ -494,6 +494,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		ret = 0;
 #endif
 		break;
+	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+		ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU:
 		return data->mtu;
 		break;

crypto/bn/bn.h

@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -740,11 +742,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

crypto/bn/bn_lib.c

@@ -824,3 +824,55 @@ int bn_cmp_part_words(const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b,
 		}
 	return bn_cmp_words(a,b,cl);
 	}
+
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

crypto/bn/bn_mont.c

@@ -701,32 +701,38 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from)
 BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock,
 					const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
 
 	CRYPTO_r_lock(lock);
-	if (!*pmont)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
-
-		if (!*pmont)
-			{
-			ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
-			if (ret && !BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
-				BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
-			else
-				*pmont = ret;
-			}
-		}
-	
 	ret = *pmont;
-	
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in
+	 * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent
+	 * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to
+	 * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work
+	 * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race
+	 * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */
+	ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+	if (!ret)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
+		{
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
+	if (*pmont)
+		{
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		ret = *pmont;
+		}
 	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		
+		*pmont = ret;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
 	return ret;
 	}

crypto/bn/bn_word.c

@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
 			a->neg=!(a->neg);
 		return(i);
 		}
-	/* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
-	if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
-			(bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
-		return(0);
-	i=0;
-	for (;;)
+	for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
 		{
-		if (i >= a->top)
-			l=w;
-		else
-			l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
-		a->d[i]=l;
-		if (w > l)
-			w=1;
-		else
-			break;
-		i++;
+		a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+		w = (w>l)?1:0;
 		}
-	if (i >= a->top)
+	if (w && i==a->top)
+		{
+		if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
 		a->top++;
+		a->d[i]=w;
+		}
 	bn_check_top(a);
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/buffer/buffer.c

@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 
+/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
+ * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures
+ * that the result fits in an int. */
+#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
+
 BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *ret;
@@ -94,6 +99,11 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 	char *ret;
 	unsigned int n;
 
+	if (len < 0)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	if (str->length >= len)
 		{
 		str->length=len;
@@ -105,6 +115,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -130,6 +146,11 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 	char *ret;
 	unsigned int n;
 
+	if (len < 0)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	if (str->length >= len)
 		{
 		memset(&str->data[len],0,str->length-len);
@@ -142,6 +163,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);

crypto/cms/cms.h

@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
 #define CMS_PARTIAL			0x4000
 #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST		0x8000
 #define CMS_USE_KEYID			0x10000
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT		0x20000
 
 const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
 

crypto/cms/cms_cd.c

@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 #include "cms_lcl.h"
 
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CompressedData)

crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
 	X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+	unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+	size_t tkeylen;
 
 	int ok = 0;
 
@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 				CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
 		goto err;
 		}
-
-
-	if (enc && !ec->key)
+	tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+	/* Generate random session key */
+	if (!enc || !ec->key)
 		{
-		/* Generate random key */
-		if (!ec->keylen)
-			ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
-		ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
-		if (!ec->key)
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
 			{
 			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
 							ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
 			goto err;
-		keep_key = 1;
 		}
-	else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
+
+	if (!ec->key)
+		{
+		ec->key = tkey;
+		ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+		tkey = NULL;
+		if (enc)
+			keep_key = 1;
+		else
+			ERR_clear_error();
+		
+		}
+
+	if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
 		{
 		/* If necessary set key length */
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
 			{
-			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
-				CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
-			goto err;
+			/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
+			 * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
+			 */
+			if (enc || ec->debug)
+				{
+				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+						CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Use random key */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+				OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+				ec->key = tkey;
+				ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+				tkey = NULL;
+				ERR_clear_error();
+				}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
 		ec->key = NULL;
 		}
+	if (tkey)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+		}
 	if (ok)
 		return b;
 	BIO_free(b);

crypto/cms/cms_env.c

@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 	if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID)
 		{
 		ktri->version = 2;
+		if (env->version < 2)
+			env->version = 2;
 		type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER;
 		}
 	else
@@ -352,6 +354,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
 	int eklen;
 	int ret = 0;
+	CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+	ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
 
 	if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
 		{
@@ -382,8 +386,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 
 	ret = 1;
 
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
+	if (ec->key)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+		}
+
+	ec->key = ek;
+	ec->keylen = eklen;
 
 	err:
 	if (!ret && ek)

crypto/cms/cms_io.c

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int cms_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
 		cmsbio = tmpbio;
 		}
 
-	return 1;
+	return r;
 
 	}
 

crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h

@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
 	unsigned char *key;
 	size_t keylen;
+	/* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+	int debug;
 	};
 
 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st

crypto/cms/cms_lib.c

@@ -475,8 +475,6 @@ int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert)
 	STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts;
 	int i;
 	pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
-	if (!pcerts)
-		return 0;
 	if (!pcerts)
 		return 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++)

crypto/cms/cms_sd.c

@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static void cms_sd_set_version(CMS_SignedData *sd)
 			if (sd->version < 3)
 				sd->version = 3;
 			}
-		else
-			sd->version = 1;
+		else if (si->version < 1)
+			si->version = 1;
 		}
 
 	if (sd->version < 1)

crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -622,12 +622,16 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 	STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
 	CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
 	int i, r;
+	int debug = 0, ri_match = 0;
 	ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+	if (ris)
+		debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
 		{
 		ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
 		if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
 				continue;
+		ri_match = 1;
 		/* If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo
 		 * otherwise try them all.
 		 */
@@ -636,17 +640,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
 			r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
-			if (r > 0)
-				return 1;
 			if (cert)
 				{
+				/* If not debugging clear any error and
+				 * return success to avoid leaking of
+				 * information useful to MMA
+				 */
+				if (!debug)
+					{
+					ERR_clear_error();
+					return 1;
+					}
+				if (r > 0)
+					return 1;
 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
 						CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
 				return 0;
 				}
-			ERR_clear_error();
+			/* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
+			 * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
+			 * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
+			 * of a successful decrypt.
+			 */
+			else if (r > 0 && debug)
+				return 1;
 			}
 		}
+	/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+	if (ri_match && !cert && !debug)
+		{
+		ERR_clear_error();
+		return 1;
+		}
 
 	CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
 	return 0;
@@ -705,9 +730,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
 		}
 	if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
 		return 0;
+	if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+	else
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+	if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+		return 1;
 	if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
 		return 0;
-
 	cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
 	if (!cont)
 		return 0;

crypto/cryptlib.c

@@ -542,3 +542,19 @@ void OpenSSLDie(const char *file,int line,const char *assertion)
 	}
 
 void *OPENSSL_stderr(void)	{ return stderr; }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+	const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+	unsigned char x = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+	return x;
+	}
+#endif

crypto/crypto.h

@@ -591,6 +591,13 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void);
 #define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT	1
 void OPENSSL_init(void);
 
+/* CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. It
+ * takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the contents
+ * of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements into a
+ * defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other than to be
+ * non-zero. */
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.

crypto/ec/ec.h

@@ -321,7 +321,15 @@ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *, point_conversion_form_t);
 /* functions to set/get method specific data  */
 void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *, 
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *));
-void EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *, void *data,
+/** Sets the key method data of an EC_KEY object, if none has yet been set.
+ *  \param  key              EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  data             opaque data to install.
+ *  \param  dup_func         a function that duplicates |data|.
+ *  \param  free_func        a function that frees |data|.
+ *  \param  clear_free_func  a function that wipes and frees |data|.
+ *  \return the previously set data pointer, or NULL if |data| was inserted.
+ */
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *));
 /* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */
 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *, int);

crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c

@@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIG
 
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopex, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation".
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time
+ * swap avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -244,6 +247,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -266,16 +274,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
 		{
 		for (; j >= 0; j--)
 			{
-			if (scalar->d[i] & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		j = BN_BITS2 - 1;

crypto/ec/ec_key.c

@@ -435,18 +435,27 @@ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
 void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *))
 	{
-	return EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
+	void *ret;
+
+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+	ret = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+	return ret;
 	}
 
-void EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *))
 	{
 	EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data;
+
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
 	ex_data = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
 	if (ex_data == NULL)
 		EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
 	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+	return ex_data;
 	}
 
 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)

crypto/ec/ec_lib.c

@@ -480,10 +480,10 @@ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) !=
 	    EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b)))
 		return 1;
-	/* compare the curve name (if present) */
+	/* compare the curve name (if present in both) */
 	if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) &&
-	    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
-		return 0;
+	    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
+		return 1;
 
 	if (!ctx)
 		ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new();
@@ -1061,12 +1061,12 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
 	if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0)
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return 0;
+		return -1;
 		}
 	if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth))
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
-		return 0;
+		return -1;
 		}
 	return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
 	}

crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c

@@ -205,8 +205,15 @@ ECDH_DATA *ecdh_check(EC_KEY *key)
 		ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)ecdh_data_new();
 		if (ecdh_data == NULL)
 			return NULL;
-		EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdh_data,
-			ecdh_data_dup, ecdh_data_free, ecdh_data_free);
+		data = EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdh_data,
+			   ecdh_data_dup, ecdh_data_free, ecdh_data_free);
+		if (data != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Another thread raced us to install the key_method
+			 * data and won. */
+			ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data);
+			ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
+			}
 	}
 	else
 		ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;

crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c

@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 	ECDSA_SIG	*ecdsa_sig = NULL;
 	unsigned char	digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
 	unsigned char	*signature = NULL;
-	unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	const unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	unsigned char	*sig_ptr2;
 	unsigned char	*raw_buf = NULL;
 	unsigned int	sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
 	int		nid, ret =  0;
@@ -464,8 +465,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
 			goto builtin_err;
 
-		sig_ptr = signature;
-		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr);
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
@@ -477,8 +478,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
 			goto builtin_err;
 
-		sig_ptr = signature;
-		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr);
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");

crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c

@@ -188,8 +188,15 @@ ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa_check(EC_KEY *key)
 		ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)ecdsa_data_new();
 		if (ecdsa_data == NULL)
 			return NULL;
-		EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdsa_data,
-			ecdsa_data_dup, ecdsa_data_free, ecdsa_data_free);
+		data = EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdsa_data,
+			   ecdsa_data_dup, ecdsa_data_free, ecdsa_data_free);
+		if (data != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Another thread raced us to install the key_method
+			 * data and won. */
+			ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data);
+			ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
+			}
 	}
 	else
 		ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;

crypto/engine/eng_all.c

@@ -102,14 +102,14 @@ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_GMP)
 	ENGINE_load_gmp();
 #endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
+	ENGINE_load_capi();
+#endif
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
 #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)
 	ENGINE_load_cryptodev();
 #endif
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
-	ENGINE_load_capi();
-#endif
 #endif
 	}
 

crypto/engine/engine.h

@@ -335,15 +335,15 @@ void ENGINE_load_gmp(void);
 void ENGINE_load_nuron(void);
 void ENGINE_load_sureware(void);
 void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void);
-#endif
-void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
-void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
-void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG
 void ENGINE_load_capi(void);
 #endif
 #endif
+#endif
+void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
+void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
+void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
 
 /* Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
  * "registry" handling. */

crypto/err/err_all.c

@@ -104,7 +104,9 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
 #include <openssl/jpake.h>
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 
 void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void)
 	{

crypto/err/openssl.ec

@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY	1071
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR		1080
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED		1090
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION		1100
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION		1110
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE		1111
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME			1112
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE	1113
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE	1114
 
 R RSAREF_R_CONTENT_ENCODING			0x0400
 R RSAREF_R_DATA					0x0401

crypto/evp/bio_b64.c

@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 		else if (ctx->start)
 			{
 			q=p=(unsigned char *)ctx->tmp;
+			num = 0;
 			for (j=0; j<i; j++)
 				{
 				if (*(q++) != '\n') continue;
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 				}
 
 			/* we fell off the end without starting */
-			if (j == i)
+			if ((j == i) && (num == 0))
 				{
 				/* Is this is one long chunk?, if so, keep on
 				 * reading until a new line. */

crypto/evp/encode.c

@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
 				v=EVP_DecodeBlock(out,d,n);
 				n=0;
 				if (v < 0) { rv=0; goto end; }
+				if (eof > v) { rv=-1; goto end; }
 				ret+=(v-eof);
 				}
 			else

crypto/mem.c

@@ -372,6 +372,10 @@ void *CRYPTO_realloc_clean(void *str, int old_len, int num, const char *file,
 
 	if (num <= 0) return NULL;
 
+	/* We don't support shrinking the buffer. Note the memcpy that copies
+	 * |old_len| bytes to the new buffer, below. */
+	if (num < old_len) return NULL;
+
 	if (realloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		realloc_debug_func(str, NULL, num, file, line, 0);
 	ret=malloc_ex_func(num,file,line);

crypto/o_init.c

@@ -93,4 +93,18 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void)
 #endif
 	}
 		
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+	const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+	unsigned char x = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+	return x;
+	}
+#endif

crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c

@@ -91,9 +91,12 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 		{
 		EVP_PKEY *skey;
 		skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
-		ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
-		EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
-		if(ret <= 0)
+		if (skey)
+			{
+			ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
+			EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+			}
+		if(!skey || ret <= 0)
 			{
 			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
 			goto end;
@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
 		if(!init_res)
 			{
+			ret = -1;
 			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
 			goto end;
 			}

crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x0090813fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x009081afL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8s-fips 4 Jan 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8za-fips 5 Jun 2014"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8s 4 Jan 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.8za 5 Jun 2014"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

crypto/pkcs12/p12_crt.c

@@ -100,7 +100,11 @@ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
 			nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
 		else
 #endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+		nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+#else
 		nid_cert = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+#endif
 		}
 	if (!nid_key)
 		nid_key = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
@@ -290,7 +294,11 @@ int PKCS12_add_safe(STACK_OF(PKCS7) **psafes, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
 		free_safes = 0;
 
 	if (nid_safe == 0)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
+		nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+#else
 		nid_safe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+#endif
 
 	if (nid_safe == -1)
 		p7 = PKCS12_pack_p7data(bags);

crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
 			int len, r;
 			unsigned char *data;
 			len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
-			if(len > 0) {
+			if(len >= 0) {
 				r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
 				OPENSSL_free(data);
 				if (!r)

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c

@@ -420,6 +420,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 		int max;
 		X509_OBJECT ret;
 #endif
+		unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+		int tkeylen;
 		int jj;
 
 		if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
@@ -461,36 +463,42 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 
 		if (pcert == NULL)
 			{
+			/* Temporary storage in case EVP_PKEY_decrypt
+			 * overwrites output buffer on error.
+			 */
+			unsigned char *tmp2;
+			tmp2 = OPENSSL_malloc(jj);
+			if (!tmp2)
+				goto err;
+			jj = -1;
+			/* Always attempt to decrypt all cases to avoid
+			 * leaking timing information about a successful
+			 * decrypt.
+			 */
 			for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++)
 				{
+				int tret;
 				ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
-				jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp,
+				tret=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp2,
 					M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
 					M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
 						pkey);
-				if (jj > 0)
-					break;
+				if (tret > 0)
+					{
+					memcpy(tmp, tmp2, tret);
+					OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, tret);
+					jj = tret;
+					}
 				ERR_clear_error();
-				ri = NULL;
-				}
-			if (ri == NULL)
-				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-				      PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
-				goto err;
 				}
+			OPENSSL_free(tmp2);
 			}
 		else
 			{
 			jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp,
 				M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
 				M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey);
-			if (jj <= 0)
-				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-								ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-				goto err;
-				}
+			ERR_clear_error();
 			}
 
 		evp_ctx=NULL;
@@ -499,24 +507,49 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 			goto err;
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
 			goto err;
+		/* Generate random key to counter MMA */
+		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
+			goto err;
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+			goto err;
+		/* If we have no key use random key */
+		if (jj <= 0)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+			jj = tkeylen;
+			tmp = tkey;
+			tkey = NULL;
+			}
 
-		if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
+		if (jj != tkeylen) {
 			/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
 			 * and effective key length. The key length is
 			 * determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key.
 			 */
 			if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, jj))
 				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-					PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
-				goto err;
+				/* As MMA defence use random key instead */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, jj);
+				OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+				jj = tkeylen;
+				tmp = tkey;
+				tkey = NULL;
 				}
 		} 
+		ERR_clear_error();
 		if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,tmp,NULL,0) <= 0)
 			goto err;
 
 		OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp,jj);
 
+		if (tkey)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+			OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+			}
+
 		if (out == NULL)
 			out=etmp;
 		else

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

@@ -486,15 +486,34 @@ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags)
 			return 0;
 		}
 		ret = SMIME_text(bread, data);
+		if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+			{
+			if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+				ret = 0;
+			}
 		BIO_free_all(bread);
 		return ret;
 	} else {
 		for(;;) {
 			i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
-			if(i <= 0) break;
-			BIO_write(data, buf, i);
+			if(i <= 0)
+				{
+				ret = 1;
+				if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+					{
+					if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+						ret = 0;
+					}
+					
+				break;
+				}
+			if (BIO_write(data, buf, i) != i)
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				break;
+				}
 		}
 		BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
-		return 1;
+		return ret;
 	}
 }

crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
 
 	EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
 
-	if (memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0 || bad)
 		goto decoding_err;
 	else
 		{

crypto/symhacks.h

@@ -252,15 +252,15 @@
 #define EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m \
                                                 EC_POINT_set_compr_coords_GF2m
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish        ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_group_clear_finish       ec_GF2m_simple_grp_clr_finish
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant
 #define ec_GF2m_simple_group_check_discriminant	ec_GF2m_simple_grp_chk_discrim
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish        ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_clear_finish       ec_GF2m_simple_pt_clr_finish
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity     ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_to_infinity    ec_GF2m_simple_pt_set_to_inf
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine
-#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine        ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine
+#define ec_GF2m_simple_points_make_affine       ec_GF2m_simple_pts_make_affine
 #undef ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates
 #define ec_GF2m_simple_point_set_affine_coordinates \
                                                 ec_GF2m_smp_pt_set_af_coords
@@ -288,8 +288,6 @@
 #define ec_GFp_simple_point_set_to_infinity     ec_GFp_simple_pt_set_to_inf
 #undef ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine
 #define ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine        ec_GFp_simple_pts_make_affine
-#undef ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp
-#define ec_GFp_simple_group_get_curve_GFp       ec_GFp_simple_grp_get_curve_GFp
 #undef ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp
 #define ec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp \
                                                 ec_GFp_smp_set_Jproj_coords_GFp

crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c

@@ -358,6 +358,20 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
       goto done;
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for inverted range.
+   */
+  i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+  {
+    ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+      extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+	goto done;
+    }
+  }
+
   ret = 1;
 
  done:
@@ -392,9 +406,18 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
     return 1;
 
   /*
-   * We have a list.  Sort it.
+   * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken.
+   */
+  if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges ||
+      sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) {
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+	      X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * We have a non-empty list.  Sort it.
    */
-  OPENSSL_assert(choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges);
   sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges);
 
   /*
@@ -414,6 +437,13 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
      */
     OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
 
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 ||
+	ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0)
+      goto done;
+
     /*
      * Check for overlaps.
      */
@@ -465,12 +495,26 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 	break;
       }
       ASIdOrRange_free(b);
-      (void)sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
+      (void) sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
       i--;
       continue;
     }
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for final inverted range.
+   */
+  i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+  {
+    ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+      extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+	goto done;
+    }
+  }
+
   OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */
 
   ret = 1;
@@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
 			       struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
 			       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
 {
+  ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
   ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL;
   int i;
 
@@ -508,7 +553,6 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
 
   for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
     CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
-    ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
     int i1, i2, i3, is_range, which;
 
     /*
@@ -578,18 +622,19 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
       max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2);
       OPENSSL_free(s);
       if (min == NULL || max == NULL) {
-	ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
-	ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
 	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	goto err;
       }
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) {
+	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+	goto err;
+      }
     }
     if (!v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) {
-      ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
-      ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
       X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
       goto err;
     }
+    min = max = NULL;
   }
 
   /*
@@ -601,6 +646,8 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(struct v3_ext_method *method,
 
  err:
   ASIdentifiers_free(asid);
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
   return NULL;
 }
 

crypto/x86cpuid.pl

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
 	&data_byte(0x0f,0x95,0xc0);	#&setne	(&LB("eax"));
 	&or	("ebp","eax");
 	&mov	("eax",1);
+	&xor	("ecx","ecx");
 	&cpuid	();
 	&cmp	("ebp",0);
 	&jne	(&label("notP4"));

demos/x509/mkreq.c

@@ -7,13 +7,14 @@
 
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
 
 int mkreq(X509_REQ **x509p, EVP_PKEY **pkeyp, int bits, int serial, int days);
-int add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_REQUEST) *sk, int nid, char *value);
+int add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, int nid, char *value);
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
@@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ err:
  * because we wont reference any other sections.
  */
 
-int add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_REQUEST) *sk, int nid, char *value)
+int add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *sk, int nid, char *value)
 	{
 	X509_EXTENSION *ex;
 	ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, NULL, nid, value);

doc/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ following methods:
 
  - in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled
    before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable
-   OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY with some non-empty value.
+   OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS with some non-empty value.
 
 There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the
 default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future.

doc/apps/CA.pl.pod

@@ -39,13 +39,13 @@ prints a usage message.
 
 =item B<-newcert>
 
-creates a new self signed certificate. The private key and certificate are
-written to the file "newreq.pem".
+creates a new self signed certificate. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".
 
 =item B<-newreq>
 
-creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are
-written to the file "newreq.pem".
+creates a new certificate request. The private key is written to the file
+"newkey.pem" and the request written to the file "newreq.pem".
 
 =item B<-newreq-nodes>
 

doc/apps/smime.pod

@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ to each certificate.
 =item B<-des -des3 -rc2-40 -rc2-64 -rc2-128 -aes128 -aes192 -aes256 -camellia128 -camellia192 -camellia256>
 
 the encryption algorithm to use. DES (56 bits), triple DES (168 bits),
-40, 64 or 128 bit RC2, 128, 192 or 256 bit AES, or 128, 192 or 256 bit Camellia respectively.  If not
-specified 40 bit RC2 is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>.
+40, 64 or 128 bit RC2, 128, 192 or 256 bit AES, or 128, 192 or 256 bit Camellia respectively.
+If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>.
 
 =item B<-nointern>
 

doc/apps/verify.pod

@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ an application specific error. Unused.
 
 =head1 BUGS
 
-Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still
+Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still
 suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that
 trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
 B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>. If they occur in both then only

doc/crypto/CONF_modules_free.pod

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ None of the functions return a value.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>,
-L<CONF_modules_load_file(3), CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
+L<CONF_modules_load_file(3)|CONF_modules_load_file(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 

doc/crypto/CONF_modules_load_file.pod

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ return value of the failing module (this will always be zero or negative).
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<OPENSSL_config(3)|OPENSSL_config(3)>,
-L<CONF_free(3), CONF_free(3)>, L<err(3),err(3)>
+L<CONF_free(3)|CONF_free(3)>, L<err(3)|err(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 

doc/crypto/ERR_get_error.pod

@@ -52,8 +52,11 @@ ERR_get_error_line_data(), ERR_peek_error_line_data() and
 ERR_get_last_error_line_data() store additional data and flags
 associated with the error code in *B<data>
 and *B<flags>, unless these are B<NULL>. *B<data> contains a string
-if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING>. If it has been allocated by OPENSSL_malloc(),
-*B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_MALLOCED> is true.
+if *B<flags>&B<ERR_TXT_STRING> is true. 
+
+An application B<MUST NOT> free the *B<data> pointer (or any other pointers
+returned by these functions) with OPENSSL_free() as freeing is handled
+automatically by the error library.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 

doc/crypto/OPENSSL_config.pod

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Neither OPENSSL_config() nor OPENSSL_no_config() return a value.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<conf(5)|conf(5)>, L<CONF_load_modules_file(3)|CONF_load_modules_file(3)>,
-L<CONF_modules_free(3),CONF_modules_free(3)>
+L<CONF_modules_free(3)|CONF_modules_free(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 

doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ set first so the relevant field information can be looked up internally.
 =head1 SEE ALSO
 
 L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>,
-L<OBJ_nid2obj(3),OBJ_nid2obj(3)>
+L<OBJ_nid2obj(3)|OBJ_nid2obj(3)>
 
 =head1 HISTORY
 

doc/crypto/ecdsa.pod

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ is ignored.
 
 ECDSA_verify() verifies that the signature in B<sig> of size
 B<siglen> is a valid ECDSA signature of the hash value
-value B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the public key B<eckey>.
+B<dgst> of size B<dgstlen> using the public key B<eckey>.
 The parameter B<type> is ignored.
 
 ECDSA_do_sign() is wrapper function for ECDSA_do_sign_ex with B<kinv>
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ using the public key B<eckey>.
 
 ECDSA_size() returns the maximum length signature or 0 on error.
 
-ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or -1
+ECDSA_sign_setup() and ECDSA_sign() return 1 if successful or 0
 on error.
 
 ECDSA_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() return 1 for a valid
@@ -131,16 +131,12 @@ specific)
 
  int        ret;
  ECDSA_SIG *sig;
- EC_KEY    *eckey = EC_KEY_new();
+ EC_KEY    *eckey;
+ eckey = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp192k1);
  if (eckey == NULL)
 	{
 	/* error */
 	}
- key->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(NID_secp192k1);
- if (key->group == NULL)
-	{
-	/* error */
-	}
  if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey))
 	{
 	/* error */

doc/fingerprints.txt

@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ pub   2048R/F295C759 1998-12-13
       Key fingerprint = D0 5D 8C 61 6E 27 E6 60  41 EC B1 B8 D5 7E E5 97
 uid                  Dr S N Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.demon.co.uk>
 
+pub   4096R/FA40E9E2 2005-03-19
+      Key fingerprint = 6260 5AA4 334A F9F0 DDE5  D349 D357 7507 FA40 E9E2
+uid                  Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@opensslfoundation.com>
+uid                  Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk>
+uid                  Dr Stephen N Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+sub   4096R/8811F530 2005-03-19
+
 pub   1024R/49A563D9 1997-02-24
       Key fingerprint = 7B 79 19 FA 71 6B 87 25  0E 77 21 E5 52 D9 83 BF
 uid                  Mark Cox <mjc@redhat.com>

doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list.pod

@@ -66,16 +66,16 @@ values:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The operation succeeded.
-
 =item 0
 
 A failure while manipulating the STACK_OF(X509_NAME) object occurred or
 the X509_NAME could not be extracted from B<cacert>. Check the error stack
 to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The operation succeeded.
+
 =back
 
 =head1 EXAMPLES

doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback.pod

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback, SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg, SSL_set_msg_callback, SS
  void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
  void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
 
- void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
- void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
+ void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg));
+ void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg);
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 

doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod

@@ -88,9 +88,10 @@ As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect.
 
 ...
 
-=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING
+=item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
 
-As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect.
+Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X.
+OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.
 
 =item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
 

doc/ssl/SSL_accept.pod

@@ -44,17 +44,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
 =item 0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
 =item E<lt>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either

doc/ssl/SSL_connect.pod

@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
 =item 0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
 =item E<lt>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either

doc/ssl/SSL_do_handshake.pod

@@ -45,17 +45,17 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
-established.
-
 =item 0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and
 by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call SSL_get_error() with the
 return value B<ret> to find out the reason.
 
+=item 1
+
+The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been
+established.
+
 =item E<lt>0
 
 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either

doc/ssl/SSL_shutdown.pod

@@ -92,11 +92,6 @@ The following return values can occur:
 
 =over 4
 
-=item 1
-
-The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
-and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
-
 =item 0
 
 The shutdown is not yet finished. Call SSL_shutdown() for a second time,
@@ -104,6 +99,11 @@ if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed.
 The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)|SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
 erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
 
+=item 1
+
+The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
+and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
+
 =item -1
 
 The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either

engines/e_capi.c

@@ -420,28 +420,36 @@ static int capi_init(ENGINE *e)
 	CAPI_CTX *ctx;
 	const RSA_METHOD *ossl_rsa_meth;
 	const DSA_METHOD *ossl_dsa_meth;
-	capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+	if (capi_idx < 0)
+		{
+		capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		if (capi_idx < 0)
+			goto memerr;
+
+		cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+		/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
+		rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
+		capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+
+		/* Setup DSA Method */
+		dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+		capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
+		capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
+		capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+		}
 
 	ctx = capi_ctx_new();
-	if (!ctx || (capi_idx < 0))
+	if (!ctx)
 		goto memerr;
 
 	ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, capi_idx, ctx);
-	/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
-	rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
-	capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
-
-	/* Setup DSA Method */
-	dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
-	capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
-	capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
-	capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG
 	{
@@ -1133,6 +1141,7 @@ static int capi_list_containers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out)
 		{
 		CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR);
 		capi_addlasterror();
+		CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
 		return 0;
 		}
 	CAPI_trace(ctx, "Got max container len %d\n", buflen);
@@ -1400,10 +1409,13 @@ static PCCERT_CONTEXT capi_find_cert(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *id, HCERTSTORE h
 static CAPI_KEY *capi_get_key(CAPI_CTX *ctx, const char *contname, char *provname, DWORD ptype, DWORD keyspec)
 	{
 	CAPI_KEY *key;
+    DWORD dwFlags = 0; 
 	key = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CAPI_KEY));
 	CAPI_trace(ctx, "capi_get_key, contname=%s, provname=%s, type=%d\n", 
 						contname, provname, ptype);
-	if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, 0))
+    if(ctx->store_flags & CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE)
+        dwFlags = CRYPT_MACHINE_KEYSET;
+    if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&key->hprov, contname, provname, ptype, dwFlags)) 
 		{
 		CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_GET_KEY, CAPI_R_CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXT_ERROR);
 		capi_addlasterror();
@@ -1550,6 +1562,8 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LPSTR pname, DWORD type, int che
 			}
 		CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
 		}
+	if (ctx->cspname)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx->cspname);
 	ctx->cspname = BUF_strdup(pname);
 	ctx->csptype = type;
 	return 1;
@@ -1559,9 +1573,12 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(CAPI_CTX *ctx, int idx)
 	{
 	LPSTR pname;
 	DWORD type;
+	int res;
 	if (capi_get_provname(ctx, &pname, &type, idx) != 1)
 		return 0;
-	return capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
+	res = capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
+	OPENSSL_free(pname);
+	return res;
 	}
 
 static int cert_issuer_match(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 *x)

ms/uplink.c

@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ void OPENSSL_Uplink (volatile void **table, int index)
      * should be sufficient [it prohibits compiler to reorder memory
      * access instructions]. */
     do {
-	len = _stprintf (msg,_T("OPENSSL_Uplink(%p,%02X): "),table,index);
+	len = _sntprintf (msg,sizeof(msg)/sizeof(TCHAR),
+			  _T("OPENSSL_Uplink(%p,%02X): "),table,index);
 	_tcscpy (msg+len,_T("unimplemented function"));
 
 	if ((h=apphandle)==NULL)

openssl.spec

@@ -1,18 +1,14 @@
 %define _unpackaged_files_terminate_build 0
-%define libmaj 0
-%define libmin 9
-%define librel 8
-%define librev s
+
 Release: 1
 
 %define openssldir /var/ssl
 
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
-#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}%{librev}
+Version: 0.9.8za
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
-Copyright: Freely distributable
+License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
 Provides: SSL
 URL: http://www.openssl.org/

ssl/Makefile

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
 SHARED_LIB= libssl$(SHLIB_EXT)
 LIBSRC=	\
 	s2_meth.c   s2_srvr.c s2_clnt.c  s2_lib.c  s2_enc.c s2_pkt.c \
-	s3_meth.c   s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c  s3_lib.c  s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c \
+	s3_meth.c   s3_srvr.c s3_clnt.c  s3_lib.c  s3_enc.c s3_pkt.c s3_both.c s3_cbc.c \
 	s23_meth.c s23_srvr.c s23_clnt.c s23_lib.c          s23_pkt.c \
 	t1_meth.c   t1_srvr.c t1_clnt.c  t1_lib.c  t1_enc.c \
 	d1_meth.c   d1_srvr.c d1_clnt.c  d1_lib.c  d1_pkt.c \
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ LIBSRC=	\
 	bio_ssl.c ssl_err.c kssl.c t1_reneg.c
 LIBOBJ= \
 	s2_meth.o  s2_srvr.o  s2_clnt.o  s2_lib.o  s2_enc.o s2_pkt.o \
-	s3_meth.o  s3_srvr.o  s3_clnt.o  s3_lib.o  s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o \
+	s3_meth.o  s3_srvr.o  s3_clnt.o  s3_lib.o  s3_enc.o s3_pkt.o s3_both.o s3_cbc.o \
 	s23_meth.o s23_srvr.o s23_clnt.o s23_lib.o          s23_pkt.o \
 	t1_meth.o   t1_srvr.o t1_clnt.o  t1_lib.o  t1_enc.o \
 	d1_meth.o   d1_srvr.o d1_clnt.o  d1_lib.o  d1_pkt.o \
@@ -545,6 +545,27 @@ s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
 s3_both.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_both.c ssl_locl.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/fips.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pq_compat.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
+s3_cbc.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s3_cbc.c ssl_locl.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
 s3_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h

ssl/d1_both.c

@@ -227,14 +227,14 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
 
 	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
-	if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
 		{
 		s->d1->mtu = 
 			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
 
 		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
 		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
 			{
 			s->d1->mtu = 0;
 			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
@@ -313,9 +313,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 				s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 				s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
-				/* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */
-				if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)  
-					len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+				if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+					len = curr_mtu;
+				else
+					len = s->init_num;
 				}
 
 			dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 
@@ -620,7 +621,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
 		}
 	else
+		{
 		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+		if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+			{
+			item = NULL;
+			frag = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
 
 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
 	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
@@ -667,8 +677,8 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 
 		if (item == NULL)
 			{
-			goto err;
 			i = -1;
+			goto err;
 			}
 
 		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
@@ -777,6 +787,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 	int i,al;
 	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
 
+	redo:
 	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
 	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
 		{
@@ -835,8 +846,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 					s->msg_callback_arg);
 			
 			s->init_num = 0;
-			return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
-				max, ok);
+			goto redo;
 			}
 		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
 			{

ssl/d1_clnt.c

@@ -257,7 +257,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			else
 				{
-				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				if (s->hit)
 					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
 				else
@@ -350,6 +349,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
 			else

ssl/d1_enc.c

@@ -126,16 +126,30 @@
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
 
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured. */
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k;
+	int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
 		{
+		if (s->write_hash)
+			{
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+			if (mac_size < 0)
+				return -1;
+			}
 		ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
 		rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
 		if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
@@ -156,6 +170,11 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		}
 	else
 		{
+		if (s->read_hash)
+			{
+			mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+			OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+			}
 		ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
 		rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
 		if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
@@ -220,7 +239,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				return -1;
+				return 0;
 			}
 		
 		EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
@@ -235,43 +254,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
-				 */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length-=i;
-
-			rec->data += bs;    /* skip the implicit IV */
-			rec->input += bs;
-			rec->length -= bs;
-			}
+			return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		}
 	return(1);
 	}

ssl/d1_lib.c

@@ -191,9 +191,12 @@ static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
 
 	while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
 		{
-		frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
-		OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
-		OPENSSL_free(frag);
+		rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
+		if (rdata->rbuf.buf)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+			}
+		OPENSSL_free(item->data);
 		pitem_free(item);
 		}
 	}
@@ -217,6 +220,7 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
 	pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num));
 
 	OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
+	s->d1 = NULL;
 	}
 
 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
@@ -421,6 +425,7 @@ void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 	{
 	/* Reset everything */
+	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
 	memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
 	s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
 	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
@@ -428,10 +433,28 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 	dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
 	}
 
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
+	{
+	s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
+
+	/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
+		{
+		s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);		
+		}
+
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
+		{
+		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
 	{
-	DTLS1_STATE *state;
-
 	/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
 	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
 		{
@@ -439,19 +462,14 @@ int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	dtls1_double_timeout(s);
-	state = s->d1;
-	state->timeout.num_alerts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
-		{
-		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
-		return -1;
-		}
 
-	state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+	if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
+	if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
 		{
-		state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
+		s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
 		}
 
 	dtls1_start_timer(s);

ssl/d1_pkt.c

@@ -139,7 +139,6 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
 static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num);
 #endif
-static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
 
 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
 static int
@@ -328,15 +327,12 @@ dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
 static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
-    int al;
-	int clear=0;
-    int enc_err;
+	int i,al;
+	int enc_err;
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-	unsigned int mac_size;
+	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+	unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
 	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
     sess = s->session;
@@ -368,12 +364,16 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 	rr->data=rr->input;
 
 	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-	if (enc_err <= 0)
+	/* enc_err is:
+	 *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+	 *    1: if the padding is valid
+	 *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+	if (enc_err == 0)
 		{
-		/* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
-		 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
-		 */
-		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+		/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+		rr->length = 0;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
+		goto err;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -383,45 +383,62 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
 	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-if (	(sess == NULL) ||
-		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-		(s->read_hash == NULL))
-    clear=1;
-
-	if (!clear)
+	if ((sess != NULL) &&
+	    (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+	    (s->read_hash != NULL))
 		{
+		/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+		unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 		mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 
-		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+		/* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
+		orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
+
+		/* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+		 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+		 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+		 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+		 */
+		if (orig_len < mac_size ||
+		    /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+		    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+		     orig_len < mac_size+1))
 			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif			
-			}
-		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length < mac_size)
-			{
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
-#else
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif
 			}
-		rr->length-=mac_size;
-		s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 			{
-			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			/* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+			 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+			 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+			 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+			 * */
+			mac = mac_tmp;
+			ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
 			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
+			 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+			 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+			}
+
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			enc_err = -1;
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+			enc_err = -1;
 		}
 
-	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+	if (enc_err < 0)
 		{
 		/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
 		rr->length = 0;
@@ -643,7 +660,6 @@ again:
 		goto again;     /* get another record */
 		}
 
-	dtls1_clear_timeouts(s);  /* done waiting */
 	return(1);
 
 	}
@@ -758,6 +774,12 @@ start:
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+		{
+		rr->length = 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
 
 	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
@@ -924,6 +946,7 @@ start:
 			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
 			!s->s3->renegotiate)
 			{
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
 			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
 			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
 				{
@@ -1112,6 +1135,9 @@ start:
 		 */
 		if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
 			{
+			if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+				return -1;
+
 			dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
 			rr->length = 0;
 			goto start;
@@ -1815,10 +1841,3 @@ bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num)
        return _num;
        }
 #endif
-
-
-static void
-dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
-	{
-	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
-	}

ssl/d1_srvr.c

@@ -246,10 +246,11 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
 
 			s->shutdown=0;
+			dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
 			dtls1_start_timer(s);
 			ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
+			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -473,15 +474,16 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0)
 				goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (ret == 2)
+				{
+				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+				}
 			else {
 				/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
 				 * have not asked for it :-) */
 				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				s->init_num=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 			}
@@ -491,7 +493,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -513,7 +514,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		p=s->s3->server_random;
 		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
 		l2n(Time,p);
-		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+		RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4);
 		/* Do the message type and length last */
 		d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);