Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS

to fix DoS attack.

Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2012-05-10 14:33:11 +00:00
parent 3978429ad5
commit 36dd4cba3d
2 changed files with 9 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -4,6 +4,14 @@
Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]

View File

@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
}
/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
* All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
if (i > (int)rec->length)
if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
{
/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
* by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is