Prepare for 0.9.8zd release

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Object files
+*.o
+
+# editor artefacts
+*.swp
+.#*
+#*#
+*~
+
+# Top level excludes
+/Makefile.bak
+/Makefile
+/*.a
+/include
+/*.pc
+/rehash.time
+
+# Most *.c files under test/ are symlinks
+/test/*.c
+# Apart from these
+!/test/asn1test.c
+!/test/methtest.c
+!/test/dummytest.c
+!/test/igetest.c
+!/test/r160test.c
+!/test/fips_algvs.c
+
+/test/*.ss
+/test/*.srl
+/test/.rnd
+/test/test*.pem
+/test/newkey.pem
+
+# Certificate symbolic links
+*.0
+
+# Links under apps
+/apps/CA.pl
+/apps/md4.c
+
+
+# Auto generated headers
+/crypto/buildinf.h
+/crypto/opensslconf.h
+
+# Auto generated assembly language source files
+*.s
+!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s
+!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s
+
+# Executables
+/apps/openssl
+/test/sha256t
+/test/sha512t
+/test/*test
+/test/fips_aesavs
+/test/fips_desmovs
+/test/fips_dhvs
+/test/fips_drbgvs
+/test/fips_dssvs
+/test/fips_ecdhvs
+/test/fips_ecdsavs
+/test/fips_rngvs
+/test/fips_test_suite
+*.so*
+*.dylib*
+*.dll*
+# Exceptions
+!/test/bctest
+!/crypto/des/times/486-50.sol
+
+# Misc auto generated files
+/tools/c_rehash
+/test/evptests.txt
+lib
+Makefile.save
+*.bak

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

@@ -10,13 +10,18 @@ OpenSSL project.
 We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
 or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
 
+Major support:
+
+	Qualys		http://www.qualys.com/
+
 Very significant support:
 
-	OpenGear: www.opengear.com
+	OpenGear:	http://www.opengear.com/
 
 Significant support:
 
-	PSW Group: www.psw.net
+	PSW Group:	http://www.psw.net/
+	Acano Ltd.	http://acano.com/
 
 Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
 we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,317 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 0.9.8zc and 0.9.8zd [8 Jan 2015]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+     message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+     dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+     Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3571)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+     built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+     method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+     dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3569)
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+  *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+     ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+     Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+     reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3572)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+     violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+     non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+     downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+     certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+     INRIA or reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0204)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+     By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+     certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+     Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+     this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+     certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+     1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+     If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+     the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+     2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+     Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+     certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+     errors for some broken certificates.
+
+     Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+     3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+     Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+     signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+     This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+     (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+     program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+     (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+     Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+     of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+     (CVE-2014-8275)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+   *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+      results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+      with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+      way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+      Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+      fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+      Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+      the OpenSSL core team.
+      (CVE-2014-3570)
+      [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8zb and 0.9.8zc [15 Oct 2014]
+
+  *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+
+     When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+     integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+     ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+     causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+     tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+     attack.
+     (CVE-2014-3567)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+
+     When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+     could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+     configured to send them.
+     (CVE-2014-3568)
+     [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
+
+  *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+     Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+     SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+     (CVE-2014-3566)
+     [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+ 
+     Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+     verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+     DigestInfo structures.
+
+     Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8za and 0.9.8zb [6 Aug 2014]
+
+  *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+     to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+     with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+     ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+     issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3510)
+     [Emilia K<>sper]
+
+  *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+     to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3507)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+     processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+     Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3506)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+     whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+     can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+     Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+     this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3505)
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+     X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+     from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+     output to the attacker.
+
+     Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3508)
+     [Emilia K<>sper, and Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+     for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+     bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8y and 0.9.8za [5 Jun 2014]
+
+  *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+     handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+     SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+     Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+     researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+     [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+     OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+     in a DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-0221)
+     [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+     be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+     client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+     code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+     Thanks to J<>ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [J<>ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+     are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+     Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+     [Felix Gr<47>bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+     ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+     by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+     http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+     Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+     flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+     [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+     Thanks to mancha for backporting the fix to the 0.9.8 branch.
+
+  *) Fix handling of warning-level alerts in SSL23 client mode so they
+     don't cause client-side termination (eg. on SNI unrecognized_name
+     warnings). Add client and server support for six additional alerts
+     per RFC 6066 and RFC 4279.
+     [mancha]
+
+  *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+     avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+     Safari on OS X.  Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+     several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them.  The bug
+     is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+     10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+     [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
+     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
+
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+     Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
+     (CVE-2013-0169)
+     [Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+     (This is a backport)
+     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+     to fix DoS attack.
+
+     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+     (CVE-2012-2333)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
+     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
+     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+     [Antonio Martin]
+
  Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
@@ -25,7 +336,9 @@
      (CVE-2011-4576)
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
 
-  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. (CVE-2011-4619)
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
      [Adam Langley (Google)]
  
   *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.

Configure

@@ -162,20 +162,21 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-ben-openbsd","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-openbsd-debug","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DPEDANTIC -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DOPENSSL_OPENBSD_DEV_CRYPTO -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g3 -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -pipe::(unknown)::::",
 "debug-ben-debug",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -O2 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
+"debug-ben-debug-64",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe::${BSDthreads}:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-ben-debug-noopt",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-ben-strict",	"gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DCONST_STRICT -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Werror -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings -pipe::(unknown)::::::",
 "debug-rse","cc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -pipe -O -g -ggdb3 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
-"debug-bodo",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -DPEDANTIC -g -march=i486 -pedantic -Wshadow -Wall -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}",
+"debug-bodo",	"gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "debug-ulf", "gcc:-DTERMIOS -DL_ENDIAN -march=i486 -Wall -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -Wformat -Wshadow -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations:::CYGWIN32:::${no_asm}:win32:cygwin-shared:::.dll",
 "debug-steve64", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve32", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m32 -DL_ENDIAN -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve-opt", "gcc:$gcc_devteam_warn -m64 -O3 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -g -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-steve",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DPEDANTIC -m32 -g -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared",
 "debug-steve-linux-pseudo64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_CTX_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -g -mcpu=i486 -Wall -Werror -Wshadow -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-rdynamic -ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
-"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+"debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme","gcc:-DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-geoff","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DBN_STRICT -DPURIFY -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DOPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -O1 -ggdb2 -Wall -Werror -Wundef -pedantic -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wbad-function-cast -Wcast-align -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wno-long-long::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "debug-linux-pentium","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentium -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
 "debug-linux-ppro","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -mcpu=pentiumpro -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn",
@@ -428,8 +429,8 @@ my %table=(
 "aix64-gcc","gcc:-maix64 -O -DB_ENDIAN::-pthread:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-maix64 -shared -Wl,-G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X64",
 # Below targets assume AIX 5. Idea is to effectively disregard $OBJECT_MODE
 # at build time. $OBJECT_MODE is respected at ./config stage!
-"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
-"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
+"aix-cc",   "cc:-q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc32.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q32 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 32",
+"aix64-cc", "cc:-q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst::-qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE:AIX::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR::aix_ppc64.o::::::::::dlfcn:aix-shared::-q64 -G:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)::-X 64",
 
 #
 # Cray T90 and similar (SDSC)

FAQ

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Why aren't tools like 'autoconf' and 'libtool' used?
 * What is an 'engine' version?
 * How do I check the authenticity of the OpenSSL distribution?
+* How does the versioning scheme work?
 
 [LEGAL] Legal questions
 
@@ -82,11 +83,11 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.0f was released on Jan 4th, 2012.
+OpenSSL 1.0.1d was released on Feb 5th, 2013.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
-ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous CVS access.
+ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/>, or get it by anonymous Git access.
 
 
 * Where is the documentation?
@@ -108,12 +109,9 @@ In addition, you can read the most current versions at
 <URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
 to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
 not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
-that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using.
-
-For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
-might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
-predecessor, at <URL: http://www.columbia.edu/~ariel/ssleay/>.  Much
-of this still applies to OpenSSL.
+that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
+documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
+directory.
 
 There is some documentation about certificate extensions and PKCS#12
 in doc/openssl.txt
@@ -173,6 +171,19 @@ just do:
 
    pgp TARBALL.asc
 
+* How does the versioning scheme work?
+
+After the release of OpenSSL 1.0.0 the versioning scheme changed. Letter 
+releases (e.g. 1.0.1a) can only contain bug and security fixes and no
+new features. Minor releases change the last number (e.g. 1.0.2) and 
+can contain new features that retain binary compatibility. Changes to
+the middle number are considered major releases and neither source nor
+binary compatibility is guaranteed.
+
+Therefore the answer to the common question "when will feature X be
+backported to OpenSSL 1.0.0/0.9.8?" is "never" but it could appear
+in the next minor release.
+
 [LEGAL] =======================================================================
 
 * Do I need patent licenses to use OpenSSL?
@@ -284,7 +295,7 @@ current directory in this case, but this has changed with 0.9.6a.)
 Check out the CA.pl(1) manual page. This provides a simple wrapper round
 the 'req', 'verify', 'ca' and 'pkcs12' utilities. For finer control check
 out the manual pages for the individual utilities and the certificate
-extensions documentation (currently in doc/openssl.txt).
+extensions documentation (in ca(1), req(1), x509v3_config(5) )
 
 
 * Why can't I create certificate requests?
@@ -752,6 +763,9 @@ openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least
 acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
 more active team members (e.g. Steve).
 
+Note that bugs only present in the openssl utility are not in general
+considered to be security issues. 
+
 [PROG] ========================================================================
 
 * Is OpenSSL thread-safe?

INSTALL.W32

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
   * Borland C
   * GNU C (Cygwin or MinGW)
 
- If you are compiling from a tarball or a CVS snapshot then the Win32 files
+ If you are compiling from a tarball or a Git snapshot then the Win32 files
  may well be not up to date. This may mean that some "tweaking" is required to
  get it all to work. See the trouble shooting section later on for if (when?)
  it goes wrong.
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ To install OpenSSL to the specified location do:
 
  then ms\do_XXX should not give a warning any more. However the numbers that
  get assigned by this technique may not match those that eventually get
- assigned in the CVS tree: so anything linked against this version of the
+ assigned in the Git tree: so anything linked against this version of the
  library may need to be recompiled.
 
  If you get errors about unresolved symbols there are several possible

Makefile.org

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ ARD=ar $(ARFLAGS) d
 RANLIB= ranlib
 PERL= perl
 TAR= tar
-TARFLAGS= --no-recursion
+TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240
 MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend
 LIBDIR=lib
 

NEWS

@@ -5,7 +5,76 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8zc and OpenSSL 0.9.8zd [8 Jan 2015]
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3571
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3569
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3572
+      o Fix for CVE-2015-0204
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-8275
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3570
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8zb and OpenSSL 0.9.8zc [15 Oct 2014]:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3513
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3567
+      o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability)
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3568
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8za and OpenSSL 0.9.8zb [6 Aug 2014]:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
+
+  Known issues in OpenSSL 0.9.8za:
+
+      o Compilation failure of s3_pkt.c on some platforms due to missing
+        <limits.h> include. Fixed in 0.9.8zb-dev.
+      o FIPS capable link failure with missing symbol BN_consttime_swap.
+        Fixed in 0.9.8zb-dev. Workaround is to compile with no-ec: the EC
+        algorithms are not FIPS approved in OpenSSL 0.9.8 anyway.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8y and OpenSSL 0.9.8za [5 Jun 2014]:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
+      o Fix for CVE-2014-0076
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-5298
+      o Fix to TLS alert handling.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
+
+      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
+      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
+
+      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
 
       o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
       o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
@@ -13,20 +82,20 @@
       o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
       o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
       o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
 
       o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
       o Various DTLS fixes.
@@ -34,12 +103,12 @@
       o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
       o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
 
       o CFB cipher definition fixes.
       o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]:
 
       o Cipher definition fixes.
       o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
@@ -51,33 +120,33 @@
       o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
       o Many fixes to DTLS handling. 
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]:
 
       o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]:
 
       o Fix various build issues.
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]:
 
       o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077)
       o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]:
 
       o CryptoAPI ENGINE support.
       o Various precautionary measures.
       o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation.
       o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]:
 
       o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8.
       o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]:
 
       o Add gcc 4.2 support.
       o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization
@@ -88,23 +157,23 @@
       o RFC4507bis support.
       o TLS Extensions support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]:
 
       o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
       o RFC3779 support.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
       o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
       o New cipher Camellia
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]:
 
       o Cipher string fixes.
       o Fixes for VC++ 2005.
@@ -114,12 +183,12 @@
       o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32.
       o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Extended Windows CE support
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]:
 
       o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to
         make operations more streamlined and less contradictory.  This
@@ -193,36 +262,36 @@
       o Added initial support for Win64.
       o Added alternate pkg-config files.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]:
 
       o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
       o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
       o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]:
 
       o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]:
 
       o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
       o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]:
 
       o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing
       o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]:
 
       o More compilation issues fixed.
       o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API.
@@ -231,7 +300,7 @@
       o More constification.
       o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820).
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]:
 
       o Several compilation issues fixed.
       o Many memory allocation failure checks added.
@@ -239,12 +308,12 @@
       o Mandatory basic checks on certificates.
       o Performance improvements.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]:
 
       o Fix race condition in CRL checking code.
       o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]:
 
       o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug
       o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec()
@@ -252,14 +321,14 @@
       o Multiple X509 verification fixes
       o Speed up HMAC and other operations
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]:
 
       o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
       o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
       o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
       o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
         Bleichbacher's attack 
@@ -270,7 +339,7 @@
       o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly.
       o Documentation: fixes and additions.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]:
 
       o Security: Important security related bugfixes.
       o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos.
@@ -281,7 +350,7 @@
       o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building.
       o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]:
 
       o New library section OCSP.
       o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code.
@@ -327,23 +396,23 @@
       o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
       o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]:
 
       o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
       o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
         Bleichbacher's attack 
       o Security: make RSA blinding default.
       o Build: shared library support fixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]:
 
       o Important security related bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]:
 
       o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX.
       o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes.
@@ -357,25 +426,25 @@
       o Fixes for smaller building problems.
       o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]:
 
       o Important building fixes on Unix.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]:
 
       o Various important bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]:
 
       o Important security related bugfixes.
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]:
 
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
       o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]:
 
       o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes.
       o BIGNUM library fixes.
@@ -388,7 +457,7 @@
         Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver
         [in 0.9.6c-engine release].
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]:
 
       o Security fix: PRNG improvements.
       o Security fix: RSA OAEP check.
@@ -405,7 +474,7 @@
       o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter.
       o Compatibility fixes in some scripts.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]:
 
       o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using
         environment variables when running as root.
@@ -430,7 +499,7 @@
       o New function BN_rand_range().
       o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]:
 
       o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries.
       o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers.
@@ -445,7 +514,7 @@
     [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate
         distribution.  See the file README.ENGINE.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]:
 
       o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 
       o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc
@@ -454,7 +523,7 @@
       o New 'rand' application
       o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]:
 
       o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command
       o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application
@@ -490,7 +559,7 @@
       o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux
       o Experimental MacOS support
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]:
 
       o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used
         by several software packages and are more secure than the standard
@@ -501,7 +570,7 @@
       o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O
         must be handled by the application (BIO pair)
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]:
       o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism
       o RSA OEAP related fixes
       o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate
@@ -515,7 +584,7 @@
       o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions
       o Option to disable selected ciphers
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]:
       o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption
       o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case
       o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers"
@@ -537,7 +606,7 @@
       o Lots of memory leak fixes.
       o Lots of bug fixes.
 
-  Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c:
+  Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]:
       o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches
       o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer
       o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 0.9.8s 4 Jan 2012
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8zd 8 Jan 2015
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current CVS or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
  OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
  can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
  compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable

STATUS

@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-
-  OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 2012/01/04 19:20:48 $
-
-  DEVELOPMENT STATE
-
-    o  OpenSSL 1.1.0:  Under development...
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.1:  Under development...
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0d: Released on February   8nd, 2011
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0c: Released on December   2nd, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0b: Released on November  16th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0a: Released on June      1st,  2010
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0:  Released on March     29th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8s: Released on January    4th, 2012
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8r: Released on February   8nd, 2011
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8q: Released on December   2nd, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8p: Released on November  16th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8o: Released on June       1st, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8n: Released on March     24th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8m: Released on February  25th, 2010
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8l: Released on November   5th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8k: Released on March     25th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8j: Released on January    7th, 2009
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8i: Released on September 15th, 2008
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8h: Released on May       28th, 2008
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8g: Released on October   19th, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8f: Released on October   11th, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8e: Released on February  23rd, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8d: Released on September 28th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8c: Released on September  5th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8b: Released on May        4th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8a: Released on October   11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8:  Released on July       5th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7m: Released on February  23rd, 2007
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7l: Released on September 28th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7k: Released on September  5th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7j: Released on May        4th, 2006
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7i: Released on October   14th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7h: Released on October   11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7g: Released on April     11th, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7f: Released on March     22nd, 2005
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7e: Released on October   25th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7d: Released on March     17th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7c: Released on September 30th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7b: Released on April     10th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7a: Released on February  19th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7:  Released on December  31st, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6m: Released on March     17th, 2004
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6l: Released on November   4th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6k: Released on September 30th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6j: Released on April     10th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6i: Released on February  19th, 2003
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6h: Released on December   5th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6g: Released on August     9th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6f: Released on August     8th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6e: Released on July      30th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6d: Released on May        9th, 2002
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6c: Released on December  21st, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6b: Released on July       9th, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6a: Released on April      5th, 2001
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.6:  Released on September 24th, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.5a: Released on April      1st, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.5:  Released on February  28th, 2000
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.4:  Released on August    09th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.3a: Released on May       29th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.3:  Released on May       25th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.2b: Released on March     22th, 1999
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.1c: Released on December  23th, 1998
-
-  [See also http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html]
-
-  RELEASE SHOWSTOPPERS
-
-    o The Makefiles fail with some SysV makes.
-    o 
-
-  AVAILABLE PATCHES
-
-    o 
-
-  IN PROGRESS
-
-    o Steve is currently working on (in no particular order):
-        ASN1 code redesign, butchery, replacement.
-        OCSP
-        EVP cipher enhancement.
-        Enhanced certificate chain verification.
-	Private key, certificate and CRL API and implementation.
-	Developing and bugfixing PKCS#7 (S/MIME code).
-        Various X509 issues: character sets, certificate request extensions.
-    o Richard is currently working on:
-	Constification
-	Attribute Certificate support
-	Certificate Pair support
-	Storage Engines (primarly an LDAP storage engine)
-	Certificate chain validation with full RFC 3280 compatibility
-
-  NEEDS PATCH
-
-    o  0.9.8-dev: COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT do not
-       handle ECCdraft cipher suites correctly.
-
-    o  apps/ca.c: "Sign the certificate?" - "n" creates empty certificate file
-
-    o  "OpenSSL STATUS" is never up-to-date.
-
-  OPEN ISSUES
-
-    o  The Makefile hierarchy and build mechanism is still not a round thing:
-
-       1. The config vs. Configure scripts
-          It's the same nasty situation as for Apache with APACI vs.
-          src/Configure. It confuses.
-          Suggestion: Merge Configure and config into a single configure
-                      script with a Autoconf style interface ;-) and remove
-                      Configure and config. Or even let us use GNU Autoconf
-                      itself. Then we can avoid a lot of those platform checks
-                      which are currently in Configure.
-
-    o  Support for Shared Libraries has to be added at least
-       for the major Unix platforms. The details we can rip from the stuff
-       Ralf has done for the Apache src/Configure script. Ben wants the
-       solution to be really simple.
-
-       Status: Ralf will look how we can easily incorporate the
-               compiler PIC and linker DSO flags from Apache
-               into the OpenSSL Configure script.
-
-               Ulf: +1 for using GNU autoconf and libtool (but not automake,
-                    which apparently is not flexible enough to generate
-                    libcrypto)
-
-  WISHES
-
-    o  Add variants of DH_generate_parameters() and BN_generate_prime() [etc?]
-       where the callback function can request that the function be aborted.
-       [Gregory Stark <ghstark@pobox.com>, <rayyang2000@yahoo.com>]
-
-    o  SRP in TLS.
-       [wished by:
-        Dj <derek@yo.net>, Tom Wu <tom@arcot.com>,
-        Tom Holroyd <tomh@po.crl.go.jp>]
-
-       See http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tls-srp-00.txt
-       as well as http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/srp/.
-
-       Tom Holroyd tells us there is a SRP patch for OpenSSH at
-       http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/, that could
-       be useful.

TABLE

@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ $arflags      =
 $cc           = cc
 $cflags       = -q32 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst
 $unistd       = 
-$thread_cflag = -qthreaded
+$thread_cflag = -qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE
 $sys_id       = AIX
 $lflags       = 
 $bn_ops       = BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ $arflags      =
 $cc           = cc
 $cflags       = -q64 -O -DB_ENDIAN -qmaxmem=16384 -qro -qroconst
 $unistd       = 
-$thread_cflag = -qthreaded
+$thread_cflag = -qthreaded -D_THREAD_SAFE
 $sys_id       = AIX
 $lflags       = 
 $bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR
@@ -1269,6 +1269,33 @@ $shared_extension =
 $ranlib       = 
 $arflags      = 
 
+*** debug-ben-debug-64
+$cc           = gcc
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DBN_DEBUG -DCONF_DEBUG -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -DDEBUG_UNUSED -g3 -O3 -pipe
+$unistd       = 
+$thread_cflag = -pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT
+$sys_id       = 
+$lflags       = 
+$bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
+$cpuid_obj    = x86_64cpuid.o
+$bn_obj       = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o
+$des_obj      = 
+$aes_obj      = aes-x86_64.o
+$bf_obj       = 
+$md5_obj      = md5-x86_64.o
+$sha1_obj     = sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o
+$cast_obj     = 
+$rc4_obj      = rc4-x86_64.o
+$rmd160_obj   = 
+$rc5_obj      = 
+$dso_scheme   = elf
+$shared_target= dlfcn
+$shared_cflag = bsd-gcc-shared
+$shared_ldflag = -fPIC
+$shared_extension = 
+$ranlib       = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
+$arflags      = 
+
 *** debug-ben-debug-noopt
 $cc           = gcc
 $cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG  -DDEBUG_SAFESTACK -ggdb3 -pipe
@@ -1379,29 +1406,29 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-bodo
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DL_ENDIAN -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -DPEDANTIC -g -march=i486 -pedantic -Wshadow -Wall -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED -Wno-error=overlength-strings -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCONF_DEBUG -DBIO_PAIR_DEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -DMD32_REG_T=int
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
-$lflags       = 
-$bn_ops       = BN_LLONG DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL RC4_INDEX MD2_INT
-$cpuid_obj    = x86cpuid-elf.o
-$bn_obj       = bn86-elf.o co86-elf.o MAYBE-MO86-elf.o
-$des_obj      = dx86-elf.o yx86-elf.o
-$aes_obj      = ax86-elf.o
-$bf_obj       = bx86-elf.o
-$md5_obj      = mx86-elf.o
-$sha1_obj     = sx86-elf.o s512sse2-elf.o
-$cast_obj     = cx86-elf.o
-$rc4_obj      = rx86-elf.o rc4_skey.o
-$rmd160_obj   = rm86-elf.o
-$rc5_obj      = r586-elf.o
-$dso_scheme   = 
-$shared_target= 
-$shared_cflag = 
-$shared_ldflag = 
-$shared_extension = 
-$ranlib       = 
+$lflags       = -ldl
+$bn_ops       = SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL
+$cpuid_obj    = x86_64cpuid.o
+$bn_obj       = x86_64-gcc.o x86_64-mont.o
+$des_obj      = 
+$aes_obj      = aes-x86_64.o
+$bf_obj       = 
+$md5_obj      = md5-x86_64.o
+$sha1_obj     = sha1-x86_64.o sha256-x86_64.o sha512-x86_64.o
+$cast_obj     = 
+$rc4_obj      = rc4-x86_64.o
+$rmd160_obj   = 
+$rc5_obj      = 
+$dso_scheme   = elf
+$shared_target= dlfcn
+$shared_cflag = linux-shared
+$shared_ldflag = -fPIC
+$shared_extension = -m64
+$ranlib       = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
 $arflags      = 
 
 *** debug-darwin-i386-cc
@@ -1487,7 +1514,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-elf
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -1514,7 +1541,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-elf-extreme
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -1541,7 +1568,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-noasm
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -ggdb -g3 -Wall
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 
@@ -1568,7 +1595,7 @@ $arflags      =
 
 *** debug-levitte-linux-noasm-extreme
 $cc           = gcc
-$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -D_POSIX_SOURCE -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -mcpu=i486 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
+$cflags       = -DLEVITTE_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG -DBN_DEBUG_RAND -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -DENGINE_CONF_DEBUG -DOPENSSL_NO_ASM -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -DPEDANTIC -ggdb -g3 -pedantic -ansi -Wall -W -Wundef -Wshadow -Wcast-align -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wno-long-long -Wundef -Wconversion -pipe
 $unistd       = 
 $thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
 $sys_id       = 

apps/apps.c

@@ -362,6 +362,8 @@ int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[])
 		{
 		arg->count=20;
 		arg->data=(char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *)*arg->count);
+		if (arg->data == NULL)
+			return 0;
 		}
 	for (i=0; i<arg->count; i++)
 		arg->data[i]=NULL;
@@ -558,12 +560,12 @@ int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify,
 
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			ok = UI_add_input_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buf,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1);
 		if (ok >= 0 && verify)
 			{
 			buff = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bufsiz);
 			ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui,prompt,ui_flags,buff,
-				PW_MIN_LENGTH,BUFSIZ-1, buf);
+				PW_MIN_LENGTH,bufsiz-1, buf);
 			}
 		if (ok >= 0)
 			do
@@ -1429,6 +1431,8 @@ char *make_config_name()
 
 	len=strlen(t)+strlen(OPENSSL_CONF)+2;
 	p=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return NULL;
 	BUF_strlcpy(p,t,len);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
 	BUF_strlcat(p,"/",len);
@@ -2052,7 +2056,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	X509_NAME *n = NULL;
 	int nid;
 
-	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values)
+	if (!buf || !ne_types || !ne_values || !mval)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err, "malloc error\n");
 		goto error;
@@ -2156,6 +2160,7 @@ X509_NAME *parse_name(char *subject, long chtype, int multirdn)
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
+	OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	return n;
 
 error:
@@ -2164,6 +2169,8 @@ error:
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_values);
 	if (ne_types)
 		OPENSSL_free(ne_types);
+	if (mval)
+		OPENSSL_free(mval);
 	if (buf)
 		OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return NULL;

apps/ca.c

@@ -1582,12 +1582,14 @@ static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
 		{
 		ok=0;
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature verification problems....\n");
+		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		goto err;
 		}
 	if (i == 0)
 		{
 		ok=0;
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
+		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		goto err;
 		}
 	else
@@ -2751,6 +2753,9 @@ char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg)
 
 	revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
 
+	if (!revtm)
+		return NULL;
+
 	i = revtm->length + 1;
 
 	if (reason) i += strlen(reason) + 1;

apps/cms.c

@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
 				cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
 #endif
+		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) 
+				flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) 
 				flags |= CMS_TEXT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) 
@@ -611,7 +613,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file   signer certificate file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip  file   recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid        use subject key identifier\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid         use subject key identifier\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file       input file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg    input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file    input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");
@@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ret = 4;
 	if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
 		{
+		if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+			CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
 
 		if (secret_key)
 			{

apps/crl2p7.c

@@ -142,7 +142,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			{
 			if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
 			if(!certflst) certflst = sk_new_null();
-			sk_push(certflst,*(++argv));
+			if (!certflst)
+				goto end;
+			if (!sk_push(certflst,*(++argv)))
+				{
+				sk_free(certflst);
+				goto end;
+				}
 			}
 		else
 			{

apps/dhparam.c

@@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ bad:
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"This is going to take a long time\n");
 			if(!dh || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, num, g, &cb))
 				{
-				if(dh) DH_free(dh);
 				ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 				goto end;
 				}

apps/ocsp.c

@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ENGINE *e = NULL;
 	char **args;
 	char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = "/";
+	char *thost = NULL, *tport = NULL, *tpath = NULL;
 	char *reqin = NULL, *respin = NULL;
 	char *reqout = NULL, *respout = NULL;
 	char *signfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL;
@@ -173,6 +174,12 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			}
 		else if (!strcmp(*args, "-url"))
 			{
+			if (thost)
+				OPENSSL_free(thost);
+			if (tport)
+				OPENSSL_free(tport);
+			if (tpath)
+				OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 			if (args[1])
 				{
 				args++;
@@ -181,6 +188,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 					BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n");
 					badarg = 1;
 					}
+				thost = host;
+				tport = port;
+				tpath = path;
 				}
 			else badarg = 1;
 			}
@@ -871,12 +881,12 @@ end:
 	sk_X509_pop_free(sign_other, X509_free);
 	sk_X509_pop_free(verify_other, X509_free);
 
-	if (use_ssl != -1)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_free(host);
-		OPENSSL_free(port);
-		OPENSSL_free(path);
-		}
+	if (thost)
+		OPENSSL_free(thost);
+	if (tport)
+		OPENSSL_free(tport);
+	if (tpath)
+		OPENSSL_free(tpath);
 
 	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 }
@@ -1334,7 +1344,7 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
 		}
 	resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, req, req_timeout);
 	if (!resp)
-		BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responsder\n");
+		BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n");
 	end:
 	if (ctx)
 		SSL_CTX_free(ctx);

apps/req.c

@@ -1574,7 +1574,13 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
+
 	if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n,nid, chtype,
 				(unsigned char *) buf, -1,-1,mval)) goto err;
 	ret=1;
@@ -1633,7 +1639,12 @@ start:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 	ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i);
 #endif
-	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max)) goto start;
+	if(!req_check_len(i, n_min, n_max))
+		{
+		if (batch || value)
+			return 0;
+		goto start;
+		}
 
 	if(!X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(req, nid, chtype,
 					(unsigned char *)buf, -1)) {

apps/s_cb.c

@@ -518,6 +518,24 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 				case 100:
 					str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
 					break;
+				case 110:
+					str_details2 = " unsupported_extension";
+					break;
+				case 111:
+					str_details2 = " certificate_unobtainable";
+					break;
+				case 112:
+					str_details2 = " unrecognized_name";
+					break;
+				case 113:
+					str_details2 = " bad_certificate_status_response";
+					break;
+				case 114:
+					str_details2 = " bad_certificate_hash_value";
+					break;
+				case 115:
+					str_details2 = " unknown_psk_identity";
+					break;
 					}
 				}
 			}

apps/s_client.c

@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -ssl3         - just use SSLv3\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1         - just use TLSv1\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1        - just use DTLSv1\n");    
+	BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu          - set the link layer MTU\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
 	BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs         - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
@@ -339,19 +340,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	char *sess_out = NULL;
 	struct sockaddr peer;
 	int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
+	int fallback_scsv = 0;
 	int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
 	long socket_mtu = 0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
 	char *jpake_secret = NULL;
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif
 
 	apps_startup();
 	c_Pause=0;
@@ -494,6 +490,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 			socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
 			}
 #endif
+		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
+			{
+			fallback_scsv = 1;
+			}
 		else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
 			bugs=1;
 		else if	(strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
@@ -784,6 +784,10 @@ bad:
 		SSL_set_session(con, sess);
 		SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
 		}
+
+	if (fallback_scsv)
+		SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
 	if (servername != NULL)
 		{

apps/s_server.c

@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
 	
 	if (servername)
 		{
-    		if (strcmp(servername,p->servername)) 
+    		if (strcasecmp(servername,p->servername)) 
 			return p->extension_error;
 		if (ctx2)
 			{
@@ -781,13 +781,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
         tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING};
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#endif
 
 	local_argc=argc;
 	local_argv=argv;
@@ -1101,6 +1095,14 @@ bad:
 		sv_usage();
 		goto end;
 		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
+	if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,
+				"Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n");
+		goto end;
+		}
+#endif
 
 	SSL_load_error_strings();
 	OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
@@ -1556,6 +1558,12 @@ end:
 	if (dpass)
 		OPENSSL_free(dpass);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (tlscstatp.host)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host);
+	if (tlscstatp.port)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port);
+	if (tlscstatp.path)
+		OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path);
 	if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ctx2);
 	if (s_cert2)
 		X509_free(s_cert2);
@@ -1922,8 +1930,10 @@ again:
 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
 					ascii2ebcdic(buf,buf,i);
 #endif
-					write(fileno(stdout),buf,
-						(unsigned int)i);
+					if (write(fileno(stdout),buf,
+						(unsigned int)i) != i)
+						goto err;
+						
 					if (SSL_pending(con)) goto again;
 					break;
 				case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:

apps/smime.c

@@ -521,8 +521,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		{
 		if (!cipher)
 			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2			
-			cipher = EVP_rc2_40_cbc();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES			
+			cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
 #else
 			BIO_printf(bio_err, "No cipher selected\n");
 			goto end;

apps/speed.c

@@ -2767,7 +2767,11 @@ static int do_multi(int multi)
 	fds=malloc(multi*sizeof *fds);
 	for(n=0 ; n < multi ; ++n)
 		{
-		pipe(fd);
+		if (pipe(fd) == -1)
+			{
+			fprintf(stderr, "pipe failure\n");
+			exit(1);
+			}
 		fflush(stdout);
 		fflush(stderr);
 		if(fork())
@@ -2779,7 +2783,11 @@ static int do_multi(int multi)
 			{
 			close(fd[0]);
 			close(1);
-			dup(fd[1]);
+			if (dup(fd[1]) == -1)
+				{
+				fprintf(stderr, "dup failed\n");
+				exit(1);
+				}
 			close(fd[1]);
 			mr=1;
 			usertime=0;

crypto/LPdir_vms.c

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-/* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir_vms.c,v 1.20 2004/08/26 13:36:05 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -82,6 +81,12 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
       size_t filespeclen = strlen(directory);
       char *filespec = NULL;
 
+      if (filespeclen == 0)
+	{
+	  errno = ENOENT;
+	  return 0;
+	}
+
       /* MUST be a VMS directory specification!  Let's estimate if it is. */
       if (directory[filespeclen-1] != ']'
 	  && directory[filespeclen-1] != '>'

crypto/LPdir_win.c

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-/* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir_win.c,v 1.10 2004/08/26 13:36:05 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
  * All rights reserved.
@@ -65,6 +64,16 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
   errno = 0;
   if (*ctx == NULL)
     {
+      const char *extdir = directory;
+      char *extdirbuf = NULL;
+      size_t dirlen = strlen (directory);
+
+      if (dirlen == 0)
+	{
+	  errno = ENOENT;
+	  return 0;
+	}
+
       *ctx = (LP_DIR_CTX *)malloc(sizeof(LP_DIR_CTX));
       if (*ctx == NULL)
 	{
@@ -73,15 +82,35 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
 	}
       memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(LP_DIR_CTX));
 
+      if (directory[dirlen-1] != '*')
+	{
+	  extdirbuf = (char *)malloc(dirlen + 3);
+	  if (extdirbuf == NULL)
+	    {
+	      free(*ctx);
+	      *ctx = NULL;
+	      errno = ENOMEM;
+	      return 0;
+	    }
+	  if (directory[dirlen-1] != '/' && directory[dirlen-1] != '\\')
+	    extdir = strcat(strcpy (extdirbuf,directory),"/*");
+	  else
+	    extdir = strcat(strcpy (extdirbuf,directory),"*");
+	}
+
       if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char))
 	{
 	  TCHAR *wdir = NULL;
 	  /* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */ 
-	  size_t index = 0,len_0 = strlen(directory) + 1;
+	  size_t index = 0,len_0 = strlen(extdir) + 1;
 
-	  wdir = (TCHAR *)malloc(len_0 * sizeof(TCHAR));
+	  wdir = (TCHAR *)calloc(len_0, sizeof(TCHAR));
 	  if (wdir == NULL)
 	    {
+	      if (extdirbuf != NULL)
+		{
+		  free (extdirbuf);
+		}
 	      free(*ctx);
 	      *ctx = NULL;
 	      errno = ENOMEM;
@@ -89,17 +118,23 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
 	    }
 
 #ifdef LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE
-	  if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, directory, len_0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0))
+	  if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, extdir, len_0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0))
 #endif
 	    for (index = 0; index < len_0; index++)
-	      wdir[index] = (TCHAR)directory[index];
+	      wdir[index] = (TCHAR)extdir[index];
 
 	  (*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile(wdir, &(*ctx)->ctx);
 
 	  free(wdir);
 	}
       else
-	(*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)directory, &(*ctx)->ctx);
+	{
+	  (*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)extdir, &(*ctx)->ctx);
+	}
+      if (extdirbuf != NULL)
+	{
+	  free (extdirbuf);
+	}
 
       if ((*ctx)->handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
 	{
@@ -116,7 +151,6 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
 	  return 0;
 	}
     }
-
   if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char))
     {
       TCHAR *wdir = (*ctx)->ctx.cFileName;

crypto/Makefile

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ AFLAGS=$(ASFLAGS)
 LIBS=
 
 GENERAL=Makefile README crypto-lib.com install.com
+TEST=constant_time_test.c
 
 LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a
 SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
@@ -40,7 +41,8 @@ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
 
 EXHEADER= crypto.h tmdiff.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \
 	ossl_typ.h
-HEADER=	cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h $(EXHEADER)
+HEADER=	cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \
+	constant_time_locl.h $(EXHEADER)
 
 ALL=    $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
 

crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c

@@ -136,11 +136,16 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
 
 	p= *pp;
 	i= *(p++);
+	if (i > 7)
+		{
+		i=ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT;
+		goto err;
+		}
 	/* We do this to preserve the settings.  If we modify
 	 * the settings, via the _set_bit function, we will recalculate
 	 * on output */
 	ret->flags&= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|0x07); /* clear */
-	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|(i&0x07)); /* set */
+	ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|i); /* set */
 
 	if (len-- > 1) /* using one because of the bits left byte */
 		{

crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 	BUF_MEM *b;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	int i;
-	int ret=-1;
 	ASN1_const_CTX c;
-	int want=HEADER_SIZE;
+	size_t want=HEADER_SIZE;
 	int eos=0;
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64)
-	/* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */
-	long off=0;
-#else
-	int off=0;
-#endif
-	int len=0;
+	size_t off=0;
+	size_t len=0;
 
 	b=BUF_MEM_new();
 	if (b == NULL)
@@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			want-=(len-off);
 
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
+			if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 				{
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 				goto err;
@@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 				goto err;
 				}
 			if (i > 0)
+				{
+				if (len+i < len)
+					{
+					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+					goto err;
+					}
 				len+=i;
+				}
 			}
 		/* else data already loaded */
 
@@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			/* no data body so go round again */
 			eos++;
+			if (eos < 0)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			want=HEADER_SIZE;
 			}
 		else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC))
@@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 		else 
 			{
 			/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
-			want=(int)c.slen;
+			want=c.slen;
 			if (want > (len-off))
 				{
 				want-=(len-off);
+				if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
+					len+want < len)
+						{
+						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+						goto err;
+						}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 					{
 					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 						    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
 						goto err;
 						}
+					/* This can't overflow because
+					 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
 					len+=i;
-					want -= i;
+					want-=i;
 					}
 				}
-			off+=(int)c.slen;
+			if (off + c.slen < off)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			off+=c.slen;
 			if (eos <= 0)
 				{
 				break;
@@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (off > INT_MAX)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	*pb = b;
 	return off;
 err:
 	if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
-	return(ret);
+	return -1;
 	}

crypto/asn1/a_int.c

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
 	int pad=0,ret,i,neg;
 	unsigned char *p,*n,pb=0;
 
-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0);
+	if (a == NULL) return(0);
 	neg=a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
 	if (a->length == 0)
 		ret=1;

crypto/asn1/a_object.c

@@ -285,16 +285,28 @@ err:
 		ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
 	return(NULL);
 }
+
 ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	     long len)
 	{
 	ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
 	const unsigned char *p;
-	int i;
-	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
-	 * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+	int i, length;
+
+	/* Sanity check OID encoding.
+	 * Need at least one content octet.
+	 * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+	 * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
 	 */
-	for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+	if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+	    p[len - 1] & 0x80)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+	length = (int)len;
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
 		{
 		if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
 			{
@@ -313,20 +325,20 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	else	ret=(*a);
 
 	p= *pp;
-	if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+	if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
 		{
 		if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
-		ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+		ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
 		ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
 		if (ret->data == NULL)
 			{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
 		}
-	memcpy(ret->data,p,(int)len);
-	ret->length=(int)len;
+	memcpy(ret->data,p,length);
+	ret->length=length;
 	ret->sn=NULL;
 	ret->ln=NULL;
 	/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
-	p+=len;
+	p+=length;
 
 	if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
 	*pp=p;

crypto/asn1/a_strex.c

@@ -567,6 +567,7 @@ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	if(mbflag == -1) return -1;
 	mbflag |= MBSTRING_FLAG;
 	stmp.data = NULL;
+	stmp.length = 0;
 	ret = ASN1_mbstring_copy(&str, in->data, in->length, mbflag, B_ASN1_UTF8STRING);
 	if(ret < 0) return ret;
 	*out = stmp.data;

crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static int table_cmp(const void *a, const void *b);
  * certain software (e.g. Netscape) has problems with them.
  */
 
-static unsigned long global_mask = 0xFFFFFFFFL;
+static unsigned long global_mask = B_ASN1_UTF8STRING;
 
 void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask)
 {

crypto/asn1/a_type.c

@@ -108,3 +108,49 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value)
 
 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
+
+/* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
+int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
+	{
+	int result = -1;
+
+	if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type) return -1;
+
+	switch (a->type)
+		{
+	case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
+		result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
+		break;
+	case V_ASN1_NULL:
+		result = 0;	/* They do not have content. */
+		break;
+	case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
+	case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
+	case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
+	case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
+	case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
+	case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
+	case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
+	case V_ASN1_SET:
+	case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_T61STRING:
+	case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_IA5STRING:
+	case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
+	case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+	case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING:
+	case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+	case V_ASN1_OTHER:
+	default:
+		result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *) a->value.ptr,
+					 (ASN1_STRING *) b->value.ptr);
+		break;
+		}
+
+	return result;
+	}

crypto/asn1/a_verify.c

@@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
 		goto err;
 		}
+
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		goto err;
+		}
 	
 	inl=i2d(data,NULL);
 	buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
@@ -138,6 +144,18 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signat
 	unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
 	int ret= -1,i,inl;
 
+	if (!pkey)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 	i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
 	type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));

crypto/asn1/asn1.h

@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE)
 int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a);
 void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value);
 int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value);
+int            ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b);
 
 ASN1_OBJECT *	ASN1_OBJECT_new(void );
 void		ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
@@ -1260,6 +1261,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE			 184
 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT			 185
 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG		 128
+#define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT		 220
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH			 129
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT				 130
 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE			 200
@@ -1308,6 +1310,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
 #define ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT			 193
 #define ASN1_R_TOO_LONG					 155
 #define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED			 156
+#define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE			 218
 #define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY			 157
 #define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY		 158
 #define ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC				 159

crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE)   ,"illegal time value"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"integer not ascii format"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG),"integer too large for long"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT),"invalid bit string bits left"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH),"invalid bmpstring length"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT)        ,"invalid digit"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE)    ,"invalid mime type"},
@@ -283,6 +284,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"time not ascii format"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LONG)             ,"too long"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED) ,"type not constructed"},
+{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE)   ,"type not primitive"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY),"unable to decode rsa key"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY),"unable to decode rsa private key"},
 {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC)       ,"unexpected eoc"},

crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
 	*pclass=xclass;
 	if (!asn1_get_length(&p,&inf,plength,(int)max)) goto err;
 
+	if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
+		goto err;
+
 #if 0
 	fprintf(stderr,"p=%d + *plength=%ld > omax=%ld + *pp=%d  (%d > %d)\n", 
 		(int)p,*plength,omax,(int)*pp,(int)(p+ *plength),

crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c

@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 
 		if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
 			strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
-			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
 			ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -595,6 +595,8 @@ static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio)
 	int len, state, save_state = 0;
 
 	headers = sk_MIME_HEADER_new(mime_hdr_cmp);
+	if (!headers)
+		return NULL;
 	while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) {
 	/* If whitespace at line start then continuation line */
 	if(mhdr && isspace((unsigned char)linebuf[0])) state = MIME_NAME;
@@ -790,12 +792,17 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
 static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
 			const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
+		return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
+
 	return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
 }
 
 static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
 			const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
+		return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
 	return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
 }
 

crypto/asn1/asn_pack.c

@@ -134,15 +134,23 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d, ASN1_STRING **oct)
 		
 	if (!(octmp->length = i2d(obj, NULL))) {
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
-		return NULL;
+		goto err;
 	}
 	if (!(p = OPENSSL_malloc (octmp->length))) {
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		return NULL;
+		goto err;
 	}
 	octmp->data = p;
 	i2d (obj, &p);
 	return octmp;
+	err:
+	if (!oct || !*oct)
+		{
+		ASN1_STRING_free(octmp);
+		if (oct)
+			*oct = NULL;
+		}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 #endif

crypto/asn1/evp_asn1.c

@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len)
 	ASN1_STRING *os;
 
 	if ((os=M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) return(0);
-	if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len)) return(0);
+	if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len))
+		{
+		M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	ASN1_TYPE_set(a,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,os);
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/asn1/t_pkey.c

@@ -208,11 +208,6 @@ int DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off)
 
 	if (x->p)
 		buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->p);
-	else
-		{
-		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRINT,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
-		goto err;
-		}
 	if (x->q)
 		if (buf_len < (i = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(x->q)))
 			buf_len = i;

crypto/asn1/t_x509.c

@@ -465,6 +465,8 @@ int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase)
 	l=80-2-obase;
 
 	b=X509_NAME_oneline(name,NULL,0);
+	if (!b)
+		return 0;
 	if (!*b)
 		{
 		OPENSSL_free(b);

crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

@@ -866,6 +866,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
 		}
 	else if (cst)
 		{
+		if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
+			|| utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER
+			|| utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
+			{
+			ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
+				ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
+			return 0;
+			}
 		buf.length = 0;
 		buf.max = 0;
 		buf.data = NULL;

crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c

@@ -453,9 +453,14 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
 			{
 			derlst = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk)
 						* sizeof(*derlst));
-			tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
-			if (!derlst || !tmpdat)
+			if (!derlst)
 				return 0;
+			tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
+			if (!tmpdat)
+				{
+				OPENSSL_free(derlst);
+				return 0;
+				}
 			}
 		}
 	/* If not sorting just output each item */

crypto/asn1/x_algor.c

@@ -128,3 +128,13 @@ void X509_ALGOR_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, void **ppval,
 		}
 	}
 
+int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b)
+	{
+	int rv;
+	rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm);
+	if (rv)
+		return rv;
+	if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter)
+		return 0;
+	return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter);
+	}

crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c

@@ -367,7 +367,19 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	key->pkey = ret;
+	/* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+	if (key->pkey)
+		{
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+		ret = key->pkey;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		key->pkey = ret;
+		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+		}
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	return(ret);
 err:

crypto/bio/bio.h

@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /* #endif */
 
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU          40 /* as kernel for current MTU */
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU   47
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU            41 /* get cached value for MTU */
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU            42 /* set cached value for
 					      * MTU. want to use this

crypto/bio/bio_lib.c

@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ int BIO_free(BIO *a)
 
 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, a, &a->ex_data);
 
-	if ((a->method == NULL) || (a->method->destroy == NULL)) return(1);
-	a->method->destroy(a);
+	if ((a->method != NULL) && (a->method->destroy != NULL))
+		a->method->destroy(a);
 	OPENSSL_free(a);
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c

@@ -494,6 +494,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		ret = 0;
 #endif
 		break;
+	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+		ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU:
 		return data->mtu;
 		break;

crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s

@@ -1584,17 +1584,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
 	dmultu	a_2,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_2,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
-	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_1,a_1		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -1609,63 +1609,63 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
 	dmultu	a_0,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_3,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
-	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_1,a_2		/* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_3,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
 	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	sd	c_1,24(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_4,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_1,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
-	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_3,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_1,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
 	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_2,a_2		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -1680,93 +1680,93 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
 	dmultu	a_0,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_2,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
-	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_1,a_4		/* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_2,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
 	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_2,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_2,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
 	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	sd	c_3,40(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_6,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_3,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
-	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_5,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_3,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
 	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_4,a_2		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_3,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
 	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_3,a_3		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -1781,108 +1781,108 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
 	dmultu	a_0,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_1,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
-	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_1,a_6		/* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_1,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
 	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_2,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_1,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
 	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_3,a_4		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_1,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
 	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	sd	c_2,56(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_7,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_2,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
-	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_6,a_2		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_2,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
 	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_5,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_2,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
 	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_4,a_4		/* mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -1897,78 +1897,78 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
 	dmultu	a_2,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_3,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
-	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_3,a_6		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_3,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
 	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_4,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_3,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
 	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	sd	c_1,72(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_7,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_1,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
-	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_6,a_4		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_1,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
 	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_5,a_5		/* mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -1983,48 +1983,48 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
 	dmultu	a_4,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_2,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
-	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_5,a_6		/* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_2,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
 	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	sd	c_3,88(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_7,a_5		/* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_3,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
-	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_6,a_6		/* mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -2039,17 +2039,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
 	dmultu	a_6,a_7		/* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_1,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
-	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	sd	c_2,104(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_7,a_7		/* mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
@@ -2070,9 +2070,9 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
 	.set	reorder
 	ld	a_0,0(a1)
 	ld	a_1,8(a1)
+	dmultu	a_0,a_0		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
 	ld	a_2,16(a1)
 	ld	a_3,24(a1)
-	dmultu	a_0,a_0		/* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	c_1
 	mfhi	c_2
 	sd	c_1,0(a0)
@@ -2093,17 +2093,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
 	dmultu	a_2,a_0		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_2,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
-	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	dmultu	a_1,a_1		/* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -2118,48 +2118,48 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
 	dmultu	a_0,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_3,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_3,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
-	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	dmultu	a_1,a_2		/* mul_add_c(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	AT,t_2,zero
-	daddu	c_3,AT
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_1,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_1,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_1,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_1,t_1
+	daddu	c_2,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	AT,c_2,AT
 	daddu	c_2,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_2,t_2
 	daddu	c_3,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_2,t_2
+	daddu	c_3,t_2
 	sd	c_1,24(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_3,a_1		/* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_1,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_2,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_2,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_2,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_2,t_1
+	daddu	c_3,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_1,c_3,AT
 	daddu	c_3,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_3,t_2
-	daddu	c_1,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_3,t_2
+	daddu	c_1,t_2
 	dmultu	a_2,a_2		/* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
@@ -2174,17 +2174,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
 	dmultu	a_2,a_3		/* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
 	mflo	t_1
 	mfhi	t_2
-	slt	c_2,t_2,zero
-	dsll	t_2,1
-	slt	a2,t_1,zero
-	daddu	t_2,a2
-	dsll	t_1,1
 	daddu	c_3,t_1
 	sltu	AT,c_3,t_1
-	daddu	t_2,AT
+	daddu	c_3,t_1
+	daddu	AT,t_2
+	sltu	t_1,c_3,t_1
+	daddu	c_1,AT
+	daddu	t_2,t_1
+	sltu	c_2,c_1,AT
 	daddu	c_1,t_2
-	sltu	AT,c_1,t_2
-	daddu	c_2,AT
+	sltu	t_2,c_1,t_2
+	daddu	c_2,t_2
 	sd	c_3,40(a0)
 
 	dmultu	a_3,a_3		/* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */

crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
 
 	if (n <= 0) return 0;
 
-	asm (
+	asm volatile (
 	"	subq	%2,%2		\n"
 	".align 16			\n"
 	"1:	movq	(%4,%2,8),%0	\n"
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
 	"	sbbq	%0,%0		\n"
 		: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
 		: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
-		: "cc"
+		: "cc", "memory"
 	);
 
   return ret&1;
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
 
 	if (n <= 0) return 0;
 
-	asm (
+	asm volatile (
 	"	subq	%2,%2		\n"
 	".align 16			\n"
 	"1:	movq	(%4,%2,8),%0	\n"
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
 	"	sbbq	%0,%0		\n"
 		: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
 		: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
-		: "cc"
+		: "cc", "memory"
 	);
 
   return ret&1;
@@ -269,6 +269,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
+ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
+ */
 #if 0
 /* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
 #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {	\
@@ -283,10 +287,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
 	t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);	\
 	t0 = ta * tb;			\
-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
+	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
 	}
 #else
 #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)	do {	\
@@ -324,22 +328,14 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 		: "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)	\
 		: "a"(a),"m"(b)		\
 		: "cc");		\
-	asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"	\
-		: "+d"(t2),"+r"(c2)	\
-		: "g"(0)		\
-		: "cc");		\
-	asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"	\
-		: "+a"(t1),"+d"(t2)	\
-		: "g"(0)		\
-		: "cc");		\
-	asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"	\
-		: "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2)	\
-		: "a"(t1),"g"(0)	\
-		: "cc");		\
-	asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"	\
-		: "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)	\
-		: "d"(t2),"g"(0)	\
-		: "cc");		\
+	asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"	\
+		: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)		\
+		: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)		\
+		: "cc");				\
+	asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2"	\
+		: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)		\
+		: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0)		\
+		: "cc");				\
 	} while (0)
 #endif
 

crypto/bn/bn.h

@@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
 BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
 	const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
 
+void	BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG swap, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords);
+
 /* Deprecated versions */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
 BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret,int bits,int safe,
@@ -740,11 +742,20 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_check_top(a)
 
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits) bn_wcheck_size(bn, ((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words) \
+	do { \
+		const BIGNUM *_bnum2 = (bn); \
+		assert(words <= (_bnum2)->dmax && words >= (_bnum2)->top); \
+	} while(0)
+
 #else /* !BN_DEBUG */
 
 #define bn_pollute(a)
 #define bn_check_top(a)
 #define bn_fix_top(a)		bn_correct_top(a)
+#define bn_check_size(bn, bits)
+#define bn_wcheck_size(bn, words)
 
 #endif
 

crypto/bn/bn_asm.c

@@ -431,6 +431,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
 
+/*
+ * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
+ * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
+ */
 #ifdef BN_LLONG
 #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) \
 	t=(BN_ULLONG)a*b; \
@@ -471,10 +475,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 #define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {	\
 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
 	BN_UMULT_LOHI(t0,t1,ta,tb);	\
-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
+	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
 	}
 
 #define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)	{	\
@@ -501,10 +505,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
 	BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;	\
 	t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);	\
 	t0 = ta * tb;			\
-	t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;	\
-	t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;	\
-	c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
 	c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;	\
+	c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0;	\
+	c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0;	\
 	}
 
 #define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)	{	\

crypto/bn/bn_exp.c

@@ -767,7 +767,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
 	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
 	if (bits == 0)
 		{
-		ret = BN_one(rr);
+		/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
+		if (BN_is_one(m))
+			{
+			ret = 1;
+			BN_zero(rr);
+			}
+		else
+			ret = BN_one(rr);
 		return ret;
 		}
 	if (a == 0)

crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c

@@ -1095,3 +1095,54 @@ int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const unsigned int p[], BIGNUM *a)
 	return 1;
 	}
 
+/* 
+ * Constant-time conditional swap of a and b.  
+ * a and b are swapped if condition is not 0.  The code assumes that at most one bit of condition is set.
+ * nwords is the number of words to swap.  The code assumes that at least nwords are allocated in both a and b,
+ * and that no more than nwords are used by either a or b.
+ * a and b cannot be the same number
+ */
+void BN_consttime_swap(BN_ULONG condition, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, int nwords)
+	{
+	BN_ULONG t;
+	int i;
+
+	bn_wcheck_size(a, nwords);
+	bn_wcheck_size(b, nwords);
+
+	assert(a != b);
+	assert((condition & (condition - 1)) == 0);
+	assert(sizeof(BN_ULONG) >= sizeof(int));
+
+	condition = ((condition - 1) >> (BN_BITS2 - 1)) - 1;
+
+	t = (a->top^b->top) & condition;
+	a->top ^= t;
+	b->top ^= t;
+
+#define BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(ind) \
+	do { \
+		t = (a->d[ind] ^ b->d[ind]) & condition; \
+		a->d[ind] ^= t; \
+		b->d[ind] ^= t; \
+	} while (0)
+
+
+	switch (nwords) {
+	default:
+		for (i = 10; i < nwords; i++) 
+			BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(i);
+		/* Fallthrough */
+	case 10: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(9); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 9: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(8); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 8: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(7); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 7: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(6); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 6: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(5); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 5: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(4); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 4: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(3); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 3: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(2); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 2: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(1); /* Fallthrough */
+	case 1: BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP(0);
+	}
+#undef BN_CONSTTIME_SWAP
+}

crypto/bn/bn_lib.c

@@ -320,6 +320,15 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
 		BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 		return(NULL);
 		}
+#ifdef PURIFY
+	/* Valgrind complains in BN_consttime_swap because we process the whole
+	 * array even if it's not initialised yet. This doesn't matter in that
+	 * function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not
+	 * actually going to use the data)
+	*/
+	memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG)*words);
+#endif
+
 #if 1
 	B=b->d;
 	/* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */

crypto/bn/bn_mont.c

@@ -701,32 +701,38 @@ BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from)
 BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(BN_MONT_CTX **pmont, int lock,
 					const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *ret;
 
 	CRYPTO_r_lock(lock);
-	if (!*pmont)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
-
-		if (!*pmont)
-			{
-			ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
-			if (ret && !BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
-				BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
-			else
-				*pmont = ret;
-			}
-		}
-	
 	ret = *pmont;
-	
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* We don't want to serialise globally while doing our lazy-init math in
+	 * BN_MONT_CTX_set. That punishes threads that are doing independent
+	 * things. Instead, punish the case where more than one thread tries to
+	 * lazy-init the same 'pmont', by having each do the lazy-init math work
+	 * independently and only use the one from the thread that wins the race
+	 * (the losers throw away the work they've done). */
+	ret = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
+	if (!ret)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(ret, mod, ctx))
+		{
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* The locked compare-and-set, after the local work is done. */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(lock);
+	if (*pmont)
+		{
+		BN_MONT_CTX_free(ret);
+		ret = *pmont;
+		}
 	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(lock);
-		
+		*pmont = ret;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(lock);
 	return ret;
 	}

crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	if (al <= 0)
 		{
 		r->top=0;
+		r->neg = 0;
 		return 1;
 		}
 

crypto/bn/bn_word.c

@@ -144,26 +144,17 @@ int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
 			a->neg=!(a->neg);
 		return(i);
 		}
-	/* Only expand (and risk failing) if it's possibly necessary */
-	if (((BN_ULONG)(a->d[a->top - 1] + 1) == 0) &&
-			(bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL))
-		return(0);
-	i=0;
-	for (;;)
+	for (i=0;w!=0 && i<a->top;i++)
 		{
-		if (i >= a->top)
-			l=w;
-		else
-			l=(a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
-		a->d[i]=l;
-		if (w > l)
-			w=1;
-		else
-			break;
-		i++;
+		a->d[i] = l = (a->d[i]+w)&BN_MASK2;
+		w = (w>l)?1:0;
 		}
-	if (i >= a->top)
+	if (w && i==a->top)
+		{
+		if (bn_wexpand(a,a->top+1) == NULL) return 0;
 		a->top++;
+		a->d[i]=w;
+		}
 	bn_check_top(a);
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/bn/bntest.c

@@ -676,44 +676,98 @@ int test_mul(BIO *bp)
 
 int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	BIGNUM a,c,d,e;
-	int i;
+	BIGNUM *a,*c,*d,*e;
+	int i, ret = 0;
 
-	BN_init(&a);
-	BN_init(&c);
-	BN_init(&d);
-	BN_init(&e);
+	a = BN_new();
+	c = BN_new();
+	d = BN_new();
+	e = BN_new();
+	if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL)
+		{
+		goto err;
+		}
 
 	for (i=0; i<num0; i++)
 		{
-		BN_bntest_rand(&a,40+i*10,0,0);
-		a.neg=rand_neg();
-		BN_sqr(&c,&a,ctx);
+		BN_bntest_rand(a,40+i*10,0,0);
+		a->neg=rand_neg();
+		BN_sqr(c,a,ctx);
 		if (bp != NULL)
 			{
 			if (!results)
 				{
-				BN_print(bp,&a);
+				BN_print(bp,a);
 				BIO_puts(bp," * ");
-				BN_print(bp,&a);
+				BN_print(bp,a);
 				BIO_puts(bp," - ");
 				}
-			BN_print(bp,&c);
+			BN_print(bp,c);
 			BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
 			}
-		BN_div(&d,&e,&c,&a,ctx);
-		BN_sub(&d,&d,&a);
-		if(!BN_is_zero(&d) || !BN_is_zero(&e))
-		    {
-		    fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
-		    return 0;
-		    }
+		BN_div(d,e,c,a,ctx);
+		BN_sub(d,d,a);
+		if(!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e))
+			{
+			fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
+			goto err;
+			}
 		}
-	BN_free(&a);
-	BN_free(&c);
-	BN_free(&d);
-	BN_free(&e);
-	return(1);
+
+	/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
+	BN_hex2bn(&a,
+		"80000000000000008000000000000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
+	BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+	if (bp != NULL)
+		{
+		if (!results)
+			{
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," * ");
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," - ");
+			}
+		BN_print(bp,c);
+		BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
+		}
+	BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+	if (BN_cmp(c, d))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+			"different results!\n");
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
+	BN_hex2bn(&a,
+		"80000000000000000000000080000001FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
+	BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
+	if (bp != NULL)
+		{
+		if (!results)
+			{
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," * ");
+			BN_print(bp,a);
+			BIO_puts(bp," - ");
+			}
+		BN_print(bp,c);
+		BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
+		}
+	BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
+	if (BN_cmp(c, d))
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
+			"different results!\n");
+		goto err;
+		}
+	ret = 1;
+err:
+	if (a != NULL) BN_free(a);
+	if (c != NULL) BN_free(c);
+	if (d != NULL) BN_free(d);
+	if (e != NULL) BN_free(e);
+	return ret;
 	}
 
 int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)

crypto/bn/exptest.c

@@ -71,6 +71,48 @@
 
 static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
 
+/*
+ * Disabled for FIPS capable builds because they use the FIPS BIGNUM library
+ * which will fail this test.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+/* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success. */
+static int test_exp_mod_zero() {
+	BIGNUM a, p, m;
+	BIGNUM r;
+	BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+	int ret = 1;
+
+	BN_init(&m);
+	BN_one(&m);
+
+	BN_init(&a);
+	BN_one(&a);
+
+	BN_init(&p);
+	BN_zero(&p);
+
+	BN_init(&r);
+	BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+	if (BN_is_zero(&r))
+		ret = 0;
+	else
+		{
+		printf("1**0 mod 1 = ");
+		BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
+		printf(", should be 0\n");
+		}
+
+	BN_free(&r);
+	BN_free(&a);
+	BN_free(&p);
+	BN_free(&m);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	{
 	BN_CTX *ctx;
@@ -190,7 +232,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	ERR_remove_state(0);
 	CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out);
 	BIO_free(out);
-	printf(" done\n");
+	printf("\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	if (test_exp_mod_zero() != 0)
+		goto err;
+#endif
+	printf("done\n");
+
 	EXIT(0);
 err:
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();

crypto/buffer/buffer.c

@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 
+/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
+ * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures
+ * that the result fits in an int. */
+#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
+
 BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *ret;
@@ -94,6 +99,11 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 	char *ret;
 	unsigned int n;
 
+	if (len < 0)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	if (str->length >= len)
 		{
 		str->length=len;
@@ -105,6 +115,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -130,6 +146,11 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 	char *ret;
 	unsigned int n;
 
+	if (len < 0)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	if (str->length >= len)
 		{
 		memset(&str->data[len],0,str->length-len);
@@ -142,6 +163,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW_CLEAN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);

crypto/cms/cms.h

@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
 #define CMS_PARTIAL			0x4000
 #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST		0x8000
 #define CMS_USE_KEYID			0x10000
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT		0x20000
 
 const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
 

crypto/cms/cms_cd.c

@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/cms.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 #include "cms_lcl.h"
 
 DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_CompressedData)

crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
 	X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+	unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+	size_t tkeylen;
 
 	int ok = 0;
 
@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 				CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
 		goto err;
 		}
-
-
-	if (enc && !ec->key)
+	tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+	/* Generate random session key */
+	if (!enc || !ec->key)
 		{
-		/* Generate random key */
-		if (!ec->keylen)
-			ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
-		ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
-		if (!ec->key)
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
 			{
 			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
 							ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
 			goto err;
-		keep_key = 1;
 		}
-	else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
+
+	if (!ec->key)
+		{
+		ec->key = tkey;
+		ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+		tkey = NULL;
+		if (enc)
+			keep_key = 1;
+		else
+			ERR_clear_error();
+		
+		}
+
+	if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
 		{
 		/* If necessary set key length */
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
 			{
-			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
-				CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
-			goto err;
+			/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
+			 * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
+			 */
+			if (enc || ec->debug)
+				{
+				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+						CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Use random key */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+				OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+				ec->key = tkey;
+				ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+				tkey = NULL;
+				ERR_clear_error();
+				}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
 		ec->key = NULL;
 		}
+	if (tkey)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+		}
 	if (ok)
 		return b;
 	BIO_free(b);

crypto/cms/cms_env.c

@@ -185,6 +185,8 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 	if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID)
 		{
 		ktri->version = 2;
+		if (env->version < 2)
+			env->version = 2;
 		type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER;
 		}
 	else
@@ -352,6 +354,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
 	int eklen;
 	int ret = 0;
+	CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+	ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
 
 	if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
 		{
@@ -382,8 +386,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 
 	ret = 1;
 
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
+	if (ec->key)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+		}
+
+	ec->key = ek;
+	ec->keylen = eklen;
 
 	err:
 	if (!ret && ek)

crypto/cms/cms_io.c

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int cms_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
 		cmsbio = tmpbio;
 		}
 
-	return 1;
+	return r;
 
 	}
 

crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h

@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
 	unsigned char *key;
 	size_t keylen;
+	/* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+	int debug;
 	};
 
 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st

crypto/cms/cms_lib.c

@@ -475,8 +475,6 @@ int CMS_add0_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *cert)
 	STACK_OF(CMS_CertificateChoices) **pcerts;
 	int i;
 	pcerts = cms_get0_certificate_choices(cms);
-	if (!pcerts)
-		return 0;
 	if (!pcerts)
 		return 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(*pcerts); i++)

crypto/cms/cms_sd.c

@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static void cms_sd_set_version(CMS_SignedData *sd)
 			if (sd->version < 3)
 				sd->version = 3;
 			}
-		else
-			sd->version = 1;
+		else if (si->version < 1)
+			si->version = 1;
 		}
 
 	if (sd->version < 1)

crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -622,12 +622,16 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 	STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
 	CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
 	int i, r;
+	int debug = 0, ri_match = 0;
 	ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+	if (ris)
+		debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
 		{
 		ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
 		if (CMS_RecipientInfo_type(ri) != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS)
 				continue;
+		ri_match = 1;
 		/* If we have a cert try matching RecipientInfo
 		 * otherwise try them all.
 		 */
@@ -636,17 +640,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
 			r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
-			if (r > 0)
-				return 1;
 			if (cert)
 				{
+				/* If not debugging clear any error and
+				 * return success to avoid leaking of
+				 * information useful to MMA
+				 */
+				if (!debug)
+					{
+					ERR_clear_error();
+					return 1;
+					}
+				if (r > 0)
+					return 1;
 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
 						CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
 				return 0;
 				}
-			ERR_clear_error();
+			/* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
+			 * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
+			 * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
+			 * of a successful decrypt.
+			 */
+			else if (r > 0 && debug)
+				return 1;
 			}
 		}
+	/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+	if (ri_match && !cert && !debug)
+		{
+		ERR_clear_error();
+		return 1;
+		}
 
 	CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
 	return 0;
@@ -705,9 +730,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
 		}
 	if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
 		return 0;
+	if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+	else
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+	if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+		return 1;
 	if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
 		return 0;
-
 	cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
 	if (!cont)
 		return 0;

crypto/conf/conf_api.c

@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ CONF_VALUE *_CONF_new_section(CONF *conf, const char *section)
 	v->value=(char *)sk;
 	
 	vv=(CONF_VALUE *)lh_insert(conf->data,v);
-	assert(vv == NULL);
+	OPENSSL_assert(vv == NULL);
 	ok=1;
 err:
 	if (!ok)

crypto/conf/conf_def.c

@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ again:
 			p=eat_ws(conf, end);
 			if (*p != ']')
 				{
-				if (*p != '\0')
+				if (*p != '\0' && ss != p)
 					{
 					ss=p;
 					goto again;

crypto/constant_time_locl.h

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+/* crypto/constant_time_locl.h */
+/*
+ * Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
+ *
+ * Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
+ * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
+ * (Google).
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+#define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+
+#include "e_os.h"  /* For 'inline' */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
+ * and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result
+ * of a conditional in constant time. For example,
+ *
+ * if (a < b) {
+ *   c = a;
+ * } else {
+ *   c = b;
+ * }
+ *
+ * can be written as
+ *
+ * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
+ * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to
+ * replace this with something else on odd CPUs.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a);
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Signed integers. */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b);
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b).
+ *
+ * When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above),
+ * the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b|
+ * (if |mask| is zero).
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+	unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+	unsigned char a, unsigned char b);
+/* Convenience method for signed integers. */
+static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b);
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	return 0-(a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return constant_time_msb(a^((a^b)|((a-b)^b)));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return ~constant_time_lt(a, b);
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b)
+	{
+	return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
+	{
+	return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+	unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+	}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+	unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+	{
+	return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b));
+	}
+
+static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
+	{
+	return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
+	}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif  /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */

crypto/constant_time_test.c

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+/* crypto/constant_time_test.c */
+/*
+ * Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
+ *
+ * Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
+ * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
+ * (Google).
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_TRUE = (unsigned)(~0);
+static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_FALSE = 0;
+static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_TRUE_8 = 0xff;
+static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_FALSE_8 = 0;
+
+static int test_binary_op(unsigned int (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
+	const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
+	{
+	unsigned c = op(a, b);
+	if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
+			"(TRUE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for  %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
+			"(FALSE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_binary_op_8(unsigned char (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
+	const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
+	{
+	unsigned char c = op(a, b);
+	if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
+			"(TRUE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for  %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
+			"(FALSE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_is_zero(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	unsigned int c = constant_time_is_zero(a);
+	if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %du (TRUE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %du (FALSE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
+	{
+	unsigned char c = constant_time_is_zero_8(a);
+	if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %u (TRUE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
+			"expected %u (FALSE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
+			c);
+		return 1;
+		}
+        return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_select(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+	{
+	unsigned int selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
+	if (selected != a)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
+			"%du): expected %du(first value), got %du\n",
+			CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
+	if (selected != b)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
+			"%du): expected %du(second value), got %du\n",
+			CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_select_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
+	{
+	unsigned char selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, a, b);
+	if (selected != a)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
+			"%u): expected %u(first value), got %u\n",
+			CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, a, b);
+	if (selected != b)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
+			"%u): expected %u(second value), got %u\n",
+			CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_select_int(int a, int b)
+	{
+	int selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
+	if (selected != a)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
+			"%d): expected %d(first value), got %d\n",
+			CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
+	if (selected != b)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
+			"%d): expected %d(second value), got %d\n",
+			CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_eq_int(int a, int b)
+	{
+	unsigned int equal = constant_time_eq_int(a, b);
+	if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %du(TRUE), got %du\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %du(FALSE), got %du\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int test_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
+	{
+	unsigned char equal = constant_time_eq_int_8(a, b);
+	if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %u(TRUE), got %u\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
+		{
+		fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
+			"expected %u(FALSE), got %u\n",
+			a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, equal);
+		return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static unsigned int test_values[] = {0, 1, 1024, 12345, 32000, UINT_MAX/2-1,
+                                     UINT_MAX/2, UINT_MAX/2+1, UINT_MAX-1,
+                                     UINT_MAX};
+
+static unsigned char test_values_8[] = {0, 1, 2, 20, 32, 127, 128, 129, 255};
+
+static int signed_test_values[] = {0, 1, -1, 1024, -1024, 12345, -12345,
+				   32000, -32000, INT_MAX, INT_MIN, INT_MAX-1,
+				   INT_MIN+1};
+
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+	{
+	unsigned int a, b, i, j;
+	int c, d;
+	unsigned char e, f;
+	int num_failed = 0, num_all = 0;
+	fprintf(stdout, "Testing constant time operations...\n");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
+		{
+		a = test_values[i];
+		num_failed += test_is_zero(a);
+		num_failed += test_is_zero_8(a);
+		num_all += 2;
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
+			{
+			b = test_values[j];
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
+				"constant_time_lt", a, b, a < b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
+				"constant_time_lt_8", a, b, a < b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
+				"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
+				"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
+				"constant_time_ge", a, b, a >= b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
+				"constant_time_ge_8", a, b, a >= b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
+				"constant_time_ge", b, a, b >= a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
+				"constant_time_ge_8", b, a, b >= a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
+				"constant_time_eq", a, b, a == b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
+				"constant_time_eq_8", a, b, a == b);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
+				"constant_time_eq", b, a, b == a);
+			num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
+				"constant_time_eq_8", b, a, b == a);
+			num_failed += test_select(a, b);
+			num_all += 13;
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
+		{
+		c = signed_test_values[i];
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
+			{
+			d = signed_test_values[j];
+			num_failed += test_select_int(c, d);
+			num_failed += test_eq_int(c, d);
+			num_failed += test_eq_int_8(c, d);
+			num_all += 3;
+			}
+		}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values_8); ++i)
+		{
+		e = test_values_8[i];
+		for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values_8); ++j)
+			{
+			f = test_values_8[j];
+			num_failed += test_select_8(e, f);
+			num_all += 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (!num_failed)
+		{
+		fprintf(stdout, "ok (ran %d tests)\n", num_all);
+		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		fprintf(stdout, "%d of %d tests failed!\n", num_failed, num_all);
+		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+		}
+	}

crypto/cryptlib.c

@@ -542,3 +542,19 @@ void OpenSSLDie(const char *file,int line,const char *assertion)
 	}
 
 void *OPENSSL_stderr(void)	{ return stderr; }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+	const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+	unsigned char x = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+	return x;
+	}
+#endif

crypto/crypto.h

@@ -591,6 +591,13 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void);
 #define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT	1
 void OPENSSL_init(void);
 
+/* CRYPTO_memcmp returns zero iff the |len| bytes at |a| and |b| are equal. It
+ * takes an amount of time dependent on |len|, but independent of the contents
+ * of |a| and |b|. Unlike memcmp, it cannot be used to put elements into a
+ * defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other than to be
+ * non-zero. */
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.

crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c

@@ -200,7 +200,11 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 	     const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
 	{
 	DSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
+
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 	if(FIPS_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW))
 		{
@@ -211,10 +215,18 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 
 	s = DSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	DSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}
-

crypto/ec/ec.h

@@ -321,7 +321,15 @@ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *, point_conversion_form_t);
 /* functions to set/get method specific data  */
 void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *, 
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *));
-void EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *, void *data,
+/** Sets the key method data of an EC_KEY object, if none has yet been set.
+ *  \param  key              EC_KEY object
+ *  \param  data             opaque data to install.
+ *  \param  dup_func         a function that duplicates |data|.
+ *  \param  free_func        a function that frees |data|.
+ *  \param  clear_free_func  a function that wipes and frees |data|.
+ *  \return the previously set data pointer, or NULL if |data| was inserted.
+ */
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *));
 /* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */
 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *, int);

crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c

@@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIG
 
 /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r.
  * point can not equal r.
- * Uses algorithm 2P of
+ * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of
  *     Lopex, J. and Dahab, R.  "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over 
  *     GF(2^m) without precomputation".
+ *
+ * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time
+ * swap avoiding conditional branches.
  */
 static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
@@ -244,6 +247,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
 	x2 = &r->X;
 	z2 = &r->Y;
 
+	bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top);
+	bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top);
+
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */
 	if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */
 	if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */
@@ -266,16 +274,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
 		{
 		for (; j >= 0; j--)
 			{
-			if (scalar->d[i] & mask)
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
-				}
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
+			if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err;
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top);
+			BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top);
 			mask >>= 1;
 			}
 		j = BN_BITS2 - 1;

crypto/ec/ec_key.c

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include "ec_lcl.h"
 #include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <string.h>
 
 EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
 	{
@@ -435,18 +434,27 @@ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform)
 void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *))
 	{
-	return EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
+	void *ret;
+
+	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+	ret = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
+	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+	return ret;
 	}
 
-void EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
+void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
 	void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *))
 	{
 	EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data;
+
 	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
 	ex_data = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
 	if (ex_data == NULL)
 		EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func);
 	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
+
+	return ex_data;
 	}
 
 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)

crypto/ec/ec_lib.c

@@ -480,10 +480,10 @@ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) !=
 	    EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b)))
 		return 1;
-	/* compare the curve name (if present) */
+	/* compare the curve name (if present in both) */
 	if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) &&
-	    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
-		return 0;
+	    EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b))
+		return 1;
 
 	if (!ctx)
 		ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new();
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *
 
 int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	if (group->meth->dbl == 0)
+	if (group->meth->invert == 0)
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
 		return 0;
@@ -1061,12 +1061,12 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
 	if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0)
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-		return 0;
+		return -1;
 		}
 	if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth))
 		{
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
-		return 0;
+		return -1;
 		}
 	return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
 	}

crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c

@@ -1540,9 +1540,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ct
 int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 	BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
-	BIGNUM *tmp0, *tmp1;
-	size_t pow2 = 0;
-	BIGNUM **heap = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z;
+	BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL;
 	size_t i;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -1557,124 +1556,104 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT
 		}
 
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-	tmp0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	if (tmp0  == NULL || tmp1 == NULL) goto err;
+	tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+	tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+	if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err;
 
-	/* Before converting the individual points, compute inverses of all Z values.
-	 * Modular inversion is rather slow, but luckily we can do with a single
-	 * explicit inversion, plus about 3 multiplications per input value.
-	 */
-
-	pow2 = 1;
-	while (num > pow2)
-		pow2 <<= 1;
-	/* Now pow2 is the smallest power of 2 satifsying pow2 >= num.
-	 * We need twice that. */
-	pow2 <<= 1;
-
-	heap = OPENSSL_malloc(pow2 * sizeof heap[0]);
-	if (heap == NULL) goto err;
-	
-	/* The array is used as a binary tree, exactly as in heapsort:
-	 *
-	 *                               heap[1]
-	 *                 heap[2]                     heap[3]
-	 *          heap[4]       heap[5]       heap[6]       heap[7]
-	 *   heap[8]heap[9] heap[10]heap[11] heap[12]heap[13] heap[14] heap[15]
-	 *
-	 * We put the Z's in the last line;
-	 * then we set each other node to the product of its two child-nodes (where
-	 * empty or 0 entries are treated as ones);
-	 * then we invert heap[1];
-	 * then we invert each other node by replacing it by the product of its
-	 * parent (after inversion) and its sibling (before inversion).
-	 */
-	heap[0] = NULL;
-	for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
-		heap[i] = NULL;
+	prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]);
+	if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err;
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
-		heap[pow2/2 + i] = &points[i]->Z;
-	for (i = pow2/2 + num; i < pow2; i++)
-		heap[i] = NULL;
-	
-	/* set each node to the product of its children */
-	for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
 		{
-		heap[i] = BN_new();
-		if (heap[i] == NULL) goto err;
-		
-		if (heap[2*i] != NULL)
-			{
-			if ((heap[2*i + 1] == NULL) || BN_is_zero(heap[2*i + 1]))
-				{
-				if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i])) goto err;
-				}
-			else
-				{
-				if (BN_is_zero(heap[2*i]))
-					{
-					if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i + 1])) goto err;
-					}
-				else
-					{
-					if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, heap[i],
-						heap[2*i], heap[2*i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
-					}
-				}
-			}
+		prod_Z[i] = BN_new();
+		if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err;
 		}
 
-	/* invert heap[1] */
-	if (!BN_is_zero(heap[1]))
-		{
-		if (!BN_mod_inverse(heap[1], heap[1], &group->field, ctx))
-			{
-			ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
-		{
-		/* in the Montgomery case, we just turned  R*H  (representing H)
-		 * into  1/(R*H),  but we need  R*(1/H)  (representing 1/H);
-		 * i.e. we have need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice */
-		if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
-		if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
-		}
+	/* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z,
+	 * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */
 
-	/* set other heap[i]'s to their inverses */
-	for (i = 2; i < pow2/2 + num; i += 2)
+	if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
 		{
-		/* i is even */
-		if ((heap[i + 1] != NULL) && !BN_is_zero(heap[i + 1]))
+		if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) goto err;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
 			{
-			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp0, heap[i/2], heap[i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
-			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, heap[i/2], heap[i], ctx)) goto err;
-			if (!BN_copy(heap[i], tmp0)) goto err;
-			if (!BN_copy(heap[i + 1], tmp1)) goto err;
+			if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err;
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[i/2])) goto err;
+			if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) goto err;
 			}
 		}
 
-	/* we have replaced all non-zero Z's by their inverses, now fix up all the points */
+	for (i = 1; i < num; i++)
+		{
+		if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
+			{
+			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every
+	 * non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
+
+	if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
+		{
+		/* In the Montgomery case, we just turned  R*H  (representing H)
+		 * into  1/(R*H),  but we need  R*(1/H)  (representing 1/H);
+		 * i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */
+		if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
+		if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
+		}
+
+	for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i)
+		{
+		/* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of
+		 * points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */
+		if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
+			{
+			/* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product
+			 * of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */
+			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err;
+			/* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */
+			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
+			/* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
+			if (!BN_copy(&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
+		{
+		/* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */
+		if (!BN_copy(&points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */
+
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
 		{
 		EC_POINT *p = points[i];
-		
+
 		if (!BN_is_zero(&p->Z))
 			{
 			/* turn  (X, Y, 1/Z)  into  (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */
 
-			if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
-			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
+
+			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
+			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
 
-			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
-			if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
-		
 			if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
 				{
 				if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
@@ -1688,20 +1667,19 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT
 		}
 
 	ret = 1;
-		
+
  err:
 	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
 	if (new_ctx != NULL)
 		BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
-	if (heap != NULL)
+	if (prod_Z != NULL)
 		{
-		/* heap[pow2/2] .. heap[pow2-1] have not been allocated locally! */
-		for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
+		for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
 			{
-			if (heap[i] != NULL)
-				BN_clear_free(heap[i]);
+			if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) break;
+			BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]);
 			}
-		OPENSSL_free(heap);
+		OPENSSL_free(prod_Z);
 		}
 	return ret;
 	}

crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c

@@ -205,8 +205,15 @@ ECDH_DATA *ecdh_check(EC_KEY *key)
 		ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)ecdh_data_new();
 		if (ecdh_data == NULL)
 			return NULL;
-		EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdh_data,
-			ecdh_data_dup, ecdh_data_free, ecdh_data_free);
+		data = EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdh_data,
+			   ecdh_data_dup, ecdh_data_free, ecdh_data_free);
+		if (data != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Another thread raced us to install the key_method
+			 * data and won. */
+			ecdh_data_free(ecdh_data);
+			ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;
+			}
 	}
 	else
 		ecdh_data = (ECDH_DATA *)data;

crypto/ecdsa/Makefile

@@ -128,11 +128,12 @@ ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
 ecs_sign.o: ecs_locl.h ecs_sign.c
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
+ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
@@ -140,4 +141,4 @@ ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
 ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
-ecs_vrf.o: ecs_locl.h ecs_vrf.c
+ecs_vrf.o: ../cryptlib.h ecs_locl.h ecs_vrf.c

crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c

@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 	ECDSA_SIG	*ecdsa_sig = NULL;
 	unsigned char	digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
 	unsigned char	*signature = NULL;
-	unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	const unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	unsigned char	*sig_ptr2;
 	unsigned char	*raw_buf = NULL;
 	unsigned int	sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
 	int		nid, ret =  0;
@@ -464,8 +465,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
 			goto builtin_err;
 
-		sig_ptr = signature;
-		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr);
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
@@ -477,8 +478,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
 			goto builtin_err;
 
-		sig_ptr = signature;
-		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr);
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");

crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c

@@ -188,8 +188,15 @@ ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa_check(EC_KEY *key)
 		ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)ecdsa_data_new();
 		if (ecdsa_data == NULL)
 			return NULL;
-		EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdsa_data,
-			ecdsa_data_dup, ecdsa_data_free, ecdsa_data_free);
+		data = EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(key, (void *)ecdsa_data,
+			   ecdsa_data_dup, ecdsa_data_free, ecdsa_data_free);
+		if (data != NULL)
+			{
+			/* Another thread raced us to install the key_method
+			 * data and won. */
+			ecdsa_data_free(ecdsa_data);
+			ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;
+			}
 	}
 	else
 		ecdsa_data = (ECDSA_DATA *)data;

crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "ecs_locl.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
 #endif
@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 		const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
  	{
 	ECDSA_SIG *s;
+	const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
+	unsigned char *der = NULL;
+	int derlen = -1;
 	int ret=-1;
 
 	s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
 	if (s == NULL) return(ret);
-	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
+	/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
+	derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
+	if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
+		goto err;
 	ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
 err:
+	if (derlen > 0)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
+		OPENSSL_free(der);
+		}
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
 	return(ret);
 	}

crypto/engine/eng_all.c

@@ -102,14 +102,14 @@ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GMP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HW_GMP)
 	ENGINE_load_gmp();
 #endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
+	ENGINE_load_capi();
+#endif
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
 #if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)
 	ENGINE_load_cryptodev();
 #endif
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
-	ENGINE_load_capi();
-#endif
 #endif
 	}
 

crypto/engine/engine.h

@@ -335,15 +335,15 @@ void ENGINE_load_gmp(void);
 void ENGINE_load_nuron(void);
 void ENGINE_load_sureware(void);
 void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void);
-#endif
-void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
-void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
-void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG
 void ENGINE_load_capi(void);
 #endif
 #endif
+#endif
+void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void);
+void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
+void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
 
 /* Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation
  * "registry" handling. */

crypto/err/err_all.c

@@ -104,7 +104,9 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
 #include <openssl/jpake.h>
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
 
 void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void)
 	{

crypto/err/openssl.ec

@@ -69,8 +69,14 @@ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION		1060
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION		1070
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY	1071
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR		1080
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	1086
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED		1090
 R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION		1100
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION		1110
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE		1111
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME			1112
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE	1113
+R SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE	1114
 
 R RSAREF_R_CONTENT_ENCODING			0x0400
 R RSAREF_R_DATA					0x0401

crypto/evp/bio_b64.c

@@ -226,6 +226,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 		else if (ctx->start)
 			{
 			q=p=(unsigned char *)ctx->tmp;
+			num = 0;
 			for (j=0; j<i; j++)
 				{
 				if (*(q++) != '\n') continue;
@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ static int b64_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 				}
 
 			/* we fell off the end without starting */
-			if (j == i)
+			if ((j == i) && (num == 0))
 				{
 				/* Is this is one long chunk?, if so, keep on
 				 * reading until a new line. */

crypto/evp/encode.c

@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
 				v=EVP_DecodeBlock(out,d,n);
 				n=0;
 				if (v < 0) { rv=0; goto end; }
+				if (eof > v) { rv=-1; goto end; }
 				ret+=(v-eof);
 				}
 			else

crypto/idea/ideatest.c

@@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher)
                 }
         memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,8);
         n=0;
-        idea_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)17,&eks,
+        idea_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)13,&eks,
                 cfb_tmp,&n,IDEA_DECRYPT);
-        idea_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]),&(cfb_buf2[17]),
-                (long)CFB_TEST_SIZE-17,&dks,
+        idea_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[13]),&(cfb_buf2[13]),
+                (long)CFB_TEST_SIZE-13,&eks,
                 cfb_tmp,&n,IDEA_DECRYPT);
         if (memcmp(plain,cfb_buf2,CFB_TEST_SIZE) != 0)
                 {

crypto/md32_common.h

@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@
 #define HOST_c2l(c,l)	(l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8),		\
-			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    ),		\
-			 l)
+			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    )		)
 #endif
 #ifndef HOST_l2c
 #define HOST_l2c(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff),	\
@@ -262,8 +261,7 @@
 #define HOST_c2l(c,l)	(l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    ),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8),		\
 			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16),		\
-			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24),		\
-			 l)
+			 l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)		)
 #endif
 #ifndef HOST_l2c
 #define HOST_l2c(l,c)	(*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff),	\

crypto/mem.c

@@ -372,6 +372,10 @@ void *CRYPTO_realloc_clean(void *str, int old_len, int num, const char *file,
 
 	if (num <= 0) return NULL;
 
+	/* We don't support shrinking the buffer. Note the memcpy that copies
+	 * |old_len| bytes to the new buffer, below. */
+	if (num < old_len) return NULL;
+
 	if (realloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		realloc_debug_func(str, NULL, num, file, line, 0);
 	ret=malloc_ex_func(num,file,line);

crypto/o_init.c

@@ -93,4 +93,18 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void)
 #endif
 	}
 		
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
 
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	const unsigned char *a = in_a;
+	const unsigned char *b = in_b;
+	unsigned char x = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+		x |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+
+	return x;
+	}
+#endif

crypto/objects/obj_dat.c

@@ -444,11 +444,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
 	unsigned char *p;
 	char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
 
-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
-		buf[0]='\0';
-		return(0);
-	}
+	/* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
+	if (buf && buf_len > 0)
+		buf[0] = '\0';
 
+	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
+		return(0);
 
 	if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
 		{
@@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
 				i=(int)(l/40);
 				l-=(long)(i*40);
 				}
-			if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
+			if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
 				{
 				*buf++ = i + '0';
+				*buf = '\0';
 				buf_len--;
 				}
 			n++;
@@ -544,9 +546,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
 			i = strlen(bndec);
 			if (buf)
 				{
-				if (buf_len > 0)
+				if (buf_len > 1)
 					{
 					*buf++ = '.';
+					*buf = '\0';
 					buf_len--;
 					}
 				BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -786,4 +789,3 @@ err:
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return(ok);
 	}
-

crypto/ocsp/ocsp_ht.c

@@ -464,6 +464,9 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req)
 
 	ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(b, path, req, -1);
 
+	if (!ctx)
+		return NULL;
+
 	do
 		{
 		rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx);