The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok",
so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06affe3dac65592a341547f5a47e52cedb7b71f8)
Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and
added appropriate error handling.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8817e2e0c998757d3bd036d7f45fe8d0a49fbe2d)
Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b611e5fe8eaac9512f72094c460f3ed6040076a)
This addresses
- request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576;
- clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to
see if there will be some traction from compiler side);
- more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout
(desired when RT#3553 was reviewed);
- minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around);
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23f6eec71dbd472044db7dc854599f1de14a1f48)
Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5991ec528b1c339062440811e2641f5ea2b328b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.
Conflicts:
apps/cms.c
apps/ocsp.c
apps/s_client.c
apps/s_server.c
apps/smime.c
apps/verify.c
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact
in the trust store.
When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.
RT3637
RT3621
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.
Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0eed48d37a4b7beea0c966caf09ad46f4a92a44)
A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb327c9ed689b9aaf7bca01a3f5a0657cb)
The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions.
Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c4137b5e828d8fab0b244defb79257619dad8fc7)
Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 111b60bea01d234b5873488c19ff2b9c5d4d58e9)
If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.
This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1c9b2b06c2d203ad89778ce1b98e0b5ad)
The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.
With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ec5c5dd361343d9017eff8547b19e86e4944ebc)
While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.
*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.
Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f617b4969a9261b9d7d381670aefbe2cf766a2cb)
Conflicts:
crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c
Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines. That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
"No gost certificate sent by peer"},
Clearly not what we wanted. This change fixes this problem.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2cfdfe0918f03f8323c9523a2beb2b363ae86ca7)
The macros BSWAP4 and BSWAP8 have statetemnt expressions
implementations that use local variable names that shadow variables
outside the macro call, generating warnings like this
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:263:14: warning: declaration shadows a local variable
[-Wshadow]
seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
^
../modes/modes_lcl.h:41:29: note: expanded from macro 'BSWAP8'
^
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:223:12: note: previous declaration is here
size_t ret = 0;
^
Have clang be quiet by modifying the macro variable names slightly
(suffixing them with an underscore).
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2da2a4349c1598ad0648405fe175e7846d893c45)
We use GNU statement expressions in crypto/md32_common.h, surrounded
by checks that GNU C is indeed used to compile. It seems that clang,
at least on Linux, pretends to be GNU C, therefore finds the statement
expressions and then warns about them.
The solution is to have clang be quiet about it.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 04958e84d8079fa57a782db70f003c38b5b156fd)
ebcdic.c:284:7: warning: ISO C requires a translation unit to contain at least one
declaration [-Wempty-translation-unit]
^
1 warning generated.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c25dea53e9db2b4956c315f85dae3f1c2854fd2b)
There is no indication that the timing differences are exploitable in
OpenSSL, and indeed there is some indication (Usenix '14) that they
are too small to be exploitable. Nevertheless, be careful and apply
the same countermeasures as in s3_srvr.c
Thanks to Nimrod Aviram, Sebastian Schinzel and Yuval Shavitt for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
ARM has optimized Cortex-A5x pipeline to favour pairs of complementary
AES instructions. While modified code improves performance of post-r0p0
Cortex-A53 performance by >40% (for CBC decrypt and CTR), it hurts
original r0p0. We favour later revisions, because one can't prevent
future from coming. Improvement on post-r0p0 Cortex-A57 exceeds 50%,
while new code is not slower on r0p0, or Apple A7 for that matter.
[Update even SHA results for latest Cortex-A53.]
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 94376cccb4ed5b376220bffe0739140ea9dad8c8)
RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30cd4ff294252c4b6a4b69cbef6a5b4117705d22)
Conflicts:
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
create an HMAC
Inspired by BoringSSL commit 2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/hmac/hmac.c
In ssl3_send_new_session_ticket the message to be sent is constructed. We
skip adding the length of the session ticket initially, then call
ssl_set_handshake_header, and finally go back and add in the length of the
ticket. Unfortunately, in DTLS, ssl_set_handshake_header also has the side
effect of buffering the message for subsequent retransmission if required.
By adding the ticket length after the call to ssl_set_handshake_header the
message that is buffered is incomplete, causing an invalid message to be
sent on retransmission.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4f9fab6bd0253416eeace5a45142c7c4a83bc511)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_srvr.c
In DTLS, immediately prior to epoch change, the write_sequence is supposed
to be stored in s->d1->last_write_sequence. The write_sequence is then reset
back to 00000000. In the event of retransmits of records from the previous
epoch, the last_write_sequence is restored. This commit fixes a bug in
DTLS1.2 where the write_sequence was being reset before last_write_sequence
was saved, and therefore retransmits are sent with incorrect sequence
numbers.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d5d0a1cb1347d4a8547e78aec56c50c528186e50)
The certificate already contains the DH parameters in that case.
ssl3_send_server_key_exchange() would fail in that case anyway.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 93f1c13619c5b41f2dcfdbf6ae666f867922a87a)
If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.
PR#3668
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4ca5efc2874e094d6382b30416824eda6dde52fe)
Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.
Reported-by: Conrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828
RT#3758
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7c82e339a677f8546e1456c7a8f6788598a9de43)
Don't check that the curve appears in the list of acceptable curves for the
peer, if they didn't send us such a list (RFC 4492 does not require that the
extension be sent).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b79d24101e3b5904b3770d60e32bdd6edc558337)
In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ecd32a1f8f0643ae7b38f59bbaf9f0d6ef326fe)
