Compare commits

...

114 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
902f3f50d0 Prepare for 1.0.2g release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 13:36:54 +00:00
Matt Caswell
45e53cf881 make update
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 13:36:54 +00:00
Matt Caswell
08d0ff54d0 Ensure mk1mf.pl is aware of no-weak-ssl-ciphers option
Update mk1mf.pl to properly handle no-weak-ssl-ciphers

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 12:41:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
248808c840 Update CHANGES and NEWS for new release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:48:43 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
515f3be47a bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: unify gather procedure in hardly used path
and reorganize/harmonize post-conditions.

Additional hardening following on from CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
2016-03-01 11:21:43 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
25d14c6c29 crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.pl: constant-time gather procedure.
At the same time remove miniscule bias in final subtraction.
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even with
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to be 4% for Sandy
Bridge and 7% on Broadwell.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
2016-03-01 11:21:29 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
08ea966c01 bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl: constant-time gather procedure.
Performance penalty is 2%.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
2016-03-01 11:21:22 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
ef98503eee bn/asm/rsax-x86_64.pl: constant-time gather procedure.
Performance penalty is 2% on Linux and 5% on Windows.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)
2016-03-01 11:21:15 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
708dc2f129 bn/bn_exp.c: constant-time MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF.
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from master)

Resolved conflicts:
	crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
2016-03-01 11:20:41 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
bc38a7d2d3 Disable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3+ ciphers by default
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:20:35 +00:00
Matt Caswell
1b1d8ae49a Add a test for SSLv2 configuration
SSLv2 should be off by default. You can only turn it on if you have called
SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or
SSL_clear_options(SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2). You should not be able to inadvertantly
turn it on again via SSL_CONF without having done that first.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:20:35 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
021fb42dd0 Bring SSL method documentation up to date
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:20:35 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
9dfd2be8a1 Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers.
SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time.  Builds that are not
configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.  Even if
"enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the
version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either
of:

    SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
or
    SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);

as appropriate.  Even if either of those is used, or the application
explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client
or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search
key recovery have been removed.  Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit
EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.

Mitigation for CVE-2016-0800

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:20:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c175308407 Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL ptr/heap corruption
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using
an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|.
For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This leaves ret->d as NULL leading
to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this
case memory is allocated to ret->d, but it is insufficiently sized
leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn.

This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever
called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is
anticipated to be a rare occurrence.

All OpenSSL internal usage of this function uses data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be a rare.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-0797

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2016-02-29 16:34:18 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
29305f4edc Fix invalid free
Also removes an extra initializer, the master branch has a extra field.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-28 13:59:57 +01:00
FdaSilvaYY
7bcdf4ef78 Fix two possible leaks
Backport of 98637bd

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-27 17:05:32 -05:00
FdaSilvaYY
e9cf5f0366 Fix possible memory leak on BUF_MEM_grow_clean failure
backport of 3eb70c5eba
shorter changes

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-27 17:05:32 -05:00
Andy Polyakov
a3762a92d6 modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl: refine GNU assembler version detection.
Even though AVX support was added in GAS 2.19 vpclmulqdq was apparently
added in 2.20.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d3cdab1736)
2016-02-27 21:35:34 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
5361af815d Revert "Don't check RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER."
This reverts commit 6656ba7152.

This broke existing engines that didn't properly implement the sign and verify
functions.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

MR: #2077
2016-02-27 13:12:02 +01:00
Matt Caswell
578b956fe7 Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string
in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length
of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.

Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to
an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of
a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also
occur.

These issues will only occur on certain platforms where sizeof(size_t) >
sizeof(int). E.g. many 64 bit systems. The first issue may mask the second
issue dependent on compiler behaviour.

These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
as command line arguments.

Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.

CVE-2016-0799

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2016-02-25 22:47:13 +00:00
Emilia Kasper
259b664f95 CVE-2016-0798: avoid memory leak in SRP
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
way of distinguishing these two cases.

Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
300 bytes per connection.

Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure
a seed are not vulnerable.

In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.

To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.

Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However,
note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the
indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular,
computations are currently not carried out in constant time.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-24 18:39:13 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
64333004a4 ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: get corner case logic right.
RT#4284

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d93753412b)
2016-02-23 21:26:53 +01:00
FdaSilvaYY
04f2a0b50d GH714: missing field initialisation
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-02-23 13:21:07 -05:00
David Woodhouse
c436c990f6 RT4175: Fix PKCS7_verify() regression with Authenticode signatures
This is a partial revert of commit c8491de39 ("GH354: Memory leak fixes"),
which was cherry-picked from commit 55500ea7c in OpenSSL 1.1.

That commit introduced a change in behaviour which is a regression for
software implementing Microsoft Authenticode — which requires a PKCS#7
signature to be validated against explicit external data, even though
it's a non-detached signature with its own embedded data.

The is fixed differently in OpenSSL 1.1 by commit 6b2ebe433 ("Add
PKCS7_NO_DUAL_CONTENT flag"), but that approach isn't viable in the
1.0.2 stable branch, so just comment the offending check back out again.

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-02-23 10:16:15 -05:00
Corinna Vinschen
f78baa9d71 Don't strip object files on Cygwin
Building for the Cygwin distro requires to be able to build debuginfo
  files.  This in turn requires to build object files without stripping.
  The stripping is performed by the next step after building which creates
  the debuginfo files.

Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>

(cherry picked from commit 42b8f1427a)

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-02-22 22:14:00 +01:00
Richard Levitte
5c57fbb8ca Recognise Cygwin-x86_64 in config
In response to RT#4326

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-22 15:44:10 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6c88c71b4e Fix double free in DSA private key parsing.
Fix double free bug when parsing malformed DSA private keys.

Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.

CVE-2016-0705

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-02-19 14:03:07 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c575ceffdb Makefile.shared: limit .dll image base pinning to FIPS builds.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-02-19 13:40:58 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
b393a4ad38 evp/e_des3.c: address compiler warning.
In backporting from master one modification was mistreated.

RT#4210

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-02-19 13:34:42 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
43be582e9b typo
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f6fb7f1856)
2016-02-18 14:00:23 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
866b282d1b Switch to FIPS implementation for CMAC.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2016-02-16 22:52:59 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
24e6a0dba4 evp/e_des[3].c: address compiler warnings, fix formatting.
RT#4210

(1.0.2-specific adaptation of 7687f52550)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-02-13 10:46:26 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
6533a0b8d1 modes/ctr128.c: pay attention to ecount_buf alignment in CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt.
It's never problem if CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt is called from EVP, because
buffer in question is always aligned within EVP_CIPHER_CTX structure.

RT#4218

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e4bbeb49f)
2016-02-12 22:00:13 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
b4b23d05d3 RT 3854: Update apps/req
Change the default keysize to 2048 bits, and the minimum to 512 bits.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a762655743)
2016-02-12 14:17:57 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
10c639a8a5 perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl: pass pure constants verbatim.
RT#3885

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fd7dc201d3)
2016-02-11 21:26:44 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
0fffd52242 util/mk1mf.pl: use LINK_CMD instead of LINK variable.
Trouble is that LINK variable assignment in make-file interferes with
LINK environment variable, which can be used to modify Microsoft's
LINK.EXE behaviour.

RT#4289

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d44bb1c31c)

Resolved conflicts:
	util/pl/VC-32.pl
2016-02-11 21:25:24 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
52464477be ms/uplink-x86.pl: make it work.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 740b2b9a6c)
2016-02-10 12:55:11 +01:00
Matt Caswell
64193c8218 Handle SSL_shutdown while in init more appropriately #2
Previous commit f73c737c7 attempted to "fix" a problem with the way
SSL_shutdown() behaved whilst in mid-handshake. The original behaviour had
SSL_shutdown() return immediately having taken no action if called mid-
handshake with a return value of 1 (meaning everything was shutdown
successfully). In fact the shutdown has not been successful.

Commit f73c737c7 changed that to send a close_notify anyway and then
return. This seems to be causing some problems for some applications so
perhaps a better (much simpler) approach is revert to the previous
behaviour (no attempt at a shutdown), but return -1 (meaning the shutdown
was not successful).

This also fixes a bug where SSL_shutdown always returns 0 when shutdown
*very* early in the handshake (i.e. we are still using SSLv23_method).

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2016-02-08 09:30:57 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
402fb1896b if no comparison function set make sk_sort no op
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ca2e82ab1)
2016-02-06 18:49:56 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
a3baa17105 Fix missing ok=0 with locally blacklisted CAs
Also in X509_verify_cert() avoid using "i" not only as a loop
counter, but also as a trust outcome and as an error ordinal.

Finally, make sure that all "goto end" jumps return an error, with
"end" renamed to "err" accordingly.

[ The 1.1.0 version of X509_verify_cert() is major rewrite,
  which addresses these issues in a more systemic way. ]

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-05 10:54:11 -05:00
Kurt Roeckx
093d20a8cb Restore xmm7 from the correct address on win64
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT: #4288, MR: #1831
(cherry picked from commit df057ea6c8)
2016-02-04 15:42:50 +01:00
Viktor Dukhovni
5df0bde60e Fix pkeyutl/rsautl empty encrypt-input/decrypt-output handling
Also fix option processing in pkeyutl to allow use of (formerly)
"out-of-order" switches that were needless implementation limitations.

RT2018

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-02 12:41:33 -05:00
Rich Salz
a2bab12a33 GH611: s_client help message bug
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-02-02 12:16:10 -05:00
Hubert Kario
106dbca36c GH554: Improve pkeyutl doc
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53619f9f40)
2016-02-01 11:45:00 -05:00
Daniel Kahn Gillmor
a38a159bfc RT4129: BUF_new_mem_buf should take const void *
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ab31975ba)
2016-02-01 08:43:27 -05:00
Rich Salz
e0fde613ac GH102: Add volatile to CRYPTO_memcmp
Can't hurt and seems to prevent problems from some over-aggressive
(LTO?) compilers.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 98ab57644f)
2016-01-30 14:41:23 -05:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2454accb6e Backport SHA2 support for capi engine
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2016-01-29 13:35:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
1e9446bf5c Add have_precompute_mult tests
Add tests for have_precompute_mult for the optimised curves (nistp224,
nistp256 and nistp521) if present

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ce4e7e605)
2016-01-29 13:07:12 +00:00
Matt Caswell
e94f52e0c7 Fix bug in nistp224/256/521 where have_precompute_mult always returns 0
During precomputation if the group given is well known then we memcpy a
well known precomputation. However we go the wrong label in the code and
don't store the data properly. Consequently if we call have_precompute_mult
the data isn't there and we return 0.

RT#3600

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 615614c886)
2016-01-29 13:07:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
83ab6e55a1 Add missing return value checks
The function DH_check_pub_key() was missing some return value checks in
some calls to BN functions.

RT#4278

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f5a12207ec)
2016-01-29 11:58:45 +00:00
Matt Caswell
7107798ae6 Correct value of DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID
A new return value for DH_check_pub_key was recently added:
DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID. As this is a flag which can be ORed with other
return values it should have been set to the value 4 not 3.

RT#4278

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb389fe804)
2016-01-29 11:58:45 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
2b0c11a620 Fix CHANGES entry about DSA_generate_parameters_ex
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
2016-01-28 19:55:46 +01:00
Richard Levitte
da7947e8c6 Correct number of arguments in BIO_get_conn_int_port macro
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41a28cb294)
2016-01-28 18:20:55 +01:00
Matt Caswell
22d192f106 Prepare for 1.0.2g-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 13:58:24 +00:00
Matt Caswell
95605f3ae1 Prepare for 1.0.2f release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 13:57:22 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f26a179abc Update CHANGES and NEWS for release
Add details about the latest issues into CHANGES and NEWS ready for the
next release.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 13:49:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
75374adf8a Add a test for small subgroup attacks on DH/DHE
Following on from the previous commit, add a test to ensure that
DH_compute_key correctly fails if passed a bad y such that:

y^q (mod p) != 1

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 13:49:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c5b831f21d Always generate DH keys for ephemeral DH cipher suites
Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.

CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 2 or 2)

Issue reported by Antonio Sanso

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 13:49:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
878e2c5b13 Prevent small subgroup attacks on DH/DHE
Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC
5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that
are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's
private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete
multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same DH exponent.

A simple mitigation is to ensure that y^q (mod p) == 1

CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 1 of 2)

Issue reported by Antonio Sanso.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 13:49:56 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
d81a160058 Better SSLv2 cipher-suite enforcement
Based on patch by: Nimrod Aviram <nimrod.aviram@gmail.com>

CVE-2015-3197

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 13:48:24 +00:00
Mouse
3665fa2543 pkeyutl: allow peerkey for EC_DERIVE to reside on a hardware token (public key for now)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-22 20:13:31 +01:00
Billy Brumley
2b80d00e3a RT3863 ECC: Add missing NULL check. Set a flag
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dd67493c34)
2016-01-21 14:14:33 +00:00
Rich Salz
78a140ecb3 GH issue 572: Error in help message
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2016-01-20 18:52:18 -05:00
Matt Caswell
f73c737c7a Handle SSL_shutdown while in init more appropriately
Calling SSL_shutdown while in init previously gave a "1" response, meaning
everything was successfully closed down (even though it wasn't). Better is
to send our close_notify, but fail when trying to receive one.

The problem with doing a shutdown while in the middle of a handshake is
that once our close_notify is sent we shouldn't really do anything else
(including process handshake/CCS messages) until we've received a
close_notify back from the peer. However the peer might send a CCS before
acting on our close_notify - so we won't be able to read it because we're
not acting on CCS messages!

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2016-01-20 13:55:36 +00:00
Richard Levitte
930d87c1e1 Fix BSD -rpath parameter
For BSD systems, Configure adds a shared_ldflags including a reference
to the Makefile variable LIBRPATH, but since it must be passed down to
Makefile.shared, care must be taken so the value of LIBRPATH doesn't
get expanded too early, or it ends up giving an empty string.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c64879d3f3)
2016-01-19 20:59:26 +01:00
Alessandro Ghedini
607e77300e Validate ClientHello session_id field length and send alert on failure
RT#4080

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-01-19 15:37:16 +00:00
Prayag Verma
0555901cb4 Update license year range to 2016
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 02f7037247)
2016-01-19 10:24:35 -05:00
Kristian Amlie
7934ce27cd Don't use "grep -q", "-q" is not POSIX, and fails on Solaris.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-18 16:20:51 +01:00
Viktor Dukhovni
4d6fe78f65 Empty SNI names are not valid
While empty inputs to SSL_set1_host() clear the reference identifier
list.

(cherry-picked from 1.1.0-dev)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-01-17 16:58:48 -05:00
Zi Lin
15debc128a NGX-2040 - fix wildcard match on punycode/IDNA DNS names
- bugfix: should not treat '--' as invalid domain substring.
    - '-' should not be the first letter of a domain

Signed-off-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-01-15 14:48:17 -05:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e254d12c43 To avoid possible time_t overflow use X509_time_adj_ex()
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9aa00b187a)

Conflicts:
	apps/x509.c
2016-01-14 03:02:27 +00:00
Mouse
8788fb97a8 Root cause discovered and fixed, this fix became unnecessary
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-13 01:23:34 +01:00
Uri Blumenthal
6fa6a66285 Changed help output
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-13 01:23:34 +01:00
Mouse
a2a29f702a Pass engine=NULL to EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(), unless "-engine_impl" was given
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-13 01:23:34 +01:00
Mouse
8259ccb44d Remove unnecessary debugging fprintf
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-13 01:23:34 +01:00
Mouse
ad81ca9061 Fixed crash (SIGSEGV) when freeing of ex_data stumbles upon a NULL-pointer.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-13 01:23:34 +01:00
Mouse
d65a8d0b7e Fixed a bug preventing pkeyutl from accessing keys directly on the token via engine_pkcs11
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-13 01:23:34 +01:00
arijitnayak
75fdee0482 Wrong definition of the macro SSL_set1_sigalgs in ssl.h
Error in the definition of the macro SSL_set1_sigalgs(ctx, slist,
slistlen): the third parameter 'slistlen' not used in the substitution
code; used 'clistlen' instead. As a result of this, compilation error
occurs when any application uses this macro.

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-01-12 12:53:27 -05:00
Kurt Roeckx
a4530ce039 Change minimum DH size from 768 to 1024
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
2016-01-11 00:01:52 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
cb19c0d15f File is about s_time, not s_client
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1918e01c9f)
2016-01-10 13:14:19 +01:00
Viktor Dukhovni
a3d74afcae Fix X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup()
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2016-01-02 11:14:05 -05:00
Rich Salz
4d9c6fa01b RT4202: Update rt URL's.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41977c53cd)
2015-12-28 16:41:10 -05:00
Matt Caswell
c52c3b5e11 Add some documentation for the OCSP callback functions
Describe the usage of the OCSP callback functions on both the client and
the server side.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2015-12-27 22:02:33 +00:00
Matt Caswell
0ac6239955 Ensure we don't call the OCSP callback if resuming a session
It makes no sense to call the OCSP status callback if we are resuming a
session because no certificates will be sent.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2015-12-27 22:02:33 +00:00
Matt Caswell
905943af3b Fix error when server does not send CertificateStatus message
If a server sends the status_request extension then it may choose
to send the CertificateStatus message. However this is optional.
We were treating it as mandatory and the connection was failing.

Thanks to BoringSSL for reporting this issue.

RT#4120

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2015-12-27 22:02:33 +00:00
Daniel Kahn Gillmor
155a1623d0 The functions take a SSL *, not a SSL_CTX *
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RT: #4192, MR: #1533
(cherry picked from commit d938e8dfee)
2015-12-23 22:33:26 +01:00
David Benjamin
1c7de36f62 Fix memory leak in DSA redo case.
Found by clang scan-build.

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT: #4184, MR: #1496
(cherry picked from commit 679d87515d)
2015-12-22 11:49:57 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6656ba7152 Don't check RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-12-20 19:27:03 +00:00
Richard Levitte
17592f323a BIO_s_datagram() ctrl doesn't support SEEK/TELL, so don't pretend it does
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-12-19 22:07:42 +01:00
Richard Levitte
6d97060ee0 Correct or add comments indicating what controls belong to what
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-12-19 22:07:42 +01:00
Richard Levitte
7eb5125125 Document how BIO_get_conn_ip and BIO_get_conn_int_port actually work
No dummy arguments.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-12-19 22:07:42 +01:00
Richard Levitte
2a60fccdd9 Have BIO_get_conn_int_port use BIO_ctrl instead BIO_int_ctrl
BIO_int_ctrl isn't made for the purpose BIO_get_conn_int_port used it
for.

This also changes BIO_C_GET_CONNECT to actually return the port
instead of assigning it to a pointer that was never returned back to
the caller.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-12-19 22:07:42 +01:00
Matt Caswell
f6cadeeeed Fix more URLs mangled by reformat
Fix some more URLs mangled by indent in the reformat. These ones don't exist
in master so we have a separate commit. Based on a patch supplied by Arnaud
Lacombe <al@aerilon.ca>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-12-19 14:44:03 +00:00
Matt Caswell
dd045d17e7 Fix URLs mangled by reformat
Some URLs in the source code ended up getting mangled by indent. This fixes
it. Based on a patch supplied by Arnaud Lacombe <al@aerilon.ca>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-12-19 14:43:43 +00:00
Richard Levitte
93a17f79b9 Remove the "eay" c-file-style indicators
Since we don't use the eay style any more, there's no point tryint to
tell emacs to use it.

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
2015-12-18 13:39:34 +01:00
Rich Salz
ecadde4d4d Provide better "make depend" warning.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2e31ef0366)
2015-12-16 17:46:07 -05:00
Emilia Kasper
44e4f5b04b Fix a ** 0 mod 1 = 0 for real this time.
Commit 2b0180c37f attempted to do this but
only hit one of many BN_mod_exp codepaths. Fix remaining variants and add
a test for each method.

Thanks to Hanno Boeck for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d911097d7c)
2015-12-14 17:57:49 +01:00
Richard Levitte
474a53b3a3 Fix tarball production to keep test/bctest and util/pod2mantest
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-12-14 03:54:56 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
e780ed0336 x86_64 assembly pack: tune clang version detection even further.
RT#4171

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b974943234)
2015-12-13 22:19:32 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
3cd33c42e3 ec/ecp_nistz256_table.c: fix potential misalignment problem with Sun C.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-12-10 20:13:28 +01:00
Matt Caswell
50053969e3 Ensure |rwstate| is set correctly on BIO_flush
A BIO_flush call in the DTLS code was not correctly setting the |rwstate|
variable to SSL_WRITING. This means that SSL_get_error() will not return
SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE in the event of an IO retry.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67f60be8c9)
2015-12-10 12:47:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
01b5c1239b Fix DTLS handshake fragment retries
If using DTLS and NBIO then if a second or subsequent handshake message
fragment hits a retry, then the retry attempt uses the wrong fragment
offset value. This commit restores the fragment offset from the last
attempt.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2ad226e88b)
2015-12-10 12:47:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f4d1926f95 Add a return value check
If the call to OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs fails to find the relevant NID then
we should set the NID to NID_undef.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 330dcb09b2)
2015-12-10 11:50:45 +00:00
Dr Stephen Henson
9501418ea2 Don't use applink for static builds.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2015-12-09 00:30:29 +00:00
Rich Salz
50b255a260 Refer to website for acknowledgements.
Reviewed-by: Steve Marquess <marquess@openssl.com>
(cherry picked from commit ab29c82a55)
2015-12-08 16:07:59 -05:00
Richard Levitte
5ff0cfa517 Not all 'find's know -xtype, use -type instead
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3cd7aef34d)
2015-12-08 21:06:19 +01:00
Richard Levitte
02d013e621 Adapt the OS X build to use the OS X tar
As part of this, move release creation to a script to be called from
.travis.yml.  That makes it much easier to test outside of travis.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 382af61f62)
2015-12-08 21:06:18 +01:00
Richard Levitte
89cd4fb5e9 Make it possible to affect the way dists are made
Introducing DISTTARVARS to propagate changed variables down to the
tar-making target.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4d3c30a179)
2015-12-08 21:06:18 +01:00
Richard Levitte
c44844d928 Cleanup the EVP_MD_CTX before exit rather than after
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-12-08 01:04:55 +01:00
Richard Levitte
4e295148c3 Change tar owner and group to just 0
It seems like some tar versions don't like the name:id form for
--owner and --group.  The closest known anonymous user being 0 (root),
that seems to be the most appropriate user/group to assign ownership
to.  It matters very little when unpacking either way.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b91dd150d2)
2015-12-07 20:10:51 +01:00
Richard Levitte
8e18babd1b Do not add symlinks in the source release
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 451a5bdf03)
2015-12-07 16:21:49 +01:00
Richard Levitte
b12fd50626 In travis, build from a "source release" rather than from the build tree
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 475fc3d872)
2015-12-07 16:21:43 +01:00
Richard Levitte
e40d6bf00a Small changes to creating dists
Make TARFILE include ../ instead of having that hard coded all over the place.
When transforming file names in TAR_COMMAND, use $(NAME) instead of openssl-$(VERSION)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a544810f0)
2015-12-07 16:20:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
8a27243c7b Prepare for 1.0.2f-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2015-12-03 14:45:41 +00:00
199 changed files with 3448 additions and 1720 deletions

10
.travis-create-release.sh Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#! /bin/sh
# $1 is expected to be $TRAVIS_OS_NAME
if [ "$1" == osx ]; then
make -f Makefile.org \
DISTTARVARS="NAME=_srcdist TAR_COMMAND='\$\$(TAR) \$\$(TARFLAGS) -s \"|^|\$\$(NAME)/|\" -T \$\$(TARFILE).list -cvf -' TARFLAGS='-n' TARFILE=_srcdist.tar" SHELL='sh -vx' dist
else
make -f Makefile.org DISTTARVARS='TARFILE=_srcdist.tar NAME=_srcdist' SHELL='sh -v' dist
fi

View File

@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ matrix:
env: CONFIG_OPTS="-d --strict-warnings"
before_script:
- sh .travis-create-release.sh $TRAVIS_OS_NAME
- tar -xvzf _srcdist.tar.gz
- cd _srcdist
- if [ "$CC" == i686-w64-mingw32-gcc ]; then
export CROSS_COMPILE=${CC%%gcc}; unset CC;
./Configure mingw $CONFIG_OPTS;
@@ -44,10 +47,13 @@ before_script:
fi;
./config $CONFIG_OPTS;
fi
- cd ..
script:
- cd _srcdist
- make
- if [ -z "$CROSS_COMPILE" ]; then make test; fi
- cd ..
notifications:
email:

View File

@@ -1,30 +1,2 @@
The OpenSSL project depends on volunteer efforts and financial support from
the end user community. That support comes in the form of donations and paid
sponsorships, software support contracts, paid consulting services
and commissioned software development.
Since all these activities support the continued development and improvement
of OpenSSL we consider all these clients and customers as sponsors of the
OpenSSL project.
We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
Major support:
Qualys http://www.qualys.com/
Very significant support:
OpenGear: http://www.opengear.com/
Significant support:
PSW Group: http://www.psw.net/
Acano Ltd. http://acano.com/
Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.
Additional sponsorship or financial support is always welcome: for more
information please contact the OpenSSL Software Foundation.
Please https://www.openssl.org/community/thanks.html for the current
acknowledgements.

182
CHANGES
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,186 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
* Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
[Viktor Dukhovni]
* Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
"enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
will need to explicitly call either of:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
or
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
(CVE-2016-0800)
[Viktor Dukhovni]
*) Fix a double-free in DSA code
A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
considered rare.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
libFuzzer.
(CVE-2016-0705)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
is configured.
Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
that of a valid user.
(CVE-2016-0798)
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
(CVE-2016-0797)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
also occur.
The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
as command line arguments.
Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
(CVE-2016-0799)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
http://cachebleed.info.
(CVE-2016-0702)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
apps to use 2048 bits by default.
[Emilia Käsper]
Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
*) DH small subgroups
Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
(CVE-2016-0701)
[Matt Caswell]
*) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
and Sebastian Schinzel.
(CVE-2015-3197)
[Viktor Dukhovni]
*) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits.
[Kurt Roeckx]
Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
*) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
@@ -57,7 +237,7 @@
[Emilia Käsper]
*) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
return an error
use a random seed, as already documented.
[Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimenta
# library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library.
# sctp include SCTP support
# 386 generate 80386 code
# enable-weak-ssl-ciphers
# Enable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3 ciphers that are disabled by
# default. Note, weak SSLv2 ciphers are unconditionally
# disabled.
# no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code, above option implies no-sse2
# no-<cipher> build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...)
# -<xxx> +<xxx> compiler options are passed through
@@ -124,6 +128,9 @@ my $clang_disabled_warnings = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initiali
# -Wextended-offsetof
my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
# Warn that "make depend" should be run?
my $warn_make_depend = 0;
my $strict_warnings = 0;
my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL";
@@ -778,11 +785,13 @@ my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental
"md2" => "default",
"rc5" => "default",
"rfc3779" => "default",
"sctp" => "default",
"sctp" => "default",
"shared" => "default",
"ssl-trace" => "default",
"ssl2" => "default",
"store" => "experimental",
"unit-test" => "default",
"weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default",
"zlib" => "default",
"zlib-dynamic" => "default"
);
@@ -1513,7 +1522,7 @@ if ($target =~ /\-icc$/) # Intel C compiler
# linker only when --prefix is not /usr.
if ($target =~ /^BSD\-/)
{
$shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
$shared_ldflag.=" -Wl,-rpath,\$\$(LIBRPATH)" if ($prefix !~ m|^/usr[/]*$|);
}
if ($sys_id ne "")
@@ -2028,14 +2037,8 @@ EOF
&dofile("apps/CA.pl",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s');
}
if ($depflags ne $default_depflags && !$make_depend) {
print <<EOF;
Since you've disabled or enabled at least one algorithm, you need to do
the following before building:
make depend
EOF
}
$warn_make_depend++;
}
}
# create the ms/version32.rc file if needed
@@ -2114,12 +2117,18 @@ EOF
print <<\EOF if ($no_shared_warn);
You gave the option 'shared'. Normally, that would give you shared libraries.
Unfortunately, the OpenSSL configuration doesn't include shared library support
for this platform yet, so it will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If
you can inform the developpers (openssl-dev\@openssl.org) how to support shared
libraries on this platform, they will at least look at it and try their best
(but please first make sure you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
You gave the option 'shared', which is not supported on this platform, so
we will pretend you gave the option 'no-shared'. If you know how to implement
shared libraries, please let us know (but please first make sure you have
tried with a current version of OpenSSL).
EOF
print <<EOF if ($warn_make_depend);
*** Because of configuration changes, you MUST do the following before
*** building:
make depend
EOF
exit(0);

View File

@@ -164,10 +164,10 @@
standard headers). If it is a problem with OpenSSL itself, please
report the problem to <openssl-bugs@openssl.org> (note that your
message will be recorded in the request tracker publicly readable
via http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html and will be forwarded to a
public mailing list). Include the output of "make report" in your message.
Please check out the request tracker. Maybe the bug was already
reported or has already been fixed.
at https://www.openssl.org/community/index.html#bugs and will be
forwarded to a public mailing list). Include the output of "make
report" in your message. Please check out the request tracker. Maybe
the bug was already reported or has already been fixed.
[If you encounter assembler error messages, try the "no-asm"
configuration option as an immediate fix.]

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
---------------
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1998-2016 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

View File

@@ -180,8 +180,7 @@ SHARED_LDFLAGS=
GENERAL= Makefile
BASENAME= openssl
NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION)
TARFILE= $(NAME).tar
WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar
TARFILE= ../$(NAME).tar
EXHEADER= e_os2.h
HEADER= e_os.h
@@ -499,38 +498,35 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
--owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
--transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from $(TARFILE).list \
--owner 0 --group 0 \
--transform 's|^|$(NAME)/|' \
-cvf -
../$(TARFILE).list:
$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
\! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
| sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
\( \! -name '*test' -o -name bctest -o -name pod2mantest \) \
\! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \! -type l \
| sort > $(TARFILE).list
tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
tar: $(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best > $(TARFILE).gz
rm -f $(TARFILE).list
ls -l $(TARFILE).gz
tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
tar-snap: $(TARFILE).list
$(TAR_COMMAND) > $(TARFILE)
rm -f $(TARFILE).list
ls -l $(TARFILE)
dist:
$(PERL) Configure dist
@$(MAKE) dist_pem_h
@$(MAKE) SDIRS='$(SDIRS)' clean
@$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' tar
dist_pem_h:
(cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean)
@$(MAKE) TAR='$(TAR)' TARFLAGS='$(TARFLAGS)' $(DISTTARVARS) tar
install: all install_docs install_sw

View File

@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ link_o.cygwin:
SHLIB_SOVER=${LIBVERSION:+"-$(LIBVERSION)"}; \
ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base $$deffile -Wl,-s,-Bsymbolic"; \
SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base $$deffile -Wl,-Bsymbolic"; \
$(LINK_SO_O)
#for mingw target if def-file is in use dll-name should match library-name
link_a.cygwin:
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ link_a.cygwin:
SHLIB_SOVER=32; \
extras="$(LIBNAME).def"; \
$(PERL) util/mkdef.pl 32 $$SHLIB > $$extras; \
base=; [ $(LIBNAME) = "crypto" ] && base=-Wl,--image-base,0x63000000; \
base=; [ $(LIBNAME) = "crypto" -a -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] && base=-Wl,--image-base,0x63000000; \
fi; \
dll_name=$$SHLIB$$SHLIB_SOVER$$SHLIB_SUFFIX; \
$(PERL) util/mkrc.pl $$dll_name | \
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ link_a.cygwin:
extras="$$extras rc.o"; \
ALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--whole-archive'; \
NOALLSYMSFLAGS='-Wl,--no-whole-archive'; \
SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-s,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,lib$(LIBNAME).dll.a $$extras"; \
SHAREDFLAGS="$(CFLAGS) $(SHARED_LDFLAGS) -shared $$base -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,lib$(LIBNAME).dll.a $$extras"; \
[ -f apps/$$dll_name ] && rm apps/$$dll_name; \
[ -f test/$$dll_name ] && rm test/$$dll_name; \
$(LINK_SO_A) || exit 1; \

18
NEWS
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,24 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers
(CVE-2016-0800)
o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705)
o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak
(CVE-2016-0798)
o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
(CVE-2016-0797)
o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799)
o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)
o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)

13
README
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015
OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -90,11 +90,12 @@
In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
take a day for the ticket to show up. (We also scan posts to make sure
that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to
openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail
to this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database
(see https://www.openssl.org/community/index.html#bugs for details) and
also forwarded the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail
may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the
key servers).
Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it

View File

@@ -2442,7 +2442,11 @@ int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in)
else
len = 1024;
len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len);
if (len <= 0)
if (len < 0) {
BIO_free(mem);
return -1;
}
if (len == 0)
break;
if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) {
BIO_free(mem);
@@ -2459,7 +2463,7 @@ int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in)
return ret;
}
int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *value)
int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value)
{
int rv;
char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL;

View File

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
int *badarg, BIO *err, X509_VERIFY_PARAM **pm);
void policies_print(BIO *out, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in);
int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *value);
int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value);
int init_gen_str(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX **pctx,
const char *algname, ENGINE *e, int do_param);
int do_X509_sign(BIO *err, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md,

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* apps/engine.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* apps/engine.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.

View File

@@ -1041,7 +1041,7 @@ static int make_ocsp_response(OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
bs = OCSP_BASICRESP_new();
thisupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
if (ndays != -1)
nextupd = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, nmin * 60 + ndays * 3600 * 24);
nextupd = X509_time_adj_ex(NULL, ndays, nmin * 60, NULL);
/* Examine each certificate id in the request */
for (i = 0; i < id_count; i++) {

View File

@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
# define CLCERTS 0x8
# define CACERTS 0x10
int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
int dump_certs_keys_p12(BIO *out, PKCS12 *p12, char *pass, int passlen,
int options, char *pempass);
int dump_certs_pkeys_bags(BIO *out, STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags,
@@ -594,7 +595,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
vret = get_cert_chain(ucert, store, &chain2);
X509_STORE_free(store);
if (!vret) {
if (vret == X509_V_OK) {
/* Exclude verified certificate */
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain2); i++)
sk_X509_push(certs, sk_X509_value(chain2, i));
@@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
X509_free(sk_X509_value(chain2, 0));
sk_X509_free(chain2);
} else {
if (vret >= 0)
if (vret != X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error %s getting chain.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(vret));
else
@@ -906,36 +907,25 @@ int dump_certs_pkeys_bag(BIO *out, PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, char *pass,
/* Given a single certificate return a verified chain or NULL if error */
/* Hope this is OK .... */
int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
static int get_cert_chain(X509 *cert, X509_STORE *store,
STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
{
X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
STACK_OF(X509) *chn;
STACK_OF(X509) *chn = NULL;
int i = 0;
/*
* FIXME: Should really check the return status of X509_STORE_CTX_init
* for an error, but how that fits into the return value of this function
* is less obvious.
*/
X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL);
if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) <= 0) {
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx);
if (i == 0)
/*
* avoid returning 0 if X509_verify_cert() did not set an
* appropriate error value in the context
*/
i = -1;
chn = NULL;
goto err;
} else
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, NULL)) {
*chain = NULL;
return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
}
if (X509_verify_cert(&store_ctx) > 0)
chn = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&store_ctx);
err:
else if ((i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx)) == 0)
i = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
*chain = chn;
return i;
}

View File

@@ -73,11 +73,12 @@ static void usage(void);
#define PROG pkeyutl_main
static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e);
const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
int impl);
static int setup_peer(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform,
const char *file);
const char *file, ENGINE* e);
static int do_keyop(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pkey_op,
unsigned char *out, size_t *poutlen,
@@ -97,10 +98,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
char *passargin = NULL;
int keysize = -1;
int engine_impl = 0;
unsigned char *buf_in = NULL, *buf_out = NULL, *sig = NULL;
size_t buf_outlen;
size_t buf_outlen = 0;
int buf_inlen = 0, siglen = -1;
const char *inkey = NULL;
const char *peerkey = NULL;
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *pkeyopts = NULL;
int ret = 1, rv = -1;
@@ -134,21 +138,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-inkey")) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
else {
ctx = init_ctx(&keysize,
*(++argv), keyform, key_type,
passargin, pkey_op, e);
if (!ctx) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing context\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
badarg = 1;
}
}
else
inkey = *++argv;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-peerkey")) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
else if (!setup_peer(bio_err, ctx, peerform, *(++argv)))
badarg = 1;
else
peerkey = *++argv;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-passin")) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
@@ -171,6 +167,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
badarg = 1;
else
e = setup_engine(bio_err, *(++argv), 0);
} else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-engine_impl")) {
engine_impl = 1;
}
#endif
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-pubin"))
@@ -187,23 +185,21 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-verifyrecover"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-rev"))
rev = 1;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-encrypt"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-decrypt"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-derive"))
pkey_op = EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE;
else if (!strcmp(*argv, "-rev"))
rev = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-pkeyopt") == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
badarg = 1;
else if (!ctx) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "-pkeyopt command before -inkey\n");
badarg = 1;
} else if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, *(++argv)) <= 0) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "parameter setting error\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
else if ((pkeyopts == NULL &&
(pkeyopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null()) == NULL) ||
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(pkeyopts, *++argv) == 0) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "out of memory\n");
goto end;
}
} else
@@ -216,10 +212,37 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
argv++;
}
if (!ctx) {
if (inkey == NULL ||
(peerkey != NULL && pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE)) {
usage();
goto end;
}
ctx = init_ctx(&keysize, inkey, keyform, key_type,
passargin, pkey_op, e, engine_impl);
if (!ctx) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error initializing context\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (peerkey != NULL && !setup_peer(bio_err, ctx, peerform, peerkey, e)) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting up peer key\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
if (pkeyopts != NULL) {
int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(pkeyopts);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
const char *opt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(pkeyopts, i);
if (pkey_ctrl_string(ctx, opt) <= 0) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "parameter setting error\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
}
}
if (sigfile && (pkey_op != EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Signature file specified for non verify\n");
@@ -269,7 +292,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
siglen = bio_to_mem(&sig, keysize * 10, sigbio);
BIO_free(sigbio);
if (siglen <= 0) {
if (siglen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature data\n");
goto end;
}
@@ -278,7 +301,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (in) {
/* Read the input data */
buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in);
if (buf_inlen <= 0) {
if (buf_inlen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
exit(1);
}
@@ -306,7 +329,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
} else {
rv = do_keyop(ctx, pkey_op, NULL, (size_t *)&buf_outlen,
buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
if (rv > 0) {
if (rv > 0 && buf_outlen != 0) {
buf_out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_outlen);
if (!buf_out)
rv = -1;
@@ -336,12 +359,14 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
BIO_free(in);
BIO_free_all(out);
if (buf_in)
if (buf_in != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (buf_out)
if (buf_out != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(buf_out);
if (sig)
if (sig != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(sig);
if (pkeyopts != NULL)
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(pkeyopts);
return ret;
}
@@ -368,18 +393,21 @@ static void usage()
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-hexdump hex dump output\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"-engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n");
"-engine e use engine e, maybe a hardware device, for loading keys.\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-engine_impl also use engine given by -engine for crypto operations\n");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-passin arg pass phrase source\n");
}
static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e)
const char *keyfile, int keyform, int key_type,
char *passargin, int pkey_op, ENGINE *e,
int engine_impl)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ENGINE *impl = NULL;
char *passin = NULL;
int rv = -1;
X509 *x;
@@ -418,9 +446,14 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
if (!pkey)
goto end;
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, e);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (engine_impl)
impl = e;
#endif
ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, impl);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (!ctx)
@@ -467,16 +500,15 @@ static EVP_PKEY_CTX *init_ctx(int *pkeysize,
}
static int setup_peer(BIO *err, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int peerform,
const char *file)
const char *file, ENGINE* e)
{
EVP_PKEY *peer = NULL;
ENGINE* engine = NULL;
int ret;
if (!ctx) {
BIO_puts(err, "-peerkey command before -inkey\n");
return 0;
}
peer = load_pubkey(bio_err, file, peerform, 0, NULL, NULL, "Peer Key");
if (peerform == FORMAT_ENGINE)
engine = e;
peer = load_pubkey(bio_err, file, peerform, 0, NULL, engine, "Peer Key");
if (!peer) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading peer key %s\n", file);

View File

@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@
#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
#define UTF8_IN "utf8"
#define DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH 512
#define MIN_KEY_LENGTH 384
#define DEFAULT_KEY_LENGTH 2048
#define MIN_KEY_LENGTH 512
#undef PROG
#define PROG req_main

View File

@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (outfile) {
if (!(out = BIO_new_file(outfile, "wb"))) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Reading Output File\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Writing Output File\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
/* Read the input data */
rsa_inlen = BIO_read(in, rsa_in, keysize * 2);
if (rsa_inlen <= 0) {
if (rsa_inlen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
exit(1);
}
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (rsa_outlen <= 0) {
if (rsa_outlen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA operation error\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;

View File

@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
" -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",
SSL_HOST_NAME, PORT_STR);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_host host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
" -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -390,8 +390,6 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
" -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -serverpref - Use server's cipher preferences (only SSLv2)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -cipher - preferred cipher to use, use the 'openssl ciphers'\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,

View File

@@ -429,6 +429,8 @@ typedef struct srpsrvparm_st {
static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
{
srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg;
int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) {
p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login);
@@ -437,21 +439,25 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
if (p->user == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login);
return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
goto err;
}
if (SSL_set_srp_server_param
(s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v,
p->user->info) < 0) {
*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
goto err;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n",
p->login, p->user->info);
/* need to check whether there are memory leaks */
ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
err:
SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user);
p->user = NULL;
p->login = NULL;
return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
return ret;
}
#endif
@@ -498,7 +504,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -accept arg - port to accept on (default is %d)\n", PORT);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_host host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
" -verify_hostname host - check peer certificate matches \"host\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -verify_email email - check peer certificate matches \"email\"\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -2452,9 +2458,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@@ -2508,9 +2515,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@@ -2605,9 +2613,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@@ -2849,9 +2858,10 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
&& SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@@ -2891,9 +2901,10 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@@ -3236,9 +3247,10 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@@ -3264,9 +3276,10 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* apps/speed.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* apps/speed.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1226,12 +1226,7 @@ static int sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int days, int clrext,
if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x), 0) == NULL)
goto err;
/* Lets just make it 12:00am GMT, Jan 1 1970 */
/* memcpy(x->cert_info->validity->notBefore,"700101120000Z",13); */
/* 28 days to be certified */
if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x), (long)60 * 60 * 24 * days) ==
NULL)
if (X509_time_adj_ex(X509_get_notAfter(x), days, 0, NULL) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_set_pubkey(x, pkey))

3
config
View File

@@ -852,7 +852,8 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
# *-dgux) OUT="dgux" ;;
mips-sony-newsos4) OUT="newsos4-gcc" ;;
*-*-cygwin_pre1.3) OUT="Cygwin-pre1.3" ;;
*-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin" ;;
i[3456]86-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin" ;;
*-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-${MACHINE}" ;;
t3e-cray-unicosmk) OUT="cray-t3e" ;;
j90-cray-unicos) OUT="cray-j90" ;;
nsr-tandem-nsk) OUT="tandem-c89" ;;

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c */
/**
* rijndael-alg-fst.c
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_ctr.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_ige.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_ige.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_misc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_misc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2002-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/aes/aes_core.c */
/**
* rijndael-alg-fst.c
*

View File

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}

View File

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
$1>=10);
$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1

View File

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}

View File

@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
long plen;
char cst, inf, free_cont = 0;
const unsigned char *p;
BUF_MEM buf;
BUF_MEM buf = { 0, NULL, 0 };
const unsigned char *cont = NULL;
long len;
if (!pval) {
@@ -793,7 +793,6 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
} else {
len = p - cont + plen;
p += plen;
buf.data = NULL;
}
} else if (cst) {
if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
@@ -802,9 +801,9 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
return 0;
}
buf.length = 0;
buf.max = 0;
buf.data = NULL;
/* Free any returned 'buf' content */
free_cont = 1;
/*
* Should really check the internal tags are correct but some things
* may get this wrong. The relevant specs say that constructed string
@@ -812,18 +811,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
* So instead just check for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag.
*/
if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) {
free_cont = 1;
goto err;
}
len = buf.length;
/* Append a final null to string */
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
goto err;
}
buf.data[len] = 0;
cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data;
free_cont = 1;
} else {
cont = p;
len = plen;
@@ -831,6 +828,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
}
/* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */
/* asn1_ex_c2i may reuse allocated buffer, and so sets free_cont to 0 */
if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it))
goto err;

View File

@@ -125,16 +125,16 @@
# define LLONG long
#endif
static void fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
const char *, int, int, int);
static void fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LLONG, int, int, int, int);
static void fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
static void doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
const char *format, va_list args);
static int fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
const char *, int, int, int);
static int fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LLONG, int, int, int, int);
static int fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
static int doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
const char *format, va_list args);
/* format read states */
#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
#define char_to_int(p) (p - '0')
#define OSSL_MAX(p,q) ((p >= q) ? p : q)
static void
static int
_dopr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen,
@@ -196,7 +196,8 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
if (ch == '%')
state = DP_S_FLAGS;
else
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
return 0;
ch = *format++;
break;
case DP_S_FLAGS:
@@ -302,8 +303,9 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
value = va_arg(args, int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 10, min, max, flags);
if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min,
max, flags))
return 0;
break;
case 'X':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
@@ -326,17 +328,19 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
min, max, flags);
if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
min, max, flags))
return 0;
break;
case 'f':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
fvalue, min, max, flags);
if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
flags))
return 0;
break;
case 'E':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
@@ -355,8 +359,9 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'c':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
va_arg(args, int));
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
va_arg(args, int)))
return 0;
break;
case 's':
strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
@@ -366,13 +371,15 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
else
max = *maxlen;
}
fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max);
if (!fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max))
return 0;
break;
case 'p':
value = (long)va_arg(args, void *);
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM);
if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM))
return 0;
break;
case 'n': /* XXX */
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
@@ -394,7 +401,8 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
}
break;
case '%':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
return 0;
break;
case 'w':
/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
@@ -418,46 +426,56 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
*truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
if (*truncated)
currlen = *maxlen - 1;
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0'))
return 0;
*retlen = currlen - 1;
return;
return 1;
}
static void
static int
fmtstr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
size_t *maxlen, const char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
{
int padlen, strln;
int padlen;
size_t strln;
int cnt = 0;
if (value == 0)
value = "<NULL>";
for (strln = 0; value[strln]; ++strln) ;
strln = strlen(value);
if (strln > INT_MAX)
strln = INT_MAX;
padlen = min - strln;
if (padlen < 0)
if (min < 0 || padlen < 0)
padlen = 0;
if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
padlen = -padlen;
while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
--padlen;
++cnt;
}
while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++))
return 0;
++cnt;
}
while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
++padlen;
++cnt;
}
return 1;
}
static void
static int
fmtint(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
@@ -517,37 +535,44 @@ fmtint(char **sbuffer,
/* spaces */
while (spadlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
--spadlen;
}
/* sign */
if (signvalue)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
return 0;
/* prefix */
while (*prefix) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix))
return 0;
prefix++;
}
/* zeros */
if (zpadlen > 0) {
while (zpadlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
return 0;
--zpadlen;
}
}
/* digits */
while (place > 0)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]);
while (place > 0) {
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]))
return 0;
}
/* left justified spaces */
while (spadlen < 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
++spadlen;
}
return;
return 1;
}
static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
@@ -578,7 +603,7 @@ static long roundv(LDOUBLE value)
return intpart;
}
static void
static int
fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
@@ -657,47 +682,61 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
if (signvalue) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
return 0;
--padlen;
signvalue = 0;
}
while (padlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
return 0;
--padlen;
}
}
while (padlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
--padlen;
}
if (signvalue)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
if (signvalue && !doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
return 0;
while (iplace > 0)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]);
while (iplace > 0) {
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]))
return 0;
}
/*
* Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
* char to print out.
*/
if (max > 0 || (flags & DP_F_NUM)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.'))
return 0;
while (fplace > 0)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace]);
while (fplace > 0) {
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen,
fconvert[--fplace]))
return 0;
}
}
while (zpadlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
return 0;
--zpadlen;
}
while (padlen < 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
++padlen;
}
return 1;
}
static void
#define BUFFER_INC 1024
static int
doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, int c)
{
@@ -708,24 +747,25 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
*maxlen += 1024;
if (*maxlen > INT_MAX - BUFFER_INC)
return 0;
*maxlen += BUFFER_INC;
if (*buffer == NULL) {
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
if (*buffer == NULL)
return 0;
if (*currlen > 0) {
assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
}
*sbuffer = NULL;
} else {
*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
char *tmpbuf;
tmpbuf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
if (tmpbuf == NULL)
return 0;
*buffer = tmpbuf;
}
}
@@ -736,7 +776,7 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
(*buffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c;
}
return;
return 1;
}
/***************************************************************************/
@@ -768,7 +808,11 @@ int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args)
dynbuf = NULL;
CRYPTO_push_info("doapr()");
_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format, args);
if (!_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format,
args)) {
OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
return -1;
}
if (dynbuf) {
ret = BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen);
OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
@@ -803,7 +847,8 @@ int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args)
size_t retlen;
int truncated;
_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args);
if(!_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args))
return -1;
if (truncated)
/*

View File

@@ -479,11 +479,11 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
# define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
# define BIO_get_conn_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
# define BIO_get_conn_ip(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0)
# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,NULL)
# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
/* BIO_s_accept_socket() */
/* BIO_s_accept() */
# define BIO_set_accept_port(b,name) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_ACCEPT,0,(char *)name)
# define BIO_get_accept_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_ACCEPT,0)
/* #define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL) */
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
# define BIO_set_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BIND_MODE,mode,NULL)
# define BIO_get_bind_mode(b,mode) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BIND_MODE,0,NULL)
/* BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
# define BIO_do_connect(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
# define BIO_do_accept(b) BIO_do_handshake(b)
# define BIO_do_handshake(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL)
@@ -515,12 +516,15 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
# define BIO_get_url(b,url) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,2,(char *)(url))
# define BIO_get_no_connect_return(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_PROXY_PARAM,5,NULL)
/* BIO_s_datagram(), BIO_s_fd(), BIO_s_socket(), BIO_s_accept() and BIO_s_connect() */
# define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd)
# define BIO_get_fd(b,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c)
/* BIO_s_file() */
# define BIO_set_fp(b,fp,c) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FILE_PTR,c,(char *)fp)
# define BIO_get_fp(b,fpp) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FILE_PTR,0,(char *)fpp)
/* BIO_s_fd() and BIO_s_file() */
# define BIO_seek(b,ofs) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_SEEK,ofs,NULL)
# define BIO_tell(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_FILE_TELL,0,NULL)
@@ -685,7 +689,7 @@ long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
long argl, long ret);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/bio/bss_bio.c -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/bio/bss_bio.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static long conn_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
{
BIO *dbio;
int *ip;
const char **pptr;
const char **pptr = NULL;
long ret = 1;
BIO_CONNECT *data;
@@ -442,19 +442,28 @@ static long conn_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
case BIO_C_GET_CONNECT:
if (ptr != NULL) {
pptr = (const char **)ptr;
if (num == 0) {
*pptr = data->param_hostname;
}
} else if (num == 1) {
*pptr = data->param_port;
} else if (num == 2) {
*pptr = (char *)&(data->ip[0]);
} else if (num == 3) {
*((int *)ptr) = data->port;
if (b->init) {
if (pptr != NULL) {
ret = 1;
if (num == 0) {
*pptr = data->param_hostname;
} else if (num == 1) {
*pptr = data->param_port;
} else if (num == 2) {
*pptr = (char *)&(data->ip[0]);
} else {
ret = 0;
}
}
if ((!b->init) || (ptr == NULL))
if (num == 3) {
ret = data->port;
}
} else {
if (pptr != NULL)
*pptr = "not initialized";
ret = 1;
ret = 0;
}
break;
case BIO_C_SET_CONNECT:

View File

@@ -519,10 +519,8 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
num = 0;
case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
ret = 0;
break;
case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
ret = 0;
break;

View File

@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void)
return (&mem_method);
}
BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len)
BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len)
{
BIO *ret;
BUF_MEM *b;
@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len)
if (!(ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())))
return NULL;
b = (BUF_MEM *)ret->ptr;
b->data = buf;
/* Cast away const and trust in the MEM_RDONLY flag. */
b->data = (void *)buf;
b->length = sz;
b->max = sz;
ret->flags |= BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY;

View File

@@ -252,8 +252,8 @@ bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h
bn_exp.o: rsaz_exp.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
bn_exp.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h rsaz_exp.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h

View File

@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ $TEMP2 = $B2;
$TEMP3 = $Y1;
$TEMP4 = $Y2;
$code.=<<___;
#we need to fix indexes 32-39 to avoid overflow
# we need to fix indices 32-39 to avoid overflow
vmovdqu 32*8(%rsp), $ACC8 # 32*8-192($tp0),
vmovdqu 32*9(%rsp), $ACC1 # 32*9-192($tp0)
vmovdqu 32*10(%rsp), $ACC2 # 32*10-192($tp0)
@@ -1592,68 +1592,128 @@ rsaz_1024_scatter5_avx2:
.type rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2:
vzeroupper
mov %rsp,%r11
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x88(%rsp),%rax
vzeroupper
.LSEH_begin_rsaz_1024_gather5:
# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
.byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 #lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp
.byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 #vmovaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 #vmovaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 #vmovaps %xmm8,0(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 #vmovaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 #vmovaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 #vmovaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 #vmovaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 #vmovaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 #vmovaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 #vmovaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax)
.byte 0x48,0x8d,0x60,0xe0 # lea -0x20(%rax),%rsp
.byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x70,0xe0 # vmovaps %xmm6,-0x20(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0xf8,0x29,0x78,0xf0 # vmovaps %xmm7,-0x10(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x40,0x00 # vmovaps %xmm8,0(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x48,0x10 # vmovaps %xmm9,0x10(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x50,0x20 # vmovaps %xmm10,0x20(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x58,0x30 # vmovaps %xmm11,0x30(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x60,0x40 # vmovaps %xmm12,0x40(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x68,0x50 # vmovaps %xmm13,0x50(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x70,0x60 # vmovaps %xmm14,0x60(%rax)
.byte 0xc5,0x78,0x29,0x78,0x70 # vmovaps %xmm15,0x70(%rax)
___
$code.=<<___;
lea .Lgather_table(%rip),%r11
mov $power,%eax
and \$3,$power
shr \$2,%eax # cache line number
shl \$4,$power # offset within cache line
lea -0x100(%rsp),%rsp
and \$-32, %rsp
lea .Linc(%rip), %r10
lea -128(%rsp),%rax # control u-op density
vmovdqu -32(%r11),%ymm7 # .Lgather_permd
vpbroadcastb 8(%r11,%rax), %xmm8
vpbroadcastb 7(%r11,%rax), %xmm9
vpbroadcastb 6(%r11,%rax), %xmm10
vpbroadcastb 5(%r11,%rax), %xmm11
vpbroadcastb 4(%r11,%rax), %xmm12
vpbroadcastb 3(%r11,%rax), %xmm13
vpbroadcastb 2(%r11,%rax), %xmm14
vpbroadcastb 1(%r11,%rax), %xmm15
vmovd $power, %xmm4
vmovdqa (%r10),%ymm0
vmovdqa 32(%r10),%ymm1
vmovdqa 64(%r10),%ymm5
vpbroadcastd %xmm4,%ymm4
lea 64($inp,$power),$inp
mov \$64,%r11 # size optimization
mov \$9,%eax
jmp .Loop_gather_1024
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1
vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*0+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm0
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2
vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*1+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm1
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3
vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*2+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm0, %ymm2
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm0, %ymm0
vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*3+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm1, %ymm3
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm1, %ymm1
vmovdqa %ymm0, 32*4+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm2, %ymm8
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm2, %ymm2
vmovdqa %ymm1, 32*5+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm3, %ymm9
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm3, %ymm3
vmovdqa %ymm2, 32*6+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm8, %ymm10
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm8, %ymm8
vmovdqa %ymm3, 32*7+128(%rax)
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm9, %ymm11
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm9, %ymm9
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm10, %ymm12
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm10, %ymm10
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm11, %ymm13
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm11, %ymm11
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm12, %ymm14
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm12, %ymm12
vpaddd %ymm5, %ymm13, %ymm15
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm13, %ymm13
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm14, %ymm14
vpcmpeqd %ymm4, %ymm15, %ymm15
vmovdqa -32(%r10),%ymm7 # .Lgather_permd
lea 128($inp), $inp
mov \$9,$power
.align 32
.Loop_gather_1024:
vpand -64($inp), %xmm8,%xmm0
vpand ($inp), %xmm9,%xmm1
vpand 64($inp), %xmm10,%xmm2
vpand ($inp,%r11,2), %xmm11,%xmm3
vpor %xmm0,%xmm1,%xmm1
vpand 64($inp,%r11,2), %xmm12,%xmm4
vpor %xmm2,%xmm3,%xmm3
vpand ($inp,%r11,4), %xmm13,%xmm5
vpor %xmm1,%xmm3,%xmm3
vpand 64($inp,%r11,4), %xmm14,%xmm6
vpor %xmm4,%xmm5,%xmm5
vpand -128($inp,%r11,8), %xmm15,%xmm2
lea ($inp,%r11,8),$inp
vpor %xmm3,%xmm5,%xmm5
vpor %xmm2,%xmm6,%xmm6
vpor %xmm5,%xmm6,%xmm6
vpermd %ymm6,%ymm7,%ymm6
vmovdqu %ymm6,($out)
vmovdqa 32*0-128($inp), %ymm0
vmovdqa 32*1-128($inp), %ymm1
vmovdqa 32*2-128($inp), %ymm2
vmovdqa 32*3-128($inp), %ymm3
vpand 32*0+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
vpand 32*1+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1
vpand 32*2+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2
vpor %ymm0, %ymm1, %ymm4
vpand 32*3+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3
vmovdqa 32*4-128($inp), %ymm0
vmovdqa 32*5-128($inp), %ymm1
vpor %ymm2, %ymm3, %ymm5
vmovdqa 32*6-128($inp), %ymm2
vmovdqa 32*7-128($inp), %ymm3
vpand 32*4+128(%rax), %ymm0, %ymm0
vpand 32*5+128(%rax), %ymm1, %ymm1
vpand 32*6+128(%rax), %ymm2, %ymm2
vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
vpand 32*7+128(%rax), %ymm3, %ymm3
vpand 32*8-128($inp), %ymm8, %ymm0
vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
vpand 32*9-128($inp), %ymm9, %ymm1
vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
vpand 32*10-128($inp),%ymm10, %ymm2
vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
vpand 32*11-128($inp),%ymm11, %ymm3
vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
vpand 32*12-128($inp),%ymm12, %ymm0
vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
vpand 32*13-128($inp),%ymm13, %ymm1
vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
vpand 32*14-128($inp),%ymm14, %ymm2
vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
vpand 32*15-128($inp),%ymm15, %ymm3
lea 32*16($inp), $inp
vpor %ymm0, %ymm4, %ymm4
vpor %ymm1, %ymm5, %ymm5
vpor %ymm2, %ymm4, %ymm4
vpor %ymm3, %ymm5, %ymm5
vpor %ymm5, %ymm4, %ymm4
vextracti128 \$1, %ymm4, %xmm5 # upper half is cleared
vpor %xmm4, %xmm5, %xmm5
vpermd %ymm5,%ymm7,%ymm5
vmovdqu %ymm5,($out)
lea 32($out),$out
dec %eax
dec $power
jnz .Loop_gather_1024
vpxor %ymm0,%ymm0,%ymm0
@@ -1661,20 +1721,20 @@ $code.=<<___;
vzeroupper
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
lea 0xa8(%rsp),%rsp
movaps -0xa8(%r11),%xmm6
movaps -0x98(%r11),%xmm7
movaps -0x88(%r11),%xmm8
movaps -0x78(%r11),%xmm9
movaps -0x68(%r11),%xmm10
movaps -0x58(%r11),%xmm11
movaps -0x48(%r11),%xmm12
movaps -0x38(%r11),%xmm13
movaps -0x28(%r11),%xmm14
movaps -0x18(%r11),%xmm15
.LSEH_end_rsaz_1024_gather5:
___
$code.=<<___;
lea (%r11),%rsp
ret
.size rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2,.-rsaz_1024_gather5_avx2
___
@@ -1708,8 +1768,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
.long 0,2,4,6,7,7,7,7
.Lgather_permd:
.long 0,7,1,7,2,7,3,7
.Lgather_table:
.byte 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0xff,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
.Linc:
.long 0,0,0,0, 1,1,1,1
.long 2,2,2,2, 3,3,3,3
.long 4,4,4,4, 4,4,4,4
.align 64
___
@@ -1837,18 +1899,19 @@ rsaz_se_handler:
.rva rsaz_se_handler
.rva .Lmul_1024_body,.Lmul_1024_epilogue
.LSEH_info_rsaz_1024_gather5:
.byte 0x01,0x33,0x16,0x00
.byte 0x36,0xf8,0x09,0x00 #vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
.byte 0x31,0xe8,0x08,0x00 #vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
.byte 0x2c,0xd8,0x07,0x00 #vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
.byte 0x27,0xc8,0x06,0x00 #vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
.byte 0x22,0xb8,0x05,0x00 #vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
.byte 0x1d,0xa8,0x04,0x00 #vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
.byte 0x18,0x98,0x03,0x00 #vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
.byte 0x13,0x88,0x02,0x00 #vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
.byte 0x0e,0x78,0x01,0x00 #vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
.byte 0x09,0x68,0x00,0x00 #vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
.byte 0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00 #sub rsp,0xa8
.byte 0x01,0x36,0x17,0x0b
.byte 0x36,0xf8,0x09,0x00 # vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
.byte 0x31,0xe8,0x08,0x00 # vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
.byte 0x2c,0xd8,0x07,0x00 # vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
.byte 0x27,0xc8,0x06,0x00 # vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
.byte 0x22,0xb8,0x05,0x00 # vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
.byte 0x1d,0xa8,0x04,0x00 # vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
.byte 0x18,0x98,0x03,0x00 # vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
.byte 0x13,0x88,0x02,0x00 # vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
.byte 0x0e,0x78,0x01,0x00 # vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
.byte 0x09,0x68,0x00,0x00 # vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
.byte 0x04,0x01,0x15,0x00 # sub rsp,0xa8
.byte 0x00,0xb3,0x00,0x00 # set_frame r11
___
}

View File

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
@@ -915,9 +915,76 @@ rsaz_512_mul_gather4:
push %r14
push %r15
mov $pwr, $pwr
subq \$128+24, %rsp
subq \$`128+24+($win64?0xb0:0)`, %rsp
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps %xmm6,0xa0(%rsp)
movaps %xmm7,0xb0(%rsp)
movaps %xmm8,0xc0(%rsp)
movaps %xmm9,0xd0(%rsp)
movaps %xmm10,0xe0(%rsp)
movaps %xmm11,0xf0(%rsp)
movaps %xmm12,0x100(%rsp)
movaps %xmm13,0x110(%rsp)
movaps %xmm14,0x120(%rsp)
movaps %xmm15,0x130(%rsp)
___
$code.=<<___;
.Lmul_gather4_body:
movd $pwr,%xmm8
movdqa .Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
movdqa .Linc(%rip),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
pshufd \$0,%xmm8,%xmm8 # broadcast $power
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
___
########################################################################
# calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power
#
for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm`$i+3`
___
}
for(;$i<7;$i++) {
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
___
}
$code.=<<___;
pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm7
movdqa 16*0($bp),%xmm8
movdqa 16*1($bp),%xmm9
movdqa 16*2($bp),%xmm10
movdqa 16*3($bp),%xmm11
pand %xmm0,%xmm8
movdqa 16*4($bp),%xmm12
pand %xmm1,%xmm9
movdqa 16*5($bp),%xmm13
pand %xmm2,%xmm10
movdqa 16*6($bp),%xmm14
pand %xmm3,%xmm11
movdqa 16*7($bp),%xmm15
leaq 128($bp), %rbp
pand %xmm4,%xmm12
pand %xmm5,%xmm13
pand %xmm6,%xmm14
pand %xmm7,%xmm15
por %xmm10,%xmm8
por %xmm11,%xmm9
por %xmm12,%xmm8
por %xmm13,%xmm9
por %xmm14,%xmm8
por %xmm15,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
movl \$0x80100,%r11d
@@ -926,45 +993,38 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($addx);
je .Lmulx_gather
___
$code.=<<___;
movl 64($bp,$pwr,4), %eax
movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments
movl ($bp,$pwr,4), %ebx
movq $mod, %xmm1
movq $n0, 128(%rsp)
movq %xmm8,%rbx
movq $n0, 128(%rsp) # off-load arguments
movq $out, 128+8(%rsp)
movq $mod, 128+16(%rsp)
shlq \$32, %rax
or %rax, %rbx
movq ($ap), %rax
movq 8($ap), %rcx
leaq 128($bp,$pwr,4), %rbp
mulq %rbx # 0 iteration
movq %rax, (%rsp)
movq %rcx, %rax
movq %rdx, %r8
mulq %rbx
movd (%rbp), %xmm4
addq %rax, %r8
movq 16($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r9
adcq \$0, %r9
mulq %rbx
movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
addq %rax, %r9
movq 24($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r10
adcq \$0, %r10
mulq %rbx
pslldq \$4, %xmm5
addq %rax, %r10
movq 32($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r11
adcq \$0, %r11
mulq %rbx
por %xmm5, %xmm4
addq %rax, %r11
movq 40($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r12
@@ -977,14 +1037,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
adcq \$0, %r13
mulq %rbx
leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
addq %rax, %r13
movq 56($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r14
adcq \$0, %r14
mulq %rbx
movq %xmm4, %rbx
addq %rax, %r14
movq ($ap), %rax
movq %rdx, %r15
@@ -996,6 +1054,35 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 32
.Loop_mul_gather:
movdqa 16*0(%rbp),%xmm8
movdqa 16*1(%rbp),%xmm9
movdqa 16*2(%rbp),%xmm10
movdqa 16*3(%rbp),%xmm11
pand %xmm0,%xmm8
movdqa 16*4(%rbp),%xmm12
pand %xmm1,%xmm9
movdqa 16*5(%rbp),%xmm13
pand %xmm2,%xmm10
movdqa 16*6(%rbp),%xmm14
pand %xmm3,%xmm11
movdqa 16*7(%rbp),%xmm15
leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
pand %xmm4,%xmm12
pand %xmm5,%xmm13
pand %xmm6,%xmm14
pand %xmm7,%xmm15
por %xmm10,%xmm8
por %xmm11,%xmm9
por %xmm12,%xmm8
por %xmm13,%xmm9
por %xmm14,%xmm8
por %xmm15,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
movq %xmm8,%rbx
mulq %rbx
addq %rax, %r8
movq 8($ap), %rax
@@ -1004,7 +1091,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
adcq \$0, %r8
mulq %rbx
movd (%rbp), %xmm4
addq %rax, %r9
movq 16($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -1013,7 +1099,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
adcq \$0, %r9
mulq %rbx
movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
addq %rax, %r10
movq 24($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -1022,7 +1107,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
adcq \$0, %r10
mulq %rbx
pslldq \$4, %xmm5
addq %rax, %r11
movq 32($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -1031,7 +1115,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
adcq \$0, %r11
mulq %rbx
por %xmm5, %xmm4
addq %rax, %r12
movq 40($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -1056,7 +1139,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
adcq \$0, %r14
mulq %rbx
movq %xmm4, %rbx
addq %rax, %r15
movq ($ap), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -1064,7 +1146,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %r15
adcq \$0, %r15
leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
leaq 8(%rdi), %rdi
decl %ecx
@@ -1079,8 +1160,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %r14, 48(%rdi)
movq %r15, 56(%rdi)
movq %xmm0, $out
movq %xmm1, %rbp
movq 128+8(%rsp), $out
movq 128+16(%rsp), %rbp
movq (%rsp), %r8
movq 8(%rsp), %r9
@@ -1098,45 +1179,37 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($addx);
.align 32
.Lmulx_gather:
mov 64($bp,$pwr,4), %eax
movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments
lea 128($bp,$pwr,4), %rbp
mov ($bp,$pwr,4), %edx
movq $mod, %xmm1
mov $n0, 128(%rsp)
movq %xmm8,%rdx
mov $n0, 128(%rsp) # off-load arguments
mov $out, 128+8(%rsp)
mov $mod, 128+16(%rsp)
shl \$32, %rax
or %rax, %rdx
mulx ($ap), %rbx, %r8 # 0 iteration
mov %rbx, (%rsp)
xor %edi, %edi # cf=0, of=0
mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9
movd (%rbp), %xmm4
mulx 16($ap), %rbx, %r10
movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
adcx %rax, %r8
mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11
pslldq \$4, %xmm5
adcx %rbx, %r9
mulx 32($ap), %rbx, %r12
por %xmm5, %xmm4
adcx %rax, %r10
mulx 40($ap), %rax, %r13
adcx %rbx, %r11
mulx 48($ap), %rbx, %r14
lea 128(%rbp), %rbp
adcx %rax, %r12
mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15
movq %xmm4, %rdx
adcx %rbx, %r13
adcx %rax, %r14
.byte 0x67
mov %r8, %rbx
adcx %rdi, %r15 # %rdi is 0
@@ -1145,24 +1218,48 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($addx);
.align 32
.Loop_mulx_gather:
mulx ($ap), %rax, %r8
movdqa 16*0(%rbp),%xmm8
movdqa 16*1(%rbp),%xmm9
movdqa 16*2(%rbp),%xmm10
movdqa 16*3(%rbp),%xmm11
pand %xmm0,%xmm8
movdqa 16*4(%rbp),%xmm12
pand %xmm1,%xmm9
movdqa 16*5(%rbp),%xmm13
pand %xmm2,%xmm10
movdqa 16*6(%rbp),%xmm14
pand %xmm3,%xmm11
movdqa 16*7(%rbp),%xmm15
leaq 128(%rbp), %rbp
pand %xmm4,%xmm12
pand %xmm5,%xmm13
pand %xmm6,%xmm14
pand %xmm7,%xmm15
por %xmm10,%xmm8
por %xmm11,%xmm9
por %xmm12,%xmm8
por %xmm13,%xmm9
por %xmm14,%xmm8
por %xmm15,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
movq %xmm8,%rdx
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x86,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx ($ap), %rax, %r8
adcx %rax, %rbx
adox %r9, %r8
mulx 8($ap), %rax, %r9
.byte 0x66,0x0f,0x6e,0xa5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # movd (%rbp), %xmm4
adcx %rax, %r8
adox %r10, %r9
mulx 16($ap), %rax, %r10
movd 64(%rbp), %xmm5
lea 128(%rbp), %rbp
adcx %rax, %r9
adox %r11, %r10
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 24($ap), %rax, %r11
pslldq \$4, %xmm5
por %xmm5, %xmm4
adcx %rax, %r10
adox %r12, %r11
@@ -1176,10 +1273,10 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($addx);
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($ap), %rax, %r14
adcx %rax, %r13
.byte 0x67
adox %r15, %r14
mulx 56($ap), %rax, %r15
movq %xmm4, %rdx
mov %rbx, 64(%rsp,%rcx,8)
adcx %rax, %r14
adox %rdi, %r15
@@ -1198,10 +1295,10 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($addx);
mov %r14, 64+48(%rsp)
mov %r15, 64+56(%rsp)
movq %xmm0, $out
movq %xmm1, %rbp
mov 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull arguments
mov 128+8(%rsp), $out
mov 128+16(%rsp), %rbp
mov 128(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0
mov (%rsp), %r8
mov 8(%rsp), %r9
mov 16(%rsp), %r10
@@ -1229,6 +1326,21 @@ $code.=<<___;
call __rsaz_512_subtract
leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps 0xa0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm6
movaps 0xb0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
movaps 0xc0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm8
movaps 0xd0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm9
movaps 0xe0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm10
movaps 0xf0-0xc8(%rax),%xmm11
movaps 0x100-0xc8(%rax),%xmm12
movaps 0x110-0xc8(%rax),%xmm13
movaps 0x120-0xc8(%rax),%xmm14
movaps 0x130-0xc8(%rax),%xmm15
lea 0xb0(%rax),%rax
___
$code.=<<___;
movq -48(%rax), %r15
movq -40(%rax), %r14
movq -32(%rax), %r13
@@ -1258,7 +1370,7 @@ rsaz_512_mul_scatter4:
mov $pwr, $pwr
subq \$128+24, %rsp
.Lmul_scatter4_body:
leaq ($tbl,$pwr,4), $tbl
leaq ($tbl,$pwr,8), $tbl
movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load arguments
movq $mod, %xmm1
movq $tbl, %xmm2
@@ -1329,30 +1441,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
call __rsaz_512_subtract
movl %r8d, 64*0($inp) # scatter
shrq \$32, %r8
movl %r9d, 64*2($inp)
shrq \$32, %r9
movl %r10d, 64*4($inp)
shrq \$32, %r10
movl %r11d, 64*6($inp)
shrq \$32, %r11
movl %r12d, 64*8($inp)
shrq \$32, %r12
movl %r13d, 64*10($inp)
shrq \$32, %r13
movl %r14d, 64*12($inp)
shrq \$32, %r14
movl %r15d, 64*14($inp)
shrq \$32, %r15
movl %r8d, 64*1($inp)
movl %r9d, 64*3($inp)
movl %r10d, 64*5($inp)
movl %r11d, 64*7($inp)
movl %r12d, 64*9($inp)
movl %r13d, 64*11($inp)
movl %r14d, 64*13($inp)
movl %r15d, 64*15($inp)
movq %r8, 128*0($inp) # scatter
movq %r9, 128*1($inp)
movq %r10, 128*2($inp)
movq %r11, 128*3($inp)
movq %r12, 128*4($inp)
movq %r13, 128*5($inp)
movq %r14, 128*6($inp)
movq %r15, 128*7($inp)
leaq 128+24+48(%rsp), %rax
movq -48(%rax), %r15
@@ -1956,16 +2052,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type rsaz_512_scatter4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
rsaz_512_scatter4:
leaq ($out,$power,4), $out
leaq ($out,$power,8), $out
movl \$8, %r9d
jmp .Loop_scatter
.align 16
.Loop_scatter:
movq ($inp), %rax
leaq 8($inp), $inp
movl %eax, ($out)
shrq \$32, %rax
movl %eax, 64($out)
movq %rax, ($out)
leaq 128($out), $out
decl %r9d
jnz .Loop_scatter
@@ -1976,22 +2070,106 @@ rsaz_512_scatter4:
.type rsaz_512_gather4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
rsaz_512_gather4:
leaq ($inp,$power,4), $inp
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4:
.byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa8,0x00,0x00,0x00 # sub $0xa8,%rsp
.byte 0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24 # movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
.byte 0x0f,0x29,0x7c,0x24,0x10 # movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x44,0x24,0x20 # movaps %xmm8,0x20(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x4c,0x24,0x30 # movaps %xmm9,0x30(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x54,0x24,0x40 # movaps %xmm10,0x40(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x5c,0x24,0x50 # movaps %xmm11,0x50(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x64,0x24,0x60 # movaps %xmm12,0x60(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0x6c,0x24,0x70 # movaps %xmm13,0x70(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xb4,0x24,0x80,0,0,0 # movaps %xmm14,0x80(%rsp)
.byte 0x44,0x0f,0x29,0xbc,0x24,0x90,0,0,0 # movaps %xmm15,0x90(%rsp)
___
$code.=<<___;
movd $power,%xmm8
movdqa .Linc+16(%rip),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
movdqa .Linc(%rip),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
pshufd \$0,%xmm8,%xmm8 # broadcast $power
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm7
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
___
########################################################################
# calculate mask by comparing 0..15 to $power
#
for($i=0;$i<4;$i++) {
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
movdqa %xmm7,%xmm`$i+3`
___
}
for(;$i<7;$i++) {
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm`$i`,%xmm`$i+1`
pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm`$i`
___
}
$code.=<<___;
pcmpeqd %xmm8,%xmm7
movl \$8, %r9d
jmp .Loop_gather
.align 16
.Loop_gather:
movl ($inp), %eax
movl 64($inp), %r8d
movdqa 16*0($inp),%xmm8
movdqa 16*1($inp),%xmm9
movdqa 16*2($inp),%xmm10
movdqa 16*3($inp),%xmm11
pand %xmm0,%xmm8
movdqa 16*4($inp),%xmm12
pand %xmm1,%xmm9
movdqa 16*5($inp),%xmm13
pand %xmm2,%xmm10
movdqa 16*6($inp),%xmm14
pand %xmm3,%xmm11
movdqa 16*7($inp),%xmm15
leaq 128($inp), $inp
shlq \$32, %r8
or %r8, %rax
movq %rax, ($out)
pand %xmm4,%xmm12
pand %xmm5,%xmm13
pand %xmm6,%xmm14
pand %xmm7,%xmm15
por %xmm10,%xmm8
por %xmm11,%xmm9
por %xmm12,%xmm8
por %xmm13,%xmm9
por %xmm14,%xmm8
por %xmm15,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm8,%xmm9
por %xmm9,%xmm8
movq %xmm8,($out)
leaq 8($out), $out
decl %r9d
jnz .Loop_gather
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps 0x00(%rsp),%xmm6
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
movaps 0x20(%rsp),%xmm8
movaps 0x30(%rsp),%xmm9
movaps 0x40(%rsp),%xmm10
movaps 0x50(%rsp),%xmm11
movaps 0x60(%rsp),%xmm12
movaps 0x70(%rsp),%xmm13
movaps 0x80(%rsp),%xmm14
movaps 0x90(%rsp),%xmm15
add \$0xa8,%rsp
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4:
.size rsaz_512_gather4,.-rsaz_512_gather4
.align 64
.Linc:
.long 0,0, 1,1
.long 2,2, 2,2
___
}
@@ -2039,6 +2217,18 @@ se_handler:
lea 128+24+48(%rax),%rax
lea .Lmul_gather4_epilogue(%rip),%rbx
cmp %r10,%rbx
jne .Lse_not_in_mul_gather4
lea 0xb0(%rax),%rax
lea -48-0xa8(%rax),%rsi
lea 512($context),%rdi
mov \$20,%ecx
.long 0xa548f3fc # cld; rep movsq
.Lse_not_in_mul_gather4:
mov -8(%rax),%rbx
mov -16(%rax),%rbp
mov -24(%rax),%r12
@@ -2090,7 +2280,7 @@ se_handler:
pop %rdi
pop %rsi
ret
.size sqr_handler,.-sqr_handler
.size se_handler,.-se_handler
.section .pdata
.align 4
@@ -2114,6 +2304,10 @@ se_handler:
.rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_mul_by_one
.rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_mul_by_one
.rva .LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4
.rva .LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4
.rva .LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4
.section .xdata
.align 8
.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_sqr:
@@ -2136,6 +2330,19 @@ se_handler:
.byte 9,0,0,0
.rva se_handler
.rva .Lmul_by_one_body,.Lmul_by_one_epilogue # HandlerData[]
.LSEH_info_rsaz_512_gather4:
.byte 0x01,0x46,0x16,0x00
.byte 0x46,0xf8,0x09,0x00 # vmovaps 0x90(rsp),xmm15
.byte 0x3d,0xe8,0x08,0x00 # vmovaps 0x80(rsp),xmm14
.byte 0x34,0xd8,0x07,0x00 # vmovaps 0x70(rsp),xmm13
.byte 0x2e,0xc8,0x06,0x00 # vmovaps 0x60(rsp),xmm12
.byte 0x28,0xb8,0x05,0x00 # vmovaps 0x50(rsp),xmm11
.byte 0x22,0xa8,0x04,0x00 # vmovaps 0x40(rsp),xmm10
.byte 0x1c,0x98,0x03,0x00 # vmovaps 0x30(rsp),xmm9
.byte 0x16,0x88,0x02,0x00 # vmovaps 0x20(rsp),xmm8
.byte 0x10,0x78,0x01,0x00 # vmovaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
.byte 0x0b,0x68,0x00,0x00 # vmovaps 0x00(rsp),xmm6
.byte 0x07,0x01,0x15,0x00 # sub rsp,0xa8
___
}

View File

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
@@ -775,100 +775,126 @@ bn_sqr8x_mont:
# 4096. this is done to allow memory disambiguation logic
# do its job.
#
lea -64(%rsp,$num,4),%r11
lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
sub $aptr,%r11
and \$4095,%r11
cmp %r11,%r10
jb .Lsqr8x_sp_alt
sub %r11,%rsp # align with $aptr
lea -64(%rsp,$num,4),%rsp # alloca(frame+4*$num)
lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
jmp .Lsqr8x_sp_done
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_sp_alt:
lea 4096-64(,$num,4),%r10 # 4096-frame-4*$num
lea -64(%rsp,$num,4),%rsp # alloca(frame+4*$num)
lea 4096-64(,$num,2),%r10 # 4096-frame-2*$num
lea -64(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
sub %r10,%r11
mov \$0,%r10
cmovc %r10,%r11
sub %r11,%rsp
.Lsqr8x_sp_done:
and \$-64,%rsp
mov $num,%r10
mov $num,%r10
neg $num
lea 64(%rsp,$num,2),%r11 # copy of modulus
mov $n0, 32(%rsp)
mov %rax, 40(%rsp) # save original %rsp
.Lsqr8x_body:
mov $num,$i
movq %r11, %xmm2 # save pointer to modulus copy
shr \$3+2,$i
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
jmp .Lsqr8x_copy_n
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_copy_n:
movq 8*0($nptr),%xmm0
movq 8*1($nptr),%xmm1
movq 8*2($nptr),%xmm3
movq 8*3($nptr),%xmm4
lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr
movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%r11)
movdqa %xmm1,16*1(%r11)
movdqa %xmm3,16*2(%r11)
movdqa %xmm4,16*3(%r11)
lea 16*4(%r11),%r11
dec $i
jnz .Lsqr8x_copy_n
movq $nptr, %xmm2 # save pointer to modulus
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
movq $rptr,%xmm1 # save $rptr
movq %r10, %xmm3 # -$num
___
$code.=<<___ if ($addx);
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+8(%rip),%eax
and \$0x80100,%eax
cmp \$0x80100,%eax
jne .Lsqr8x_nox
call bn_sqrx8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
lea 48(%rsp),%rax
lea 64(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx
shr \$3+2,$num
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
jmp .Lsqr8x_zero
# %rax top-most carry
# %rbp nptr
# %rcx -8*num
# %r8 end of tp[2*num]
lea (%r8,%rcx),%rbx
mov %rcx,$num
mov %rcx,%rdx
movq %xmm1,$rptr
sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0
jmp .Lsqr8x_sub
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_nox:
___
$code.=<<___;
call bn_sqr8x_internal # see x86_64-mont5 module
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
lea 48(%rsp),%rax
lea 64(%rsp,$num,2),%rdx
shr \$3+2,$num
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
jmp .Lsqr8x_zero
# %rax top-most carry
# %rbp nptr
# %r8 -8*num
# %rdi end of tp[2*num]
lea (%rdi,$num),%rbx
mov $num,%rcx
mov $num,%rdx
movq %xmm1,$rptr
sar \$3+2,%rcx # %cf=0
jmp .Lsqr8x_sub
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_zero:
movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%rax) # wipe t
movdqa %xmm0,16*1(%rax)
movdqa %xmm0,16*2(%rax)
movdqa %xmm0,16*3(%rax)
lea 16*4(%rax),%rax
movdqa %xmm0,16*0(%rdx) # wipe n
movdqa %xmm0,16*1(%rdx)
movdqa %xmm0,16*2(%rdx)
movdqa %xmm0,16*3(%rdx)
lea 16*4(%rdx),%rdx
dec $num
jnz .Lsqr8x_zero
.Lsqr8x_sub:
mov 8*0(%rbx),%r12
mov 8*1(%rbx),%r13
mov 8*2(%rbx),%r14
mov 8*3(%rbx),%r15
lea 8*4(%rbx),%rbx
sbb 8*0(%rbp),%r12
sbb 8*1(%rbp),%r13
sbb 8*2(%rbp),%r14
sbb 8*3(%rbp),%r15
lea 8*4(%rbp),%rbp
mov %r12,8*0($rptr)
mov %r13,8*1($rptr)
mov %r14,8*2($rptr)
mov %r15,8*3($rptr)
lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr
inc %rcx # preserves %cf
jnz .Lsqr8x_sub
sbb \$0,%rax # top-most carry
lea (%rbx,$num),%rbx # rewind
lea ($rptr,$num),$rptr # rewind
movq %rax,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
jmp .Lsqr8x_cond_copy
.align 32
.Lsqr8x_cond_copy:
movdqa 16*0(%rbx),%xmm2
movdqa 16*1(%rbx),%xmm3
lea 16*2(%rbx),%rbx
movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4
movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5
lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr
movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx) # zero tp
movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx)
movdqa %xmm0,-16*2(%rbx,%rdx)
movdqa %xmm0,-16*1(%rbx,%rdx)
pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm1,%xmm2
pand %xmm1,%xmm3
pand %xmm0,%xmm4
pand %xmm0,%xmm5
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
por %xmm2,%xmm4
por %xmm3,%xmm5
movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr)
movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr)
add \$32,$num
jnz .Lsqr8x_cond_copy
mov \$1,%rax
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
@@ -1135,64 +1161,75 @@ $code.=<<___;
adc $zero,%r15 # modulo-scheduled
sub 0*8($tptr),$zero # pull top-most carry
adc %r15,%r14
mov -8($nptr),$mi
sbb %r15,%r15 # top-most carry
mov %r14,-1*8($tptr)
cmp 16(%rsp),$bptr
jne .Lmulx4x_outer
sub %r14,$mi # compare top-most words
sbb $mi,$mi
or $mi,%r15
neg $num
xor %rdx,%rdx
mov 32(%rsp),$rptr # restore rp
lea 64(%rsp),$tptr
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
mov 0*8($nptr,$num),%r8
mov 1*8($nptr,$num),%r9
neg %r8
jmp .Lmulx4x_sub_entry
sub $num,$nptr # rewind $nptr
neg %r15
mov $num,%rdx
shr \$3+2,$num # %cf=0
mov 32(%rsp),$rptr # restore rp
jmp .Lmulx4x_sub
.align 32
.Lmulx4x_sub:
mov 0*8($nptr,$num),%r8
mov 1*8($nptr,$num),%r9
not %r8
.Lmulx4x_sub_entry:
mov 2*8($nptr,$num),%r10
not %r9
and %r15,%r8
mov 3*8($nptr,$num),%r11
not %r10
and %r15,%r9
not %r11
and %r15,%r10
and %r15,%r11
neg %rdx # mov %rdx,%cf
adc 0*8($tptr),%r8
adc 1*8($tptr),%r9
movdqa %xmm0,($tptr)
adc 2*8($tptr),%r10
adc 3*8($tptr),%r11
movdqa %xmm0,16($tptr)
lea 4*8($tptr),$tptr
sbb %rdx,%rdx # mov %cf,%rdx
mov %r8,0*8($rptr)
mov %r9,1*8($rptr)
mov %r10,2*8($rptr)
mov %r11,3*8($rptr)
lea 4*8($rptr),$rptr
add \$32,$num
mov 8*0($tptr),%r11
mov 8*1($tptr),%r12
mov 8*2($tptr),%r13
mov 8*3($tptr),%r14
lea 8*4($tptr),$tptr
sbb 8*0($nptr),%r11
sbb 8*1($nptr),%r12
sbb 8*2($nptr),%r13
sbb 8*3($nptr),%r14
lea 8*4($nptr),$nptr
mov %r11,8*0($rptr)
mov %r12,8*1($rptr)
mov %r13,8*2($rptr)
mov %r14,8*3($rptr)
lea 8*4($rptr),$rptr
dec $num # preserves %cf
jnz .Lmulx4x_sub
sbb \$0,%r15 # top-most carry
lea 64(%rsp),$tptr
sub %rdx,$rptr # rewind
movq %r15,%xmm1
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
pshufd \$0,%xmm1,%xmm1
mov 40(%rsp),%rsi # restore %rsp
jmp .Lmulx4x_cond_copy
.align 32
.Lmulx4x_cond_copy:
movdqa 16*0($tptr),%xmm2
movdqa 16*1($tptr),%xmm3
lea 16*2($tptr),$tptr
movdqu 16*0($rptr),%xmm4
movdqu 16*1($rptr),%xmm5
lea 16*2($rptr),$rptr
movdqa %xmm0,-16*2($tptr) # zero tp
movdqa %xmm0,-16*1($tptr)
pcmpeqd %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm1,%xmm2
pand %xmm1,%xmm3
pand %xmm0,%xmm4
pand %xmm0,%xmm5
pxor %xmm0,%xmm0
por %xmm2,%xmm4
por %xmm3,%xmm5
movdqu %xmm4,-16*2($rptr)
movdqu %xmm5,-16*1($rptr)
sub \$32,%rdx
jnz .Lmulx4x_cond_copy
mov %rdx,($tptr)
mov \$1,%rax
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
mov -40(%rsi),%r14

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
#ifndef HEADER_BN_H
# define HEADER_BN_H
# include <limits.h>
# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
# include <stdio.h> /* FILE */
@@ -721,8 +722,17 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void);
/* library internal functions */
# define bn_expand(a,bits) ((((((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)) <= (a)->dmax)?\
(a):bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2))
# define bn_expand(a,bits) \
( \
bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1) ? \
NULL \
: \
(((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) ? \
(a) \
: \
bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) \
)
# define bn_wexpand(a,words) (((words) <= (a)->dmax)?(a):bn_expand2((a),(words)))
BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED

View File

@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
*/
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include "constant_time_locl.h"
#include "bn_lcl.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -282,9 +283,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
ret = BN_one(r);
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(r);
} else {
ret = BN_one(r);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -418,7 +424,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
ret = BN_one(rr);
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -595,15 +607,17 @@ static BN_ULONG bn_get_bits(const BIGNUM *a, int bitpos)
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
int window)
{
size_t i, j;
int i, j;
int width = 1 << window;
BN_ULONG *table = (BN_ULONG *)buf;
if (top > b->top)
top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
* zeroed */
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
buf[j] = ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i];
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top; i++, j += width) {
table[j] = b->d[i];
}
return 1;
@@ -611,15 +625,51 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
int window)
{
size_t i, j;
int i, j;
int width = 1 << window;
volatile BN_ULONG *table = (volatile BN_ULONG *)buf;
if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
((unsigned char *)b->d)[i] = buf[j];
if (window <= 3) {
for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
BN_ULONG acc = 0;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++) {
acc |= table[j] &
((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
}
b->d[i] = acc;
}
} else {
int xstride = 1 << (window - 2);
BN_ULONG y0, y1, y2, y3;
i = idx >> (window - 2); /* equivalent of idx / xstride */
idx &= xstride - 1; /* equivalent of idx % xstride */
y0 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,0)&1);
y1 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,1)&1);
y2 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,2)&1);
y3 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,3)&1);
for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
BN_ULONG acc = 0;
for (j = 0; j < xstride; j++) {
acc |= ( (table[j + 0 * xstride] & y0) |
(table[j + 1 * xstride] & y1) |
(table[j + 2 * xstride] & y2) |
(table[j + 3 * xstride] & y3) )
& ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
}
b->d[i] = acc;
}
}
b->top = top;
@@ -639,7 +689,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
* precomputation memory layout to limit data-dependency to a minimum to
* protect secret exponents (cf. the hyper-threading timing attacks pointed
* out by Colin Percival,
* http://www.daemong-consideredperthreading-considered-harmful/)
* http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
*/
int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
@@ -671,7 +721,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
ret = BN_one(rr);
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -732,8 +788,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
if (window >= 5) {
window = 5; /* ~5% improvement for RSA2048 sign, and even
* for RSA4096 */
if ((top & 7) == 0)
powerbufLen += 2 * top * sizeof(m->d[0]);
/* reserve space for mont->N.d[] copy */
powerbufLen += top * sizeof(mont->N.d[0]);
}
#endif
(void)0;
@@ -954,7 +1010,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BN_ULONG *not_used, const BN_ULONG *np,
const BN_ULONG *n0, int num);
BN_ULONG *np = mont->N.d, *n0 = mont->n0, *np2;
BN_ULONG *n0 = mont->n0, *np;
/*
* BN_to_montgomery can contaminate words above .top [in
@@ -965,11 +1021,11 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
for (i = tmp.top; i < top; i++)
tmp.d[i] = 0;
if (top & 7)
np2 = np;
else
for (np2 = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++)
np2[2 * i] = np[i];
/*
* copy mont->N.d[] to improve cache locality
*/
for (np = am.d + top, i = 0; i < top; i++)
np[i] = mont->N.d[i];
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 0);
bn_scatter5(am.d, am.top, powerbuf, 1);
@@ -979,7 +1035,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
# if 0
for (i = 3; i < 32; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# else
@@ -990,7 +1046,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
for (i = 3; i < 8; i += 2) {
int j;
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
for (j = 2 * i; j < 32; j *= 2) {
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
@@ -998,13 +1054,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
}
for (; i < 16; i += 2) {
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
bn_mul_mont(tmp.d, tmp.d, tmp.d, np, n0, top);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, 2 * i);
}
for (; i < 32; i += 2) {
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_mul_mont_gather5(tmp.d, am.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, i - 1);
bn_scatter5(tmp.d, top, powerbuf, i);
}
# endif
@@ -1033,11 +1089,11 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
while (bits >= 0) {
wvalue = bn_get_bits5(p->d, bits - 4);
bits -= 5;
bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np2, n0, top, wvalue);
bn_power5(tmp.d, tmp.d, powerbuf, np, n0, top, wvalue);
}
}
ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np2, n0, top);
ret = bn_from_montgomery(tmp.d, tmp.d, NULL, np, n0, top);
tmp.top = top;
bn_correct_top(&tmp);
if (ret) {
@@ -1048,9 +1104,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
} else
#endif
{
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, window))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, window))
goto err;
/*
@@ -1062,15 +1118,15 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
if (window > 1) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2,
window))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i,
window))
goto err;
}
}
@@ -1078,8 +1134,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
window))
goto err;
/*
@@ -1099,8 +1155,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/*
* Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
*/
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
window))
goto err;
/* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */
@@ -1182,8 +1238,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
} else
} else {
ret = BN_one(rr);
}
return ret;
}
if (a == 0) {
@@ -1297,9 +1354,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
}
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
ret = BN_one(r);
if (bits == 0) {
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m)) {
ret = 1;
BN_zero(r);
} else {
ret = BN_one(r);
}
return ret;
}

View File

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include "bn_lcl.h"
@@ -189,7 +190,11 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
a++;
}
for (i = 0; isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) ;
for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
continue;
if (i > INT_MAX/4)
goto err;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
@@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
BN_zero(ret);
}
/* i is the number of hex digests; */
/* i is the number of hex digits */
if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -260,7 +265,11 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
a++;
}
for (i = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) ;
for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
continue;
if (i > INT_MAX/4)
goto err;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
@@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
BN_zero(ret);
}
/* i is the number of digests, a bit of an over expand; */
/* i is the number of digits, a bit of an over expand */
if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
goto err;

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
BN_init(&(recp->N));
BN_init(&(recp->Nr));
recp->num_bits = 0;
recp->shift = 0;
recp->flags = 0;
}

View File

@@ -72,6 +72,25 @@
static const char rnd_seed[] =
"string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
/*
* Test that r == 0 in test_exp_mod_zero(). Returns one on success,
* returns zero and prints debug output otherwise.
*/
static int a_is_zero_mod_one(const char *method, const BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *a) {
if (!BN_is_zero(r)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s failed:\n", method);
fprintf(stderr, "a ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
fprintf(stderr, "a = ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, a);
fprintf(stderr, "\nr = ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, r);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success.
*/
@@ -79,8 +98,9 @@ static int test_exp_mod_zero()
{
BIGNUM a, p, m;
BIGNUM r;
BN_ULONG one_word = 1;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
int ret = 1;
int ret = 1, failed = 0;
BN_init(&m);
BN_one(&m);
@@ -92,21 +112,65 @@ static int test_exp_mod_zero()
BN_zero(&p);
BN_init(&r);
BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (BN_is_zero(&r))
ret = 0;
else {
printf("1**0 mod 1 = ");
BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
printf(", should be 0\n");
if (!BN_rand(&a, 1024, 0, 0))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
goto err;
if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp", &r, &a))
failed = 1;
if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
goto err;
if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_recp", &r, &a))
failed = 1;
if (!BN_mod_exp_simple(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx))
goto err;
if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_simple", &r, &a))
failed = 1;
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx, NULL))
goto err;
if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont", &r, &a))
failed = 1;
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx, NULL)) {
goto err;
}
if (!a_is_zero_mod_one("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime", &r, &a))
failed = 1;
/*
* A different codepath exists for single word multiplication
* in non-constant-time only.
*/
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_word(&r, one_word, &p, &m, ctx, NULL))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_zero(&r)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_word failed:\n");
fprintf(stderr, "1 ** 0 mod 1 = r (should be 0)\n");
fprintf(stderr, "r = ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, &r);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
return 0;
}
ret = failed;
err:
BN_free(&r);
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&p);
BN_free(&m);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
/*
* Algorithm Specification
* http://info.isl.llia/specicrypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html
* http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/specifications.html
*/
/*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cbc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cbc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cfb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_cfb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ctr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ctr.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ecb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ecb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_locl.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_locl.h */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2006 NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) .
* ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_misc.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_misc.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ofb.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/camellia_ofb.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/camellia/cmll_utl.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -160,6 +160,14 @@ int CMAC_Init(CMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t keylen,
EVPerr(EVP_F_CMAC_INIT, EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS);
return 0;
}
/* Switch to FIPS cipher implementation if possible */
if (cipher != NULL) {
const EVP_CIPHER *fcipher;
fcipher = FIPS_get_cipherbynid(EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher));
if (fcipher != NULL)
cipher = fcipher;
}
/*
* Other algorithm blocking will be done in FIPS_cmac_init, via
* FIPS_cipherinit().

View File

@@ -1016,11 +1016,11 @@ void *OPENSSL_stderr(void)
return stderr;
}
int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *in_a, const void *in_b, size_t len)
int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void *in_a, const volatile void *in_b, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
const unsigned char *a = in_a;
const unsigned char *b = in_b;
const volatile unsigned char *a = in_a;
const volatile unsigned char *b = in_b;
unsigned char x = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)

View File

@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void);
* into a defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other
* than to be non-zero.
*/
int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void *a, const volatile void *b, size_t len);
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/des/des_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/des/des_old.c */
/*-
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/des/des_old.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/des/des_old.h */
/*-
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/des/des_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/des/des_old.c */
/*
* WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING WARNING The

View File

@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct dh_st {
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE 0x02
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID 0x04
/*
* primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for

View File

@@ -151,23 +151,37 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *q = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
q = BN_new();
if (q == NULL)
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_set_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
goto err;
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
BN_copy(q, dh->p);
BN_sub_word(q, 1);
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
goto err;
if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
if (dh->q != NULL) {
/* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
}
ok = 1;
err:
if (q != NULL)
BN_free(q);
if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
}
return (ok);
}

View File

@@ -471,6 +471,31 @@ static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_Z[] = {
0xC2, 0x6C, 0x5D, 0x7C
};
static const unsigned char dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y[] = {
0x45, 0x32, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x07, 0xE5, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xD6, 0x02, 0x82, 0xB3,
0x32, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x41, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xAD,
0xC6, 0x26, 0x85, 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x8C, 0x12, 0x4C, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x20,
0xC4, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xA4, 0x25, 0xB7, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xCC, 0x67,
0xBA, 0xEA, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0x24, 0x72, 0x60, 0xDA, 0x88,
0x18, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x35, 0x8B, 0x83,
0x4A, 0x6E, 0xFA, 0x48, 0x73, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x87, 0xFF, 0x6B, 0x66, 0x1F,
0xA8, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x01, 0xE5, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x52, 0xD0, 0xE9, 0xD8,
0x72, 0xF9, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA5, 0x25, 0x95, 0x74, 0xE2,
0x7A, 0x61, 0x4E, 0xA7, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xE2, 0xD2, 0x9D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x70,
0x34, 0x44, 0x32, 0xC7, 0xB2, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xFE, 0x17, 0x2B, 0xD6, 0x1F,
0x8B, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x9A, 0x33, 0x66,
0x62, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x18, 0x3E, 0xA2, 0x5F, 0x00, 0x07, 0xD8, 0x9B, 0x22,
0xE4, 0xEC, 0x84, 0xD5, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x31, 0x23, 0xD8, 0x44,
0x22, 0x2A, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x44, 0xCC, 0xC6, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xBE, 0x50, 0x9D,
0x4A, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x72, 0x4D, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xED,
0x33, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0x7F, 0x16, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xEB, 0xD2, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x01,
0x73, 0x84, 0x62, 0xB9, 0x29, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x32, 0x9E, 0x7A, 0x6A,
0xCF, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x62, 0x77, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x62, 0x72,
0x5A, 0x69, 0xA6, 0x5B, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x95, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0xC2,
0xDF, 0x72, 0x6D, 0xB1, 0x1E, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0x89,
0x93, 0x74, 0x89, 0x59
};
typedef struct {
DH *(*get_param) (void);
const unsigned char *xA;
@@ -503,10 +528,15 @@ static const rfc5114_td rfctd[] = {
static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
{
int i;
DH *dhA = NULL;
DH *dhB = NULL;
unsigned char *Z1 = NULL;
unsigned char *Z2 = NULL;
const rfc5114_td *td = NULL;
BIGNUM *bady = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(rfctd) / sizeof(rfc5114_td)); i++) {
DH *dhA, *dhB;
unsigned char *Z1 = NULL, *Z2 = NULL;
const rfc5114_td *td = rfctd + i;
td = rfctd + i;
/* Set up DH structures setting key components */
dhA = td->get_param();
dhB = td->get_param();
@@ -549,14 +579,63 @@ static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
DH_free(dhB);
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
OPENSSL_free(Z2);
dhA = NULL;
dhB = NULL;
Z1 = NULL;
Z2 = NULL;
}
/* Now i == OSSL_NELEM(rfctd) */
/* RFC5114 uses unsafe primes, so now test an invalid y value */
dhA = DH_get_2048_224();
if (dhA == NULL)
goto bad_err;
Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA));
if (Z1 == NULL)
goto bad_err;
bady = BN_bin2bn(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y,
sizeof(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y), NULL);
if (bady == NULL)
goto bad_err;
if (!DH_generate_key(dhA))
goto bad_err;
if (DH_compute_key(Z1, bady, dhA) != -1) {
/*
* DH_compute_key should fail with -1. If we get here we unexpectedly
* allowed an invalid y value
*/
goto err;
}
/* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
ERR_clear_error();
printf("RFC5114 parameter test %d OK\n", i + 1);
BN_free(bady);
DH_free(dhA);
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
return 1;
bad_err:
BN_free(bady);
DH_free(dhA);
DH_free(dhB);
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
OPENSSL_free(Z2);
fprintf(stderr, "Initalisation error RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return 0;
err:
BN_free(bady);
DH_free(dhA);
DH_free(dhB);
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
OPENSSL_free(Z2);
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed RFC5114 set %d\n", i + 1);
return 0;
}

View File

@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
DSA *dsa = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
@@ -262,23 +264,21 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
}
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
ret = 1;
goto done;
decerr:
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
dsaerr:
DSA_free(dsa);
done:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (ndsa)
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
else
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
return 1;
decerr:
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
dsaerr:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (privkey)
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
DSA_free(dsa);
return 0;
return ret;
}
static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)

View File

@@ -187,9 +187,6 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
ret = DSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
* unlikely.
@@ -201,11 +198,14 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
}
goto redo;
}
ret = DSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
ret->r = r;
ret->s = s;
err:
if (!ret) {
if (ret == NULL) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dso.h -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* dso.h */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dso_dl.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* dso_dl.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dso_dlfcn.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* dso_dlfcn.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dso_lib.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* dso_lib.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ DSO *DSO_new_method(DSO_METHOD *meth)
ret->meth = meth;
ret->references = 1;
if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
sk_void_free(ret->meth_data);
OPENSSL_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dso_vms.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* dso_vms.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dso_win32.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* dso_win32.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.

View File

@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
@@ -2001,6 +2001,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
push %r15
sub \$32*5+8, %rsp
.Lpoint_double_shortcut$x:
movdqu 0x00($a_ptr), %xmm0 # copy *(P256_POINT *)$a_ptr.x
mov $a_ptr, $b_ptr # backup copy
movdqu 0x10($a_ptr), %xmm1
@@ -2291,6 +2292,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 0x40+8*1($b_ptr), $acc6
mov 0x40+8*2($b_ptr), $acc7
mov 0x40+8*3($b_ptr), $acc0
movq $b_ptr, %xmm1
lea 0x40-$bias($b_ptr), $a_ptr
lea $Z1sqr(%rsp), $r_ptr # Z1^2
@@ -2346,7 +2348,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
test $acc0, $acc0
jnz .Ladd_proceed$x # (in1infty || in2infty)?
test $acc1, $acc1
jz .Ladd_proceed$x # is_equal(S1,S2)?
jz .Ladd_double$x # is_equal(S1,S2)?
movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr
pxor %xmm0, %xmm0
@@ -2358,6 +2360,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
movdqu %xmm0, 0x50($r_ptr)
jmp .Ladd_done$x
.align 32
.Ladd_double$x:
movq %xmm1, $a_ptr # restore $a_ptr
movq %xmm0, $r_ptr # restore $r_ptr
add \$`32*(18-5)`, %rsp # difference in frame sizes
jmp .Lpoint_double_shortcut$x
.align 32
.Ladd_proceed$x:
`&load_for_sqr("$R(%rsp)", "$src0")`

View File

@@ -746,6 +746,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
goto err;
if (!BN_one(&point->Z))
goto err;
point->Z_is_one = 1;
ret = 1;

View File

@@ -387,6 +387,8 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (ty == NULL)
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));

View File

@@ -1657,8 +1657,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
*/
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
ret = 1;
goto err;
goto done;
}
if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][0], &group->generator->X)) ||
(!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1][1], &group->generator->Y)) ||
@@ -1736,6 +1735,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp224_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_felems);
done:
if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre, nistp224_pre_comp_dup,
nistp224_pre_comp_free,
nistp224_pre_comp_clear_free))

View File

@@ -2249,8 +2249,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
*/
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
ret = 1;
goto err;
goto done;
}
if ((!BN_to_felem(x_tmp, &group->generator->X)) ||
(!BN_to_felem(y_tmp, &group->generator->Y)) ||
@@ -2337,6 +2336,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp256_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
make_points_affine(31, &(pre->g_pre_comp[0][1]), tmp_smallfelems);
done:
if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre, nistp256_pre_comp_dup,
nistp256_pre_comp_free,
nistp256_pre_comp_clear_free))

View File

@@ -2056,8 +2056,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
*/
if (0 == EC_POINT_cmp(group, generator, group->generator, ctx)) {
memcpy(pre->g_pre_comp, gmul, sizeof(pre->g_pre_comp));
ret = 1;
goto err;
goto done;
}
if ((!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][0], &group->generator->X)) ||
(!BN_to_felem(pre->g_pre_comp[1][1], &group->generator->Y)) ||
@@ -2115,6 +2114,7 @@ int ec_GFp_nistp521_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
}
make_points_affine(15, &(pre->g_pre_comp[1]), tmp_felems);
done:
if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&group->extra_data, pre, nistp521_pre_comp_dup,
nistp521_pre_comp_free,
nistp521_pre_comp_clear_free))

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ __attribute((aligned(4096)))
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
__declspec(align(4096))
#elif defined(__SUNPRO_C)
# pragma align 4096(ecp_nistz256_precomputed)
# pragma align 64(ecp_nistz256_precomputed)
#endif
static const BN_ULONG ecp_nistz256_precomputed[37][64 *
sizeof(P256_POINT_AFFINE) /

View File

@@ -1591,7 +1591,7 @@ struct nistp_test_params {
int degree;
/*
* Qx, Qy and D are taken from
* http://csrcdocut.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
* http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/ECDSA_Prime.pdf
* Otherwise, values are standard curve parameters from FIPS 180-3
*/
const char *p, *a, *b, *Qx, *Qy, *Gx, *Gy, *order, *d;
@@ -1758,9 +1758,18 @@ static void nistp_single_test(const struct nistp_test_params *test)
if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(NISTP, Q, Q_CHECK, ctx))
ABORT;
/*
* We have not performed precomputation so have_precompute mult should be
* false
*/
if (EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP))
ABORT;
/* now repeat all tests with precomputation */
if (!EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(NISTP, ctx))
ABORT;
if (!EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(NISTP))
ABORT;
/* fixed point multiplication */
EC_POINT_mul(NISTP, Q, m, NULL, NULL, ctx);

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/engine/eng_all.c -*- mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/engine/eng_all.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
* 2000.

View File

@@ -243,8 +243,10 @@ static int dynamic_set_data_ctx(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx **ctx)
* If we lost the race to set the context, c is non-NULL and *ctx is the
* context of the thread that won.
*/
if (c)
if (c) {
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(c->dirs);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/evp/e_camellia.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/evp/e_camellia.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -71,12 +71,13 @@ typedef struct {
DES_key_schedule ks;
} ks;
union {
void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t, const void *, void *);
void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t,
const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *);
} stream;
} EVP_DES_KEY;
# if defined(AES_ASM) && (defined(__sparc) || defined(__sparc__))
/* ---------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that
/* ----------^^^ this is not a typo, just a way to detect that
* assembler support was in general requested... */
# include "sparc_arch.h"
@@ -86,9 +87,9 @@ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks);
void des_t4_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
void des_t4_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
const DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
# endif
static int des_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ static int des_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
{
EVP_DES_KEY *dat = (EVP_DES_KEY *) ctx->cipher_data;
if (dat->stream.cbc) {
if (dat->stream.cbc != NULL) {
(*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, &dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv);
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ typedef struct {
DES_key_schedule ks[3];
} ks;
union {
void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t, const void *, void *);
void (*cbc) (const void *, void *, size_t,
const DES_key_schedule *, unsigned char *);
} stream;
} DES_EDE_KEY;
# define ks1 ks.ks[0]
@@ -93,9 +94,9 @@ extern unsigned int OPENSSL_sparcv9cap_P[];
void des_t4_key_expand(const void *key, DES_key_schedule *ks);
void des_t4_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]);
void des_t4_ede3_cbc_decrypt(const void *inp, void *out, size_t len,
DES_key_schedule *ks, unsigned char iv[8]);
const DES_key_schedule ks[3], unsigned char iv[8]);
# endif
static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
@@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ static int des_ede_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
}
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (dat->stream.cbc) {
(*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, &dat->ks, ctx->iv);
(*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, inl, dat->ks.ks, ctx->iv);
return 1;
}
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ static int des_ede3_unwrap(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
int rv = -1;
if (inl < 24)
return -1;
if (!out)
if (out == NULL)
return inl - 16;
memcpy(ctx->iv, wrap_iv, 8);
/* Decrypt first block which will end up as icv */
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ static int des_ede3_wrap(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
{
unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (!out)
if (out == NULL)
return inl + 16;
/* Copy input to output buffer + 8 so we have space for IV */
memmove(out + 8, in, inl);

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/evp/e_old.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/evp/e_old.c */
/*
* Written by Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 2004.

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/evp/e_seed.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/evp/e_seed.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* crypto/mem_clr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* crypto/mem_clr.c */
/*
* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL project
* 2002.

View File

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
$avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22);
}
if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm6
movaps -0xd8(%rax),%xmm7
movaps -0xc8(%rax),%xmm7
movaps -0xb8(%rax),%xmm8
movaps -0xa8(%rax),%xmm9
movaps -0x98(%rax),%xmm10

View File

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
if (`$ENV{CC} -Wa,-v -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1`
=~ /GNU assembler version ([2-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($1>=2.19) + ($1>=2.22);
$avx = ($1>=2.20) + ($1>=2.22);
}
if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More