Prepare for 1.0.2e release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
make update
2015-12-03 14:44:31 +00:00 · 2015-12-03 14:44:31 +00:00 · 2015-12-03 14:32:05 +00:00 · 2015-12-03 14:32:05 +00:00 · 2015-12-03 14:32:05 +00:00 · 2015-12-03 14:32:05 +00:00
387 changed files with 3610 additions and 5159 deletions
--- a/.cvsignore
+++ b/.cvsignore
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-openssl.pc
-libcrypto.pc
-libssl.pc
-MINFO
-makefile.one
-tmp
-out
-outinc
-rehash.time
-testlog
-make.log
-maketest.log
-cctest
-cctest.c
-cctest.a
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-Makefile
-*.dll*
-*.so*
-*.sl*
-*.dylib*
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 .#*
 #*#
 *~
+/.dir-locals.el

 # Top level excludes
 /Makefile.bak
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+language: c
+
+addons:
+    apt_packages:
+        - binutils-mingw-w64
+        - gcc-mingw-w64
+
+os:
+    - linux
+    - osx
+
+compiler:
+    - clang
+    - gcc
+    - i686-w64-mingw32-gcc
+    - x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc
+
+env:
+    - CONFIG_OPTS=""
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="shared"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="-d --strict-warnings"
+
+matrix:
+    exclude:
+        - os: osx
+          compiler: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc
+        - os: osx
+          compiler: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc
+        - compiler: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="-d --strict-warnings"
+        - compiler: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc
+          env: CONFIG_OPTS="-d --strict-warnings"
+
+before_script:
+    - if [ "$CC" == i686-w64-mingw32-gcc ]; then
+          export CROSS_COMPILE=${CC%%gcc}; unset CC;
+          ./Configure mingw $CONFIG_OPTS;
+      elif [ "$CC" == x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc ]; then
+          export CROSS_COMPILE=${CC%%gcc}; unset CC;
+          ./Configure mingw64 $CONFIG_OPTS;
+      else
+          if [ "$CC" == gcc ]; then
+              export CONFIG_OPTS="$CONFIG_OPTS -Wno-error=shadow";
+          fi;
+          ./config $CONFIG_OPTS;
+      fi
+
+script:
+    - make
+    - if [ -z "$CROSS_COMPILE" ]; then make test; fi
+
+notifications:
+    email:
+        - openssl-commits@openssl.org
--- a/257
+++ b/257
@@ -2,6 +2,89 @@
 OpenSSL CHANGES
 _______________

+ Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+  *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+     There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+     procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+     against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+     perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+     feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+     deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+     of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+     likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+     additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+     private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+     key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+     default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
+     (CVE-2015-3193)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+
+     The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+     dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+     algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+     routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+     used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+     DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+     vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+     authentication.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+     (CVE-2015-3194)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+     When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+     memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+     application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+     affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+     libFuzzer.
+     (CVE-2015-3195)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+     This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+     though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+     legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+     return an error
+     [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
+
+  *) Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+     During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+     alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+     fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+     attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+     bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+     certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+     (Google/BoringSSL).
+     (CVE-2015-1793)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
+
+     If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+     the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+     result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+     identify hint data.
+     (CVE-2015-3196)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
 Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]

  *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
@@ -40,9 +123,9 @@
     callbacks.

     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
-     independently by Hanno B<EFBFBD>ck.
+     independently by Hanno Böck.
     (CVE-2015-1789)
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+     [Emilia Käsper]

  *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent

@@ -56,7 +139,7 @@

     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
     (CVE-2015-1790)
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+     [Emilia Käsper]

  *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function

@@ -186,7 +269,7 @@

     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
     (CVE-2015-0289)
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+     [Emilia Käsper]

  *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix

@@ -194,10 +277,10 @@
     servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
     a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.

-     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper
+     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
     (OpenSSL development team).
     (CVE-2015-0293)
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+     [Emilia Käsper]

  *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix

@@ -257,6 +340,10 @@

 Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]

+  *) Change RSA and DH/DSA key generation apps to generate 2048-bit
+     keys by default.
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
+
  *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
     ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
     So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
@@ -702,12 +789,12 @@
      version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
      version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
      sanity and breaks all known clients.
-      [David Benjamin, Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+      [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]

   *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
      early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
      renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
-      [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+      [Emilia Käsper]

   *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
      ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
@@ -718,7 +805,7 @@
      Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
      was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
      ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
-      [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+      [Emilia Käsper]

 Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]

@@ -798,10 +885,10 @@
     with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
     ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.

-     Thanks to Felix Gr<EFBFBD>bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+     Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
     issue.
     (CVE-2014-3510)
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper]
+     [Emilia Käsper]

  *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
     to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
@@ -838,7 +925,7 @@
     properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
     Denial of Service attack.

-     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam<EFBFBD>ki (Codenomicon) for
+     Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
     discovering and researching this issue.
     (CVE-2014-5139)
     [Steve Henson]
@@ -850,7 +937,7 @@

     Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
     (CVE-2014-3508)
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper, and Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]

  *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
     for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
@@ -880,22 +967,22 @@
     client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
     code on a vulnerable client or server.

-     Thanks to J<EFBFBD>ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
-     [J<EFBFBD>ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+     Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+     [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]

  *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
     are subject to a denial of service attack.

-     Thanks to Felix Gr<EFBFBD>bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+     Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
     this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
-     [Felix Gr<EFBFBD>bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+     [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]

  *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
     compilation flags.
     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

  *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
-     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+     in i2d_ECPrivateKey.  Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
     [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]

  *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
@@ -967,9 +1054,9 @@
     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
-     Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper for the initial patch.
+     Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
     (CVE-2013-0169)
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+     [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]

  *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
     ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
@@ -1144,7 +1231,7 @@
     EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
     EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
     implementations).
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+     [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]

  *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
     all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
@@ -1420,7 +1507,7 @@
     [Adam Langley (Google)]

  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]

  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
@@ -1434,7 +1521,7 @@
     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
     the last update always remained unused).
-     [Emilia K<EFBFBD>sper (Google)]
+     [Emilia Käsper (Google)]

  *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
     [Bob Buckholz (Google)]
@@ -2243,7 +2330,7 @@

  *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
     and response verification functionality.
-     [Zolt<EFBFBD>n Gl<EFBFBD>zik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
+     [Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]

  *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
     extension so far.  The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
@@ -3411,7 +3498,7 @@

  *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
     initialised value as BN_new().
-     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]

  *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
     [Steve Henson]
@@ -3430,7 +3517,7 @@
     some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
     maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
     in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
-     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]

  *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
     that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
@@ -3497,7 +3584,7 @@
     [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]

  *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
-     [G<EFBFBD>tz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
+     [Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]

  *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
     control of the error stack.
@@ -4212,7 +4299,7 @@
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Undo Cygwin change.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
     Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
@@ -4245,11 +4332,11 @@
     [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]

  *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
     prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
-     [Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz J<EFBFBD>nicke, resolves #1014]
+     [Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]

  *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
     [Steve Henson]
@@ -4711,7 +4798,7 @@
     pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
     the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
     data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
-     [G<EFBFBD>tz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
+     [Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]

  *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
     [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>]
@@ -6816,7 +6903,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Bodo Moeller]

  *) BN_sqr() bug fix.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
+     [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]

  *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
     so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
@@ -6976,7 +7063,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Bodo Moeller]

  *) Fix OAEP check.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller, Bodo M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]

  *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
     RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
@@ -7238,10 +7325,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Bodo Moeller]

  *) Use better test patterns in bntest.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]
 
  *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
     [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -7386,14 +7473,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
     BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
-     [Bodo M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Bodo Möller]

  *) Add DSO method for VMS.
     [Richard Levitte]

  *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
     wrong sign.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
     packages.  The default package contains applications, application
@@ -7411,7 +7498,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
     random number < q in the DSA library.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'.  This disables the default
     behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
@@ -7677,7 +7764,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
  *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
     Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
     Random Numbers.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
     DSA key.
@@ -7897,7 +7984,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
     rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
@@ -7929,7 +8016,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Bodo Moeller]

  *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
     RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
@@ -8018,7 +8105,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
+     [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
      the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow@DEMENTIA.ORG>]

  *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
@@ -8119,7 +8206,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Rolf Haberrecker <rolf@suse.de>]

  *) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
     [Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
@@ -8138,7 +8225,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
     case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
     assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
@@ -8168,14 +8255,14 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
+     [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
      pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33@cornell.edu>]

  *) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>.  New functions
     RAND_egd() and RAND_status().  In the command line application,
     the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
     or -rand.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
     Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
@@ -8208,7 +8295,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
        #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
        #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
     defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
-     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]

  *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
     record layer.
@@ -8259,17 +8346,17 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
     bits.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
     [Andy Polyakov]

  *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
     equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
     options to produce them.
@@ -8277,11 +8364,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
     get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
     for p == 0.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
     include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
@@ -8305,7 +8392,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
     use void * instead of char * in lhash.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller] 
+     [Ulf Möller] 

  *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
     (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
@@ -8350,13 +8437,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
     bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
     SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
     the comments.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
     made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
@@ -8366,25 +8453,25 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
  *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
     by stat().  RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
     to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller, Bodo M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]

  *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
     used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
     BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
     BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
     Rabin-Miller iterations.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
     DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
     (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
     "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
@@ -8440,7 +8527,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
  *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
     as a shared library without RSA.  Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
     NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. 
-     [Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]

  *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
     has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
@@ -8449,7 +8536,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
     RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
     (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
     3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
@@ -8479,7 +8566,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, 
     unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
@@ -9313,7 +9400,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
     delete an unused file.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
     since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
@@ -9402,7 +9489,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     worked.

  *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
+     [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]

  *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
     RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
@@ -9519,7 +9606,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Ben Laurie]

  *) DES library cleanups.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
     used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
@@ -9562,7 +9649,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Christian Forster <fo@hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]

  *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
     File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
@@ -9675,7 +9762,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Bodo Moeller]

  *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
     -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
@@ -9732,10 +9819,10 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Ben Laurie]

  *) Support Borland C++ builder.
-     [Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]

  *) Support Mingw32.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9744,7 +9831,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]

  *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Update HPUX configuration.
     [Anonymous]
@@ -9777,7 +9864,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Bodo Moeller]

  *) OAEP decoding bug fix.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
     David Harris.
@@ -9800,21 +9887,21 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]

  *) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
     extension adding in x509 utility.
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
     prototypes.
     [Steve Henson]

  *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
     by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
@@ -9843,7 +9930,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
     8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
@@ -9861,13 +9948,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]

  *) Change functions to ANSI C.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Fix typos in error codes.
-     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]

  *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
     [Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
@@ -9904,7 +9991,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) New Configure option "rsaref".
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
     [Bodo Moeller]
@@ -9952,7 +10039,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
     the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) Tweaks to Configure
     [Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
@@ -9962,11 +10049,11 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]

  *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
     The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller]
+     [Ulf Möller]
  
  *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
     SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
@@ -10505,7 +10592,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      Hagino <itojun@kame.net>]

  *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]

  *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
     functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
@@ -10515,7 +10602,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
     [Steve Henson]

  *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
-     [Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+     [Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]

  *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
     [Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
@@ -10662,7 +10749,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k

  *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
     was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
-     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf M<EFBFBD>ller <ulf@fitug.de>]
+     [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]

  *) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
     [Ben Laurie]
--- a/38
+++ b/38
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
+----------------------------
+
+Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
+http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
+would like to submit a patch, send it to rt@openssl.org with
+the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
+textual explanation of what your patch does.
+
+You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+mail to rt@openssl.org with a brief description and a link to the PR so
+that we can more easily keep track of it.
+
+If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
+OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
+Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
+reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
+
+Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
+current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+(see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
+warnings using the --strict-warnings flag.  OpenSSL compiles on many varied
+platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
+
+Our preferred format for patch files is "git format-patch" output. For example
+to provide a patch file containing the last commit in your local git repository
+use the following command:
+
+# git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch
+
+Another method of creating an acceptable patch file without using git is as
+follows:
+
+# cd openssl-work
+# [your changes]
+# ./Configure dist; make clean
+# cd ..
+# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
--- a/11
+++ b/11
@@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ my %table=(
 "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "linux-x86_64-clang",	"clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+"debug-linux-x86_64-clang",	"clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
 "linux-x32",	"gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
 "linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
@@ -1646,21 +1647,22 @@ if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
 	$shlib_minor=$2;
 	}

+my $ecc = $cc;
+$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
+
 if ($strict_warnings)
 	{
-	my $ecc = $cc;
-	$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
 	my $wopt;
 	die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
 	foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
 		{
-		$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
+		$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
 		}
 	if ($ecc eq "clang")
 		{
 		foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
 			{
-			$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
+			$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -1713,6 +1715,7 @@ while (<IN>)
 		s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/;
 		s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/;
 		s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
+		s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $ecc eq "gcc" || $ecc eq "clang";
 		}
 	s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/;
 	s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/;
--- a/1055
+++ b/1055
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ CLEARENV=	TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS}	\
 		$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS}	\
 		$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}

-BUILDENV=	PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
+# LC_ALL=C ensures that error [and other] messages are delivered in
+# same language for uniform treatment.
+BUILDENV=	LC_ALL=C PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)'\
 		CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' 			\
 		AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c'			\
 		AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)'	\
@@ -269,6 +271,7 @@ reflect:
 	@[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV)

 sub_all: build_all
+
 build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools

 build_libs: build_libcrypto build_libssl openssl.pc
@@ -278,15 +281,15 @@ build_libssl: build_ssl libssl.pc

 build_crypto:
 	@dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_ssl:
+build_ssl: build_crypto
 	@dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_engines:
+build_engines: build_crypto
 	@dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_apps:
+build_apps: build_libs
 	@dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tests:
+build_tests: build_libs
 	@dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)
-build_tools:
+build_tools: build_libs
 	@dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD)

 all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps
@@ -496,25 +499,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
 # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+	                       --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
+			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+			       -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
+	       \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+	    | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
 	find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
 	find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
 	find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
-	find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
-	$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
-	gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
-	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz

-tar-snap:
-	@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
-		`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE)

 dist:   
--- a/14
+++ b/14
@@ -5,6 +5,20 @@
  This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
  release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.

+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+      o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
+      o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
+      o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
+      o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs
+      o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+        return an error
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
+
+      o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
+      o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
+
  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]

      o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
--- a/176
+++ b/176
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@

- OpenSSL 1.0.2c 12 Jun 2015
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015

- Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
 Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
 All rights reserved.

@@ -10,17 +10,17 @@

 The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
 commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
- protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
- The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
- Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its
- related documentation.
+ Secure Sockets Layer (SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as
+ well as a full-strength general purpose cryptograpic library. The project is
+ managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to
+ communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related
+ documentation.

- OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young
+ OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young
 and Tim J. Hudson.  The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the
- OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license) situation, which basically means
- that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial
- purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
+ OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to
+ get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you
+ fulfill the conditions of both licenses.

 OVERVIEW
 --------
@@ -28,90 +28,39 @@
 The OpenSSL toolkit includes:

 libssl.a:
-     Implementation of SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1 and the required code to support
-     both SSLv2, SSLv3 and TLSv1 in the one server and client.
+     Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS.

 libcrypto.a:
-     General encryption and X.509 v1/v3 stuff needed by SSL/TLS but not
-     actually logically part of it. It includes routines for the following:
-
-     Ciphers
-        libdes - EAY's libdes DES encryption package which was floating
-                 around the net for a few years, and was then relicensed by
-                 him as part of SSLeay.  It includes 15 'modes/variations'
-                 of DES (1, 2 and 3 key versions of ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb;
-                 pcbc and a more general form of cfb and ofb) including desx
-                 in cbc mode, a fast crypt(3), and routines to read
-                 passwords from the keyboard.
-        RC4 encryption,
-        RC2 encryption      - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
-        Blowfish encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
-        IDEA encryption     - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
-
-     Digests
-        MD5 and MD2 message digest algorithms, fast implementations,
-        SHA (SHA-0) and SHA-1 message digest algorithms,
-        MDC2 message digest. A DES based hash that is popular on smart cards.
-
-     Public Key
-        RSA encryption/decryption/generation.
-            There is no limit on the number of bits.
-        DSA encryption/decryption/generation.
-            There is no limit on the number of bits.
-        Diffie-Hellman key-exchange/key generation.
-            There is no limit on the number of bits.
-
-     X.509v3 certificates
-        X509 encoding/decoding into/from binary ASN1 and a PEM
-             based ASCII-binary encoding which supports encryption with a
-             private key.  Program to generate RSA and DSA certificate
-             requests and to generate RSA and DSA certificates.
-
-     Systems
-        The normal digital envelope routines and base64 encoding.  Higher
-        level access to ciphers and digests by name.  New ciphers can be
-        loaded at run time.  The BIO io system which is a simple non-blocking
-        IO abstraction.  Current methods supported are file descriptors,
-        sockets, socket accept, socket connect, memory buffer, buffering, SSL
-        client/server, file pointer, encryption, digest, non-blocking testing
-        and null.
-
-     Data structures
-        A dynamically growing hashing system
-        A simple stack.
-        A Configuration loader that uses a format similar to MS .ini files.
+     Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but
+     not logically part of it.

 openssl:
     A command line tool that can be used for:
-        Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters
+        Creation of key parameters
        Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
-        Calculation of Message Digests
-        Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
-        SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
+        Calculation of message digests
+        Encryption and decryption
+        SSL/TLS client and server tests
        Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
+        And more...

 INSTALLATION
 ------------

- To install this package under a Unix derivative, read the INSTALL file.  For
- a Win32 platform, read the INSTALL.W32 file.  For OpenVMS systems, read
- INSTALL.VMS.
-
- Read the documentation in the doc/ directory.  It is quite rough, but it
- lists the functions; you will probably have to look at the code to work out
- how to use them. Look at the example programs.
-
- PROBLEMS
- --------
-
- For some platforms, there are some known problems that may affect the user
- or application author.  We try to collect those in doc/PROBLEMS, with current
- thoughts on how they should be solved in a future of OpenSSL.
+ See the appropriate file:
+        INSTALL         Linux, Unix, etc.
+        INSTALL.DJGPP   DOS platform with DJGPP
+        INSTALL.NW      Netware
+        INSTALL.OS2     OS/2
+        INSTALL.VMS     VMS
+        INSTALL.W32     Windows (32bit)
+        INSTALL.W64     Windows (64bit)
+        INSTALL.WCE     Windows CE

 SUPPORT
 -------

- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details of how to obtain
+ See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain
 commercial technical support.

 If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps
@@ -137,56 +86,33 @@

 Email the report to:

-    openssl-bugs@openssl.org
+    rt@openssl.org

- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up.  (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list.  Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).

- Note that mail to openssl-bugs@openssl.org is recorded in the public
- request tracker database (see https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html
- for details) and also forwarded to a public mailing list. Confidential
- mail may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from
- the key servers).
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt@openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.

 HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
 ----------------------------

- Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
- http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
- would like to submit a patch, send it to openssl-bugs@openssl.org with
- the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
- textual explanation of what your patch does.
+ See CONTRIBUTING

- If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
- OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
- Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
- reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
-
- Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
-
- Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
- if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt@bis.doc.gov
- (formerly BXA) with a copy to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator;
- please take some time to look at
-    http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption/PubAvailEncSourceCodeNofify.html [sic]
- and
-    http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (EAR Section 740.13(e))
- for the details. If "your encryption source code is too large to serve as
- an email attachment", they are glad to receive it by fax instead; hope you
- have a cheap long-distance plan.
-
- Our preferred format for changes is "diff -u" output. You might
- generate it like this:
-
- # cd openssl-work
- # [your changes]
- # ./Configure dist; make clean
- # cd ..
- # diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
+ LEGALITIES
+ ----------

+ A number of nations, in particular the U.S., restrict the use or export
+ of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions
+ you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to
+ develop or distribute cryptographic code.
--- a/apps/.cvsignore
+++ b/apps/.cvsignore
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-openssl
-Makefile.save
-der_chop
-der_chop.bak
-CA.pl
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-*.dll
--- a/apps/Makefile
+++ b/apps/Makefile
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
 depend: local_depend
 	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 local_depend:
-	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)

 dclean:
 	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
--- a/apps/app_rand.c
+++ b/apps/app_rand.c
@@ -124,10 +124,7 @@ int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, BIO *bio_e, int dont_warn)
    char buffer[200];

 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
-    BIO_printf(bio_e, "Loading 'screen' into random state -");
-    BIO_flush(bio_e);
    RAND_screen();
-    BIO_printf(bio_e, " done\n");
 #endif

    if (file == NULL)
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -119,9 +119,6 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINCE) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
-# include <strings.h>
-#endif
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -1352,7 +1349,11 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
        {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
        {NULL, 0, 0}
    };
-    return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl);
+    if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
+        *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
+    return 1;
 }

 int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)
--- a/apps/asn1pars.c
+++ b/apps/asn1pars.c
@@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
            }
            typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
            if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+                || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
                || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
-                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n",
-                           typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT");
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
                goto end;
            }
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -99,25 +99,19 @@
 #undef PROG
 #define PROG ca_main

-#define BASE_SECTION    "ca"
-#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
+#define BASE_SECTION            "ca"
+#define CONFIG_FILE             "openssl.cnf"

 #define ENV_DEFAULT_CA          "default_ca"

-#define STRING_MASK     "string_mask"
+#define STRING_MASK             "string_mask"
 #define UTF8_IN                 "utf8"

-#define ENV_DIR                 "dir"
-#define ENV_CERTS               "certs"
-#define ENV_CRL_DIR             "crl_dir"
-#define ENV_CA_DB               "CA_DB"
 #define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR       "new_certs_dir"
 #define ENV_CERTIFICATE         "certificate"
 #define ENV_SERIAL              "serial"
 #define ENV_CRLNUMBER           "crlnumber"
-#define ENV_CRL                 "crl"
 #define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY         "private_key"
-#define ENV_RANDFILE            "RANDFILE"
 #define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS        "default_days"
 #define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE   "default_startdate"
 #define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE     "default_enddate"
@@ -2538,6 +2532,8 @@ static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db)
    char **rrow, *a_tm_s;

    a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
+    if (a_tm == NULL)
+        return -1;

    /* get actual time and make a string */
    a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0);
--- a/apps/ecparam.c
+++ b/apps/ecparam.c
@@ -416,14 +416,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
    }

    if (check) {
-        if (group == NULL)
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "no elliptic curve parameters\n");
        BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
        if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
            BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-        } else
-            BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
+            goto end;
+        }
+        BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");

    }

--- a/apps/engine.c
+++ b/apps/engine.c
@@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ static void identity(char *ptr)

 static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
 {
-    int l = strlen(s);
-
    if (*buf == NULL) {
        *size = step;
        *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size);
@@ -109,9 +107,6 @@ static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
        **buf = '\0';
    }

-    if (**buf != '\0')
-        l += 2;                 /* ", " */
-
    if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
        *size += step;
        *buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);
--- a/apps/ocsp.c
+++ b/apps/ocsp.c
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
                OPENSSL_free(tport);
            if (tpath)
                OPENSSL_free(tpath);
+            thost = tport = tpath = NULL;
            if (args[1]) {
                args++;
                if (!OCSP_parse_url(*args, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) {
@@ -1260,8 +1261,8 @@ static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, const char *path,
        return NULL;
    }

-    if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) <= 0) {
-        BIO_puts(err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
+    if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) {
+        BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
        goto err;
    }

--- a/apps/pkcs12.c
+++ b/apps/pkcs12.c
@@ -134,13 +134,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)

    apps_startup();

-# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-    if (FIPS_mode())
-        cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
-    else
-# endif
-        cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
-
    enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
    if (bio_err == NULL)
        bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
@@ -148,6 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
    if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
        goto end;

+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    if (FIPS_mode())
+        cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
+    else
+# endif
+        cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
+
    args = argv + 1;

    while (*args) {
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -981,6 +981,11 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
        extname = "next protocol";
        break;
 #endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
+    case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation:
+        extname = "application layer protocol negotiation";
+        break;
+#endif

    case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
        extname = "TLS padding";
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -424,6 +424,14 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
               " -no_ticket        - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
    BIO_printf(bio_err,
               " -serverinfo types - send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               " -curves arg       - Elliptic curves to advertise (colon-separated list)\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               " -sigalgs arg      - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               " -client_sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support for client\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               "                       certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n");
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
    BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -2065,6 +2073,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
        sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
    if (pass)
        OPENSSL_free(pass);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin);
+#endif
    if (vpm)
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
    ssl_excert_free(exc);
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -652,6 +652,12 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
               " -no_ticket    - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
    BIO_printf(bio_err,
               " -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               " -sigalgs arg      - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               " -client_sigalgs arg  - Signature algorithms to support for client \n");
+    BIO_printf(bio_err,
+               "                        certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n");
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
    BIO_printf(bio_err,
               " -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
@@ -2881,6 +2887,21 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
                goto err;
            } else {
                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+                    && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+                    srp_callback_parm.user =
+                        SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                              srp_callback_parm.login);
+                    if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                                   srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+                    else
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+                    continue;
+                }
+#endif
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
                delay(1000);
 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
@@ -3211,6 +3232,21 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
            ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
            goto end;
        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+        if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+            && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+            BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n");
+            srp_callback_parm.user =
+                SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                      srp_callback_parm.login);
+            if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                           srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+            else
+                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+            continue;
+        }
+#endif
    }
    BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n");
    print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con);
@@ -3224,6 +3260,21 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
                goto err;
            } else {
                BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
+                    && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
+                    BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
+                    srp_callback_parm.user =
+                        SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
+                                              srp_callback_parm.login);
+                    if (srp_callback_parm.user)
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
+                                   srp_callback_parm.user->info);
+                    else
+                        BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
+                    continue;
+                }
+#endif
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
                delay(1000);
 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
--- a/appveyor.yml
+++ b/appveyor.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+platform:
+    - x86
+    - x64
+
+environment:
+    matrix:
+        - VSVER: 9
+        - VSVER: 10
+        - VSVER: 11
+        - VSVER: 12
+        - VSVER: 14
+
+configuration:
+    - plain
+    - shared
+
+matrix:
+    allow_failures:
+        - platform: x64
+          VSVER: 9
+        - platform: x64
+          VSVER: 10
+        - platform: x64
+          VSVER: 11
+
+before_build:
+    - ps: >-
+        If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") {
+            $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86"
+            $env:TARGET="VC-WIN32"
+            $env:DO="do_ms"
+        } Else {
+            $env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64"
+            $env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A"
+            $env:DO="do_win64a"
+        }
+    - ps: >-
+        If ($env:Configuration -Like "*shared*") {
+            $env:MAK="ntdll.mak"
+        } Else {
+            $env:MAK="nt.mak"
+        }
+    - ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS"))
+    - call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM%
+    - perl Configure %TARGET% no-asm
+    - call ms\%DO%
+
+build_script:
+    - nmake /f ms\%MAK%
+
+test_script:
+    - nmake /f ms\%MAK% test
+
+notifications:
+    - provider: Email
+      to:
+          - openssl-commits@openssl.org
+      on_build_success: false
+      on_build_failure: true
+      on_build_status_changed: true
--- a/crypto/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/.cvsignore
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-lib
-buildinf.h
-opensslconf.h
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-*cpuid.s
-uplink-cof.s
--- a/crypto/aes/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/aes/.cvsignore
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-aes-*.s
-aesni-*.s
-bsaes-*.s
-vpaes-*.s
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
 # the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
 # register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
 # Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
-# better performance on most recent <EFBFBD>-archs...
+# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
 #
 # Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
 # up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
 $speed_limit=512;	# chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
 			# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
 $small_footprint=1;	# $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
-			# recent <EFBFBD>-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
+			# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
 			# I favor compact code to minimize cache
 			# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
 			# in real-life applications...
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ sub enctransform()
 # Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
 # x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
 # Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
-# <EFBFBD>-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
+# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
 # better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
 # eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
 # minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
 }

-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
 	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
 }

--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
 $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	   `ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
 	   $1>=10);
-$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
+$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);

 $shaext=1;	### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1

--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
 }

-if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
 	$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
 }

@@ -139,11 +139,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
 	je	${func}_avx2
 ___
 $code.=<<___;
-	and	\$`1<<30`,%eax			# mask "Intel CPU" bit
-	and	\$`1<<28|1<<9`,%r10d		# mask AVX+SSSE3 bits
-	or	%eax,%r10d
-	cmp	\$`1<<28|1<<9|1<<30`,%r10d
-	je	${func}_avx
+	and	\$`1<<28`,%r10d			# check for AVX
+	jnz	${func}_avx
 	ud2
 ___
 						}
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ $inout3="xmm5";	$in1="xmm5";
 $inout4="xmm6";	$in0="xmm6";
 $inout5="xmm7";	$ivec="xmm7";

-# AESNI extenstion
+# AESNI extension
 sub aeskeygenassist
 { my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
    if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
@@ -337,24 +337,27 @@ Lenc_entry:
 	addi	$inp, $inp, 15		# 15 is not a typo
 	 ?lvsr	$outperm, 0, $out
 	?lvsl	$keyperm, 0, $key	# prepare for unaligned access
-	 vnor	$outmask, v7, v7	# 0xff..ff
 	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp	# redundant in aligned case
-	 ?vperm	$outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
-	 lvx	$outhead, 0, $out
 	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm

 	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core

-	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
-	vsel	v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
-	vmr	$outhead, v0
-	stvx	v1, 0, $out
-	addi	$out, $out, 15		# 15 is not a typo
-	########
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	li	r9, 16
+	beq	Lenc_out_aligned

-	lvx	v1, 0, $out		# redundant in aligned case
-	vsel	v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
-	stvx	v1, 0, $out
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	mtctr	r9
+Lenc_out_unaligned:
+	stvebx	v0, 0, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 1
+	bdnz	Lenc_out_unaligned
+	b	Lenc_done
+
+.align	4
+Lenc_out_aligned:
+	stvx	v0, 0, $out
+Lenc_done:

 	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
 	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
@@ -566,24 +569,27 @@ Ldec_entry:
 	addi	$inp, $inp, 15		# 15 is not a typo
 	 ?lvsr	$outperm, 0, $out
 	?lvsl	$keyperm, 0, $key
-	 vnor	$outmask, v7, v7	# 0xff..ff
 	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp	# redundant in aligned case
-	 ?vperm	$outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
-	 lvx	$outhead, 0, $out
 	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm

 	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_core

-	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
-	vsel	v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
-	vmr	$outhead, v0
-	stvx	v1, 0, $out
-	addi	$out, $out, 15		# 15 is not a typo
-	########
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	li	r9, 16
+	beq	Ldec_out_aligned

-	lvx	v1, 0, $out		# redundant in aligned case
-	vsel	v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
-	stvx	v1, 0, $out
+	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	mtctr	r9
+Ldec_out_unaligned:
+	stvebx	v0, 0, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 1
+	bdnz	Ldec_out_unaligned
+	b	Ldec_done
+
+.align	4
+Ldec_out_aligned:
+	stvx	v0, 0, $out
+Ldec_done:

 	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
 	li	r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
@@ -658,11 +664,11 @@ Ldec_entry:
 	$PUSH	r0, `$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2+$LRSAVE`($sp)

 	and	r30, r5, r9		# copy length&-16
+	andi.	r9, $out, 15		# is $out aligned?
 	mr	r5, r6			# copy pointer to key
 	mr	r31, r7			# copy pointer to iv
-	blt	Lcbc_abort
-	cmpwi	r8, 0			# test direction
 	li	r6, -1
+	mcrf	cr1, cr0		# put aside $out alignment flag
 	mr	r7, r12			# copy vrsave
 	mtspr	256, r6			# preserve all AltiVec registers

@@ -672,6 +678,7 @@ Ldec_entry:
 	lvx	v25, r9, r31
 	?vperm	v24, v24, v25, $inpperm

+	cmpwi	r8, 0			# test direction
 	neg	r8, $inp		# prepare for unaligned access
 	 vxor	v7, v7, v7
 	?lvsl	$keyperm, 0, $key
@@ -681,13 +688,37 @@ Ldec_entry:
 	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
 	 ?vperm	$outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
 	addi	$inp, $inp, 15		# 15 is not a typo
-	 lvx	$outhead, 0, $out

 	beq	Lcbc_decrypt

 	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_preheat
 	li	r0, 16

+	beq	cr1, Lcbc_enc_loop	# $out is aligned
+
+	vmr	v0, $inptail
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 16
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+	vxor	v0, v0, v24		# ^= iv
+
+	bl	_vpaes_encrypt_core
+
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	vmr	v24, v0			# put aside iv
+	sub	r9, $out, r8
+	vperm	$outhead, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+
+Lcbc_enc_head:
+	stvebx	$outhead, r8, r9
+	cmpwi	r8, 15
+	addi	r8, r8, 1
+	bne	Lcbc_enc_head
+
+	sub.	r30, r30, r0		# len -= 16
+	addi	$out, $out, 16
+	beq	Lcbc_unaligned_done
+
 Lcbc_enc_loop:
 	vmr	v0, $inptail
 	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
@@ -713,6 +744,32 @@ Lcbc_decrypt:
 	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_preheat
 	li	r0, 16

+	beq	cr1, Lcbc_dec_loop	# $out is aligned
+
+	vmr	v0, $inptail
+	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
+	addi	$inp, $inp, 16
+	?vperm	v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
+	vmr	v25, v0			# put aside input
+
+	bl	_vpaes_decrypt_core
+
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	vxor	v0, v0, v24		# ^= iv
+	vmr	v24, v25
+	sub	r9, $out, r8
+	vperm	$outhead, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+
+Lcbc_dec_head:
+	stvebx	$outhead, r8, r9
+	cmpwi	r8, 15
+	addi	r8, r8, 1
+	bne	Lcbc_dec_head
+
+	sub.	r30, r30, r0		# len -= 16
+	addi	$out, $out, 16
+	beq	Lcbc_unaligned_done
+
 Lcbc_dec_loop:
 	vmr	v0, $inptail
 	lvx	$inptail, 0, $inp
@@ -733,23 +790,29 @@ Lcbc_dec_loop:
 	bne	Lcbc_dec_loop

 Lcbc_done:
-	addi	$out, $out, -1
-	lvx	v1, 0, $out		# redundant in aligned case
-	vsel	v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
-	stvx	v1, 0, $out
+	beq	cr1, Lcbc_write_iv	# $out is aligned

+Lcbc_unaligned_done:
+	andi.	r8, $out, 15
+	sub	$out, $out, r8
+	li	r9, 0
+Lcbc_tail:
+	stvebx	$outhead, r9, $out
+	addi	r9, r9, 1
+	cmpw	r9, r8
+	bne	Lcbc_tail
+
+Lcbc_write_iv:
 	neg	r8, r31			# write [potentially unaligned] iv
+	li	r10, 4
 	?lvsl	$outperm, 0, r8
-	li	r6, 15
-	vnor	$outmask, v7, v7	# 0xff..ff
-	?vperm	$outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
-	lvx	$outhead, 0, r31
+	li	r11, 8
+	li	r12, 12
 	vperm	v24, v24, v24, $outperm	# rotate right/left
-	vsel	v0, $outhead, v24, $outmask
-	lvx	v1, r6, r31
-	stvx	v0, 0, r31
-	vsel	v1, v24, v1, $outmask
-	stvx	v1, r6, r31
+	stvewx	v24, 0, r31		# ivp is at least 32-bit aligned
+	stvewx	v24, r10, r31
+	stvewx	v24, r11, r31
+	stvewx	v24, r12, r31

 	mtspr	256, r7			# restore vrsave
 	li	r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
@@ -872,18 +935,21 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:

 	# encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform
 	li	r8, 0x30		# mov	\$0x30,%r8d
-	addi	r10, r12, 0x80		# lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	li	r9, 4
+	li	r10, 8
+	li	r11, 12

 	?lvsr	$outperm, 0, $out	# prepare for unaligned access
 	vnor	$outmask, v9, v9	# 0xff..ff
-	lvx	$outhead, 0, $out
 	?vperm	$outmask, v9, $outmask, $outperm

 	#stvx	v0, 0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)
-	vperm	v1, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
-	vsel	v2, $outhead, v1, $outmask
-	vmr	$outhead, v1
-	stvx	v2, 0, $out
+	vperm	$outhead, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	stvewx	$outhead, 0, $out	# some are superfluous
+	stvewx	$outhead, r9, $out
+	stvewx	$outhead, r10, $out
+	addi	r10, r12, 0x80		# lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	stvewx	$outhead, r11, $out
 	b	Lschedule_go

 Lschedule_am_decrypting:
@@ -893,20 +959,24 @@ Lschedule_am_decrypting:
 	addi	r10, r12, 0x80		# lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
 	# decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows
 	lvx	v1, r8, r10		# vmovdqa	(%r8,%r10),	%xmm1
+	li	r9, 4
+	li	r10, 8
+	li	r11, 12
 	vperm	v4, v3, v3, v1		# vpshufb	%xmm1,	%xmm3,	%xmm3

 	neg	r0, $out		# prepare for unaligned access
 	?lvsl	$outperm, 0, r0
-	addi	$out, $out, 15		# 15 is not typo
 	vnor	$outmask, v9, v9	# 0xff..ff
-	lvx	$outhead, 0, $out
 	?vperm	$outmask, $outmask, v9, $outperm

 	#stvx	v4, 0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm3,	(%rdx)
-	vperm	v4, v4, v4, $outperm	# rotate right/left
-	vsel	v2, $outhead, v4, $outmask
-	vmr	$outhead, v4
-	stvx	v2, 0, $out
+	vperm	$outhead, v4, v4, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	stvewx	$outhead, 0, $out	# some are superfluous
+	stvewx	$outhead, r9, $out
+	stvewx	$outhead, r10, $out
+	addi	r10, r12, 0x80		# lea	.Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
+	stvewx	$outhead, r11, $out
+	addi	$out, $out, 15		# 15 is not typo
 	xori	r8, r8, 0x30		# xor	\$0x30, %r8

 Lschedule_go:
@@ -1038,14 +1108,15 @@ Lschedule_mangle_last:

 	#stvx	v0, r0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)		# save last key
 	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	li	r10, 4
 	vsel	v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
-	vmr	$outhead, v0
+	li	r11, 8
 	stvx	v2, 0, $out
-
-	addi	$out, $out, 15		# 15 is not typo
-	lvx	v1, 0, $out		# redundant in aligned case
-	vsel	v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
-	stvx	v1, 0, $out
+	li	r12, 12
+	stvewx	v0, 0, $out		# some (or all) are redundant
+	stvewx	v0, r10, $out
+	stvewx	v0, r11, $out
+	stvewx	v0, r12, $out
 	b	Lschedule_mangle_done

 .align	4
@@ -1057,15 +1128,18 @@ Lschedule_mangle_last_dec:
 	bl	_vpaes_schedule_transform	# output transform

 	#stvx	v0, r0, $out		# vmovdqu	%xmm0,	(%rdx)		# save last key
+	addi	r9, $out, -15		# -15 is not typo
 	vperm	v0, v0, v0, $outperm	# rotate right/left
+	li	r10, 4
 	vsel	v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
-	vmr	$outhead, v0
+	li	r11, 8
 	stvx	v2, 0, $out
+	li	r12, 12
+	stvewx	v0, 0, r9		# some (or all) are redundant
+	stvewx	v0, r10, r9
+	stvewx	v0, r11, r9
+	stvewx	v0, r12, r9

-	addi	$out, $out, -15		# -15 is not typo
-	lvx	v1, 0, $out		# redundant in aligned case
-	vsel	v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
-	stvx	v1, 0, $out

 Lschedule_mangle_done:
 	mtlr	r7
--- a/crypto/asn1/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/asn1/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>

+#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
+#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
+#endif
+
 static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
                           int indent);
 static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
@@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
 #else
    dump_indent = 6;            /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
 #endif
+
+    if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
+            BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
+            return 0;
+    }
+
    p = *pp;
    tot = p + length;
    op = p - 1;
--- a/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
                         long length)
 {
    EVP_PKEY *ret;
+    const unsigned char *p = *pp;

    if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
        if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -94,21 +95,23 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
    }

    if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
-        !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) {
+        !ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
        if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
            PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
-            p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
+            p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
            if (!p8)
                goto err;
            EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
            ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
            PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
-
+            if (ret == NULL)
+                goto err;
        } else {
            ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
            goto err;
        }
    }
+    *pp = p;
    if (a != NULL)
        (*a) = ret;
    return (ret);
@@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
     * input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
     */
    inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
+    p = *pp;
    /*
     * Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
     * can just count the elements.
@@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
        keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
    else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
                                              * traditional format */
-        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
+        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
        EVP_PKEY *ret;

        sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
@@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
        }
        ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
        PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
+        if (ret == NULL)
+            return NULL;
+        *pp = p;
        if (a) {
            *a = ret;
        }
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
    int otag;
    int ret = 0;
    ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
+    int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+    aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
    if (!pval)
        return 0;
    if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
@@ -350,9 +352,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
        }

        asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
-        *in = p;
        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
            goto auxerr;
+        *in = p;
        return 1;

    case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
@@ -489,9 +491,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
        /* Save encoding */
        if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
            goto auxerr;
-        *in = p;
        if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
            goto auxerr;
+        *in = p;
        return 1;

    default:
@@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
 auxerr:
    ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
 err:
-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    if (combine == 0)
+        ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
    if (errtt)
        ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
                           ", Type=", it->sname);
@@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
    } else {
        /* Nothing special */
        ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-                               -1, 0, opt, ctx);
+                               -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
        if (!ret) {
            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
            goto err;
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
@@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
                  int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
    BIGNUM *bn;
-    if (!*pval)
-        bn_new(pval, it);
+
+    if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
+        return 0;
    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
    if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
        bn_free(pval, it);
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
@@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
 {
    X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
    EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
-    xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length);
+    const unsigned char *q;
+    q = *pp;
+    xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
    if (!xpk)
        return NULL;
    pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
    X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
    if (!pktmp)
        return NULL;
+    *pp = q;
    if (a) {
        EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
        *a = pktmp;
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
@@ -180,16 +180,15 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
    if (!a || *a == NULL) {
        freeret = 1;
    }
-    ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
+    ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
    /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
    if (!ret)
        return NULL;
    /* update length */
-    length -= *pp - q;
-    if (!length)
-        return ret;
-    if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length))
+    length -= q - *pp;
+    if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
        goto err;
+    *pp = q;
    return ret;
 err:
    if (freeret) {
--- a/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c
@@ -163,10 +163,13 @@ int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
    if (!(objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj)))
        return 0;
    if (!(aux = aux_get(x)))
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
    if (!aux->reject && !(aux->reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()))
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
    return sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->reject, objtmp);
+ err:
+    ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
+    return 0;
 }

 void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x)
--- a/crypto/bf/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/bf/.cvsignore
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-bf-*.s
--- a/crypto/bf/asm/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/bf/asm/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-bx86unix.cpp
-bx86-elf.s
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/bio/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/bio/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
    if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
        rows++;
    for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
-        buf[0] = '\0';          /* start with empty string */
        BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
        BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
        BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
--- a/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
 * BIO_CB_RETURN flag indicates if it is after the call
 */
 # define BIO_CB_RETURN   0x80
-# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN))
+# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN)
 # define BIO_cb_pre(a)   (!((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN))
 # define BIO_cb_post(a)  ((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN)

--- a/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
@@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
    NULL,
 };

-BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+static FILE *file_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
 {
-    BIO *ret;
    FILE *file = NULL;

 #  if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
@@ -164,6 +163,14 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
 #  else
    file = fopen(filename, mode);
 #  endif
+    return (file);
+}
+
+BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
+{
+    BIO  *ret;
+    FILE *file = file_fopen(filename, mode);
+
    if (file == NULL) {
        SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
        ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
@@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
        else
            strcat(p, "t");
 #  endif
-        fp = fopen(ptr, p);
+        fp = file_fopen(ptr, p);
        if (fp == NULL) {
            SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
            ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");
--- a/crypto/bn/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/bn/.cvsignore
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-co-*.s
-bn-*.s
-*-mont.s
-modexp512-x86_64.s
-*-gf2m.s
-x86_64-mont5.s
--- a/crypto/bn/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/bn/Makefile
@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
 bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
 bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
 bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h
+bn_exp.o: rsaz_exp.h
 bn_exp2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
 bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
 bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/.cvsignore
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-bn86unix.cpp
-co86unix.cpp
-bn86-elf.s
-co86-elf.s
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 # referred below, which improves ECDH and ECDSA verify benchmarks
 # by 18-40%.
 #
-# C<EFBFBD>mara, D.; Gouv<EFBFBD>a, C. P. L.; L<EFBFBD>pez, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
+# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
 # Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
 # 
 # http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ ___
 ################
 # void	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
 #	BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
-#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0<EFBFBD>b1b0
+#	BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0);	# r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
 {
 $code.=<<___;
 .global	bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	$mask,#7<<2
 	sub	sp,sp,#32		@ allocate tab[8]

-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1<EFBFBD>b1
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a1·b1
 	str	$lo,[$ret,#8]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#12]

@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 eor	r2,r2,$a
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
 	 eor	$a,$a,r2
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0<EFBFBD>b0
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ a0·b0
 	str	$lo,[$ret]
 	str	$hi,[$ret,#4]

 	eor	$a,$a,r2
 	eor	$b,$b,r3
-	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)<EFBFBD>(b1+b0)
+	bl	mul_1x1_ialu		@ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
 ___
@r=map("r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words:

 // This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
 // Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
-// version was peforming *all* additions in IALU and was starving
+// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving
 // for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
 // moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
 // of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
 // I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
 // (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
 // cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
-// clause in Itanium <EFBFBD>-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
+// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
 // highly appreciated.
 //
 // On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ if ($flavour =~ /32/) {
 	$POP=	"ld";
 } else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }

+$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0;
+
 $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
 ( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
 ( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
@@ -294,12 +296,12 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);

 	extrdi	$t0,$a0,32,32		; lwz	$t0,4($ap)
 	extrdi	$t1,$a0,32,0		; lwz	$t1,0($ap)
-	lwz	$t2,12($ap)		; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
-	lwz	$t3,8($ap)
-	lwz	$t4,4($np)		; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
-	lwz	$t5,0($np)
-	lwz	$t6,12($np)		; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
-	lwz	$t7,8($np)
+	lwz	$t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)	; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+	lwz	$t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+	lwz	$t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
 	lwz	$a0,0($ap)		; pull ap[0,1] value
@@ -463,14 +465,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 L1st:
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
-	lwz	$t0,4($ap)		; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
-	lwz	$t1,0($ap)
-	lwz	$t2,12($ap)		; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
-	lwz	$t3,8($ap)
-	lwz	$t4,4($np)		; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
-	lwz	$t5,0($np)
-	lwz	$t6,12($np)		; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
-	lwz	$t7,8($np)
+	lwz	$t0,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)	; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t1,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+	lwz	$t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)	; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
+	lwz	$t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
+	lwz	$t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)	; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
+	lwz	$t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
 ___
 $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
 	lwz	$t0,0($ap)		; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
@@ -505,14 +507,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 ___
 } else {
 $code.=<<___;
-	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
-	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
-	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
-	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
-	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
-	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
-	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
-	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 ___
 }
 $code.=<<___;
@@ -651,8 +653,8 @@ $code.=<<___;

 	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
 	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
-	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp)	; permuted $t1
-	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
 	 addc	$t4,$t4,$carry
 	 adde	$t5,$t5,$c1
 	 srwi	$carry,$t4,16
@@ -673,8 +675,8 @@ $code.=<<___;

 	fmadd	$T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
 	fmadd	$T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
-	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp)	; permuted $t3
-	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
 	 addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
 	 adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
 	 srwi	$carry,$t2,16
@@ -686,8 +688,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
 	fmadd	$T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
 	fmadd	$T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
-	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp)	; permuted $t5
-	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
 	 addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
 	 adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
 	 srwi	$carry,$t6,16
@@ -699,8 +701,8 @@ $code.=<<___;

 	fctid	$T0a,$T0a
 	fctid	$T0b,$T0b
-	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp)	; permuted $t7
-	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6
 	 addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
 	 adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
 	 srwi	$carry,$t0,16
@@ -787,14 +789,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 ___
 } else {
 $code.=<<___;
-	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
-	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
-	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
-	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
-	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
-	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
-	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
-	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 	stfd	$dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
 	stfd	$dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)

@@ -823,14 +825,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 stw	$t0,12($tp)		; tp[j-1]
 	 stw	$t4,8($tp)

-	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp)	; permuted $t1
-	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp)	; permuted $t0
-	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp)	; permuted $t3
-	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp)	; permuted $t2
-	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp)	; permuted $t5
-	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp)	; permuted $t4
-	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp)	; permuted $t7
-	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6

 	addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
 	adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
@@ -857,10 +859,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 stw	$t2,20($tp)		; tp[j]
 	 stwu	$t0,16($tp)

-	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
-	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
-	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
-	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)

 	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
 	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
@@ -1165,23 +1167,23 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	fmadd	$T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
 	fmadd	$T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
-	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
-	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 	fmadd	$T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
 	fmadd	$T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
-	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
-	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 	fmadd	$T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
 	fmadd	$T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
-	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
-	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 	 addc	$t0,$t0,$carry
 	 adde	$t1,$t1,$c1
 	 srwi	$carry,$t0,16
 	fmadd	$T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
 	fmadd	$T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
-	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
-	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 	 srwi	$c1,$t1,16
 	 insrwi	$carry,$t1,16,0

@@ -1218,8 +1220,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	fctid	$T1a,$T1a
 	 addc	$t0,$t0,$t2
 	 adde	$t4,$t4,$t3
-	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp)	; permuted $t1
-	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	 lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	 lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
 	fctid	$T1b,$T1b
 	 addze	$carry,$carry
 	 addze	$c1,$c1
@@ -1229,19 +1231,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
 	 adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
 	 srwi	$carry,$t2,16
-	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp)	; permuted $t3
-	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
 	fctid	$T2b,$T2b
 	 srwi	$c1,$t3,16
 	 insrwi	$carry,$t3,16,0
-	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp)	; permuted $t5
-	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	 lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	 lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
 	fctid	$T3a,$T3a
 	 addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
 	 adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
 	 srwi	$carry,$t6,16
-	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp)	; permuted $t7
-	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6
 	fctid	$T3b,$T3b

 	 insrwi	$t2,$t6,16,0		; 64..95 bits
@@ -1354,14 +1356,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 ___
 } else {
 $code.=<<___;
-	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
-	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
-	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
-	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
-	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
-	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
-	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
-	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 	stfd	$dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
 	stfd	$dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)

@@ -1397,14 +1399,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 stw	$t0,4($tp)		; tp[j-1]
 	 stw	$t4,0($tp)

-	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp)	; permuted $t1
-	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp)	; permuted $t0
-	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp)	; permuted $t3
-	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp)	; permuted $t2
-	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp)	; permuted $t5
-	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp)	; permuted $t4
-	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp)	; permuted $t7
-	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp)	; permuted $t6
+	lwz	$t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t1
+	lwz	$t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t0
+	lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t3
+	lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t2
+	lwz	$t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t5
+	lwz	$t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t4
+	lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t7
+	lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)	; permuted $t6

 	addc	$t2,$t2,$carry
 	adde	$t3,$t3,$c1
@@ -1433,12 +1435,12 @@ $code.=<<___;

 	addc	$t2,$t2,$t6
 	adde	$t0,$t0,$t7
-	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
-	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
 	addze	$carry,$carry
 	addze	$c1,$c1
-	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
-	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
+	 lwz	$t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)

 	addc	$t6,$t6,$carry
 	adde	$t7,$t7,$c1
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	$addx = ($1>=12);
 }

-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
 	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
 	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
 }
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
@@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
 if ($SIZE_T==8) {
 my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
 $code.=<<___;
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1<EFBFBD>b1
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a1·b1
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,16($rp)

 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0<EFBFBD>b0
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# a0·b0
 	stmg	$lo,$hi,0($rp)

 	lg	$a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	lg	$b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
 	xg	$b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
-	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)<EFBFBD>(b0+b1)
+	bras	$ra,_mul_1x1			# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
 	lmg	@r[0],@r[3],0($rp)

 	xgr	$lo,$hi
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
@@ -18,71 +18,106 @@
 .align	4
 bn_mul_add_words:
 	lghi	zero,0		// zero = 0
-	la	%r1,0(%r2)	// put rp aside
-	lghi	%r2,0		// i=0;
+	la	%r1,0(%r2)	// put rp aside [to give way to]
+	lghi	%r2,0		// return value
 	ltgfr	%r4,%r4
 	bler	%r14		// if (len<=0) return 0;

-	stmg	%r6,%r10,48(%r15)
-	lghi	%r10,3
-	lghi	%r8,0		// carry = 0
-	nr	%r10,%r4	// len%4
+	stmg	%r6,%r13,48(%r15)
+	lghi	%r2,3
+	lghi	%r12,0		// carry = 0
+	slgr	%r1,%r3		// rp-=ap
+	nr	%r2,%r4		// len%4
 	sra	%r4,2		// cnt=len/4
 	jz	.Loop1_madd	// carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken
 	algr	zero,zero	// clear carry

-.Loop4_madd:
-	lg	%r7,0(%r2,%r3)	// ap[i]
+	lg	%r7,0(%r3)	// ap[0]
+	lg	%r9,8(%r3)	// ap[1]
 	mlgr	%r6,%r5		// *=w
-	alcgr	%r7,%r8		// +=carry
-	alcgr	%r6,zero
-	alg	%r7,0(%r2,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
-	stg	%r7,0(%r2,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+	brct	%r4,.Loop4_madd
+	j	.Loop4_madd_tail

-	lg	%r9,8(%r2,%r3)
+.Loop4_madd:
 	mlgr	%r8,%r5
+	lg	%r11,16(%r3)	// ap[i+2]
+	alcgr	%r7,%r12	// +=carry
+	alcgr	%r6,zero
+	alg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
+	stg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+
+	mlgr	%r10,%r5
+	lg	%r13,24(%r3)
 	alcgr	%r9,%r6
 	alcgr	%r8,zero
-	alg	%r9,8(%r2,%r1)
-	stg	%r9,8(%r2,%r1)
+	alg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+
+	mlgr	%r12,%r5
+	lg	%r7,32(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r11,%r8
+	alcgr	%r10,zero
+	alg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)

-	lg	%r7,16(%r2,%r3)
 	mlgr	%r6,%r5
-	alcgr	%r7,%r8
-	alcgr	%r6,zero
-	alg	%r7,16(%r2,%r1)
-	stg	%r7,16(%r2,%r1)
+	lg	%r9,40(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r13,%r10
+	alcgr	%r12,zero
+	alg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)

-	lg	%r9,24(%r2,%r3)
-	mlgr	%r8,%r5
-	alcgr	%r9,%r6
-	alcgr	%r8,zero
-	alg	%r9,24(%r2,%r1)
-	stg	%r9,24(%r2,%r1)
-
-	la	%r2,32(%r2)	// i+=4
+	la	%r3,32(%r3)	// i+=4
 	brct	%r4,.Loop4_madd

-	la	%r10,1(%r10)		// see if len%4 is zero ...
-	brct	%r10,.Loop1_madd	// without touching condition code:-)
+.Loop4_madd_tail:
+	mlgr	%r8,%r5
+	lg	%r11,16(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r7,%r12	// +=carry
+	alcgr	%r6,zero
+	alg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
+	stg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+
+	mlgr	%r10,%r5
+	lg	%r13,24(%r3)
+	alcgr	%r9,%r6
+	alcgr	%r8,zero
+	alg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r9,8(%r3,%r1)
+
+	mlgr	%r12,%r5
+	alcgr	%r11,%r8
+	alcgr	%r10,zero
+	alg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r11,16(%r3,%r1)
+
+	alcgr	%r13,%r10
+	alcgr	%r12,zero
+	alg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+	stg	%r13,24(%r3,%r1)
+
+	la	%r3,32(%r3)	// i+=4
+
+	la	%r2,1(%r2)	// see if len%4 is zero ...
+	brct	%r2,.Loop1_madd	// without touching condition code:-)

 .Lend_madd:
-	alcgr	%r8,zero	// collect carry bit
-	lgr	%r2,%r8
-	lmg	%r6,%r10,48(%r15)
+	lgr	%r2,zero	// return value
+	alcgr	%r2,%r12	// collect even carry bit
+	lmg	%r6,%r13,48(%r15)
 	br	%r14

 .Loop1_madd:
-	lg	%r7,0(%r2,%r3)	// ap[i]
+	lg	%r7,0(%r3)	// ap[i]
 	mlgr	%r6,%r5		// *=w
-	alcgr	%r7,%r8		// +=carry
+	alcgr	%r7,%r12	// +=carry
 	alcgr	%r6,zero
-	alg	%r7,0(%r2,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
-	stg	%r7,0(%r2,%r1)	// rp[i]=
+	alg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// +=rp[i]
+	stg	%r7,0(%r3,%r1)	// rp[i]=

-	lgr	%r8,%r6
-	la	%r2,8(%r2)	// i++
-	brct	%r10,.Loop1_madd
+	lgr	%r12,%r6
+	la	%r3,8(%r3)	// i++
+	brct	%r2,.Loop1_madd

 	j	.Lend_madd
 .size	bn_mul_add_words,.-bn_mul_add_words
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 # the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
 # code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
 # and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
-# from one benchmark and <EFBFBD>-arch to another. Below are interval values
+# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
 # for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
 # code:
 #
@@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&push	("edi");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1<EFBFBD>b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a1·b1
 	&movq	("mm7",$R);

 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0<EFBFBD>b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# a0·b0
 	&movq	("mm6",$R);

 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)<EFBFBD>(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_mmx");	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
 	&pxor	($R,"mm7");
 	&mov	($a,&wparam(0));
-	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)<EFBFBD>(b0+b1)-a1<EFBFBD>b1-a0<EFBFBD>b0
+	&pxor	($R,"mm6");		# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0

 	&movq	($A,$R);
 	&psllq	($R,32);
@@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {

 	&mov	($a,&wparam(1));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1<EFBFBD>b1
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a1·b1
 	&mov	(&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);

 	&mov	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0<EFBFBD>b0
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# a0·b0
 	&mov	(&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
 	&mov	(&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);

@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
 	&mov	($b,&wparam(3));
 	&xor	($a,&wparam(2));
 	&xor	($b,&wparam(4));
-	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)<EFBFBD>(b0+b1)
+	&call	("_mul_1x1_ialu");	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)

 	&mov	("ebp",&wparam(0));
 		 @r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 # undef mul_add

 /*-
- * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath <EFBFBD>-code;
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
 * "g"(0)               let the compiler to decide where does it
 *                      want to keep the value of zero;
 */
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 # in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
 # the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
 # for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
-# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and <EFBFBD>-arch to another.
+# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
 # Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
 # [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
 # 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
@@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___
 $code.=<<___;
 	movdqa		%xmm0,%xmm4
 	movdqa		%xmm1,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1<EFBFBD>b1
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm1,%xmm0	# a1·b1
 	pxor		%xmm2,%xmm4
 	pxor		%xmm3,%xmm5
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0<EFBFBD>b0
-	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)<EFBFBD>(b0+b1)
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm3,%xmm2	# a0·b0
+	pclmulqdq	\$0,%xmm5,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
 	xorps		%xmm0,%xmm4
-	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)<EFBFBD>(b0+b1)-a0<EFBFBD>b0-a1<EFBFBD>b1
+	xorps		%xmm2,%xmm4	# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
 	movdqa		%xmm4,%xmm5
 	pslldq		\$8,%xmm4
 	psrldq		\$8,%xmm5
@@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	\$0xf,$mask
 	mov	$a1,$a
 	mov	$b1,$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a1<EFBFBD>b1
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a1·b1
 	mov	$lo,16(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,24(%rsp)

 	mov	48(%rsp),$a
 	mov	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# a0<EFBFBD>b0
+	call	_mul_1x1		# a0·b0
 	mov	$lo,0(%rsp)
 	mov	$hi,8(%rsp)

@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	mov	56(%rsp),$b
 	xor	48(%rsp),$a
 	xor	64(%rsp),$b
-	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)<EFBFBD>(b0+b1)
+	call	_mul_1x1		# (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
 ___
 	@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
 $code.=<<___;
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	$addx = ($1>=12);
 }

+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
 # int bn_mul_mont(
 $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
 $ap="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	$addx = ($1>=12);
 }

+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
+	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
+}
+
 # int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
 $rp="%rdi";	# BN_ULONG *rp,
 $ap="%rsi";	# const BN_ULONG *ap,
@@ -1779,6 +1784,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
 .align	32
 .L8x_tail_done:
 	add	(%rdx),%r8		# can this overflow?
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+	adc	\$0,%r11
+	adc	\$0,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+	adc	\$0,%r14
+	adc	\$0,%r15		# can't overflow, because we
+					# started with "overhung" part
+					# of multiplication
 	xor	%rax,%rax

 	neg	$carry
@@ -3125,6 +3139,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
 .align	32
 .Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
 	add	24+8(%rsp),%r8		# can this overflow?
+	adc	\$0,%r9
+	adc	\$0,%r10
+	adc	\$0,%r11
+	adc	\$0,%r12
+	adc	\$0,%r13
+	adc	\$0,%r14
+	adc	\$0,%r15		# can't overflow, because we
+					# started with "overhung" part
+					# of multiplication
 	mov	$carry,%rax		# xor	%rax,%rax

 	sub	16+8(%rsp),$carry	# mov 16(%rsp),%cf
@@ -3168,13 +3191,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
 my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
 my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
 $code.=<<___;
-	xor	%rbx,%rbx
+	xor	%ebx,%ebx
 	sub	%r15,%rsi		# compare top-most words
 	adc	%rbx,%rbx
 	mov	%rcx,%r10		# -$num
-	.byte	0x67
 	or	%rbx,%rax
-	.byte	0x67
 	mov	%rcx,%r9		# -$num
 	xor	\$1,%rax
 	sar	\$3+2,%rcx		# cf=0
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -126,13 +126,7 @@
 # include <alloca.h>
 #endif

-#undef RSAZ_ENABLED
-#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && \
-        (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
-         defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
-# include "rsaz_exp.h"
-# define RSAZ_ENABLED
-#endif
+#include "rsaz_exp.h"

 #undef SPARC_T4_MONT
 #if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && (defined(__sparc__) || defined(__sparc))
@@ -668,12 +662,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
    bn_check_top(p);
    bn_check_top(m);

-    top = m->top;
-
-    if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
+    if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
        BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
        return (0);
    }
+
+    top = m->top;
+
    bits = BN_num_bits(p);
    if (bits == 0) {
        ret = BN_one(rr);
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
         * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
         */
        pB = &local_B;
+        local_B.flags = 0;
        BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
        if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
            goto err;
@@ -610,6 +611,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
         * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
         */
        pA = &local_A;
+        local_A.flags = 0;
        BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
    bn_check_top(a);
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
    if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
        goto err;

@@ -699,18 +699,21 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
        int top = p->top;
        BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;

-        bn_wexpand(u, top);
+        if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
+            goto err;
        udp = u->d;
        for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
            udp[i] = 0;
        u->top = top;
-        bn_wexpand(b, top);
+        if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
+          goto err;
        bdp = b->d;
        bdp[0] = 1;
        for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
            bdp[i] = 0;
        b->top = top;
-        bn_wexpand(c, top);
+        if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
+          goto err;
        cdp = c->d;
        for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
            cdp[i] = 0;
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
@@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
    if (mont == NULL)
        return;

-    BN_free(&(mont->RR));
-    BN_free(&(mont->N));
-    BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
    if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
        OPENSSL_free(mont);
 }
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
    int ret = 0;
    BIGNUM *Ri, *R;

+    if (BN_is_zero(mod))
+        return 0;
+
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
        goto err;
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
@@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,

    if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
        BN_zero(d);
-        if (!BN_copy(r, m))
+        if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
+            BN_CTX_end(ctx);
            return 0;
+        }
        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
        return (1);
    }
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
@@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
     * exceeded.
     */
    if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
-        return 0;
+        goto err;

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
    t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
        if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
-            return 0;
+            goto err;
        /* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
        BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
        if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)

    return 0;

+ err:
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    return 0;
 }

 /*
--- a/crypto/bn/bntest.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bntest.c
@@ -441,6 +441,14 @@ int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
    BN_init(&d);
    BN_init(&e);

+    BN_one(&a);
+    BN_zero(&b);
+
+    if (BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
        if (i < num1) {
            BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
@@ -516,9 +524,9 @@ int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
        do {
            BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0);
            BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
-            s = b.d[0];
-        } while (!s);
+        } while (BN_is_zero(&b));

+        s = b.d[0];
        BN_copy(&b, &a);
        r = BN_div_word(&b, s);

@@ -781,6 +789,18 @@ int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
    if (mont == NULL)
        return 0;

+    BN_zero(&n);
+    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_set_word(&n, 16);
+    if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
    BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
    for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
@@ -887,6 +907,14 @@ int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
    d = BN_new();
    e = BN_new();

+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_one(b);
+    BN_zero(c);
+    if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
        BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
        for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
@@ -952,6 +980,14 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
    d = BN_new();
    e = BN_new();

+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_one(b);
+    BN_zero(c);
+    if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
    for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
        BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
@@ -980,6 +1016,24 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
            return 0;
        }
    }
+
+    /* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */
+    BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505");
+    BN_hex2bn(&b, "02");
+    BN_hex2bn(&c,
+        "4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
+        "4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
+        "4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+        "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
+    BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx);
+    BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx);
+    if (BN_cmp(d, e)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    BN_free(a);
    BN_free(b);
    BN_free(c);
@@ -999,6 +1053,22 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
    d = BN_new();
    e = BN_new();

+    BN_one(a);
+    BN_one(b);
+    BN_zero(c);
+    if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
+                "succeeded\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    BN_set_word(c, 16);
+    if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
+                "succeeded\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
    BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
    for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
        BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
@@ -1042,7 +1112,6 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
    BIGNUM *a, *p, *m, *d, *e;
-
    BN_MONT_CTX *mont;

    a = BN_new();
@@ -1050,7 +1119,6 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
    m = BN_new();
    d = BN_new();
    e = BN_new();
-
    mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new();

    BN_bntest_rand(m, 1024, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
@@ -1099,6 +1167,7 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont5(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
        fprintf(stderr, "Modular exponentiation test failed!\n");
        return 0;
    }
+    BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);
    BN_free(a);
    BN_free(p);
    BN_free(m);
--- a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.c
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@

 #include "rsaz_exp.h"

+#ifdef RSAZ_ENABLED
+
 /*
 * See crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl for further details.
 */
@@ -334,3 +336,11 @@ void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8],

    OPENSSL_cleanse(storage, sizeof(storage));
 }
+
+#else
+
+# if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(__DECC) || defined(__clang__)
+static void *dummy = &dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif
--- a/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
+++ b/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
@@ -1,37 +1,55 @@
-/******************************************************************************
-* Copyright(c) 2012, Intel Corp.
-* Developers and authors:
-* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)
-* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel
-* (2) University of Haifa, Israel
+/*****************************************************************************
+*                                                                            *
+*  Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation                                     *
+*                                                                            *
+*  All rights reserved.                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without        *
+*  modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are    *
+*  met:                                                                      *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright         *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright      *
+*     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the    *
+*     documentation and/or other materials provided with the                 *
+*     distribution.                                                          *
+*                                                                            *
+*  *  Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its         *
+*     contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from   *
+*     this software without specific prior written permission.               *
+*                                                                            *
+*                                                                            *
+*  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY          *
+*  EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE         *
+*  IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR        *
+*  PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR            *
+*  CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,     *
+*  EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,       *
+*  PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR        *
+*  PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF    *
+*  LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING      *
+*  NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS        *
+*  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.              *
+*                                                                            *
 ******************************************************************************
-* LICENSE:
-* This submission to OpenSSL is to be made available under the OpenSSL
-* license, and only to the OpenSSL project, in order to allow integration
-* into the publicly distributed code.
-* The use of this code, or portions of this code, or concepts embedded in
-* this code, or modification of this code and/or algorithm(s) in it, or the
-* use of this code for any other purpose than stated above, requires special
-* licensing.
-******************************************************************************
-* DISCLAIMER:
-* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS
-* ``AS IS''. ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
-* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
-* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR THE COPYRIGHT
-* OWNERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
-* OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
-* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
-* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
-* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
-* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
-* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-******************************************************************************/
+* Developers and authors:                                                    *
+* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)                                   *
+* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel            *
+* (2) University of Haifa, Israel                                            *
+*****************************************************************************/

 #ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
 # define RSAZ_EXP_H

-# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# undef RSAZ_ENABLED
+# if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT) && \
+        (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+         defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64))
+#  define RSAZ_ENABLED
+
+#  include <openssl/bn.h>

 void RSAZ_1024_mod_exp_avx2(BN_ULONG result[16],
                            const BN_ULONG base_norm[16],
@@ -44,4 +62,7 @@ void RSAZ_512_mod_exp(BN_ULONG result[8],
                      const BN_ULONG base_norm[8], const BN_ULONG exponent[8],
                      const BN_ULONG m_norm[8], BN_ULONG k0,
                      const BN_ULONG RR[8]);
+
+# endif
+
 #endif
--- a/crypto/buffer/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/buffer/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
+++ b/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@

 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>

 size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
 char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
 {
    if (str == NULL)
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
    return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
 }

@@ -81,16 +82,22 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
    char *ret;

    if (str == NULL)
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;

    siz = BUF_strnlen(str, siz);

+    if (siz >= INT_MAX)
+        return NULL;
+
    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
    if (ret == NULL) {
        BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
    }
-    BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
+
+    memcpy(ret, str, siz);
+    ret[siz] = '\0';
+
    return (ret);
 }

@@ -98,13 +105,13 @@ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
 {
    void *ret;

-    if (data == NULL)
-        return (NULL);
+    if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
+        return NULL;

    ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
    if (ret == NULL) {
        BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        return (NULL);
+        return NULL;
    }
    return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
 }
--- a/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
+++ b/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
@@ -86,7 +86,13 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
 int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
 size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen);
 char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
+
+/*
+ * Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the
+ * first |siz| bytes of |str|.
+ */
 char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
+
 void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
 void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);

--- a/crypto/camellia/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/camellia/.cvsignore
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-cmll-*.s
--- a/crypto/cast/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/cast/.cvsignore
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-cx86-*.s
-cast-586.s
--- a/crypto/cast/asm/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/cast/asm/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-cx86unix.cpp
-cx86-elf.s
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/cmac/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/cmac/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/cms/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/cms/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
    ok = 1;

 err:
-    if (ec->key && !keep_key) {
+    if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) {
        OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
        OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
        ec->key = NULL;
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,

    /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
    encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    if (encalg == NULL) {
+        goto merr;
+    }
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);

    if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
@@ -857,6 +857,8 @@ int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain)
    } else {
        const EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&mctx);
        pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL);
+        if (pkctx == NULL)
+            goto err;
        if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0)
            goto err;
        if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
        tmpin = BIO_new_mem_buf(ptr, len);
        if (tmpin == NULL) {
            CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            return 0;
+            goto err2;
        }
    } else
        tmpin = dcont;
@@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
    else
        BIO_free_all(cmsbio);

+ err2:
    if (cms_certs)
        sk_X509_pop_free(cms_certs, X509_free);
    if (crls)
@@ -753,7 +754,7 @@ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
    BIO *cmsbio;
    int ret = 0;
    if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
-        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
        return 0;
    }

--- a/crypto/comp/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/comp/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
+++ b/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
@@ -404,8 +404,9 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
 void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void)
 {
 #ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
-    if (zlib_dso)
+    if (zlib_dso != NULL)
        DSO_free(zlib_dso);
+    zlib_dso = NULL;
 #endif
 }

--- a/crypto/conf/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/conf/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
@@ -225,12 +225,11 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
        goto err;
    }

-    section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10);
+    section = BUF_strdup("default");
    if (section == NULL) {
        CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }
-    BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10);

    if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
        CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
    CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
                               CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
                               CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
+    openssl_configured = 1;
 }

 void OPENSSL_no_config()
--- a/crypto/cryptlib.c
+++ b/crypto/cryptlib.c
@@ -953,13 +953,29 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
 # if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
    /* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
    if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
-        HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0, _T("OPENSSL"));
-        const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
-        ReportEvent(h, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, &pmsg, 0);
-        DeregisterEventSource(h);
+        HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL"));
+
+        if (hEventLog != NULL) {
+            const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
+
+            if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL,
+                             1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) {
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+                /*
+                 * We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
+                 * error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort,
+                 * in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other
+                 * tool like DebugView which can monitor the output.
+                 */
+                OutputDebugString(pmsg);
+#endif
+            }
+
+            (void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog);
+        }
    } else
 # endif
-        MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONSTOP);
+        MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
 }
 #else
 void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
--- a/crypto/des/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/des/.cvsignore
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-des
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
-crypt*.s
-des-*.s
--- a/crypto/des/asm/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/des/asm/.cvsignore
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-dx86unix.cpp
-yx86unix.cpp
-des_enc-sparc.S
-dx86-elf.s
-yx86-elf.s
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/dh/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/dh/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/dh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct dh_st {
    BIGNUM *p;
    BIGNUM *g;
    long length;                /* optional */
-    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x */
+    BIGNUM *pub_key;            /* g^x % p */
    BIGNUM *priv_key;           /* x */
    int flags;
    BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;
--- a/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
@@ -533,9 +533,9 @@ static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
         * Work out shared secrets using both sides and compare with expected
         * values.
         */
-        if (!DH_compute_key(Z1, dhB->pub_key, dhA))
+        if (DH_compute_key(Z1, dhB->pub_key, dhA) == -1)
            goto bad_err;
-        if (!DH_compute_key(Z2, dhA->pub_key, dhB))
+        if (DH_compute_key(Z2, dhA->pub_key, dhB) == -1)
            goto bad_err;

        if (memcmp(Z1, td->Z, td->Z_len))
--- a/crypto/dsa/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/dsa/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
    dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);

    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;

    if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                         V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
@@ -114,16 +114,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
    }
 # endif
    else {
-        const EVP_MD *evpmd;
-        size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160;
-
-        if (bits >= 2048) {
-            qbits = 256;
-            evpmd = EVP_sha256();
-        } else {
-            qbits = 160;
-            evpmd = EVP_sha1();
-        }
+        const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
+        size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;

        return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
                                    seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
@@ -176,13 +168,14 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
    if (seed_in != NULL)
        memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);

-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
    if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
        goto err;

+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+
    r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
    W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -203,7 +196,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
            if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
                goto err;

-            if (!seed_len) {
+            if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
                    goto err;
                seed_is_random = 1;
--- a/crypto/dso/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/dso/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/ec/.cvsignore
+++ b/crypto/ec/.cvsignore
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-lib
-Makefile.save
-*.flc
-semantic.cache
--- a/crypto/ec/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/ec/Makefile
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ dclean:
 	mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)

 clean:
-	rm -f *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
+	rm -f *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff

 # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.

--- a/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
+++ b/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
 	$addx = ($1>=12);
 }

-if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
+if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
 	my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0;	# 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
 	$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
 	$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
--- a/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef enum {
        /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
         *  which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */
    POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
-        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02  */
+        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04  */
    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
        /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
         *  which solution of the quadratic equation y is  */
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More