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53 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
e903aaf894 Remove some documentation for functions not in 1.0.x
A few functions in the recently added EVP_EncodeInit docs don't apply to
the 1.0.x branches.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-05-03 12:54:06 +01:00
Matt Caswell
fec6d1e868 Add documentation for EVP_EncodeInit() and similar functions
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-05-03 11:54:00 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5d20e98465 Ensure EVP_EncodeUpdate handles an output length that is too long
With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-05-03 11:52:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5b814481f3 Avoid overflow in EVP_EncodeUpdate
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.

Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.

User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2105

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-05-03 11:52:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2919516136 Prevent EBCDIC overread for very long strings
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2176

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2016-05-03 10:28:00 +01:00
Matt Caswell
56ea22458f Fix encrypt overflow
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.

Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.

The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()

i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.

The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.

Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.

It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.

This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.

CVE-2016-2106

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3f3582139fbb259a1c3cbb0a25236500a409bf26)
2016-05-03 09:03:16 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1d29506fe0 Fix i2d_X509_AUX: pp can be NULL.
Reported by David Benjamin

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 05aef4bbdbc18e7b9490512cdee41e8a608bcc0e)
2016-05-02 22:50:19 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
66ce2861c1 Don't free ret->data if malloc fails.
Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 64eaf6c928f4066d62aa86f805796ef05bd0b1cc)
2016-04-29 21:43:12 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1c81a59503 Add checks to X509_NAME_oneline()
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9b08619cb45e75541809b1154c90e1a00450e537)

Conflicts:
	crypto/x509/x509.h
	crypto/x509/x509_err.c
2016-04-29 19:55:56 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0b34cf8223 Sanity check buffer length.
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b33d1141b6dcce947708b984c5e9e91dad3d675d)
2016-04-29 19:54:06 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
53d6c14bef Add size limit to X509_NAME structure.
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 295f3a24919157e2f9021d0b1709353710ad63db)
2016-04-29 19:53:47 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
6dfa55ab2f Reject inappropriate private key encryption ciphers.
The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function
properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers
(e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption
anyway.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d78df5dfd650e6de159a19a033513481064644f5)
2016-04-28 00:07:20 +01:00
Matt Caswell
a04d08fc18 Ensure we check i2d_X509 return val
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore
we should make sure we check it.

Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 446ba8de9af9aa4fa3debc7c76a38f4efed47a62)
2016-04-26 14:39:56 +01:00
Matt Caswell
1ee4541576 Fix a signed/unsigned warning
This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2
and 1.0.1

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0ca67644ddedfd656d43a6639d89a6236ff64652)
2016-04-25 19:47:18 +01:00
Rich Salz
184ebf0fca Fix NULL deref in apps/pkcs7
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 79356a83b78a2d936dcd022847465d9ebf6c67b1)
2016-04-25 11:46:52 -04:00
Viktor Dukhovni
697283ba41 Fix buffer overrun in ASN1_parse().
Backport of commits:

        79c7f74d6cefd5d32fa20e69195ad3de834ce065
	bdcd660e33710079b495cf5cc6a1aaa5d2dcd317

from master.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2016-04-23 00:46:32 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3d411057a5 Harden ASN.1 BIO handling of large amounts of data.
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in
chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents
small files allocating excessive amounts of data.

CVE-2016-2109

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c62981390d6cf9e3d612c489b8b77c2913b25807)
2016-04-23 00:28:06 +01:00
David Benjamin
7a433893ad Fix memory leak on invalid CertificateRequest.
Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message
contains excess data.

The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side
only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would
be needed to have a significant impact.

This was found by libFuzzer.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec66c8c98881186abbb4a7ddd6617970f1ee27a7)
2016-04-07 19:27:45 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f4bed7c7b6 Fix FIPS SSLv2 test
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 21211ade53f92629250bbea5e37d9179a31d3be2)
2016-03-26 16:02:39 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f16080718e Fix the no-comp option for Windows
no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code,
although it was suppressing its use.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a6406c95984a1009f5676bbcf60cc0d6db107af4)
2016-03-18 12:17:06 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4275ee389b Add a check for a failed malloc
Ensure we check for a NULL return from OPENSSL_malloc

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-18 11:59:11 +00:00
Matt Caswell
d31b25138f Ensure that memory allocated for the ticket is freed
If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur.
Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-18 11:59:11 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4161523ecd Fix a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex
There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed
to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it
anyway.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffe9150b1508a0ffc9e724f975691f24eb045c05)
2016-03-18 11:44:47 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
6629966097 Add no-ssl2-method
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

MR: #2341
(cherry picked from commit 4256957570a233ed4e9840353e95e623dfd62086)
2016-03-14 21:17:18 +01:00
Viktor Dukhovni
03c71b84d3 expose SSLv2 method prototypes
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2016-03-09 03:13:06 -05:00
Viktor Dukhovni
5bac9d44e7 Retain SSLv2 methods as functions that return NULL
This improves ABI compatibility when symbol resolution is not lazy.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-08 09:08:28 -05:00
Andy Polyakov
a159719440 bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: complement alloca with page-walking.
Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit adc4f1fc25b2cac90076f1e1695b05b7aeeae501)

Resolved conflicts:
	crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
	crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-07 22:16:11 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
6e7a1f35b7 Remove LOW from the default
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 29cce508972f61511318bf8cf7011fae027cddb2)
2016-03-07 18:57:40 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0199251318 Don't shift serial number into sign bit
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 01c32b5e448f6d42a23ff16bdc6bb0605287fa6f)
2016-03-07 15:19:58 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
298d823bf8 Sanity check PVK file fields.
PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an
integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption.
However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not
normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not
significant.

Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be
more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5f57abe2b150139b8b057313d52b1fe8f126c952)
2016-03-04 01:26:13 +00:00
Matt Caswell
73158771aa Prepare for 1.0.1t-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 13:42:02 +00:00
Matt Caswell
57ac73fb5d Prepare for 1.0.1s release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 13:40:46 +00:00
Matt Caswell
5d2b93ad7b make update
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 13:40:45 +00:00
Matt Caswell
f588db9017 Ensure mk1mf.pl is aware of no-weak-ssl-ciphers option
Update mk1mf.pl to properly handle no-weak-ssl-ciphers

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 12:42:12 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8954b54182 Update CHANGES and NEWS for new release
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:51:00 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
c582e9d213 perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl: handle inter-bank movd.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 902b30df193afc3417a96ba72a81ed390bd50de3)
2016-03-01 11:27:40 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
7f98aa7403 crypto/bn/x86_64-mont5.pl: constant-time gather procedure.
[Backport from master]

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:27:40 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
d7a854c055 bn/bn_exp.c: constant-time MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF.
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:24:05 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
abd5d8fbef Disable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3+ ciphers by default
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:24:02 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
a82cfd612b Bring SSL method documentation up to date
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:24:02 +00:00
Viktor Dukhovni
56f1acf5ef Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers.
SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time.  Builds that are not
configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.  Even if
"enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the
version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either
of:

    SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
or
    SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);

as appropriate.  Even if either of those is used, or the application
explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client
or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search
key recovery have been removed.  Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit
EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.

Mitigation for CVE-2016-0800

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2016-03-01 11:23:45 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8f651326a5 Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL ptr/heap corruption
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using
an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|.
For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This leaves ret->d as NULL leading
to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this
case memory is allocated to ret->d, but it is insufficiently sized
leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn.

This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever
called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is
anticipated to be a rare occurrence.

All OpenSSL internal usage of this function uses data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be a rare.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-0797

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c175308407858afff3fc8c2e5e085d94d12edc7d)
2016-02-29 16:40:02 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
f16bc6f06c Revert "Don't check RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER."
This reverts commit 23a58779f53a9060c823d00d76b3070cad61d9a3.

This broke existing engines that didn't properly implement the sign and verify
functions.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

MR: #2077
2016-02-27 13:38:01 +01:00
Matt Caswell
a801bf2638 Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string
in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length
of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.

Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to
an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of
a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also
occur.

These issues will only occur on certain platforms where sizeof(size_t) >
sizeof(int). E.g. many 64 bit systems. The first issue may mask the second
issue dependent on compiler behaviour.

These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
as command line arguments.

Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.

CVE-2016-0799

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 578b956fe741bf8e84055547b1e83c28dd902c73)
2016-02-25 22:48:17 +00:00
Emilia Kasper
59a908f1e8 CVE-2016-0798: avoid memory leak in SRP
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
way of distinguishing these two cases.

Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
300 bytes per connection.

Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure
a seed are not vulnerable.

In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.

To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.

Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However,
note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the
indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular,
computations are currently not carried out in constant time.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2016-02-25 15:44:21 +01:00
FdaSilvaYY
3ee48ada8c GH714: missing field initialisation
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 04f2a0b50d219aafcef2fa718d91462b587aa23d)
2016-02-23 13:21:48 -05:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ccb2a61407 Fix double free in DSA private key parsing.
Fix double free bug when parsing malformed DSA private keys.

Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.

CVE-2016-0705

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6c88c71b4e4825c7bc0489306d062d017634eb88)
2016-02-19 14:04:21 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
3629c49d7a modes/ctr128.c: pay attention to ecount_buf alignment in CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt.
It's never problem if CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt is called from EVP, because
buffer in question is always aligned within EVP_CIPHER_CTX structure.

RT#4218

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e4bbeb49fb6522d858703201b5adee9611e7b7b)
2016-02-12 22:01:13 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
b0b9f693b4 util/mk1mf.pl: use LINK_CMD instead of LINK variable.
Trouble is that LINK variable assignment in make-file interferes with
LINK environment variable, which can be used to modify Microsoft's
LINK.EXE behaviour.

RT#4289

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d44bb1c31ca00f4359090daa15659c0dd1a08f0d)

Resolved conflicts:
	util/pl/VC-32.pl

(cherry picked from commit 0fffd522426c7fc022894c8dd079dc2625c04096)
2016-02-11 21:30:19 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
9b6e183925 ms/uplink-x86.pl: make it work.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 740b2b9a6cf31b02916a4d18f868e8a95934c083)
2016-02-10 12:57:29 +01:00
Kurt Roeckx
99a5c8a659 Fix CHANGES entry about DSA_generate_parameters_ex
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2b0c11a620c3a3431410c5d56799286f60f60d8d)
2016-01-28 19:56:49 +01:00
Richard Levitte
5d5de781a5 Correct number of arguments in BIO_get_conn_int_port macro
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41a28cb2944a4e1c9d13889757a3bd9f72abeca1)
2016-01-28 18:20:53 +01:00
Matt Caswell
69ff244490 Prepare for 1.0.1s-dev
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2016-01-28 17:06:38 +00:00
73 changed files with 1595 additions and 651 deletions

144
CHANGES
View File

@ -2,6 +2,148 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.1s and 1.0.1t [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
default.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
[Kurt Roeckx]
Changes between 1.0.1r and 1.0.1s [1 Mar 2016]
* Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
[Viktor Dukhovni]
* Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
"enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
will need to explicitly call either of:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
or
SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
(CVE-2016-0800)
[Viktor Dukhovni]
*) Fix a double-free in DSA code
A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
considered rare.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
libFuzzer.
(CVE-2016-0705)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
is configured.
Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
that of a valid user.
(CVE-2016-0798)
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
(CVE-2016-0797)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
also occur.
The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
as command line arguments.
Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
(CVE-2016-0799)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
http://cachebleed.info.
(CVE-2016-0702)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
apps to use 2048 bits by default.
[Emilia Käsper]
Changes between 1.0.1q and 1.0.1r [28 Jan 2016]
*) Protection for DH small subgroup attacks
@ -62,7 +204,7 @@
[Emilia Käsper]
*) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
return an error
use a random seed, as already documented.
[Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
Changes between 1.0.1o and 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015]

View File

@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimenta
# library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library.
# sctp include SCTP support
# 386 generate 80386 code
# enable-weak-ssl-ciphers
# Enable EXPORT and LOW SSLv3 ciphers that are disabled by
# default. Note, weak SSLv2 ciphers are unconditionally
# disabled.
# no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code, above option implies no-sse2
# no-<cipher> build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...)
# -<xxx> +<xxx> compiler options are passed through
@ -724,10 +728,12 @@ my %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" [or special keyword "experimental
"md2" => "default",
"rc5" => "default",
"rfc3779" => "default",
"sctp" => "default",
"sctp" => "default",
"shared" => "default",
"ssl2" => "default",
"store" => "experimental",
"unit-test" => "default",
"weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default",
"zlib" => "default",
"zlib-dynamic" => "default"
);

17
NEWS
View File

@ -5,6 +5,23 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1s and OpenSSL 1.0.1t [under development]
o
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1r and OpenSSL 1.0.1s [1 Mar 2016]
o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers
(CVE-2016-0800)
o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705)
o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak
(CVE-2016-0798)
o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
(CVE-2016-0797)
o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799)
o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1q and OpenSSL 1.0.1r [28 Jan 2016]
o Protection for DH small subgroup attacks

2
README
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.1r 28 Jan 2016
OpenSSL 1.0.1t-dev
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

View File

@ -235,12 +235,16 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
switch (i) {
case NID_pkcs7_signed:
certs = p7->d.sign->cert;
crls = p7->d.sign->crl;
if (p7->d.sign != NULL) {
certs = p7->d.sign->cert;
crls = p7->d.sign->crl;
}
break;
case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl;
if (p7->d.signed_and_enveloped != NULL) {
certs = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->cert;
crls = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->crl;
}
break;
default:
break;

View File

@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ typedef struct srpsrvparm_st {
static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
{
srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg;
int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) {
p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login);
@ -424,21 +426,25 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
if (p->user == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login);
return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
goto err;
}
if (SSL_set_srp_server_param
(s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v,
p->user->info) < 0) {
*ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return SSL3_AL_FATAL;
goto err;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n",
p->login, p->user->info);
/* need to check whether there are memory leaks */
ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
err:
SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user);
p->user = NULL;
p->login = NULL;
return SSL_ERROR_NONE;
return ret;
}
#endif
@ -2244,9 +2250,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@ -2300,9 +2307,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@ -2387,9 +2395,10 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@ -2616,9 +2625,10 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
&& SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
@ -2658,9 +2668,10 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user);
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);

View File

@ -200,13 +200,13 @@ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp,
} else {
if (len != 0) {
if ((ret->length < len) || (ret->data == NULL)) {
if (ret->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((int)len + 1);
if (s == NULL) {
i = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
if (ret->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
} else
s = ret->data;
memcpy(s, p, (int)len);

View File

@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x)
#endif
#define HEADER_SIZE 8
#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
{
BUF_MEM *b;
@ -217,29 +218,44 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
want = c.slen;
if (want > (len - off)) {
size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
want -= (len - off);
if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
len + want < len) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
while (want > 0) {
i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
if (i <= 0) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
/*
* Read content in chunks of increasing size
* so we can return an error for EOF without
* having to allocate the entire content length
* in one go.
*/
size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
want -= chunk;
while (chunk > 0) {
i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
if (i <= 0) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
goto err;
}
/*
* This can't overflow because |len+want| didn't
* overflow.
*/
len += i;
want -= i;
len += i;
chunk -= i;
}
if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
chunk_max *= 2;
}
}
if (off + c.slen < off) {

View File

@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
int max);
long max);
static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length);
const char ASN1_version[] = "ASN.1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
}
*ptag = tag;
*pclass = xclass;
if (!asn1_get_length(&p, &inf, plength, (int)max))
if (!asn1_get_length(&p, &inf, plength, max))
goto err;
if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
@ -159,14 +159,14 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
}
static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
int max)
long max)
{
const unsigned char *p = *pp;
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned int i;
unsigned long i;
if (max-- < 1)
return (0);
return 0;
if (*p == 0x80) {
*inf = 1;
ret = 0;
@ -175,15 +175,11 @@ static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
*inf = 0;
i = *p & 0x7f;
if (*(p++) & 0x80) {
if (i > sizeof(long))
if (i > sizeof(ret) || max < (long)i)
return 0;
if (max-- == 0)
return (0);
while (i-- > 0) {
ret <<= 8L;
ret |= *(p++);
if (max-- == 0)
return (0);
}
} else
ret = i;
@ -192,7 +188,7 @@ static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl,
return 0;
*pp = p;
*rl = (long)ret;
return (1);
return 1;
}
/*

View File

@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
if (!asn1_print_info(bp, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0))
goto end;
if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
const unsigned char *sp;
ep = p + len;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
@ -182,6 +184,7 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
goto end;
}
if ((j == 0x21) && (len == 0)) {
sp = p;
for (;;) {
r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)(tot - p),
offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
@ -190,19 +193,25 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot))
if ((r == 2) || (p >= tot)) {
len = p - sp;
break;
}
}
} else
} else {
long tmp = len;
while (p < ep) {
r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, (long)len,
offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
sp = p;
r = asn1_parse2(bp, &p, tmp, offset + (p - *pp), depth + 1,
indent, dump);
if (r == 0) {
ret = 0;
goto end;
}
tmp -= p - sp;
}
}
} else if (xclass != 0) {
p += len;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)

View File

@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509 *x, unsigned long nmflags,
goto err;
bs = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
if (bs->length <= (int)sizeof(long)) {
if (bs->length < (int)sizeof(long)
|| (bs->length == sizeof(long) && (bs->data[0] & 0x80) == 0)) {
l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs);
if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
l = -l;

View File

@ -66,6 +66,13 @@
typedef STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY)
/*
* Maximum length of X509_NAME: much larger than anything we should
* ever see in practice.
*/
#define X509_NAME_MAX (1024 * 1024)
static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@ -192,6 +199,10 @@ static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
int i, j, ret;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
if (len > X509_NAME_MAX) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
q = p;
/* Get internal representation of Name */

View File

@ -201,9 +201,19 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int length;
int length, tmplen;
unsigned char *start = pp != NULL ? *pp : NULL;
length = i2d_X509(a, pp);
if (a)
length += i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
if (length < 0 || a == NULL)
return length;
tmplen = i2d_X509_CERT_AUX(a->aux, pp);
if (tmplen < 0) {
if (start != NULL)
*pp = start;
return tmplen;
}
length += tmplen;
return length;
}

View File

@ -125,16 +125,16 @@
# define LLONG long
#endif
static void fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
const char *, int, int, int);
static void fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LLONG, int, int, int, int);
static void fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
static void doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
const char *format, va_list args);
static int fmtstr(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
const char *, int, int, int);
static int fmtint(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LLONG, int, int, int, int);
static int fmtfp(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *,
LDOUBLE, int, int, int);
static int doapr_outch(char **, char **, size_t *, size_t *, int);
static int _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen, size_t *retlen, int *truncated,
const char *format, va_list args);
/* format read states */
#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static void _dopr(char **sbuffer, char **buffer,
#define char_to_int(p) (p - '0')
#define OSSL_MAX(p,q) ((p >= q) ? p : q)
static void
static int
_dopr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen,
@ -196,7 +196,8 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
if (ch == '%')
state = DP_S_FLAGS;
else
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
return 0;
ch = *format++;
break;
case DP_S_FLAGS:
@ -302,8 +303,9 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
value = va_arg(args, int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 10, min, max, flags);
if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min,
max, flags))
return 0;
break;
case 'X':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
@ -326,17 +328,19 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
min, max, flags);
if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
min, max, flags))
return 0;
break;
case 'f':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
fvalue, min, max, flags);
if (!fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max,
flags))
return 0;
break;
case 'E':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
@ -355,8 +359,9 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'c':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
va_arg(args, int));
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
va_arg(args, int)))
return 0;
break;
case 's':
strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
@ -366,13 +371,15 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
else
max = *maxlen;
}
fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max);
if (!fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max))
return 0;
break;
case 'p':
value = (long)va_arg(args, void *);
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM);
if (!fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM))
return 0;
break;
case 'n': /* XXX */
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
@ -394,7 +401,8 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
}
break;
case '%':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch))
return 0;
break;
case 'w':
/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
@ -418,46 +426,56 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
*truncated = (currlen > *maxlen - 1);
if (*truncated)
currlen = *maxlen - 1;
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, '\0'))
return 0;
*retlen = currlen - 1;
return;
return 1;
}
static void
static int
fmtstr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
size_t *maxlen, const char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
{
int padlen, strln;
int padlen;
size_t strln;
int cnt = 0;
if (value == 0)
value = "<NULL>";
for (strln = 0; value[strln]; ++strln) ;
strln = strlen(value);
if (strln > INT_MAX)
strln = INT_MAX;
padlen = min - strln;
if (padlen < 0)
if (min < 0 || padlen < 0)
padlen = 0;
if (flags & DP_F_MINUS)
padlen = -padlen;
while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
--padlen;
++cnt;
}
while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *value++))
return 0;
++cnt;
}
while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
++padlen;
++cnt;
}
return 1;
}
static void
static int
fmtint(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
@ -517,37 +535,44 @@ fmtint(char **sbuffer,
/* spaces */
while (spadlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
--spadlen;
}
/* sign */
if (signvalue)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
return 0;
/* prefix */
while (*prefix) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix);
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, *prefix))
return 0;
prefix++;
}
/* zeros */
if (zpadlen > 0) {
while (zpadlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
return 0;
--zpadlen;
}
}
/* digits */
while (place > 0)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]);
while (place > 0) {
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, convert[--place]))
return 0;
}
/* left justified spaces */
while (spadlen < 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
++spadlen;
}
return;
return 1;
}
static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
@ -578,7 +603,7 @@ static long roundv(LDOUBLE value)
return intpart;
}
static void
static int
fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *currlen,
@ -657,47 +682,61 @@ fmtfp(char **sbuffer,
if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
if (signvalue) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
return 0;
--padlen;
signvalue = 0;
}
while (padlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
return 0;
--padlen;
}
}
while (padlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
--padlen;
}
if (signvalue)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
if (signvalue && !doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, signvalue))
return 0;
while (iplace > 0)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]);
while (iplace > 0) {
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, iconvert[--iplace]))
return 0;
}
/*
* Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct
* char to print out.
*/
if (max > 0 || (flags & DP_F_NUM)) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '.'))
return 0;
while (fplace > 0)
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, fconvert[--fplace]);
while (fplace > 0) {
if(!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen,
fconvert[--fplace]))
return 0;
}
}
while (zpadlen > 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, '0'))
return 0;
--zpadlen;
}
while (padlen < 0) {
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' ');
if (!doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, currlen, maxlen, ' '))
return 0;
++padlen;
}
return 1;
}
static void
#define BUFFER_INC 1024
static int
doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t *maxlen, int c)
{
@ -708,24 +747,25 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
assert(*currlen <= *maxlen);
if (buffer && *currlen == *maxlen) {
*maxlen += 1024;
if (*maxlen > INT_MAX - BUFFER_INC)
return 0;
*maxlen += BUFFER_INC;
if (*buffer == NULL) {
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(*maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
if (*buffer == NULL)
return 0;
if (*currlen > 0) {
assert(*sbuffer != NULL);
memcpy(*buffer, *sbuffer, *currlen);
}
*sbuffer = NULL;
} else {
*buffer = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
if (!*buffer) {
/* Panic! Can't really do anything sensible. Just return */
return;
}
char *tmpbuf;
tmpbuf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buffer, *maxlen);
if (tmpbuf == NULL)
return 0;
*buffer = tmpbuf;
}
}
@ -736,7 +776,7 @@ doapr_outch(char **sbuffer,
(*buffer)[(*currlen)++] = (char)c;
}
return;
return 1;
}
/***************************************************************************/
@ -768,7 +808,11 @@ int BIO_vprintf(BIO *bio, const char *format, va_list args)
dynbuf = NULL;
CRYPTO_push_info("doapr()");
_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format, args);
if (!_dopr(&hugebufp, &dynbuf, &hugebufsize, &retlen, &ignored, format,
args)) {
OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
return -1;
}
if (dynbuf) {
ret = BIO_write(bio, dynbuf, (int)retlen);
OPENSSL_free(dynbuf);
@ -803,7 +847,8 @@ int BIO_vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t n, const char *format, va_list args)
size_t retlen;
int truncated;
_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args);
if(!_dopr(&buf, NULL, &n, &retlen, &truncated, format, args))
return -1;
if (truncated)
/*

View File

@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
# define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
# define BIO_get_conn_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
# define BIO_get_conn_ip(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0,NULL)
# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,NULL)
# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)

View File

@ -243,7 +243,8 @@ bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h
bn_exp.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../constant_time_locl.h
bn_exp.o: ../cryptlib.h bn_exp.c bn_lcl.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
bn_exp2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h

View File

@ -85,6 +85,21 @@ $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n
&and ("esp",-64); # align to cache line
# Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
&mov ("eax","ebp");
&sub ("eax","esp");
&and ("eax",-4096);
&set_label("page_walk");
&mov ("edx",&DWP(0,"esp","eax"));
&sub ("eax",4096);
&data_byte(0x2e);
&jnc (&label("page_walk"));
################################# load argument block...
&mov ("eax",&DWP(0*4,"esi"));# BN_ULONG *rp
&mov ("ebx",&DWP(1*4,"esi"));# const BN_ULONG *ap

View File

@ -91,6 +91,20 @@ bn_mul_mont:
mov %r11,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul_body:
# Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
sub %rsp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
.Lmul_page_walk:
mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
sub \$4096,%r11
.byte 0x66,0x2e # predict non-taken
jnc .Lmul_page_walk
mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp
___
$bp="%r12";
@ -296,6 +310,14 @@ bn_mul4x_mont:
mov %r11,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul4x_body:
sub %rsp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
.Lmul4x_page_walk:
mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
sub \$4096,%r11
.byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
jnc .Lmul4x_page_walk
mov $rp,16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+2]=$rp
mov %rdx,%r12 # reassign $bp
___
@ -707,6 +729,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 16
bn_sqr4x_mont:
.Lsqr4x_enter:
mov %rsp,%rax
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
@ -715,12 +738,23 @@ bn_sqr4x_mont:
push %r15
shl \$3,${num}d # convert $num to bytes
xor %r10,%r10
mov %rsp,%r11 # put aside %rsp
sub $num,%r10 # -$num
neg $num # -$num
mov ($n0),$n0 # *n0
lea -72(%rsp,%r10,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
lea -72(%rsp,$num,2),%rsp # alloca(frame+2*$num)
and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
sub %rsp,%r11
and \$-4096,%r11
.Lsqr4x_page_walk:
mov (%rsp,%r11),%r10
sub \$4096,%r11
.byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
jnc .Lsqr4x_page_walk
mov $num,%r10
neg $num # restore $num
lea -48(%rax),%r11 # restore saved %rsp
##############################################################
# Stack layout
#

View File

@ -66,60 +66,127 @@ bn_mul_mont_gather5:
.align 16
.Lmul_enter:
mov ${num}d,${num}d
mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%r10d # load 7th argument
movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5 # load 7th argument
lea .Linc(%rip),%r10
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
.Lmul_alloca:
___
$code.=<<___;
mov %rsp,%rax
lea 2($num),%r11
neg %r11
lea (%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2))
lea -264(%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+2)+256+8)
and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul_body:
mov $bp,%r12 # reassign $bp
# Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to
# physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack
# allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can
# be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on
# other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits
# the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one...
sub %rsp,%rax
and \$-4096,%rax
.Lmul_page_walk:
mov (%rsp,%rax),%r11
sub \$4096,%rax
.byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
jnc .Lmul_page_walk
lea 128($bp),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization)
___
$bp="%r12";
$STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size"
$N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size
$code.=<<___;
mov %r10,%r11
shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,%r10
and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
not %r10
lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,%r10 # 5 is "window size"
lea 96($bp,%r11,8),$bp # pointer within 1st cache line
movq 0(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
movq 8(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
movq 16(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
movq 24(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm7
movdqa 0(%r10),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
movdqa 16(%r10),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
lea 24-112(%rsp,$num,8),%r10# place the mask after tp[num+3] (+ICache optimization)
and \$-16,%r10
movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
pand %xmm5,%xmm1
movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
pand %xmm6,%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm7,%xmm3
pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
___
########################################################################
# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
#
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0
.byte 0x67
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
___
for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2
movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0
paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4
movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6
movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
___
}
$code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized
paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
.byte 0x67
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
pand `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register
pand `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
pand `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
pand `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm0
por %xmm3,%xmm1
___
for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4
movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5
movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
pand `16*($k+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
pand `16*($k+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
por %xmm4,%xmm0
pand `16*($k+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
por %xmm5,%xmm1
pand `16*($k+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm0
por %xmm3,%xmm1
___
}
$code.=<<___;
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
por %xmm3,%xmm0
movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0]
mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value
@ -128,29 +195,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
xor $i,$i # i=0
xor $j,$j # j=0
movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
pand %xmm5,%xmm1
mov $n0,$m1
mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0]
mov %rax,$lo0
mov ($np),%rax
movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
pand %xmm6,%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm7,%xmm3
imulq $lo0,$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0
mov %rdx,$hi0
por %xmm2,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
por %xmm3,%xmm0
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$lo0 # discarded
mov 8($ap),%rax
@ -183,8 +235,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
cmp $num,$j
jne .L1st
movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[1]
add %rax,$hi1
mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0]
adc \$0,%rdx
@ -204,33 +254,46 @@ $code.=<<___;
jmp .Louter
.align 16
.Louter:
lea 24+128(%rsp,$num,8),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization)
and \$-16,%rdx
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
___
for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16;$k+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0
movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
pand `16*($k+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0
pand `16*($k+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1
por %xmm0,%xmm4
pand `16*($k+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm5
pand `16*($k+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm4
por %xmm3,%xmm5
___
}
$code.=<<___;
por %xmm5,%xmm4
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
por %xmm4,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i]
xor $j,$j # j=0
mov $n0,$m1
mov (%rsp),$lo0
movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
pand %xmm5,%xmm1
mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[i]
add %rax,$lo0 # ap[0]*bp[i]+tp[0]
mov ($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
pand %xmm6,%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm7,%xmm3
imulq $lo0,$m1 # tp[0]*n0
mov %rdx,$hi0
por %xmm2,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
por %xmm3,%xmm0
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$lo0 # discarded
mov 8($ap),%rax
@ -266,8 +329,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
cmp $num,$j
jne .Linner
movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[i+1]
add %rax,$hi1
mov ($ap),%rax # ap[0]
adc \$0,%rdx
@ -321,13 +382,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsi),%xmm6
movaps 0x10(%rsi),%xmm7
lea 0x28(%rsi),%rsi
___
$code.=<<___;
mov (%rsi),%r15
mov 8(%rsi),%r14
mov 16(%rsi),%r13
@ -348,91 +403,138 @@ $code.=<<___;
bn_mul4x_mont_gather5:
.Lmul4x_enter:
mov ${num}d,${num}d
mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%r10d # load 7th argument
movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),%xmm5 # load 7th argument
lea .Linc(%rip),%r10
push %rbx
push %rbp
push %r12
push %r13
push %r14
push %r15
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x28(%rsp),%rsp
movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
movaps %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
.Lmul4x_alloca:
___
$code.=<<___;
mov %rsp,%rax
lea 4($num),%r11
neg %r11
lea (%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+4))
lea -256(%rsp,%r11,8),%rsp # tp=alloca(8*(num+4)+256)
and \$-1024,%rsp # minimize TLB usage
mov %rax,8(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+1]=%rsp
.Lmul4x_body:
sub %rsp,%rax
and \$-4096,%rax
.Lmul4x_page_walk:
mov (%rsp,%rax),%r11
sub \$4096,%rax
.byte 0x2e # predict non-taken
jnc .Lmul4x_page_walk
mov $rp,16(%rsp,$num,8) # tp[num+2]=$rp
mov %rdx,%r12 # reassign $bp
lea 128(%rdx),%r12 # reassign $bp (+size optimization)
___
$bp="%r12";
$STRIDE=2**5*8; # 5 is "window size"
$N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size
$code.=<<___;
mov %r10,%r11
shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,%r10
and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
not %r10
lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,%r10 # 5 is "window size"
lea 96($bp,%r11,8),$bp # pointer within 1st cache line
movq 0(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
movq 8(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
movq 16(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
movq 24(%rax,%r10,8),%xmm7
movdqa 0(%r10),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
movdqa 16(%r10),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
lea 32-112(%rsp,$num,8),%r10# place the mask after tp[num+4] (+ICache optimization)
movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
pand %xmm5,%xmm1
movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
pand %xmm6,%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm7,%xmm3
pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
.byte 0x67,0x67
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
___
########################################################################
# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to index and save result to stack
#
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0
.byte 0x67
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
___
for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2
movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0
paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4
movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6
movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2
paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
___
}
$code.=<<___; # last iteration can be optimized
paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1
movdqa %xmm0,`16*($k+0)+112`(%r10)
paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
.byte 0x67
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2
movdqa %xmm1,`16*($k+1)+112`(%r10)
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3
movdqa %xmm2,`16*($k+2)+112`(%r10)
pand `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0 # while it's still in register
pand `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
pand `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
movdqa %xmm3,`16*($k+3)+112`(%r10)
pand `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm0
por %xmm3,%xmm1
___
for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16-4;$k+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm4
movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm5
movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
pand `16*($k+0)+112`(%r10),%xmm4
movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
pand `16*($k+1)+112`(%r10),%xmm5
por %xmm4,%xmm0
pand `16*($k+2)+112`(%r10),%xmm2
por %xmm5,%xmm1
pand `16*($k+3)+112`(%r10),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm0
por %xmm3,%xmm1
___
}
$code.=<<___;
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm0,%xmm1
por %xmm1,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
por %xmm3,%xmm0
movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[0]
mov ($n0),$n0 # pull n0[0] value
mov ($ap),%rax
xor $i,$i # i=0
xor $j,$j # j=0
movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
pand %xmm5,%xmm1
mov $n0,$m1
mulq $m0 # ap[0]*bp[0]
mov %rax,$A[0]
mov ($np),%rax
movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
pand %xmm6,%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm7,%xmm3
imulq $A[0],$m1 # "tp[0]"*n0
mov %rdx,$A[1]
por %xmm2,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
por %xmm3,%xmm0
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$A[0] # discarded
mov 8($ap),%rax
@ -550,8 +652,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1]
mov %rdx,$N[0]
movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[1]
xor $N[1],$N[1]
add $A[0],$N[0]
adc \$0,$N[1]
@ -561,12 +661,34 @@ $code.=<<___;
lea 1($i),$i # i++
.align 4
.Louter4x:
lea 32+128(%rsp,$num,8),%rdx # where 256-byte mask is (+size optimization)
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
___
for($k=0;$k<$STRIDE/16;$k+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
movdqa `16*($k+0)-128`($bp),%xmm0
movdqa `16*($k+1)-128`($bp),%xmm1
movdqa `16*($k+2)-128`($bp),%xmm2
movdqa `16*($k+3)-128`($bp),%xmm3
pand `16*($k+0)-128`(%rdx),%xmm0
pand `16*($k+1)-128`(%rdx),%xmm1
por %xmm0,%xmm4
pand `16*($k+2)-128`(%rdx),%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm5
pand `16*($k+3)-128`(%rdx),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm4
por %xmm3,%xmm5
___
}
$code.=<<___;
por %xmm5,%xmm4
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
por %xmm4,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
movq %xmm0,$m0 # m0=bp[i]
xor $j,$j # j=0
movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm0
movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm2
pand %xmm5,%xmm1
mov (%rsp),$A[0]
mov $n0,$m1
@ -575,18 +697,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov ($np),%rax
adc \$0,%rdx
movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($bp),%xmm3
pand %xmm6,%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm7,%xmm3
imulq $A[0],$m1 # tp[0]*n0
mov %rdx,$A[1]
por %xmm2,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($bp),$bp
por %xmm3,%xmm0
mulq $m1 # np[0]*m1
add %rax,$A[0] # "$N[0]", discarded
mov 8($ap),%rax
@ -718,7 +831,6 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $N[0],-24(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1]
mov %rdx,$N[0]
movq %xmm0,$m0 # bp[i+1]
mov $N[1],-16(%rsp,$j,8) # tp[j-1]
xor $N[1],$N[1]
@ -809,13 +921,7 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
mov 8(%rsp,$num,8),%rsi # restore %rsp
mov \$1,%rax
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsi),%xmm6
movaps 0x10(%rsi),%xmm7
lea 0x28(%rsi),%rsi
___
$code.=<<___;
mov (%rsi),%r15
mov 8(%rsi),%r14
mov 16(%rsi),%r13
@ -830,8 +936,8 @@ ___
}}}
{
my ($inp,$num,$tbl,$idx)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9") : # Win64 order
("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%rcx"); # Unix order
my ($inp,$num,$tbl,$idx)=$win64?("%rcx","%rdx","%r8", "%r9d") : # Win64 order
("%rdi","%rsi","%rdx","%ecx"); # Unix order
my $out=$inp;
my $STRIDE=2**5*8;
my $N=$STRIDE/4;
@ -859,53 +965,89 @@ bn_scatter5:
.type bn_gather5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
bn_gather5:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
.LSEH_begin_bn_gather5:
.LSEH_begin_bn_gather5: # Win64 thing, but harmless in other cases
# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
.byte 0x48,0x83,0xec,0x28 #sub \$0x28,%rsp
.byte 0x0f,0x29,0x34,0x24 #movaps %xmm6,(%rsp)
.byte 0x0f,0x29,0x7c,0x24,0x10 #movdqa %xmm7,0x10(%rsp)
.byte 0x4c,0x8d,0x14,0x24 # lea (%rsp),%r10
.byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0x08,0x01,0x00,0x00 # sub $0x108,%rsp
lea .Linc(%rip),%rax
and \$-16,%rsp # shouldn't be formally required
movd $idx,%xmm5
movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
lea 128($tbl),%r11 # size optimization
lea 128(%rsp),%rax # size optimization
pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast $idx
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm2
___
########################################################################
# calculate mask by comparing 0..31 to $idx and save result to stack
#
for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
paddd %xmm0,%xmm1
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm0 # compare to 1,0
___
$code.=<<___ if ($i);
movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax)
___
$code.=<<___;
mov $idx,%r11
shr \$`log($N/8)/log(2)`,$idx
and \$`$N/8-1`,%r11
not $idx
lea .Lmagic_masks(%rip),%rax
and \$`2**5/($N/8)-1`,$idx # 5 is "window size"
lea 96($tbl,%r11,8),$tbl # pointer within 1st cache line
movq 0(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm4 # set of masks denoting which
movq 8(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm5 # cache line contains element
movq 16(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm6 # denoted by 7th argument
movq 24(%rax,$idx,8),%xmm7
jmp .Lgather
.align 16
.Lgather:
movq `0*$STRIDE/4-96`($tbl),%xmm0
movq `1*$STRIDE/4-96`($tbl),%xmm1
pand %xmm4,%xmm0
movq `2*$STRIDE/4-96`($tbl),%xmm2
pand %xmm5,%xmm1
movq `3*$STRIDE/4-96`($tbl),%xmm3
pand %xmm6,%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm0
pand %xmm7,%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm0
lea $STRIDE($tbl),$tbl
por %xmm3,%xmm0
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm3
paddd %xmm1,%xmm2
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm1 # compare to 3,2
movdqa %xmm0,`16*($i+0)-128`(%rax)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm0
paddd %xmm2,%xmm3
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm2 # compare to 5,4
movdqa %xmm1,`16*($i+1)-128`(%rax)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm1
paddd %xmm3,%xmm0
pcmpeqd %xmm5,%xmm3 # compare to 7,6
movdqa %xmm2,`16*($i+2)-128`(%rax)
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm2
___
}
$code.=<<___;
movdqa %xmm3,`16*($i-1)-128`(%rax)
jmp .Lgather
.align 32
.Lgather:
pxor %xmm4,%xmm4
pxor %xmm5,%xmm5
___
for($i=0;$i<$STRIDE/16;$i+=4) {
$code.=<<___;
movdqa `16*($i+0)-128`(%r11),%xmm0
movdqa `16*($i+1)-128`(%r11),%xmm1
movdqa `16*($i+2)-128`(%r11),%xmm2
pand `16*($i+0)-128`(%rax),%xmm0
movdqa `16*($i+3)-128`(%r11),%xmm3
pand `16*($i+1)-128`(%rax),%xmm1
por %xmm0,%xmm4
pand `16*($i+2)-128`(%rax),%xmm2
por %xmm1,%xmm5
pand `16*($i+3)-128`(%rax),%xmm3
por %xmm2,%xmm4
por %xmm3,%xmm5
___
}
$code.=<<___;
por %xmm5,%xmm4
lea $STRIDE(%r11),%r11
pshufd \$0x4e,%xmm4,%xmm0
por %xmm4,%xmm0
movq %xmm0,($out) # m0=bp[0]
lea 8($out),$out
sub \$1,$num
jnz .Lgather
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps (%rsp),%xmm6
movaps 0x10(%rsp),%xmm7
lea 0x28(%rsp),%rsp
___
$code.=<<___;
lea (%r10),%rsp
ret
.LSEH_end_bn_gather5:
.size bn_gather5,.-bn_gather5
@ -913,9 +1055,9 @@ ___
}
$code.=<<___;
.align 64
.Lmagic_masks:
.long 0,0, 0,0, 0,0, -1,-1
.long 0,0, 0,0, 0,0, 0,0
.Linc:
.long 0,0, 1,1
.long 2,2, 2,2
.asciz "Montgomery Multiplication with scatter/gather for x86_64, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
___
@ -954,7 +1096,7 @@ mul_handler:
cmp %r10,%rbx # context->Rip<end of prologue label
jb .Lcommon_seh_tail
lea `40+48`(%rax),%rax
lea 48(%rax),%rax
mov 4(%r11),%r10d # HandlerData[1]
lea (%rsi,%r10),%r10 # end of alloca label
@ -971,9 +1113,7 @@ mul_handler:
mov 192($context),%r10 # pull $num
mov 8(%rax,%r10,8),%rax # pull saved stack pointer
movaps (%rax),%xmm0
movaps 16(%rax),%xmm1
lea `40+48`(%rax),%rax
lea 48(%rax),%rax
mov -8(%rax),%rbx
mov -16(%rax),%rbp
@ -987,8 +1127,6 @@ mul_handler:
mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15
movups %xmm0,512($context) # restore context->Xmm6
movups %xmm1,528($context) # restore context->Xmm7
.Lcommon_seh_tail:
mov 8(%rax),%rdi
@ -1057,10 +1195,9 @@ mul_handler:
.rva .Lmul4x_alloca,.Lmul4x_body,.Lmul4x_epilogue # HandlerData[]
.align 8
.LSEH_info_bn_gather5:
.byte 0x01,0x0d,0x05,0x00
.byte 0x0d,0x78,0x01,0x00 #movaps 0x10(rsp),xmm7
.byte 0x08,0x68,0x00,0x00 #movaps (rsp),xmm6
.byte 0x04,0x42,0x00,0x00 #sub rsp,0x28
.byte 0x01,0x0b,0x03,0x0a
.byte 0x0b,0x01,0x21,0x00 # sub rsp,0x108
.byte 0x04,0xa3,0x00,0x00 # lea r10,(rsp), set_frame r10
.align 8
___
}

View File

@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
#ifndef HEADER_BN_H
# define HEADER_BN_H
# include <limits.h>
# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
# include <stdio.h> /* FILE */
@ -739,8 +740,17 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void);
/* library internal functions */
# define bn_expand(a,bits) ((((((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)) <= (a)->dmax)?\
(a):bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2))
# define bn_expand(a,bits) \
( \
bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1) ? \
NULL \
: \
(((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) ? \
(a) \
: \
bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) \
)
# define bn_wexpand(a,words) (((words) <= (a)->dmax)?(a):bn_expand2((a),(words)))
BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED

View File

@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
*/
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include "constant_time_locl.h"
#include "bn_lcl.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
@ -546,15 +547,17 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
int window)
{
size_t i, j;
int i, j;
int width = 1 << window;
BN_ULONG *table = (BN_ULONG *)buf;
if (top > b->top)
top = b->top; /* this works because 'buf' is explicitly
* zeroed */
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
buf[j] = ((unsigned char *)b->d)[i];
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top; i++, j += width) {
table[j] = b->d[i];
}
return 1;
@ -562,15 +565,51 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(const BIGNUM *b, int top,
static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
unsigned char *buf, int idx,
int width)
int window)
{
size_t i, j;
int i, j;
int width = 1 << window;
volatile BN_ULONG *table = (volatile BN_ULONG *)buf;
if (bn_wexpand(b, top) == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, j = idx; i < top * sizeof b->d[0]; i++, j += width) {
((unsigned char *)b->d)[i] = buf[j];
if (window <= 3) {
for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
BN_ULONG acc = 0;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++) {
acc |= table[j] &
((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
}
b->d[i] = acc;
}
} else {
int xstride = 1 << (window - 2);
BN_ULONG y0, y1, y2, y3;
i = idx >> (window - 2); /* equivalent of idx / xstride */
idx &= xstride - 1; /* equivalent of idx % xstride */
y0 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,0)&1);
y1 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,1)&1);
y2 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,2)&1);
y3 = (BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(i,3)&1);
for (i = 0; i < top; i++, table += width) {
BN_ULONG acc = 0;
for (j = 0; j < xstride; j++) {
acc |= ( (table[j + 0 * xstride] & y0) |
(table[j + 1 * xstride] & y1) |
(table[j + 2 * xstride] & y2) |
(table[j + 3 * xstride] & y3) )
& ((BN_ULONG)0 - (constant_time_eq_int(j,idx)&1));
}
b->d[i] = acc;
}
}
b->top = top;
@ -800,9 +839,9 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
} else
#endif
{
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 0, window))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, 1, window))
goto err;
/*
@ -814,15 +853,15 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
if (window > 1) {
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &am, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, 2,
window))
goto err;
for (i = 3; i < numPowers; i++) {
/* Calculate a^i = a^(i-1) * a */
if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(&tmp, &am, &tmp, mont, ctx))
goto err;
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_TO_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, i,
window))
goto err;
}
}
@ -830,8 +869,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits--;
for (wvalue = 0, i = bits % window; i >= 0; i--, bits--)
wvalue = (wvalue << 1) + BN_is_bit_set(p, bits);
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&tmp, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
window))
goto err;
/*
@ -851,8 +890,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
/*
* Fetch the appropriate pre-computed value from the pre-buf
*/
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF
(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue, numPowers))
if (!MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(&am, top, powerbuf, wvalue,
window))
goto err;
/* Multiply the result into the intermediate result */

View File

@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include "bn_lcl.h"
@ -189,7 +190,11 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
a++;
}
for (i = 0; isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) ;
for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
continue;
if (i > INT_MAX/4)
goto err;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
@ -204,7 +209,7 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
BN_zero(ret);
}
/* i is the number of hex digests; */
/* i is the number of hex digits */
if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
goto err;
@ -260,7 +265,11 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
a++;
}
for (i = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) ;
for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
continue;
if (i > INT_MAX/4)
goto err;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
BN_zero(ret);
}
/* i is the number of digests, a bit of an over expand; */
/* i is the number of digits, a bit of an over expand */
if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL)
goto err;

View File

@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp)
BN_init(&(recp->N));
BN_init(&(recp->Nr));
recp->num_bits = 0;
recp->shift = 0;
recp->flags = 0;
}

View File

@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
# include <openssl/crypto.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
# error COMP is disabled.
# endif
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

View File

@ -191,6 +191,8 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *ndsa = NULL;
DSA *dsa = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
@ -262,23 +264,21 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
}
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
ret = 1;
goto done;
decerr:
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
dsaerr:
DSA_free(dsa);
done:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (ndsa)
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
else
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
return 1;
decerr:
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
dsaerr:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (privkey)
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
DSA_free(dsa);
return 0;
return ret;
}
static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)

View File

@ -200,8 +200,10 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
}
#endif
if (ctx->digest != type) {
if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size)
if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->md_data);
ctx->md_data = NULL;
}
ctx->digest = type;
if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT) && type->ctx_size) {
ctx->update = type->update;

View File

@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
@ -151,13 +152,13 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int i, j;
unsigned int total = 0;
size_t total = 0;
*outl = 0;
if (inl <= 0)
return;
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
ctx->num += inl;
return;
@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
*out = '\0';
total = j + 1;
}
while (inl >= ctx->length) {
while (inl >= ctx->length && total <= INT_MAX) {
j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
in += ctx->length;
inl -= ctx->length;
@ -183,6 +184,11 @@ void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
*out = '\0';
total += j + 1;
}
if (total > INT_MAX) {
/* Too much output data! */
*outl = 0;
return;
}
if (inl != 0)
memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
ctx->num = inl;

View File

@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf));
if (i != 0) {
if (i + inl < bl) {
if (bl - i > inl) {
memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
ctx->buf_len += inl;
*outl = 0;

View File

@ -67,23 +67,20 @@
/* increment counter (128-bit int) by 1 */
static void ctr128_inc(unsigned char *counter)
{
u32 n = 16;
u8 c;
u32 n = 16, c = 1;
do {
--n;
c = counter[n];
++c;
counter[n] = c;
if (c)
return;
c += counter[n];
counter[n] = (u8)c;
c >>= 8;
} while (n);
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT)
static void ctr128_inc_aligned(unsigned char *counter)
{
size_t *data, c, n;
size_t *data, c, d, n;
const union {
long one;
char little;
@ -91,20 +88,19 @@ static void ctr128_inc_aligned(unsigned char *counter)
1
};
if (is_endian.little) {
if (is_endian.little || ((size_t)counter % sizeof(size_t)) != 0) {
ctr128_inc(counter);
return;
}
data = (size_t *)counter;
c = 1;
n = 16 / sizeof(size_t);
do {
--n;
c = data[n];
++c;
data[n] = c;
if (c)
return;
d = data[n] += c;
/* did addition carry? */
c = ((d - c) ^ d) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1);
} while (n);
}
#endif
@ -144,14 +140,14 @@ void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
}
# if defined(STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ivec) % sizeof(size_t) !=
0)
if (((size_t)in | (size_t)out | (size_t)ecount_buf)
% sizeof(size_t) != 0)
break;
# endif
while (len >= 16) {
(*block) (ivec, ecount_buf, key);
ctr128_inc_aligned(ivec);
for (; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t))
for (n = 0; n < 16; n += sizeof(size_t))
*(size_t *)(out + n) =
*(size_t *)(in + n) ^ *(size_t *)(ecount_buf + n);
len -= 16;
@ -189,16 +185,13 @@ void CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
/* increment upper 96 bits of 128-bit counter by 1 */
static void ctr96_inc(unsigned char *counter)
{
u32 n = 12;
u8 c;
u32 n = 12, c = 1;
do {
--n;
c = counter[n];
++c;
counter[n] = c;
if (c)
return;
c += counter[n];
counter[n] = (u8)c;
c >>= 8;
} while (n);
}

View File

@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000112fL
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x10001140L
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1r-fips 28 Jan 2016"
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1t-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
# else
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1r 28 Jan 2016"
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1t-dev xx XXX xxxx"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

View File

@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp,
if (enc != NULL) {
objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc));
if (objstr == NULL) {
if (objstr == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) == 0) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto err;
}

View File

@ -131,6 +131,10 @@ static int read_lebn(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int nbyte, BIGNUM **r)
# define MS_PVKMAGIC 0xb0b5f11eL
/* Salt length for PVK files */
# define PVK_SALTLEN 0x10
/* Maximum length in PVK header */
# define PVK_MAX_KEYLEN 102400
/* Maximum salt length */
# define PVK_MAX_SALTLEN 10240
static EVP_PKEY *b2i_rsa(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
unsigned int bitlen, int ispub);
@ -644,6 +648,9 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
*psaltlen = read_ledword(&p);
*pkeylen = read_ledword(&p);
if (*pkeylen > PVK_MAX_KEYLEN || *psaltlen > PVK_MAX_SALTLEN)
return 0;
if (is_encrypted && !*psaltlen) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_INCONSISTENT_HEADER);
return 0;

View File

@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ my %globals;
$self->{sz} = "";
} elsif ($self->{op} =~ /^v/) { # VEX
$self->{sz} = "";
} elsif ($self->{op} =~ /movq/ && $line =~ /%xmm/) {
} elsif ($self->{op} =~ /mov[dq]/ && $line =~ /%xmm/) {
$self->{sz} = "";
} elsif ($self->{op} =~ /([a-z]{3,})([qlwb])$/) {
$self->{op} = $1;

View File

@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ int RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
return 0;
}
#endif
if (rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_sign) {
return rsa->meth->rsa_sign(type, m, m_len, sigret, siglen, rsa);
}
/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER) && rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(dtype, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
}

View File

@ -82,16 +82,21 @@ typedef struct SRP_gN_cache_st {
DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache)
typedef struct SRP_user_pwd_st {
/* Owned by us. */
char *id;
BIGNUM *s;
BIGNUM *v;
/* Not owned by us. */
const BIGNUM *g;
const BIGNUM *N;
/* Owned by us. */
char *info;
} SRP_user_pwd;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd)
void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd);
typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st {
STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd) *users_pwd;
STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache;
@ -115,7 +120,12 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN)
SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key);
int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb);
int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file);
/* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. */
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
/* NOTE: unlike in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user, caller owns the returned pointer.*/
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g);
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,

View File

@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static char *t_tob64(char *dst, const unsigned char *src, int size)
return olddst;
}
static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
@ -247,6 +247,24 @@ static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, BIGNUM *s, BIGNUM *v)
return (vinfo->s != NULL && vinfo->v != NULL);
}
static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
{
SRP_user_pwd *ret;
if (src == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((ret = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(ret, src->g, src->N);
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(ret, src->id, src->info)
|| !SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(ret, BN_dup(src->s), BN_dup(src->v))) {
SRP_user_pwd_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
{
SRP_VBASE *vb = (SRP_VBASE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_VBASE));
@ -468,21 +486,50 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
}
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
{
int i;
SRP_user_pwd *user;
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
return user;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
* Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
* In other words, caller must not free the result.
*/
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
{
return find_user(vb, username);
}
/*
* Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
* In other words, caller must free the result once done.
*/
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
{
SRP_user_pwd *user;
unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SRP_user_pwd_num(vb->users_pwd); i++) {
user = sk_SRP_user_pwd_value(vb->users_pwd, i);
if (strcmp(user->id, username) == 0)
return user;
}
if ((user = find_user(vb, username)) != NULL)
return srp_user_pwd_dup(user);
if ((vb->seed_key == NULL) ||
(vb->default_g == NULL) || (vb->default_N == NULL))
return NULL;

View File

@ -1281,6 +1281,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
# define X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR 103
# define X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS 104
# define X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED 124
# define X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG 134
# define X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY 105
# define X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR 125
# define X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR 126

View File

@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR), "loading cert dir"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS), "loading defaults"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_METHOD_NOT_SUPPORTED), "method not supported"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG), "name too long"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY),
"no cert set for us to verify"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_PUBLIC_KEY_DECODE_ERROR), "public key decode error"},

View File

@ -63,6 +63,13 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
/*
* Limit to ensure we don't overflow: much greater than
* anything enountered in practice.
*/
#define NAME_ONELINE_MAX (1024 * 1024)
char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
{
X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne;
@ -86,6 +93,8 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
goto err;
b->data[0] = '\0';
len = 200;
} else if (len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (a == NULL) {
if (b) {
@ -110,6 +119,10 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
type = ne->value->type;
num = ne->value->length;
if (num > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
q = ne->value->data;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING ||
@ -117,8 +130,9 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
type == V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING ||
type == V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING || type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, (num > sizeof ebcdic_buf)
? sizeof ebcdic_buf : num);
if (num > (int)sizeof(ebcdic_buf))
num = sizeof(ebcdic_buf);
ascii2ebcdic(ebcdic_buf, q, num);
q = ebcdic_buf;
}
#endif
@ -154,6 +168,10 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
lold = l;
l += 1 + l1 + 1 + l2;
if (l > NAME_ONELINE_MAX) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, X509_R_NAME_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
if (b != NULL) {
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(b, l + 1))
goto err;
@ -206,7 +224,7 @@ char *X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int len)
return (p);
err:
X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (b != NULL)
BUF_MEM_free(b);
end:
BUF_MEM_free(b);
return (NULL);
}

View File

@ -38,25 +38,21 @@ SSL v2 and for SSL v3/TLS v1.
Like B<-v>, but include cipher suite codes in output (hex format).
=item B<-ssl3>
=item B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>
only include SSL v3 ciphers.
This lists ciphers compatible with any of SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2.
=item B<-ssl2>
only include SSL v2 ciphers.
=item B<-tls1>
only include TLS v1 ciphers.
Only include SSLv2 ciphers.
=item B<-h>, B<-?>
print a brief usage message.
Print a brief usage message.
=item B<cipherlist>
a cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included
A cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included
then the default cipher list will be used. The format is described below.
=back
@ -109,9 +105,10 @@ The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings.
=item B<DEFAULT>
the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and
is normally B<ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>. This must be the firstcipher string
specified.
The default cipher list.
This is determined at compile time and is normally
B<ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2>.
When used, this must be the first cipherstring specified.
=item B<COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT>
@ -139,34 +136,46 @@ than 128 bits, and some cipher suites with 128-bit keys.
=item B<LOW>
"low" encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit encryption algorithms
but excluding export cipher suites.
Low strength encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit
encryption algorithms but excluding export cipher suites.
As of OpenSSL 1.0.1s, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<EXP>, B<EXPORT>
export encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms.
Export strength encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms.
As of OpenSSL 1.0.1s, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<EXPORT40>
40 bit export encryption algorithms
40-bit export encryption algorithms
As of OpenSSL 1.0.1s, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<EXPORT56>
56 bit export encryption algorithms. In OpenSSL 0.9.8c and later the set of
56-bit export encryption algorithms. In OpenSSL 0.9.8c and later the set of
56 bit export ciphers is empty unless OpenSSL has been explicitly configured
with support for experimental ciphers.
As of OpenSSL 1.0.1s, these are disabled in default builds.
=item B<eNULL>, B<NULL>
the "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no
encryption at all and are a security risk they are disabled unless explicitly
included.
The "NULL" ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no
encryption at all and are a security risk they are not enabled via either the
B<DEFAULT> or B<ALL> cipher strings.
Be careful when building cipherlists out of lower-level primitives such as
B<kRSA> or B<aECDSA> as these do overlap with the B<eNULL> ciphers.
When in doubt, include B<!eNULL> in your cipherlist.
=item B<aNULL>
the cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous
The cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous
DH algorithms and anonymous ECDH algorithms. These cipher suites are vulnerable
to a "man in the middle" attack and so their use is normally discouraged.
These are excluded from the B<DEFAULT> ciphers, but included in the B<ALL>
ciphers.
Be careful when building cipherlists out of lower-level primitives such as
B<kDHE> or B<AES> as these do overlap with the B<aNULL> ciphers.
When in doubt, include B<!aNULL> in your cipherlist.
=item B<kRSA>, B<RSA>
@ -572,11 +581,11 @@ Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3.
=head2 Deprecated SSL v2.0 cipher suites.
SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 RC4-MD5
SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5
SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 RC2-MD5
SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 EXP-RC2-MD5
SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 Not implemented.
SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 RC2-CBC-MD5
SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 Not implemented.
SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 IDEA-CBC-MD5
SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC-MD5
SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 Not implemented.
SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 DES-CBC3-MD5
=head1 NOTES

View File

@ -197,16 +197,11 @@ Use the PSK key B<key> when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is
given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
1a2b3c4d.
=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.
Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which
cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only
work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only
support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option.
These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols.
By default the initial handshake uses a I<version-flexible> method which will
negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol version.
=item B<-bugs>

View File

@ -221,11 +221,11 @@ Use the PSK key B<key> when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is
given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk
1a2b3c4d.
=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>
=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-tls1_1>, B<-tls1_2>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>
these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default
the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all
servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.
These options require or disable the use of the specified SSL or TLS protocols.
By default the initial handshake uses a I<version-flexible> method which will
negotiate the highest mutually supported protocol version.
=item B<-bugs>

View File

@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
=pod
=head1 NAME
EVP_EncodeInit, EVP_EncodeUpdate, EVP_EncodeFinal, EVP_EncodeBlock,
EVP_DecodeInit, EVP_DecodeUpdate, EVP_DecodeFinal, EVP_DecodeBlock - EVP base 64
encode/decode routines
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/evp.h>
void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
void EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl);
void EVP_EncodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl);
int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_DecodeFinal(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned
char *out, int *outl);
int EVP_DecodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int n);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The EVP encode routines provide a high level interface to base 64 encoding and
decoding. Base 64 encoding converts binary data into a printable form that uses
the characters A-Z, a-z, 0-9, "+" and "/" to represent the data. For every 3
bytes of binary data provided 4 bytes of base 64 encoded data will be produced
plus some occasional newlines (see below). If the input data length is not a
multiple of 3 then the output data will be padded at the end using the "="
character.
Encoding of binary data is performed in blocks of 48 input bytes (or less for
the final block). For each 48 byte input block encoded 64 bytes of base 64 data
is output plus an additional newline character (i.e. 65 bytes in total). The
final block (which may be less than 48 bytes) will output 4 bytes for every 3
bytes of input. If the data length is not divisible by 3 then a full 4 bytes is
still output for the final 1 or 2 bytes of input. Similarly a newline character
will also be output.
EVP_EncodeInit() initialises B<ctx> for the start of a new encoding operation.
EVP_EncodeUpdate() encode B<inl> bytes of data found in the buffer pointed to by
B<in>. The output is stored in the buffer B<out> and the number of bytes output
is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that the
buffer at B<out> is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. Only full
blocks of data (48 bytes) will be immediately processed and output by this
function. Any remainder is held in the B<ctx> object and will be processed by a
subsequent call to EVP_EncodeUpdate() or EVP_EncodeFinal(). To calculate the
required size of the output buffer add together the value of B<inl> with the
amount of unprocessed data held in B<ctx> and divide the result by 48 (ignore
any remainder). This gives the number of blocks of data that will be processed.
Ensure the output buffer contains 65 bytes of storage for each block, plus an
additional byte for a NUL terminator. EVP_EncodeUpdate() may be called
repeatedly to process large amounts of input data. In the event of an error
EVP_EncodeUpdate() will set B<*outl> to 0.
EVP_EncodeFinal() must be called at the end of an encoding operation. It will
process any partial block of data remaining in the B<ctx> object. The output
data will be stored in B<out> and the length of the data written will be stored
in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that B<out> is
sufficiently large to accommodate the output data which will never be more than
65 bytes plus an additional NUL terminator (i.e. 66 bytes in total).
EVP_EncodeBlock() encodes a full block of input data in B<f> and of length
B<dlen> and stores it in B<t>. For every 3 bytes of input provided 4 bytes of
output data will be produced. If B<dlen> is not divisible by 3 then the block is
encoded as a final block of data and the output is padded such that it is always
divisible by 4. Additionally a NUL terminator character will be added. For
example if 16 bytes of input data is provided then 24 bytes of encoded data is
created plus 1 byte for a NUL terminator (i.e. 25 bytes in total). The length of
the data generated I<without> the NUL terminator is returned from the function.
EVP_DecodeInit() initialises B<ctx> for the start of a new decoding operation.
EVP_DecodeUpdate() decodes B<inl> characters of data found in the buffer pointed
to by B<in>. The output is stored in the buffer B<out> and the number of bytes
output is stored in B<*outl>. It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that
the buffer at B<out> is sufficiently large to accommodate the output data. This
function will attempt to decode as much data as possible in 4 byte chunks. Any
whitespace, newline or carriage return characters are ignored. Any partial chunk
of unprocessed data (1, 2 or 3 bytes) that remains at the end will be held in
the B<ctx> object and processed by a subsequent call to EVP_DecodeUpdate(). If
any illegal base 64 characters are encountered or if the base 64 padding
character "=" is encountered in the middle of the data then the function returns
-1 to indicate an error. A return value of 0 or 1 indicates successful
processing of the data. A return value of 0 additionally indicates that the last
input data characters processed included the base 64 padding character "=" and
therefore no more non-padding character data is expected to be processed. For
every 4 valid base 64 bytes processed (ignoring whitespace, carriage returns and
line feeds), 3 bytes of binary output data will be produced (or less at the end
of the data where the padding character "=" has been used).
EVP_DecodeFinal() must be called at the end of a decoding operation. If there
is any unprocessed data still in B<ctx> then the input data must not have been
a multiple of 4 and therefore an error has occurred. The function will return -1
in this case. Otherwise the function returns 1 on success.
EVP_DecodeBlock() will decode the block of B<n> characters of base 64 data
contained in B<f> and store the result in B<t>. Any leading whitespace will be
trimmed as will any trailing whitespace, newlines, carriage returns or EOF
characters. After such trimming the length of the data in B<f> must be divisbile
by 4. For every 4 input bytes exactly 3 output bytes will be produced. The
output will be padded with 0 bits if necessary to ensure that the output is
always 3 bytes for every 4 input bytes. This function will return the length of
the data decoded or -1 on error.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
EVP_EncodeBlock() returns the number of bytes encoded excluding the NUL
terminator.
EVP_DecodeUpdate() returns -1 on error and 0 or 1 on success. If 0 is returned
then no more non-padding base 64 characters are expected.
EVP_DecodeFinal() returns -1 on error or 1 on success.
EVP_DecodeBlock() returns the length of the data decoded or -1 on error.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<evp(3)>
=cut

View File

@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ functions. The B<EVP_Digest>I<...> functions provide message digests.
The B<EVP_PKEY>I<...> functions provide a high level interface to
asymmetric algorithms.
The L<B<EVP_Encode>I<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> and
L<B<EVP_Decode>I<...>|EVP_EncodeInit(3)> functions implement base 64 encoding
and decoding.
Algorithms are loaded with OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3).
All the symmetric algorithms (ciphers), digests and asymmetric algorithms
@ -49,6 +53,7 @@ L<EVP_OpenInit(3)|EVP_OpenInit(3)>,
L<EVP_SealInit(3)|EVP_SealInit(3)>,
L<EVP_SignInit(3)|EVP_SignInit(3)>,
L<EVP_VerifyInit(3)|EVP_VerifyInit(3)>,
L<EVP_EncodeInit(3)>,
L<OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)|OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)>,
L<engine(3)|engine(3)>

View File

@ -2,13 +2,47 @@
=head1 NAME
SSL_CTX_new - create a new SSL_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL enabled functions
SSL_CTX_new,
SSLv23_method, SSLv23_server_method, SSLv23_client_method,
TLSv1_2_method, TLSv1_2_server_method, TLSv1_2_client_method,
TLSv1_1_method, TLSv1_1_server_method, TLSv1_1_client_method,
TLSv1_method, TLSv1_server_method, TLSv1_client_method,
SSLv3_method, SSLv3_server_method, SSLv3_client_method,
SSLv2_method, SSLv2_server_method, SSLv2_client_method,
DTLSv1_method, DTLSv1_server_method, DTLSv1_client_method -
create a new SSL_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL enabled functions
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *method);
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_server_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_client_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_server_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_1_client_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void);
#endif
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void);
const SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@ -23,65 +57,80 @@ client only type. B<method> can be of the following types:
=over 4
=item SSLv2_method(void), SSLv2_server_method(void), SSLv2_client_method(void)
=item SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv23_client_method()
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand
the SSLv2 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages
and will also indicate that it only understand SSLv2. A server will only
understand SSLv2 client hello messages.
These are the general-purpose I<version-flexible> SSL/TLS methods.
The actual protocol version used will be negotiated to the highest version
mutually supported by the client and the server.
The supported protocols are SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2.
Most applications should use these method, and avoid the version specific
methods described below.
=item SSLv3_method(void), SSLv3_server_method(void), SSLv3_client_method(void)
The list of protocols available can be further limited using the
B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2>, B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3>, B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1>,
B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1> and B<SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2> options of the
L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> or L<SSL_set_options(3)> functions.
Clients should avoid creating "holes" in the set of protocols they support,
when disabling a protocol, make sure that you also disable either all previous
or all subsequent protocol versions.
In clients, when a protocol version is disabled without disabling I<all>
previous protocol versions, the effect is to also disable all subsequent
protocol versions.
The SSLv2 and SSLv3 protocols are deprecated and should generally not be used.
Applications should typically use L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> in combination with
the B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3> flag to disable negotiation of SSLv3 via the above
I<version-flexible> SSL/TLS methods.
The B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2> option is set by default, and would need to be cleared
via L<SSL_CTX_clear_options(3)> in order to enable negotiation of SSLv2.
=item TLSv1_2_method(), TLSv1_2_server_method(), TLSv1_2_client_method()
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
SSLv3 protocol. A client will send out SSLv3 client hello messages
and will indicate that it only understands SSLv3. A server will only understand
SSLv3 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will
not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for
compatibility reasons, see SSLv23_*_method().
TLSv1.2 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1.2 client hello messages and
will also indicate that it only understand TLSv1.2. A server will only
understand TLSv1.2 client hello messages.
=item TLSv1_method(void), TLSv1_server_method(void), TLSv1_client_method(void)
=item TLSv1_1_method(), TLSv1_1_server_method(), TLSv1_1_client_method()
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages
and will indicate that it only understands TLSv1. A server will only understand
TLSv1 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will
not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for
compatibility reasons, see SSLv23_*_method(). It will also not understand
SSLv3 client hello messages.
TLSv1.1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1.1 client hello messages and
will also indicate that it only understand TLSv1.1. A server will only
understand TLSv1.1 client hello messages.
=item SSLv23_method(void), SSLv23_server_method(void), SSLv23_client_method(void)
=item TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), TLSv1_client_method()
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods may understand the SSLv2,
SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 protocols.
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages and will
indicate that it only understands TLSv1. A server will only understand TLSv1
client hello messages.
If the cipher list does not contain any SSLv2 ciphersuites (the default
cipher list does not) or extensions are required (for example server name)
a client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages including extensions and
will indicate that it also understands TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 and permits a
fallback to SSLv3. A server will support SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2
protocols. This is the best choice when compatibility is a concern.
=item SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), SSLv3_client_method()
If any SSLv2 ciphersuites are included in the cipher list and no extensions
are required then SSLv2 compatible client hellos will be used by clients and
SSLv2 will be accepted by servers. This is B<not> recommended due to the
insecurity of SSLv2 and the limited nature of the SSLv2 client hello
prohibiting the use of extensions.
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
SSLv3 protocol. A client will send out SSLv3 client hello messages and will
indicate that it only understands SSLv3. A server will only understand SSLv3
client hello messages. The SSLv3 protocol is deprecated and should not be
used.
=item SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv2_client_method()
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the
SSLv2 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages and will
also indicate that it only understand SSLv2. A server will only understand
SSLv2 client hello messages. The SSLv2 protocol offers little to no security
and should not be used.
As of OpenSSL 1.0.1s, EXPORT ciphers and 56-bit DES are no longer available
with SSLv2.
=item DTLSv1_method(), DTLSv1_server_method(), DTLSv1_client_method()
These are the version-specific methods for DTLSv1.
=back
The list of protocols available can later be limited using the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2,
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 and SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
options of the SSL_CTX_set_options() or SSL_set_options() functions.
Using these options it is possible to choose e.g. SSLv23_server_method() and
be able to negotiate with all possible clients, but to only allow newer
protocols like TLSv1, TLSv1.1 or TLS v1.2.
Applications which never want to support SSLv2 (even is the cipher string
is configured to use SSLv2 ciphersuites) can set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
SSL_CTX_new() initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting,
the callbacks, the keys and certificates and the options to its default
values.
SSL_CTX_new() initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting, the
callbacks, the keys and certificates and the options to its default values.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
@ -91,8 +140,8 @@ The following return values can occur:
=item NULL
The creation of a new SSL_CTX object failed. Check the error stack to
find out the reason.
The creation of a new SSL_CTX object failed. Check the error stack to find out
the reason.
=item Pointer to an SSL_CTX object
@ -102,6 +151,7 @@ The return value points to an allocated SSL_CTX object.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_clear_options(3)>, L<SSL_set_options(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_free(3)|SSL_CTX_free(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)|SSL_accept(3)>,
L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)|SSL_set_connect_state(3)>

View File

@ -189,15 +189,25 @@ browser has a cert, it will crash/hang. Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta
=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
Do not use the SSLv2 protocol.
As of OpenSSL 1.0.1s the B<SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2> option is set by default.
=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
Do not use the SSLv3 protocol.
It is recommended that applications should set this option.
=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
Do not use the TLSv1 protocol.
=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
Do not use the TLSv1.1 protocol.
=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
Do not use the TLSv1.2 protocol.
=item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session

View File

@ -130,41 +130,86 @@ protocol methods defined in B<SSL_METHOD> structures.
=over 4
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_client_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv23_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client.
Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for
clients, servers or both.
See L<SSL_CTX_new(3)> for details.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_server_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv23_client_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server.
Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for
clients.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv23_client_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server.
Constructor for the I<version-flexible> SSL_METHOD structure for
servers.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_client_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client.
Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
or both.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_server_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_client_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server.
Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_2_server_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server.
Constructor for the TLSv1.2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_client_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_method>(void);
Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated client.
Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
or both.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_server_method>(void);
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_client_method>(void);
Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for a dedicated server.
Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_1_server_method>(void);
Constructor for the TLSv1.1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_method>(void);
Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for combined client and server.
Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
or both.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_client_method>(void);
Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<TLSv1_server_method>(void);
Constructor for the TLSv1 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
or both.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_client_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv3_server_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv3 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients, servers
or both.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_client_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for clients.
=item const SSL_METHOD *B<SSLv2_server_method>(void);
Constructor for the SSLv2 SSL_METHOD structure for servers.
=back

View File

@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ require "uplink-common.pl";
for ($i=1;$i<=$N;$i++) {
&function_begin_B("_\$lazy${i}");
&lea ("eax",&DWP(&label("OPENSSL_UplinkTable")));
&push ("eax");
&push ($i);
&push ("eax");
&call (&label("OPENSSL_Uplink"));
&add ("esp",8);
&pop ("eax");
&add ("esp",4);
&jmp_ptr(&DWP(4*$i,"eax"));
&function_end_B("_\$lazy${i}");
}

View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
Name: openssl
#Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
Version: 1.0.1r
Version: 1.0.1t
Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries

View File

@ -420,14 +420,14 @@ s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rand.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_clnt.c ssl_locl.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
s2_clnt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_clnt.c
s2_clnt.o: ssl_locl.h
s2_enc.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
s2_enc.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
s2_enc.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
@ -456,18 +456,18 @@ s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/md5.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/rsa.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl23.h ../include/openssl/ssl3.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/tls1.h ../include/openssl/x509.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_lib.c ssl_locl.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
s2_lib.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_lib.c
s2_lib.o: ssl_locl.h
s2_meth.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
s2_meth.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
s2_meth.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
@ -508,20 +508,19 @@ s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
s2_pkt.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h s2_pkt.c
s2_pkt.o: ssl_locl.h
s2_srvr.o: ../crypto/constant_time_locl.h ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dsa.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/evp.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/hmac.h ../include/openssl/kssl.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/pqueue.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/rand.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
s2_srvr.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/comp.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dsa.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/dtls1.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ec.h ../include/openssl/ecdh.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../include/openssl/err.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/kssl.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../include/openssl/objects.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/pem.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pem2.h ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/pqueue.h ../include/openssl/rsa.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/sha.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/srtp.h ../include/openssl/ssl.h
s2_srvr.o: ../include/openssl/ssl2.h ../include/openssl/ssl23.h

View File

@ -1579,6 +1579,8 @@ int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
* plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
*/
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
if (buffer == NULL)
return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */

View File

@ -150,12 +150,13 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
0,
128,
128,
},
# if 0
/* RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
{
1,
@ -166,11 +167,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
40,
128,
},
# endif
/* RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
{
@ -182,12 +184,13 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
0,
128,
128,
},
# if 0
/* RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 */
{
1,
@ -198,11 +201,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL2_CF_5_BYTE_ENC,
40,
128,
},
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
/* IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
@ -215,13 +219,14 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_IDEA,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
0,
128,
128,
},
# endif
# if 0
/* DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
{
1,
@ -232,11 +237,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
0,
56,
56,
},
# endif
/* DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 */
{
@ -248,7 +254,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_3DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
0,
112,
168,
@ -265,7 +271,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL const SSL_CIPHER ssl2_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC,
64,
64,

View File

@ -57,7 +57,8 @@
*/
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
# include <stdio.h>
# include <openssl/objects.h>
@ -72,7 +73,16 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_method(int ver)
IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_method,
ssl2_accept, ssl2_connect, ssl2_get_method)
#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
# else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void) { return NULL; }
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void) { return NULL; }
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void) { return NULL; }
# endif
#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD */
# if PEDANTIC
static void *dummy = &dummy;

View File

@ -2104,6 +2104,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = NULL;
p += l;
nc += l + 2;
@ -2127,6 +2128,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
X509_NAME_free(xn);
if (ca_sk != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);

View File

@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
},
/* Cipher 03 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_40_MD5,
@ -212,11 +213,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 04 */
{
@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
},
/* Cipher 06 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC2_40_MD5,
@ -260,11 +263,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 07 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
@ -285,6 +289,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
#endif
/* Cipher 08 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -294,13 +299,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 09 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
@ -310,11 +317,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 0A */
{
@ -334,6 +342,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
/* The DH ciphers */
/* Cipher 0B */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
0,
SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -343,13 +352,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 0C */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
SSL3_TXT_DH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
@ -359,11 +370,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 0D */
{
@ -382,6 +394,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
},
/* Cipher 0E */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -391,13 +404,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 0F */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
0, /* not implemented (non-ephemeral DH) */
SSL3_TXT_DH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
@ -407,11 +422,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 10 */
{
@ -431,6 +447,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
/* The Ephemeral DH ciphers */
/* Cipher 11 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -440,13 +457,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 12 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
@ -456,11 +475,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 13 */
{
@ -479,6 +499,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
},
/* Cipher 14 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -488,13 +509,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 15 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
@ -504,11 +527,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 16 */
{
@ -527,6 +551,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
},
/* Cipher 17 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_40_MD5,
@ -536,11 +561,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 18 */
{
@ -552,13 +578,14 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
},
/* Cipher 19 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -568,13 +595,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 1A */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
@ -584,11 +613,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
#endif
/* Cipher 1B */
{
@ -600,7 +630,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
112,
168,
@ -660,6 +690,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
/* The Kerberos ciphers*/
/* Cipher 1E */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA,
@ -669,11 +700,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 1F */
{
@ -724,6 +756,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
},
/* Cipher 22 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5,
@ -733,11 +766,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_LOW,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 23 */
{
@ -788,6 +822,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
},
/* Cipher 26 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -797,13 +832,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 27 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA,
@ -813,13 +850,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 28 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA,
@ -829,13 +868,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 29 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5,
@ -845,13 +886,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
56,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 2A */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5,
@ -861,13 +904,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 2B */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5,
@ -877,11 +922,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_SSLV3,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP40,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
40,
128,
},
# endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
/* New AES ciphersuites */
@ -970,7 +1016,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@ -1065,7 +1111,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@ -1261,7 +1307,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_CAMELLIA128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@ -1281,7 +1327,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
@ -1297,7 +1343,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC2,
SSL_MD5,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
@ -1305,6 +1351,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
# endif
/* Cipher 62 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
@ -1314,13 +1361,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 63 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
@ -1330,13 +1379,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
56,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 64 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
@ -1346,13 +1397,15 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 65 */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
{
1,
TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA,
@ -1362,11 +1415,12 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_EXPORT | SSL_EXP56,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
56,
128,
},
# endif
/* Cipher 66 */
{
@ -1476,7 +1530,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA256,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@ -1492,7 +1546,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA256,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@ -1645,7 +1699,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_CAMELLIA256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,
@ -1811,7 +1865,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_SEED,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@ -1991,7 +2045,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256,
128,
128,
@ -2007,7 +2061,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256GCM,
SSL_AEAD,
SSL_TLSV1_2,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384,
256,
256,
@ -2360,7 +2414,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_RC4,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_MEDIUM,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@ -2376,7 +2430,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_3DES,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
112,
168,
@ -2392,7 +2446,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES128,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
128,
128,
@ -2408,7 +2462,7 @@ OPENSSL_GLOBAL SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = {
SSL_AES256,
SSL_SHA1,
SSL_TLSV1,
SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_NOT_EXP | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS,
SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF,
256,
256,

View File

@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ extern "C" {
* The following cipher list is used by default. It also is substituted when
* an application-defined cipher list string starts with 'DEFAULT'.
*/
# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!EXPORT:!LOW:!aNULL:!eNULL:!SSLv2"
/*
* As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always
* starts with a reasonable order, and all we have to do for DEFAULT is
@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s);
/* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */
int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2_METHOD
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */
const SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */

View File

@ -235,8 +235,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
* "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
* ALL!)
*/
{0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, ~SSL_SSLV2,
SSL_EXP_MASK, 0, 0, 0},
{0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT, 0, 0, 0},
/*
* key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here
@ -1000,10 +999,6 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->algorithm_ssl,
cp->algo_strength);
#endif
if (algo_strength == SSL_EXP_MASK && SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cp))
goto ok;
if (alg_ssl == ~SSL_SSLV2 && cp->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
goto ok;
if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
continue;
if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
@ -1020,10 +1015,11 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
&& !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
continue;
if ((algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT)
&& !(cp->algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT))
continue;
}
ok:
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule);
#endif
@ -1307,6 +1303,10 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
}
if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_NOT_DEFAULT) {
algo_strength |= SSL_NOT_DEFAULT;
}
if (ca_list[j]->valid) {
/*
* explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not

View File

@ -1896,6 +1896,13 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
/*
* Disable SSLv2 by default, callers that want to enable SSLv2 will have to
* explicitly clear this option via either of SSL_CTX_clear_options() or
* SSL_clear_options().
*/
ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
return (ret);
err:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

View File

@ -435,8 +435,9 @@
# define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000040L
# define SSL_HIGH 0x00000080L
# define SSL_FIPS 0x00000100L
# define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT 0x00000200L
/* we have used 000001ff - 23 bits left to go */
/* we have used 000003ff - 22 bits left to go */
/*-
* Macros to check the export status and cipher strength for export ciphers.

View File

@ -2321,8 +2321,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
if (sdec == NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
@ -2579,6 +2581,8 @@ int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
* plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
*/
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
if (buffer == NULL)
return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */

View File

@ -38,8 +38,12 @@ fi
echo test ssl3 is forbidden in FIPS mode
$ssltest -ssl3 $extra && exit 1
echo test ssl2 is forbidden in FIPS mode
$ssltest -ssl2 $extra && exit 1
if ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ../apps/openssl ciphers SSLv2 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo test ssl2 is forbidden in FIPS mode
$ssltest -ssl2 $extra && exit 1
else
echo ssl2 disabled: skipping test
fi
echo test tls1
$ssltest -tls1 $extra || exit 1

View File

@ -1065,8 +1065,8 @@ d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING 1092 EXIST::FUNCTION:
i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING 1093 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BIO_f_ber 1094 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_init 1095 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_CTX_new 1096 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_CTX_free 1097 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_CTX_new 1096 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
COMP_CTX_free 1097 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
COMP_CTX_compress_block 1098 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_CTX_expand_block 1099 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index 1100 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@ -1113,10 +1113,10 @@ PKCS7_digest_from_attributes 1140 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS7_get_attribute 1141 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial 1142 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS7_get_signed_attribute 1143 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_compress_block 1144 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_expand_block 1145 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_rle 1146 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_zlib 1147 EXIST::FUNCTION:
COMP_compress_block 1144 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
COMP_expand_block 1145 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
COMP_rle 1146 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
COMP_zlib 1147 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
ms_time_diff 1148 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
ms_time_new 1149 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
ms_time_free 1150 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
@ -1807,6 +1807,8 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME_get 2350 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_REQ_digest 2362 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP
X509_CRL_digest 2391 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP
ASN1_STRING_clear_free 2392 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user 2393 EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
SRP_user_pwd_free 2394 EXIST::FUNCTION:SRP
d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7 2397 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_ALGOR_cmp 2398 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length 2399 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@ -1943,7 +1945,7 @@ ENGINE_get_ctrl_function 2521 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
ENGINE_set_ctrl_function 2522 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
BN_pseudo_rand_range 2523 EXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb 2524 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ERR_load_COMP_strings 2525 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ERR_load_COMP_strings 2525 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i 2526 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_UTF8STRING_it 2527 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:
ASN1_UTF8STRING_it 2527 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:
@ -3543,8 +3545,8 @@ X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ 3931 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_TYPE_set1 3932 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_STRING_set0 3933 EXIST::FUNCTION:
i2d_X509_ALGORS 3934 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BIO_f_zlib 3935 EXIST:ZLIB:FUNCTION:
COMP_zlib_cleanup 3936 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BIO_f_zlib 3935 EXIST:ZLIB:FUNCTION:COMP
COMP_zlib_cleanup 3936 EXIST::FUNCTION:COMP
d2i_X509_ALGORS 3937 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CMS_ReceiptRequest_free 3938 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
PEM_write_CMS 3939 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:CMS

View File

@ -281,8 +281,10 @@ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m;
$cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
$cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS" if $no_weak_ssl;
$cflags.=" -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt;
$cflags.=" -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2;
$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_COMP" if $no_comp;
if ($no_static_engine)
{
@ -459,7 +461,7 @@ EX_LIBS=$ex_libs
# The OpenSSL directory
SRC_D=$src_dir
LINK=$link
LINK_CMD=$link
LFLAGS=$lflags
RSC=$rsc
@ -779,6 +781,7 @@ sub var_add
return("") if $no_gost && $dir =~ /\/ccgost/;
return("") if $no_cms && $dir =~ /\/cms/;
return("") if $no_jpake && $dir =~ /\/jpake/;
return("") if $no_comp && $dir =~ /\/comp/;
if ($no_des && $dir =~ /\/des/)
{
if ($val =~ /read_pwd/)
@ -1114,6 +1117,7 @@ sub read_options
"nw-mwasm" => \$nw_mwasm,
"gaswin" => \$gaswin,
"no-ssl2" => \$no_ssl2,
"no-ssl2-method" => 0,
"no-ssl3" => \$no_ssl3,
"no-ssl3-method" => 0,
"no-tlsext" => \$no_tlsext,
@ -1122,6 +1126,7 @@ sub read_options
"no-ec2m" => \$no_ec2m,
"no-jpake" => \$no_jpake,
"no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => 0,
"no-weak-ssl-ciphers" => \$no_weak_ssl,
"no-err" => \$no_err,
"no-sock" => \$no_sock,
"no-krb5" => \$no_krb5,
@ -1154,6 +1159,7 @@ sub read_options
"no-unit-test" => 0,
"no-zlib" => 0,
"no-zlib-dynamic" => 0,
"no-comp" => \$no_comp,
"fips" => \$fips
);
@ -1171,7 +1177,6 @@ sub read_options
}
}
}
elsif (/^no-comp$/) { $xcflags = "-DOPENSSL_NO_COMP $xcflags"; }
elsif (/^enable-zlib$/) { $zlib_opt = 1 if $zlib_opt == 0 }
elsif (/^enable-zlib-dynamic$/)
{

View File

@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ my @known_algorithms = ( "RC2", "RC4", "RC5", "IDEA", "DES", "BF",
"CAPIENG",
# SSL v2
"SSL2",
# SSL v2 method
"SSL2_METHOD",
# SSL v3 method
"SSL3_METHOD",
# JPAKE
@ -143,7 +145,7 @@ my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng;
my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc;
my $no_nextprotoneg; my $no_sctp; my $no_srtp;
my $no_unit_test; my $no_ssl3_method;
my $no_unit_test; my $no_ssl3_method; my $no_ssl2_method;
my $fips;
@ -238,6 +240,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV, split(/ /, $options))
elsif (/^no-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128$/) { $no_nistp_gcc=1; }
elsif (/^no-nextprotoneg$/) { $no_nextprotoneg=1; }
elsif (/^no-ssl2$/) { $no_ssl2=1; }
elsif (/^no-ssl2-method$/) { $no_ssl2_method=1; }
elsif (/^no-ssl3-method$/) { $no_ssl3_method=1; }
elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; }
elsif (/^no-jpake$/) { $no_jpake=1; }
@ -1211,6 +1214,7 @@ sub is_valid
if ($keyword eq "EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128" && $no_nistp_gcc)
{ return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "SSL2" && $no_ssl2) { return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "SSL2_METHOD" && $no_ssl2_method) { return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "SSL3_METHOD" && $no_ssl3_method) { return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "CAPIENG" && $no_capieng) { return 0; }
if ($keyword eq "JPAKE" && $no_jpake) { return 0; }

View File

@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ ___
{
local($ex)=($target =~ /O_SSL/)?' $(L_CRYPTO)':'';
$ex.=' ws2_32.lib gdi32.lib';
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target /def:ms/${Name}.def @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex\n<<\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target /def:ms/${Name}.def @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex\n<<\n";
}
$ret.="\n";
return($ret);
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $files \$(APP_EX_OBJ), $target,, $libs\n\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $files \$(APP_EX_OBJ), $target,, $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}

View File

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}
1;

View File

@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ sub do_lib_rule
{
local($ex)=($target =~ /O_SSL/)?' $(L_CRYPTO)':'';
$ex.=' -lsocket';
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) \$(${Name}OBJ) $ex os2/${Name}.def\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) \$(${Name}OBJ) $ex os2/${Name}.def\n";
$ret.="\temximp -o $out_def/$name.a os2/${Name}.def\n";
$ret.="\temximp -o $out_def/$name.lib os2/${Name}.def\n\n";
}
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(CFLAG) \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(CFLAG) \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}

View File

@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ sub do_lib_rule
if ($fips && $target =~ /O_CRYPTO/)
{
$ret.="$target: $objs \$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)";
$ret.="\n\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
$ret.="\n\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK_CMD)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
$ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)\n";
@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ sub do_lib_rule
else
{
$ret.="$target: $objs";
$ret.="\n\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target $name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex \$(EX_LIBS)\n<<\n";
$ret.="\n\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target $name @<<\n \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex \$(EX_LIBS)\n<<\n";
}
$ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;2\n\n";
}
@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
{
$ret.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj" if $shlib;
$ret.="\n";
$ret.=" \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
$ret.=" \$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n\t";
if ($files =~ /O_FIPSCANISTER/ && !$fipscanisterbuild) {
$ret.= "\$(EX_LIBS) ";
$ret.= "\$(OBJ_D)${o}applink.obj " if $shlib;
@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
elsif ($standalone == 2)
{
$ret.="\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_LINK=\$(LINK_CMD)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC=\$(CC)\n";
$ret.="\tSET FIPS_CC_ARGS=/Fo\$(OBJ_D)${o}fips_premain.obj \$(SHLIB_CFLAGS) -c\n";
$ret.="\tSET PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=\n";
@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
else
{
$ret.="\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
$ret.="\t\$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n";
}
$ret.="\tIF EXIST \$@.manifest mt -nologo -manifest \$@.manifest -outputresource:\$@;1\n\n";

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@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}

View File

@ -506,22 +506,22 @@ sub do_link_rule
if ($gnuc)
{
$ret.="\t\$(MKLIB) $lib_flags \$(TMP_D)${o}\$(E_EXE).a \$(filter-out \$(TMP_D)${o}\$(E_EXE)${obj},$files)\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2\n";
$ret.="\t\@$mv \$(E_EXE)2.nlm \$(TEST_D)\n";
}
else
{
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2 $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target2\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file2 $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target2\n";
}
}
if ($gnuc)
{
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file\n";
$ret.="\t\@$mv \$(\@F) \$(TEST_D)\n";
}
else
{
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) \$(LFLAGS) $def_file $files \"$prelude\" $libs -o $target\n";
}
$ret.="\n";

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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}

View File

@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ sub do_link_rule
$file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
$n=&bname($target);
$ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
$ret.="\t\$(LINK_CMD) ${efile}$target \$(LFLAGS) $files $libs\n\n";
return($ret);
}

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@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms 109 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:
SSLv23_client_method 110 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
SSLv23_method 111 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
SSLv23_server_method 112 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
SSLv2_client_method 113 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
SSLv2_method 114 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
SSLv2_server_method 115 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
SSLv2_client_method 113 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2_METHOD
SSLv2_method 114 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2_METHOD
SSLv2_server_method 115 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2_METHOD
SSLv3_client_method 116 EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL3_METHOD
SSLv3_method 117 EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL3_METHOD
SSLv3_server_method 118 EXIST::FUNCTION:SSL3_METHOD