Prepare for 1.0.1o release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,12 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
+
+  *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+     incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+     restored.
+
  Changes between 1.0.1m and 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015]
 
   *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop

NEWS

@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1n and OpenSSL 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
+
+      o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1m and OpenSSL 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015]
 
       o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.1n 11 Jun 2015
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1o 12 Jun 2015
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

crypto/hmac/hmac.c

@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
             return FIPS_hmac_init_ex(ctx, key, len, md, NULL);
     }
 #endif
+    /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */
+    if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0))
+        return 0;
 
     if (md != NULL) {
         reset = 1;
@@ -97,9 +100,6 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (!ctx->key_init && key == NULL)
-        return 0;
-
     if (key != NULL) {
         reset = 1;
         j = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
         if (ctx->key_length != HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK)
             memset(&ctx->key[ctx->key_length], 0,
                    HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK - ctx->key_length);
-        ctx->key_init = 1;
     }
 
     if (reset) {
@@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
     if (FIPS_mode() && !ctx->i_ctx.engine)
         return FIPS_hmac_update(ctx, data, len);
 #endif
-    if (!ctx->key_init)
+    if (!ctx->md)
         return 0;
 
     return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
@@ -174,7 +173,7 @@ int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len)
         return FIPS_hmac_final(ctx, md, len);
 #endif
 
-    if (!ctx->key_init)
+    if (!ctx->md)
         goto err;
 
     if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i))
@@ -195,7 +194,6 @@ void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx);
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx);
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx);
-    ctx->key_init = 0;
     ctx->md = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -207,11 +205,8 @@ int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dctx, HMAC_CTX *sctx)
         goto err;
     if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&dctx->md_ctx, &sctx->md_ctx))
         goto err;
-    dctx->key_init = sctx->key_init;
-    if (sctx->key_init) {
-        memcpy(dctx->key, sctx->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK);
-        dctx->key_length = sctx->key_length;
-    }
+    memcpy(dctx->key, sctx->key, HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK);
+    dctx->key_length = sctx->key_length;
     dctx->md = sctx->md;
     return 1;
  err:

crypto/hmac/hmac.h

@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ typedef struct hmac_ctx_st {
     EVP_MD_CTX o_ctx;
     unsigned int key_length;
     unsigned char key[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];
-    int key_init;
 } HMAC_CTX;
 
 # define HMAC_size(e)    (EVP_MD_size((e)->md))

crypto/hmac/hmactest.c

@@ -233,7 +233,12 @@ test5:
         err++;
         goto test6;
     }
-    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+    if (HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, NULL, 0, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+        printf("Should disallow changing MD without a new key (test 5)\n");
+        err++;
+        goto test6;
+    }
+    if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, test[4].key, test[4].key_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
         printf("Failed to reinitialise HMAC (test 5)\n");
         err++;
         goto test6;

crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x100010efL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x100010ffL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1n-fips 11 Jun 2015"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1o-fips 12 Jun 2015"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1n 11 Jun 2015"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.1o 12 Jun 2015"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

openssl.spec

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Release: 1
 Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools
 Name: openssl
 #Version: %{libmaj}.%{libmin}.%{librel}
-Version: 1.0.1n
+Version: 1.0.1o
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries

ssl/t1_lib.c

@@ -1016,12 +1016,12 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
 
     s->srtp_profile = NULL;
 
-    if (data >= (d + n - 2)) {
-        if (data != d + n)
-            goto err;
-        else
-            goto ri_check;
-    }
+    if (data == d + n)
+        goto ri_check;
+
+    if (data > (d + n - 2))
+        goto err;
+
     n2s(data, len);
 
     if (data > (d + n - len))