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220 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matt Caswell
cdac2e8928 Prepare for 1.0.0q release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-15 14:56:27 +00:00
Matt Caswell
01fb34ad43 make update
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-15 14:56:27 +00:00
Matt Caswell
08fac3fb6f Updates to CHANGES and NEWS
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-15 13:18:57 +00:00
Richard Levitte
0c8dc6ebe5 Fixup installation script for VMS
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-01-14 19:17:17 +01:00
Richard Levitte
f4f1e80801 VMS fixups for 1.0.0
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-01-14 00:18:23 +01:00
Matt Caswell
36f309c50a Make output from openssl version -f consistent with previous versions
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2d2671790e)
2015-01-13 11:29:21 +00:00
Matt Caswell
94e5cf36bd Fix warning where BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK was being redefined.
This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1ffc6ca1c)
2015-01-13 11:25:55 +00:00
Matt Caswell
23df532ec4 Avoid deprecation problems in Visual Studio 13
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86d21d0b95)
2015-01-13 09:48:38 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b960060a0d Further windows specific .gitignore entries
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41c9cfbc4e)
2015-01-09 23:41:07 +00:00
Matt Caswell
e9cb6eb1d3 Update .gitignore with windows files to be excluded from git
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	.gitignore

(cherry picked from commit 04f670cf3d)
2015-01-09 11:30:50 +00:00
Matt Caswell
181ae2badb Fix build failure on Windows due to undefined cflags identifier
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5c5e7e1a7e)
2015-01-08 19:28:43 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a98051fb47 Prepare for 1.0.0q-dev
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:23:38 +00:00
Matt Caswell
225628f280 Prepare for 1.0.0p release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:21:42 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ca39b261bf make update
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:21:42 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c1beec0e6d CHANGES and NEWS updates for release
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:14:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b095884a58 A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.

Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.

CVE-2015-0206

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 652ff0f4796eecd8729b4690f2076d1c7ccb2862)
2015-01-08 14:14:56 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f7fe3d235a Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix.
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.

If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.

We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:14:56 +00:00
Matt Caswell
b2688c9161 Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 14:14:29 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
bf6fa208b5 Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.

CVE-2014-3571

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 11:25:45 +00:00
Andy Polyakov
eb37b6aa41 Fix for CVE-2014-3570.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-01-08 11:25:45 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f66f76a24a fix error discrepancy
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a4d415857)
2015-01-07 18:11:07 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
65c63da207 use correct credit in CHANGES
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4138e38825)
2015-01-06 22:41:45 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9f028e4a78 use correct function name
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb62ab4b17)
2015-01-06 21:05:07 +00:00
Matt Caswell
64eec8f898 Remove blank line from start of cflags character array in buildinf.h
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b691154e18)
2015-01-06 15:39:32 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
08a88774bd Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc88)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod
2015-01-06 13:18:46 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
802a070bb6 ECDH downgrade bug fix.
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit b15f876964)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
2015-01-05 23:52:28 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
31c65a7bc0 update ordinals
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2015-01-05 16:50:31 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
208a6012be Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.

1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.

If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.

2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.

Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.

3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.

Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.

This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).

CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 684400ce19)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c
2015-01-05 15:06:15 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d7f8a7cafd Constify ASN1_TYPE_cmp add X509_ALGOR_cmp.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4c52816d35)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/x_algor.c
	crypto/x509/x509.h
2015-01-05 14:57:39 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
0f1c30b00d Reject invalid constructed encodings.
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5b5)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
2015-01-05 14:39:07 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c4b969639a Fix a problem if CFLAGS is too long cversion.c fails to compile when config
is run with --strict-warnings.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 488f16e31b)
2014-12-19 14:11:20 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
bfb2e4b280 Return error when a bit string indicates an invalid amount of bits left
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-12-18 15:12:34 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
d8c8a718a2 Revert "RT3425: constant-time evp_enc"
Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.

This reverts commit b55ff319f8.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
2014-12-17 14:56:46 +01:00
Adam Langley
40c2812f56 Premaster secret handling fixes
From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d9f)
2014-12-17 14:04:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2e3e3d278e Add OPENSSL_NO_ECDH guards
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7f9edfd23a)
2014-12-16 10:22:20 +00:00
Matt Caswell
2ececf59de Remove extraneous white space, and add some braces
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55e530265a)
2014-12-16 00:11:02 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a60536348b DTLS fixes for signed/unsigned issues
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1904d21123)
2014-12-16 00:11:02 +00:00
Matt Caswell
9d410579a7 Checkout return value of dtls1_output_cert_chain
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9beb948c0d)
2014-12-15 21:29:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4f90ef0c5b Check return value of ssl3_output_cert_chain
Based on commit 66f96fe2d5 by Steve Henson

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ce5ddefc43)
2014-12-15 21:29:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
eae2bb2f1f Fix memory leak in s2_srvr.c if BUF_MEM_grow fails
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d04a1e0b5b)
2014-12-13 00:06:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c313270836 Fixed memory leak if BUF_MEM_grow fails
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb1ddd3d9a)
2014-12-13 00:06:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
af8a66d10d Fix use of NULL memory pointer in X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new in the event of a
malloc failure.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c6a84ff351)
2014-12-12 23:52:41 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ec5c25b3b4 Fixed memory leak in the event of a failure of BUF_MEM_grow
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41bf250130)
2014-12-08 16:51:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
38afaa48ec Fix memory leak in SSL_new if errors occur.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 76e6509085)
2014-12-08 16:51:01 +00:00
Matt Caswell
954818fe60 Remove incorrect code inadvertently introduced through commit 59669b6ab.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_lib.c
2014-12-04 14:25:09 +00:00
Matt Caswell
027381f68c Remove "#if 0" code
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4bb8eb9ce4)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a900b3b51c Only use the fallback mtu after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions if it is less
than the mtu we are already using

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 047f21593e)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
82d7247fc5 Updates to s_client and s_server to remove the constant 28 (for IPv4 header
and UDP header) when setting an mtu. This constant is not always correct (e.g.
if using IPv6). Use the new DTLS_CTRL functions instead.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 464ce92026)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
ceb4c684e4 If we really get a situation where the underlying mtu is less than the minimum
we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit
fixes that.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d3d9eef316)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
a8da754d84 Fix dtls_query_mtu so that it will always either complete with an mtu that is
at least the minimum or it will fail.
There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up
being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This
shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having
logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum
mtu to use.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1620a2e49c)
2014-12-03 09:43:49 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8ccb44e6f5 Remove instances in libssl of the constant 28 (for size of IPv4 header + UDP)
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some
new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to
know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the
link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous
DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 59669b6abf)

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_both.c
	ssl/ssl.h
	ssl/ssl_lib.c
2014-12-03 09:43:47 +00:00
Matt Caswell
bbfdd1f0c9 There are a number of instances throughout the code where the constant 28 is
used with no explanation. Some of this was introduced as part of RT#1929. The
value 28 is the length of the IP header (20 bytes) plus the UDP header (8
bytes). However use of this constant is incorrect because there may be
instances where a different value is needed, e.g. an IPv4 header is 20 bytes
but an IPv6 header is 40. Similarly you may not be using UDP (e.g. SCTP).
This commit introduces a new BIO_CTRL that provides the value to be used for
this mtu "overhead". It will be used by subsequent commits.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0d3ae34df5)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bio/bio.h
	crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
2014-12-03 09:41:16 +00:00
Matt Caswell
8724f9f9cf The first call to query the mtu in dtls1_do_write correctly checks that the
mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the
minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but
instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we
have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query
checks consistent.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6abb0d1f8e)
2014-12-03 09:38:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
6d41cbb63a The SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU option is supposed to stop the mtu from being
automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead.
Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 001235778a)
2014-12-03 09:38:10 +00:00
Matt Caswell
04a73c844f Verify that we have a sensible message len and fail if not
RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit
replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the
underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This
happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the
MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cf75017bfd)
2014-12-03 09:38:10 +00:00
Richard Levitte
87ff17a05d Check for FindNextFile when defining it rather than FindFirstFile
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-11-28 23:31:53 +01:00
Richard Levitte
d93112abc6 [PR3597] Advance to the next state variant when reusing messages.
Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state
being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A").

This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections
that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because
their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required
for the retry code path.

Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh).

Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-11-28 23:31:53 +01:00
Richard Levitte
875a33d7f7 Correct some layout issues, convert all remaining tabs to appropriate amounts of spaces.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8123d158ab)
2014-11-28 17:04:32 +01:00
Alok Menghrajani
cf48a6d7f6 Improves the proxy certificates howto doc.
The current documentation contains a bunch of spelling and grammar mistakes. I also
found it hard to understand some paragraphs, so here is my attempt to improve its
readability.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 03b637a730)
2014-11-28 17:04:32 +01:00
Matt Caswell
7f3490e685 Fixed warning in ssl2_enc
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2db95e094d)
2014-11-27 21:58:32 +00:00
Matt Caswell
dcf7a2dc4a Check EVP_Cipher return values for SSL2
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5fc8bb6ab7)
2014-11-27 21:58:32 +00:00
Matt Caswell
6ff76b3347 Add checks to the return value of EVP_Cipher to prevent silent encryption failure.
PR#1767

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 244d0955ad)
2014-11-27 21:58:31 +00:00
Matt Caswell
3b12515180 Remove redundant checks in ssl_cert_dup. This was causing spurious error messages when using GOST
PR#3613

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fc3968a25c)
2014-11-27 20:55:52 +00:00
Matt Caswell
4e73dc5b76 Remove duplicated code
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-11-27 14:33:55 +00:00
Matt Caswell
67eb85d7d4 Tidy up ocsp help output
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e31a40f47)

Conflicts:
	apps/ocsp.c

(cherry picked from commit e164582690)
2014-11-27 14:21:42 +00:00
André Guerreiro
915a3b1c21 Add documentation on -timeout option in the ocsp utility
PR#3612

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de87dd46c1)
(cherry picked from commit 4d3df37bc7)
2014-11-27 14:21:42 +00:00
Matt Caswell
e1b1d82aab Fixed memory leak due to incorrect freeing of DTLS reassembly bit mask
PR#3608

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8a35dbb6d8)
2014-11-26 10:18:15 +00:00
Matt Caswell
c25456633c Corrected comments in ssl.h about SSLv23_method and friends
PR#3574

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3a0765882c)
2014-11-25 22:28:42 +00:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aaf9335970 Fix cross reference table generator.
If the hash or public key algorithm is "undef" the signature type
will receive special handling and shouldn't be included in the
cross reference table.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 55f7fb8848)

Conflicts:
	crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
2014-11-13 13:40:41 +00:00
Alok Menghrajani
cee17f96f1 Fixes a minor typo in the EVP docs.
Out is the buffer which needs to contain at least inl + cipher_block_size - 1 bytes. Outl
is just an int*.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5211e094de)
2014-11-12 21:05:44 +00:00
Michal Bozon
bd36615973 Correct timestamp output when clock_precision_digits > 0
PR#3535

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-11-12 20:55:32 +00:00
Matt Caswell
db85611989 Fix free of garbage pointer. PR#3595
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e04d426bf9)
2014-11-12 20:33:24 +00:00
Kurt Roeckx
9e5267fcdd Fix warning about negative unsigned intergers
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2014-11-11 15:48:18 +01:00
Samuel Neves
0d330ce5cc Use only unsigned arithmetic in constant-time operations
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-10-28 20:54:34 +01:00
Bodo Moeller
2a303a5834 Fix and improve SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV documentation.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-21 22:41:07 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
8d81dfd0a6 When processing ClientHello.cipher_suites, don't ignore cipher suites
listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

RT: 3575
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-10-21 22:32:44 +02:00
Kurt Roeckx
69c163ac81 Keep old method in case of an unsupported protocol
When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL.  We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things.  This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d.  Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.

CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a952)
2014-10-21 21:15:58 +02:00
Tim Hudson
b7eaea7397 no-ssl2 with no-ssl3 does not mean drop the ssl lib
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c882abd522)
2014-10-20 15:25:13 +10:00
Andy Polyakov
2d2965d2c1 e_os.h: refine inline override logic (to address warnings in debug build).
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55c7a4cf11)
2014-10-17 11:55:07 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
56cee260d8 e_os.h: allow inline functions to be compiled by legacy compilers.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 40155f4089)
2014-10-17 11:55:02 +02:00
Kurt Cancemi
e2e13b8f3a RT3547: Add missing static qualifier
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 87d388c955)
2014-10-17 11:48:47 +02:00
Matt Caswell
13b2a4d06a Prepare for 1.0.0p-dev
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 13:52:37 +01:00
Matt Caswell
41da9188cc Prepare for 1.0.0o release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 13:52:08 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e9fe4b1033 Updates to NEWS
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:49:50 -04:00
Matt Caswell
6469c947f5 Update to CHANGES file
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:49:50 -04:00
Geoff Thorpe
9bf3ff1ca0 Fix no-ssl3 configuration option
CVE-2014-3568

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:49:50 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
74f77d40a9 Fix for session tickets memory leak.
CVE-2014-3567

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 08:49:50 -04:00
Bodo Moeller
55513f3e48 Fix SSL_R naming inconsistency.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 14:47:17 +02:00
Tim Hudson
c8dd719095 Add constant_time_locl.h to HEADERS,
so the Win32 compile picks it up correctly.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
0bfd0bff17 Add the constant time test to the VMS build and tests
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	test/maketests.com
	test/tests.com
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
eb269523bb Include "constant_time_locl.h" rather than "../constant_time_locl.h".
The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
802feda7fc Spaces were added in some strings for better readability. However, those spaces do not belong in file names, so when picking out the individual parts, remove the spaces
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
cdad6ad015 Adjust VMS build to Unix build. Most of all, make it so the disabled
algorithms MD2 and RC5 don't get built.
Also, disable building the test apps in crypto/des and crypto/pkcs7, as
they have no support at all.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/crypto-lib.com
	makevms.com
	ssl/ssl-lib.com
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
4eca4cfbc8 Make sure test/tests.com exit gracefully, even when openssl.exe wasn't properly built.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 11:32:17 +02:00
Richard Levitte
7e29be228e Make sure that disabling the MAYLOSEDATA3 warning is only done when the compiler supports it. Otherwise, there are warnings about it lacking everywhere, which is quite tedious to read through while trying to check for other warnings.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/ssl-lib.com
2014-10-15 11:32:15 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
8745c0815c Add TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV documentation, and move s_client -fallback_scsv
handling out of #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 section.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 11:14:34 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
68828f167c Oops -- fix typo in coment added with TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openss.org>
2014-10-15 04:25:41 +02:00
Bodo Moeller
59dcfa21e5 Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-10-15 04:05:57 +02:00
Matt Caswell
13f8ddacbe Removed duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_encrypted
Patch supplied by Matthieu Patou <mat@matws.net>, and modified to also
remove duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_digest.

PR#3551

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fdea3e49)
2014-10-06 23:48:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ad8b204386 Add additional DigestInfo checks.
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.

Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-09-29 12:30:47 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
7b7aef9bfd Add missing tests
Accidentally omitted from commit 455b65dfab

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdc35a9d3e)
2014-09-25 13:47:42 +02:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
93540299fe Use correct function name: CMS_add1_signer()
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5886354dcc)
2014-09-25 00:07:26 +01:00
Andy Polyakov
1db72876dc crypto/bn/bn_nist.c: work around MSC ARM compiler bug.
RT: 3541
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b07c005fe)
2014-09-25 00:48:40 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
b55ff319f8 RT3425: constant-time evp_enc
Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to
avoid a timing leak from padding failure.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aac102f75)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

(cherry picked from commit 738911cde6)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
2014-09-24 16:29:02 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
9a6940a349 RT3067: simplify patch
(Original commit adb46dbc6d)

Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab)

Conflicts:
	ssl/Makefile
2014-09-24 15:58:20 +02:00
Adam Langley
c36ceb0b15 This change alters the processing of invalid, RSA pre-master secrets so
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.

(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6d)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
2014-09-24 15:56:09 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
904fcce0c6 RT3066: rewrite RSA padding checks to be slightly more constant time.
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1

This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
2014-09-24 14:35:03 +02:00
Tim Hudson
2518a35a51 Fixed error introduced in commit f2be92b94d
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit

Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff9)
2014-09-22 06:32:42 +10:00
Adam Langley
442ca2bd00 psk_client_callback, 128-byte id bug.
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.

OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.

This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.

(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d851732)
2014-09-05 12:25:20 +02:00
Adam Langley
09e62af4d4 Ensure that x**0 mod 1 = 0.
(cherry picked from commit 2b0180c37f)

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
2014-09-04 16:07:16 +02:00
Richard Levitte
88f0c9797e Followup on RT3334 fix: make sure that a directory that's the empty
string returns 0 with errno = ENOENT.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 360928b7d0)
2014-09-03 22:26:19 +02:00
Phil Mesnier
74f5307d57 RT3334: Fix crypto/LPdir_win.c
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6a14fe7576)
2014-09-03 22:26:19 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
da8dd611ae Make the inline const-time functions static.
"inline" without static is not correct as the compiler may choose to ignore it
and will then either emit an external definition, or expect one.

Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86f50b36e6)
2014-09-02 15:25:04 +02:00
Andy Polyakov
43711a589b md5-x86_64.pl: work around warning.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4d86e8df6b)
2014-08-30 19:19:47 +02:00
Rich Salz
bf63eab048 Add tags/TAGS
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d6253cfd3)
2014-08-30 10:09:44 -04:00
Rich Salz
62ca466a54 RT2379: Bug in BIO_set_accept_port.pod
The doc says that port can be "*" to mean any port.
That's wrong.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07e3b31fae)
2014-08-29 16:46:44 -04:00
Matt Caswell
17d3b1ecea Fixed double inclusion of string.h
PR2693

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5d33b70ef5a4768fdfb77a73f9817c4570613039)
2014-08-29 21:38:03 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
73729e4cf3 Constant-time utilities
Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e7169a5835)

Conflicts:
	ssl/Makefile
	test/Makefile
2014-08-28 17:18:01 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
05f61fb27e Explicitly check for empty ASN.1 strings in d2i_ECPrivateKey
The old code implicitly relies on the ASN.1 code returning a \0-prefixed buffer
when the buffer length is 0. Change this to verify explicitly that the ASN.1 string
has positive length.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82dc08de54ce443c2a9ac478faffe79e76157795)
2014-08-27 19:42:31 +02:00
Matt Caswell
10be715b95 RT3065: automatically generate a missing EC public key
When d2i_ECPrivateKey reads a private key with a missing (optional) public key,
generate one automatically from the group and private key.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed383f847156940e93f256fed78599873a4a9b28)

Conflicts:
	doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod
2014-08-27 19:42:24 +02:00
Adam Langley
e87a4a7011 RT3065: ec_private_key_dont_crash
This change saves several EC routines from crashing when an EC_KEY is
missing a public key. The public key is optional in the EC private key
format and, without this patch, running the following through `openssl
ec` causes a crash:

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MBkCAQEECAECAwQFBgcIoAoGCCqGSM49AwEH
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b391570bdeb386d4fd325917c248d593d3c43930)
2014-08-27 19:42:09 +02:00
Mihai Militaru
f2a57c101f RT2210: Add missing EVP_cleanup to example
I also removed some trailing whitespace and cleaned
up the "see also" list.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3e11c544)
2014-08-27 13:27:24 -04:00
David Gatwood
b88ffa2bce RT1744: SSL_CTX_set_dump_dh() doc feedback
The description of when the server creates a DH key is
confusing.  This cleans it up.
(rsalz: also removed trailing whitespace.)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
2014-08-26 13:40:16 -04:00
Jan Schaumann
27b0494153 RT1804: fix EXAMPLE in EVP_EncryptInit.pod
The EXAMPLE that used FILE and RC2 doesn't compile due to a
few minor errors.  Tweak to use IDEA and AES-128. Remove
examples about RC2 and RC5.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-25 10:27:20 -04:00
Matt Caswell
d38dcafe95 Typo fixes to evp documentation.
This patch was submitted by user "Kox" via the wiki

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2dd8cb3b95)
2014-08-24 21:27:11 +01:00
Adam Langley
b0873dbb44 RT3060: Limit the number of empty records.
Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.

Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3aac17a82f)
2014-08-22 15:53:26 +02:00
Adam Langley
48ae65be09 RT3061: Don't SEGFAULT when trying to export a public DSA key as a private key.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e19c93811f)
2014-08-22 15:25:30 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
dd5d7447c1 Improve EVP_PKEY_sign documentation
Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a20)
2014-08-22 15:06:26 +02:00
Emilia Kasper
4ff9cbe635 define inline for Visual Studio
In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a73)
2014-08-21 16:08:05 +02:00
Adam Langley
e164b34079 Add volatile qualifications to two blocks of inline asm to stop GCC from
eliminating them as dead code.

Both volatile and "memory" are used because of some concern that the compiler
may still cache values across the asm block without it, and because this was
such a painful debugging session that I wanted to ensure that it's never
repeated.

(cherry picked from commit 7753a3a684)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a90b1e32d2)
2014-08-19 17:11:14 +02:00
Matt Caswell
679d0c8655 Fixed out-of-bounds read errors in ssl3_get_key_exchange.
PR#3450

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-15 23:30:11 +01:00
Bodo Moeller
1d5e58b53c Further improve/fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (ecp_smpl.c) and
group_order_tests (ectest.c).  Also fix the EC_POINTs_mul documentation (ec.h).

Reviewed-by: emilia@openssl.org

Conflicts:
	crypto/ec/ectest.c
2014-08-13 17:56:18 +02:00
Matt Caswell
118149887b Prepare for 1.0.0o-dev
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 22:25:27 +01:00
Matt Caswell
bb505311c6 Prepare for 1.0.0n release
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 22:24:50 +01:00
Matt Caswell
f5fc85d382 make update
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 22:24:50 +01:00
Matt Caswell
6e4929fcdb Updates to CHANGES and NEWS
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:34:00 +01:00
Gabor Tyukasz
03a12c1330 Fix race condition in ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext
CVE-2014-3509
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Emilia Kasper
57b0c4697a Fix OID handling:
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.

CVE-2014-3508

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Emilia Käsper
9fd3555305 Fix DTLS anonymous EC(DH) denial of service
CVE-2014-3510

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
David Benjamin
67e53f73bf Fix protocol downgrade bug in case of fragmented packets
CVE-2014-3511

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Adam Langley
2281d10a7b Remove some duplicate DTLS code.
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.

Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e5861c885f Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.
Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Adam Langley
60be115771 Fix return code for truncated DTLS fragment.
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.

I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Adam Langley
5ee775a4a5 Fix memory leak from zero-length DTLS fragments.
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.

This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.

Fixes CVE-2014-3507

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
934ca0714a Fix DTLS handshake message size checks.
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.

In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.

Fixes CVE-2014-3506

Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Matt Caswell
ad007e0aaf Added comment for the frag->reassembly == NULL case as per feedback from Emilia
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Adam Langley
84361b898d Avoid double free when processing DTLS packets.
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.

Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).

Fixes CVE-2014-3505

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:30:39 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1a80d39021 Fix warnings about ignored return values.
(cherry picked from commit 27131fe8f7)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
2014-08-06 21:04:08 +01:00
Bodo Moeller
c5526a16b1 Simplify and fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine
(which didn't always handle value 0 correctly).

Reviewed-by: emilia@openssl.org

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	crypto/ec/ectest.c
2014-08-01 17:58:26 +02:00
Billy Brumley
b6b9670017 "EC_POINT_invert" was checking "dbl" function pointer instead of "invert".
PR#2569

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cba11f57ce)
2014-07-21 22:29:12 +01:00
Tim Hudson
469665f658 Remove old unused and unmaintained demonstration code.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 62352b8138)
2014-07-22 07:26:15 +10:00
Tim Hudson
c4eb02bcaa Minor documentation update removing "really" and a
statement of opinion rather than a fact.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8d133e4b6)
2014-07-21 20:24:13 +10:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
97f336f25d Fix documentation for RSA_set_method(3)
PR#1675
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 197400c3f0d617d71ad8167b52fb73046d334320)
2014-07-19 18:26:31 +01:00
Jeffrey Walton
5e05728ace Fix typo, add reference.
PR#3456
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d48e78f0cf)
2014-07-17 12:09:02 +01:00
Matt Caswell
061a5bdba2 Add Matt Caswell's fingerprint, and general update on the fingerprints file to bring it up to date
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3bd548192a)
2014-07-15 23:24:48 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e6ed83fb74 Clarify -Verify and PSK.
PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit ca2015a617)
2014-07-15 20:23:41 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c3f2fc419b Fix DTLS certificate requesting code.
Use same logic when determining when to expect a client
certificate for both TLS and DTLS.

PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit c8d710dc5f)
2014-07-15 18:23:52 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ec9cb40da5 Add ECC extensions with DTLS.
PR#3449
(cherry picked from commit 2054eb771e)
2014-07-15 12:29:20 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ed1de3810d Don't allow -www etc options with DTLS.
The options which emulate a web server don't make sense when doing DTLS.
Exit with an error if an attempt is made to use them.

PR#3453
(cherry picked from commit 58a2aaeade8bdecd0f9f0df41927f7cff3012547)
2014-07-15 12:27:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
df35da266d Use case insensitive compare for servername.
PR#3445
(cherry picked from commit 1c3e9a7c67)
2014-07-15 00:00:14 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
26d60e29e3 Use more common name for GOST key exchange.
(cherry picked from commit 7aabd9c92fe6f0ea2a82869e5171dcc4518cee85)
2014-07-14 18:31:54 +01:00
Matt Caswell
5a0df377ac Fixed valgrind complaint due to BN_consttime_swap reading uninitialised data.
This is actually ok for this function, but initialised to zero anyway if
PURIFY defined.

This does have the impact of masking any *real* unitialised data reads in bn though.

Patch based on approach suggested by Rich Salz.

PR#3415

(cherry picked from commit 77747e2d9a5573b1dbc15e247ce18c03374c760c)
2014-07-13 22:25:53 +01:00
Peter Mosmans
f7123634a5 Add names of GOST algorithms.
PR#3440
(cherry picked from commit 924e5eda2c)

Conflicts:

	ssl/ssl_ciph.c
2014-07-13 18:35:14 +01:00
Richard Levitte
7aeb3d7937 * crypto/ui/ui_lib.c: misplaced brace in switch statement.
Detected by dcruette@qualitesys.com

(cherry picked from commit 8b5dd34091)
2014-07-13 19:16:06 +02:00
Matt Caswell
182f1ad8a1 Fix memory leak in BIO_free if there is no destroy function.
Based on an original patch by Neitrino Photonov <neitrinoph@gmail.com>

PR#3439

(cherry picked from commit 66816c53be)
2014-07-09 23:37:04 +01:00
David Lloyd
0819130188 Prevent infinite loop loading config files.
PR#2985
(cherry picked from commit 9d23f422a3)
2014-07-07 13:50:52 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
3fe4fc4774 Usage for -hack and -prexit -verify_return_error
(cherry picked from commit a07f514fc0)
2014-07-06 22:59:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1326733457 Document certificate status request options.
Conflicts:

	doc/apps/s_client.pod
	doc/apps/s_server.pod
(cherry picked from commit b197c770a6)
2014-07-06 22:59:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
d8426e6b7d s_server usage for certificate status requests 2014-07-06 22:58:58 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aa90ff7d8e Update ticket callback docs.
(cherry picked from commit a23a6e85d8)
2014-07-06 12:42:58 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
aeae79951c Sanity check keylength in PVK files.
PR#2277
(cherry picked from commit 733a6c882e92f8221bd03a51643bb47f5f81bb81)
2014-07-06 00:36:10 +01:00
Matt Caswell
cf3792b3e4 Fixed error in pod files with latest versions of pod2man
(cherry picked from commit 07255f0a76d9d349d915e14f969b9ff2ee0d1953)
2014-07-06 00:05:01 +01:00
Alan Hryngle
e6b98d5a40 Return smaller of ret and f.
PR#3418.
(cherry picked from commit fdea4fff8f)
2014-07-05 22:38:56 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
4054d95eb9 Don't limit message sizes in ssl3_get_cert_verify.
PR#319 (reoponed version).
(cherry picked from commit 7f6e957864)

Conflicts:

	ssl/s3_srvr.c
2014-07-05 13:31:53 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
a05e954b66 Add license info.
(cherry picked from commit 55707a36cc)
2014-07-04 18:44:24 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ca4a339eeb typo
(cherry picked from commit 2cfbec1cae)
(cherry picked from commit a9661e45ac)
2014-07-04 18:44:18 +01:00
Rich Salz
835e32f9f6 Merge branch 'rsalz-docfixes' 2014-07-03 12:50:06 -04:00
Rich Salz
23396f5500 Close 3170, remove reference to Ariel Glenn's old 0.9.8 doc
(cherry picked from commit f1112985e8)
2014-07-03 12:44:41 -04:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1c9b82a91f update release notes 2014-07-02 18:31:56 +01:00
Matt Smart
99657430c0 Fix doc typo.
ERR_get_error(3) references the non-existent
ERR_get_last_error_line_data instead of the one that does exist,
ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.

PR#3283
(cherry picked from commit 5cc99c6cf5)
2014-07-02 03:45:14 +01:00
Thijs Alkemade
ce20ac72b4 Make disabling last cipher work.
(cherry picked from commit 7cb472bd0d)
2014-07-02 03:33:12 +01:00
Geoff Thorpe
525b6c7585 util/mkerr.pl: fix perl warning
Gets rid of this;

defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 792.
        (Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)
defined(@array) is deprecated at ../util/mkerr.pl line 800.
        (Maybe you should just omit the defined()?)

Signed-off-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 647f360e2e)
2014-07-02 01:50:58 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
29ed482ffc ASN1 sanity check.
Primitive encodings shouldn't use indefinite length constructed
form.

PR#2438 (partial).
(cherry picked from commit 398e99fe5e)
2014-07-02 01:01:41 +01:00
Jeffrey Walton
b38db8803f Clarified that the signature's buffer size, s, is not used as an
IN parameter.

Under the old docs, the only thing stated was "at most
EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes will be written". It was kind of misleading
since it appears EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) WILL be written regardless of the
signature's buffer size.

(cherry picked from commit 6e6ba36d98)
2014-06-29 23:37:12 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
59899c4d1b Fix memory leak.
PR#2531.
2014-06-29 13:53:06 +01:00
Ken Ballou
eec4cc8878 Typo.
PR#3173
(cherry picked from commit 76ed5a42ea)
2014-06-29 13:39:28 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2e7124497d Show errors on CSR verification failure.
If CSR verify fails in ca utility print out error messages.
Otherwise some errors give misleading output: for example
if the key size exceeds the library limit.

PR#2875
(cherry picked from commit a30bdb55d1)
2014-06-29 13:35:01 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
c0eae35b3d Make no-ssl3 no-ssl2 do more sensible things.
(cherry picked from commit 7ae6a4b659)
2014-06-29 03:05:54 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
50c9141d00 Typo.
PR#3107
(cherry picked from commit 7c206db928)
2014-06-28 12:43:36 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
2617a3c44d Don't disable state strings with no-ssl2
Some state strings were erronously not compiled when no-ssl2
was set.

PR#3295
(cherry picked from commit 0518a3e19e)
2014-06-28 00:56:59 +01:00
Andreas Westfeld
a7da2b8e17 Fix typo in ideatest.c
(cherry picked from commit d1d4382dcb)
2014-06-28 00:06:47 +01:00
Ken Ballou
e617a506ff Remove redundant check.
PR#3174
(cherry picked from commit fd331c0bb9b557903dd2ce88398570a3327b5ef0)
2014-06-27 23:18:25 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
80640bf0bc Fix for EVP_PBE_alg_add().
In EVP_PBE_alg_add don't use the underlying NID for the cipher
as it may have a non-standard key size.

PR#3206
(cherry picked from commit efb7caef637a1de8468ca109efd355a9d0e73a45)
2014-06-27 22:59:13 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f05bce4f2f Tolerate critical AKID in CRLs.
PR#3014
(cherry picked from commit 11da66f8b1)
2014-06-27 18:50:45 +01:00
Tom Greenslade
5cd3ae9f18 Handle IPv6 addresses in OCSP_parse_url.
PR#2783
(cherry picked from commit b36f35cda9)
2014-06-27 17:31:50 +01:00
Tomas Mraz
d9d5a12823 Don't advertise ECC ciphersuits in SSLv2 compatible client hello.
PR#3374
(cherry picked from commit 0436369fcc)
2014-06-27 16:52:10 +01:00
Jeffrey Walton
06f3746c62 Clarify docs.
Document that the certificate passed to SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert()
should not be freed by the application.

PR#3409
(cherry picked from commit 0535c2d67c)

Add restrictions section present in other branches.

Conflicts:

	doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert.pod
(cherry picked from commit 86cac6d3b2)
2014-06-27 16:42:42 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
14247e4f59 Memory leak and NULL dereference fixes.
PR#3403
(cherry picked from commit d2aea03829)
2014-06-27 14:53:21 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
72bc04942a Remove ancient obsolete files under pkcs7.
(cherry picked from commit 7be6b27aaf)
2014-06-27 13:56:53 +01:00
Huzaifa Sidhpurwala
8e28ef0d85 Make sure BN_sqr can never return a negative value.
PR#3410
(cherry picked from commit e14e764c0d5d469da63d0819c6ffc0e1e9e7f0bb)
2014-06-26 23:50:52 +01:00
Jenny Yung
996edff7e1 Memory allocation checks.
PR#3399.
(cherry picked from commit da0d5e78bc)
2014-06-26 23:33:05 +01:00
Miod Vallat
532ee6e056 Fix off-by-one errors in ssl_cipher_get_evp()
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.

Bug discovered and fixed by Miod Vallat from the OpenBSD team.

PR#3375
2014-06-22 23:22:49 +01:00
Matt Caswell
08db2cc9c1 Revert "Fix off-by-one errors in ssl_cipher_get_evp()"
This reverts commit 7e98378d15.

Incorrect attribution.
2014-06-22 23:22:33 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
f25e4263fe Accept CCS after sending finished.
Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point
keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from
server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail.

PR#3400
(cherry picked from commit 99cd6a91fcb0931feaebbb4832681d40a66fad41)
2014-06-14 22:26:31 +01:00
Matt Caswell
2dc967ddd0 Fixed incorrect return code handling in ssl3_final_finish_mac.
Based on an original patch by Joel Sing (OpenBSD) who also originally identified the issue.
2014-06-13 15:56:19 +01:00
Matt Caswell
a357acdd3b Revert "Fixed incorrect return code handling in ssl3_final_finish_mac"
This reverts commit e05282f8b0.

Missing attribution.
2014-06-13 15:55:57 +01:00
Kurt Cancemi
7e98378d15 Fix off-by-one errors in ssl_cipher_get_evp()
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays.

PR#3375
2014-06-12 21:17:30 +01:00
Ben Laurie
d663f506dc Allow the maximum value.
(Backported as a result of PR#3377 reported by Rainer Jung <rainer.jung@kippdata.de>)
2014-06-12 20:48:40 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
ead6774804 Fix compilation with no-comp
(cherry picked from commit 7239a09c7b5757ed8d0e9869f3e9b03c0e11f4d1)
2014-06-11 14:33:47 +01:00
Matt Caswell
e05282f8b0 Fixed incorrect return code handling in ssl3_final_finish_mac 2014-06-10 23:29:53 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
34b087c9d0 Fix null pointer errors.
PR#3394
(cherry picked from commit 7a9d59c148)
2014-06-10 14:48:12 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
9f81028969 Update strength_bits for 3DES.
Fix strength_bits to 112 for 3DES.
2014-06-09 12:09:47 +01:00
Jakub Wilk
8781538f41 Create ~/.rnd with mode 0600 instead of 0666
Because of a missing include <fcntl.h> we don't have O_CREATE and don't create
the file with open() using mode 0600 but fall back to using fopen() with the
default umask followed by a chmod().

Problem found by Jakub Wilk <jwilk@debian.org>.
2014-06-08 21:29:23 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
8343fdc3c7 update NEWS 2014-06-07 18:19:13 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e966578d2f Make tls_session_secret_cb work with CVE-2014-0224 fix.
If application uses tls_session_secret_cb for session resumption
set the CCS_OK flag.
(cherry picked from commit 953c592572e8811b7956cc09fbd8e98037068b58)
2014-06-07 15:27:21 +01:00
Matt Caswell
7bab3c16ff Fixed minor duplication in docs 2014-06-07 12:32:30 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
e2d569973c Correct wording for website scripts. 2014-06-06 13:26:03 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
caff6fc593 Add known issue. 2014-06-06 12:31:14 +01:00
Matt Caswell
ccb0398da6 Fixed Windows compilation failure 2014-06-05 20:24:36 +01:00
Dr. Stephen Henson
1f163fce81 Prepare for 1.0.0n-dev 2014-06-05 10:43:52 +01:00
239 changed files with 3807 additions and 5547 deletions

32
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# Object files
*.o
*.obj
# editor artefacts
*.swp
@@ -47,6 +48,21 @@
*.s
!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2.s
!/crypto/bn/asm/pa-risc2W.s
crypto/aes/asm/a_win32.asm
crypto/bf/asm/b_win32.asm
crypto/bn/asm/bn_win32.asm
crypto/bn/asm/co_win32.asm
crypto/bn/asm/mt_win32.asm
crypto/cast/asm/c_win32.asm
crypto/cpu_win32.asm
crypto/des/asm/d_win32.asm
crypto/des/asm/y_win32.asm
crypto/md5/asm/m5_win32.asm
crypto/rc4/asm/r4_win32.asm
crypto/rc5/asm/r5_win32.asm
crypto/ripemd/asm/rm_win32.asm
crypto/sha/asm/s1_win32.asm
crypto/sha/asm/sha512-sse2.asm
# Executables
/apps/openssl
@@ -75,3 +91,19 @@
lib
Makefile.save
*.bak
tags
TAGS
# Windows
/tmp32dll
/tmp32dll.dbg
/out32dll
/out32dll.dbg
/inc32
/MINFO
ms/bcb.mak
ms/libeay32.def
ms/nt.mak
ms/ntdll.mak
ms/ssleay32.def
ms/version32.rc

199
CHANGES
View File

@@ -2,6 +2,205 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.0p and 1.0.0q [15 Jan 2015]
*) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
[Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte]
Changes between 1.0.0o and 1.0.0p [8 Jan 2015]
*) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2014-3571)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0206)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2014-3569)
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
ECDH ciphersuites.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
reporting this issue.
(CVE-2014-3572)
[Steve Henson]
*) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
INRIA or reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
[Steve Henson]
*) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
this issue.
(CVE-2015-0205)
[Steve Henson]
*) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
the OpenSSL core team.
(CVE-2014-3570)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
of the OpenSSL core team.
(CVE-2014-8275)
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0n and 1.0.0o [15 Oct 2014]
*) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
attack.
(CVE-2014-3567)
[Steve Henson]
*) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
configured to send them.
(CVE-2014-3568)
[Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
*) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
Client applications doing fallback retries should call
SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
(CVE-2014-3566)
[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
*) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.0m and 1.0.0n [6 Aug 2014]
*) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3510)
[Emilia K<>sper]
*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3507)
[Adam Langley]
*) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-3506)
[Adam Langley]
*) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
this issue.
(CVE-2014-3505)
[Adam Langley]
*) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3509)
[Gabor Tyukasz]
*) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
output to the attacker.
Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
(CVE-2014-3508)
[Emilia K<>sper, and Steve Henson]
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
[Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 1.0.0l and 1.0.0m [5 Jun 2014]
*) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted

5
FAQ
View File

@@ -113,11 +113,6 @@ that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using. The pod format
documentation is included in each OpenSSL distribution under the docs
directory.
For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
predecessor, at <URL: http://www.columbia.edu/~ariel/ssleay/>. Much
of this still applies to OpenSSL.
There is some documentation about certificate extensions and PKCS#12
in doc/openssl.txt

39
NEWS
View File

@@ -5,10 +5,49 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0p and OpenSSL 1.0.0q [15 Jan 2015]
o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0o and OpenSSL 1.0.0p [8 Jan 2015]
o Fix for CVE-2014-3571
o Fix for CVE-2015-0206
o Fix for CVE-2014-3569
o Fix for CVE-2014-3572
o Fix for CVE-2015-0204
o Fix for CVE-2015-0205
o Fix for CVE-2014-8275
o Fix for CVE-2014-3570
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0n and OpenSSL 1.0.0o [15 Oct 2014]
o Fix for CVE-2014-3513
o Fix for CVE-2014-3567
o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability)
o Fix for CVE-2014-3568
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0m and OpenSSL 1.0.0n [6 Aug 2014]
o Fix for CVE-2014-3510
o Fix for CVE-2014-3507
o Fix for CVE-2014-3506
o Fix for CVE-2014-3505
o Fix for CVE-2014-3509
o Fix for CVE-2014-3508
Known issues in OpenSSL 1.0.0m:
o EAP-FAST and other applications using tls_session_secret_cb
wont resume sessions. Fixed in 1.0.0n-dev
o Compilation failure of s3_pkt.c on some platforms due to missing
<limits.h> include. Fixed in 1.0.0n-dev
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0l and OpenSSL 1.0.0m [5 Jun 2014]
o Fix for CVE-2014-0224
o Fix for CVE-2014-0221
o Fix for CVE-2014-0198
o Fix for CVE-2014-0195
o Fix for CVE-2014-3470
o Fix for CVE-2014-0076

2
README
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.0m 5 Jun 2014
OpenSSL 1.0.0q 15 Jan 2015
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

View File

@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@ int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[])
{
arg->count=20;
arg->data=(char **)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(char *)*arg->count);
if (arg->data == NULL)
return 0;
}
for (i=0; i<arg->count; i++)
arg->data[i]=NULL;
@@ -1542,6 +1544,8 @@ char *make_config_name()
len=strlen(t)+strlen(OPENSSL_CONF)+2;
p=OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (p == NULL)
return NULL;
BUF_strlcpy(p,t,len);
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
BUF_strlcat(p,"/",len);

View File

@@ -1599,12 +1599,14 @@ static int certify(X509 **xret, char *infile, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *x509,
{
ok=0;
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature verification problems....\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
ok=0;
BIO_printf(bio_err,"Signature did not match the certificate request\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto err;
}
else
@@ -2752,6 +2754,9 @@ char *make_revocation_str(int rev_type, char *rev_arg)
revtm = X509_gmtime_adj(NULL, 0);
if (!revtm)
return NULL;
i = revtm->length + 1;
if (reason) i += strlen(reason) + 1;

View File

@@ -96,13 +96,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char buf[512];
BIO *STDout=NULL;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
meth=SSLv23_server_method();
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
meth=SSLv3_server_method();
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
meth=SSLv2_server_method();
#endif
apps_startup();

View File

@@ -141,7 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
if(!certflst) certflst = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv));
if (!certflst)
goto end;
if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(certflst,*(++argv)))
{
sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(certflst);
goto end;
}
}
else
{

View File

@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
#include <openssl/comp.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
int set_hex(char *in,unsigned char *out,int size);

View File

@@ -773,9 +773,12 @@ $ CCDEFS = "MONOLITH"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
$ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. ""
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ ENDIF
$!
$! Check To See If We Have A ZLIB Option.
$!
@@ -1064,6 +1067,18 @@ $! Finish up the definition of CC.
$!
$ IF COMPILER .EQS. "DECC"
$ THEN
$! Not all compiler versions support MAYLOSEDATA3.
$ OPT_TEST = "MAYLOSEDATA3"
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$ERROR NL:
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$OUTPUT NL:
$ 'CC' /NOCROSS_REFERENCE /NOLIST /NOOBJECT -
/WARNINGS = DISABLE = ('OPT_TEST', EMPTYFILE) NL:
$ IF ($SEVERITY)
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ OPT_TEST
$ ENDIF
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. ""
$ THEN
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = " /WARNING=(DISABLE=(" + CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "))"

View File

@@ -583,51 +583,52 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf (bio_err, "OCSP utility\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "Usage ocsp [options]\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "where options are\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-out file output filename\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-issuer file issuer certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-cert file certificate to check\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-serial n serial number to check\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file certificate to sign OCSP request with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signkey file private key to sign OCSP request with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-sign_other file additional certificates to include in signed request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_certs don't include any certificates in signed request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-req_text print text form of request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_text print text form of response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text print text form of request and response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqout file write DER encoded OCSP request to \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respout file write DER encoded OCSP reponse to \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqin file read DER encoded OCSP request from \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respin file read DER encoded OCSP reponse from \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nonce add OCSP nonce to request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_nonce don't add OCSP nonce to request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-url URL OCSP responder URL\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-host host:n send OCSP request to host on port n\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path path to use in OCSP request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-status_age n maximum status age in seconds\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-noverify don't verify response at all\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-verify_other file additional certificates to search for signer\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trust_other don't verify additional certificates\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_intern don't search certificates contained in response for signer\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-out file output filename\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-issuer file issuer certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-cert file certificate to check\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-serial n serial number to check\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file certificate to sign OCSP request with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signkey file private key to sign OCSP request with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-sign_other file additional certificates to include in signed request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_certs don't include any certificates in signed request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-req_text print text form of request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_text print text form of response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-text print text form of request and response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqout file write DER encoded OCSP request to \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respout file write DER encoded OCSP reponse to \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-reqin file read DER encoded OCSP request from \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-respin file read DER encoded OCSP reponse from \"file\"\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nonce add OCSP nonce to request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_nonce don't add OCSP nonce to request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-url URL OCSP responder URL\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-host host:n send OCSP request to host on port n\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-path path to use in OCSP request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CApath dir trusted certificates directory\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CAfile file trusted certificates file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-VAfile file validator certificates file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-validity_period n maximum validity discrepancy in seconds\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-status_age n maximum status age in seconds\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-noverify don't verify response at all\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-verify_other file additional certificates to search for signer\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-trust_other don't verify additional certificates\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_intern don't search certificates contained in response for signer\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_signature_verify don't check signature on response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_verify don't check signing certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_chain don't chain verify response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_checks don't do additional checks on signing certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-port num port to run responder on\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-index file certificate status index file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CA file CA certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rsigner file responder certificate to sign responses with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rkey file responder key to sign responses with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rother file other certificates to include in response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_no_certs don't include any certificates in response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nmin n number of minutes before next update\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-ndays n number of days before next update\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_key_id identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nrequest n number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg> use specified digest in the request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_verify don't check signing certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_chain don't chain verify response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-no_cert_checks don't do additional checks on signing certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-port num port to run responder on\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-index file certificate status index file\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-CA file CA certificate\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rsigner file responder certificate to sign responses with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rkey file responder key to sign responses with\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-rother file other certificates to include in response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_no_certs don't include any certificates in response\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nmin n number of minutes before next update\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-ndays n number of days before next update\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-resp_key_id identify reponse by signing certificate key ID\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-nrequest n number of requests to accept (default unlimited)\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-<dgst alg> use specified digest in the request\n");
BIO_printf (bio_err, "-timeout n timeout connection to OCSP responder after n seconds\n");
goto end;
}
@@ -1419,7 +1420,7 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *process_responder(BIO *err, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
}
resp = query_responder(err, cbio, path, headers, req, req_timeout);
if (!resp)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responsder\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error querying OCSP responder\n");
end:
if (cbio)
BIO_free_all(cbio);

View File

@@ -106,16 +106,16 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"gendsa",gendsa_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"genpkey",genpkey_main},
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_server",s_server_main},
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_client",s_client_main},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SPEED
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"speed",speed_main},
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"s_time",s_time_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"version",version_main},
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ FUNCTION functions[] = {
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"crl2pkcs7",crl2pkcs7_main},
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"sess_id",sess_id_main},
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"ciphers",ciphers_main},
#endif
{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,"nseq",nseq_main},

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV)
push(@files,$_);
$str="\t{FUNC_TYPE_GENERAL,\"$_\",${_}_main},\n";
if (($_ =~ /^s_/) || ($_ =~ /^ciphers$/))
{ print "#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && !(defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3))\n${str}#endif\n"; }
{ print "#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK)\n${str}#endif\n"; }
elsif ( ($_ =~ /^speed$/))
{ print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SPEED\n${str}#endif\n"; }
elsif ( ($_ =~ /^engine$/))

View File

@@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -connect host:port - who to connect to (default is %s:%s)\n",SSL_HOST_NAME,PORT_STR);
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert arg - certificate file to use, PEM format assumed\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -certform arg - certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -key arg - Private key file to use, in cert file if\n");
@@ -294,6 +295,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -reconnect - Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -pause - sleep(1) after each read(2) and write(2) system call\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -prexit - print session information even on connection failure\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -showcerts - show all certificates in the chain\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -debug - extra output\n");
#ifdef WATT32
@@ -320,6 +322,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -ssl3 - just use SSLv3\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
@@ -434,6 +437,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char *sess_out = NULL;
struct sockaddr peer;
int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
int fallback_scsv = 0;
int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
long socket_mtu = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
@@ -608,6 +612,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
}
#endif
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
{
fallback_scsv = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
bugs=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
@@ -933,6 +941,10 @@ bad:
SSL_set_session(con, sess);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
}
if (fallback_scsv)
SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (servername != NULL)
{
@@ -1006,10 +1018,22 @@ re_start:
BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
}
if (socket_mtu > 28)
if (socket_mtu)
{
if(socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
BIO_free(sbio);
goto shut;
}
SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
SSL_set_mtu(con, socket_mtu - 28);
if(!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
BIO_free(sbio);
goto shut;
}
}
else
/* want to do MTU discovery */

View File

@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -context arg - set session ID context\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -Verify arg - turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert.\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -verify_return_error - return verification errors\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -cert arg - certificate file to use\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," (default is %s)\n",TEST_CERT);
BIO_printf(bio_err," -crl_check - check the peer certificate has not been revoked by its CA.\n" \
@@ -473,6 +474,7 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ecdhe - Disable ephemeral ECDH\n");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Turn on SSL bug compatibility\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -hack - workaround for early Netscape code\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -www - Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -WWW - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -HTTP - Respond to a 'GET /<path> HTTP/1.0' with file ./<path>\n");
@@ -493,6 +495,10 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
#endif
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status - respond to certificate status requests\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_verbose - enable status request verbose printout\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_timeout n - status request responder timeout\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -status_url URL - status request fallback URL\n");
}
static int local_argc=0;
@@ -670,7 +676,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
if (servername)
{
if (strcmp(servername,p->servername))
if (strcasecmp(servername,p->servername))
return p->extension_error;
if (ctx2)
{
@@ -1209,6 +1215,14 @@ bad:
sv_usage();
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n");
goto end;
}
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PSK)
if (jpake_secret)
@@ -1842,10 +1856,24 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout);
}
if (socket_mtu > 28)
if (socket_mtu)
{
if(socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n",
DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con));
ret = -1;
BIO_free(sbio);
goto err;
}
SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU);
SSL_set_mtu(con, socket_mtu - 28);
if(!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu))
{
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n");
ret = -1;
BIO_free(sbio);
goto err;
}
}
else
/* want to do MTU discovery */

View File

@@ -2608,7 +2608,11 @@ static int do_multi(int multi)
fds=malloc(multi*sizeof *fds);
for(n=0 ; n < multi ; ++n)
{
pipe(fd);
if (pipe(fd) == -1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pipe failure\n");
exit(1);
}
fflush(stdout);
fflush(stderr);
if(fork())
@@ -2620,7 +2624,11 @@ static int do_multi(int multi)
{
close(fd[0]);
close(1);
dup(fd[1]);
if (dup(fd[1]) == -1)
{
fprintf(stderr, "dup failed\n");
exit(1);
}
close(fd[1]);
mr=1;
usertime=0;
@@ -2670,27 +2678,6 @@ static int do_multi(int multi)
k=atoi(sstrsep(&p,sep));
sstrsep(&p,sep);
d=atof(sstrsep(&p,sep));
if(n)
rsa_results[k][0]=1/(1/rsa_results[k][0]+1/d);
else
rsa_results[k][0]=d;
d=atof(sstrsep(&p,sep));
if(n)
rsa_results[k][1]=1/(1/rsa_results[k][1]+1/d);
else
rsa_results[k][1]=d;
}
else if(!strncmp(buf,"+F2:",4))
{
int k;
double d;
p=buf+4;
k=atoi(sstrsep(&p,sep));
sstrsep(&p,sep);
d=atof(sstrsep(&p,sep));
if(n)
rsa_results[k][0]=1/(1/rsa_results[k][0]+1/d);

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
/* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir_vms.c,v 1.20 2004/08/26 13:36:05 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -88,6 +87,12 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
size_t filespeclen = strlen(directory);
char *filespec = NULL;
if (filespeclen == 0)
{
errno = ENOENT;
return 0;
}
/* MUST be a VMS directory specification! Let's estimate if it is. */
if (directory[filespeclen-1] != ']'
&& directory[filespeclen-1] != '>'

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
/* $LP: LPlib/source/LPdir_win.c,v 1.10 2004/08/26 13:36:05 _cvs_levitte Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004, Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org>
* All rights reserved.
@@ -37,7 +36,7 @@
#if defined(LP_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(FindFirstFile)
# define FindFirstFile FindFirstFileW
#endif
#if defined(LP_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(FindFirstFile)
#if defined(LP_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(FindNextFile)
# define FindNextFile FindNextFileW
#endif
@@ -63,6 +62,16 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
errno = 0;
if (*ctx == NULL)
{
const char *extdir = directory;
char *extdirbuf = NULL;
size_t dirlen = strlen (directory);
if (dirlen == 0)
{
errno = ENOENT;
return 0;
}
*ctx = (LP_DIR_CTX *)malloc(sizeof(LP_DIR_CTX));
if (*ctx == NULL)
{
@@ -71,15 +80,35 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
}
memset(*ctx, '\0', sizeof(LP_DIR_CTX));
if (directory[dirlen-1] != '*')
{
extdirbuf = (char *)malloc(dirlen + 3);
if (extdirbuf == NULL)
{
free(*ctx);
*ctx = NULL;
errno = ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
if (directory[dirlen-1] != '/' && directory[dirlen-1] != '\\')
extdir = strcat(strcpy (extdirbuf,directory),"/*");
else
extdir = strcat(strcpy (extdirbuf,directory),"*");
}
if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char))
{
TCHAR *wdir = NULL;
/* len_0 denotes string length *with* trailing 0 */
size_t index = 0,len_0 = strlen(directory) + 1;
size_t index = 0,len_0 = strlen(extdir) + 1;
wdir = (TCHAR *)malloc(len_0 * sizeof(TCHAR));
wdir = (TCHAR *)calloc(len_0, sizeof(TCHAR));
if (wdir == NULL)
{
if (extdirbuf != NULL)
{
free (extdirbuf);
}
free(*ctx);
*ctx = NULL;
errno = ENOMEM;
@@ -87,17 +116,23 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
}
#ifdef LP_MULTIBYTE_AVAILABLE
if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, directory, len_0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0))
if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, extdir, len_0, (WCHAR *)wdir, len_0))
#endif
for (index = 0; index < len_0; index++)
wdir[index] = (TCHAR)directory[index];
wdir[index] = (TCHAR)extdir[index];
(*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile(wdir, &(*ctx)->ctx);
free(wdir);
}
else
(*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)directory, &(*ctx)->ctx);
{
(*ctx)->handle = FindFirstFile((TCHAR *)extdir, &(*ctx)->ctx);
}
if (extdirbuf != NULL)
{
free (extdirbuf);
}
if ((*ctx)->handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
{
@@ -114,7 +149,6 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
return 0;
}
}
if (sizeof(TCHAR) != sizeof(char))
{
TCHAR *wdir = (*ctx)->ctx.cFileName;

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ CPUID_OBJ=mem_clr.o
LIBS=
GENERAL=Makefile README crypto-lib.com install.com
TEST=constant_time_test.c
LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a
SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT)
@@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
EXHEADER= crypto.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \
ossl_typ.h
HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h $(EXHEADER)
HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \
constant_time_locl.h $(EXHEADER)
ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
@@ -51,12 +53,7 @@ top:
all: shared
buildinf.h: ../Makefile
( echo "#ifndef MK1MF_BUILD"; \
echo ' /* auto-generated by crypto/Makefile for crypto/cversion.c */'; \
echo ' #define CFLAGS "$(CC) $(CFLAG)"'; \
echo ' #define PLATFORM "$(PLATFORM)"'; \
echo " #define DATE \"`LC_ALL=C LC_TIME=C date`\""; \
echo '#endif' ) >buildinf.h
$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(CFLAGS)" "$(PLATFORM)" >buildinf.h
x86cpuid.s: x86cpuid.pl perlasm/x86asm.pl
$(PERL) x86cpuid.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@

View File

@@ -136,11 +136,16 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,
p= *pp;
i= *(p++);
if (i > 7)
{
i=ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT;
goto err;
}
/* We do this to preserve the settings. If we modify
* the settings, via the _set_bit function, we will recalculate
* on output */
ret->flags&= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|0x07); /* clear */
ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|(i&0x07)); /* set */
ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|i); /* set */
if (len-- > 1) /* using one because of the bits left byte */
{

View File

@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
return(NULL);
}
ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long len)
{
ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *data;
int i;
/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
* subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
int i, length;
/* Sanity check OID encoding.
* Need at least one content octet.
* MSB must be clear in the last octet.
* can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
*/
for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
p[len - 1] & 0x80)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
return NULL;
}
/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
length = (int)len;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
{
if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
{
@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
ret->data = NULL;
/* once detached we can change it */
if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
{
ret->length=0;
if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
if (data == NULL)
{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
}
memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
memcpy(data,p,length);
/* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
ret->data =data;
ret->length=(int)len;
ret->length=length;
ret->sn=NULL;
ret->ln=NULL;
/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
p+=len;
p+=length;
if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
*pp=p;

View File

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE)
/* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b)
int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
{
int result = -1;

View File

@@ -196,24 +196,29 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
struct tm *ts;
struct tm data;
size_t len = 20;
int free_s = 0;
if (s == NULL)
{
free_s = 1;
s=M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
}
if (s == NULL)
return(NULL);
goto err;
ts=OPENSSL_gmtime(&t, &data);
if (ts == NULL)
return(NULL);
goto err;
if (offset_day || offset_sec)
{
if (!OPENSSL_gmtime_adj(ts, offset_day, offset_sec))
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if((ts->tm_year < 50) || (ts->tm_year >= 150))
return NULL;
goto err;
p=(char *)s->data;
if ((p == NULL) || ((size_t)s->length < len))
@@ -222,7 +227,7 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
if (p == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_ADJ,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
goto err;
}
if (s->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->data);
@@ -237,6 +242,10 @@ ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t,
ebcdic2ascii(s->data, s->data, s->length);
#endif
return(s);
err:
if (free_s && s)
M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(s);
return NULL;
}

View File

@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
goto err;
}
inl=i2d(data,NULL);
buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
@@ -142,6 +148,12 @@ int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signat
return -1;
}
if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT);
return -1;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
/* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */

View File

@@ -256,7 +256,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_asn1_add_alias(int to, int from)
if (!ameth)
return 0;
ameth->pkey_base_id = to;
return EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth);
if (!EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(ameth))
{
EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(ameth);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(int *ppkey_id, int *ppkey_base_id, int *ppkey_flags,

View File

@@ -777,7 +777,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE)
int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a);
void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value);
int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value);
int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b);
int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b);
ASN1_OBJECT * ASN1_OBJECT_new(void );
void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
#define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE 184
#define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 185
#define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG 128
#define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT 220
#define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH 129
#define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT 130
#define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 205
@@ -1376,6 +1377,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
#define ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 193
#define ASN1_R_TOO_LONG 155
#define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 156
#define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE 218
#define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY 157
#define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY 158
#define ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC 159

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE) ,"illegal time value"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"integer not ascii format"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG),"integer too large for long"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT),"invalid bit string bits left"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH),"invalid bmpstring length"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT) ,"invalid digit"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE) ,"invalid mime type"},
@@ -292,6 +293,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"time not ascii format"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LONG) ,"too long"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED) ,"type not constructed"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE) ,"type not primitive"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY),"unable to decode rsa key"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY),"unable to decode rsa private key"},
{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC) ,"unexpected eoc"},

View File

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag,
*pclass=xclass;
if (!asn1_get_length(&p,&inf,plength,(int)max)) goto err;
if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))
goto err;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"p=%d + *plength=%ld > omax=%ld + *pp=%d (%d > %d)\n",
(int)p,*plength,omax,(int)*pp,(int)(p+ *plength),

View File

@@ -667,6 +667,8 @@ static STACK_OF(MIME_HEADER) *mime_parse_hdr(BIO *bio)
int len, state, save_state = 0;
headers = sk_MIME_HEADER_new(mime_hdr_cmp);
if (!headers)
return NULL;
while ((len = BIO_gets(bio, linebuf, MAX_SMLEN)) > 0) {
/* If whitespace at line start then continuation line */
if(mhdr && isspace((unsigned char)linebuf[0])) state = MIME_NAME;

View File

@@ -134,15 +134,23 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d, ASN1_STRING **oct)
if (!(octmp->length = i2d(obj, NULL))) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
if (!(p = OPENSSL_malloc (octmp->length))) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
goto err;
}
octmp->data = p;
i2d (obj, &p);
return octmp;
err:
if (!oct || !*oct)
{
ASN1_STRING_free(octmp);
if (oct)
*oct = NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
#endif

View File

@@ -154,7 +154,10 @@ static int asn1_bio_new(BIO *b)
if (!ctx)
return 0;
if (!asn1_bio_init(ctx, DEFAULT_ASN1_BUF_SIZE))
{
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
return 0;
}
b->init = 1;
b->ptr = (char *)ctx;
b->flags = 0;

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
#!/usr/local/bin/perl -w
# Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org).
# Licensed under the terms of the OpenSSL license.
use strict;
my ($i, @arr);

View File

@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len)
ASN1_STRING *os;
if ((os=M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) return(0);
if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len)) return(0);
if (!M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,data,len))
{
M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
return 0;
}
ASN1_TYPE_set(a,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,os);
return(1);
}

View File

@@ -440,6 +440,8 @@ int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase)
l=80-2-obase;
b=X509_NAME_oneline(name,NULL,0);
if (!b)
return 0;
if (!*b)
{
OPENSSL_free(b);

View File

@@ -870,6 +870,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
}
else if (cst)
{
if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
|| utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER
|| utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE,
ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
return 0;
}
buf.length = 0;
buf.max = 0;
buf.data = NULL;

View File

@@ -453,9 +453,14 @@ static int asn1_set_seq_out(STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *sk, unsigned char **out,
{
derlst = OPENSSL_malloc(sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(sk)
* sizeof(*derlst));
tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
if (!derlst || !tmpdat)
if (!derlst)
return 0;
tmpdat = OPENSSL_malloc(skcontlen);
if (!tmpdat)
{
OPENSSL_free(derlst);
return 0;
}
}
}
/* If not sorting just output each item */

View File

@@ -128,3 +128,13 @@ void X509_ALGOR_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, void **ppval,
}
}
int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b)
{
int rv;
rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm);
if (rv)
return rv;
if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter)
return 0;
return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter);
}

View File

@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
{
/* We handle IDP and deltas */
if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
|| (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier)
|| (nid == NID_delta_crl))
break;;
crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;

View File

@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ extern "C" {
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER 44 /* Destination for the data */
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT 45 /* Next DTLS handshake timeout to
* adjust socket timeouts */
* adjust socket timeouts */
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD 49
/* modifiers */
#define BIO_FP_READ 0x02
@@ -553,6 +554,8 @@ int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b);
(int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
#define BIO_dgram_set_peer(b,peer) \
(int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, (char *)peer)
#define BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(b) \
(unsigned int)BIO_ctrl((b), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD, 0, NULL)
/* These two aren't currently implemented */
/* int BIO_get_ex_num(BIO *bio); */

View File

@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ int BIO_free(BIO *a)
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, a, &a->ex_data);
if ((a->method == NULL) || (a->method->destroy == NULL)) return(1);
a->method->destroy(a);
if ((a->method != NULL) && (a->method->destroy != NULL))
a->method->destroy(a);
OPENSSL_free(a);
return(1);
}

View File

@@ -375,6 +375,36 @@ static int dgram_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
return(ret);
}
static long dgram_get_mtu_overhead(bio_dgram_data *data)
{
long ret;
switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
/* Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */
ret = 28;
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
#ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&data->peer.sa_in6.sin6_addr))
/* Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */
ret = 28;
else
#endif
/* Assume this is UDP - 40 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */
ret = 48;
break;
#endif
default:
/* We don't know. Go with the historical default */
ret = 28;
break;
}
return ret;
}
static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
{
long ret=1;
@@ -551,23 +581,24 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
#endif
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
ret = -dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data);
switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family)
{
case AF_INET:
ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
ret += 576;
break;
#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
case AF_INET6:
#ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&data->peer.sa_in6.sin6_addr))
ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
ret += 576;
else
#endif
ret = 1280 - 40 - 8;
ret += 1280;
break;
#endif
default:
ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
ret += 576;
break;
}
break;
@@ -768,6 +799,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = 0;
break;
#endif
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD:
ret = dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data);
break;
default:
ret=0;
break;

View File

@@ -1584,17 +1584,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
dmultu a_2,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_2,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_2,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_1,a_1 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -1609,63 +1609,63 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
dmultu a_0,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_3,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_3,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_1,a_2 /* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_3,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
sd c_1,24(a0)
dmultu a_4,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_1,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_1,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_3,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_1,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_2,a_2 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -1680,93 +1680,93 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
dmultu a_0,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_2,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_2,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_1,a_4 /* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_2,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_2,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_2,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
sd c_3,40(a0)
dmultu a_6,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_3,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_3,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_5,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_3,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_4,a_2 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_3,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_3,a_3 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -1781,108 +1781,108 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
dmultu a_0,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_1,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_1,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_1,a_6 /* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_1,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_2,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_1,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_3,a_4 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_1,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
sd c_2,56(a0)
dmultu a_7,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_2,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_2,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_6,a_2 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_2,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_5,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_2,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_4,a_4 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -1897,78 +1897,78 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
dmultu a_2,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_3,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_3,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_3,a_6 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_3,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_4,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_3,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
sd c_1,72(a0)
dmultu a_7,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_1,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_1,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_6,a_4 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_1,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_5,a_5 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -1983,48 +1983,48 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
dmultu a_4,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_2,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_2,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_5,a_6 /* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_2,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
sd c_3,88(a0)
dmultu a_7,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_3,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_3,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_6,a_6 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -2039,17 +2039,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8)
dmultu a_6,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_1,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_1,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
sd c_2,104(a0)
dmultu a_7,a_7 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */
@@ -2070,9 +2070,9 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
.set reorder
ld a_0,0(a1)
ld a_1,8(a1)
dmultu a_0,a_0 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
ld a_2,16(a1)
ld a_3,24(a1)
dmultu a_0,a_0 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo c_1
mfhi c_2
sd c_1,0(a0)
@@ -2093,17 +2093,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
dmultu a_2,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_2,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_2,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
dmultu a_1,a_1 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -2118,48 +2118,48 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
dmultu a_0,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_3,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_3,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
dmultu a_1,a_2 /* mul_add_c(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt AT,t_2,zero
daddu c_3,AT
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_1,t_1
sltu AT,c_1,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_1,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_1,t_1
daddu c_2,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_2
sltu AT,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,AT
sltu t_2,c_2,t_2
daddu c_3,t_2
sd c_1,24(a0)
dmultu a_3,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_1,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_2,t_1
sltu AT,c_2,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_2,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_2,t_1
daddu c_3,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_1,c_3,AT
daddu c_3,t_2
sltu AT,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,AT
sltu t_2,c_3,t_2
daddu c_1,t_2
dmultu a_2,a_2 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
@@ -2174,17 +2174,17 @@ LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4)
dmultu a_2,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */
mflo t_1
mfhi t_2
slt c_2,t_2,zero
dsll t_2,1
slt a2,t_1,zero
daddu t_2,a2
dsll t_1,1
daddu c_3,t_1
sltu AT,c_3,t_1
daddu t_2,AT
daddu c_3,t_1
daddu AT,t_2
sltu t_1,c_3,t_1
daddu c_1,AT
daddu t_2,t_1
sltu c_2,c_1,AT
daddu c_1,t_2
sltu AT,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,AT
sltu t_2,c_1,t_2
daddu c_2,t_2
sd c_3,40(a0)
dmultu a_3,a_3 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */

View File

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
if (n <= 0) return 0;
asm (
asm volatile (
" subq %2,%2 \n"
".p2align 4 \n"
"1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
" sbbq %0,%0 \n"
: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
: "cc"
: "cc", "memory"
);
return ret&1;
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
if (n <= 0) return 0;
asm (
asm volatile (
" subq %2,%2 \n"
".p2align 4 \n"
"1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n"
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int
" sbbq %0,%0 \n"
: "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i)
: "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
: "cc"
: "cc", "memory"
);
return ret&1;
@@ -273,6 +273,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
/* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
/*
* Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
* can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
*/
#if 0
/* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
#define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \
@@ -287,10 +291,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0; \
t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \
t0 = ta * tb; \
t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0; \
t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0; \
c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0; \
c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0; \
c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0; \
c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0; \
}
#else
#define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do { \
@@ -328,22 +332,14 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
: "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2) \
: "a"(a),"m"(b) \
: "cc"); \
asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1" \
: "+d"(t2),"+r"(c2) \
: "g"(0) \
: "cc"); \
asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1" \
: "+a"(t1),"+d"(t2) \
: "g"(0) \
: "cc"); \
asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
: "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2) \
: "a"(t1),"g"(0) \
: "cc"); \
asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \
: "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
: "d"(t2),"g"(0) \
: "cc"); \
asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2" \
: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0) \
: "cc"); \
asm ("addq %3,%0; adcq %4,%1; adcq %5,%2" \
: "+r"(c0),"+r"(c1),"+r"(c2) \
: "r"(t1),"r"(t2),"g"(0) \
: "cc"); \
} while (0)
#endif

View File

@@ -438,6 +438,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
/* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
/*
* Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result
* can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones.
*/
#ifdef BN_LLONG
#define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) \
t=(BN_ULLONG)a*b; \
@@ -478,10 +482,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
#define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \
BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0; \
BN_UMULT_LOHI(t0,t1,ta,tb); \
t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0; \
t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0; \
c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0; \
c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0; \
c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0; \
c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0; \
}
#define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) { \
@@ -508,10 +512,10 @@ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n)
BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0; \
t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \
t0 = ta * tb; \
t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0; \
t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0; \
c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0; \
c0 += t0; t2 = t1+((c0<t0)?1:0);\
c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0; \
c0 += t0; t1 += (c0<t0)?1:0; \
c1 += t1; c2 += (c1<t1)?1:0; \
}
#define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) { \

View File

@@ -767,7 +767,14 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0)
{
ret = BN_one(rr);
/* x**0 mod 1 is still zero. */
if (BN_is_one(m))
{
ret = 1;
BN_zero(rr);
}
else
ret = BN_one(rr);
return ret;
}
if (a == 0)

View File

@@ -339,6 +339,15 @@ static BN_ULONG *bn_expand_internal(const BIGNUM *b, int words)
BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXPAND_INTERNAL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
#ifdef PURIFY
/* Valgrind complains in BN_consttime_swap because we process the whole
* array even if it's not initialised yet. This doesn't matter in that
* function - what's important is constant time operation (we're not
* actually going to use the data)
*/
memset(a, 0, sizeof(BN_ULONG)*words);
#endif
#if 1
B=b->d;
/* Check if the previous number needs to be copied */

View File

@@ -824,9 +824,9 @@ int BN_nist_mod_521(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *field,
/* ... and right shift */
for (val=t_d[0],i=0; i<BN_NIST_521_TOP-1; i++)
{
tmp = val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
val = t_d[i+1];
t_d[i] = (tmp | val<<BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT) & BN_MASK2;
t_d[i] = ( val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT |
(tmp=t_d[i+1])<<BN_NIST_521_LSHIFT ) & BN_MASK2;
val=tmp;
}
t_d[i] = val>>BN_NIST_521_RSHIFT;
/* lower 521 bits */

View File

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (al <= 0)
{
r->top=0;
r->neg = 0;
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -676,44 +676,98 @@ int test_mul(BIO *bp)
int test_sqr(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM a,c,d,e;
int i;
BIGNUM *a,*c,*d,*e;
int i, ret = 0;
BN_init(&a);
BN_init(&c);
BN_init(&d);
BN_init(&e);
a = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
if (a == NULL || c == NULL || d == NULL || e == NULL)
{
goto err;
}
for (i=0; i<num0; i++)
{
BN_bntest_rand(&a,40+i*10,0,0);
a.neg=rand_neg();
BN_sqr(&c,&a,ctx);
BN_bntest_rand(a,40+i*10,0,0);
a->neg=rand_neg();
BN_sqr(c,a,ctx);
if (bp != NULL)
{
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,&a);
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," * ");
BN_print(bp,&a);
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
}
BN_print(bp,&c);
BN_print(bp,c);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
}
BN_div(&d,&e,&c,&a,ctx);
BN_sub(&d,&d,&a);
if(!BN_is_zero(&d) || !BN_is_zero(&e))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_div(d,e,c,a,ctx);
BN_sub(d,d,a);
if(!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n");
goto err;
}
}
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&c);
BN_free(&d);
BN_free(&e);
return(1);
/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
BN_hex2bn(&a,
"80000000000000008000000000000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000");
BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
if (bp != NULL)
{
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," * ");
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
}
BN_print(bp,c);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
}
BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
if (BN_cmp(c, d))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
"different results!\n");
goto err;
}
/* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */
BN_hex2bn(&a,
"80000000000000000000000080000001FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000");
BN_sqr(c, a, ctx);
if (bp != NULL)
{
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," * ");
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
}
BN_print(bp,c);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
}
BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx);
if (BN_cmp(c, d))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce "
"different results!\n");
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
if (a != NULL) BN_free(a);
if (c != NULL) BN_free(c);
if (d != NULL) BN_free(d);
if (e != NULL) BN_free(e);
return ret;
}
int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)

View File

@@ -71,6 +71,43 @@
static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
/* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success. */
static int test_exp_mod_zero() {
BIGNUM a, p, m;
BIGNUM r;
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
int ret = 1;
BN_init(&m);
BN_one(&m);
BN_init(&a);
BN_one(&a);
BN_init(&p);
BN_zero(&p);
BN_init(&r);
BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (BN_is_zero(&r))
ret = 0;
else
{
printf("1**0 mod 1 = ");
BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
printf(", should be 0\n");
}
BN_free(&r);
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&p);
BN_free(&m);
return ret;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
BN_CTX *ctx;
@@ -190,7 +227,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out);
BIO_free(out);
printf(" done\n");
printf("\n");
if (test_exp_mod_zero() != 0)
goto err;
printf("done\n");
EXIT(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();

View File

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ again:
p=eat_ws(conf, end);
if (*p != ']')
{
if (*p != '\0')
if (*p != '\0' && ss != p)
{
ss=p;
goto again;

206
crypto/constant_time_locl.h Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
/* crypto/constant_time_locl.h */
/*
* Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
*
* Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
* Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
* (Google).
* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
#define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
#include "e_os.h" /* For 'inline' */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/*
* The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
* and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result
* of a conditional in constant time. For example,
*
* if (a < b) {
* c = a;
* } else {
* c = b;
* }
*
* can be written as
*
* unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
* c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
*/
/*
* Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
* bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
* However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to
* replace this with something else on odd CPUs.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a);
/*
* Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Signed integers. */
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b);
/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b);
/*
* Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b).
*
* When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above),
* the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b|
* (if |mask| is zero).
*/
static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
/* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */
static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
unsigned char a, unsigned char b);
/* Convenience method for signed integers. */
static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b);
static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
{
return 0-(a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return constant_time_msb(a^((a^b)|((a-b)^b)));
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return ~constant_time_lt(a, b);
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a)
{
return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b)
{
return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
{
return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
}
static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
}
static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b));
}
static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
{
return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
}
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */

330
crypto/constant_time_test.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
/* crypto/constant_time_test.c */
/*
* Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
*
* Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org)
* Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
* (Google).
* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_TRUE = (unsigned)(~0);
static const unsigned int CONSTTIME_FALSE = 0;
static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_TRUE_8 = 0xff;
static const unsigned char CONSTTIME_FALSE_8 = 0;
static int test_binary_op(unsigned int (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
{
unsigned c = op(a, b);
if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
"(TRUE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
return 1;
}
else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %du "
"(FALSE), got %du\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_binary_op_8(unsigned char (*op)(unsigned int a, unsigned int b),
const char* op_name, unsigned int a, unsigned int b, int is_true)
{
unsigned char c = op(a, b);
if (is_true && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
"(TRUE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
return 1;
}
else if (!is_true && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for %s(%du, %du): expected %u "
"(FALSE), got %u\n", op_name, a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_is_zero(unsigned int a)
{
unsigned int c = constant_time_is_zero(a);
if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %du (TRUE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE, c);
return 1;
}
else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %du (FALSE), got %du\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
{
unsigned char c = constant_time_is_zero_8(a);
if (a == 0 && c != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %u (TRUE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, c);
return 1;
}
else if (a != 0 && c != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_is_zero(%du): "
"expected %u (FALSE), got %u\n", a, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8,
c);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_select(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
unsigned int selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
if (selected != a)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
"%du): expected %du(first value), got %du\n",
CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
return 1;
}
selected = constant_time_select(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
if (selected != b)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %du,"
"%du): expected %du(second value), got %du\n",
CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_select_8(unsigned char a, unsigned char b)
{
unsigned char selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, a, b);
if (selected != a)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
"%u): expected %u(first value), got %u\n",
CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
return 1;
}
selected = constant_time_select_8(CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, a, b);
if (selected != b)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%u, %u,"
"%u): expected %u(second value), got %u\n",
CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_select_int(int a, int b)
{
int selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b);
if (selected != a)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
"%d): expected %d(first value), got %d\n",
CONSTTIME_TRUE, a, b, a, selected);
return 1;
}
selected = constant_time_select_int(CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b);
if (selected != b)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_select(%du, %d,"
"%d): expected %d(second value), got %d\n",
CONSTTIME_FALSE, a, b, b, selected);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_eq_int(int a, int b)
{
unsigned int equal = constant_time_eq_int(a, b);
if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
"expected %du(TRUE), got %du\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE, equal);
return 1;
}
else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int(%d, %d): "
"expected %du(FALSE), got %du\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE, equal);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int test_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
{
unsigned char equal = constant_time_eq_int_8(a, b);
if (a == b && equal != CONSTTIME_TRUE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
"expected %u(TRUE), got %u\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_TRUE_8, equal);
return 1;
}
else if (a != b && equal != CONSTTIME_FALSE_8)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Test failed for constant_time_eq_int_8(%d, %d): "
"expected %u(FALSE), got %u\n",
a, b, CONSTTIME_FALSE_8, equal);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static unsigned int test_values[] = {0, 1, 1024, 12345, 32000, UINT_MAX/2-1,
UINT_MAX/2, UINT_MAX/2+1, UINT_MAX-1,
UINT_MAX};
static unsigned char test_values_8[] = {0, 1, 2, 20, 32, 127, 128, 129, 255};
static int signed_test_values[] = {0, 1, -1, 1024, -1024, 12345, -12345,
32000, -32000, INT_MAX, INT_MIN, INT_MAX-1,
INT_MIN+1};
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
unsigned int a, b, i, j;
int c, d;
unsigned char e, f;
int num_failed = 0, num_all = 0;
fprintf(stdout, "Testing constant time operations...\n");
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
{
a = test_values[i];
num_failed += test_is_zero(a);
num_failed += test_is_zero_8(a);
num_all += 2;
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
{
b = test_values[j];
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
"constant_time_lt", a, b, a < b);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
"constant_time_lt_8", a, b, a < b);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_lt,
"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_lt_8,
"constant_time_lt_8", b, a, b < a);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
"constant_time_ge", a, b, a >= b);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
"constant_time_ge_8", a, b, a >= b);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_ge,
"constant_time_ge", b, a, b >= a);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_ge_8,
"constant_time_ge_8", b, a, b >= a);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
"constant_time_eq", a, b, a == b);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
"constant_time_eq_8", a, b, a == b);
num_failed += test_binary_op(&constant_time_eq,
"constant_time_eq", b, a, b == a);
num_failed += test_binary_op_8(&constant_time_eq_8,
"constant_time_eq_8", b, a, b == a);
num_failed += test_select(a, b);
num_all += 13;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++i)
{
c = signed_test_values[i];
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(signed_test_values)/sizeof(int); ++j)
{
d = signed_test_values[j];
num_failed += test_select_int(c, d);
num_failed += test_eq_int(c, d);
num_failed += test_eq_int_8(c, d);
num_all += 3;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_values_8); ++i)
{
e = test_values_8[i];
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(test_values_8); ++j)
{
f = test_values_8[j];
num_failed += test_select_8(e, f);
num_all += 1;
}
}
if (!num_failed)
{
fprintf(stdout, "ok (ran %d tests)\n", num_all);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
else
{
fprintf(stdout, "%d of %d tests failed!\n", num_failed, num_all);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
}

View File

@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ $ ET_WHIRLPOOL = "WHRLPOOL"
$ IF ARCH .EQS. "VAX" THEN ET_WHIRLPOOL = ""
$ ENCRYPT_TYPES = "Basic,"+ -
"OBJECTS,"+ -
"MD2,MD4,MD5,SHA,MDC2,HMAC,RIPEMD,"+ET_WHIRLPOOL+","+ -
"DES,AES,RC2,RC4,RC5,IDEA,BF,CAST,CAMELLIA,SEED,MODES,"+ -
"MD4,MD5,SHA,MDC2,HMAC,RIPEMD,"+ET_WHIRLPOOL+","+ -
"DES,AES,RC2,RC4,IDEA,BF,CAST,CAMELLIA,SEED,MODES,"+ -
"BN,EC,RSA,DSA,ECDSA,DH,ECDH,DSO,ENGINE,"+ -
"BUFFER,BIO,STACK,LHASH,RAND,ERR,"+ -
"EVP,EVP_2,EVP_3,ASN1,ASN1_2,PEM,X509,X509V3,"+ -
@@ -204,10 +204,18 @@ $ GOSUB CHECK_OPT_FILE
$!
$! Define The Different Encryption "library" Strings.
$!
$ APPS_DES = "DES/DES,CBC3_ENC"
$ APPS_PKCS7 = "ENC/ENC;DEC/DEC;SIGN/SIGN;VERIFY/VERIFY,EXAMPLE"
$!!! Test apps disabled, as they aren't supported at all,
$!!! not even in the unix build
$!!! APPS_DES = "DES/DES,CBC3_ENC"
$!!! APPS_PKCS7 = "ENC/ENC;DEC/DEC;SIGN/SIGN;VERIFY/VERIFY,EXAMPLE"
$
$ LIB_ = "cryptlib,mem,mem_clr,mem_dbg,cversion,ex_data,cpt_err,ebcdic,uid,o_time,o_str,o_dir"
$! These variables are ordered as the SDIRS variable from the top Makefile.org
$! The contents of these variables are copied from the LIBOBJ variable in the
$! corresponding Makefile from each corresponding subdirectory, with .o stripped
$! and spaces replaced with commas.
$ LIB_ = "cryptlib,mem,mem_dbg,cversion,ex_data,cpt_err,ebcdic,"+ -
"uid,o_time,o_str,o_dir,mem_clr"
$ LIB_OBJECTS = "o_names,obj_dat,obj_lib,obj_err,obj_xref"
$ LIB_MD2 = "md2_dgst,md2_one"
$ LIB_MD4 = "md4_dgst,md4_one"
$ LIB_MD5 = "md5_dgst,md5_one"
@@ -224,13 +232,13 @@ $ LIB_DES = "set_key,ecb_enc,cbc_enc,"+ -
"fcrypt,xcbc_enc,rpc_enc,cbc_cksm,"+ -
"ede_cbcm_enc,des_old,des_old2,read2pwd"
$ LIB_RC2 = "rc2_ecb,rc2_skey,rc2_cbc,rc2cfb64,rc2ofb64"
$ LIB_RC4 = "rc4_skey,rc4_enc"
$ LIB_RC4 = "rc4_enc,rc4_skey"
$ LIB_RC5 = "rc5_skey,rc5_ecb,rc5_enc,rc5cfb64,rc5ofb64"
$ LIB_IDEA = "i_cbc,i_cfb64,i_ofb64,i_ecb,i_skey"
$ LIB_BF = "bf_skey,bf_ecb,bf_enc,bf_cfb64,bf_ofb64"
$ LIB_CAST = "c_skey,c_ecb,c_enc,c_cfb64,c_ofb64"
$ LIB_CAMELLIA = "camellia,cmll_misc,cmll_ecb,cmll_cbc,cmll_ofb,"+ -
"cmll_cfb,cmll_ctr"
$ LIB_CAMELLIA = "cmll_ecb,cmll_ofb,cmll_cfb,cmll_ctr,"+ -
"camellia,cmll_misc,cmll_cbc"
$ LIB_SEED = "seed,seed_ecb,seed_cbc,seed_cfb,seed_ofb"
$ LIB_MODES = "cbc128,ctr128,cts128,cfb128,ofb128"
$ LIB_BN_ASM = "[.asm]vms.mar,vms-helper"
@@ -261,22 +269,21 @@ $ LIB_ENGINE = "eng_err,eng_lib,eng_list,eng_init,eng_ctrl,"+ -
"tb_rsa,tb_dsa,tb_ecdsa,tb_dh,tb_ecdh,tb_rand,tb_store,"+ -
"tb_cipher,tb_digest,tb_pkmeth,tb_asnmth,"+ -
"eng_openssl,eng_dyn,eng_cnf,eng_cryptodev"
$ LIB_AES = "aes_core,aes_misc,aes_ecb,aes_cbc,aes_cfb,aes_ofb,aes_ctr,"+ -
"aes_ige,aes_wrap"
$ LIB_AES = "aes_misc,aes_ecb,aes_cfb,aes_ofb,aes_ctr,aes_ige,aes_wrap,"+ -
"aes_core,aes_cbc"
$ LIB_BUFFER = "buffer,buf_err"
$ LIB_BIO = "bio_lib,bio_cb,bio_err,"+ -
"bss_mem,bss_null,bss_fd,"+ -
"bss_file,bss_sock,bss_conn,"+ -
"bf_null,bf_buff,b_print,b_dump,"+ -
"b_sock,bss_acpt,bf_nbio,bss_rtcp,bss_bio,bss_log,"+ -
"b_sock,bss_acpt,bf_nbio,bss_log,bss_bio,"+ -
"bss_dgram,"+ -
"bf_lbuf"
"bf_lbuf,bss_rtcp" ! The last two are VMS specific
$ LIB_STACK = "stack"
$ LIB_LHASH = "lhash,lh_stats"
$ LIB_RAND = "md_rand,randfile,rand_lib,rand_err,rand_egd,"+ -
"rand_vms"
"rand_vms" ! The last one is VMS specific
$ LIB_ERR = "err,err_all,err_prn"
$ LIB_OBJECTS = "o_names,obj_dat,obj_lib,obj_err,obj_xref"
$ LIB_EVP = "encode,digest,evp_enc,evp_key,evp_acnf,"+ -
"e_des,e_bf,e_idea,e_des3,e_camellia,"+ -
"e_rc4,e_aes,names,e_seed,"+ -
@@ -337,6 +344,7 @@ $ LIB_TS = "ts_err,ts_req_utils,ts_req_print,ts_rsp_utils,ts_rsp_print,"+ -
"ts_rsp_sign,ts_rsp_verify,ts_verify_ctx,ts_lib,ts_conf,"+ -
"ts_asn1"
$ LIB_JPAKE = "jpake,jpake_err"
$ LIB_STORE = "str_err,str_lib,str_meth,str_mem"
$!
$! Setup exceptional compilations
$!
@@ -372,7 +380,7 @@ $ MODULE_NEXT:
$!
$! Extract The Module Name From The Encryption List.
$!
$ MODULE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(MODULE_COUNTER,",",ENCRYPT_TYPES)
$ MODULE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(MODULE_COUNTER,",",ENCRYPT_TYPES),"COLLAPSE")
$ IF MODULE_NAME.EQS."Basic" THEN MODULE_NAME = ""
$ MODULE_NAME1 = MODULE_NAME
$!
@@ -456,7 +464,7 @@ $ THEN
$!
$! O.K, Extract The File Name From The File List.
$!
$ FILE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",'LIB_MODULE')
$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",'LIB_MODULE'),"COLLAPSE")
$!
$! else
$!
@@ -483,7 +491,7 @@ $! SHOW SYMBOL APPLICATION*
$!
$ IF APPLICATION .NES. ";"
$ THEN
$ FILE_NAME = F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",APPLICATION_OBJECTS)
$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,",",APPLICATION_OBJECTS),"COLLAPSE")
$ IF FILE_NAME .EQS. ","
$ THEN
$ APPLICATION = ""
@@ -1123,9 +1131,12 @@ $ CCDEFS = "TCPIP_TYPE_''P4',DSO_VMS"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDEFS) .NES. "" THEN CCDEFS = CCDEFS + "," + USER_CCDEFS
$ CCEXTRAFLAGS = ""
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCFLAGS) .NES. "" THEN CCEXTRAFLAGS = USER_CCFLAGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + "," + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = "" !!! "MAYLOSEDATA3" !!! "LONGLONGTYPE,LONGLONGSUFX,FOUNDCR"
$ IF F$TYPE(USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS) .NES. ""
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS + USER_CCDISABLEWARNINGS
$ ENDIF
$!
$! Check To See If We Have A ZLIB Option.
$!
@@ -1290,6 +1301,18 @@ $! Finish up the definition of CC.
$!
$ IF COMPILER .EQS. "DECC"
$ THEN
$! Not all compiler versions support MAYLOSEDATA3.
$ OPT_TEST = "MAYLOSEDATA3"
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$ERROR NL:
$ DEFINE /USER_MODE SYS$OUTPUT NL:
$ 'CC' /NOCROSS_REFERENCE /NOLIST /NOOBJECT -
/WARNINGS = DISABLE = ('OPT_TEST', EMPTYFILE) NL:
$ IF ($SEVERITY)
$ THEN
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .NES. "" THEN -
CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ ","
$ CCDISABLEWARNINGS = CCDISABLEWARNINGS+ OPT_TEST
$ ENDIF
$ IF CCDISABLEWARNINGS .EQS. ""
$ THEN
$ CC4DISABLEWARNINGS = "DOLLARID"

View File

@@ -69,10 +69,7 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
if (t == SSLEAY_BUILT_ON)
{
#ifdef DATE
static char buf[sizeof(DATE)+11];
BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"built on: %s",DATE);
return(buf);
return(DATE);
#else
return("built on: date not available");
#endif
@@ -80,10 +77,7 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
if (t == SSLEAY_CFLAGS)
{
#ifdef CFLAGS
static char buf[sizeof(CFLAGS)+11];
BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"compiler: %s",CFLAGS);
return(buf);
return(CFLAGS);
#else
return("compiler: information not available");
#endif
@@ -91,10 +85,7 @@ const char *SSLeay_version(int t)
if (t == SSLEAY_PLATFORM)
{
#ifdef PLATFORM
static char buf[sizeof(PLATFORM)+11];
BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"platform: %s", PLATFORM);
return(buf);
return(PLATFORM);
#else
return("platform: information not available");
#endif

View File

@@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
unsigned char *dp = NULL;
int dplen;
if (!pkey->pkey.dsa || !pkey->pkey.dsa->priv_key)
{
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PRIV_ENCODE,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
params = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (!params)
@@ -654,4 +660,3 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dsa_asn1_meths[] =
old_dsa_priv_encode
}
};

View File

@@ -77,13 +77,25 @@ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa)
{
DSA_SIG *s;
const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
unsigned char *der = NULL;
int derlen = -1;
int ret=-1;
s = DSA_SIG_new();
if (s == NULL) return(ret);
if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err;
/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
goto err;
ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa);
err:
if (derlen > 0)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
OPENSSL_free(der);
}
DSA_SIG_free(s);
return(ret);
}

View File

@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN
int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *);
int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *, size_t num, EC_POINT *[], BN_CTX *);
/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^num p[i] * m[i]
/** Computes r = generator * n sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i]
* \param group underlying EC_GROUP object
* \param r EC_POINT object for the result
* \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional)

View File

@@ -453,14 +453,16 @@ static int do_EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *x, int off, int ktype)
if (ktype > 0)
{
public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(x);
if ((pub_key = EC_POINT_point2bn(group, public_key,
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), NULL, ctx)) == NULL)
if (public_key != NULL)
{
reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
goto err;
}
if (pub_key)
if ((pub_key = EC_POINT_point2bn(group, public_key,
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(x), NULL, ctx)) == NULL)
{
reason = ERR_R_EC_LIB;
goto err;
}
buf_len = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
}
}
if (ktype == 2)

View File

@@ -1167,30 +1167,47 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
goto err;
}
if (ret->pub_key)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
if (ret->pub_key == NULL)
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (priv_key->publicKey)
{
const unsigned char *pub_oct;
size_t pub_oct_len;
int pub_oct_len;
if (ret->pub_key)
EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key);
ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group);
if (ret->pub_key == NULL)
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
pub_oct = M_ASN1_STRING_data(priv_key->publicKey);
pub_oct_len = M_ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey);
/* save the point conversion form */
/* The first byte - point conversion form - must be present. */
if (pub_oct_len <= 0)
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
/* Save the point conversion form. */
ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(pub_oct[0] & ~0x01);
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key,
pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL))
pub_oct, (size_t)(pub_oct_len), NULL))
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
if (!EC_POINT_mul(ret->group, ret->pub_key, ret->priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL))
{
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */
ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
}
ok = 1;
err:
@@ -1214,7 +1231,8 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out)
size_t buf_len=0, tmp_len;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key=NULL;
if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL)
if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || a->priv_key == NULL ||
(!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL))
{
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY,
ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);

View File

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "ec_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <string.h>
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
{

View File

@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *
int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->dbl == 0)
if (group->meth->invert == 0)
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;

View File

@@ -445,15 +445,16 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof wNAF_len[0]);
wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((totalnum + 1) * sizeof wNAF[0]); /* includes space for pivot */
val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(totalnum * sizeof val_sub[0]);
/* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err */
if (wNAF) wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */
if (!wsize || !wNAF_len || !wNAF || !val_sub)
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */
/* num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points */
num_val = 0;

View File

@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
{
int ret;
@@ -200,6 +201,7 @@ static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
*keylen = ret;
return 1;
}
#endif
static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
@@ -332,7 +334,11 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth =
0,0,
0,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
pkey_ec_derive,
#else
0,
#endif
pkey_ec_ctrl,
pkey_ec_ctrl_str

View File

@@ -1540,9 +1540,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ct
int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp0, *tmp1;
size_t pow2 = 0;
BIGNUM **heap = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z;
BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL;
size_t i;
int ret = 0;
@@ -1557,124 +1556,104 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT
}
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp0 == NULL || tmp1 == NULL) goto err;
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err;
/* Before converting the individual points, compute inverses of all Z values.
* Modular inversion is rather slow, but luckily we can do with a single
* explicit inversion, plus about 3 multiplications per input value.
*/
pow2 = 1;
while (num > pow2)
pow2 <<= 1;
/* Now pow2 is the smallest power of 2 satifsying pow2 >= num.
* We need twice that. */
pow2 <<= 1;
heap = OPENSSL_malloc(pow2 * sizeof heap[0]);
if (heap == NULL) goto err;
/* The array is used as a binary tree, exactly as in heapsort:
*
* heap[1]
* heap[2] heap[3]
* heap[4] heap[5] heap[6] heap[7]
* heap[8]heap[9] heap[10]heap[11] heap[12]heap[13] heap[14] heap[15]
*
* We put the Z's in the last line;
* then we set each other node to the product of its two child-nodes (where
* empty or 0 entries are treated as ones);
* then we invert heap[1];
* then we invert each other node by replacing it by the product of its
* parent (after inversion) and its sibling (before inversion).
*/
heap[0] = NULL;
for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
heap[i] = NULL;
prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]);
if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
heap[pow2/2 + i] = &points[i]->Z;
for (i = pow2/2 + num; i < pow2; i++)
heap[i] = NULL;
/* set each node to the product of its children */
for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
{
heap[i] = BN_new();
if (heap[i] == NULL) goto err;
if (heap[2*i] != NULL)
{
if ((heap[2*i + 1] == NULL) || BN_is_zero(heap[2*i + 1]))
{
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i])) goto err;
}
else
{
if (BN_is_zero(heap[2*i]))
{
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i + 1])) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, heap[i],
heap[2*i], heap[2*i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
}
}
}
prod_Z[i] = BN_new();
if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err;
}
/* invert heap[1] */
if (!BN_is_zero(heap[1]))
{
if (!BN_mod_inverse(heap[1], heap[1], &group->field, ctx))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
{
/* in the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H)
* into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H);
* i.e. we have need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice */
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err;
}
/* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z,
* skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */
/* set other heap[i]'s to their inverses */
for (i = 2; i < pow2/2 + num; i += 2)
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
{
/* i is even */
if ((heap[i + 1] != NULL) && !BN_is_zero(heap[i + 1]))
if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp0, heap[i/2], heap[i + 1], ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, heap[i/2], heap[i], ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], tmp0)) goto err;
if (!BN_copy(heap[i + 1], tmp1)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[i/2])) goto err;
if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) goto err;
}
}
/* we have replaced all non-zero Z's by their inverses, now fix up all the points */
for (i = 1; i < num; i++)
{
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
{
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
}
else
{
if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err;
}
}
/* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every
* non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx))
{
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (group->meth->field_encode != 0)
{
/* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H)
* into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H);
* i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
}
for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i)
{
/* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of
* points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z))
{
/* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product
* of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err;
/* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err;
/* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_copy(&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err;
}
}
if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z))
{
/* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */
if (!BN_copy(&points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err;
}
/* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
EC_POINT *p = points[i];
if (!BN_is_zero(&p->Z))
{
/* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp1, ctx)) goto err;
if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0)
{
if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err;
@@ -1688,20 +1667,19 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
if (new_ctx != NULL)
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
if (heap != NULL)
if (prod_Z != NULL)
{
/* heap[pow2/2] .. heap[pow2-1] have not been allocated locally! */
for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--)
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
{
if (heap[i] != NULL)
BN_clear_free(heap[i]);
if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) break;
BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]);
}
OPENSSL_free(heap);
OPENSSL_free(prod_Z);
}
return ret;
}

View File

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
*/
#include "ecs_locl.h"
#include <string.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
@@ -84,13 +85,25 @@ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey)
{
ECDSA_SIG *s;
const unsigned char *p = sigbuf;
unsigned char *der = NULL;
int derlen = -1;
int ret=-1;
s = ECDSA_SIG_new();
if (s == NULL) return(ret);
if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err;
/* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der);
if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen))
goto err;
ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey);
err:
if (derlen > 0)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen);
OPENSSL_free(der);
}
ECDSA_SIG_free(s);
return(ret);
}

View File

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090
R SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
R SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110

View File

@@ -601,4 +601,3 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in)
return in->cipher->ctrl((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)in, EVP_CTRL_COPY, 0, out);
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
{
int cipher_nid, md_nid;
if (cipher)
cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher);
cipher_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
else
cipher_nid = -1;
if (md)

View File

@@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher)
}
memcpy(cfb_tmp,cfb_iv,8);
n=0;
idea_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)17,&eks,
idea_cfb64_encrypt(cfb_buf1,cfb_buf2,(long)13,&eks,
cfb_tmp,&n,IDEA_DECRYPT);
idea_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[17]),&(cfb_buf2[17]),
(long)CFB_TEST_SIZE-17,&dks,
idea_cfb64_encrypt(&(cfb_buf1[13]),&(cfb_buf2[13]),
(long)CFB_TEST_SIZE-13,&eks,
cfb_tmp,&n,IDEA_DECRYPT);
if (memcmp(plain,cfb_buf2,CFB_TEST_SIZE) != 0)
{

View File

@@ -75,13 +75,13 @@ $!
$ sdirs := , -
'archd', -
objects, -
md2, md4, md5, sha, mdc2, hmac, ripemd, whrlpool, -
des, aes, rc2, rc4, rc5, idea, bf, cast, camellia, seed, -
md4, md5, sha, mdc2, hmac, ripemd, whrlpool, -
des, aes, rc2, rc4, idea, bf, cast, camellia, seed, modes, -
bn, ec, rsa, dsa, ecdsa, dh, ecdh, dso, engine, -
buffer, bio, stack, lhash, rand, err, -
evp, asn1, pem, x509, x509v3, conf, txt_db, pkcs7, pkcs12, comp, ocsp, -
ui, krb5, -
store, cms, pqueue, ts, jpake
cms, pqueue, ts, jpake, store
$!
$ exheader_ := crypto.h, opensslv.h, ebcdic.h, symhacks.h, ossl_typ.h
$ exheader_'archd' := opensslconf.h
@@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ $ exheader_cms := cms.h
$ exheader_pqueue := pqueue.h
$ exheader_ts := ts.h
$ exheader_jpake := jpake.h
$ exheader_srp := srp.h
$ exheader_store := store.h
$ exheader_cmac := cmac.h
$ libs := ssl_libcrypto
$!
$ exe_dir := [-.'archd'.exe.crypto]

View File

@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ sub round4_step
EOF
}
no warnings qw(uninitialized);
my $flavour = shift;
my $output = shift;
if ($flavour =~ /\./) { $output = $flavour; undef $flavour; }
@@ -119,7 +120,6 @@ $0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; my $dir=$1; my $xlate;
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
die "can't locate x86_64-xlate.pl";
no warnings qw(uninitialized);
open OUT,"| \"$^X\" $xlate $flavour $output";
*STDOUT=*OUT;

View File

@@ -471,11 +471,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
const unsigned char *p;
char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
buf[0]='\0';
return(0);
}
/* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
if (buf && buf_len > 0)
buf[0] = '\0';
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
return(0);
if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
{
@@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
i=(int)(l/40);
l-=(long)(i*40);
}
if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
{
*buf++ = i + '0';
*buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
n++;
@@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
i = strlen(bndec);
if (buf)
{
if (buf_len > 0)
if (buf_len > 1)
{
*buf++ = '.';
*buf = '\0';
buf_len--;
}
BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err:
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(ok);
}

View File

@@ -42,8 +42,6 @@ static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] =
static const nid_triple * const sigoid_srt_xref[] =
{
&sigoid_srt[17],
&sigoid_srt[18],
&sigoid_srt[0],
&sigoid_srt[1],
&sigoid_srt[7],

View File

@@ -90,7 +90,10 @@ EOF
foreach (@srt2)
{
my $x = $xref_tbl{$_}[2];
my ($p1, $p2, $x) = @{$xref_tbl{$_}};
# If digest or signature algorithm is "undef" then the algorithm
# needs special handling and is excluded from the cross reference table.
next if $p1 eq "undef" || $p2 eq "undef";
print "\t\&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n";
}

View File

@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx;
rctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(OCSP_REQ_CTX));
if (!rctx)
return NULL;
rctx->state = OHS_ERROR;
rctx->mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
rctx->io = io;
@@ -167,18 +169,21 @@ OCSP_REQ_CTX *OCSP_sendreq_new(BIO *io, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
else
rctx->iobuflen = OCSP_MAX_LINE_LEN;
rctx->iobuf = OPENSSL_malloc(rctx->iobuflen);
if (!rctx->iobuf)
return 0;
if (!rctx->mem || !rctx->iobuf)
goto err;
if (!path)
path = "/";
if (BIO_printf(rctx->mem, post_hdr, path) <= 0)
return 0;
goto err;
if (req && !OCSP_REQ_CTX_set1_req(rctx, req))
return 0;
goto err;
return rctx;
err:
OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx);
return NULL;
}
/* Parse the HTTP response. This will look like this:
@@ -490,6 +495,9 @@ OCSP_RESPONSE *OCSP_sendreq_bio(BIO *b, char *path, OCSP_REQUEST *req)
ctx = OCSP_sendreq_new(b, path, req, -1);
if (!ctx)
return NULL;
do
{
rv = OCSP_sendreq_nbio(&resp, ctx);

View File

@@ -221,8 +221,19 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath, int *pss
if (!*ppath) goto mem_err;
p = host;
if(host[0] == '[')
{
/* ipv6 literal */
host++;
p = strchr(host, ']');
if(!p) goto parse_err;
*p = '\0';
p++;
}
/* Look for optional ':' for port number */
if ((p = strchr(host, ':')))
if ((p = strchr(p, ':')))
{
*p = 0;
port = p + 1;

View File

@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x100000dfL
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000011fL
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0m-fips 5 Jun 2014"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0q-fips 15 Jan 2015"
#else
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0m 5 Jun 2014"
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.0q 15 Jan 2015"
#endif
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT

View File

@@ -755,6 +755,11 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
/* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
p += 8;
if (keylen < 8)
{
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
return NULL;
}
inlen = keylen - 8;
q = enctmp + 8;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cctx);

View File

@@ -39,20 +39,6 @@ test:
all: lib
testapps: enc dec sign verify
enc: enc.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o enc enc.o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
dec: dec.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o dec dec.o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
sign: sign.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o sign sign.o $(PEX_LIBS) $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
verify: verify.o example.o lib
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o verify verify.o $(PEX_LIBS) example.o $(LIB) $(EX_LIBS)
lib: $(LIBOBJ)
$(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
$(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.

View File

@@ -1,466 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/evp/bio_ber.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
static int ber_write(BIO *h,char *buf,int num);
static int ber_read(BIO *h,char *buf,int size);
/*static int ber_puts(BIO *h,char *str); */
/*static int ber_gets(BIO *h,char *str,int size); */
static long ber_ctrl(BIO *h,int cmd,long arg1,char *arg2);
static int ber_new(BIO *h);
static int ber_free(BIO *data);
static long ber_callback_ctrl(BIO *h,int cmd,void *(*fp)());
#define BER_BUF_SIZE (32)
/* This is used to hold the state of the BER objects being read. */
typedef struct ber_struct
{
int tag;
int class;
long length;
int inf;
int num_left;
int depth;
} BER_CTX;
typedef struct bio_ber_struct
{
int tag;
int class;
long length;
int inf;
/* most of the following are used when doing non-blocking IO */
/* reading */
long num_left; /* number of bytes still to read/write in block */
int depth; /* used with indefinite encoding. */
int finished; /* No more read data */
/* writting */
char *w_addr;
int w_offset;
int w_left;
int buf_len;
int buf_off;
unsigned char buf[BER_BUF_SIZE];
} BIO_BER_CTX;
static BIO_METHOD methods_ber=
{
BIO_TYPE_CIPHER,"cipher",
ber_write,
ber_read,
NULL, /* ber_puts, */
NULL, /* ber_gets, */
ber_ctrl,
ber_new,
ber_free,
ber_callback_ctrl,
};
BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ber(void)
{
return(&methods_ber);
}
static int ber_new(BIO *bi)
{
BIO_BER_CTX *ctx;
ctx=(BIO_BER_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_BER_CTX));
if (ctx == NULL) return(0);
memset((char *)ctx,0,sizeof(BIO_BER_CTX));
bi->init=0;
bi->ptr=(char *)ctx;
bi->flags=0;
return(1);
}
static int ber_free(BIO *a)
{
BIO_BER_CTX *b;
if (a == NULL) return(0);
b=(BIO_BER_CTX *)a->ptr;
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->ptr,sizeof(BIO_BER_CTX));
OPENSSL_free(a->ptr);
a->ptr=NULL;
a->init=0;
a->flags=0;
return(1);
}
int bio_ber_get_header(BIO *bio, BIO_BER_CTX *ctx)
{
char buf[64];
int i,j,n;
int ret;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned long length
int tag;
int class;
long max;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
/* Pack the buffer down if there is a hole at the front */
if (ctx->buf_off != 0)
{
p=ctx->buf;
j=ctx->buf_off;
n=ctx->buf_len-j;
for (i=0; i<n; i++)
{
p[0]=p[j];
p++;
}
ctx->buf_len-j;
ctx->buf_off=0;
}
/* If there is more room, read some more data */
i=BER_BUF_SIZE-ctx->buf_len;
if (i)
{
i=BIO_read(bio->next_bio,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_len]),i);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
else
ctx->buf_len+=i;
}
max=ctx->buf_len;
p=ctx->buf;
ret=ASN1_get_object(&p,&length,&tag,&class,max);
if (ret & 0x80)
{
if ((ctx->buf_len < BER_BUF_SIZE) &&
(ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ASN1_R_TOO_LONG))
{
ERR_clear_error(); /* clear the error */
BIO_set_retry_read(b);
}
return(-1);
}
/* We have no error, we have a header, so make use of it */
if ((ctx->tag >= 0) && (ctx->tag != tag))
{
BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_BER_GET_HEADER,BIO_R_TAG_MISMATCH);
sprintf(buf,"tag=%d, got %d",ctx->tag,tag);
ERR_add_error_data(1,buf);
return(-1);
}
if (ret & 0x01)
if (ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
}
static int ber_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
{
int ret=0,i,n;
BIO_BER_CTX *ctx;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
if (out == NULL) return(0);
ctx=(BIO_BER_CTX *)b->ptr;
if ((ctx == NULL) || (b->next_bio == NULL)) return(0);
if (ctx->finished) return(0);
again:
/* First see if we are half way through reading a block */
if (ctx->num_left > 0)
{
if (ctx->num_left < outl)
n=ctx->num_left;
else
n=outl;
i=BIO_read(b->next_bio,out,n);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
ctx->num_left-=i;
outl-=i;
ret+=i;
if (ctx->num_left <= 0)
{
ctx->depth--;
if (ctx->depth <= 0)
ctx->finished=1;
}
if (outl <= 0)
return(ret);
else
goto again;
}
else /* we need to read another BER header */
{
}
}
static int ber_write(BIO *b, char *in, int inl)
{
int ret=0,n,i;
BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
ret=inl;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
n=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
while (n > 0)
{
i=BIO_write(b->next_bio,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),n);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
ctx->buf_off+=i;
n-=i;
}
/* at this point all pending data has been written */
if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return(0);
ctx->buf_off=0;
while (inl > 0)
{
n=(inl > ENC_BLOCK_SIZE)?ENC_BLOCK_SIZE:inl;
EVP_CipherUpdate(&(ctx->cipher),
(unsigned char *)ctx->buf,&ctx->buf_len,
(unsigned char *)in,n);
inl-=n;
in+=n;
ctx->buf_off=0;
n=ctx->buf_len;
while (n > 0)
{
i=BIO_write(b->next_bio,&(ctx->buf[ctx->buf_off]),n);
if (i <= 0)
{
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(i);
}
n-=i;
ctx->buf_off+=i;
}
ctx->buf_len=0;
ctx->buf_off=0;
}
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
return(ret);
}
static long ber_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, char *ptr)
{
BIO *dbio;
BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx,*dctx;
long ret=1;
int i;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
switch (cmd)
{
case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
ctx->ok=1;
ctx->finished=0;
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&(ctx->cipher),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,
ctx->cipher.berrypt);
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_EOF: /* More to read */
if (ctx->cont <= 0)
ret=1;
else
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
ret=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
if (ret <= 0)
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: /* More to read in buffer */
ret=ctx->buf_len-ctx->buf_off;
if (ret <= 0)
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
/* do a final write */
again:
while (ctx->buf_len != ctx->buf_off)
{
i=ber_write(b,NULL,0);
if (i < 0)
{
ret=i;
break;
}
}
if (!ctx->finished)
{
ctx->finished=1;
ctx->buf_off=0;
ret=EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&(ctx->cipher),
(unsigned char *)ctx->buf,
&(ctx->buf_len));
ctx->ok=(int)ret;
if (ret <= 0) break;
/* push out the bytes */
goto again;
}
/* Finally flush the underlying BIO */
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
case BIO_C_GET_CIPHER_STATUS:
ret=(long)ctx->ok;
break;
case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE:
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
dctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)dbio->ptr;
memcpy(&(dctx->cipher),&(ctx->cipher),sizeof(ctx->cipher));
dbio->init=1;
break;
default:
ret=BIO_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,num,ptr);
break;
}
return(ret);
}
static long ber_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, void *(*fp)())
{
long ret=1;
if (b->next_bio == NULL) return(0);
switch (cmd)
{
default:
ret=BIO_callback_ctrl(b->next_bio,cmd,fp);
break;
}
return(ret);
}
/*
void BIO_set_cipher_ctx(b,c)
BIO *b;
EVP_CIPHER_ctx *c;
{
if (b == NULL) return;
if ((b->callback != NULL) &&
(b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,0L) <= 0))
return;
b->init=1;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
memcpy(ctx->cipher,c,sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX));
if (b->callback != NULL)
b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,1L);
}
*/
void BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER *c, unsigned char *k, unsigned char *i,
int e)
{
BIO_ENC_CTX *ctx;
if (b == NULL) return;
if ((b->callback != NULL) &&
(b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,0L) <= 0))
return;
b->init=1;
ctx=(BIO_ENC_CTX *)b->ptr;
EVP_CipherInit_ex(&(ctx->cipher),c,NULL,k,i,e);
if (b->callback != NULL)
b->callback(b,BIO_CB_CTRL,(char *)c,BIO_CTRL_SET,e,1L);
}

View File

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/pkcs7/verify.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
BIO *bio_err=NULL;
int main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
char *keyfile=NULL;
BIO *in;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
X509 *x509;
PKCS7 *p7;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
X509_STORE_CTX cert_ctx;
X509_STORE *cert_store=NULL;
BIO *data,*detached=NULL,*p7bio=NULL;
char buf[1024*4];
unsigned char *pp;
int i,printit=0;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *sk;
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
bio_err=BIO_new_fp(stderr,BIO_NOCLOSE);
data=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
pp=NULL;
while (argc > 1)
{
argc--;
argv++;
if (strcmp(argv[0],"-p") == 0)
{
printit=1;
}
else if ((strcmp(argv[0],"-k") == 0) && (argc >= 2)) {
keyfile = argv[1];
argc-=1;
argv+=1;
} else if ((strcmp(argv[0],"-d") == 0) && (argc >= 2))
{
detached=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (!BIO_read_filename(detached,argv[1]))
goto err;
argc-=1;
argv+=1;
}
else break;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(data,argv[0])) goto err;
if(!keyfile) {
fprintf(stderr, "No private key file specified\n");
goto err;
}
if ((in=BIO_new_file(keyfile,"r")) == NULL) goto err;
if ((x509=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_reset(in);
if ((pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL)
goto err;
BIO_free(in);
if (pp == NULL)
BIO_set_fp(data,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
/* Load the PKCS7 object from a file */
if ((p7=PEM_read_bio_PKCS7(data,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
/* This stuff is being setup for certificate verification.
* When using SSL, it could be replaced with a
* cert_stre=SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx); */
cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
X509_STORE_set_default_paths(cert_store);
X509_STORE_load_locations(cert_store,NULL,"../../certs");
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(cert_store,verify_callback);
ERR_clear_error();
/* We need to process the data */
/* We cannot support detached encryption */
p7bio=PKCS7_dataDecode(p7,pkey,detached,x509);
if (p7bio == NULL)
{
printf("problems decoding\n");
goto err;
}
/* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(p7bio,buf,sizeof(buf));
/* print it? */
if (i <= 0) break;
fwrite(buf,1, i, stdout);
}
/* We can now verify signatures */
sk=PKCS7_get_signer_info(p7);
if (sk == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "there are no signatures on this data\n");
}
else
{
/* Ok, first we need to, for each subject entry,
* see if we can verify */
ERR_clear_error();
for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sk); i++)
{
si=sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sk,i);
i=PKCS7_dataVerify(cert_store,&cert_ctx,p7bio,p7,si);
if (i <= 0)
goto err;
else
fprintf(stderr,"Signature verified\n");
}
}
X509_STORE_free(cert_store);
exit(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}
/* should be X509 * but we can just have them as char *. */
int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
char buf[256];
X509 *err_cert;
int err,depth;
err_cert=X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth= X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),buf,256);
BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d %s\n",depth,buf);
if (!ok)
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
if (depth < 6)
{
ok=1;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,X509_V_OK);
}
else
{
ok=0;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
}
}
switch (ctx->error)
{
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),buf,256);
BIO_printf(bio_err,"issuer= %s\n",buf);
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"notBefore=");
ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
BIO_printf(bio_err,"notAfter=");
ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
break;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify return:%d\n",ok);
return(ok);
}

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@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View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
int PKCS7_set_content_type(PKCS7 *p7, int type);
Call to set the type of PKCS7 object we are working on
int PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
EVP_MD *dgst);
Use this to setup a signer info
There will also be functions to add signed and unsigned attributes.
int PKCS7_add_signer(PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *p7i);
Add a signer info to the content.
int PKCS7_add_certificae(PKCS7 *p7, X509 *x509);
int PKCS7_add_crl(PKCS7 *p7, X509_CRL *x509);
----
p7=PKCS7_new();
PKCS7_set_content_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_signed);
signer=PKCS7_SINGNER_INFO_new();
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set(signer,x509,pkey,EVP_md5());
PKCS7_add_signer(py,signer);
we are now setup.

View File

@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/pkcs7/enc.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
int main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
X509 *x509;
PKCS7 *p7;
BIO *in;
BIO *data,*p7bio;
char buf[1024*4];
int i;
int nodetach=1;
char *keyfile = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher=NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *recips=NULL;
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
data=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
while(argc > 1)
{
if (strcmp(argv[1],"-nd") == 0)
{
nodetach=1;
argv++; argc--;
}
else if ((strcmp(argv[1],"-c") == 0) && (argc >= 2)) {
if(!(cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(argv[2]))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher %s\n", argv[2]);
goto err;
}
argc-=2;
argv+=2;
} else if ((strcmp(argv[1],"-k") == 0) && (argc >= 2)) {
keyfile = argv[2];
argc-=2;
argv+=2;
if (!(in=BIO_new_file(keyfile,"r"))) goto err;
if (!(x509=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)))
goto err;
if(!recips) recips = sk_X509_new_null();
sk_X509_push(recips, x509);
BIO_free(in);
} else break;
}
if(!recips) {
fprintf(stderr, "No recipients\n");
goto err;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(data,argv[1])) goto err;
p7=PKCS7_new();
#if 0
BIO_reset(in);
if ((pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_free(in);
PKCS7_set_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped);
if (PKCS7_add_signature(p7,x509,pkey,EVP_sha1()) == NULL) goto err;
/* we may want to add more */
PKCS7_add_certificate(p7,x509);
#else
PKCS7_set_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_enveloped);
#endif
if(!cipher) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
cipher = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
#else
fprintf(stderr, "No cipher selected\n");
goto err;
#endif
}
if (!PKCS7_set_cipher(p7,cipher)) goto err;
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(recips); i++) {
if (!PKCS7_add_recipient(p7,sk_X509_value(recips, i))) goto err;
}
sk_X509_pop_free(recips, X509_free);
/* Set the content of the signed to 'data' */
/* PKCS7_content_new(p7,NID_pkcs7_data); not used in envelope */
/* could be used, but not in this version :-)
if (!nodetach) PKCS7_set_detached(p7,1);
*/
if ((p7bio=PKCS7_dataInit(p7,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(data,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(p7bio,buf,i);
}
BIO_flush(p7bio);
if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7,p7bio)) goto err;
BIO_free(p7bio);
PEM_write_PKCS7(stdout,p7);
PKCS7_free(p7);
exit(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}

View File

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
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Gh4d/Z0EUMCVHs/HZ/bWgiyhtHpvuVAzidm8D81p1LJ5BQX5/5f/m+q5+fS/npL27dTEbNqs
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1wRIo72NaeWuUEQ+rt1SlCsOJ7k1ioJSqhrPOfvwcaFcb4beVet1JWiy4yvowTjLDGbUje2s
xjrlVt4BJWI/uA6jbQsrxSe89ADZBAi5YAlR4qszeAQIXD3VSBVKbRUECNTtyvw9vvqXBAhb
IZNn4H4cxgQI+XW7GkfL+ekECCCCg2reMyGDBAh1PYqkg3lw3gQQkNlggEPU+BH8eh7Gm7n7
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qZV2VhjkB2j09GEECOIdv8AVOJgKBAjlHgIqAD9jZQQIXHbs44+wogcEIGGqTACRJxrhMcMG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-----END PKCS7-----

View File

@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
int add_signed_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
{
ASN1_UTCTIME *sign_time;
/* The last parameter is the amount to add/subtract from the current
* time (in seconds) */
sign_time=X509_gmtime_adj(NULL,0);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
V_ASN1_UTCTIME,(char *)sign_time);
return(1);
}
ASN1_UTCTIME *get_signed_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si,NID_pkcs9_signingTime);
if (so->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return so->value.utctime;
return NULL;
}
static int signed_string_nid= -1;
void add_signed_string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *str)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
/* To a an object of OID 1.2.3.4.5, which is an octet string */
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
os=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,(unsigned char*)str,strlen(str));
/* When we add, we do not free */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,signed_string_nid,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,(char *)os);
}
int get_signed_string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *buf, int len)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
int i;
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si,signed_string_nid);
if (so != NULL)
{
if (so->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
{
os=so->value.octet_string;
i=os->length;
if ((i+1) > len)
i=len-1;
memcpy(buf,os->data,i);
return(i);
}
}
return(0);
}
static int signed_seq2string_nid= -1;
/* ########################################### */
int add_signed_seq2string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *str1, char *str2)
{
/* To add an object of OID 1.9.999, which is a sequence containing
* 2 octet strings */
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
ASN1_STRING *seq;
unsigned char *data;
int i,total;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
os1=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
os2=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os1,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os2,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
i =i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,NULL);
i+=i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,NULL);
total=ASN1_object_size(1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
data=malloc(total);
p=data;
ASN1_put_object(&p,1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,&p);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,&p);
seq=ASN1_STRING_new();
ASN1_STRING_set(seq,data,total);
free(data);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si,signed_seq2string_nid,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,(char *)seq);
return(1);
}
/* For this case, I will malloc the return strings */
int get_signed_seq2string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char **str1, char **str2)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(si,signed_seq2string_nid);
if (so && (so->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
{
ASN1_const_CTX c;
ASN1_STRING *s;
long length;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
s=so->value.sequence;
c.p=ASN1_STRING_data(s);
c.max=c.p+ASN1_STRING_length(s);
if (!asn1_GetSequence(&c,&length)) goto err;
/* Length is the length of the seqence */
c.q=c.p;
if ((os1=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
c.q=c.p;
if ((os2=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
if (!asn1_const_Finish(&c)) goto err;
*str1=malloc(os1->length+1);
*str2=malloc(os2->length+1);
memcpy(*str1,os1->data,os1->length);
memcpy(*str2,os2->data,os2->length);
(*str1)[os1->length]='\0';
(*str2)[os2->length]='\0';
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
return(1);
}
err:
return(0);
}
/* #######################################
* THE OTHER WAY TO DO THINGS
* #######################################
*/
X509_ATTRIBUTE *create_time(void)
{
ASN1_UTCTIME *sign_time;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
/* The last parameter is the amount to add/subtract from the current
* time (in seconds) */
sign_time=X509_gmtime_adj(NULL,0);
ret=X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(NID_pkcs9_signingTime,
V_ASN1_UTCTIME,(char *)sign_time);
return(ret);
}
ASN1_UTCTIME *sk_get_time(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO si;
si.auth_attr=sk;
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(&si,NID_pkcs9_signingTime);
if (so->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return so->value.utctime;
return NULL;
}
X509_ATTRIBUTE *create_string(char *str)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
/* To a an object of OID 1.2.3.4.5, which is an octet string */
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
os=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os,(unsigned char*)str,strlen(str));
/* When we add, we do not free */
ret=X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(signed_string_nid,
V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,(char *)os);
return(ret);
}
int sk_get_string(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, char *buf, int len)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
int i;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO si;
si.auth_attr=sk;
if (signed_string_nid == -1)
signed_string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.2.3.4.5","OID_example","Our example OID");
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(&si,signed_string_nid);
if (so != NULL)
{
if (so->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
{
os=so->value.octet_string;
i=os->length;
if ((i+1) > len)
i=len-1;
memcpy(buf,os->data,i);
return(i);
}
}
return(0);
}
X509_ATTRIBUTE *add_seq2string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char *str1, char *str2)
{
/* To add an object of OID 1.9.999, which is a sequence containing
* 2 octet strings */
unsigned char *p;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
ASN1_STRING *seq;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *ret;
unsigned char *data;
int i,total;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
os1=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
os2=ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os1,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os2,(unsigned char*)str1,strlen(str1));
i =i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,NULL);
i+=i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,NULL);
total=ASN1_object_size(1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
data=malloc(total);
p=data;
ASN1_put_object(&p,1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os1,&p);
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(os2,&p);
seq=ASN1_STRING_new();
ASN1_STRING_set(seq,data,total);
free(data);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
ret=X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(signed_seq2string_nid,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE,(char *)seq);
return(ret);
}
/* For this case, I will malloc the return strings */
int sk_get_seq2string(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, char **str1, char **str2)
{
ASN1_TYPE *so;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO si;
if (signed_seq2string_nid == -1)
signed_seq2string_nid=
OBJ_create("1.9.9999","OID_example","Our example OID");
si.auth_attr=sk;
/* To retrieve */
so=PKCS7_get_signed_attribute(&si,signed_seq2string_nid);
if (so->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
{
ASN1_const_CTX c;
ASN1_STRING *s;
long length;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os1,*os2;
s=so->value.sequence;
c.p=ASN1_STRING_data(s);
c.max=c.p+ASN1_STRING_length(s);
if (!asn1_GetSequence(&c,&length)) goto err;
/* Length is the length of the seqence */
c.q=c.p;
if ((os1=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
c.q=c.p;
if ((os2=d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL,&c.p,c.slen)) == NULL)
goto err;
c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
if (!asn1_const_Finish(&c)) goto err;
*str1=malloc(os1->length+1);
*str2=malloc(os2->length+1);
memcpy(*str1,os1->data,os1->length);
memcpy(*str2,os2->data,os2->length);
(*str1)[os1->length]='\0';
(*str2)[os2->length]='\0';
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os1);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os2);
return(1);
}
err:
return(0);
}

View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
int add_signed_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
ASN1_UTCTIME *get_signed_time(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si);
int get_signed_seq2string(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si, char **str1, char **str2);

View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
issuer :/C=AU/SP=Queensland/L=Brisbane/O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd/OU=DEMONSTRATION AND TESTING/CN=DEMO ZERO VALUE CA
subject:/C=AU/SP=Queensland/L=Brisbane/O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd/OU=SMIME 003/CN=Information/Email=info@cryptsoft.com
serial :047D
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1149 (0x47d)
Signature Algorithm: md5withRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=AU, SP=Queensland, L=Brisbane, O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd, OU=DEMONSTRATION AND TESTING, CN=DEMO ZERO VALUE CA
Validity
Not Before: May 13 05:40:58 1998 GMT
Not After : May 12 05:40:58 2000 GMT
Subject: C=AU, SP=Queensland, L=Brisbane, O=Cryptsoft Pty Ltd, OU=SMIME 003, CN=Information/Email=info@cryptsoft.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
Modulus:
00:ad:e7:23:89:ee:0d:87:b7:9c:32:44:4b:95:81:
73:dd:22:80:4b:2d:c5:60:b8:fe:1e:18:63:ef:dc:
89:89:22:df:95:3c:7a:db:3d:9a:06:a8:08:d6:29:
fd:ef:41:09:91:ed:bc:ad:98:f9:f6:28:90:62:6f:
e7:e7:0c:4d:0b
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
Netscape Comment:
Generated with SSLeay
Signature Algorithm: md5withRSAEncryption
52:15:ea:88:f4:f0:f9:0b:ef:ce:d5:f8:83:40:61:16:5e:55:
f9:ce:2d:d1:8b:31:5c:03:c6:2d:10:7c:61:d5:5c:0a:42:97:
d1:fd:65:b6:b6:84:a5:39:ec:46:ec:fc:e0:0d:d9:22:da:1b:
50:74:ad:92:cb:4e:90:e5:fa:7d
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBOgIBAAJBAK3nI4nuDYe3nDJES5WBc90igEstxWC4/h4YY+/ciYki35U8ets9
mgaoCNYp/e9BCZHtvK2Y+fYokGJv5+cMTQsCAwEAAQJBAIHpvXvqEcOEoDRRHuIG
fkcB4jPHcr9KE9TpxabH6xs9beN6OJnkePXAHwaz5MnUgSnbpOKq+cw8miKjXwe/
zVECIQDVLwncT2lRmXarEYHzb+q/0uaSvKhWKKt3kJasLNTrAwIhANDUc/ghut29
p3jJYjurzUKuG774/5eLjPLsxPPIZzNZAiA/10hSq41UnGqHLEUIS9m2/EeEZe7b
bm567dfRU9OnVQIgDo8ROrZXSchEGbaog5J5r/Fle83uO8l93R3GqVxKXZkCIFfk
IPD5PIYQAyyod3hyKKza7ZP4CGY4oOfZetbkSGGG
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBOgIBAAJBAK3nI4nuDYe3nDJES5WBc90igEstxWC4/h4YY+/ciYki35U8ets9
mgaoCNYp/e9BCZHtvK2Y+fYokGJv5+cMTQsCAwEAAQJBAIHpvXvqEcOEoDRRHuIG
fkcB4jPHcr9KE9TpxabH6xs9beN6OJnkePXAHwaz5MnUgSnbpOKq+cw8miKjXwe/
zVECIQDVLwncT2lRmXarEYHzb+q/0uaSvKhWKKt3kJasLNTrAwIhANDUc/ghut29
p3jJYjurzUKuG774/5eLjPLsxPPIZzNZAiA/10hSq41UnGqHLEUIS9m2/EeEZe7b
bm567dfRU9OnVQIgDo8ROrZXSchEGbaog5J5r/Fle83uO8l93R3GqVxKXZkCIFfk
IPD5PIYQAyyod3hyKKza7ZP4CGY4oOfZetbkSGGG
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
j,H>_<15><>_<>D<EFBFBD>zE<>L<EFBFBD> VJ<56><4A><10><><1D>E3<45><33>Y<08>x%_<>k
3<EFBFBD>)DLSc<53>8% <0C>M

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
k~@a<>,N<>M͹<> <O( KP<4B><EFBFBD>K<EFBFBD>><3E><>U<>o_<6F>Bqrm<72>?٠t?t<><74>ρ<EFBFBD>Id2<><32>

Binary file not shown.

Binary file not shown.

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -233,10 +233,6 @@ DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF(PKCS7)
(OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped)
#define PKCS7_type_is_data(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_data)
#define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest)
#define PKCS7_type_is_encrypted(a) \
(OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_encrypted)
#define PKCS7_type_is_digest(a) (OBJ_obj2nid((a)->type) == NID_pkcs7_digest)
#define PKCS7_set_detached(p,v) \
PKCS7_ctrl(p,PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE,v,NULL)

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
issuer= /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
subject=/C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Server test cert (512 bit)
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIBPAIBAAJBAJ+zw4Qnlf8SMVIPFe9GEcStgOY2Ww/dgNdhjeD8ckUJNP5VZkVD
TGiXav6ooKXfX3j/7tdkuD8Ey2//Kv7+ue0CAwEAAQJAN6W31vDEP2DjdqhzCDDu
OA4NACqoiFqyblo7yc2tM4h4xMbC3Yx5UKMN9ZkCtX0gzrz6DyF47bdKcWBzNWCj
gQIhANEoojVt7hq+SQ6MCN6FTAysGgQf56Q3TYoJMoWvdiXVAiEAw3e3rc+VJpOz
rHuDo6bgpjUAAXM+v3fcpsfZSNO6V7kCIQCtbVjanpUwvZkMI9by02oUk9taki3b
PzPfAfNPYAbCJQIhAJXNQDWyqwn/lGmR11cqY2y9nZ1+5w3yHGatLrcDnQHxAiEA
vnlEGo8K85u+KwIOimM48ZG8oTk7iFdkqLJR1utT3aU=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

View File

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
/* crypto/pkcs7/sign.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
int main(argc,argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
X509 *x509;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
PKCS7 *p7;
PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si;
BIO *in;
BIO *data,*p7bio;
char buf[1024*4];
int i;
int nodetach=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
EVP_add_digest(EVP_mdc2());
#endif
data=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
again:
if (argc > 1)
{
if (strcmp(argv[1],"-nd") == 0)
{
nodetach=1;
argv++; argc--;
goto again;
}
if (!BIO_read_filename(data,argv[1]))
goto err;
}
else
BIO_set_fp(data,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
if ((in=BIO_new_file("server.pem","r")) == NULL) goto err;
if ((x509=PEM_read_bio_X509(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_reset(in);
if ((pkey=PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in,NULL,NULL,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
BIO_free(in);
p7=PKCS7_new();
PKCS7_set_type(p7,NID_pkcs7_signed);
si=PKCS7_add_signature(p7,x509,pkey,EVP_sha1());
if (si == NULL) goto err;
/* If you do this then you get signing time automatically added */
PKCS7_add_signed_attribute(si, NID_pkcs9_contentType, V_ASN1_OBJECT,
OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data));
/* we may want to add more */
PKCS7_add_certificate(p7,x509);
/* Set the content of the signed to 'data' */
PKCS7_content_new(p7,NID_pkcs7_data);
if (!nodetach)
PKCS7_set_detached(p7,1);
if ((p7bio=PKCS7_dataInit(p7,NULL)) == NULL) goto err;
for (;;)
{
i=BIO_read(data,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) break;
BIO_write(p7bio,buf,i);
}
if (!PKCS7_dataFinal(p7,p7bio)) goto err;
BIO_free(p7bio);
PEM_write_PKCS7(stdout,p7);
PKCS7_free(p7);
exit(0);
err:
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
exit(1);
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----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-----END PKCS7-----

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More