corrected fix to PR#2711 and also cover mime_param_cmp

continue with symmetric decryption process to avoid leaking timing
information to an attacker.

Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,24 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
  Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]
 
   *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.

Configure

@@ -1015,6 +1015,8 @@ foreach (sort (keys %disabled))
 			else
 				{
 				push @skip, $algo;
+				# fix-up crypto/directory name(s)
+				@skip[$#skip]="whrlpool" if $algo eq "whirlpool";
 				print " (skip dir)";
 
 				$depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_$ALGO";
@@ -1415,7 +1417,7 @@ else	{
 	$aes_obj=$aes_enc;
 	}
 $wp_obj="" if ($wp_obj =~ /mmx/ && $processor eq "386");
-if ($wp_obj =~ /\.o$/)
+if ($wp_obj =~ /\.o$/ && !$disabled{"whirlpool"})
 	{
 	$cflags.=" -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM";
 	}

FAQ

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 1.0.0g was released on Jan 18th, 2012.
+OpenSSL 1.0.0h was released on Mar 12th, 2012.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:

Makefile.org

@@ -322,7 +322,8 @@ libcrypto.pc: Makefile
 	    echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \
 	    echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
 	    echo 'Requires: '; \
-	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto'; \
+	    echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
 	    echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc
 
 libssl.pc: Makefile
@@ -335,7 +336,8 @@ libssl.pc: Makefile
 	    echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \
 	    echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
 	    echo 'Requires: '; \
-	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+	    echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
 	    echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc
 
 openssl.pc: Makefile
@@ -348,7 +350,8 @@ openssl.pc: Makefile
 	    echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \
 	    echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \
 	    echo 'Requires: '; \
-	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \
+	    echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto'; \
+	    echo 'Libs.private: $(EX_LIBS)'; \
 	    echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc
 
 Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config

NEWS

@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h:
+
+      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g:
 
       o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.0g 18 Jan 2012
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0h 12 Mar 2012
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

STATUS

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 
   OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 2012/01/18 13:38:33 $
+  ______________                           $Date: 2012/03/12 14:24:48 $
 
   DEVELOPMENT STATE
 
     o  OpenSSL 1.1.0:  Under development...
     o  OpenSSL 1.0.1:  Under development...
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0h: Released on March     12th, 2012
     o  OpenSSL 1.0.0g: Released on January   18th, 2012
     o  OpenSSL 1.0.0f: Released on January    4th, 2012
     o  OpenSSL 1.0.0e: Released on September  6th, 2011

apps/apps.c

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
  *
  */
 
-#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
+#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
 #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2	/* On VMS, you need to define this to get
 				   the declaration of fileno().  The value
 				   2 is to make sure no function defined
@@ -1215,7 +1215,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
 	const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
-	load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, &certs, NULL);
+	if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, &certs, NULL))
+		return NULL;
 	return certs;
 	}	
 
@@ -1223,7 +1224,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *load_crls(BIO *err, const char *file, int format,
 	const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *desc)
 	{
 	STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls;
-	load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, NULL, &crls);
+	if (!load_certs_crls(err, file, format, pass, e, desc, NULL, &crls))
+		return NULL;
 	return crls;
 	}	
 

crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c

@@ -377,8 +377,12 @@ static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
 	BIO *tmpbio;
 	const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs;
 	ASN1_STREAM_ARG sarg;
+	int rv = 1;
 
-	if (!(flags & SMIME_DETACHED))
+	/* If data is not deteched or resigning then the output BIO is
+	 * already set up to finalise when it is written through.
+	 */
+	if (!(flags & SMIME_DETACHED) || (flags & PKCS7_REUSE_DIGEST))
 		{
 		SMIME_crlf_copy(data, out, flags);
 		return 1;
@@ -405,7 +409,7 @@ static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
 
 	/* Finalize structure */
 	if (aux->asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_DETACHED_POST, &val, it, &sarg) <= 0)
-		return 0;
+		rv = 0;
 
 	/* Now remove any digests prepended to the BIO */
 
@@ -416,7 +420,7 @@ static int asn1_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
 		sarg.ndef_bio = tmpbio;
 		}
 
-	return 1;
+	return rv;
 
 	}
 
@@ -486,9 +490,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 
 		if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
 			strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
-			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
 			ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -858,12 +862,17 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
 static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
 			const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
+		return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
+
 	return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
 }
 
 static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
 			const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
+		return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
 	return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
 }
 

crypto/asn1/x_name.c

@@ -399,8 +399,7 @@ static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, ASN1_STRING *in)
 	/* If type not in bitmask just copy string across */
 	if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(in->type) & ASN1_MASK_CANON))
 		{
-		out->type = in->type;
-		if (!ASN1_STRING_set(out, in->data, in->length))
+		if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(out, in))
 			return 0;
 		return 1;
 		}

crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c

@@ -171,7 +171,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 		goto error;
 		}
 
-	key->pkey = ret;
+	/* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+	if (key->pkey)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+		ret = key->pkey;
+		}
+	else
+		key->pkey = ret;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 
 	return ret;

crypto/bio/bio.h

@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /* #endif */
 
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU          40 /* as kernel for current MTU */
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU   47
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU            41 /* get cached value for MTU */
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU            42 /* set cached value for
 					      * MTU. want to use this

crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c

@@ -547,6 +547,27 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		ret = 0;
 #endif
 		break;
+	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+		switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family)
+			{
+			case AF_INET:
+				ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+				break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+			case AF_INET6:
+#ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED
+				if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&data->peer.sa_in6.sin6_addr))
+					ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+				else
+#endif
+					ret = 1280 - 40 - 8;
+				break;
+#endif
+			default:
+				ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+				break;
+			}
+		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU:
 		return data->mtu;
 		break;

crypto/cms/cms.h

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_PRINT_FUNCTION(CMS_ContentInfo)
 #define CMS_PARTIAL			0x4000
 #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST		0x8000
 #define CMS_USE_KEYID			0x10000
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT		0x20000
 
 const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
 

crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
 	X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+	unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+	size_t tkeylen;
 
 	int ok = 0;
 
@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 				CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
 		goto err;
 		}
-
-
-	if (enc && !ec->key)
+	/* Generate random session key */
+	if (!enc || !ec->key)
 		{
-		/* Generate random key */
-		if (!ec->keylen)
-			ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
-		ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
-		if (!ec->key)
+		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
 			{
 			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
 							ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
 			goto err;
-		keep_key = 1;
 		}
-	else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
+
+	if (!ec->key)
+		{
+		ec->key = tkey;
+		ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+		tkey = NULL;
+		if (enc)
+			keep_key = 1;
+		else
+			ERR_clear_error();
+		
+		}
+
+	if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
 		{
 		/* If necessary set key length */
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
 			{
-			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
-				CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
-			goto err;
+			/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
+			 * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
+			 */
+			if (ec->debug)
+				{
+				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+						CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Use random key */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+				OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+				ec->key = tkey;
+				ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+				tkey = NULL;
+				ERR_clear_error();
+				}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
 		ec->key = NULL;
 		}
+	if (tkey)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+		}
 	if (ok)
 		return b;
 	BIO_free(b);

crypto/cms/cms_env.c

@@ -371,6 +371,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
 	size_t eklen;
 	int ret = 0;
+	CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+	ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
 
 	if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
 		{
@@ -417,8 +419,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 
 	ret = 1;
 
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
+	if (ec->key)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+		}
+
+	ec->key = ek;
+	ec->keylen = eklen;
 
 	err:
 	if (pctx)

crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h

@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
 	unsigned char *key;
 	size_t keylen;
+	/* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+	int debug;
 	};
 
 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st

crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -611,7 +611,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 	STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
 	CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
 	int i, r;
+	int debug = 0;
 	ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+	if (ris)
+		debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
 		{
 		ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
@@ -625,17 +628,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
 			r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
-			if (r > 0)
-				return 1;
 			if (cert)
 				{
+				/* If not debugging clear any error and
+				 * return success to avoid leaking of
+				 * information useful to MMA
+				 */
+				if (!debug)
+					{
+					ERR_clear_error();
+					return 1;
+					}
+				if (r > 0)
+					return 1;
 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
 						CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
 				return 0;
 				}
-			ERR_clear_error();
+			/* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
+			 * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
+			 * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
+			 * of a successful decrypt.
+			 */
+			else if (r > 0 && debug)
+				return 1;
 			}
 		}
+	/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+	if (!cert && !debug)
+		{
+		ERR_clear_error();
+		return 1;
+		}
 
 	CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
 	return 0;
@@ -694,9 +718,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
 		}
 	if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
 		return 0;
+	if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+	else
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+	if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+		return 1;
 	if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
 		return 0;
-
 	cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
 	if (!cont)
 		return 0;

crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c

@@ -79,8 +79,6 @@ struct dev_crypto_state {
 	unsigned char digest_res[HASH_MAX_LEN];
 	char *mac_data;
 	int mac_len;
-
-	int copy;
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -200,6 +198,7 @@ get_dev_crypto(void)
 
 	if ((fd = open_dev_crypto()) == -1)
 		return (-1);
+#ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
 	if (ioctl(fd, CRIOGET, &retfd) == -1)
 		return (-1);
 
@@ -208,9 +207,19 @@ get_dev_crypto(void)
 		close(retfd);
 		return (-1);
 	}
+#else
+        retfd = fd;
+#endif
 	return (retfd);
 }
 
+static void put_dev_crypto(int fd)
+{
+#ifndef CRIOGET_NOT_NEEDED
+	close(fd);
+#endif
+}
+
 /* Caching version for asym operations */
 static int
 get_asym_dev_crypto(void)
@@ -252,7 +261,7 @@ get_cryptodev_ciphers(const int **cnids)
 		    ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
 			nids[count++] = ciphers[i].nid;
 	}
-	close(fd);
+	put_dev_crypto(fd);
 
 	if (count > 0)
 		*cnids = nids;
@@ -291,7 +300,7 @@ get_cryptodev_digests(const int **cnids)
 		    ioctl(fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess.ses) != -1)
 			nids[count++] = digests[i].nid;
 	}
-	close(fd);
+	put_dev_crypto(fd);
 
 	if (count > 0)
 		*cnids = nids;
@@ -436,7 +445,7 @@ cryptodev_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
 	sess->cipher = cipher;
 
 	if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) == -1) {
-		close(state->d_fd);
+		put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
 		state->d_fd = -1;
 		return (0);
 	}
@@ -473,7 +482,7 @@ cryptodev_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	} else {
 		ret = 1;
 	}
-	close(state->d_fd);
+	put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
 	state->d_fd = -1;
 
 	return (ret);
@@ -686,7 +695,7 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 	sess->mac = digest;
 
 	if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
-		close(state->d_fd);
+		put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);
 		state->d_fd = -1;
 		printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n");
 		return (0);
@@ -758,14 +767,12 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
 	if (! (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT) ) {
 		/* if application doesn't support one buffer */
 		memset(&cryp, 0, sizeof(cryp));
-
 		cryp.ses = sess->ses;
 		cryp.flags = 0;
 		cryp.len = state->mac_len;
 		cryp.src = state->mac_data;
 		cryp.dst = NULL;
 		cryp.mac = (caddr_t)md;
-
 		if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCCRYPT, &cryp) < 0) {
 			printf("cryptodev_digest_final: digest failed\n");
 			return (0);
@@ -786,6 +793,9 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 	struct dev_crypto_state *state = ctx->md_data;
 	struct session_op *sess = &state->d_sess;
 
+	if (state == NULL)
+	  return 0;
+
 	if (state->d_fd < 0) {
 		printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: illegal input\n");
 		return (0);
@@ -797,16 +807,13 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 		state->mac_len = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (state->copy)
-		return 1;
-
 	if (ioctl(state->d_fd, CIOCFSESSION, &sess->ses) < 0) {
 		printf("cryptodev_digest_cleanup: failed to close session\n");
 		ret = 0;
 	} else {
 		ret = 1;
 	}
-	close(state->d_fd);	
+	put_dev_crypto(state->d_fd);	
 	state->d_fd = -1;
 
 	return (ret);
@@ -816,15 +823,39 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to,const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
 {
 	struct dev_crypto_state *fstate = from->md_data;
 	struct dev_crypto_state *dstate = to->md_data;
+	struct session_op *sess;
+	int digest;
 
-	memcpy(dstate, fstate, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
+	if (dstate == NULL || fstate == NULL)
+	  return 1;
 
-	if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
-		dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
-		memcpy(dstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_len);
+       	memcpy(dstate, fstate, sizeof(struct dev_crypto_state));
+
+	sess = &dstate->d_sess;
+
+	digest = digest_nid_to_cryptodev(to->digest->type);
+
+	sess->mackey = dstate->dummy_mac_key;
+	sess->mackeylen = digest_key_length(to->digest->type);
+	sess->mac = digest;
+
+	dstate->d_fd = get_dev_crypto();
+
+	if (ioctl(dstate->d_fd, CIOCGSESSION, sess) < 0) {
+		put_dev_crypto(dstate->d_fd);
+		dstate->d_fd = -1;
+		printf("cryptodev_digest_init: Open session failed\n");
+		return (0);
 	}
 
-	dstate->copy = 1;
+	if (fstate->mac_len != 0) {
+	        if (fstate->mac_data != NULL)
+	                {
+        		dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len);
+	        	memcpy(dstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_data, fstate->mac_len);
+           		dstate->mac_len = fstate->mac_len;
+	        	}
+	}
 
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -1347,11 +1378,11 @@ ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void)
 	 * find out what asymmetric crypto algorithms we support
 	 */
 	if (ioctl(fd, CIOCASYMFEAT, &cryptodev_asymfeat) == -1) {
-		close(fd);
+		put_dev_crypto(fd);
 		ENGINE_free(engine);
 		return;
 	}
-	close(fd);
+	put_dev_crypto(fd);
 
 	if (!ENGINE_set_id(engine, "cryptodev") ||
 	    !ENGINE_set_name(engine, "BSD cryptodev engine") ||

crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000007fL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x1000008fL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0g-fips 18 Jan 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0h-fips 12 Mar 2012"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0g 18 Jan 2012"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 1.0.0h 12 Mar 2012"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl

@@ -555,7 +555,8 @@ my %globals;
 					    $v.=" READONLY";
 					    $v.=" ALIGN(".($1 eq "p" ? 4 : 8).")" if ($masm>=$masmref);
 					} elsif ($line=~/\.CRT\$/i) {
-					    $v.=" READONLY DWORD";
+					    $v.=" READONLY ";
+					    $v.=$masm>=$masmref ? "ALIGN(8)" : "DWORD";
 					}
 				    }
 				    $current_segment = $line;

crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c

@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
 	if (cert && *cert)
 		X509_free(*cert);
 	if (x)
-		X509_free(*cert);
+		X509_free(x);
 	if (ocerts)
 		sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
 	return 0;

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c

@@ -204,11 +204,11 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
 	size_t eklen;
 
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
 
 	pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
 	if (!pctx)
-		return 0;
+		return -1;
 
 	if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
 		goto err;
@@ -235,12 +235,19 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
 	if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
 				ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0)
 		{
+		ret = 0;
 		PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
 		goto err;
 		}
 
 	ret = 1;
 
+	if (*pek)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(*pek, *peklen);
+		OPENSSL_free(*pek);
+		}
+
 	*pek = ek;
 	*peklen = eklen;
 
@@ -500,8 +507,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 		int max;
 		X509_OBJECT ret;
 #endif
-		unsigned char *ek = NULL;
-		int eklen;
+		unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
+		int eklen, tkeylen;
 
 		if ((etmp=BIO_new(BIO_f_cipher())) == NULL)
 			{
@@ -534,29 +541,28 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 			}
 
 		/* If we haven't got a certificate try each ri in turn */
-
 		if (pcert == NULL)
 			{
+			/* Always attempt to decrypt all rinfo even
+			 * after sucess as a defence against MMA timing
+			 * attacks.
+			 */
 			for (i=0; i<sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++)
 				{
 				ri=sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk,i);
+				
 				if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen,
-							ri, pkey) > 0)
-					break;
+							ri, pkey) < 0)
+					goto err;
 				ERR_clear_error();
-				ri = NULL;
-				}
-			if (ri == NULL)
-				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-				      PKCS7_R_NO_RECIPIENT_MATCHES_KEY);
-				goto err;
 				}
 			}
 		else
 			{
-			if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) <= 0)
+			/* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
+			if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
 				goto err;
+			ERR_clear_error();
 			}
 
 		evp_ctx=NULL;
@@ -565,6 +571,19 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 			goto err;
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
 			goto err;
+		/* Generate random key as MMA defence */
+		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx);
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
+			goto err;
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(evp_ctx, tkey) <= 0)
+			goto err;
+		if (ek == NULL)
+			{
+			ek = tkey;
+			eklen = tkeylen;
+			tkey = NULL;
+			}
 
 		if (eklen != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
 			/* Some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
@@ -573,11 +592,16 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 			 */
 			if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(evp_ctx, eklen))
 				{
-				PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
-					PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
-				goto err;
+				/* Use random key as MMA defence */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ek, eklen);
+				OPENSSL_free(ek);
+				ek = tkey;
+				eklen = tkeylen;
+				tkey = NULL;
 				}
 		} 
+		/* Clear errors so we don't leak information useful in MMA */
+		ERR_clear_error();
 		if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(evp_ctx,NULL,NULL,ek,NULL,0) <= 0)
 			goto err;
 
@@ -586,6 +610,11 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
 			OPENSSL_cleanse(ek,eklen);
 			OPENSSL_free(ek);
 			}
+		if (tkey)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey,tkeylen);
+			OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+			}
 
 		if (out == NULL)
 			out=etmp;

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

@@ -573,15 +573,34 @@ int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags)
 			return 0;
 		}
 		ret = SMIME_text(bread, data);
+		if (ret > 0 && BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+			{
+			if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+				ret = 0;
+			}
 		BIO_free_all(bread);
 		return ret;
 	} else {
 		for(;;) {
 			i = BIO_read(tmpmem, buf, sizeof(buf));
-			if(i <= 0) break;
-			BIO_write(data, buf, i);
+			if(i <= 0)
+				{
+				ret = 1;
+				if (BIO_method_type(tmpmem) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER)
+					{
+					if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(tmpmem))
+						ret = 0;
+					}
+					
+				break;
+				}
+			if (BIO_write(data, buf, i) != i)
+				{
+				ret = 0;
+				break;
+				}
 		}
 		BIO_free_all(tmpmem);
-		return 1;
+		return ret;
 	}
 }

crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
  * sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for
  * the intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi.
  */
-#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
+#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
 #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2
 #endif
 #include <signal.h>

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	{
 	X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
-	X509_NAME *xn;
 	int bad_chain = 0;
 	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
 	int depth,i,ok=0;
@@ -205,7 +204,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		                         */
 
 		/* If we are self signed, we break */
-		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
 
 		/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
@@ -242,7 +240,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
 	i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 	x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
-	xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
 	if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
 		{
 		/* we have a self signed certificate */
@@ -291,7 +288,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		if (depth < num) break;
 
 		/* If we are self signed, we break */
-		xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
 
 		ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
@@ -310,7 +306,6 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		}
 
 	/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
-	xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 
 	/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
 	if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))

crypto/x509v3/v3_asid.c

@@ -358,6 +358,20 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
       goto done;
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for inverted range.
+   */
+  i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+  {
+    ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+      extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+	goto done;
+    }
+  }
+
   ret = 1;
 
  done:
@@ -392,9 +406,18 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
     return 1;
 
   /*
-   * We have a list.  Sort it.
+   * If not a list, or if empty list, it's broken.
+   */
+  if (choice->type != ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges ||
+      sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) == 0) {
+    X509V3err(X509V3_F_ASIDENTIFIERCHOICE_CANONIZE,
+	      X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * We have a non-empty list.  Sort it.
    */
-  OPENSSL_assert(choice->type == ASIdentifierChoice_asIdsOrRanges);
   sk_ASIdOrRange_sort(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges);
 
   /*
@@ -414,6 +437,13 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
      */
     OPENSSL_assert(ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, b_min) <= 0);
 
+    /*
+     * Punt inverted ranges.
+     */
+    if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0 ||
+	ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(b_min, b_max) > 0)
+      goto done;
+
     /*
      * Check for overlaps.
      */
@@ -465,12 +495,26 @@ static int ASIdentifierChoice_canonize(ASIdentifierChoice *choice)
 	break;
       }
       ASIdOrRange_free(b);
-      sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
+      (void) sk_ASIdOrRange_delete(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i + 1);
       i--;
       continue;
     }
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Check for final inverted range.
+   */
+  i = sk_ASIdOrRange_num(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges) - 1;
+  {
+    ASIdOrRange *a = sk_ASIdOrRange_value(choice->u.asIdsOrRanges, i);
+    ASN1_INTEGER *a_min, *a_max;
+    if (a != NULL && a->type == ASIdOrRange_range) {
+      extract_min_max(a, &a_min, &a_max);
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a_min, a_max) > 0)
+	goto done;
+    }
+  }
+
   OPENSSL_assert(ASIdentifierChoice_is_canonical(choice)); /* Paranoia */
 
   ret = 1;
@@ -498,6 +542,7 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
 			       struct v3_ext_ctx *ctx,
 			       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values)
 {
+  ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
   ASIdentifiers *asid = NULL;
   int i;
 
@@ -508,7 +553,6 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
 
   for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
     CONF_VALUE *val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
-    ASN1_INTEGER *min = NULL, *max = NULL;
     int i1, i2, i3, is_range, which;
 
     /*
@@ -578,18 +622,19 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
       max = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, s + i2);
       OPENSSL_free(s);
       if (min == NULL || max == NULL) {
-	ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
-	ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
 	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 	goto err;
       }
+      if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(min, max) > 0) {
+	X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, X509V3_R_EXTENSION_VALUE_ERROR);
+	goto err;
+      }
     }
     if (!v3_asid_add_id_or_range(asid, which, min, max)) {
-      ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
-      ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
       X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_ASIDENTIFIERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
       goto err;
     }
+    min = max = NULL;
   }
 
   /*
@@ -601,6 +646,8 @@ static void *v2i_ASIdentifiers(const struct v3_ext_method *method,
 
  err:
   ASIdentifiers_free(asid);
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(min);
+  ASN1_INTEGER_free(max);
   return NULL;
 }
 

engines/ccgost/gost_pmeth.c

@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ static int pkey_gost_mac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
 				{
 				GOSTerr(GOST_F_PKEY_GOST_MAC_CTRL_STR,
 					GOST_R_INVALID_MAC_KEY_LENGTH);
+				OPENSSL_free(keybuf);
 				return 0;	
 				}
 			ret= pkey_gost_mac_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY,

engines/e_capi.c

@@ -442,28 +442,36 @@ static int capi_init(ENGINE *e)
 	CAPI_CTX *ctx;
 	const RSA_METHOD *ossl_rsa_meth;
 	const DSA_METHOD *ossl_dsa_meth;
-	capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+	if (capi_idx < 0)
+		{
+		capi_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		if (capi_idx < 0)
+			goto memerr;
+
+		cert_capi_idx = X509_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+
+		/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
+		rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
+		capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
+		capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+
+		/* Setup DSA Method */
+		dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+		ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
+		capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
+		capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
+		capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
+		}
 
 	ctx = capi_ctx_new();
-	if (!ctx || (capi_idx < 0))
+	if (!ctx)
 		goto memerr;
 
 	ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, capi_idx, ctx);
-	/* Setup RSA_METHOD */
-	rsa_capi_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	ossl_rsa_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_enc = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_enc;
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_pub_dec = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_pub_dec;
-	capi_rsa_method.rsa_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->rsa_mod_exp;
-	capi_rsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_rsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
-
-	/* Setup DSA Method */
-	dsa_capi_idx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-	ossl_dsa_meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
-	capi_dsa_method.dsa_do_verify = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_do_verify;
-	capi_dsa_method.dsa_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->dsa_mod_exp;
-	capi_dsa_method.bn_mod_exp = ossl_dsa_meth->bn_mod_exp;
 
 #ifdef OPENSSL_CAPIENG_DIALOG
 	{
@@ -1155,6 +1163,7 @@ static int capi_list_containers(CAPI_CTX *ctx, BIO *out)
 		{
 		CAPIerr(CAPI_F_CAPI_LIST_CONTAINERS, CAPI_R_ENUMCONTAINERS_ERROR);
 		capi_addlasterror();
+		CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
 		return 0;
 		}
 	CAPI_trace(ctx, "Got max container len %d\n", buflen);
@@ -1572,6 +1581,8 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname(CAPI_CTX *ctx, LPSTR pname, DWORD type, int che
 			}
 		CryptReleaseContext(hprov, 0);
 		}
+	if (ctx->cspname)
+		OPENSSL_free(ctx->cspname);
 	ctx->cspname = BUF_strdup(pname);
 	ctx->csptype = type;
 	return 1;
@@ -1581,9 +1592,12 @@ static int capi_ctx_set_provname_idx(CAPI_CTX *ctx, int idx)
 	{
 	LPSTR pname;
 	DWORD type;
+	int res;
 	if (capi_get_provname(ctx, &pname, &type, idx) != 1)
 		return 0;
-	return capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
+	res = capi_ctx_set_provname(ctx, pname, type, 0);
+	OPENSSL_free(pname);
+	return res;
 	}
 
 static int cert_issuer_match(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 *x)

openssl.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 %define libmaj 1
 %define libmin 0
 %define librel 0
-%define librev g
+%define librev h
 Release: 1
 
 %define openssldir /var/ssl

ssl/d1_both.c

@@ -227,14 +227,14 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 	unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
 
 	/* AHA!  Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
-	if ( ! (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+	if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
 		{
 		s->d1->mtu = 
 			BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
 
 		/* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
 		 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
-		if ( s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+		if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
 			{
 			s->d1->mtu = 0;
 			s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);

ssl/d1_clnt.c

@@ -260,7 +260,6 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 			else
 				{
-				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				if (s->hit)
 					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
 				else
@@ -354,6 +353,7 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
 			else

ssl/d1_lib.c

@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 	{
 	/* Reset everything */
+	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
 	memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
 	s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
 	BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout));
@@ -388,10 +389,28 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
 	dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
 	}
 
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
+	{
+	s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
+
+	/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2)
+		{
+		s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, NULL);		
+		}
+
+	if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
+		{
+		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
 	{
-	DTLS1_STATE *state;
-
 	/* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
 	if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
 		{
@@ -399,19 +418,14 @@ int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
 		}
 
 	dtls1_double_timeout(s);
-	state = s->d1;
-	state->timeout.num_alerts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT)
-		{
-		/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
-		return -1;
-		}
 
-	state->timeout.read_timeouts++;
-	if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+	if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
+	if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
 		{
-		state->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
+		s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
 		}
 
 	dtls1_start_timer(s);

ssl/d1_pkt.c

@@ -179,7 +179,6 @@ static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
 	unsigned char *priority);
 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
-static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
 
 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
 static int
@@ -682,7 +681,6 @@ again:
 		goto again;   /* get another record */
 		}
 
-	dtls1_clear_timeouts(s);  /* done waiting */
 	return(1);
 
 	}
@@ -1152,6 +1150,9 @@ start:
 		 */
 		if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
 			{
+			if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+				return -1;
+
 			dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
 			rr->length = 0;
 			goto start;
@@ -1765,10 +1766,3 @@ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
 
 	memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
 	}
-
-
-static void
-dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
-	{
-	memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
-	}

ssl/d1_srvr.c

@@ -485,15 +485,16 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
 			if (ret <= 0)
 				goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			if (ret == 2)
+				{
+				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+				}
 			else {
 				/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
 				 * have not asked for it :-) */
 				ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
 				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-				dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 				s->init_num=0;
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
 			}
@@ -503,7 +504,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
 			ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
 			s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -540,7 +540,6 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-			dtls1_stop_timer(s);
 
 			s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 			s->init_num=0;

ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -756,14 +756,6 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	int ok;
 	long n;
 
-	/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
-	 * negotiation. */
-	if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
 	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
 	 * so permit appropriate message length */
 	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
@@ -776,6 +768,13 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
 	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
 		{
+		/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+		 * negotiation. */
+		if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+			return -1;
+			}
 		/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
 		 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH

ssl/ssl.h

@@ -1825,6 +1825,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT				 246
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF			 295
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD			 247
+#define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM			 305
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO			 248
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT				 249
 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC					 250

ssl/ssl_err.c

@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[]=
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT),	"DTLS1_ACCEPT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF),	"DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD),	"DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD"},
+{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM),	"DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO),	"DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT),	"DTLS1_CONNECT"},
 {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC),	"DTLS1_ENC"},

ssl/ssl_locl.h

@@ -943,6 +943,7 @@ void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw);
 long dtls1_default_timeout(void);
 struct timeval* dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval* timeleft);
+int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s);
 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s);
 const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u);
 void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s);