Prepare for 1.0.0t release

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

.gitignore

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 .#*
 #*#
 *~
+/.dir-locals.el
 
 # Top level excludes
 /Makefile.bak

.travis.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+language: c
+
+addons:
+    apt_packages:
+        - binutils-mingw-w64
+        - gcc-mingw-w64
+
+os:
+    - linux
+    - osx
+
+compiler:
+    - clang
+    - gcc
+    - i686-w64-mingw32-gcc
+    - x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc
+
+env:
+    - CONFIG_OPTS=""
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="shared"
+    - CONFIG_OPTS="-d"
+
+matrix:
+    exclude:
+        - os: osx
+          compiler: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc
+        - os: osx
+          compiler: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc
+
+before_script:
+    - if [ "$CC" == i686-w64-mingw32-gcc ]; then
+          export CROSS_COMPILE=${CC%%gcc}; unset CC;
+          ./Configure mingw $CONFIG_OPTS;
+      elif [ "$CC" == x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc ]; then
+          export CROSS_COMPILE=${CC%%gcc}; unset CC;
+          ./Configure mingw64 $CONFIG_OPTS;
+      else
+          ./config $CONFIG_OPTS;
+      fi
+
+script:
+    - make
+    - if [ -z "$CROSS_COMPILE" ]; then make test; fi
+
+notifications:
+    recipient:
+        - openssl-commits@openssl.org
+    email:
+        on_success: change
+        on_failure: always

CHANGES

@@ -2,9 +2,173 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 1.0.0q and 1.0.0r [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.0s and 1.0.0t [3 Dec 2015]
 
-  *)
+  *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+     When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+     memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+     application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+     affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+     libFuzzer.
+     (CVE-2015-3195)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
+
+     If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+     the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+     result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+     identify hint data.
+     (CVE-2015-3196)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0r and 1.0.0s [11 Jun 2015]
+
+  *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+     When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+     if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+     field.
+
+     This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+     system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+     certificates.  This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+     client authentication enabled.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+     (CVE-2015-1788)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+     X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+     string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+     X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+     time string.
+
+     An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+     various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+     a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+     that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+     authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+     callbacks.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+     independently by Hanno B<>ck.
+     (CVE-2015-1789)
+     [Emilia K<>sper]
+
+  *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+     The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+     correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+     with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+     Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+     structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+     servers are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+     (CVE-2015-1790)
+     [Emilia K<>sper]
+
+  *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+     When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+     if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+     denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+     the CMS code.
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+     (CVE-2015-1792)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+     If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+     reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+     a double free of the ticket data.
+     (CVE-2015-1791)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0q and 1.0.0r [19 Mar 2015]
+
+  *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+     The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+     made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+     certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+     certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+     application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+     OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+     (CVE-2015-0286)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+
+     Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+     memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+     strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+     Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+     components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+     functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+     not affected.
+     (CVE-2015-0287)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+     The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+     correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+     missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+     Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+     otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+     affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+     (CVE-2015-0289)
+     [Emilia K<>sper]
+
+  *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+     A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+     servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+     a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+     This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia K<>sper
+     (OpenSSL development team).
+     (CVE-2015-0293)
+     [Emilia K<>sper]
+
+  *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+     A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+     could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+     free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+     or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+     for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+     sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+     This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+     commit 517073cd4b.
+     (CVE-2015-0209)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+     The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+     the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+     This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+     (CVE-2015-0288)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+     [Kurt Roeckx]
 
  Changes between 1.0.0p and 1.0.0q [15 Jan 2015]
 
@@ -1320,228 +1484,6 @@
   *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
      [NTT]
 
- Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
-
-  *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
-
-     This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by 
-     Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
-     at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/     
-
-     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
-     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
-     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
-     Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
-     (CVE-2013-0169)
-     [Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
-     This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
-     the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
-     so it returns the certificate actually sent.
-     See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
-     (This is a backport)
-     [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
-
-  *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
-
-  *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
-     to fix DoS attack.
-
-     Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
-     fuzzing as a service testing platform.
-     (CVE-2012-2333)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
-     Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
-
-  *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 
-     'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
-     int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by 
-     rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
-     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
-
-  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
-     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
-     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
-
-     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
-     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
-     (CVE-2012-2110)
-     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
-
-  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
-     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
-     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
-     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
-     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
-     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
-     an MMA defence is not necessary.
-     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
-     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
-     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
-     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
-
-  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
-     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
-     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
-     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
-     [Antonio Martin]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
-
-  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
-     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
-     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
-     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
-     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
-     paper describing this attack can be found at:
-                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
-     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
-     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
-     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
-     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
-     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
-     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
-
-  *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
-     [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
-
-  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
-     (CVE-2011-4576)
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
-     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
-     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
- 
-  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
-     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
-     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
-     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
-
-  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
-     [Emilia K<>sper (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
-     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
-     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
-     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
-
-     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
-     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
-     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
-     the last update always remained unused).
-     [Emilia K<>sper (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
-     for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
-     [Adam Langley (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
-     [Bodo Moeller]
-
-  *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
-     by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
-
-	http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
-
-     [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
-
-  *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
-     [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
-
-  *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
-     escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
-     ambiguous.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
-
-  *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
-     and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
-     Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
-     Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
-     Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
-     [Ben Laurie]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
-
-  *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
-     overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
-     be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
-     the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
-     some broken encodings work correctly.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
-     is also one of the inputs.
-     [Emilia K<>sper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
-
-  *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
-     Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
-     after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
-     etc are non-op.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
- Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
-
-  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
-  OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
-
-  *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
-     access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
-     [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
-
-  *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
-     common in certificates and some applications which only call
-     SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
-     [Steve Henson]
-
-  *) VMS fixes: 
-     Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
-     Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
-     Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
-     [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
-
  Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
 
   *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never

Makefile.org

@@ -416,6 +416,9 @@ tests: rehash
 report:
 	@$(PERL) util/selftest.pl
 
+update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num TABLE
+	@set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
+
 depend:
 	@set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD)
 
@@ -440,50 +443,37 @@ util/libeay.num::
 util/ssleay.num::
 	$(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update
 
-crypto/objects/obj_dat.h: crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
-	$(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
-crypto/objects/obj_mac.h: crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
-	$(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_mac.h
-crypto/objects/obj_xref.h: crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num
-	$(PERL) crypto/objects/objxref.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_xref.txt >crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
-
-apps/openssl-vms.cnf: apps/openssl.cnf
-	$(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf
-
-crypto/bn/bn_prime.h: crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
-	$(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl >crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
-
-
 TABLE: Configure
 	(echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \
 	$(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE
 
-update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h crypto/objects/obj_xref.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE depend
-
 # Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is
 # pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar
 # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
 # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
 # tar does not support the --files-from option.
-tar:
+TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
+	                       --owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
+			       --transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
+			       -cvf -
+
+../$(TARFILE).list:
+	find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
+	       \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \
+	       \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
+	    | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
+
+tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
 	find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
 	find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
 	find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
-	find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
-	$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
-	gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
-	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
 
-tar-snap:
-	@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
-		`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*'  \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
-	tardy --user_number=0  --user_name=openssl \
-	      --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
-	      --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
+tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
+	$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
+	rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
 	ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
 
 dist:   

NEWS

@@ -5,9 +5,28 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0q and OpenSSL 1.0.0r [under development]
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0s and OpenSSL 1.0.0t [3 Dec 2015]
 
-      o
+      o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
+      o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0r and OpenSSL 1.0.0s [11 Jun 2015]
+
+      o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788)
+      o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789)
+      o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790)
+      o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792)
+      o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791)
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0q and OpenSSL 1.0.0r [19 Mar 2015]
+
+      o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286)
+      o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287)
+      o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289)
+      o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293)
+      o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209)
+      o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288)
+      o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0p and OpenSSL 1.0.0q [15 Jan 2015]
 
@@ -146,62 +165,6 @@
       o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support.
       o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]:
-
-      o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169
-      o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]:
-
-      o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110)
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
-      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
-      o Various DTLS fixes.
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]:
-
-      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
-      o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
-      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
-      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
-      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
-      o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
-
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]:
-
-      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
-      o Various DTLS fixes.
-      o Recognise SHA2 certificates if only SSL algorithms added.
-      o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
-      o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
-
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]:
 
       o CFB cipher definition fixes.

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.0r-dev
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0t 3 Dec 2015
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
@@ -164,16 +164,23 @@
  Report the bug to the OpenSSL project via the Request Tracker
  (http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html) by mail to:
 
-    openssl-bugs@openssl.org
+    rt@openssl.org
 
- Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
- or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
- does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+ In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
+ take a day for the ticket to show up.  (We also scan posts to make sure
+ that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
+ this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
+ https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
+ the public openssl-dev mailing list.  Confidential mail may be sent to
+ openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
 
- Note that mail to openssl-bugs@openssl.org is recorded in the publicly
- readable request tracker database and is forwarded to a public
- mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org
- (PGP key available from the key servers).
+ Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
+ Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
+ is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
+
+ You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
+ mail to rt@openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
+ keep track of it.
 
  HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
  ----------------------------
@@ -190,11 +197,10 @@
  reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
 
  Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
- current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
- OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
- can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
- compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
- features.
+ current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
+ (see http://openssl.org/about/codingstyle.txt) and compile without
+ warnings using the --strict-warnings flag.  OpenSSL compiles on many
+ varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
 
  Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
  if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt@bis.doc.gov

apps/Makefile

@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ req: sreq.o $(A_OBJ) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
 sreq.o: req.c 
 	$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) -o sreq.o req.c
 
+openssl-vms.cnf: openssl.cnf
+	$(PERL) $(TOP)/VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < openssl.cnf > openssl-vms.cnf
+
 files:
 	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO
 
@@ -127,12 +130,12 @@ links:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
-depend:
-	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then \
-	    $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; \
-	else \
-	    $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
-	fi
+update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
+
+depend: local_depend
+	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
 
 dclean:
 	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new

apps/apps.c

@@ -1236,7 +1236,11 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
         {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
         {NULL, 0, 0}
     };
-    return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl);
+    if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
+        return 0;
+    if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
+        *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
+    return 1;
 }
 
 int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)

apps/asn1pars.c

@@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
             }
             typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
             if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+                || (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
                 || (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
-                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n",
-                           typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT");
+                BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
                 ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
                 goto end;
             }

apps/s_server.c

@@ -2037,8 +2037,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
                     ret = 1;
                     goto err;
                 }
-                l += k;
-                i -= k;
+                if (k > 0) {
+                    l += k;
+                    i -= k;
+                }
                 if (i <= 0)
                     break;
             }

crypto/Makefile

@@ -121,12 +121,17 @@ install:
 lint:
 	@target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE)
 
-depend:
+update: local_depend
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=update; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
+	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+
+depend: local_depend
+	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
+	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
+local_depend:
 	@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist
 	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
 	@[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h
-	@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) )
-	@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
 
 clean:
 	rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff

crypto/aes/Makefile

@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/asn1/Makefile

@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/asn1/a_int.c

@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
     else {
         ret = a->length;
         i = a->data[0];
+        if (ret == 1 && i == 0)
+            neg = 0;
         if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
             pad = 1;
             pb = 0;
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
         p += a->length - 1;
         i = a->length;
         /* Copy zeros to destination as long as source is zero */
-        while (!*n) {
+        while (!*n && i > 1) {
             *(p--) = 0;
             n--;
             i--;
@@ -419,7 +421,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
         ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
         goto err;
     }
-    if (BN_is_negative(bn))
+    if (BN_is_negative(bn) && !BN_is_zero(bn))
         ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
     else
         ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;

crypto/asn1/a_type.c

@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b)
     case V_ASN1_OBJECT:
         result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object);
         break;
+    case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN:
+        result = a->value.boolean - b->value.boolean;
+        break;
     case V_ASN1_NULL:
         result = 0;             /* They do not have content. */
         break;

crypto/asn1/asn1.h

@@ -796,6 +796,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_OBJECT)
 
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void);
 void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
+void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
 int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str);
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *a);
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type);

crypto/asn1/asn1_gen.c

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
 #define ASN1_GEN_STR(str,val)   {str, sizeof(str) - 1, val}
 
 #define ASN1_FLAG_EXP_MAX       20
+/* Maximum number of nested sequences */
+#define ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH  50
 
 /* Input formats */
 
@@ -110,13 +112,16 @@ typedef struct {
     int exp_count;
 } tag_exp_arg;
 
+static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
+                              int *perr);
 static int bitstr_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
 static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr);
 static int append_exp(tag_exp_arg *arg, int exp_tag, int exp_class,
                       int exp_constructed, int exp_pad, int imp_ok);
 static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag,
                          int *pclass);
-static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf);
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
+                             int depth, int *perr);
 static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_str2type(const char *str, int format, int utype);
 static int asn1_str2tag(const char *tagstr, int len);
 
@@ -132,6 +137,16 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf)
 }
 
 ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
+{
+    int err = 0;
+    ASN1_TYPE *ret = generate_v3(str, cnf, 0, &err);
+    if (err)
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3, err);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static ASN1_TYPE *generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf, int depth,
+                              int *perr)
 {
     ASN1_TYPE *ret;
     tag_exp_arg asn1_tags;
@@ -152,17 +167,22 @@ ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
     asn1_tags.imp_class = -1;
     asn1_tags.format = ASN1_GEN_FORMAT_ASCII;
     asn1_tags.exp_count = 0;
-    if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0)
+    if (CONF_parse_list(str, ',', 1, asn1_cb, &asn1_tags) != 0) {
+        *perr = ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG;
         return NULL;
+    }
 
     if ((asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
         || (asn1_tags.utype == V_ASN1_SET)) {
         if (!cnf) {
-            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3,
-                    ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG);
+            *perr = ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG;
             return NULL;
         }
-        ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf);
+        if (depth >= ASN1_GEN_SEQ_MAX_DEPTH) {
+            *perr = ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING;
+            return NULL;
+        }
+        ret = asn1_multi(asn1_tags.utype, asn1_tags.str, cnf, depth, perr);
     } else
         ret = asn1_str2type(asn1_tags.str, asn1_tags.format, asn1_tags.utype);
 
@@ -279,6 +299,9 @@ static int asn1_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *bitstr)
 
     int tmp_tag, tmp_class;
 
+    if (elem == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
     for (i = 0, p = elem; i < len; p++, i++) {
         /* Look for the ':' in name value pairs */
         if (*p == ':') {
@@ -428,7 +451,8 @@ static int parse_tagging(const char *vstart, int vlen, int *ptag, int *pclass)
 
 /* Handle multiple types: SET and SEQUENCE */
 
-static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
+static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf,
+                             int depth, int *perr)
 {
     ASN1_TYPE *ret = NULL;
     STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *sk = NULL;
@@ -447,7 +471,8 @@ static ASN1_TYPE *asn1_multi(int utype, const char *section, X509V3_CTX *cnf)
             goto bad;
         for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
             ASN1_TYPE *typ =
-                ASN1_generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf);
+                generate_v3(sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i)->value, cnf,
+                            depth + 1, perr);
             if (!typ)
                 goto bad;
             if (!sk_ASN1_TYPE_push(sk, typ))

crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c

@@ -430,6 +430,13 @@ void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
     OPENSSL_free(a);
 }
 
+void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a)
+{
+    if (a && a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF))
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->length);
+    ASN1_STRING_free(a);
+}
+
 int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
 {
     int i;

crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c

@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 
+#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
+#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
+#endif
+
 static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
                            int indent);
 static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
@@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
 #else
     dump_indent = 6;            /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
 #endif
+
+    if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
+            BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
+            return 0;
+    }
+
     p = *pp;
     tot = p + length;
     op = p - 1;

crypto/asn1/p8_pkey.c

@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static int pkey_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
     /* Since the structure must still be valid use ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE */
     if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
         PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *key = (PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *)*pval;
-        if (key->pkey->value.octet_string)
+        if (key->pkey && key->pkey->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING
+            && key->pkey->value.octet_string != NULL)
             OPENSSL_cleanse(key->pkey->value.octet_string->data,
                             key->pkey->value.octet_string->length);
     }

crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

@@ -140,11 +140,17 @@ ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
 {
     ASN1_TLC c;
     ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL;
-    if (!pval)
-        pval = &ptmpval;
     asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
-    if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0)
-        return *pval;
+    if (pval && *pval && it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE)
+        ptmpval = *pval;
+    if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&ptmpval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) {
+        if (pval && it->itype != ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE) {
+            if (*pval)
+                ASN1_item_free(*pval, it);
+            *pval = ptmpval;
+        }
+        return ptmpval;
+    }
     return NULL;
 }
 
@@ -180,6 +186,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
     int otag;
     int ret = 0;
     ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
+    int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
+    aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
     if (!pval)
         return 0;
     if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
@@ -304,9 +312,16 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
     case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
             goto auxerr;
-
-        /* Allocate structure */
-        if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
+        if (*pval) {
+            /* Free up and zero CHOICE value if initialised */
+            i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
+            if ((i >= 0) && (i < it->tcount)) {
+                tt = it->templates + i;
+                pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt);
+                ASN1_template_free(pchptr, tt);
+                asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, -1, it);
+            }
+        } else if (!ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
             goto err;
         }
@@ -386,6 +401,17 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
             goto auxerr;
 
+        /* Free up and zero any ADB found */
+        for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
+            if (tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_ADB_MASK) {
+                const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
+                ASN1_VALUE **pseqval;
+                seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1);
+                pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt);
+                ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt);
+            }
+        }
+
         /* Get each field entry */
         for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) {
             const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt;
@@ -482,7 +508,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
  auxerr:
     ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
  err:
-    ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
+    if (combine == 0)
+        ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
     if (errtt)
         ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
                            ", Type=", it->sname);
@@ -671,7 +698,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
     } else {
         /* Nothing special */
         ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-                               -1, 0, opt, ctx);
+                               -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
         if (!ret) {
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
             goto err;

crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c

@@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_combine_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
     else
         asn1_cb = 0;
 
-    if (!combine)
-        *pval = NULL;
-
 #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
     if (it->sname)
         CRYPTO_push_info(it->sname);

crypto/asn1/tasn_prn.c

@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static int asn1_item_print_ctx(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **fld, int indent,
             if (!asn1_template_print_ctx(out, fld, indent,
                                          it->templates, pctx))
                 return 0;
+            break;
         }
         /* fall thru */
     case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:

crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c

@@ -98,46 +98,55 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(CBIGNUM)
 
 static int bn_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
-        if(*pval) return 1;
-        else return 0;
+    *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)BN_new();
+    if (*pval)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 0;
 }
 
 static void bn_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        if(!*pval) return;
-        if(it->size & BN_SENSITIVE) BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
-        else BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
-        *pval = NULL;
+    if (!*pval)
+        return;
+    if (it->size & BN_SENSITIVE)
+        BN_clear_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+    else
+        BN_free((BIGNUM *)*pval);
+    *pval = NULL;
 }
 
-static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+static int bn_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                  const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        BIGNUM *bn;
-        int pad;
-        if(!*pval) return -1;
-        bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
-        /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
-        if(BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7) pad = 0;
-        else pad = 1;
-        if(cont) {
-                if(pad) *cont++ = 0;
-                BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
-        }
-        return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+    int pad;
+    if (!*pval)
+        return -1;
+    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+    /* If MSB set in an octet we need a padding byte */
+    if (BN_num_bits(bn) & 0x7)
+        pad = 0;
+    else
+        pad = 1;
+    if (cont) {
+        if (pad)
+            *cont++ = 0;
+        BN_bn2bin(bn, cont);
+    }
+    return pad + BN_num_bytes(bn);
 }
 
 static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
                   int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        BIGNUM *bn;
-        if(!*pval) bn_new(pval, it);
-        bn  = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
-        if(!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
-                bn_free(pval, it);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        return 1;
+    BIGNUM *bn;
+    if (!*pval)
+        bn_new(pval, it);
+    bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
+    if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
+        bn_free(pval, it);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
-
-

crypto/asn1/x_long.c

@@ -97,87 +97,100 @@ ASN1_ITEM_end(ZLONG)
 
 static int long_new(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        *(long *)pval = it->size;
-        return 1;
+    *(long *)pval = it->size;
+    return 1;
 }
 
 static void long_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        *(long *)pval = it->size;
+    *(long *)pval = it->size;
 }
 
-static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+static int long_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int *putype,
+                    const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        long ltmp;
-        unsigned long utmp;
-        int clen, pad, i;
-        /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
-        char *cp = (char *)pval;
+    long ltmp;
+    unsigned long utmp;
+    int clen, pad, i;
+    /* this exists to bypass broken gcc optimization */
+    char *cp = (char *)pval;
 
-        /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */
-        memcpy(&ltmp, cp, sizeof(long));
+    /* use memcpy, because we may not be long aligned */
+    memcpy(&ltmp, cp, sizeof(long));
 
-        if(ltmp == it->size) return -1;
-        /* Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so
-         * we can cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading
-         * octet is set.
-         */
-        if(ltmp < 0) utmp = -ltmp - 1;
-        else utmp = ltmp;
-        clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp);
-        /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */
-        if(!(clen & 0x7)) pad = 1;
-        else pad = 0;
+    if (ltmp == it->size)
+        return -1;
+    /*
+     * Convert the long to positive: we subtract one if negative so we can
+     * cleanly handle the padding if only the MSB of the leading octet is
+     * set.
+     */
+    if (ltmp < 0)
+        utmp = -ltmp - 1;
+    else
+        utmp = ltmp;
+    clen = BN_num_bits_word(utmp);
+    /* If MSB of leading octet set we need to pad */
+    if (!(clen & 0x7))
+        pad = 1;
+    else
+        pad = 0;
 
-        /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */
-        clen = (clen + 7) >> 3;
+    /* Convert number of bits to number of octets */
+    clen = (clen + 7) >> 3;
 
-        if(cont) {
-                if(pad) *cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0;
-                for(i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-                        cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff);
-                        if(ltmp < 0) cont[i] ^= 0xff;
-                        utmp >>= 8;
-                }
+    if (cont) {
+        if (pad)
+            *cont++ = (ltmp < 0) ? 0xff : 0;
+        for (i = clen - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+            cont[i] = (unsigned char)(utmp & 0xff);
+            if (ltmp < 0)
+                cont[i] ^= 0xff;
+            utmp >>= 8;
         }
-        return clen + pad;
+    }
+    return clen + pad;
 }
 
 static int long_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
                     int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
-        int neg, i;
-        long ltmp;
-        unsigned long utmp = 0;
-        char *cp = (char *)pval;
-        if(len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
-                ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        /* Is it negative? */
-        if(len && (cont[0] & 0x80)) neg = 1;
-        else neg = 0;
-        utmp = 0;
-        for(i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-                utmp <<= 8;
-                if(neg) utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff;
-                else utmp |= cont[i];
-        }
-        ltmp = (long)utmp;
-        if(neg) {
-                ltmp++;
-                ltmp = -ltmp;
-        }
-        if(ltmp == it->size) {
-                ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
-                return 0;
-        }
-        memcpy(cp, &ltmp, sizeof(long));
-        return 1;
+    int neg, i;
+    long ltmp;
+    unsigned long utmp = 0;
+    char *cp = (char *)pval;
+    if (len > (int)sizeof(long)) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    /* Is it negative? */
+    if (len && (cont[0] & 0x80))
+        neg = 1;
+    else
+        neg = 0;
+    utmp = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+        utmp <<= 8;
+        if (neg)
+            utmp |= cont[i] ^ 0xff;
+        else
+            utmp |= cont[i];
+    }
+    ltmp = (long)utmp;
+    if (neg) {
+        ltmp++;
+        ltmp = -ltmp;
+    }
+    if (ltmp == it->size) {
+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I, ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(cp, &ltmp, sizeof(long));
+    return 1;
 }
 
 static int long_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-                        int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
-        {
-        return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval);
-        }
+                      int indent, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+    return BIO_printf(out, "%ld\n", *(long *)pval);
+}

crypto/asn1/x_x509.c

@@ -172,8 +172,14 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
 {
     const unsigned char *q;
     X509 *ret;
+    int freeret = 0;
+
     /* Save start position */
     q = *pp;
+
+    if (!a || *a == NULL) {
+        freeret = 1;
+    }
     ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
     /* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
     if (!ret)
@@ -186,7 +192,11 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
         goto err;
     return ret;
  err:
-    X509_free(ret);
+    if (freeret) {
+        X509_free(ret);
+        if (a)
+            *a = NULL;
+    }
     return NULL;
 }
 

crypto/bf/Makefile

@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/bio/Makefile

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/bio/bio.h

@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ void BIO_clear_flags(BIO *b, int flags);
  * BIO_CB_RETURN flag indicates if it is after the call
  */
 # define BIO_CB_RETURN   0x80
-# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN))
+# define BIO_CB_return(a) ((a)|BIO_CB_RETURN)
 # define BIO_cb_pre(a)   (!((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN))
 # define BIO_cb_post(a)  ((a)&BIO_CB_RETURN)
 

crypto/bn/Makefile

@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: bn_prime.h depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/bn/bn.h

@@ -894,6 +894,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR                  135
 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR                             136
 # define BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT                            137
+# define BN_F_BN_LSHIFT                                   145
 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT                            118
 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT                             109
 # define BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME                   124
@@ -909,12 +910,14 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
 # define BN_F_BN_NEW                                      113
 # define BN_F_BN_RAND                                     114
 # define BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE                               122
+# define BN_F_BN_RSHIFT                                   146
 # define BN_F_BN_USUB                                     115
 
 /* Reason codes. */
 # define BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3                                100
 # define BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL                              101
 # define BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG                             114
+# define BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL                              118
 # define BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS                    102
 # define BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO                                 103
 # define BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR                              104
@@ -922,6 +925,7 @@ void ERR_load_BN_strings(void);
 # define BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED                           110
 # define BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH                              106
 # define BN_R_INVALID_RANGE                               115
+# define BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT                               119
 # define BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE                                111
 # define BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED                             107
 # define BN_R_NO_INVERSE                                  108

crypto/bn/bn_err.c

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto/bn/bn_err.c */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SOLVE_QUAD_ARR), "BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQR), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_SQRT), "BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT), "BN_lshift"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT), "BN_mod_exp2_mont"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT), "BN_mod_exp_mont"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME), "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"},
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_NEW), "BN_new"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND), "BN_rand"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RAND_RANGE), "BN_rand_range"},
+    {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT), "BN_rshift"},
     {ERR_FUNC(BN_F_BN_USUB), "BN_usub"},
     {0, NULL}
 };
@@ -117,6 +119,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ARG2_LT_ARG3), "arg2 lt arg3"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BAD_RECIPROCAL), "bad reciprocal"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BIGNUM_TOO_LONG), "bignum too long"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL), "bits too small"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS), "called with even modulus"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO), "div by zero"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_ENCODING_ERROR), "encoding error"},
@@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA BN_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INPUT_NOT_REDUCED), "input not reduced"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH), "invalid length"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_RANGE), "invalid range"},
+    {ERR_REASON(BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT), "invalid shift"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE), "not a square"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED), "not initialized"},
     {ERR_REASON(BN_R_NO_INVERSE), "no inverse"},

crypto/bn/bn_mont.c

@@ -427,9 +427,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
     if (mont == NULL)
         return;
 
-    BN_free(&(mont->RR));
-    BN_free(&(mont->N));
-    BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
+    BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
     if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
         OPENSSL_free(mont);
 }

crypto/bn/bn_print.c

@@ -71,7 +71,12 @@ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
     char *buf;
     char *p;
 
-    buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
+    if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) {
+        /* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */
+        buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
+    } else {
+        buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
+    }
     if (buf == NULL) {
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         goto err;

crypto/bn/bn_rand.c

@@ -121,6 +121,11 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
     int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
     time_t tim;
 
+    if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (bits == 0) {
         BN_zero(rnd);
         return 1;
@@ -168,7 +173,7 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
     }
 #endif
 
-    if (top != -1) {
+    if (top >= 0) {
         if (top) {
             if (bit == 0) {
                 buf[0] = 1;

crypto/bn/bn_shift.c

@@ -133,6 +133,11 @@ int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
     bn_check_top(r);
     bn_check_top(a);
 
+    if (n < 0) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_LSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     r->neg = a->neg;
     nw = n / BN_BITS2;
     if (bn_wexpand(r, a->top + nw + 1) == NULL)
@@ -170,6 +175,11 @@ int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n)
     bn_check_top(r);
     bn_check_top(a);
 
+    if (n < 0) {
+        BNerr(BN_F_BN_RSHIFT, BN_R_INVALID_SHIFT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     nw = n / BN_BITS2;
     rb = n % BN_BITS2;
     lb = BN_BITS2 - rb;

crypto/buffer/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/camellia/Makefile

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/cast/Makefile

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/cms/Makefile

@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static void do_free_upto(BIO *f, BIO *upto)
             BIO_free(f);
             f = tbio;
         }
-        while (f != upto);
+        while (f && f != upto);
     } else
         BIO_free_all(f);
 }

crypto/comp/Makefile

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

crypto/conf/Makefile

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

crypto/cryptlib.c

@@ -776,8 +776,6 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void)
     if (_OPENSSL_isservice.p != (void *)-1)
         return (*_OPENSSL_isservice.f) ();
 
-    (void)GetDesktopWindow();   /* return value is ignored */
-
     h = GetProcessWindowStation();
     if (h == NULL)
         return -1;

crypto/des/Makefile

@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/des/spr.h

@@ -58,180 +58,155 @@
 
 OPENSSL_GLOBAL const DES_LONG DES_SPtrans[8][64] = {
     {
-/* nibble 0 */
-     0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L,
-     0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L,
-     0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L,
-     0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L,
-     0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L,
-     0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
-     0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L,
-     0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L,
-     0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L,
-     0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
-     0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L,
-     0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L,
-     0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L,
-     0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L,
-     0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L,
-     0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L,
-     }, {
-/* nibble 1 */
-         0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
-         0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L,
-         0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L,
-         0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L,
-         0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L,
-         0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L,
-         0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L,
-         0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L,
-         0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L,
-         0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L,
-         0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L,
-         0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L,
-         0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L,
-         0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
-         0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L,
-         0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L,
-         }, {
-/* nibble 2 */
-             0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L,
-             0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
-             0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L,
-             0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L,
-             0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L,
-             0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L,
-             0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L,
-             0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L,
-             0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L,
-             0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L,
-             0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L,
-             0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L,
-             0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L,
-             0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
-             0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L,
-             0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L,
-             }, {
-/* nibble 3 */
-                 0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L,
-                 0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L,
-                 0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L,
-                 0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L,
-                 0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L,
-                 0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L,
-                 0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L,
-                 0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L,
-                 0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L,
-                 0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L,
-                 0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L,
-                 0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L,
-                 0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L,
-                 0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L,
-                 0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L,
-                 0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L,
-                 }, {
-/* nibble 4 */
-                     0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L,
-                     0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L,
-                     0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L,
-                     0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L,
-                     0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L,
-                     0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L,
-                     0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L,
-                     0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L,
-                     0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L,
-                     0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L,
-                     0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L,
-                     0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L,
-                     0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L,
-                     0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L,
-                     0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L,
-                     0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L,
-                     }, {
-/* nibble 5 */
-                         0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L,
-                         0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L,
-                         0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L,
-                         0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L,
-                         0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L,
-                         0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L,
-                         0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L,
-                         0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L,
-                         0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L,
-                         0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L,
-                         0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L,
-                         0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L,
-                         0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L,
-                         0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L,
-                         0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L,
-                         0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L,
-                         }, {
-/* nibble 6 */
-                             0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L,
-                             0x01000004L,
-                             0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L,
-                             0x00000000L,
-                             0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L,
-                             0x01004000L,
-                             0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L,
-                             0x00000204L,
-                             0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L,
-                             0x01004204L,
-                             0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L,
-                             0x00004200L,
-                             0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L,
-                             0x00000004L,
-                             0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L,
-                             0x01000000L,
-                             0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L,
-                             0x00000204L,
-                             0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L,
-                             0x01004004L,
-                             0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L,
-                             0x00000000L,
-                             0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L,
-                             0x01000200L,
-                             0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L,
-                             0x00004200L,
-                             0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L,
-                             0x01000000L,
-                             0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L,
-                             0x01004204L,
-                             0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L,
-                             0x00004004L,
-                             }, {
-/* nibble 7 */
-                                 0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L,
-                                 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x20820080L,
-                                 0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L,
-                                 0x00020080L,
-                                 0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L,
-                                 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L,
-                                 0x20020000L,
-                                 0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x00820000L,
-                                 0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L,
-                                 0x20800080L,
-                                 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L,
-                                 0x00000080L,
-                                 0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L,
-                                 0x20820080L,
-                                 0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x00820000L,
-                                 0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L,
-                                 0x00800080L,
-                                 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L,
-                                 0x20020000L,
-                                 0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x20000080L,
-                                 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L,
-                                 0x20800000L,
-                                 0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L,
-                                 0x00000000L,
-                                 0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L,
-                                 0x00820080L,
-                                 }
+        /* nibble 0 */
+        0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080802L,
+        0x02000000L, 0x00080802L, 0x00080002L, 0x02000002L,
+        0x00080802L, 0x02080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L,
+        0x02000802L, 0x02000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00080002L,
+        0x00080000L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080800L,
+        0x02080802L, 0x02080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
+        0x00000002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080002L,
+        0x00000800L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x02080802L, 0x02000800L, 0x00080002L,
+        0x02080800L, 0x00080000L, 0x00000802L, 0x02000800L,
+        0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080800L, 0x02000002L,
+        0x00080802L, 0x00000002L, 0x02000002L, 0x02080000L,
+        0x02080802L, 0x00080800L, 0x02080000L, 0x02000802L,
+        0x02000000L, 0x00000802L, 0x00080002L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00080000L, 0x02000000L, 0x02000802L, 0x02080800L,
+        0x00000002L, 0x02080002L, 0x00000800L, 0x00080802L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 1 */
+        0x40108010L, 0x00000000L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
+        0x40000010L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108000L,
+        0x00008000L, 0x40100010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40008000L,
+        0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40100000L, 0x00000010L,
+        0x00100000L, 0x40008010L, 0x40100010L, 0x00008000L,
+        0x00108010L, 0x40000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00100010L,
+        0x40008010L, 0x00108010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40000010L,
+        0x40000000L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40108010L,
+        0x00100010L, 0x40108000L, 0x40008000L, 0x00108010L,
+        0x40108010L, 0x00100010L, 0x40000010L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x40000000L, 0x00008010L, 0x00100000L, 0x40100010L,
+        0x00008000L, 0x40000000L, 0x00108010L, 0x40008010L,
+        0x40108000L, 0x00008000L, 0x00000000L, 0x40000010L,
+        0x00000010L, 0x40108010L, 0x00108000L, 0x40100000L,
+        0x40100010L, 0x00100000L, 0x00008010L, 0x40008000L,
+        0x40008010L, 0x00000010L, 0x40100000L, 0x00108000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 2 */
+        0x04000001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x04000101L,
+        0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
+        0x04000100L, 0x00040000L, 0x04040000L, 0x00000001L,
+        0x04040101L, 0x00000101L, 0x00000001L, 0x04040001L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040100L, 0x00000100L,
+        0x00000101L, 0x04040101L, 0x00040000L, 0x04000001L,
+        0x04040001L, 0x04000100L, 0x00040101L, 0x04040000L,
+        0x00040100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04000000L, 0x00040101L,
+        0x04040100L, 0x00000100L, 0x00000001L, 0x00040000L,
+        0x00000101L, 0x00040001L, 0x04040000L, 0x04000101L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x04040100L, 0x00040100L, 0x04040001L,
+        0x00040001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L, 0x00000001L,
+        0x00040101L, 0x04000001L, 0x04000000L, 0x04040101L,
+        0x00040000L, 0x04000100L, 0x04000101L, 0x00040100L,
+        0x04000100L, 0x00000000L, 0x04040001L, 0x00000101L,
+        0x04000001L, 0x00040101L, 0x00000100L, 0x04040000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 3 */
+        0x00401008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10401008L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L, 0x00400008L,
+        0x10401000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10000000L, 0x00001008L,
+        0x10000008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000000L,
+        0x10400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00000008L,
+        0x00401000L, 0x10001008L, 0x10400000L, 0x00001000L,
+        0x00001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00400008L, 0x10401000L,
+        0x10001000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401008L, 0x00400000L,
+        0x10400008L, 0x00001008L, 0x00400000L, 0x10000008L,
+        0x00401000L, 0x10001000L, 0x00000008L, 0x10400000L,
+        0x10001008L, 0x00000000L, 0x00001000L, 0x00400008L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x10400008L, 0x10401000L, 0x00001000L,
+        0x10000000L, 0x10401008L, 0x00401008L, 0x00400000L,
+        0x10401008L, 0x00000008L, 0x10001000L, 0x00401008L,
+        0x00400008L, 0x00401000L, 0x10400000L, 0x10001008L,
+        0x00001008L, 0x10000000L, 0x10000008L, 0x10401000L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 4 */
+        0x08000000L, 0x00010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x08010420L,
+        0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L,
+        0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x00010400L,
+        0x08000420L, 0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00010400L, 0x08000000L, 0x00010020L, 0x00000420L,
+        0x08000400L, 0x00010420L, 0x00000000L, 0x08000020L,
+        0x00000020L, 0x08000420L, 0x08010420L, 0x00010020L,
+        0x08010000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000420L, 0x08010400L,
+        0x08010400L, 0x08000420L, 0x00010020L, 0x08010000L,
+        0x00010000L, 0x00000020L, 0x08000020L, 0x08000400L,
+        0x08000000L, 0x00010400L, 0x08010420L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00010420L, 0x08000000L, 0x00000400L, 0x00010020L,
+        0x08000420L, 0x00000400L, 0x00000000L, 0x08010420L,
+        0x08010020L, 0x08010400L, 0x00000420L, 0x00010000L,
+        0x00010400L, 0x08010020L, 0x08000400L, 0x00000420L,
+        0x00000020L, 0x00010420L, 0x08010000L, 0x08000020L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 5 */
+        0x80000040L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80202000L,
+        0x00200040L, 0x00002000L, 0x80002040L, 0x00200000L,
+        0x00002040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x80000000L,
+        0x80002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L,
+        0x00200000L, 0x80002040L, 0x80200040L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00002000L, 0x00000040L, 0x80202000L, 0x80200040L,
+        0x80202040L, 0x80200000L, 0x80000000L, 0x00002040L,
+        0x00000040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00202040L, 0x80002000L,
+        0x00002040L, 0x80000000L, 0x80002000L, 0x00202040L,
+        0x80202000L, 0x00200040L, 0x00000000L, 0x80002000L,
+        0x80000000L, 0x00002000L, 0x80200040L, 0x00200000L,
+        0x00200040L, 0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00000040L,
+        0x80202040L, 0x00202000L, 0x00200000L, 0x80002040L,
+        0x80000040L, 0x80200000L, 0x00202040L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00002000L, 0x80000040L, 0x80002040L, 0x80202000L,
+        0x80200000L, 0x00002040L, 0x00000040L, 0x80200040L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 6 */
+        0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L,
+        0x01004204L, 0x00004004L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x01000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x00000204L, 0x01004000L,
+        0x00000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00000204L,
+        0x01000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x01000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00004200L,
+        0x01004004L, 0x00004204L, 0x01004200L, 0x00000004L,
+        0x00004204L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L,
+        0x00004204L, 0x01004000L, 0x01004004L, 0x00000204L,
+        0x00004000L, 0x00000200L, 0x01000000L, 0x01004004L,
+        0x01000204L, 0x00004204L, 0x00004200L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x00000200L, 0x01000004L, 0x00000004L, 0x01000200L,
+        0x00000000L, 0x01000204L, 0x01000200L, 0x00004200L,
+        0x00000204L, 0x00004000L, 0x01004204L, 0x01000000L,
+        0x01004200L, 0x00000004L, 0x00004004L, 0x01004204L,
+        0x01000004L, 0x01004200L, 0x01004000L, 0x00004004L,
+    },
+    {
+        /* nibble 7 */
+        0x20800080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x20020000L, 0x00800080L, 0x20800000L, 0x20820080L,
+        0x00000080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00820000L, 0x00020080L,
+        0x00820080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20000080L, 0x20800000L,
+        0x00020000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
+        0x20820080L, 0x20000080L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
+        0x20000000L, 0x00800000L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800080L,
+        0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20820000L, 0x00000080L,
+        0x00800000L, 0x00020000L, 0x20000080L, 0x20820080L,
+        0x00020080L, 0x20000000L, 0x00000000L, 0x00820000L,
+        0x20800080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20020000L, 0x00800080L,
+        0x20820000L, 0x00000080L, 0x00800080L, 0x20020000L,
+        0x20820080L, 0x00800000L, 0x20800000L, 0x20000080L,
+        0x00820000L, 0x00020080L, 0x20020080L, 0x20800000L,
+        0x00000080L, 0x20820000L, 0x00820080L, 0x00000000L,
+        0x20000000L, 0x20800080L, 0x00020000L, 0x00820080L,
+    }
 };

crypto/dh/Makefile

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
 
     EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, dh);
 
-    ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
 
     return 1;
 
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
     DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
  dherr:
     DH_free(dh);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -257,7 +258,8 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
-    ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dhKeyAgreement), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
@@ -271,7 +273,7 @@ static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     if (params != NULL)
         ASN1_STRING_free(params);
     if (prkey != NULL)
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
     return 0;
 }
 

crypto/dsa/Makefile

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
             goto decerr;
         if (privkey->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
             p8->broken = PKCS8_NEG_PRIVKEY;
-            ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+            ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
             if (!(privkey = d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(NULL, &q, pklen)))
                 goto decerr;
         }
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
     if (ndsa)
         sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
     else
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
 
     return 1;
 
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
  dsaerr:
     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
     if (privkey)
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(privkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey);
     sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(ndsa, ASN1_TYPE_free);
     DSA_free(dsa);
     return 0;
@@ -315,7 +315,8 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 
     dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
 
-    ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+    ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
+    prkey = NULL;
 
     if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
                          V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     if (params != NULL)
         ASN1_STRING_free(params);
     if (prkey != NULL)
-        ASN1_INTEGER_free(prkey);
+        ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
     return 0;
 }
 

crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c

@@ -183,8 +183,9 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
             if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
                 goto err;
 
-            if (!seed_len) {
-                RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize);
+            if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
+                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
+                    goto err;
                 seed_is_random = 1;
             } else {
                 seed_is_random = 0;

crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c

@@ -106,23 +106,23 @@ static DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = {
 #define DSA_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,rr,a1,p1,a2,p2,m,ctx,in_mont) \
         do { \
         int _tmp_res53; \
-        if((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
+        if ((dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp) \
                 _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->dsa_mod_exp((dsa), (rr), (a1), (p1), \
                                 (a2), (p2), (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
         else \
                 _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp2_mont((rr), (a1), (p1), (a2), (p2), \
                                 (m), (ctx), (in_mont)); \
-        if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
+        if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
         } while(0)
 #define DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(err_instr,dsa,r,a,p,m,ctx,m_ctx) \
         do { \
         int _tmp_res53; \
-        if((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
+        if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp) \
                 _tmp_res53 = (dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp((dsa), (r), (a), (p), \
                                 (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
         else \
                 _tmp_res53 = BN_mod_exp_mont((r), (a), (p), (m), (ctx), (m_ctx)); \
-        if(!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
+        if (!_tmp_res53) err_instr; \
         } while(0)
 
 const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)

crypto/dso/Makefile

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/dso/dso_lib.c

@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ DSO_FUNC_TYPE DSO_bind_func(DSO *dso, const char *symname)
  * honest. For one thing, I think I have to return a negative value for any
  * error because possible DSO_ctrl() commands may return values such as
  * "size"s that can legitimately be zero (making the standard
- * "if(DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
+ * "if (DSO_cmd(...))" form that works almost everywhere else fail at odd
  * times. I'd prefer "output" values to be passed by reference and the return
  * value as success/failure like usual ... but we conform when we must... :-)
  */

crypto/ec/Makefile

@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c

@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
     }
 
     /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) {
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
         goto err;
     }

crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c

@@ -1014,8 +1014,6 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
             ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             goto err;
         }
-        if (a)
-            *a = ret;
     } else
         ret = *a;
 
@@ -1083,10 +1081,12 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
         ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY;
     }
 
+    if (a)
+        *a = ret;
     ok = 1;
  err:
     if (!ok) {
-        if (ret)
+        if (ret && (a == NULL || *a != ret))
             EC_KEY_free(ret);
         ret = NULL;
     }
@@ -1213,16 +1213,19 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
             ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
             return NULL;
         }
-        if (a)
-            *a = ret;
     } else
         ret = *a;
 
     if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+        if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
+             EC_KEY_free(ret);
         return NULL;
     }
 
+    if (a)
+        *a = ret;
+
     return ret;
 }
 

crypto/ec/ec_check.c

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
         goto err;
     }
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx)) {
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, group->generator, ctx) <= 0) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
         goto err;
     }

crypto/ec/ec_key.c

@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
         goto err;
 
     /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) {
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
         goto err;
     }

crypto/ec/ec_lib.c

@@ -993,6 +993,13 @@ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
     return group->meth->is_at_infinity(group, point);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check whether an EC_POINT is on the curve or not. Note that the return
+ * value for this function should NOT be treated as a boolean. Return values:
+ *  1: The point is on the curve
+ *  0: The point is not on the curve
+ * -1: An error occurred
+ */
 int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
                          BN_CTX *ctx)
 {

crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c

@@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
     }
 
     /* test required by X9.62 */
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx)) {
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, point, ctx) <= 0) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_OCT2POINT, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
         goto err;
     }

crypto/ec/ectest.c

@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, 1, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) {
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
         if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
             ABORT;
         fprintf(stderr, "Point is not on curve: x = 0x");
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, y, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "0100000000000000000001F4C8F927AED3CA752257"))
         ABORT;
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF99DEF836146BC9B1B4D22831"))
         ABORT;
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn
         (&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF16A2E0B8F03E13DD29455C5C2A3D"))
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E"
                    "84F3B9CAC2FC632551"))
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 1, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
                    "FFC7634D81F4372DDF581A0DB248B0A77AECEC196ACCC52973"))
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(group, P, x, 0, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, "1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"
                    "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5"
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
         ABORT;                  /* P = -2Q */
@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
 #  define CHAR2_CURVE_TEST_INTERNAL(_name, _p, _a, _b, _x, _y, _y_bit, _order, _cof, _degree, _variable) \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, _y_bit, ctx)) ABORT; \
-        if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ void prime_field_tests()
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&x, _x)) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&y, _y)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, P, x, y, ctx)) ABORT; \
-        if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx)) ABORT; \
+        if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&z, _order)) ABORT; \
         if (!BN_hex2bn(&cof, _cof)) ABORT; \
         if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, z, cof)) ABORT; \
@@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ void char2_field_tests()
     if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
         ABORT;
 # endif
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx)) {
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, Q, ctx) <= 0) {
 /* Change test based on whether binary point compression is enabled or not. */
 # ifdef OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP
         if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(group, Q, x, y, ctx))
@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@ void char2_field_tests()
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, P, P, ctx))
         ABORT;
-    if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx))
+    if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(group, P, ctx) <= 0)
         ABORT;
     if (!EC_POINT_invert(group, Q, ctx))
         ABORT;                  /* P = -2Q */

crypto/ecdh/Makefile

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/ecdsa/Makefile

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/engine/Makefile

@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/err/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/evp/Makefile

@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

crypto/evp/e_des3.c

@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
     DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
 # ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
     if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1)
-        ! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
+        || DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
         return 0;
 # else
     DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1);

crypto/hmac/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/idea/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/jpake/Makefile

@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ install:
 	chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
 	done;
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/krb5/Makefile

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

crypto/lhash/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/md2/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/md32_common.h

@@ -225,15 +225,13 @@
 #  define HOST_c2l(c,l)   (l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24),          \
                          l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16),          \
                          l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8),          \
-                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    ),          \
-                         l)
+                         l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))    )   )
 # endif
 # ifndef HOST_l2c
 #  define HOST_l2c(l,c)   (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff),      \
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff),      \
                          *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff),      \
-                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff),      \
-                         l)
+                         *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)    )&0xff)   )
 # endif
 
 #elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN)
@@ -253,8 +251,8 @@
 # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)
 #  ifndef B_ENDIAN
    /* See comment in DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN section. */
-#   define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, l)
-#   define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, l)
+#   define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4)
+#   define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4)
 #  endif
 # endif
 

crypto/md4/Makefile

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/md5/Makefile

@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/mdc2/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/mem.c

@@ -358,6 +358,9 @@ char *CRYPTO_strdup(const char *str, const char *file, int line)
 {
     char *ret = CRYPTO_malloc(strlen(str) + 1, file, line);
 
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
     strcpy(ret, str);
     return ret;
 }

crypto/mem_clr.c

@@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
 {
     unsigned char *p = ptr;
     size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
+
+    if (ptr == NULL)
+        return;
+
     while (loop--) {
         *(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
         ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));

crypto/modes/Makefile

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/objects/Makefile

@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: obj_dat.h obj_mac.h obj_xref.h depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/objects/obj_dat.c

@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a)
     if (a->nid != 0)
         return (a->nid);
 
+    if (a->length == 0)
+        return NID_undef;
+
     if (added != NULL) {
         ad.type = ADDED_DATA;
         ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* XXX: ugly but harmless */

crypto/objects/objects.pl

@@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ open (OUT,">$ARGV[2]") || die "Can't open output file $ARGV[2]";
 print OUT <<'EOF';
 /* crypto/objects/obj_mac.h */
 
-/* THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the
- * following command:
- * perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
+/*
+ * THIS FILE IS GENERATED FROM objects.txt by objects.pl via the following
+ * command: perl objects.pl objects.txt obj_mac.num obj_mac.h
  */
 
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
@@ -132,21 +132,21 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  * This package is an SSL implementation written
  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
+ *
  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
+ *
  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  * the code are not to be removed.
  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
+ *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  * are met:
@@ -161,10 +161,10 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
+ *
  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -176,28 +176,36 @@ print OUT <<'EOF';
  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
+ *
  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-#define SN_undef			"UNDEF"
-#define LN_undef			"undefined"
-#define NID_undef			0
-#define OBJ_undef			0L
-
+#define SN_undef                        "UNDEF"
+#define LN_undef                        "undefined"
+#define NID_undef                       0
+#define OBJ_undef                       0L
 EOF
 
+sub expand
+	{
+	my $string = shift;
+
+	1 while $string =~ s/\t+/' ' x (length($&) * 8 - length($`) % 8)/e;
+
+	return $string;
+	}
+
 foreach (sort { $a <=> $b } keys %ordern)
 	{
 	$Cname=$ordern{$_};
-	print OUT "#define SN_",$Cname,"\t\t\"",$sn{$Cname},"\"\n" if $sn{$Cname} ne "";
-	print OUT "#define LN_",$Cname,"\t\t\"",$ln{$Cname},"\"\n" if $ln{$Cname} ne "";
-	print OUT "#define NID_",$Cname,"\t\t",$nid{$Cname},"\n" if $nid{$Cname} ne "";
-	print OUT "#define OBJ_",$Cname,"\t\t",$obj{$Cname},"\n" if $obj{$Cname} ne "";
 	print OUT "\n";
+	print OUT expand("#define SN_$Cname\t\t\"$sn{$Cname}\"\n") if $sn{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define LN_$Cname\t\t\"$ln{$Cname}\"\n") if $ln{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define NID_$Cname\t\t$nid{$Cname}\n") if $nid{$Cname} ne "";
+	print OUT expand("#define OBJ_$Cname\t\t$obj{$Cname}\n") if $obj{$Cname} ne "";
 	}
 
 close OUT;

crypto/objects/objxref.pl

@@ -62,30 +62,36 @@ $pname =~ s|^.[^/]/||;
 print <<EOF;
 /* AUTOGENERATED BY $pname, DO NOT EDIT */
 
-typedef struct
-	{
-	int sign_id;
-	int hash_id;
-	int pkey_id;
-	} nid_triple;
+typedef struct {
+    int sign_id;
+    int hash_id;
+    int pkey_id;
+} nid_triple;
 
-static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] =
-	{
+static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = {
 EOF
 
 foreach (@srt1)
 	{
 	my $xr = $_;
 	my ($p1, $p2) = @{$xref_tbl{$_}};
-	print "\t{NID_$xr, NID_$p1, NID_$p2},\n";
-	}
+	my $o1 = "    {NID_$xr, NID_$p1,";
+	my $o2 = "NID_$p2},";
+        if (length("$o1 $o2") < 78)
+		{
+		print "$o1 $o2\n";
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		print "$o1\n     $o2\n";
+		}
+        }
 
-print "\t};";
+print "};";
 print <<EOF;
 
 
-static const nid_triple * const sigoid_srt_xref[] =
-	{
+static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = {
 EOF
 
 foreach (@srt2)
@@ -94,10 +100,10 @@ foreach (@srt2)
 	# If digest or signature algorithm is "undef" then the algorithm
 	# needs special handling and is excluded from the cross reference table.
 	next if $p1 eq "undef" || $p2 eq "undef";
-	print "\t\&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n";
+	print "    \&sigoid_srt\[$x\],\n";
 	}
 
-print "\t};\n\n";
+print "};\n";
 
 sub check_oid
 	{
@@ -107,4 +113,3 @@ sub check_oid
 		die "Not Found \"$chk\"\n";
 		}
 	}
-

crypto/ocsp/Makefile

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c

@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 {
     X509 *signer, *x;
     STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
     X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
     int i, ret = 0;
     ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
@@ -107,10 +108,20 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
     }
     if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
         int init_res;
-        if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
-            init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
-        else
-            init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
+        if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
+            untrusted = NULL;
+        } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
+            untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
+            for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+                if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
+                    OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                    goto end;
+                }
+            }
+        } else {
+            untrusted = bs->certs;
+        }
+        init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
         if (!init_res) {
             ret = -1;
             OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
@@ -161,6 +172,8 @@ int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
  end:
     if (chain)
         sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+    if (bs->certs && certs)
+        sk_X509_free(untrusted);
     return ret;
 }
 

crypto/opensslconf.h.in

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #if defined(DES_RISC1) && defined(DES_RISC2)
-YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
+#error YOU SHOULD NOT HAVE BOTH DES_RISC1 AND DES_RISC2 DEFINED!!!!!
 #endif
 
 /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.

crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x10000120L
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000014fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0r-fips-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0t-fips 3 Dec 2015"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0r-dev xx XXX xxxx"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.0t 3 Dec 2015"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

crypto/pem/Makefile

@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC)

crypto/pem/pem.h

@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str);
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509, X509)
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_AUX, X509)
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_CERT_PAIR, X509_CERT_PAIR)
-DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_REQ, X509_REQ) DECLARE_PEM_write(X509_REQ_NEW, X509_REQ)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_REQ, X509_REQ)
+DECLARE_PEM_write(X509_REQ_NEW, X509_REQ)
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS7, PKCS7)
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE)
@@ -458,20 +459,24 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8, X509_SIG)
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO)
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(RSAPrivateKey, RSA)
-DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(RSAPublicKey, RSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(RSA_PUBKEY, RSA)
 # endif
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(DSAPrivateKey, DSA)
-DECLARE_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA) DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DSAparams, DSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(DSA_PUBKEY, DSA)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DSAparams, DSA)
 # endif
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(ECPKParameters, EC_GROUP)
-DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY) DECLARE_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(ECPrivateKey, EC_KEY)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(EC_PUBKEY, EC_KEY)
 # endif
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
 DECLARE_PEM_rw_const(DHparams, DH)
 # endif
-DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(PrivateKey, EVP_PKEY) DECLARE_PEM_rw(PUBKEY, EVP_PKEY)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw_cb(PrivateKey, EVP_PKEY)
+DECLARE_PEM_rw(PUBKEY, EVP_PKEY)
 
 int PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
                                       char *kstr, int klen,

crypto/pem/pem_pk8.c

@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ static int do_pk8pkey(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int isder, int nid,
         if (kstr == buf)
             OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, klen);
         PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf);
+        if (p8 == NULL)
+            return 0;
         if (isder)
             ret = i2d_PKCS8_bio(bp, p8);
         else

crypto/pkcs12/Makefile

@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/pkcs12/p12_kiss.c

@@ -135,10 +135,12 @@ int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
 
     while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts))) {
         if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert) {
+            ERR_set_mark();
             if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey)) {
                 *cert = x;
                 x = NULL;
             }
+            ERR_pop_to_mark();
         }
 
         if (ca && x) {

crypto/pkcs7/Makefile

@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c

@@ -261,6 +261,25 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
     PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    /*
+     * The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
+     * only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
+     *
+     * When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
+     * error.
+     *
+     * When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
+     * calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
+     */
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
 
@@ -411,11 +430,27 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
     unsigned char *ek = NULL, *tkey = NULL;
     int eklen = 0, tkeylen = 0;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
 
     switch (i) {
     case NID_pkcs7_signed:
+        /*
+         * p7->d.sign->contents is a PKCS7 structure consisting of a contentType
+         * field and optional content.
+         * data_body is NULL if that structure has no (=detached) content
+         * or if the contentType is wrong (i.e., not "data").
+         */
         data_body = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.sign->contents);
         if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && data_body == NULL) {
             PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
@@ -427,6 +462,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
     case NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped:
         rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
         md_sk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->md_algs;
+        /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
         data_body = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
         enc_alg = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
         evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
@@ -439,6 +475,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
     case NID_pkcs7_enveloped:
         rsk = p7->d.enveloped->recipientinfo;
         enc_alg = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm;
+        /* data_body is NULL if the optional EncryptedContent is missing. */
         data_body = p7->d.enveloped->enc_data->enc_data;
         evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm);
         if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
@@ -452,6 +489,12 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
         goto err;
     }
 
+    /* Detached content must be supplied via in_bio instead. */
+    if (data_body == NULL && in_bio == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     /* We will be checking the signature */
     if (md_sk != NULL) {
         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_ALGOR_num(md_sk); i++) {
@@ -594,7 +637,7 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
         etmp = NULL;
     }
 #if 1
-    if (PKCS7_is_detached(p7) || (in_bio != NULL)) {
+    if (in_bio != NULL) {
         bio = in_bio;
     } else {
 # if 0
@@ -704,6 +747,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
     STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *si_sk = NULL;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
     i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
     p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
@@ -743,6 +796,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
         /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
         if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.sign->contents) && p7->detached) {
             M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+            os = NULL;
             p7->d.sign->contents->d.data = NULL;
         }
         break;
@@ -752,6 +806,7 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
         /* If detached data then the content is excluded */
         if (PKCS7_type_is_data(p7->d.digest->contents) && p7->detached) {
             M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
+            os = NULL;
             p7->d.digest->contents->d.data = NULL;
         }
         break;
@@ -815,22 +870,30 @@ int PKCS7_dataFinal(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
         M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(p7->d.digest->digest, md_data, md_len);
     }
 
-    if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7) && !(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
-        char *cont;
-        long contlen;
-        btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
-        if (btmp == NULL) {
-            PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+    if (!PKCS7_is_detached(p7)) {
         /*
-         * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
-         * instead of making an extra copy.
+         * NOTE(emilia): I think we only reach os == NULL here because detached
+         * digested data support is broken.
          */
-        BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
-        BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
-        ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+        if (os == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!(os->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) {
+            char *cont;
+            long contlen;
+            btmp = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MEM);
+            if (btmp == NULL) {
+                PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAFINAL, PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MEM_BIO);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            contlen = BIO_get_mem_data(btmp, &cont);
+            /*
+             * Mark the BIO read only then we can use its copy of the data
+             * instead of making an extra copy.
+             */
+            BIO_set_flags(btmp, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY);
+            BIO_set_mem_eof_return(btmp, 0);
+            ASN1_STRING_set0(os, (unsigned char *)cont, contlen);
+        }
     }
     ret = 1;
  err:
@@ -905,6 +968,16 @@ int PKCS7_dataVerify(X509_STORE *cert_store, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, BIO *bio,
     STACK_OF(X509) *cert;
     X509 *x509;
 
+    if (p7 == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
+        PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAVERIFY, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
         cert = p7->d.sign->cert;
     } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {

crypto/pkcs7/pk7_lib.c

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ long PKCS7_ctrl(PKCS7 *p7, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
     nid = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
 
     switch (cmd) {
+    /* NOTE(emilia): does not support detached digested data. */
     case PKCS7_OP_SET_DETACHED_SIGNATURE:
         if (nid == NID_pkcs7_signed) {
             ret = p7->detached = (int)larg;
@@ -444,6 +445,8 @@ int PKCS7_set_digest(PKCS7 *p7, const EVP_MD *md)
 
 STACK_OF(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO) *PKCS7_get_signer_info(PKCS7 *p7)
 {
+    if (p7 == NULL || p7->d.ptr == NULL)
+        return NULL;
     if (PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7)) {
         return (p7->d.sign->signer_info);
     } else if (PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {

crypto/pqueue/Makefile

@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)

crypto/rand/Makefile

@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ tests:
 lint:
 	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
 
+update: depend
+
 depend:
 	@[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
 	$(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)