update FAQ

BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.

Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+The OpenSSL project depends on volunteer efforts and financial support from
+the end user community. That support comes in the form of donations and paid
+sponsorships, software support contracts, paid consulting services
+and commissioned software development.
+
+Since all these activities support the continued development and improvement
+of OpenSSL we consider all these clients and customers as sponsors of the
+OpenSSL project.
+
+We would like to identify and thank the following such sponsors for their past
+or current significant support of the OpenSSL project:
+
+Very significant support:
+
+	OpenGear: www.opengear.com
+
+Significant support:
+
+	PSW Group: www.psw.net
+
+Please note that we ask permission to identify sponsors and that some sponsors
+we consider eligible for inclusion here have requested to remain anonymous.
+
+Additional sponsorship or financial support is always welcome: for more
+information please contact the OpenSSL Software Foundation.

CHANGES

@@ -2,7 +2,213 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
- Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+  *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+     BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+     in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+     Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+     issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+     (CVE-2012-2110)
+     [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+  *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+     in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+     content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+     needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+     old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+     an MMA defence is not necessary.
+     Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+     this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a 
+     client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+     Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+     Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+     Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+     preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+     [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+  *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+     of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+     which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+     the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+     differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+     paper describing this attack can be found at:
+                  http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+     Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+     Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+     (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+     <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+     for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+     [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+  *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+     [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
+
+  *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+     (CVE-2011-4576)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+     Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+     Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+ 
+  *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+     Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+     and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+     [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+  *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+     [Emilia K<>sper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+     interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+     BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+     threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+     This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+     lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+     BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+     the last update always remained unused).
+     [Emilia K<>sper (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+     for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
+     [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+     by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+	http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+     [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
+
+  *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+     [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+  *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+     escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+     ambiguous.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
+
+  *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+     and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+     Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+     Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+     Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+     [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
+
+  *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+     overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+     be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
+     the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
+     some broken encodings work correctly.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
+     is also one of the inputs.
+     [Emilia K<>sper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+
+  *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
+     Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
+     after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
+     etc are non-op.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
+
+  [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
+  OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
+
+  *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
+     access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
+     [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
+
+  *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
+     common in certificates and some applications which only call
+     SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) VMS fixes: 
+     Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
+     Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
+     Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
+     [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
+
+  *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
+     update s->server with a new major version number.  As of
+     - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
+     - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
+     the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
+     receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
+     protection is active.  (CVE-2010-0740)
+     [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>]
+
+  *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL 
+     could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
+     [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+
+  *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure.  (CVE-2009-3245)
+     [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
+
+  *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
+     accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
+     excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
+     include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
+     BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
+     the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
+     trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
+     of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally.
+     This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op.
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
      highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
@@ -11,7 +217,7 @@
 
   *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
      ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
-     call CRYPTO_free_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
+     call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
      restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
      This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
      has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
@@ -23,7 +229,7 @@
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
   *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
-     connect (but not renegotiate) with servers which do not support RI.
+     connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
      Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
      [Steve Henson]
 
@@ -31,14 +237,14 @@
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
-     a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
-     Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
-     when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
-     this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
-     receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal 
-     error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
-     expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
-     denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+     a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746.  Some renegotiating
+     TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+     the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+     waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+     received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+     applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+     and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+     only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
@@ -50,10 +256,9 @@
      the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
      [Steve Henson]
 
-  *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03. Re-enable
-     renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
-     SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
-     bad idea. It has been replaced by
+  *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+     as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+     turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
      SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
      SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
      know what you are doing.

Configure

@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ my %table=(
 "linux-alpha-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}",
 "linux-alpha+bwx-ccc","ccc:-fast -readonly_strings -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO::-D_REENTRANT:::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}",
 
+# Android: Linux but without -DTERMIO and pointers to headers and libs.
+"android","gcc:-mandroid -I\$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B\$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+
 #### *BSD [do see comment about ${BSDthreads} above!]
 "BSD-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG RC2_CHAR RC4_INDEX DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${no_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-gcc-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
 "BSD-x86",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIOS -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::${BSDthreads}:::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_out_asm}:dlfcn:bsd-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
@@ -1812,11 +1815,11 @@ EOF
 	(system $make_command.$make_targets) == 0 or exit $?
 		if $make_targets ne "";
 	if ( $perl =~ m@^/@) {
-	    &dofile("tools/c_rehash",$perl,'^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";');
+	    &dofile("tools/c_rehash",$perl,'^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";', '^my \$prefix;$', 'my $prefix = "' . $prefix . '";');
 	    &dofile("apps/CA.pl",$perl,'^#!/', '#!%s');
 	} else {
 	    # No path for Perl known ...
-	    &dofile("tools/c_rehash",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";');
+	    &dofile("tools/c_rehash",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s','^my \$dir;$', 'my $dir = "' . $openssldir . '";',  '^my \$prefix;$', 'my $prefix = "' . $prefix . '";');
 	    &dofile("apps/CA.pl",'/usr/local/bin/perl','^#!/', '#!%s');
 	}
 	if ($depflags ne $default_depflags && !$make_depend) {

FAQ

@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Why does the OpenSSL test suite fail in sha512t on x86 CPU?
 * Why does compiler fail to compile sha512.c?
 * Test suite still fails, what to do?
+* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
+* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
+* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
 
 [PROG] Questions about programming with OpenSSL
 
@@ -70,6 +73,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * I think I've detected a memory leak, is this a bug?
 * Why does Valgrind complain about the use of uninitialized data?
 * Why doesn't a memory BIO work when a file does?
+* Where are the declarations and implementations of d2i_X509() etc?
 
 ===============================================================================
 
@@ -78,7 +82,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 0.9.8k was released on Mar 25th, 2009.
+OpenSSL 1.0.0i was released on Apr 19th, 2012.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
@@ -94,14 +98,17 @@ explains how to install this library.
 
 OpenSSL includes a command line utility that can be used to perform a
 variety of cryptographic functions.  It is described in the openssl(1)
-manpage.  Documentation for developers is currently being written.  A
-few manual pages already are available; overviews over libcrypto and
+manpage.  Documentation for developers is currently being written. Many
+manual pages are available; overviews over libcrypto and
 libssl are given in the crypto(3) and ssl(3) manpages.
 
 The OpenSSL manpages are installed in /usr/local/ssl/man/ (or a
 different directory if you specified one as described in INSTALL).
 In addition, you can read the most current versions at
-<URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>.
+<URL: http://www.openssl.org/docs/>. Note that the online documents refer
+to the very latest development versions of OpenSSL and may include features
+not present in released versions. If in doubt refer to the documentation
+that came with the version of OpenSSL you are using.
 
 For information on parts of libcrypto that are not yet documented, you
 might want to read Ariel Glenn's documentation on SSLeay 0.9, OpenSSL's
@@ -127,7 +134,7 @@ OpenSSL.  Information on the OpenSSL mailing lists is available from
 * Where can I get a compiled version of OpenSSL?
 
 You can finder pointers to binary distributions in
-http://www.openssl.org/related/binaries.html .
+<URL: http://www.openssl.org/related/binaries.html> .
 
 Some applications that use OpenSSL are distributed in binary form.
 When using such an application, you don't need to install OpenSSL
@@ -459,7 +466,7 @@ administrators.
 Other projects do have other policies so you can for example extract the CA
 bundle used by Mozilla and/or modssl as described in this article:
 
-  http://www.mail-archive.com/modssl-users@modssl.org/msg16980.html
+  <URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/modssl-users@modssl.org/msg16980.html>
 
 
 [BUILD] =======================================================================
@@ -501,7 +508,7 @@ when you run the test suite (using "make test").  The message returned is
 "bc: 1 not implemented".
 
 The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html
+and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
 for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
 
 
@@ -512,7 +519,7 @@ that the OpenSSL bntest throws at it.  This gets triggered when you run the
 test suite (using "make test").  The message returned is "bc: stack empty".
 
 The best way to deal with this is to find another implementation of bc
-and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html
+and compile/install it.  GNU bc (see <URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/software.html>
 for download instructions) can be safely used, for example.
 
 
@@ -705,6 +712,46 @@ never make sense, and tend to emerge when you least expect them. In order
 to identify one, drop optimization level, e.g. by editing CFLAG line in
 top-level Makefile, recompile and re-run the test.
 
+* I think I've found a bug, what should I do?
+
+If you are a new user then it is quite likely you haven't found a bug and
+something is happening you aren't familiar with. Check this FAQ, the associated
+documentation and the mailing lists for similar queries. If you are still
+unsure whether it is a bug or not submit a query to the openssl-users mailing
+list.
+
+
+* I'm SURE I've found a bug, how do I report it?
+
+Bug reports with no security implications should be sent to the request
+tracker. This can be done by mailing the report to <rt@openssl.org> (or its
+alias <openssl-bugs@openssl.org>), please note that messages sent to the
+request tracker also appear in the public openssl-dev mailing list.
+
+The report should be in plain text. Any patches should be sent as
+plain text attachments because some mailers corrupt patches sent inline.
+If your issue affects multiple versions of OpenSSL check any patches apply
+cleanly and, if possible include patches to each affected version.
+
+The report should be given a meaningful subject line briefly summarising the
+issue. Just "bug in OpenSSL" or "bug in OpenSSL 0.9.8n" is not very helpful.
+
+By sending reports to the request tracker the bug can then be given a priority
+and assigned to the appropriate maintainer. The history of discussions can be
+accessed and if the issue has been addressed or a reason why not. If patches
+are only sent to openssl-dev they can be mislaid if a team member has to
+wade through months of old messages to review the discussion.
+
+See also <URL: http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html>
+
+
+* I've found a security issue, how do I report it?
+
+If you think your bug has security implications then please send it to
+openssl-security@openssl.org if you don't get a prompt reply at least 
+acknowledging receipt then resend or mail it directly to one of the
+more active team members (e.g. Steve).
+
 [PROG] ========================================================================
 
 * Is OpenSSL thread-safe?
@@ -717,8 +764,10 @@ file.
 
 Multi-threaded applications must provide two callback functions to
 OpenSSL by calling CRYPTO_set_locking_callback() and
-CRYPTO_set_id_callback().  This is described in the threads(3)
-manpage.
+CRYPTO_set_id_callback(), for all versions of OpenSSL up to and
+including 0.9.8[abc...]. As of version 1.0.0, CRYPTO_set_id_callback()
+and associated APIs are deprecated by CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback()
+and friends. This is described in the threads(3) manpage.
 
 * I've compiled a program under Windows and it crashes: why?
 
@@ -962,4 +1011,15 @@ is needed. This must be done by calling:
 See the manual pages for more details.
 
 
+* Where are the declarations and implementations of d2i_X509() etc?
+
+These are defined and implemented by macros of the form:
+
+
+ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509) and IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509)
+
+The implementation passes an ASN1 "template" defining the structure into an
+ASN1 interpreter using generalised functions such as ASN1_item_d2i().
+
+
 ===============================================================================

LICENSE

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
   ---------------
 
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2008 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

Makefile.org

@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ install_docs:
 		$(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \
 		$(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \
 		$(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7
-	@pod2man="`cd util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
+	@pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \
 	here="`pwd`"; \
 	filecase=; \
 	if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \

NEWS

@@ -5,11 +5,61 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
-  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m-beta1:
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v:
 
+      o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u:
+
+      o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884
+      o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s:
+
+      o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108
+      o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109
+      o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576
+      o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619
+      o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180
+      o Fix for CVE-2010-4252
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o:
+
+      o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742.
+      o Various DTLS fixes.
+      o Recognise SHA2 certificates if only SSL algorithms added.
+      o Fix for no-rc4 compilation.
+      o Chil ENGINE unload workaround.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n:
+
+      o CFB cipher definition fixes.
+      o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433.
+
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m:
+
+      o Cipher definition fixes.
+      o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions.
       o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables.
       o SPKAC handling fixes.
-      o Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.
+      o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension.
       o Compression memory leak fixed.
       o Compression session resumption fixed.
       o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes.
@@ -157,6 +207,11 @@
       o Added initial support for Win64.
       o Added alternate pkg-config files.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m:
+
+      o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking.
+      o Various ciphersuite selection fixes.
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
 
       o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)

PROBLEMS

@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ may differ on your machine.
 
 
 As long as Apple doesn't fix the problem with ld, this problem building
-OpenSSL will remain as is.
+OpenSSL will remain as is. Well, the problem was addressed in 0.9.8f by
+passing -Wl,-search_paths_first, but it's unknown if the flag was
+supported from the initial MacOS X release.
 
 
 * Parallell make leads to errors

README

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
- OpenSSL 0.9.8m-beta1
+ OpenSSL 0.9.8v 19 Apr 2012
 
- Copyright (c) 1998-2009 The OpenSSL Project
+ Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
  All rights reserved.
 

STATUS

@@ -1,11 +1,26 @@
 
   OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 2010/01/20 17:26:01 $
+  ______________                           $Date: 2012/04/19 11:39:02 $
 
   DEVELOPMENT STATE
 
-    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0:  Under development...
-    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8m-beta1: Released on January 20th, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 1.1.0:  Under development...
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.1:  Under development...
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0d: Released on February   8nd, 2011
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0c: Released on December   2nd, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0b: Released on November  16th, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0a: Released on June      1st,  2010
+    o  OpenSSL 1.0.0:  Released on March     29th, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8v: Released on April     19th, 2012
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8u: Released on March     12th, 2012
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8t: Released on January   18th, 2012
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8s: Released on January    4th, 2012
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8r: Released on February   8nd, 2011
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8q: Released on December   2nd, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8p: Released on November  16th, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8o: Released on June       1st, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8n: Released on March     24th, 2010
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8m: Released on February  25th, 2010
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.8l: Released on November   5th, 2009
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.8k: Released on March     25th, 2009
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.8j: Released on January    7th, 2009

TABLE

@@ -864,6 +864,33 @@ $shared_extension = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
 $ranlib       = 
 $arflags      = -X64
 
+*** android
+$cc           = gcc
+$cflags       = -mandroid -I$(ANDROID_DEV)/include -B$(ANDROID_DEV)/lib -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall
+$unistd       = 
+$thread_cflag = -D_REENTRANT
+$sys_id       = 
+$lflags       = -ldl
+$bn_ops       = BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR
+$cpuid_obj    = 
+$bn_obj       = 
+$des_obj      = 
+$aes_obj      = 
+$bf_obj       = 
+$md5_obj      = 
+$sha1_obj     = 
+$cast_obj     = 
+$rc4_obj      = 
+$rmd160_obj   = 
+$rc5_obj      = 
+$dso_scheme   = dlfcn
+$shared_target= linux-shared
+$shared_cflag = -fPIC
+$shared_ldflag = 
+$shared_extension = .so.$(SHLIB_MAJOR).$(SHLIB_MINOR)
+$ranlib       = 
+$arflags      = 
+
 *** aux3-gcc
 $cc           = gcc
 $cflags       = -O2 -DTERMIO

apps/CA.com

@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ $!
 $   IF F$SEARCH(CATOP+".private"+CAKEY) .EQS. ""
 $   THEN
 $     READ '__INPUT' FILE -
-	   /PROMT="CA certificate filename (or enter to create)"
-$     IF F$SEARCH(FILE) .NES. ""
+	   /PROMPT="CA certificate filename (or enter to create): "
+$     IF (FILE .NES. "") .AND. (F$SEARCH(FILE) .NES. "")
 $     THEN
 $       COPY 'FILE' 'CATOP'.private'CAKEY'
 $	RET=$STATUS

apps/apps.c

@@ -351,13 +351,12 @@ void program_name(char *in, char *out, int size)
 
 int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf, int *argc, char **argv[])
 	{
-	int num,len,i;
+	int num,i;
 	char *p;
 
 	*argc=0;
 	*argv=NULL;
 
-	len=strlen(buf);
 	i=0;
 	if (arg->count == 0)
 		{
@@ -866,10 +865,17 @@ EVP_PKEY *load_key(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
 	if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE)
 		{
 		if (!e)
-			BIO_printf(bio_err,"no engine specified\n");
+			BIO_printf(err,"no engine specified\n");
 		else
+			{
 			pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, file,
 				ui_method, &cb_data);
+			if (!pkey) 
+				{
+				BIO_printf(err,"cannot load %s from engine\n",key_descrip);
+				ERR_print_errors(err);
+				}	
+			}
 		goto end;
 		}
 #endif
@@ -919,8 +925,11 @@ EVP_PKEY *load_key(BIO *err, const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin,
 		}
  end:
 	if (key != NULL) BIO_free(key);
-	if (pkey == NULL)
+	if (pkey == NULL) 
+		{
 		BIO_printf(err,"unable to load %s\n", key_descrip);
+		ERR_print_errors(err);
+		}	
 	return(pkey);
 	}
 

apps/asn1pars.c

@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ static int do_generate(BIO *bio, char *genstr, char *genconf, BUF_MEM *buf)
 
 	atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf);
 	NCONF_free(cnf);
+	cnf = NULL;
 
 	if (!atyp)
 		return -1;

apps/cms.c

@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		else if (!strcmp(*args,"-camellia256"))
 				cipher = EVP_camellia_256_cbc();
 #endif
+		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-debug_decrypt")) 
+				flags |= CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-text")) 
 				flags |= CMS_TEXT;
 		else if (!strcmp (*args, "-nointern")) 
@@ -611,7 +613,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-certsout file certificate output file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-signer file   signer certificate file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-recip  file   recipient certificate file for decryption\n");
-		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-skeyid        use subject key identifier\n");
+		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-keyid         use subject key identifier\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-in file       input file\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inform arg    input format SMIME (default), PEM or DER\n");
 		BIO_printf (bio_err, "-inkey file    input private key (if not signer or recipient)\n");
@@ -1013,6 +1015,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	ret = 4;
 	if (operation == SMIME_DECRYPT)
 		{
+		if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+			CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
 
 		if (secret_key)
 			{

apps/dh.c

@@ -88,9 +88,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	DH *dh=NULL;
 	int i,badops=0,text=0;
 	BIO *in=NULL,*out=NULL;
@@ -189,7 +186,7 @@ bad:
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());

apps/dhparam.c

@@ -149,9 +149,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	DH *dh=NULL;
 	int i,badops=0,text=0;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
@@ -270,7 +267,7 @@ bad:
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	if (g && !num)

apps/dsa.c

@@ -65,11 +65,11 @@
 #include "apps.h"
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
 
 #undef PROG
 #define PROG	dsa_main

apps/dsaparam.c

@@ -111,9 +111,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	DSA *dsa=NULL;
 	int i,badops=0,text=0;
 	BIO *in=NULL,*out=NULL;
@@ -278,7 +275,7 @@ bad:
 		}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	if (need_rand)
@@ -357,12 +354,10 @@ bad:
 	if (C)
 		{
 		unsigned char *data;
-		int l,len,bits_p,bits_q,bits_g;
+		int l,len,bits_p;
 
 		len=BN_num_bytes(dsa->p);
 		bits_p=BN_num_bits(dsa->p);
-		bits_q=BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
-		bits_g=BN_num_bits(dsa->g);
 		data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len+20);
 		if (data == NULL)
 			{
@@ -475,4 +470,10 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK dsa_cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *cb)
 #endif
 	return 1;
 	}
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
 #endif

apps/ec.c

@@ -85,9 +85,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE 	*e = NULL;
-#endif
 	int 	ret = 1;
 	EC_KEY 	*eckey = NULL;
 	const EC_GROUP *group;
@@ -254,7 +251,7 @@ bad:
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	if(!app_passwd(bio_err, passargin, passargout, &passin, &passout)) 

apps/ecparam.c

@@ -129,9 +129,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	char	*infile = NULL, *outfile = NULL, *prog;
 	BIO 	*in = NULL, *out = NULL;
 	int 	informat, outformat, noout = 0, C = 0, ret = 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE	*e = NULL;
-#endif
 	char	*engine = NULL;
 
 	BIGNUM	*ec_p = NULL, *ec_a = NULL, *ec_b = NULL,
@@ -340,7 +337,7 @@ bad:
 		}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+	setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	if (list_curves)

apps/enc.c

@@ -100,9 +100,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	static const char magic[]="Salted__";
 	char mbuf[sizeof magic-1];
 	char *strbuf=NULL;
@@ -311,7 +308,7 @@ bad:
 		}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	if (md && (dgst=EVP_get_digestbyname(md)) == NULL)

apps/gendh.c

@@ -89,9 +89,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
 	BN_GENCB cb;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	DH *dh=NULL;
 	int ret=1,num=DEFBITS;
 	int g=2;
@@ -163,7 +160,7 @@ bad:
 		}
 		
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	out=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());

apps/gendsa.c

@@ -78,9 +78,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	DSA *dsa=NULL;
 	int ret=1;
 	char *outfile=NULL;
@@ -206,7 +203,7 @@ bad:
 		}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	if(!app_passwd(bio_err, NULL, passargout, NULL, &passout)) {
@@ -279,4 +276,10 @@ end:
 	apps_shutdown();
 	OPENSSL_EXIT(ret);
 	}
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
 #endif

apps/genrsa.c

@@ -89,9 +89,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
 	BN_GENCB cb;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	int ret=1;
 	int i,num=DEFBITS;
 	long l;
@@ -235,7 +232,7 @@ bad:
 	}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	if (outfile == NULL)

apps/makeapps.com

@@ -70,10 +70,6 @@ $!
 $! Define what programs should be compiled
 $!
 $ PROGRAMS := OPENSSL
-$!$ PROGRAMS := VERIFY,ASN1PARS,REQ,DGST,DH,ENC,PASSWD,GENDH,ERRSTR,CA,CRL,-
-$!	      RSA,DSA,DSAPARAM,-
-$!	      X509,GENRSA,GENDSA,S_SERVER,S_CLIENT,SPEED,-
-$!	      S_TIME,VERSION,PKCS7,CRL2P7,SESS_ID,CIPHERS,NSEQ,
 $!
 $! Define The CRYPTO Library.
 $!
@@ -142,13 +138,13 @@ $! NOTE: Some might think this list ugly.  However, it's made this way to
 $! reflect the E_OBJ variable in Makefile as closely as possible, thereby
 $! making it fairly easy to verify that the lists are the same.
 $!
-$ LIB_FILES = "VERIFY;ASN1PARS;REQ;DGST;DH;DHPARAM;ENC;PASSWD;GENDH;ERRSTR;"+-
-	      "CA;PKCS7;CRL2P7;CRL;"+-
-	      "RSA;RSAUTL;DSA;DSAPARAM;EC;ECPARAM;"+-
-	      "X509;GENRSA;GENDSA;S_SERVER;S_CLIENT;SPEED;"+-
-	      "S_TIME;APPS;S_CB;S_SOCKET;APP_RAND;VERSION;SESS_ID;"+-
-	      "CIPHERS;NSEQ;PKCS12;PKCS8;SPKAC;SMIME;RAND;ENGINE;"+-
-	      "OCSP;PRIME;CMS"
+$ LIB_OPENSSL = "VERIFY,ASN1PARS,REQ,DGST,DH,DHPARAM,ENC,PASSWD,GENDH,ERRSTR,"+-
+		"CA,PKCS7,CRL2P7,CRL,"+-
+		"RSA,RSAUTL,DSA,DSAPARAM,EC,ECPARAM,"+-
+		"X509,GENRSA,GENDSA,S_SERVER,S_CLIENT,SPEED,"+-
+		"S_TIME,APPS,S_CB,S_SOCKET,APP_RAND,VERSION,SESS_ID,"+-
+		"CIPHERS,NSEQ,PKCS12,PKCS8,SPKAC,SMIME,RAND,ENGINE,"+-
+		"OCSP,PRIME,CMS"
 $ TCPIP_PROGRAMS = ",,"
 $ IF COMPILER .EQS. "VAXC" THEN -
      TCPIP_PROGRAMS = ",OPENSSL,"
@@ -161,121 +157,149 @@ $ PHASE := LIB
 $!
 $ RESTART: 
 $!
-$!  Define A File Counter And Set It To "0".
+$!  Define An App Counter And Set It To "0".
 $!
-$ FILE_COUNTER = 0
+$ APP_COUNTER = 0
 $!
-$! Top Of The File Loop.
+$!  Top Of The App Loop.
 $!
-$ NEXT_FILE:
+$ NEXT_APP:
 $!
-$! O.K, Extract The File Name From The File List.
+$!  Make The Application File Name
 $!
-$ FILE_NAME0 = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(FILE_COUNTER,";",'PHASE'_FILES),"TRIM")
-$ FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(0,",",FILE_NAME0),"TRIM")
-$ EXTRA_OBJ = FILE_NAME0 - FILE_NAME
+$ CURRENT_APP = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(APP_COUNTER,",",PROGRAMS),"TRIM")
 $!
-$! Check To See If We Are At The End Of The File List.
+$!  Create The Executable File Name.
 $!
-$ IF (FILE_NAME0.EQS.";")
+$   EXE_FILE = EXE_DIR + CURRENT_APP + ".EXE"
+$!
+$!  Check To See If We Are At The End Of The File List.
+$!
+$ IF (CURRENT_APP.EQS.",")
 $ THEN
 $   IF (PHASE.EQS."LIB")
 $   THEN
 $     PHASE := APP
 $     GOTO RESTART
 $   ELSE
-$     GOTO FILE_DONE
+$     GOTO APP_DONE
 $   ENDIF
 $ ENDIF
 $!
-$! Increment The Counter.
+$!  Increment The Counter.
 $!
-$ FILE_COUNTER = FILE_COUNTER + 1
+$ APP_COUNTER = APP_COUNTER + 1
 $!
-$! Check to see if this program should actually be compiled
-$!
-$ IF PHASE .EQS. "APP" .AND. -
-     ","+PROGRAMS+"," - (","+F$EDIT(FILE_NAME,"UPCASE")+",") .EQS. ","+PROGRAMS+","
-$ THEN
-$   GOTO NEXT_FILE
-$ ENDIF
-$!
-$! Create The Source File Name.
-$!
-$ SOURCE_FILE = "SYS$DISK:[]" + FILE_NAME + ".C"
-$!
-$! Create The Object File Name.
-$!
-$ OBJECT_FILE = OBJ_DIR + FILE_NAME + ".OBJ"
-$!
-$! Create The Executable File Name.
-$!
-$ EXE_FILE = EXE_DIR + FILE_NAME + ".EXE"
-$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO NEXT_FILE
-$!
-$! Check To See If The File We Want To Compile Actually Exists.
-$!
-$ IF (F$SEARCH(SOURCE_FILE).EQS."")
-$ THEN
-$!
-$!  Tell The User That The File Dosen't Exist.
-$!
-$   WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ""
-$   WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "The File ",SOURCE_FILE," Dosen't Exist."
-$   WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ""
-$!
-$!  Exit The Build.
-$!
-$   GOTO EXIT
-$!
-$! End The File Exist Check.
-$!
-$ ENDIF
-$!
-$! Tell The User What We Are Building.
+$!  Decide if we're building the object files or not.
 $!
 $ IF (PHASE.EQS."LIB")
 $ THEN
-$   WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Compiling The ",FILE_NAME,".C File."
-$ ELSE
-$   WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Building The ",FILE_NAME," Application Program."
-$ ENDIF
 $!
-$! Compile The File.
+$!  Define A Library File Counter And Set It To "-1".
+$!  -1 Means The Application File Name Is To Be Used.
 $!
-$ ON ERROR THEN GOTO NEXT_FILE
-$ IF COMPILEWITH_CC2 - FILE_NAME .NES. COMPILEWITH_CC2
-$ THEN
-$   CC2/OBJECT='OBJECT_FILE' 'SOURCE_FILE'
-$ ELSE
-$   CC/OBJECT='OBJECT_FILE' 'SOURCE_FILE'
-$ ENDIF
+$   LIB_COUNTER = -1
 $!
-$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO NEXT_FILE
+$!  Create a .OPT file for the object files
 $!
-$ IF (PHASE.EQS."LIB") 
-$ THEN 
-$   GOTO NEXT_FILE
+$   OPEN/WRITE OBJECTS 'EXE_DIR''CURRENT_APP'.OPT
+$!
+$!  Top Of The File Loop.
+$!
+$  NEXT_LIB:
+$!
+$!  O.K, Extract The File Name From The File List.
+$!
+$   IF LIB_COUNTER .GE. 0
+$   THEN
+$     FILE_NAME = F$EDIT(F$ELEMENT(LIB_COUNTER,",",LIB_'CURRENT_APP'),"TRIM")
+$   ELSE
+$     FILE_NAME = CURRENT_APP
+$   ENDIF
+$!
+$!  Check To See If We Are At The End Of The File List.
+$!
+$   IF (FILE_NAME.EQS.",")
+$   THEN
+$     CLOSE OBJECTS
+$     GOTO NEXT_APP
+$   ENDIF
+$!
+$!  Increment The Counter.
+$!
+$   LIB_COUNTER = LIB_COUNTER + 1
+$!
+$!  Create The Source File Name.
+$!
+$   SOURCE_FILE = "SYS$DISK:[]" + FILE_NAME + ".C"
+$!
+$!  Create The Object File Name.
+$!
+$   OBJECT_FILE = OBJ_DIR + FILE_NAME + ".OBJ"
+$   ON WARNING THEN GOTO NEXT_LIB
+$!
+$!  Check To See If The File We Want To Compile Actually Exists.
+$!
+$   IF (F$SEARCH(SOURCE_FILE).EQS."")
+$   THEN
+$!
+$!    Tell The User That The File Dosen't Exist.
+$!
+$     WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ""
+$     WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "The File ",SOURCE_FILE," Dosen't Exist."
+$     WRITE SYS$OUTPUT ""
+$!
+$!    Exit The Build.
+$!
+$     GOTO EXIT
+$!
+$!  End The File Exist Check.
+$!
+$   ENDIF
+$!
+$!  Tell The User What We Are Building.
+$!
+$   IF (PHASE.EQS."LIB")
+$   THEN
+$     WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Compiling The ",FILE_NAME,".C File."
+$   ELSE
+$     WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "Building The ",FILE_NAME," Application Program."
+$   ENDIF
+$!
+$!  Compile The File.
+$!
+$   ON ERROR THEN GOTO NEXT_LIB
+$   IF COMPILEWITH_CC2 - FILE_NAME .NES. COMPILEWITH_CC2
+$   THEN
+$     CC2/OBJECT='OBJECT_FILE' 'SOURCE_FILE'
+$   ELSE
+$     CC/OBJECT='OBJECT_FILE' 'SOURCE_FILE'
+$   ENDIF
+$   WRITE OBJECTS OBJECT_FILE
+$!
+$   GOTO NEXT_LIB
 $ ENDIF
 $!
 $!  Check if this program works well without a TCPIP library
 $!
-$ IF TCPIP_LIB .EQS. "" .AND. TCPIP_PROGRAMS - FILE_NAME .NES. TCPIP_PROGRAMS
+$ IF TCPIP_LIB .EQS. "" .AND. TCPIP_PROGRAMS - CURRENT_APP .NES. TCPIP_PROGRAMS
 $ THEN
-$   WRITE SYS$OUTPUT FILE_NAME," needs a TCP/IP library.  Can't link.  Skipping..."
-$   GOTO NEXT_FILE
+$   WRITE SYS$OUTPUT CURRENT_APP," needs a TCP/IP library.  Can't link.  Skipping..."
+$   GOTO NEXT_APP
 $ ENDIF
 $!
 $! Link The Program.
 $! Check To See If We Are To Link With A Specific TCP/IP Library.
 $!
+$ ON WARNING THEN GOTO NEXT_APP
+$!
 $ IF (TCPIP_LIB.NES."")
 $ THEN
 $!
 $! Don't Link With The RSAREF Routines And TCP/IP Library.
 $!
 $   LINK/'DEBUGGER'/'TRACEBACK' /EXE='EXE_FILE' -
-	'OBJECT_FILE''EXTRA_OBJ', -
+	'EXE_DIR''CURRENT_APP'.OPT/OPTION, -
         'SSL_LIB'/LIBRARY,'CRYPTO_LIB'/LIBRARY, -
         'TCPIP_LIB','OPT_FILE'/OPTION
 $!
@@ -286,7 +310,7 @@ $!
 $! Don't Link With The RSAREF Routines And Link With A TCP/IP Library.
 $!
 $   LINK/'DEBUGGER'/'TRACEBACK' /EXE='EXE_FILE' -
-	'OBJECT_FILE''EXTRA_OBJ', -
+	'EXE_DIR''CURRENT_APP'.OPT/OPTION, -
         'SSL_LIB'/LIBRARY,'CRYPTO_LIB'/LIBRARY, -
         'OPT_FILE'/OPTION
 $!
@@ -296,11 +320,11 @@ $ ENDIF
 $!
 $! Go Back And Do It Again.
 $!
-$ GOTO NEXT_FILE
+$ GOTO NEXT_APP
 $!
 $! All Done With This File.
 $!
-$ FILE_DONE:
+$ APP_DONE:
 $ EXIT:
 $!
 $! All Done, Time To Clean Up And Exit.

apps/openssl-vms.cnf

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default	=
 
-commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max			= 64
 
 emailAddress			= Email Address

apps/openssl.cnf

@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ localityName			= Locality Name (eg, city)
 organizationalUnitName		= Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
 #organizationalUnitName_default	=
 
-commonName			= Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
+commonName			= Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name)
 commonName_max			= 64
 
 emailAddress			= Email Address

apps/pkcs12.c

@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
     if (!twopass) BUF_strlcpy(macpass, pass, sizeof macpass);
 
-    if (options & INFO) BIO_printf (bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n", p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get (p12->mac->iter) : 1);
+    if ((options & INFO) && p12->mac) BIO_printf (bio_err, "MAC Iteration %ld\n", p12->mac->iter ? ASN1_INTEGER_get (p12->mac->iter) : 1);
     if(macver) {
 #ifdef CRYPTO_MDEBUG
     CRYPTO_push_info("verify MAC");

apps/pkcs7.c

@@ -82,9 +82,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	PKCS7 *p7=NULL;
 	int i,badops=0;
 	BIO *in=NULL,*out=NULL;
@@ -180,7 +177,7 @@ bad:
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());

apps/rand.c

@@ -77,9 +77,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	int i, r, ret = 1;
 	int badopt;
 	char *outfile = NULL;
@@ -178,7 +175,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-        e = setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
+        setup_engine(bio_err, engine, 0);
 #endif
 
 	app_RAND_load_file(NULL, bio_err, (inrand != NULL));

apps/req.c

@@ -1433,11 +1433,17 @@ start2:			for (;;)
 
 				BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s_min",type);
 				if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,attr_sect,buf, &n_min))
+					{
+					ERR_clear_error();
 					n_min = -1;
+					}
 
 				BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s_max",type);
 				if (!NCONF_get_number(req_conf,attr_sect,buf, &n_max))
+					{
+					ERR_clear_error();
 					n_max = -1;
+					}
 
 				if (!add_attribute_object(req,
 					v->value,def,value,nid,n_min,n_max, chtype))

apps/s_client.c

@@ -345,13 +345,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	char *jpake_secret = NULL;
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_client_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_client_method();
-#endif
 
 	apps_startup();
 	c_Pause=0;

apps/s_server.c

@@ -781,13 +781,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char *argv[])
         tlsextctx tlsextcbp = {NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING};
 #endif
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
 	meth=SSLv23_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
-	meth=SSLv3_server_method();
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2)
-	meth=SSLv2_server_method();
-#endif
 
 	local_argc=argc;
 	local_argv=argv;
@@ -2075,12 +2069,14 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
 	{
 	char *buf=NULL;
 	int ret=1;
-	int i,j,k,blank,dot;
+	int i,j,k,dot;
 	struct stat st_buf;
 	SSL *con;
 	SSL_CIPHER *c;
 	BIO *io,*ssl_bio,*sbio;
+#ifdef RENEG
 	long total_bytes;
+#endif
 
 	buf=OPENSSL_malloc(bufsize);
 	if (buf == NULL) return(0);
@@ -2151,7 +2147,6 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
 		SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_out);
 		}
 
-	blank=0;
 	for (;;)
 		{
 		if (hack)
@@ -2388,7 +2383,9 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
                                         BIO_puts(io,"HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n");
                                 }
 			/* send the file */
+#ifdef RENEG
 			total_bytes=0;
+#endif
 			for (;;)
 				{
 				i=BIO_read(file,buf,bufsize);

apps/s_socket.c

@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int init_server_long(int *sock, int port, char *ip, int type)
 	{
 	int ret=0;
 	struct sockaddr_in server;
-	int s= -1,i;
+	int s= -1;
 
 	if (!ssl_sock_init()) return(0);
 
@@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ static int init_server_long(int *sock, int port, char *ip, int type)
 		}
 	/* Make it 128 for linux */
 	if (type==SOCK_STREAM && listen(s,128) == -1) goto err;
-	i=0;
 	*sock=s;
 	ret=1;
 err:
@@ -386,7 +385,7 @@ static int init_server(int *sock, int port, int type)
 
 static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host)
 	{
-	int ret,i;
+	int ret;
 	struct hostent *h1,*h2;
 	static struct sockaddr_in from;
 	int len;
@@ -409,6 +408,7 @@ redoit:
 	if (ret == INVALID_SOCKET)
 		{
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK))
+		int i;
 		i=WSAGetLastError();
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"accept error %d\n",i);
 #else
@@ -463,7 +463,6 @@ redoit:
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname failure\n");
 			return(0);
 			}
-		i=0;
 		if (h2->h_addrtype != AF_INET)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(bio_err,"gethostbyname addr is not AF_INET\n");

apps/speed.c

@@ -254,12 +254,18 @@
 # endif
 #endif
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-# define NO_FORK 1
-#elif HAVE_FORK
+#ifndef HAVE_FORK
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
+#  define HAVE_FORK 0
+# else
+#  define HAVE_FORK 1
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if HAVE_FORK
 # undef NO_FORK
 #else
-# define NO_FORK 1
+# define NO_FORK
 #endif
 
 #undef BUFSIZE
@@ -297,8 +303,12 @@ static const char *names[ALGOR_NUM]={
   "aes-128 ige","aes-192 ige","aes-256 ige"};
 static double results[ALGOR_NUM][SIZE_NUM];
 static int lengths[SIZE_NUM]={16,64,256,1024,8*1024};
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 static double rsa_results[RSA_NUM][2];
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
 static double dsa_results[DSA_NUM][2];
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
 static double ecdsa_results[EC_NUM][2];
 #endif
@@ -490,9 +500,6 @@ int MAIN(int, char **);
 
 int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-	ENGINE *e = NULL;
-#endif
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL,*buf2=NULL;
 	int mret=1;
 	long count=0,save_count=0;
@@ -583,7 +590,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 	unsigned char DES_iv[8];
 	unsigned char iv[2*MAX_BLOCK_SIZE/8];
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-	DES_cblock *buf_as_des_cblock = NULL;
 	static DES_cblock key ={0x12,0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0};
 	static DES_cblock key2={0x34,0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0,0x12};
 	static DES_cblock key3={0x56,0x78,0x9a,0xbc,0xde,0xf0,0x12,0x34};
@@ -796,9 +802,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
 		goto end;
 		}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
-	buf_as_des_cblock = (DES_cblock *)buf;
-#endif
 	if ((buf2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((int)BUFSIZE)) == NULL)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
@@ -873,7 +876,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 				BIO_printf(bio_err,"no engine given\n");
 				goto end;
 				}
-                        e = setup_engine(bio_err, *argv, 0);
+                        setup_engine(bio_err, *argv, 0);
 			/* j will be increased again further down.  We just
 			   don't want speed to confuse an engine with an
 			   algorithm, especially when none is given (which
@@ -1378,7 +1381,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 		count*=2;
 		Time_F(START);
 		for (it=count; it; it--)
-			DES_ecb_encrypt(buf_as_des_cblock,buf_as_des_cblock,
+			DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)buf,
+				(DES_cblock *)buf,
 				&sch,DES_ENCRYPT);
 		d=Time_F(STOP);
 		} while (d <3);

apps/x509.c

@@ -539,7 +539,6 @@ bad:
 	if (reqfile)
 		{
 		EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-		X509_CINF *ci;
 		BIO *in;
 
 		if (!sign_flag && !CA_flag)
@@ -607,7 +606,6 @@ bad:
 		print_name(bio_err, "subject=", X509_REQ_get_subject_name(req), nmflag);
 
 		if ((x=X509_new()) == NULL) goto end;
-		ci=x->cert_info;
 
 		if (sno == NULL)
 			{
@@ -971,7 +969,7 @@ bad:
 				else
 					{
 					pk=load_key(bio_err,
-						keyfile, FORMAT_PEM, 0,
+						keyfile, keyformat, 0,
 						passin, e, "request key");
 					if (pk == NULL) goto end;
 					}

config

@@ -741,6 +741,10 @@ case "$GUESSOS" in
 	OBJECT_MODE=${OBJECT_MODE:-32}
 	if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then
 	    OUT="aix-gcc"
+          if [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then
+            echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64'
+            OUT="aix64-gcc"
+          fi
 	elif [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then
 	    echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' 
 	    OUT="aix64-cc"
@@ -786,6 +790,10 @@ esac
 #  options="$options -DATALLA"
 #fi
 
+($CC -Wa,--help -c -o /dev/null -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1 | \
+ grep \\--noexecstack) 2>&1 > /dev/null && \
+  options="$options -Wa,--noexecstack"
+
 # gcc < 2.8 does not support -march=ultrasparc
 if [ "$OUT" = solaris-sparcv9-gcc -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ]
 then

crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c

@@ -201,7 +201,6 @@ void AES_cfb1_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
     assert(in && out && key && ivec && num);
     assert(*num == 0);
 
-    memset(out,0,(length+7)/8);
     for(n=0 ; n < length ; ++n)
 	{
 	c[0]=(in[n/8]&(1 << (7-n%8))) ? 0x80 : 0;

crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c

@@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ int AES_wrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
 			A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
 			if (t > 0xff)	
 				{
-				A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t & 0xff) >> 8);
-				A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t & 0xff) >> 16);
-				A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t & 0xff) >> 24);
+				A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
+				A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
+				A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
 				}
 			memcpy(R, B + 8, 8);
 			}
@@ -119,9 +119,9 @@ int AES_unwrap_key(AES_KEY *key, const unsigned char *iv,
 			A[7] ^= (unsigned char)(t & 0xff);
 			if (t > 0xff)	
 				{
-				A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t & 0xff) >> 8);
-				A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t & 0xff) >> 16);
-				A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t & 0xff) >> 24);
+				A[6] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 8) & 0xff);
+				A[5] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 16) & 0xff);
+				A[4] ^= (unsigned char)((t >> 24) & 0xff);
 				}
 			memcpy(B + 8, R, 8);
 			AES_decrypt(B, B, key);

crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl

@@ -751,7 +751,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
 AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	push	%rbx
 	push	%rbp
+	sub	\$8,%rsp
 
+	call	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+	mov	8(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rbx
+	add	\$24,%rsp
+	ret
+.size	AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key
+
+.type	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,\@abi-omnipotent
+.align	16
+_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 	mov	%esi,%ecx			# %ecx=bits
 	mov	%rdi,%rsi			# %rsi=userKey
 	mov	%rdx,%rdi			# %rdi=key
@@ -938,10 +950,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .Lbadpointer:
 	mov	\$-1,%rax
 .Lexit:
-	pop	%rbp
-	pop	%rbx
-	ret
-.size	AES_set_encrypt_key,.-AES_set_encrypt_key
+	.byte	0xf3,0xc3		# rep ret
+.size	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key,.-_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
 ___
 
 sub deckey()
@@ -973,15 +983,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	AES_set_decrypt_key,\@function,3
 .align	16
 AES_set_decrypt_key:
-	push	%rdx
-	call	AES_set_encrypt_key
-	cmp	\$0,%eax
-	je	.Lproceed
-	lea	24(%rsp),%rsp
-	ret
-.Lproceed:
+	push	%rbx
+	push	%rbp
+	push	%rdx			# save key schedule
+
+	call	_x86_64_AES_set_encrypt_key
 	mov	(%rsp),%r8		# restore key schedule
-	mov	%rbx,(%rsp)
+	cmp	\$0,%eax
+	jne	.Labort
 
 	mov	240(%r8),%ecx		# pull number of rounds
 	xor	%rdi,%rdi
@@ -1023,7 +1032,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	jnz	.Lpermute
 
 	xor	%rax,%rax
-	pop	%rbx
+.Labort:
+	mov	8(%rsp),%rbp
+	mov	16(%rsp),%rbx
+	add	\$24,%rsp
 	ret
 .size	AES_set_decrypt_key,.-AES_set_decrypt_key
 ___

crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
@@ -143,17 +144,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 	BUF_MEM *b;
 	unsigned char *p;
 	int i;
-	int ret=-1;
 	ASN1_const_CTX c;
-	int want=HEADER_SIZE;
+	size_t want=HEADER_SIZE;
 	int eos=0;
-#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64)
-	/* pathetic compiler bug in all known versions as of Nov. 2002 */
-	long off=0;
-#else
-	int off=0;
-#endif
-	int len=0;
+	size_t off=0;
+	size_t len=0;
 
 	b=BUF_MEM_new();
 	if (b == NULL)
@@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			want-=(len-off);
 
-			if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
+			if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 				{
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 				goto err;
@@ -181,7 +176,14 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 				goto err;
 				}
 			if (i > 0)
+				{
+				if (len+i < len)
+					{
+					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+					goto err;
+					}
 				len+=i;
+				}
 			}
 		/* else data already loaded */
 
@@ -206,6 +208,11 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			{
 			/* no data body so go round again */
 			eos++;
+			if (eos < 0)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
 			want=HEADER_SIZE;
 			}
 		else if (eos && (c.slen == 0) && (c.tag == V_ASN1_EOC))
@@ -220,10 +227,16 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 		else 
 			{
 			/* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
-			want=(int)c.slen;
+			want=c.slen;
 			if (want > (len-off))
 				{
 				want-=(len-off);
+				if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
+					len+want < len)
+						{
+						ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+						goto err;
+						}
 				if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b,len+want))
 					{
 					ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -238,11 +251,18 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 						    ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
 						goto err;
 						}
+					/* This can't overflow because
+					 * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
 					len+=i;
-					want -= i;
+					want-=i;
 					}
 				}
-			off+=(int)c.slen;
+			if (off + c.slen < off)
+				{
+				ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			off+=c.slen;
 			if (eos <= 0)
 				{
 				break;
@@ -252,9 +272,15 @@ static int asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (off > INT_MAX)
+		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	*pb = b;
 	return off;
 err:
 	if (b != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(b);
-	return(ret);
+	return -1;
 	}

crypto/asn1/a_int.c

@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	{
 	ASN1_INTEGER *ret=NULL;
 	const unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned char *to,*s;
+	unsigned char *s;
 	long len;
 	int inf,tag,xclass;
 	int i;
@@ -308,7 +308,6 @@ ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 		i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE;
 		goto err;
 		}
-	to=s;
 	ret->type=V_ASN1_INTEGER;
 	if(len) {
 		if ((*p == 0) && (len != 1))

crypto/asn1/a_object.c

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out, int olen, const char *buf, int num)
 				ASN1err(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT);
 				goto err;
 				}
-			if (!use_bn && l > (ULONG_MAX / 10L))
+			if (!use_bn && l >= ((ULONG_MAX - 80) / 10L))
 				{
 				use_bn = 1;
 				if (!bl)
@@ -291,12 +291,12 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
 	const unsigned char *p;
 	int i;
-	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have 0x80 in subidentifiers, see:
-	 * X.690 8.19.2
+	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
+	 * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
 	 */
-	for (i = 0, p = *pp + 1; i < len - 1; i++, p++)
+	for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
 		{
-		if (*p == 0x80)
+		if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
 			{
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
 			return NULL;

crypto/asn1/a_strex.c

@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@
 
 #define CHARTYPE_BS_ESC		(ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 | CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253)
 
+#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
+		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
+		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
+		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
+
 
 /* Three IO functions for sending data to memory, a BIO and
  * and a FILE pointer.
@@ -148,6 +153,13 @@ static int do_esc_char(unsigned long c, unsigned char flags, char *do_quotes, ch
 		if(!io_ch(arg, tmphex, 3)) return -1;
 		return 3;
 	}
+	/* If we get this far and do any escaping at all must escape 
+	 * the escape character itself: backslash.
+	 */
+	if (chtmp == '\\' && flags & ESC_FLAGS) {
+		if(!io_ch(arg, "\\\\", 2)) return -1;
+		return 2;
+	}
 	if(!io_ch(arg, &chtmp, 1)) return -1;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -292,11 +304,6 @@ static const signed char tag2nbyte[] = {
 	4, -1, 2		/* 28-30 */
 };
 
-#define ESC_FLAGS (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \
-		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \
-		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \
-		  ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB)
-
 /* This is the main function, print out an
  * ASN1_STRING taking note of various escape
  * and display options. Returns number of

crypto/asn1/a_strnid.c

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void)
  * default:   the default value, Printable, T61, BMP.
  */
 
-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p)
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p)
 {
 	unsigned long mask;
 	char *end;

crypto/asn1/asn1.h

@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d,
 ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct);
 
 void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask);
-int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(char *p);
+int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p);
 unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void);
 int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len,
 					int inform, unsigned long mask);

crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c

@@ -418,9 +418,9 @@ ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 
 		if(strcmp(hdr->value, "application/x-pkcs7-signature") &&
 			strcmp(hdr->value, "application/pkcs7-signature")) {
-			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1,ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE);
 			ERR_add_error_data(2, "type: ", hdr->value);
+			sk_MIME_HEADER_pop_free(headers, mime_hdr_free);
 			sk_BIO_pop_free(parts, BIO_vfree);
 			return NULL;
 		}
@@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int mime_hdr_addparam(MIME_HEADER *mhdr, char *name, char *value)
 static int mime_hdr_cmp(const MIME_HEADER * const *a,
 			const MIME_HEADER * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->name || !(*b)->name)
+		return !!(*a)->name - !!(*b)->name;
+
 	return(strcmp((*a)->name, (*b)->name));
 }
 
 static int mime_param_cmp(const MIME_PARAM * const *a,
 			const MIME_PARAM * const *b)
 {
+	if (!(*a)->param_name || !(*b)->param_name)
+		return !!(*a)->param_name - !!(*b)->param_name;
 	return(strcmp((*a)->param_name, (*b)->param_name));
 }
 

crypto/asn1/n_pkey.c

@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ RSA *d2i_RSA_NET(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
 		 int sgckey)
 	{
 	RSA *ret=NULL;
-	const unsigned char *p, *kp;
+	const unsigned char *p;
 	NETSCAPE_ENCRYPTED_PKEY *enckey = NULL;
 
 	p = *pp;
@@ -265,7 +265,6 @@ RSA *d2i_RSA_NET(RSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET,ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
 		goto err;
 	}
-	kp = enckey->enckey->digest->data;
 	if (cb == NULL)
 		cb=EVP_read_pw_string;
 	if ((ret=d2i_RSA_NET_2(a, enckey->enckey->digest,cb, sgckey)) == NULL) goto err;

crypto/asn1/t_crl.c

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int X509_CRL_print(BIO *out, X509_CRL *x)
 	STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *rev;
 	X509_REVOKED *r;
 	long l;
-	int i, n;
+	int i;
 	char *p;
 
 	BIO_printf(out, "Certificate Revocation List (CRL):\n");
@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@ int X509_CRL_print(BIO *out, X509_CRL *x)
 	else BIO_printf(out,"NONE");
 	BIO_printf(out,"\n");
 
-	n=X509_CRL_get_ext_count(x);
 	X509V3_extensions_print(out, "CRL extensions",
 						x->crl->extensions, 0, 8);
 

crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
 	int i;
 	int otag;
 	int ret = 0;
-	ASN1_VALUE *pchval, **pchptr, *ptmpval;
+	ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
 	if (!pval)
 		return 0;
 	if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
@@ -317,7 +317,6 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
 			goto err;
 			}
 		/* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */
-		pchval = NULL;
 		p = *in;
 		for (i = 0, tt=it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++)
 			{

crypto/asn1/x_name.c

@@ -196,7 +196,9 @@ static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len
 	*val = nm.a;
 	*in = p;
 	return ret;
-	err:
+err:
+        if (nm.x != NULL)
+		X509_NAME_free(nm.x);
 	ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
 	return 0;
 }

crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c

@@ -367,7 +367,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key)
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	key->pkey = ret;
+	/* Check to see if another thread set key->pkey first */
+	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
+	if (key->pkey)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+		ret = key->pkey;
+		}
+	else
+		key->pkey = ret;
+	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
 	return(ret);
 err:

crypto/asn1/x_x509.c

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_CINF) = {
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CINF, enc, 0) = {
 	ASN1_EXP_OPT(X509_CINF, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
 	ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
 	ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CINF, signature, X509_ALGOR),
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_CINF) = {
 	ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1),
 	ASN1_IMP_OPT(X509_CINF, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
 	ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CINF, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 3)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_CINF)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CINF, X509_CINF)
 
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF)
 /* X509 top level structure needs a bit of customisation */

crypto/bio/b_sock.c

@@ -659,7 +659,14 @@ again:
 #ifdef SO_REUSEADDR
 		err_num=get_last_socket_error();
 		if ((bind_mode == BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED) &&
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
+			/* Some versions of Windows define EADDRINUSE to
+			 * a dummy value.
+			 */
+			(err_num == WSAEADDRINUSE))
+#else
 			(err_num == EADDRINUSE))
+#endif
 			{
 			memcpy((char *)&client,(char *)&server,sizeof(server));
 			if (strcmp(h,"*") == 0)

crypto/bio/bf_buff.c

@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ start:
 	/* add to buffer and return */
 	if (i >= inl)
 		{
-		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
+		memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,inl);
 		ctx->obuf_len+=inl;
 		return(num+inl);
 		}
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ start:
 		{
 		if (i > 0) /* lets fill it up if we can */
 			{
-			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
+			memcpy(&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off+ctx->obuf_len]),in,i);
 			in+=i;
 			inl-=i;
 			num+=i;
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	case BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES:
 		ret=0;
 		p1=ctx->ibuf;
-		for (i=ctx->ibuf_off; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
+		for (i=0; i<ctx->ibuf_len; i++)
 			{
-			if (p1[i] == '\n') ret++;
+			if (p1[ctx->ibuf_off + i] == '\n') ret++;
 			}
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
@@ -399,17 +399,18 @@ static long buffer_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		for (;;)
 			{
 			BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
-			if (ctx->obuf_len > ctx->obuf_off)
+			if (ctx->obuf_len > 0)
 				{
 				r=BIO_write(b->next_bio,
 					&(ctx->obuf[ctx->obuf_off]),
-					ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off);
+					ctx->obuf_len);
 #if 0
-fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len-ctx->obuf_off,r);
+fprintf(stderr,"FLUSH [%3d] %3d -> %3d\n",ctx->obuf_off,ctx->obuf_len,r);
 #endif
 				BIO_copy_next_retry(b);
 				if (r <= 0) return((long)r);
 				ctx->obuf_off+=r;
+				ctx->obuf_len-=r;
 				}
 			else
 				{

crypto/bio/bf_nbio.c

@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ static int nbiof_free(BIO *a)
 	
 static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 	{
-	NBIO_TEST *nt;
 	int ret=0;
 #if 1
 	int num;
@@ -134,7 +133,6 @@ static int nbiof_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 
 	if (out == NULL) return(0);
 	if (b->next_bio == NULL) return(0);
-	nt=(NBIO_TEST *)b->ptr;
 
 	BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
 #if 1

crypto/bio/bio.h

@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /* #endif */
 
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU          40 /* as kernel for current MTU */
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU   47
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU            41 /* get cached value for MTU */
 #define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU            42 /* set cached value for
 					      * MTU. want to use this
@@ -321,6 +322,15 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
 
 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct
 	{
+	/* Buffers are setup like this:
+	 *
+	 * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+	 * +---------------------------------------------------+
+	 * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+	 */
+
 	/* BIO *bio; */ /* this is now in the BIO struct */
 	int ibuf_size;	/* how big is the input buffer */
 	int obuf_size;	/* how big is the output buffer */

crypto/bio/bio_lib.c

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int BIO_set(BIO *bio, BIO_METHOD *method)
 
 int BIO_free(BIO *a)
 	{
-	int ret=0,i;
+	int i;
 
 	if (a == NULL) return(0);
 
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int BIO_free(BIO *a)
 	CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_BIO, a, &a->ex_data);
 
 	if ((a->method == NULL) || (a->method->destroy == NULL)) return(1);
-	ret=a->method->destroy(a);
+	a->method->destroy(a);
 	OPENSSL_free(a);
 	return(1);
 	}

crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c

@@ -340,7 +340,6 @@ static int acpt_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl)
 
 static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	{
-	BIO *dbio;
 	int *ip;
 	long ret=1;
 	BIO_ACCEPT *data;
@@ -437,8 +436,8 @@ static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		ret=(long)data->bind_mode;
 		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
-		dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
-/*		if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
+/*		dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
+		if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
 			BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
 		if (data->param_hostname)
 			BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);

crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
  *
  */
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -65,6 +64,7 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 		 */
 		dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b);
 		ret=recvfrom(b->num,out,outl,0,&peer,(void *)&peerlen);
-		dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);
 
 		if ( ! data->connected  && ret >= 0)
 			BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer);
@@ -302,6 +301,8 @@ static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
 				data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
 				}
 			}
+
+		dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b);
 		}
 	return(ret);
 	}
@@ -493,6 +494,9 @@ static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 		ret = 0;
 #endif
 		break;
+	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU:
+		ret = 576 - 20 - 8;
+		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU:
 		return data->mtu;
 		break;
@@ -654,9 +658,13 @@ static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int i)
 		{
 		err=get_last_socket_error();
 
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && 0 /* more microsoft stupidity? perhaps not? Ben 4/1/99 */
-		if ((i == -1) && (err == 0))
-			return(1);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+	/* If the socket return value (i) is -1
+	 * and err is unexpectedly 0 at this point,
+	 * the error code was overwritten by
+	 * another system call before this error
+	 * handling is called.
+	 */
 #endif
 
 		return(BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(err));
@@ -719,7 +727,6 @@ int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err)
 		}
 	return(0);
 	}
-#endif
 
 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
 	{
@@ -737,3 +744,5 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
 	gettimeofday(t, NULL);
 #endif
 	}
+
+#endif

crypto/bio/bss_file.c

@@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 			BIO_clear_flags(b,BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK);
 #endif
 #endif
-#ifdef UP_fsetmode
+#ifdef UP_fsetmod
 		if (b->flags&BIO_FLAGS_UPLINK)
-			UP_fsetmode(b->ptr,num&BIO_FP_TEXT?'t':'b');
+			UP_fsetmod(b->ptr,(char)((num&BIO_FP_TEXT)?'t':'b'));
 		else
 #endif
 		{

crypto/bio/bss_sock.c

@@ -172,15 +172,6 @@ static long sock_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 
 	switch (cmd)
 		{
-	case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
-		num=0;
-	case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
-		ret=0;
-		break;
-	case BIO_C_FILE_TELL:
-	case BIO_CTRL_INFO:
-		ret=0;
-		break;
 	case BIO_C_SET_FD:
 		sock_free(b);
 		b->num= *((int *)ptr);
@@ -203,10 +194,6 @@ static long sock_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
 	case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE:
 		b->shutdown=(int)num;
 		break;
-	case BIO_CTRL_PENDING:
-	case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING:
-		ret=0;
-		break;
 	case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
 	case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH:
 		ret=1;

crypto/bn/asm/mo-586.pl

@@ -539,8 +539,10 @@ $sbit=$num;
 	&jle	(&label("sqradd"));
 
 	&mov	($carry,"edx");
-	&lea	("edx",&DWP(0,$sbit,"edx",2));
+	&add	("edx","edx");
 	&shr	($carry,31);
+	&add	("edx",$sbit);
+	&adc	($carry,0);
 &set_label("sqrlast");
 	&mov	($word,$_n0);
 	&mov	($inp,$_np);

crypto/bn/asm/ppc.pl

@@ -1039,7 +1039,7 @@ sub data {
 	addze	r11,r0
 					#mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
 	$LD	r6,`3*$BNSZ`(r4)
-	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r4)
+	$LD	r7,`2*$BNSZ`(r5)
 	$UMULL	r8,r6,r7
 	$UMULH	r9,r6,r7
 	addc	r12,r8,r12
@@ -2074,5 +2074,7 @@ EOF
 	$data =~ s/^(\s*)cmplw(\s+)([^,]+),(.*)/$1cmpl$2$3,0,$4/gm;
 	# assembler X doesn't accept li, load immediate value
 	#$data =~ s/^(\s*)li(\s+)([^,]+),(.*)/$1addi$2$3,0,$4/gm;
+	# assembler Y chokes on apostrophes in comments
+	$data =~ s/'//gm;
 	return($data);
 }

crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
 
 #undef mul
 #undef mul_add
+#undef sqr
 
 /*
  * "m"(a), "+m"(r)	is the way to favor DirectPath <20>-code;

crypto/bn/bn_blind.c

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ struct bn_blinding_st
 	BIGNUM *mod; /* just a reference */
 	unsigned long thread_id; /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b;
 				  * used only by crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c, rsa_lib.c */
-	unsigned int  counter;
+	int counter;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx;
 	int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
@@ -157,7 +157,10 @@ BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, /* const */ BIGN
 	if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
 		BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
 
-	ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	/* Set the counter to the special value -1
+	 * to indicate that this is never-used fresh blinding
+	 * that does not need updating before first use. */
+	ret->counter = -1;
 	return(ret);
 err:
 	if (ret != NULL) BN_BLINDING_free(ret);
@@ -186,7 +189,10 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	if (--(b->counter) == 0 && b->e != NULL &&
+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		b->counter = 0;
+
+	if (++b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER && b->e != NULL &&
 		!(b->flags & BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE))
 		{
 		/* re-create blinding parameters */
@@ -201,8 +207,8 @@ int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 
 	ret=1;
 err:
-	if (b->counter == 0)
-		b->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
+	if (b->counter == BN_BLINDING_COUNTER)
+		b->counter = 0;
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
@@ -223,6 +229,12 @@ int BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		return(0);
 		}
 
+	if (b->counter == -1)
+		/* Fresh blinding, doesn't need updating. */
+		b->counter = 0;
+	else if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		return(0);
+
 	if (r != NULL)
 		{
 		if (!BN_copy(r, b->Ai)) ret=0;
@@ -243,22 +255,19 @@ int BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *r, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ct
 	int ret;
 
 	bn_check_top(n);
-	if ((b->A == NULL) || (b->Ai == NULL))
-		{
-		BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
-		return(0);
-		}
 
 	if (r != NULL)
 		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, r, b->mod, ctx);
 	else
-		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
-
-	if (ret >= 0)
 		{
-		if (!BN_BLINDING_update(b,ctx))
+		if (b->Ai == NULL)
+			{
+			BNerr(BN_F_BN_BLINDING_INVERT_EX,BN_R_NOT_INITIALIZED);
 			return(0);
+			}
+		ret = BN_mod_mul(n, n, b->Ai, b->mod, ctx);
 		}
+
 	bn_check_top(n);
 	return(ret);
 	}

crypto/bn/bn_div.c

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
 	/* The next 2 are needed so we can do a dv->d[0]|=1 later
 	 * since BN_lshift1 will only work once there is a value :-) */
 	BN_zero(dv);
-	bn_wexpand(dv,1);
+	if(bn_wexpand(dv,1) == NULL) goto end;
 	dv->top=1;
 
 	if (!BN_lshift(D,D,nm-nd)) goto end;
@@ -337,7 +337,10 @@ X) -> 0x%08X\n",
 				t2 -= d1;
 				}
 #else /* !BN_LLONG */
-			BN_ULONG t2l,t2h,ql,qh;
+			BN_ULONG t2l,t2h;
+#if !defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) && !defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
+			BN_ULONG ql,qh;
+#endif
 
 			q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0);
 #ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE
@@ -561,7 +564,10 @@ X) -> 0x%08X\n",
 				t2 -= d1;
 				}
 #else /* !BN_LLONG */
-			BN_ULONG t2l,t2h,ql,qh;
+			BN_ULONG t2l,t2h;
+#if !defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) && !defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
+			BN_ULONG ql,qh;
+#endif
 
 			q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0);
 #ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE

crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c

@@ -301,7 +301,8 @@ int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1,
 			r_is_one = 0;
 			}
 		}
-	BN_from_montgomery(rr,r,mont,ctx);
+	if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr,r,mont,ctx))
+		goto err;
 	ret=1;
 err:
 	if ((in_mont == NULL) && (mont != NULL)) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont);

crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c

@@ -294,7 +294,8 @@ int	BN_GF2m_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
 	if (a->top < b->top) { at = b; bt = a; }
 	else { at = a; bt = b; }
 
-	bn_wexpand(r, at->top);
+	if(bn_wexpand(r, at->top) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < bt->top; i++)
 		{
@@ -606,6 +607,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		{
 		while (!BN_is_odd(u))
 			{
+			if (BN_is_zero(u)) goto err;
 			if (!BN_rshift1(u, u)) goto err;
 			if (BN_is_odd(b))
 				{

crypto/bn/bn_mul.c

@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
 	     int tna, int tnb, BN_ULONG *t)
 	{
 	int i,j,n2=n*2;
-	int c1,c2,neg,zero;
+	int c1,c2,neg;
 	BN_ULONG ln,lo,*p;
 
 # ifdef BN_COUNT
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
 	/* r=(a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) */
 	c1=bn_cmp_part_words(a,&(a[n]),tna,n-tna);
 	c2=bn_cmp_part_words(&(b[n]),b,tnb,tnb-n);
-	zero=neg=0;
+	neg=0;
 	switch (c1*3+c2)
 		{
 	case -4:
@@ -575,7 +575,6 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
 		bn_sub_part_words(&(t[n]),b,      &(b[n]),tnb,n-tnb); /* - */
 		break;
 	case -3:
-		zero=1;
 		/* break; */
 	case -2:
 		bn_sub_part_words(t,      &(a[n]),a,      tna,tna-n); /* - */
@@ -585,7 +584,6 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
 	case -1:
 	case 0:
 	case 1:
-		zero=1;
 		/* break; */
 	case 2:
 		bn_sub_part_words(t,      a,      &(a[n]),tna,n-tna); /* + */
@@ -593,7 +591,6 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
 		neg=1;
 		break;
 	case 3:
-		zero=1;
 		/* break; */
 	case 4:
 		bn_sub_part_words(t,      a,      &(a[n]),tna,n-tna);
@@ -1012,7 +1009,6 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 		{
 		if (i >= -1 && i <= 1)
 			{
-			int sav_j =0;
 			/* Find out the power of two lower or equal
 			   to the longest of the two numbers */
 			if (i >= 0)
@@ -1023,7 +1019,6 @@ int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 				{
 				j = BN_num_bits_word((BN_ULONG)bl);
 				}
-			sav_j = j;
 			j = 1<<(j-1);
 			assert(j <= al || j <= bl);
 			k = j+j;

crypto/buffer/buffer.c

@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 
+/* LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION is the maximum n such that (n+3)/3*4 < 2**31. That
+ * function is applied in several functions in this file and this limit ensures
+ * that the result fits in an int. */
+#define LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION 0x5ffffffc
+
 BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void)
 	{
 	BUF_MEM *ret;
@@ -105,6 +110,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);
@@ -142,6 +153,12 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, int len)
 		str->length=len;
 		return(len);
 		}
+	/* This limit is sufficient to ensure (len+3)/3*4 < 2**31 */
+	if (len > LIMIT_BEFORE_EXPANSION)
+		{
+		BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEM_GROW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+		return 0;
+		}
 	n=(len+3)/3*4;
 	if (str->data == NULL)
 		ret=OPENSSL_malloc(n);

crypto/cms/cms.h

@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(CMS_ReceiptRequest)
 #define CMS_PARTIAL			0x4000
 #define CMS_REUSE_DIGEST		0x8000
 #define CMS_USE_KEYID			0x10000
+#define CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT		0x20000
 
 const ASN1_OBJECT *CMS_get0_type(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);
 

crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c

@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_SignedData) = {
 } ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_SignedData)
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OriginatorInfo) = {
-	ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignedData, certificates, CMS_CertificateChoices, 0),
-	ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_SignedData, crls, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, 1)
+	ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_OriginatorInfo, certificates, CMS_CertificateChoices, 0),
+	ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(CMS_OriginatorInfo, crls, CMS_RevocationInfoChoice, 1)
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_OriginatorInfo)
 
 ASN1_NDEF_SEQUENCE(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo) = {

crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph;
 	X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm;
 	unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], *piv = NULL;
+	unsigned char *tkey = NULL;
+	size_t tkeylen;
 
 	int ok = 0;
 
@@ -137,32 +139,57 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 				CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
 		goto err;
 		}
-
-
-	if (enc && !ec->key)
+	/* Generate random session key */
+	if (!enc || !ec->key)
 		{
-		/* Generate random key */
-		if (!ec->keylen)
-			ec->keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
-		ec->key = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen);
-		if (!ec->key)
+		tkeylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
+		tkey = OPENSSL_malloc(tkeylen);
+		if (!tkey)
 			{
 			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
 							ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, ec->key) <= 0)
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, tkey) <= 0)
 			goto err;
-		keep_key = 1;
 		}
-	else if (ec->keylen != (unsigned int)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx))
+
+	if (!ec->key)
+		{
+		ec->key = tkey;
+		ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+		tkey = NULL;
+		if (enc)
+			keep_key = 1;
+		else
+			ERR_clear_error();
+		
+		}
+
+	if (ec->keylen != tkeylen)
 		{
 		/* If necessary set key length */
 		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, ec->keylen) <= 0)
 			{
-			CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
-				CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
-			goto err;
+			/* Only reveal failure if debugging so we don't
+			 * leak information which may be useful in MMA.
+			 */
+			if (ec->debug)
+				{
+				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENCRYPTEDCONTENT_INIT_BIO,
+						CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				/* Use random key */
+				OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+				OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+				ec->key = tkey;
+				ec->keylen = tkeylen;
+				tkey = NULL;
+				ERR_clear_error();
+				}
 			}
 		}
 
@@ -198,6 +225,11 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
 		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
 		ec->key = NULL;
 		}
+	if (tkey)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(tkey, tkeylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(tkey);
+		}
 	if (ok)
 		return b;
 	BIO_free(b);

crypto/cms/cms_env.c

@@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 	unsigned char *ek = NULL;
 	int eklen;
 	int ret = 0;
+	CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+	ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
 
 	if (ktri->pkey == NULL)
 		{
@@ -382,8 +384,14 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
 
 	ret = 1;
 
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->key = ek;
-	cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->keylen = eklen;
+	if (ec->key)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+		OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
+		}
+
+	ec->key = ek;
+	ec->keylen = eklen;
 
 	err:
 	if (!ret && ek)

crypto/cms/cms_io.c

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static int cms_output_data(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags,
 		cmsbio = tmpbio;
 		}
 
-	return 1;
+	return r;
 
 	}
 

crypto/cms/cms_lcl.h

@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ struct CMS_EncryptedContentInfo_st
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
 	unsigned char *key;
 	size_t keylen;
+	/* Set to 1 if we are debugging decrypt and don't fake keys for MMA */
+	int debug;
 	};
 
 struct CMS_RecipientInfo_st

crypto/cms/cms_lib.c

@@ -415,7 +415,11 @@ int cms_DigestAlgorithm_find_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *mctx, BIO *chain,
 			return 0;
 			}
 		BIO_get_md_ctx(chain, &mtmp);
-		if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mtmp) == nid)
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mtmp) == nid
+		/* Workaround for broken implementations that use signature
+		 * algorithm  OID instead of digest.
+		 */
+			|| EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mtmp)) == nid)
 			{
 			EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(mctx, mtmp);
 			return 1;

crypto/cms/cms_smime.c

@@ -622,7 +622,10 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 	STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *ris;
 	CMS_RecipientInfo *ri;
 	int i, r;
+	int debug = 0;
 	ris = CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(cms);
+	if (ris)
+		debug = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug;
 	for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(ris); i++)
 		{
 		ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(ris, i);
@@ -636,17 +639,38 @@ int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert)
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, pk);
 			r = CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(cms, ri);
 			CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(ri, NULL);
-			if (r > 0)
-				return 1;
 			if (cert)
 				{
+				/* If not debugging clear any error and
+				 * return success to avoid leaking of
+				 * information useful to MMA
+				 */
+				if (!debug)
+					{
+					ERR_clear_error();
+					return 1;
+					}
+				if (r > 0)
+					return 1;
 				CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY,
 						CMS_R_DECRYPT_ERROR);
 				return 0;
 				}
-			ERR_clear_error();
+			/* If no cert and not debugging don't leave loop
+			 * after first successful decrypt. Always attempt
+			 * to decrypt all recipients to avoid leaking timing
+			 * of a successful decrypt.
+			 */
+			else if (r > 0 && debug)
+				return 1;
 			}
 		}
+	/* If no cert and not debugging always return success */
+	if (!cert && !debug)
+		{
+		ERR_clear_error();
+		return 1;
+		}
 
 	CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT_SET1_PKEY, CMS_R_NO_MATCHING_RECIPIENT);
 	return 0;
@@ -705,9 +729,14 @@ int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert,
 		}
 	if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
 		return 0;
+	if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT)
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1;
+	else
+		cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0;
+	if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out)
+		return 1;
 	if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert))
 		return 0;
-
 	cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
 	if (!cont)
 		return 0;

crypto/comp/c_rle.c

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 	{
 	int i;
 
-	if (olen < (ilen-1))
+	if (ilen == 0 || olen < (ilen-1))
 		{
 		/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
 		return(-1);
@@ -59,4 +59,3 @@ static int rle_expand_block(COMP_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
 		}
 	return(ilen-1);
 	}
-

crypto/conf/conf_api.c

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 #endif
 
 #include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <openssl/conf.h>
 #include <openssl/conf_api.h>

crypto/conf/conf_def.c

@@ -213,13 +213,14 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
 	int bufnum=0,i,ii;
 	BUF_MEM *buff=NULL;
 	char *s,*p,*end;
-	int again,n;
+	int again;
 	long eline=0;
 	char btmp[DECIMAL_SIZE(eline)+1];
 	CONF_VALUE *v=NULL,*tv;
 	CONF_VALUE *sv=NULL;
 	char *section=NULL,*buf;
-	STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section_sk=NULL,*ts;
+/*	STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *section_sk=NULL;*/
+/*	STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ts=NULL;*/
 	char *start,*psection,*pname;
 	void *h = (void *)(conf->data);
 
@@ -250,7 +251,7 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
 					CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
 		goto err;
 		}
-	section_sk=(STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)sv->value;
+/*	section_sk=(STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)sv->value;*/
 
 	bufnum=0;
 	again=0;
@@ -309,7 +310,6 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
 		buf=buff->data;
 
 		clear_comments(conf, buf);
-		n=strlen(buf);
 		s=eat_ws(conf, buf);
 		if (IS_EOF(conf,*s)) continue; /* blank line */
 		if (*s == '[')
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ again:
 					CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
 				goto err;
 				}
-			section_sk=(STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)sv->value;
+/*			section_sk=(STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)sv->value;*/
 			continue;
 			}
 		else
@@ -406,12 +406,12 @@ again:
 					   CONF_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_NEW_SECTION);
 					goto err;
 					}
-				ts=(STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)tv->value;
+/*				ts=(STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *)tv->value;*/
 				}
 			else
 				{
 				tv=sv;
-				ts=section_sk;
+/*				ts=section_sk;*/
 				}
 #if 1
 			if (_CONF_add_string(conf, tv, v) == 0)
@@ -465,9 +465,6 @@ err:
 
 static void clear_comments(CONF *conf, char *p)
 	{
-	char *to;
-
-	to=p;
 	for (;;)
 		{
 		if (IS_FCOMMENT(conf,*p))

crypto/cryptlib.c

@@ -396,7 +396,6 @@ BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason,
 	case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
 		break;
 	case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
-		ERR_remove_state(0);
 		break;
 	case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
 		break;

crypto/crypto-lib.com

@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ $     IF ARCH.EQS."VAX" .AND. F$TRNLNM("DECC$CC_DEFAULT").NES."/DECC" -
 	 THEN CC = "CC/DECC"
 $     CC = CC + "/''CC_OPTIMIZE'/''DEBUGGER'/STANDARD=ANSI89" + -
            "/NOLIST/PREFIX=ALL" + -
-	   "/INCLUDE=(SYS$DISK:[],SYS$DISK:[.''ARCH'],SYS$DISK:[-],SYS$DISK:[.ENGINE.VENDOR_DEFNS],SYS$DISK:[.EVP])" + -
+	   "/INCLUDE=(SYS$DISK:[],SYS$DISK:[._''ARCH'],SYS$DISK:[-],SYS$DISK:[.ENGINE.VENDOR_DEFNS],SYS$DISK:[.EVP])" + -
 	   CCEXTRAFLAGS
 $!
 $!    Define The Linker Options File Name.
@@ -1060,7 +1060,7 @@ $	EXIT
 $     ENDIF
 $     IF F$TRNLNM("DECC$CC_DEFAULT").EQS."/DECC" THEN CC = "CC/VAXC"
 $     CC = CC + "/''CC_OPTIMIZE'/''DEBUGGER'/NOLIST" + -
-	   "/INCLUDE=(SYS$DISK:[],SYS$DISK:[.''ARCH'],SYS$DISK:[-],SYS$DISK:[.ENGINE.VENDOR_DEFNS])" + -
+	   "/INCLUDE=(SYS$DISK:[],SYS$DISK:[._''ARCH'],SYS$DISK:[-],SYS$DISK:[.ENGINE.VENDOR_DEFNS])" + -
 	   CCEXTRAFLAGS
 $     CCDEFS = """VAXC""," + CCDEFS
 $!
@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ $!
 $!    Use GNU C...
 $!
 $     CC = "GCC/NOCASE_HACK/''GCC_OPTIMIZE'/''DEBUGGER'/NOLIST" + -
-	   "/INCLUDE=(SYS$DISK:[],SYS$DISK:[.''ARCH'],SYS$DISK:[-],SYS$DISK:[.ENGINE.VENDOR_DEFNS])" + -
+	   "/INCLUDE=(SYS$DISK:[],SYS$DISK:[._''ARCH'],SYS$DISK:[-],SYS$DISK:[.ENGINE.VENDOR_DEFNS])" + -
 	   CCEXTRAFLAGS
 $!
 $!    Define The Linker Options File Name.

crypto/crypto.h

@@ -588,15 +588,15 @@ int OPENSSL_isservice(void);
 
 #endif /* def OPENSSL_FIPS */
 
+#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT	1
+void OPENSSL_init(void);
+
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
  */
 void ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(void);
 
-#define OPENSSL_HAVE_INIT	1
-void OPENSSL_init(void);
-
 /* Error codes for the CRYPTO functions. */
 
 /* Function codes. */

crypto/des/rpc_des.h

@@ -122,10 +122,10 @@ struct desparams {
 /*
  * Encrypt an arbitrary sized buffer
  */
-#define	DESIOCBLOCK	_IOWR(d, 6, struct desparams)
+#define	DESIOCBLOCK	_IOWR('d', 6, struct desparams)
 
 /* 
  * Encrypt of small amount of data, quickly
  */
-#define DESIOCQUICK	_IOWR(d, 7, struct desparams) 
+#define DESIOCQUICK	_IOWR('d', 7, struct desparams) 
 

crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, int bits,
 	BIGNUM *r0,*W,*X,*c,*test;
 	BIGNUM *g=NULL,*q=NULL,*p=NULL;
 	BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL;
-	int k,n=0,i,b,m=0;
+	int k,n=0,i,m=0;
 	int counter=0;
 	int r=0;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
@@ -211,7 +211,6 @@ static int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, int bits,
 		/* "offset = 2" */
 
 		n=(bits-1)/160;
-		b=(bits-1)-n*160;
 
 		for (;;)
 			{

crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c

@@ -178,7 +178,8 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
 	if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
 	if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err;		/* s = m + xr */
 	if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
-		BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);
+		if (!BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q))
+			goto err;
 	if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
 
 	ret=DSA_SIG_new();

crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c

@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 	int ret = 0;
 	size_t i;
 	EC_POINT *p=NULL;
+	EC_POINT *acc = NULL;
 
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		{
@@ -337,15 +338,16 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 		}
 
 	if ((p = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) goto err;
+	if ((acc = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) goto err;
 
-	if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) goto err;
+	if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, acc)) goto err;
 
 	if (scalar)
 		{
 		if (!ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(group, p, scalar, group->generator, ctx)) goto err;
-		if (BN_is_negative(scalar)) 
+		if (BN_is_negative(scalar))
 			if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err;
-		if (!group->meth->add(group, r, r, p, ctx)) goto err;
+		if (!group->meth->add(group, acc, acc, p, ctx)) goto err;
 		}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
@@ -353,13 +355,16 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
 		if (!ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(group, p, scalars[i], points[i], ctx)) goto err;
 		if (BN_is_negative(scalars[i]))
 			if (!group->meth->invert(group, p, ctx)) goto err;
-		if (!group->meth->add(group, r, r, p, ctx)) goto err;
+		if (!group->meth->add(group, acc, acc, p, ctx)) goto err;
 		}
 
+	if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, acc)) goto err;
+
 	ret = 1;
 
   err:
 	if (p) EC_POINT_free(p);
+	if (acc) EC_POINT_free(acc);
 	if (new_ctx != NULL)
 		BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
 	return ret;

crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c

@@ -174,8 +174,10 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
 	dest->poly[2] = src->poly[2];
 	dest->poly[3] = src->poly[3];
 	dest->poly[4] = src->poly[4];
-	bn_wexpand(&dest->a, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2);
-	bn_wexpand(&dest->b, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2);
+	if(bn_wexpand(&dest->a, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if(bn_wexpand(&dest->b, (int)(dest->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL)
+		return 0;
 	for (i = dest->a.top; i < dest->a.dmax; i++) dest->a.d[i] = 0;
 	for (i = dest->b.top; i < dest->b.dmax; i++) dest->b.d[i] = 0;
 	return 1;
@@ -199,12 +201,12 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_group_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group,
 
 	/* group->a */
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(&group->a, a, group->poly)) goto err;
-	bn_wexpand(&group->a, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2);
+	if(bn_wexpand(&group->a, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL) goto err;
 	for (i = group->a.top; i < group->a.dmax; i++) group->a.d[i] = 0;
 	
 	/* group->b */
 	if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(&group->b, b, group->poly)) goto err;
-	bn_wexpand(&group->b, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2);
+	if(bn_wexpand(&group->b, (int)(group->poly[0] + BN_BITS2 - 1) / BN_BITS2) == NULL) goto err;
 	for (i = group->b.top; i < group->b.dmax; i++) group->b.d[i] = 0;
 		
 	ret = 1;
@@ -819,7 +821,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_
 	field_sqr = group->meth->field_sqr;	
 
 	/* only support affine coordinates */
-	if (!point->Z_is_one) goto err;
+	if (!point->Z_is_one) return -1;
 
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		{
@@ -869,6 +871,9 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT
 		{
 		return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
 		}
+
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+		return 1;
 	
 	if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one)
 		{

crypto/ec/ec_key.c

@@ -304,7 +304,13 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
 		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
 		return 0;
 		}
-	
+
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key))
+		{
+		ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
 		goto err;
 	if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)

crypto/ec/ec_mult.c

@@ -169,11 +169,13 @@ static void ec_pre_comp_clear_free(void *pre_)
 		EC_POINT **p;
 
 		for (p = pre->points; *p != NULL; p++)
+			{
 			EC_POINT_clear_free(*p);
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(pre->points, sizeof pre->points);
+			OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof *p);
+			}
 		OPENSSL_free(pre->points);
 		}
-	OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof pre);
+	OPENSSL_cleanse(pre, sizeof *pre);
 	OPENSSL_free(pre);
 	}
 

crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c

@@ -1406,6 +1406,9 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *
 		{
 		return EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b) ? 0 : 1;
 		}
+
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, b))
+		return 1;
 	
 	if (a->Z_is_one && b->Z_is_one)
 		{

crypto/ecdh/ech_lib.c

@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ const ECDH_METHOD *ECDH_get_default_method(void)
 
 int ECDH_set_method(EC_KEY *eckey, const ECDH_METHOD *meth)
 	{
-	const ECDH_METHOD *mtmp;
 	ECDH_DATA *ecdh;
 
 	ecdh = ecdh_check(eckey);
@@ -104,11 +103,6 @@ int ECDH_set_method(EC_KEY *eckey, const ECDH_METHOD *meth)
 	if (ecdh == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-        mtmp = ecdh->meth;
-#if 0
-        if (mtmp->finish)
-		mtmp->finish(eckey);
-#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	if (ecdh->engine)
 		{

crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c

@@ -168,10 +168,9 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 		return 0;
 		}
 	fbytes_counter ++;
-	ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf);	
-	if (ret == 0 || ret != num)
+	if (num != BN_num_bytes(tmp) || !BN_bn2bin(tmp, buf))
 		ret = 0;
-	else
+	else 
 		ret = 1;
 	if (tmp)
 		BN_free(tmp);
@@ -287,9 +286,13 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 	size_t		crv_len = 0, n = 0;
 	EC_KEY		*eckey = NULL, *wrong_eckey = NULL;
 	EC_GROUP	*group;
+	ECDSA_SIG	*ecdsa_sig = NULL;
 	unsigned char	digest[20], wrong_digest[20];
-	unsigned char	*signature = NULL; 
-	unsigned int	sig_len;
+	unsigned char	*signature = NULL;
+	const unsigned char	*sig_ptr;
+	unsigned char	*sig_ptr2;
+	unsigned char	*raw_buf = NULL;
+	unsigned int	sig_len, degree, r_len, s_len, bn_len, buf_len;
 	int		nid, ret =  0;
 	
 	/* fill digest values with some random data */
@@ -339,7 +342,8 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 		if (EC_KEY_set_group(eckey, group) == 0)
 			goto builtin_err;
 		EC_GROUP_free(group);
-		if (EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) < 160)
+		degree = EC_GROUP_get_degree(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+		if (degree < 160)
 			/* drop the curve */ 
 			{
 			EC_KEY_free(eckey);
@@ -415,26 +419,89 @@ int test_builtin(BIO *out)
 			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
-		/* modify a single byte of the signature */
-		offset = signature[10] % sig_len;
-		dirt   = signature[11];
-		signature[offset] ^= dirt ? dirt : 1; 
+		/* wrong length */
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len - 1,
+			eckey) == 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		BIO_printf(out, ".");
+		(void)BIO_flush(out);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte of the signature: to ensure we don't
+		 * garble the ASN1 structure, we read the raw signature and
+		 * modify a byte in one of the bignums directly. */
+		sig_ptr = signature;
+		if ((ecdsa_sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sig_ptr, sig_len)) == NULL)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+
+		/* Store the two BIGNUMs in raw_buf. */
+		r_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->r);
+		s_len = BN_num_bytes(ecdsa_sig->s);
+		bn_len = (degree + 7) / 8;
+		if ((r_len > bn_len) || (s_len > bn_len))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
+		buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
+		if ((raw_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL)
+			goto builtin_err;
+		/* Pad the bignums with leading zeroes. */
+		memset(raw_buf, 0, buf_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->r, raw_buf + bn_len - r_len);
+		BN_bn2bin(ecdsa_sig->s, raw_buf + buf_len - s_len);
+
+		/* Modify a single byte in the buffer. */
+		offset = raw_buf[10] % buf_len;
+		dirt   = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		/* Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf. */
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
 		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) == 1)
 			{
 			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
 			goto builtin_err;
 			}
+		/* Sanity check: undo the modification and verify signature. */
+		raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
+		if ((BN_bin2bn(raw_buf, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL) ||
+			(BN_bin2bn(raw_buf + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL))
+			goto builtin_err;
+
+		sig_ptr2 = signature;
+		sig_len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(ecdsa_sig, &sig_ptr2);
+		if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature, sig_len, eckey) != 1)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(out, " failed\n");
+			goto builtin_err;
+			}
 		BIO_printf(out, ".");
 		(void)BIO_flush(out);
 		
 		BIO_printf(out, " ok\n");
 		/* cleanup */
+		/* clean bogus errors */
+		ERR_clear_error();
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
 		signature = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 		eckey = NULL;
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
 		wrong_eckey = NULL;
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
+		ecdsa_sig = NULL;
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
+		raw_buf = NULL;
 		}
 
 	ret = 1;	
@@ -443,8 +510,12 @@ builtin_err:
 		EC_KEY_free(eckey);
 	if (wrong_eckey)
 		EC_KEY_free(wrong_eckey);
+	if (ecdsa_sig)
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ecdsa_sig);
 	if (signature)
 		OPENSSL_free(signature);
+	if (raw_buf)
+		OPENSSL_free(raw_buf);
 	if (curves)
 		OPENSSL_free(curves);
 

crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c

@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ const ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_get_default_method(void)
 
 int ECDSA_set_method(EC_KEY *eckey, const ECDSA_METHOD *meth)
 {
-        const ECDSA_METHOD *mtmp;
 	ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa;
 
 	ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey);
@@ -91,7 +90,6 @@ int ECDSA_set_method(EC_KEY *eckey, const ECDSA_METHOD *meth)
 	if (ecdsa == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-        mtmp = ecdsa->meth;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
 	if (ecdsa->engine)
 	{

crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c

@@ -144,6 +144,14 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 			}
 		while (BN_is_zero(k));
 
+		/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+		 * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+		 * bit-length. */
+
+		if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
+		if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
+			if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
+
 		/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
 		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))
 		{

crypto/engine/eng_all.c

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void)
 #endif
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__)
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(HAVE_CRYPTODEV)
 	ENGINE_load_cryptodev();
 #endif
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)