Prepare for 0.9.7l release

cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
[Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]

Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]

Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
(CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]

Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)
[Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]

CHANGES

@@ -2,6 +2,31 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l  [28 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
+     cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
+     [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
+     in a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2937)  [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. 
+     (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
+     malicious SSLv2 server.  (CVE-2006-4343)
+     [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+
+  *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit
+     ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA"
+     will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar
+     ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that
+     "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the
+     SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite).  This is a backport combining
+     changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+
  Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k  [05 Sep 2006]
 
   *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher

FAQ

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 0.9.7k was released on September 5, 2006.
+OpenSSL 0.9.7l was released on September 28, 2006.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:

NEWS

@@ -5,12 +5,18 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l:
+
+      o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS  (CVE-2006-2940)
+      o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343)
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k:
 
       o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j:
 
+      o Visual C++ 2005 fixes.
       o Update Windows build system for FIPS.
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i:

README

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 0.9.7k 05 Sep 2006
+ OpenSSL 0.9.7l 28 Sep 2006
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

STATUS

@@ -1,14 +1,16 @@
 
   OpenSSL STATUS                           Last modified at
-  ______________                           $Date: 2006/09/05 08:34:05 $
+  ______________                           $Date: 2006/09/28 11:56:56 $
 
   DEVELOPMENT STATE
 
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.9:  Under development...
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.8d: Released on September 28th, 2006
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.8c: Released on September  5th, 2006
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.8b: Released on May        4th, 2006
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.8a: Released on October   11th, 2005
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.8:  Released on July       5th, 2005
+    o  OpenSSL 0.9.7l: Released on September 28th, 2006
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.7k: Released on September  5th, 2006
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.7j: Released on May        4th, 2006
     o  OpenSSL 0.9.7i: Released on October   14th, 2005

apps/enc.c

@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ bad:
 			}
 
 		/* It must be large enough for a base64 encoded line */
-		if (n < 80) n=80;
+		if (base64 && n < 80) n=80;
 
 		bsize=(int)n;
 		if (verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err,"bufsize=%d\n",bsize);
@@ -376,7 +376,11 @@ bad:
 		}
 
 	if (inf == NULL)
+	        {
+		if (bufsize != NULL)
+			setvbuf(stdin, (char *)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
 		BIO_set_fp(in,stdin,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+	        }
 	else
 		{
 		if (BIO_read_filename(in,inf) <= 0)
@@ -427,6 +431,8 @@ bad:
 	if (outf == NULL)
 		{
 		BIO_set_fp(out,stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE);
+		if (bufsize != NULL)
+			setvbuf(stdout, (char *)NULL, _IONBF, 0);
 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
 		{
 		BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer());

crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

@@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **in, long inl
 		ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
 		return 0;
 	} else if(ret == -1) return -1;
+        ret = 0;
 	/* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */
 	if((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) {
 		/* Clear context cache for type OTHER because the auto clear when

crypto/asn1/x_req.c

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, enc, rinf_cb) = {
 
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO)
 
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_REQ, 0, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_INFO) = {
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_REQ, 0, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_REQ) = {
 	ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, req_info, X509_REQ_INFO),
 	ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
 	ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)

crypto/bn/bn_prime.c

@@ -350,13 +350,14 @@ static int probable_prime(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits)
 	{
 	int i;
 	BN_ULONG mods[NUMPRIMES];
-	BN_ULONG delta,d;
+	BN_ULONG delta,maxdelta;
 
 again:
 	if (!BN_rand(rnd,bits,1,1)) return(0);
 	/* we now have a random number 'rand' to test. */
 	for (i=1; i<NUMPRIMES; i++)
 		mods[i]=BN_mod_word(rnd,(BN_ULONG)primes[i]);
+	maxdelta=BN_MASK2 - primes[NUMPRIMES-1];
 	delta=0;
 	loop: for (i=1; i<NUMPRIMES; i++)
 		{
@@ -364,12 +365,8 @@ again:
 		 * that gcd(rnd-1,primes) == 1 (except for 2) */
 		if (((mods[i]+delta)%primes[i]) <= 1)
 			{
-			d=delta;
 			delta+=2;
-			/* perhaps need to check for overflow of
-			 * delta (but delta can be up to 2^32)
-			 * 21-May-98 eay - added overflow check */
-			if (delta < d) goto again;
+			if (delta > maxdelta) goto again;
 			goto loop;
 			}
 		}

crypto/dh/dh.h

@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
 	
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
+#endif
+
 #define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01
 #define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH
                                        * implementation now uses constant time
@@ -207,6 +211,7 @@ void ERR_load_DH_strings(void);
 /* Reason codes. */
 #define DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR				 101
 #define DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE				 100
+#define DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE                           103
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }

crypto/dh/dh_err.c

@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_functs[]=
 static ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[]=
 	{
 {ERR_REASON(DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR)          ,"bad generator"},
+{ERR_REASON(DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)      ,"modulus too large"},               
 {ERR_REASON(DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE)       ,"no private value"},
 {0,NULL}
 	};

crypto/dh/dh_key.c

@@ -180,6 +180,12 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
 	BIGNUM *tmp;
 	int ret= -1;
 
+	if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		DHerr(DH_F_DH_COMPUTE_KEY,DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 	ctx = BN_CTX_new();
 	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
 	BN_CTX_start(ctx);

crypto/dsa/dsa.h

@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@
 # include <openssl/dh.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
+#endif
+
 #define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P	0x01
 #define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME       0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA
                                               * implementation now uses constant time
@@ -259,8 +263,10 @@ void ERR_load_DSA_strings(void);
 #define DSA_F_SIG_CB					 114
 
 /* Reason codes. */
+#define DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE				 102
 #define DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE		 100
 #define DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS			 101
+#define DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 103
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }

crypto/dsa/dsa_err.c

@@ -89,8 +89,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_functs[]=
 
 static ERR_STRING_DATA DSA_str_reasons[]=
 	{
+{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE)           ,"bad q value"},
 {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),"data too large for key size"},
 {ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS)    ,"missing parameters"},
+{ERR_REASON(DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)     ,"modulus too large"},
 {0,NULL}
 	};
 

crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c

@@ -274,6 +274,18 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
 		return -1;
 		}
 
+	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
+		{
+		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
 	BN_init(&u1);
 	BN_init(&u2);
 	BN_init(&t1);

crypto/opensslv.h

@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x009070bfL
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER	0x009070cfL
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.7k-fips 05 Sep 2006"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.7l-fips 28 Sep 2006"
 #else
-#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.7k 05 Sep 2006"
+#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT	"OpenSSL 0.9.7l 28 Sep 2006"
 #endif
 #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT	" part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

crypto/rsa/rsa.h

@@ -154,6 +154,17 @@ struct rsa_st
 	BN_BLINDING *blinding;
 	};
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	16384
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS	3072
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS	64 /* exponent limit enforced for "large" modulus only */
+#endif
+
 #define RSA_3	0x3L
 #define RSA_F4	0x10001L
 
@@ -386,11 +397,11 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 #define RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q			 126
 #define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL			 120
 #define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID			 134
+#define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE				 105
 #define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING			 113
 #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
-#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT			 105
 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED		 130

crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c

@@ -157,6 +157,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ 		{
+ 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ 		return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+ 		{
+ 		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ 		return -1;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ 	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+ 		{
+ 		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+ 			{
+ 			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ 			return -1;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
@@ -370,7 +392,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
 		{
-		if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+		if (1)
 			{
 			/* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
 
@@ -507,7 +529,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	
 	if (blinding != NULL)
 		{
-		if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+		if (1)
 			{
 			/* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
 
@@ -600,6 +622,28 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
+		{
+		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
+		{
+		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		}
+
 	BN_init(&f);
 	BN_init(&ret);
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
@@ -651,15 +695,6 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		{
 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
-		/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
-		   this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
-		   signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
-		   small. */
-		if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
-			goto err;
-			}
 		break;
 	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);

crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c

@@ -129,12 +129,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q) ,"iqmp not inverse of q"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL)    ,"key size too small"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID)    ,"last octet invalid"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE)     ,"modulus too large"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),"null before block missing"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED)  ,"salt length recovery failed"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},

openssl.spec

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 %define libmaj 0
 %define libmin 9
 %define librel 7
-%define librev k
-Release: 2
+%define librev l
+Release: 1
 
 %define openssldir /var/ssl
 

ssl/s2_clnt.c

@@ -538,7 +538,8 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 		}
 
-	if (s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
+	if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL 
+      || s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
 		/* can't happen */
 		{
 		ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);

ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
                 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
                         {
-                        int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+                        size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
                         if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 
                                 {
                                 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;

ssl/ssl_ciph.c

@@ -108,7 +108,64 @@
  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  *
  */
-
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by 
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/comp.h>
@@ -493,7 +550,8 @@ static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
 	*ca_curr = NULL;	/* end of list */
 	}
 
-static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long algorithms, unsigned long mask,
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id, unsigned long ssl_version,
+		unsigned long algorithms, unsigned long mask,
 		unsigned long algo_strength, unsigned long mask_strength,
 		int rule, int strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
 		CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
@@ -519,11 +577,20 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long algorithms, unsigned long mask,
 
 		cp = curr->cipher;
 
+		/* If explicit cipher suite, match only that one for its own protocol version.
+		 * Usual selection criteria will be used for similar ciphersuites from other version! */
+
+		if (cipher_id && (cp->algorithms & SSL_SSL_MASK) == ssl_version)
+			{
+			if (cp->id != cipher_id)
+				continue;
+			}
+
 		/*
 		 * Selection criteria is either the number of strength_bits
 		 * or the algorithm used.
 		 */
-		if (strength_bits == -1)
+		else if (strength_bits == -1)
 			{
 			ma = mask & cp->algorithms;
 			ma_s = mask_strength & cp->algo_strength;
@@ -636,7 +703,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
 	 */
 	for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
 		if (number_uses[i] > 0)
-			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i,
+			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i,
 					co_list, head_p, tail_p);
 
 	OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
@@ -650,6 +717,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 	unsigned long algorithms, mask, algo_strength, mask_strength;
 	const char *l, *start, *buf;
 	int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
+	unsigned long cipher_id = 0, ssl_version = 0;
 	char ch;
 
 	retval = 1;
@@ -739,6 +807,8 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 			 * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
 			 */
 			 j = found = 0;
+			 cipher_id = 0;
+			 ssl_version = 0;
 			 while (ca_list[j])
 				{
 				if (!strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) &&
@@ -767,6 +837,14 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 			                (algo_strength & ca_list[j]->algo_strength);
 			mask_strength |= ca_list[j]->mask_strength;
 
+			/* explicit ciphersuite found */
+			if (ca_list[j]->valid)
+				{
+				cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
+				ssl_version = ca_list[j]->algorithms & SSL_SSL_MASK;
+				break;
+				}
+
 			if (!multi) break;
 			}
 
@@ -796,7 +874,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
 			}
 		else if (found)
 			{
-			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(algorithms, mask,
+			ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, ssl_version, algorithms, mask,
 				algo_strength, mask_strength, rule, -1,
 				co_list, head_p, tail_p);
 			}

ssl/ssl_lib.c

@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
 		c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
 		for (cp=c->name; *cp; )
 			{
-			if (len-- == 0)
+			if (len-- <= 0)
 				{
 				*p='\0';
 				return(buf);