Fixes for the following claims:
1) Certificate Message with no certs OpenSSL implementation sends the Certificate message during SSL handshake, however as per the specification, these have been omitted. -- RFC 2712 -- CertificateRequest, and the ServerKeyExchange shown in Figure 1 will be omitted since authentication and the establishment of a master secret will be done using the client's Kerberos credentials for the TLS server. The client's certificate will be omitted for the same reason. -- RFC 2712 -- 3) Pre-master secret Protocol version The pre-master secret generated by OpenSSL does not have the correct client version. RFC 2712 says, if the Kerberos option is selected, the pre-master secret structure is the same as that used in the RSA case. TLS specification defines pre-master secret as: struct { ProtocolVersion client_version; opaque random[46]; } PreMasterSecret; where client_version is the latest protocol version supported by the client The pre-master secret generated by OpenSSL does not have the correct client version. The implementation does not update the first 2 bytes of random secret for Kerberos Cipher suites. At the server-end, the client version from the pre-master secret is not validated. PR: 1336
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@ -1902,8 +1902,10 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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n+=2;
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}
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if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
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goto err;
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tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
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tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
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if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
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goto err;
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/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
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** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
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/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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@ -323,10 +323,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
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/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
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/* or normal PSK */
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/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
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/* normal PSK or KRB5 */
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if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
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&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_kPSK))
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&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_kPSK)
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&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
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{
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ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@ -2061,6 +2062,25 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
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{
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/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
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* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
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* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
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* However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
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* the protocol version.
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* If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
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* (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
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*/
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if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
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(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
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SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
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s->session->master_key_length=
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