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Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and

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DTLS to fix DoS attack.

Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2012-05-10 16:03:52 +00:00
parent 7388b43cae
commit c46ecc3a55
3 changed files with 11 additions and 1 deletions
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8
CHANGES
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@ -292,6 +292,14 @@
Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
[Steve Henson]
*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
[Steve Henson]

2
ssl/d1_enc.c
View File

@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
}
/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
* All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
if (i > (int)rec->length)
if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
{
/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
* by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is

2
ssl/t1_enc.c
View File

@ -889,6 +889,8 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
{
if (bs > (int)rec->length)
return -1;
rec->data += bs; /* skip the explicit IV */
rec->input += bs;
rec->length -= bs;