Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane. Conflicts: ssl/d1_pkt.c Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ again:
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* would be dropped unnecessarily.
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* would be dropped unnecessarily.
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*/
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*/
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if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
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if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
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*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
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s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
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s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
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!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
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!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
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{
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{
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rr->length = 0;
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rr->length = 0;
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