From b2688c91613566db1f42edd4b45f6e17146531b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2015 00:54:35 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was
the original source of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents
this situation from occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking
at the code for dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more
sane.
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_pkt.c
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
---
ssl/d1_pkt.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 3ed2e9584..de184e33a 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ again:
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
- *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+ s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;