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Fix bug in aes-586.pl.

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This commit is contained in:
Andy Polyakov 2006-08-31 21:15:38 +00:00
parent 2f35ae90fe
commit 2b8a5406f9
1 changed files with 2 additions and 3 deletions
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5
crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
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@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
# to process in one stroke.
#
# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collect
# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
# malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES,
# instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data.
@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
# CBC, do masks the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount possible key
# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
# combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised
# AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk
# of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of
@ -2595,7 +2595,6 @@ my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp"); # copy of aes_key->rounds
&mov ($acc,$_inp); # load inp
&lea ($acc,&DWP(16,$acc)); # advance inp
&mov ($_inp,$acc); # save inp
&mov ($_len,$s2); # save len
&jnz (&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));
&mov ("esp",$_esp);
&popf ();