use TLS1_get_version macro to check version so TLS v1.2 changes don't interfere with DTLS
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@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
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/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
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* client authentication.
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*/
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if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
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goto f_err;
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/* lets get the compression algorithm */
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/* COMPRESSION */
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@ -1659,7 +1659,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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/* if it was signed, check the signature */
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if (pkey != NULL)
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{
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
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/* Should never happen */
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@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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int num;
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@ -1864,8 +1864,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
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for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
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s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
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p+=ctype_num;
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/* HACK! For now just skip over signatature algorithms */
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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n2s(p, llen);
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/* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
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@ -2886,7 +2885,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
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EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
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if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
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{
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if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
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NID_sha1,
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&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
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@ -2898,7 +2897,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
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/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
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* using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
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*/
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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long hdatalen = 0;
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void *hdata;
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@ -3780,7 +3780,7 @@ need to go to SSL_ST_ACCEPT.
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long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
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{
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long alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2;
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
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alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT|TLS1_PRF))
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return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
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return alg2;
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@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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#endif
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s->init_num = 0;
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}
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else if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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@ -1380,7 +1380,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
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s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
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}
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if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
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{
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if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
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goto f_err;
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@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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* and p points to the space at the end. */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
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if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
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&& s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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&& TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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q=md_buf;
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j=0;
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@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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{
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/* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
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* algorithm */
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
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{
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@ -1975,7 +1975,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
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}
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s2n(i,p);
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n+=i+2;
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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n+= 2;
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}
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else
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@ -2031,7 +2031,7 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
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p+=n;
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n++;
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
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s2n(nl, p);
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@ -2964,7 +2964,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
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}
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else
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{
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
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/* Should never happen */
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@ -3011,7 +3011,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
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goto f_err;
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}
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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long hdatalen = 0;
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void *hdata;
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@ -2226,7 +2226,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
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if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
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@ -2235,7 +2235,7 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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/* signature alg must be RSA */
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@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
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}
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skip_ext:
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if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
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{
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if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
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return NULL;
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@ -2100,7 +2100,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
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const EVP_MD *md;
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CERT *c = s->cert;
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/* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
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if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
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return 1;
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/* Should never happen */
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if (!c)
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@ -171,6 +171,9 @@ extern "C" {
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#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
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#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
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#define TLS1_get_version(s) \
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((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
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#define TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21
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#define TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22
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#define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* fatal */
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