Submitted by: Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>

Approved by: steve@openssl.org

Check return code properly in CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content().
This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2009-03-25 10:40:32 +00:00
parent f021b7cca6
commit 188abf7e2a
2 changed files with 6 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -4,6 +4,11 @@
Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not
checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to
appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591)
[Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>]
*) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This
prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have
a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590)

View File

@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_SignerInfo_num(sinfos); i++)
{
si = sk_CMS_SignerInfo_value(sinfos, i);
if (!CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio))
if (CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(si, cmsbio) <= 0)
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_VERIFY,
CMS_R_CONTENT_VERIFY_ERROR);