To force each backend implementation to really attempt to provide proper
random. If a proper random function is missing, then we can explicitly
make use of the default one we use when TLS support is missing.
This commit makes sure it works for darwinssl, gnutls, nss and openssl.
Removing defines, even obsolete ones that haven't been used for a very
long time, still break a lot of applications.
Bug: https://github.com/bagder/curl/pull/106
If a non-standard $TESTDIR is used the file may not be necessary.
Previously a "missing" file resulted in the warning:
readline() on closed filehandle D at ./runtests.pl line 4940.
warning C4267: '=' : conversion from 'size_t' to 'long', possible loss
of data
The member connection_id of struct connectdata is a long (always a
32-bit signed integer on Visual C++) and the member next_connection_id
of struct conncache is a size_t, so one of them should be changed to
match the other.
This patch the size_t in struct conncache to long (the less invasive
change as that variable is only ever used in a single code line).
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1399
1 - fixes the warnings when built without http2 support
2 - adds CURLE_HTTP2, a new error code for errors detected by nghttp2
basically when they are about http2 specific things.
CyaSSL 3.0.0 returns a unique error code if no CA cert is available,
so translate that into CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE when peer verification
is requested.
- Replace CURLAUTH_GSSNEGOTIATE with CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE
- CURL_VERSION_GSSNEGOTIATE is deprecated which
is served by CURL_VERSION_SSPI, CURL_VERSION_GSSAPI and
CURUL_VERSION_SPNEGO now.
- Remove display of feature 'GSS-Negotiate'
This reverts commit cb3e6dfa35 and instead fixes the problem
differently.
The reverted commit addressed a test failure in test 1021 by simplifying
and generalizing the code flow in a way that damaged the
performance. Now we modify the flow so that Curl_proxyCONNECT() again
does as much as possible in one go, yet still do test 1021 with and
without valgrind. It failed due to mistakes in the multi state machine.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1397
Reported-by: Paul Saab
The curl tool project files for VC8 to VC12 would set this setting to
$(IntDir) which is the Visual Studio default value. To avoid confusion
when viewing settings from within Visual Studio and for consistency
with the libcurl project files removed this setting.
Conflicts:
projects/Windows/VC10/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC11/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC12/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC8/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC9/src/curlsrc.tmpl
The curl tool project files for VC7 to VC12 would set this settings to
$(IntDir)$(TargetName).pch which is the Visual Studio default value. To
avoid confusion when viewing settings from within Visual Studio and for
consistency with the libcurl project files removed this setting.
Conflicts:
projects/Windows/VC10/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC11/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC12/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC8/src/curlsrc.tmpl
projects/Windows/VC9/src/curlsrc.tmpl
The curl tool project files for VC7 to VC12 would set these settings to
$(IntDir) which is the Visual Studio default value. To avoid confusion
when viewing settings from within Visual Studio and for consistency
with the libcurl project files removed these two settings.
This prevents targets like tool_hugehelp.c from leaving around
half-constructed files if the rule fails with GNU make.
Reported-by: Rafaël Carré <funman@videolan.org>
It's wrong to assume that we can send a single SPNEGO packet which will
complete the authentication. It's a *negotiation* — the clue is in the
name. So make sure we handle responses from the server.
Curl_input_negotiate() will already handle bailing out if it thinks the
state is GSS_S_COMPLETE (or SEC_E_OK on Windows) and the server keeps
talking to us, so we should avoid endless loops that way.
This is the correct way to do SPNEGO. Just ask for it
Now I correctly see it trying NTLMSSP authentication when a Kerberos ticket
isn't available. Of course, we bail out when the server responds with the
challenge packet, since we don't expect that. But I'll fix that bug next...
This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which
allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will
actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also
be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various
different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too.
A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used,
and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism.
But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet
and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information
about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos,
and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default
mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument).
Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input
tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the
server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume
that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server
wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO
to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway.
So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in
Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO
token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its
token".
You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token
with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO
handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all.
The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do
SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context()
is for. And then it should all Just Work™.
That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes
for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound
token to the server which results in immediate success.
