Both libc/include/sys/auxv.h and libc/private/bionic_auxv.h
use _SYS_AUXV_H_ to see if a header file has already been included.
This prevents both of these files from being included at the same
time.
Fix this name conflict.
Change-Id: Ifaec88aa9779d784b95f8e75145117acf3d5cfc5
We had two copies of the backtrace code, and two copies of the
libcorkscrew /proc/pid/maps code. This patch gets us down to one.
We also had hacks so we could log in the malloc debugging code.
This patch pulls the non-allocating "printf" code out of the
dynamic linker so everyone can share.
This patch also makes the leak diagnostics easier to read, and
makes it possible to paste them directly into the 'stack' tool (by
using relative PCs).
This patch also fixes the stdio standard stream leak that was
causing a leak warning every time tf_daemon ran.
Bug: 7291287
Change-Id: I66e4083ac2c5606c8d2737cb45c8ac8a32c7cfe8
Currently, system properties are passed via the environment
variable ANDROID_PROPERTY_WORKSPACE and a file descriptor passed
from parent to child. This is insecure for setuid executables,
as the environment variable can be changed by the caller.
Modify system property handling so that we get the properties
from a root owned properties file, rather than using an
environment variable.
Related to bug: 8029617
Change-Id: I5717e51f20f9e4339ed0a1fdf2fc797e52670fbb
Don't do the fortify_source checks if we can determine, at
compile time, that the provided operation is safe.
This avoids silliness like calling fortify source on things like:
size_t len = strlen("asdf");
printf("%d\n", len);
and allows the compiler to optimize this code to:
printf("%d\n", 4);
Defer to gcc's builtin functions instead of pointing our code
to the libc implementation.
Change-Id: I5e1dcb61946461c4afaaaa983e39f07c7a0df0ae
The AT_RANDOM changes broke setuid / setgid executables
such as "ping". When the linker executes a setuid program,
it cleans the environment, removing any invalid environment
entries, and adding "NULL"s to the end of the environment
array for each removed variable. Later on, we try to determine
the location of the aux environment variable, and get tripped
up by these extra NULLs.
Reverting this patch will get setuid executables working again,
but getauxval() is still broken for setuid programs because of
this bug.
This reverts commit e3a49a8661.
Change-Id: I05c58a896b1fe32cfb5d95d43b096045cda0aa4a
Populate the stack canaries from the kernel supplied
AT_RANDOM value, which doesn't involve any system calls.
This is slightly faster (6 fewer syscalls) and avoids
unnecessarily reading /dev/urandom, which depletes entropy.
Bug: 7959813
Change-Id: If2b43100a2a9929666df3de56b6139fed969e0f1
In the default case, we don't need to use the stack, we can save r7 with
ip register (that what does eglibc).
This allow to fix vfork data corruption
(see 3884bfe966), because vfork now don't
use the stack.
This reverts commit f4b34b6c39.
The revert was only meant to apply to the jb-mr1 branch, but accidentally
leaked out into AOSP. This revert-revert gets AOSP master and internal
master back in sync.
If the platform code is compiled with -mcpu=cortex-a15, then without this
change prebuilt libraries built against -march=armv7 cannot resolve the
dependency on __aeabi_idiv (provided by libgcc.a).
Bug: 7961327
cherry-picked from internal master.
Change-Id: I8fe59a98eb53d641518b882523c1d6a724fb7e55
Pull a new version of auxvec.h from the upstream Linux
kernel at commit b719f43059903820c31edb30f4663a2818836e7f
These files were generated using the following commands:
cd bionic/libc/kernel
./tools/clean_header.py -u ../../../external/kernel-headers/original/uapi/linux/auxvec.h
./tools/clean_header.py -u ../../../external/kernel-headers/original/linux/auxvec.h
./tools/clean_header.py -u ../../../external/kernel-headers/original/asm-x86/auxvec.h
This change is needed to get AT_RANDOM defined.
Change-Id: Ib064649684b17af6ff4b1a31d501a05f78bb81d0
If the platform code is compiled with -mcpu=cortex-a15, then without this
change prebuilt libraries built against -march=armv7 cannot resolve the
dependency on __aeabi_idiv (provided by libgcc.a).
Bug: 7961327
Change-Id: I0a05ce9c44e44d39b8ce1f0e319e2d37a010f3c7
The dynamic linker applies relro before the preinit and init
arrays are executed, so we should be consistent for statically
linked executables.
Change-Id: Ia0a49d0e981a6e8791f74eed00280edf576ba139
name server addresses are read from the dns
cache associated wih the interface on which
the request shall be done.
processes which has requested to issue dns request
using specific interface are now proxied to netd.
added methods to attach/detach a process to a specific
dns cache/interface.
added getaddrinfoforinface method which takes an
interface as an argument.
Change-Id: I851ec8ab8ce3112626ad2a729078b91d013f32fd
bug:4815099
bug:5465296
Add signalfd() call to bionic.
Adding the signalfd call was done in 3 steps:
- add signalfd4 system call (function name and syscall
number) to libc/SYSCALLS.TXT
- generate all necessary headers by calling
libc/tools/gensyscalls.py. This patch is adding
the generated files since the build system
does not call gensyscalls.py.
- create the signalfd wrapper in signalfd.cpp and add
the function prototype to sys/signalfd.h
(cherry-pick of 0c11611c11, modified to
work with older versions of GCC still in use on some branches.)
Change-Id: I4c6c3f12199559af8be63f93a5336851b7e63355
Add signalfd() call to bionic.
Adding the signalfd call was done in 3 steps:
- add signalfd4 system call (function name and syscall
number) to libc/SYSCALLS.TXT
- generate all necessary headers by calling
libc/tools/gensyscalls.py. This patch is adding
the generated files since the build system
does not call gensyscalls.py.
- create the signalfd wrapper in signalfd.cpp and add
the function prototype to sys/signalfd.h
Change-Id: I7ee1d3e60d5d3e1c73d9820e07d23b9ce6e1a5ab
Find the TTL for the negative results using the minimum of
the SOA records TTL or the MINIMUM-TTL field (RFC-2308).
bug:5926539
Change-Id: I6d39c9fb558afcb7a4a5bc014d97dab4a85c0d4f
Spotted while running the tests on MIPS, where sigset_t is
actually large enough. The bits in sigset_t are used such that
signal 1 is represented by bit 0, so the range of signals is
actually [1, 8*sizeof(sigset_t)]; it seems clearer to reword
the code in terms of valid bit offsets [0, 8*sizeof(sigset_t)),
which leads to the usual bounds checking idiom.
Change-Id: Id899c288e15ff71c85dd2fd33c47f8e97aa1956f
