ccd86b68ef
yet tighter, and also put some heat on the rest of the library by insisting (correctly) that compare callbacks used in stacks are prototyped with "const" parameters. This has led to a depth-first explosion of compiler warnings in the code where 1 constification has led to 3 or 4 more. Fortunately these have all been resolved to completion and the code seems cleaner as a result - in particular many of the _cmp() functions should have been prototyped with "const"s, and now are. There was one little problem however; X509_cmp() should by rights compare "const X509 *" pointers, and it is now declared as such. However, it's internal workings can involve recalculating hash values and extensions if they have not already been setup. Someone with a more intricate understanding of the flow control of X509 might be able to tighten this up, but for now - this seemed the obvious place to stop the "depth-first" constification of the code by using an evil cast (they have migrated all the way here from safestack.h). Fortunately, this is the only place in the code where this was required to complete these type-safety changes, and it's reasonably clear and commented, and seemed the least unacceptable of the options. Trying to take the constification further ends up exploding out considerably, and indeed leads directly into generalised ASN functions which are not likely to cooperate well with this.
315 lines
8.9 KiB
C
315 lines
8.9 KiB
C
/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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int i;
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X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
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ai=a->cert_info;
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bi=b->cert_info;
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i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
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if (i) return(i);
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return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
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}
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#ifndef NO_MD5
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unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
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{
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unsigned long ret=0;
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MD5_CTX ctx;
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unsigned char md[16];
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char str[256];
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X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,str,256);
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ret=strlen(str);
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MD5_Init(&ctx);
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MD5_Update(&ctx,(unsigned char *)str,ret);
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MD5_Update(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
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(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length);
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MD5_Final(&(md[0]),&ctx);
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ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
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((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
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)&0xffffffffL;
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return(ret);
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}
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#endif
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int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
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}
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int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
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}
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int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
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{
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return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
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}
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X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
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{
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return(a->cert_info->issuer);
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}
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unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
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{
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return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
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}
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X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
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{
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return(a->cert_info->subject);
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}
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ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
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{
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return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
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}
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unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
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{
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return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
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}
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#ifndef NO_SHA
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/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
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* this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
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* prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
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* STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
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* involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
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* certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
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* where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
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* with an evil cast.
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*/
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int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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/* ensure hash is valid */
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X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
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X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
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return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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}
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#endif
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int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
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{
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int i,j;
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X509_NAME_ENTRY *na,*nb;
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if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)
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!= sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(b->entries))
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return sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)
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-sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(b->entries);
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for (i=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)-1; i>=0; i--)
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{
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na=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries,i);
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nb=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(b->entries,i);
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j=na->value->length-nb->value->length;
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if (j) return(j);
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j=memcmp(na->value->data,nb->value->data,
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na->value->length);
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if (j) return(j);
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j=na->set-nb->set;
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if (j) return(j);
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}
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/* We will check the object types after checking the values
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* since the values will more often be different than the object
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* types. */
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for (i=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)-1; i>=0; i--)
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{
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na=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries,i);
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nb=sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(b->entries,i);
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j=OBJ_cmp(na->object,nb->object);
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if (j) return(j);
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}
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return(0);
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}
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#ifndef NO_MD5
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/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
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* this is reasonably efficient. */
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unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
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{
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unsigned long ret=0;
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unsigned char md[16];
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unsigned char str[256],*p,*pp;
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int i;
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i=i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
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if (i > sizeof(str))
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p=Malloc(i);
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else
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p=str;
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pp=p;
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i2d_X509_NAME(x,&pp);
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MD5((unsigned char *)p,i,&(md[0]));
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if (p != str) Free(p);
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ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
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((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
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)&0xffffffffL;
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return(ret);
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}
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#endif
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/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
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X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
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ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
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{
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int i;
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X509_CINF cinf;
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X509 x,*x509=NULL;
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if(!sk) return NULL;
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x.cert_info= &cinf;
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cinf.serialNumber=serial;
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cinf.issuer=name;
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for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
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{
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x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
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if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
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return(x509);
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}
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return(NULL);
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}
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X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
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{
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X509 *x509;
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int i;
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for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
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{
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x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
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return(x509);
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}
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return(NULL);
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}
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EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
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{
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if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
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return(NULL);
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return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
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}
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int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
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{
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EVP_PKEY *xk=NULL;
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int ok=0;
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xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
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if (xk->type != k->type)
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{
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
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goto err;
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}
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switch (k->type)
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{
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#ifndef NO_RSA
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case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
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if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->n,k->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
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|| BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->e,k->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
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{
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
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goto err;
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}
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break;
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#endif
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#ifndef NO_DSA
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case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
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if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.dsa->pub_key,k->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
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{
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
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goto err;
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}
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break;
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#endif
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#ifndef NO_DH
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case EVP_PKEY_DH:
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/* No idea */
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY);
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goto err;
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#endif
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default:
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X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
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goto err;
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}
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ok=1;
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err:
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EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
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return(ok);
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}
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