664 lines
20 KiB
C
664 lines
20 KiB
C
/* v3_purp.c */
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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 2001.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
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static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
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static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
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static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
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static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
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const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
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static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
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static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
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{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
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{X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
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};
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#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
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IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
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static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
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static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
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const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
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{
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return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
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}
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/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
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* I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
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* things. */
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int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
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{
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int idx;
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const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
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if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
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x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
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}
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if(id == -1) return 1;
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idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
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if(idx == -1) return -1;
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pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
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return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
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{
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if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
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return 0;
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}
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*p = purpose;
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return 1;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
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{
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if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
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return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
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}
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X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
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{
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if(idx < 0) return NULL;
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if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
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return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
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{
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int i;
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X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
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for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
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xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
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if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
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}
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return -1;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
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{
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X509_PURPOSE tmp;
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int idx;
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if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
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return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
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tmp.purpose = purpose;
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if(!xptable) return -1;
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idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
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if(idx == -1) return -1;
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return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
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int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
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char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
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{
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int idx;
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X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
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/* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
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flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
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/* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
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flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
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/* Get existing entry if any */
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idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
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/* Need a new entry */
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if(idx == -1) {
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if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
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} else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
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/* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
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if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
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OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
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OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
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}
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/* dup supplied name */
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ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
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ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname);
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if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
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ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
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/* Set all other flags */
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ptmp->flags |= flags;
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ptmp->purpose = id;
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ptmp->trust = trust;
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ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
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ptmp->usr_data = arg;
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/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
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if(idx == -1) {
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if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
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X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
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{
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if(!p) return;
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if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC)
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{
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if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
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OPENSSL_free(p->name);
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OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(p);
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}
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}
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void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
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for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
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xptable = NULL;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->purpose;
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}
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char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->name;
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}
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char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->sname;
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}
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int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
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{
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return xp->trust;
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}
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static int nid_cmp(int *a, int *b)
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{
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return *a - *b;
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}
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int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
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{
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/* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
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* that is those which are used by the verify process. If
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* an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
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* then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
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* The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
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* searched using bsearch.
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*/
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static int supported_nids[] = {
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NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
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NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
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NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
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NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
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NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
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NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */
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NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
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#endif
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NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
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NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 661 */
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NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
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};
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int ex_nid;
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ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
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if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
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return 0;
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if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid, (char *)supported_nids,
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sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
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(int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp))
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
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{
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BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
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PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
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EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
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X509_EXTENSION *ex;
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int i;
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if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
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X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
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#endif
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/* Does subject name match issuer ? */
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if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
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/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
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if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
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/* Handle basic constraints */
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if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
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if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
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if(bs->pathlen) {
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if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
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|| !bs->ca) {
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
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x->ex_pathlen = 0;
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} else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
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} else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
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BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
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}
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/* Handle proxy certificates */
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if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
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if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
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|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0
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|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) {
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
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}
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if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
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x->ex_pcpathlen =
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ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
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} else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
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PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
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}
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/* Handle key usage */
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if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
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if(usage->length > 0) {
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x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
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if(usage->length > 1)
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x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
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} else x->ex_kusage = 0;
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
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}
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x->ex_xkusage = 0;
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if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
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for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
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switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
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case NID_server_auth:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
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break;
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case NID_client_auth:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
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break;
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case NID_email_protect:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
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break;
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case NID_code_sign:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
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break;
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case NID_ms_sgc:
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case NID_ns_sgc:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
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break;
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case NID_OCSP_sign:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
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break;
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|
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case NID_time_stamp:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
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break;
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case NID_dvcs:
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x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
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break;
|
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}
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}
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sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
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}
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if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
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if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
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else x->ex_nscert = 0;
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
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}
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x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
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x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
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x->rfc3779_addr =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
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x->rfc3779_asid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
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NULL, NULL);
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#endif
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for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
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{
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ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
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if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
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continue;
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if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
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{
|
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x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
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break;
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}
|
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}
|
|
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
|
|
}
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|
|
/* CA checks common to all purposes
|
|
* return codes:
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* 0 not a CA
|
|
* 1 is a CA
|
|
* 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
|
|
* 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
|
|
* 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
|
|
#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
|
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
|
|
#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
|
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
|
|
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
|
|
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
|
|
|
|
static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
/* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
|
|
if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
|
|
if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
|
|
if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
|
|
/* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
|
|
else return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
|
|
if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
|
|
/* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
|
|
else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
|
|
/* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
|
|
else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
|
|
&& x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
|
|
/* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return check_ca(x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
|
|
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int ca_ret;
|
|
ca_ret = check_ca(x);
|
|
if(!ca_ret) return 0;
|
|
/* check nsCertType if present */
|
|
if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
|
|
else return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
|
|
if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
|
|
/* We need to do digital signatures with it */
|
|
if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
|
|
/* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
|
|
if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
|
|
if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
|
|
|
|
if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
|
|
/* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
|
|
if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
|
|
if(!ret || ca) return ret;
|
|
/* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
|
|
if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* common S/MIME checks */
|
|
static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
|
|
if(ca) {
|
|
int ca_ret;
|
|
ca_ret = check_ca(x);
|
|
if(!ca_ret) return 0;
|
|
/* check nsCertType if present */
|
|
if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
|
|
else return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
|
|
if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
|
|
/* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
|
|
if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
|
|
if(!ret || ca) return ret;
|
|
if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
|
|
if(!ret || ca) return ret;
|
|
if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
if(ca) {
|
|
int ca_ret;
|
|
if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
|
|
else return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
|
|
* each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
|
|
value (2)? */
|
|
if(ca) return check_ca(x);
|
|
/* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
|
|
* This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
|
|
* which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
|
|
* subject name.
|
|
* These are:
|
|
* 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
|
|
* 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
|
|
* 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
|
|
* returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
|
|
* codes for X509_verify_cert()
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
|
|
{
|
|
if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
|
|
X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
|
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
|
|
x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
|
|
if(subject->akid) {
|
|
/* Check key ids (if present) */
|
|
if(subject->akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
|
|
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject->akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
|
|
/* Check serial number */
|
|
if(subject->akid->serial &&
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer),
|
|
subject->akid->serial))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
|
|
/* Check issuer name */
|
|
if(subject->akid->issuer) {
|
|
/* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
|
|
* SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
|
|
* There may be more than one but we only take any
|
|
* notice of the first.
|
|
*/
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
|
|
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
|
|
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
gens = subject->akid->issuer;
|
|
for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
|
|
gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
|
|
if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
|
nm = gen->d.dirn;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
|
|
{
|
|
if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
|
|
}
|
|
else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
|
|
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
|
|
return X509_V_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|