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3dd814ac4d0581af363068e83b5fa8d5271063d5
openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c
Emilia Kasper 455b65dfab RT3067: simplify patch 
(Original commit adb46dbc6d)

Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
2014-09-24 15:35:02 +02:00

3703 lines
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/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
{
if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
{
/* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
we do so if There is no srp login name */
ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
}
else
{
ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
}
}
return ret;
}
#endif
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
ssl3_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl3_get_server_method)
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0,
s->version, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
* client that doesn't support secure
* renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
{
int al;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
{
/* callback indicates firther work to be done */
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
/* This is not really an error but the only means to
for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
* PSK: may send PSK identity hints
*
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
|| (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
|| (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/* This code originally checked to see if
* any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
* and then flushed. This caused problems
* as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
* fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
* as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
* still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
* Also for GOST ciphersuites when
* the client uses its key from the certificate
* for key exchange.
*/
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
* at this point and digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
int offset=0;
int dgst_num;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
* FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
* should be generalized. But it is next step
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
{
int dgst_size;
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
if (dgst_size < 0)
{
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
offset+=dgst_size;
}
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->init_num = 0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
{
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
}
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#endif
}
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
{
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
* so permit appropriate message length */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
{
/* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
* negotiation. */
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
return -1;
}
/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
* which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
return 2;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p,*d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
* If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
* This down switching should be handled by a different method.
* If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
* TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet=1;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->first_packet=0;
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
* (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
: (s->client_version < s->version))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
{
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
* contain one, just return since we do not want to
* allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
{
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
s->hit=0;
/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
* 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
* with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
* won't even compile against older library versions).
*
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
* renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
* this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* setting will be ignored.
*/
if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
else
{
i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
if (i == 1)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else /* i == 0 */
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
}
p+=j;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
/* cookie stuff */
cookie_len = *(p++);
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
{
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
cookie_len > 0)
{
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
{
if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
ret = -2;
}
p += cookie_len;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
{
/* Select version to use */
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
{
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
}
else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
{
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
}
n2s(p,i);
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
{
/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
{
/* not enough data */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
== NULL))
{
goto err;
}
p+=i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
{
j=0;
id=s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id)
{
j=1;
break;
}
}
/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
* attack: CVE-2010-4180.
*/
#if 0
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
{
/* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
* not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
* continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
* preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
* enabled, though. */
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
{
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (j == 0)
{
/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
* list if we are asked to reuse it */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i= *(p++);
if ((p+i) > (d+n))
{
/* not enough data */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
q=p;
#endif
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
{
if (p[j] == 0) break;
}
p+=i;
if (j >= i)
{
/* no compress */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
/* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
* handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
* server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
* SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos=s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
{
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
{
s->hit=1;
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
ciphers=NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
if (s->cipher_list)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
{
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
{
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
if (comp_id == comp->id)
{
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
{
if (q[m] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (m >= i)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
{ /* See if we have a match */
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
{
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
v=comp->id;
for (o=0; o<i; o++)
{
if (v == q[o])
{
done=1;
break;
}
}
if (done) break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
else
comp=NULL;
}
#else
/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
* pick a cipher */
if (!s->hit)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth=0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers=NULL;
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
retry_cert:
if (s->cert->cert_cb)
{
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (rv < 0)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
}
else
{
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
{
sk=s->session->ciphers;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc=c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec=c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
}
else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
{
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
}
/* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
}
int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,sl;
int al = 0;
unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
p=s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
return -1;
#endif
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* There are several cases for the session ID to send
* back in the server hello:
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
* we send back the old session ID.
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
* session ID.
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
if (s->session->not_resumable ||
(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->hit))
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
*(p++)=sl;
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
p+=sl;
/* put the cipher */
i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++)=0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
return -1;
}
if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
{
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
{
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j,num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int al,i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
CERT *cert;
BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4],kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert=s->cert;
buf=s->init_buf;
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
n=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
{
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if(rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
r[0]=rsa->n;
r[1]=rsa->e;
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kDHE)
{
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
{
dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
if (dhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
dh = dhp;
else if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
{
if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
(dh->priv_key == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
r[0]=dh->p;
r[1]=dh->g;
r[2]=dh->pub_key;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
{
const EC_GROUP *group;
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
{
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
if (nid != NID_undef)
ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
}
else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
{
ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
}
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
ecdh = ecdhp;
else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
{
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
* keys over named (not generic) curves. For
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key.
* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
if (encodedlen == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
* In this situation, we need four additional bytes
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
n = 4 + encodedlen;
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
*/
r[0]=NULL;
r[1]=NULL;
r[2]=NULL;
r[3]=NULL;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
{
/* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP)
{
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
goto err;
}
r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
}
else
#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
n+=1+nr[i];
else
#endif
n+=2+nr[i];
}
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
== NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
}
else
{
pkey=NULL;
kn=0;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
}
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
{
*p = nr[i];
p++;
}
else
#endif
s2n(nr[i],p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
p+=nr[i];
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
{
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
* [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
* the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
*p = 0;
p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
p += 1;
memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_kPSK)
{
/* copy PSK identity hint */
s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
}
#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
* and p points to the space at the end. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
q=md_buf;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(u,p);
n+=u+2;
}
else
#endif
if (md)
{
/* send signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
{
/* Should never happen */
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
p+=2;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
n+= 2;
}
else
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return ssl_do_write(s);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
{
buf=s->init_buf;
d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
d[0]=n;
p+=n;
n++;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
const unsigned char *psigs;
unsigned char *etmp = p;
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
/* Skip over length for now */
p += 2;
nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
/* Now fill in length */
s2n(nl, etmp);
p += nl;
n += nl + 2;
}
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
n+=2+j;
nl+=2+j;
}
else
{
d=p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
n+=j;
nl+=j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
s2n(nl,p);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->init_num += 4;
}
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i,al,ok;
long n;
unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2048, /* ??? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
{
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
* be sent already */
if (rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
{
pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
else
p-=2;
}
else
n=i;
}
/* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
* of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
* RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
* the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
* case that the decrypt fails. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
/* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
goto err;
decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
/* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
* decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
/* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
* then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
* number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
* are done in constant time and are treated like any other
* decryption error. */
version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
* the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
* (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
* DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
* negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
* support the requested protocol version. If
* SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
{
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
/* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
* to remain non-zero (0xff). */
decrypt_good &= version_good;
/* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
* decrypt_good_mask. */
for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
{
p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
rand_premaster_secret[i]);
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p,i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
if (n)
n2s(p,i);
else
i = 0;
if (n && n != i+2)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
else
{
p-=2;
i=(int)n;
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
if (idx >= 0)
{
skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
if ((skey == NULL) ||
(skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
(skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
}
else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
else
dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
if (n == 0L)
{
/* Get pubkey from cert */
EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (clkey)
{
if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
}
if (dh_clnt == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
}
else
pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
if (pub == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
BN_clear_free(pub);
goto err;
}
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
if (dh_clnt)
DH_free(dh_clnt);
else
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
if (dh_clnt)
return 2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p,i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p,i);
authenticator.length = i;
if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p+=authenticator.length;
n2s(p,i);
enc_pms.length = i;
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_pms.length;
/* Note that the length is checked again below,
** after decryption
*/
if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
enc_pms.length + 6))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
** but will return authtime == 0.
*/
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
outl += padl;
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
{
/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
* the protocol version.
* If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
* (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
*/
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
{
size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
{
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
}
}
/* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
** but it caused problems for apache.
** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
}
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
/* use the certificate */
tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
}
else
{
/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
* generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (n == 0L)
{
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) ||
(clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
{
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates
* so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
* never executed. When that support is
* added, we ought to ensure the key
* received in the certificate is
* authorized for key agreement.
* ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
* the two ECDH shares are for the same
* group.
*/
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
}
else
{
/* Get client's public key from encoded point
* in the ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Get encoded point length */
i = *p;
p += 1;
if (n != 1 + i)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
* currently, so set it to the start
*/
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
/* Compute the master secret */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
return (ret);
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
unsigned char *t = NULL;
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto psk_err;
}
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
goto psk_err;
}
/* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
* string for the callback */
memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto psk_err;
}
else if (psk_len == 0)
{
/* PSK related to the given identity not found */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t+=psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto psk_err;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0)
goto f_err;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
int param_len;
n2s(p,i);
param_len=i+2;
if (param_len > n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
}
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
{
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
size_t outlen=32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
/* Get our certificate private key*/
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
* a client certificate for authorization only. */
client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (client_pub_pkey)
{
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
start = p;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
/* Generate master secret */
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
ret = 2;
else
ret = 1;
gerr:
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
if (ret)
return ret;
else
goto err;
}
else
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
unsigned char *p;
int al,ok,ret=0;
long n;
int type=0,i,j;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
{
peer=s->session->peer;
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
}
else
{
peer=NULL;
pkey=NULL;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
ret=1;
goto end;
}
if (peer == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
* signature without length field */
if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
{
i=64;
}
else
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
else if (rv == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
if (i > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
{ unsigned char signature[64];
int idx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
if (i!=64) {
fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
}
for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
}
j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
if (j<=0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto f_err;
}
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
end:
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
const unsigned char *p,*q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
if (x == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (p != (q+l))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
nc+=l+3;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
{
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
else
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if (i <= 0)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > 1)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL)
{
al=SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
* when we arrive here. */
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
* peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
sk=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (cpk == NULL)
{
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
{
unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
* too long
*/
if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
return -1;
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (!senc)
return -1;
p = senc;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
/* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
p = senc;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows handshake_header_length +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
return -1;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
* it does all the work otherwise use generated values
* from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
&hctx, 1) < 0)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
}
else
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
/* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
* We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
* and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
* as their sessions. */
l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
p += 16;
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
p += len;
EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
p += len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
s2n(len - 6, p);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
{
unsigned char *p;
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
return -1;
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
/* message length */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
/* status type */
*(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
/* length of OCSP response */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
/* actual response */
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
* sets the next_proto member in s if found */
int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
int proto_len, padding_len;
long n;
const unsigned char *p;
/* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
* extension in their ClientHello */
if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
return -1;
}
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
514, /* See the payload format below */
&ok);
if (!ok)
return((int)n);
/* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
* in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
* by ssl3_get_finished). */
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
return -1;
}
if (n < 2)
return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* The payload looks like:
* uint8 proto_len;
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
* uint8 padding_len;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
proto_len = p[0];
if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
return 0;
padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
return 0;
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
return 1;
}
# endif
#endif
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