f3b355fec3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR #838
(cherry picked from commit 57e477b9ec)
3524 lines
116 KiB
C
3524 lines
116 KiB
C
/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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*
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license provided above.
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*
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
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* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include "kssl_lcl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
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# include <openssl/fips.h>
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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# include <openssl/dh.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
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# include <openssl/engine.h>
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#endif
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static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
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static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
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{
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if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
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return (SSLv3_client_method());
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else
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return (NULL);
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}
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IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
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ssl_undefined_function,
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ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
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#endif
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int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
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{
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BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
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unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
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void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
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int ret = -1;
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int new_state, state, skip = 0;
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RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
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ERR_clear_error();
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
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s->in_handshake++;
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if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
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SSL_clear(s);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
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/*
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* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
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* don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
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* handshakes anyway.
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*/
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if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
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s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
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s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
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}
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#endif
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for (;;) {
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state = s->state;
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switch (s->state) {
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case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
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s->renegotiate = 1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
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/* break */
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
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case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
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case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
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s->server = 0;
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if (cb != NULL)
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cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
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if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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ret = -1;
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goto end;
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}
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/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
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s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
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if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
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if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_buf = buf;
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buf = NULL;
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}
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
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ret = -1;
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goto end;
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}
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/* setup buffing BIO */
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if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
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s->init_num = 0;
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s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/*
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* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
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*/
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s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
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s->shutdown = 0;
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ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
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s->init_num = 0;
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/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
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if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
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s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
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ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
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if (s->hit) {
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
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/* receive renewed session ticket */
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
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}
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#endif
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} else
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
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s->init_num = 0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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/* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
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ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto end;
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if (ret == 1) {
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s->hit = 1;
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
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s->init_num = 0;
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break;
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}
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#endif
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/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
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/* or PSK */
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if (!
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(s->s3->tmp.
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new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
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&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
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ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
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if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
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else
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
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} else {
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skip = 1;
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
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}
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#else
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} else
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skip = 1;
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
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#endif
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s->init_num = 0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
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ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
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s->init_num = 0;
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/*
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* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
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* the server
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*/
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if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
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ret = -1;
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
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}
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break;
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|
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
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ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
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s->init_num = 0;
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break;
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|
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case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
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ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
|
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
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if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
|
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if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
|
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
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ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
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goto end;
|
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}
|
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}
|
|
#endif
|
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if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
|
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
|
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else
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s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
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s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/*
|
|
* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
|
|
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
|
|
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
|
|
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
|
|
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
|
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s->init_num = 0;
|
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break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
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case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
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ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
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SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
|
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SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
|
{
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
|
|
s->method->
|
|
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
|
|
|
|
/* clear flags */
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
|
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
}
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
|
|
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
|
|
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
s->init_buf = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
|
|
* buffering now
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
|
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
s->renegotiate = 0;
|
|
s->new_session = 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
/* s->server=0; */
|
|
s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_ERR:
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* did we do anything */
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
|
|
if (s->debug) {
|
|
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
|
|
new_state = s->state;
|
|
s->state = state;
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
|
|
s->state = new_state;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
end:
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
|
if (buf != NULL)
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
int j;
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
|
|
if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
!sess->session_id_length ||
|
|
#else
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
|
|
* "ticket" without a session ID.
|
|
*/
|
|
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
(sess->not_resumable)) {
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
|
|
|
|
p = s->s3->client_random;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
d = p = &(buf[4]);
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
|
|
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
|
|
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
|
|
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
|
|
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
|
|
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
|
|
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
|
|
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
|
|
* 1.0.
|
|
*
|
|
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
|
|
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
|
|
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
|
|
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
|
|
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
|
|
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
|
|
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
|
|
* know that is maximum server supports.
|
|
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
|
|
* containing version 1.0.
|
|
*
|
|
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
|
|
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
|
|
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
|
|
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
|
|
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
|
|
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
|
|
* the negotiated version.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if 0
|
|
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
|
|
s->client_version = s->version;
|
|
#else
|
|
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
|
|
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Random stuff */
|
|
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/* Session ID */
|
|
if (s->new_session)
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
i = s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
*(p++) = i;
|
|
if (i != 0) {
|
|
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
|
|
p += i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ciphers supported */
|
|
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
|
|
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
|
|
* use TLS v1.2
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
|
|
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
|
|
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s2n(i, p);
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
/* COMPRESSION */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
*(p++) = 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
|
|
|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
else
|
|
j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
|
*(p++) = 1 + j;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
|
|
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
|
|
*(p++) = comp->id;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
/* TLS extensions */
|
|
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((p =
|
|
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p,
|
|
buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
|
|
NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
l = (p - d);
|
|
d = buf;
|
|
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
l2n3(l, d);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = p - buf;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
|
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int i, al, ok;
|
|
unsigned int j;
|
|
long n;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
|
|
if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else { /* already sent a cookie */
|
|
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
|
|
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* load the server hello data */
|
|
/* load the server random */
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
s->hit = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* get the session-id */
|
|
j = *(p++);
|
|
|
|
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
|
|
* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
|
|
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
|
|
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
|
|
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
|
|
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
|
|
* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
|
|
* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
|
|
* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
|
|
* server wants to resume.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
|
|
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
|
|
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
|
|
&s->session->master_key_length,
|
|
NULL, &pref_cipher,
|
|
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
|
|
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
|
|
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
|
|
|
|
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
|
|
&& memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
|
|
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|
|
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
|
|
/* actually a client application bug */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->hit = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
|
|
* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
|
|
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
|
|
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
|
|
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->session_id_length = j;
|
|
memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
|
|
}
|
|
p += j;
|
|
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
|
|
if (c == NULL) {
|
|
/* unknown cipher */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
|
|
if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
|
|
(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)) &&
|
|
!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
|
|
p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
|
|
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
|
|
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
|
|
* set and use it for comparison.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->cipher)
|
|
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
|
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
|
|
/* Workaround is now obsolete */
|
|
#if 0
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for client
|
|
* authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
|
|
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
|
|
/* COMPRESSION */
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
|
if (*(p++) != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
|
|
* using compression.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
j = *(p++);
|
|
if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (j == 0)
|
|
comp = NULL;
|
|
else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else
|
|
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
|
|
|
|
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
/* TLS extensions */
|
|
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
|
|
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (p != (d + n)) {
|
|
/* wrong packet length */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
|
|
unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
const unsigned char *q, *p;
|
|
unsigned char *d;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
|
|
SESS_CERT *sc;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
|
|
* KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
|
|
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
|
|
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2l3(p, llen);
|
|
if (llen + 3 != n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
|
|
n2l3(p, l);
|
|
if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
q = p;
|
|
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
|
|
if (x == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (q != (p + l)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
nc += l + 3;
|
|
p = q;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
|
|
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
&& !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
) {
|
|
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
|
|
|
|
sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
if (sc == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert)
|
|
ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = sc;
|
|
|
|
sc->cert_chain = sk;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
|
|
* which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
|
|
*/
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
|
|
sk = NULL;
|
|
/*
|
|
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
|
|
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
|
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
|
|
? 0 : 1;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
|
|
if (need_cert && i < 0) {
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (need_cert) {
|
|
sc->peer_cert_type = i;
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
|
|
* of lines ago.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
|
|
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
|
|
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
|
|
sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
s->session->peer = x;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sc->peer_cert_type = i;
|
|
sc->peer_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
s->session->peer = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
unsigned char *param, *p;
|
|
int al, j, ok;
|
|
long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
int curve_nid = 0;
|
|
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
|
|
* ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
|
|
*/
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
|
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
|
|
* ciphersuite.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
/*
|
|
* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
|
|
* identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
|
|
* problems later.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
|
|
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
|
|
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
|
|
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
|
|
param_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
|
|
|
|
param_len = 2;
|
|
if (param_len > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
|
|
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
|
|
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
|
|
* identity.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
|
|
* is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
|
|
* so create a NULL-terminated string.
|
|
*/
|
|
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
|
|
memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
|
|
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
|
|
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += i;
|
|
n -= param_len;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
param_len = 2;
|
|
if (param_len > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
if (2 > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += 2;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
if (1 > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += 1;
|
|
|
|
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
if (2 > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += 2;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
n -= param_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
|
# else
|
|
if (0) ;
|
|
# endif
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
|
|
x509);
|
|
# endif
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
|
|
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
param_len = 2;
|
|
if (param_len > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
if (2 > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += 2;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
n -= param_len;
|
|
|
|
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
|
else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
|
|
rsa = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
|
|
if (0) ;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
|
|
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
param_len = 2;
|
|
if (param_len > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
if (2 > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += 2;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
|
|
if (2 > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += 2;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
|
|
if (i > n - param_len) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += i;
|
|
|
|
if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += i;
|
|
n -= param_len;
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
|
# else
|
|
if (0) ;
|
|
# endif
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
|
|
x509);
|
|
# endif
|
|
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
|
|
dh = NULL;
|
|
} else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
|
|
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
|
|
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
|
|
* public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
|
|
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
|
|
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
|
|
* byte for the length of the encoded point
|
|
*/
|
|
param_len = 4;
|
|
if (param_len > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
|
|
((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
|
|
if (ngroup == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
|
|
|
|
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += 3;
|
|
|
|
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
|
|
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
|
|
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
|
|
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
|
|
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
|
|
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
|
|
|
|
n -= param_len;
|
|
p += encoded_pt_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
|
|
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
|
|
* and ECDSA.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (0) ;
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
|
# endif
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
|
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
|
# endif
|
|
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
|
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
|
|
ecdh = NULL;
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
|
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
} else if (alg_k) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
|
|
|
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
|
|
|
|
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) {
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
int sigalg;
|
|
if (2 > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
if (sigalg == -1) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
|
|
if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
|
|
if (md == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n -= 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
md = EVP_sha1();
|
|
|
|
if (2 > n) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
n2s(p, i);
|
|
n -= 2;
|
|
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
|
|
/* wrong packet length */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
|
|
&& TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
int num;
|
|
unsigned int size;
|
|
|
|
j = 0;
|
|
q = md_buf;
|
|
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
|
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
|
|
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
|
|
q += size;
|
|
j += size;
|
|
}
|
|
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
|
|
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
|
|
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* still data left over */
|
|
if (n != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return (1);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (rsa != NULL)
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (dh != NULL)
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
|
if (ecdh != NULL)
|
|
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok, ret = 0;
|
|
unsigned long n, nc, l;
|
|
unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
|
|
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
|
|
const unsigned char *p, *q;
|
|
unsigned char *d;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
|
|
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
|
|
* wont be doing client auth.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the certificate types */
|
|
ctype_num = *(p++);
|
|
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
|
|
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
|
|
p += ctype_num;
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
n2s(p, llen);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
|
|
* length value.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += llen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get the CA RDNs */
|
|
n2s(p, llen);
|
|
#if 0
|
|
{
|
|
FILE *out;
|
|
out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
|
|
fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
|
|
fclose(out);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
|
|
n2s(p, l);
|
|
if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
|
goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
q = p;
|
|
|
|
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
|
|
/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
|
|
goto cont;
|
|
else {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (q != (p + l)) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
|
|
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += l;
|
|
nc += l + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
cont:
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
|
|
ca_sk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
done:
|
|
if (ca_sk != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
|
|
long n;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
unsigned char *d;
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
|
|
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
|
|
if (n < 6) {
|
|
/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
|
|
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
|
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
|
|
/*
|
|
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
|
|
* one
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Remove the old session from the cache
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
|
|
if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
|
|
s->session);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* We carry on if this fails */
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
s->session = new_sess;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
|
|
n2s(p, ticklen);
|
|
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
|
|
if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
|
|
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
|
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
|
|
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
|
|
/*
|
|
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
|
|
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
|
|
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
|
|
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
|
|
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
|
|
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
|
|
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
|
|
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
|
|
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
|
|
*/
|
|
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
|
|
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
|
|
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
|
|
# else
|
|
EVP_sha1(), NULL);
|
|
# endif
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok, al;
|
|
unsigned long resplen, n;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
if (n < 4) {
|
|
/* need at least status type + length */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
n2l3(p, resplen);
|
|
if (resplen + 4 != n) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
|
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
|
|
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
|
|
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok, ret = 0;
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
/* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
|
|
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
|
|
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return ((int)n);
|
|
if (n > 0) {
|
|
/* should contain no data */
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
int n;
|
|
unsigned long alg_k;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
|
|
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
|
|
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p = &(d[4]);
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
|
|
/* Fool emacs indentation */
|
|
if (0) {
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
|
|
*/
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
|
rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
|
else {
|
|
pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
|
|
x509);
|
|
if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
|| (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
|
|
tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
|
|
|
|
q = p;
|
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
|
|
tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
|
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
|
|
p[1]++;
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
|
|
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
|
|
# endif
|
|
if (n <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
s2n(n, q);
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
tmp_buf,
|
|
sizeof tmp_buf);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
|
|
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
|
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
|
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
|
|
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
|
|
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
|
const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
|
|
alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
|
|
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
authp = NULL;
|
|
# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
|
|
if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
|
|
authp = &authenticator;
|
|
# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
|
|
|
|
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
|
|
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
|
if (enc == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
{
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
|
|
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
|
|
kssl_err.text);
|
|
}
|
|
# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
if (krb5rc) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
|
|
* in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
|
|
*
|
|
* Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
|
|
* n = krb5_ap_req.length;
|
|
* memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
|
|
* if (krb5_ap_req.data)
|
|
* kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
|
|
*
|
|
* Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
|
|
* (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
|
|
* Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
|
|
* with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
|
|
* Example:
|
|
* KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
|
|
* Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
|
|
* optional authenticator omitted.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
|
|
s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
|
|
memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
|
|
p += enc_ticket->length;
|
|
n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
|
|
|
|
/* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
|
|
if (authp && authp->length) {
|
|
s2n(authp->length, p);
|
|
memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
|
|
p += authp->length;
|
|
n += authp->length + 2;
|
|
|
|
free(authp->data);
|
|
authp->data = NULL;
|
|
authp->length = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
|
|
tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
|
|
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
|
|
* EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
|
|
* kssl_ctx->length);
|
|
* EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
|
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
|
|
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
|
|
sizeof tmp_buf);
|
|
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
|
|
outl += padl;
|
|
if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
|
|
s2n(outl, p);
|
|
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
|
|
p += outl;
|
|
n += outl + 2;
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
tmp_buf,
|
|
sizeof tmp_buf);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
|
|
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
|
|
dh_srvr = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* we get them from the cert */
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* generate a new random key */
|
|
if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
|
|
* clear it out afterwards
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
|
|
|
|
if (n <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* generate master key from the result */
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
p, n);
|
|
/* clean up */
|
|
memset(p, 0, n);
|
|
|
|
/* send off the data */
|
|
n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
|
|
s2n(n, p);
|
|
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
|
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
|
|
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
|
|
EC_KEY *tkey;
|
|
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
|
|
int field_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
|
|
* computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
|
|
* ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
|
|
/*-
|
|
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
|
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
|
|
* To add such support, one needs to add
|
|
* code that checks for appropriate
|
|
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
|
* For example, the cert have an ECC
|
|
* key on the same curve as the server's
|
|
* and the key should be authorized for
|
|
* key agreement.
|
|
*
|
|
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
|
|
* to skip sending the certificate verify
|
|
* message.
|
|
*
|
|
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
|
|
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
|
|
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
|
|
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
|
|
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
|
|
srvr_pub_pkey =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
|
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
|
|
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
|
|| (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
|
|
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
|
|
|
|
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
|
|
* private key to perform the ECDH computation.
|
|
*/
|
|
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
|
|
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
|
|
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
|
|
if (priv_key == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
|
|
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
|
|
* clear it out afterwards
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
|
|
if (field_size <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
|
|
clnt_ecdh, NULL);
|
|
if (n <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* generate master key from the result */
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
p, n);
|
|
|
|
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
|
|
|
|
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
|
|
/* Send empty client key exch message */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
|
|
* accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
encoded_pt_len =
|
|
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
|
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the public key */
|
|
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
|
|
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
/* copy the point */
|
|
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
|
|
/* increment n to account for length field */
|
|
n += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Free allocated memory */
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
|
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
|
|
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
|
|
X509 *peer_cert;
|
|
size_t msglen;
|
|
unsigned int md_len;
|
|
int keytype;
|
|
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
|
|
*/
|
|
peer_cert =
|
|
s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
|
|
if (!peer_cert)
|
|
peer_cert =
|
|
s->session->
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
|
|
if (!peer_cert) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
|
|
X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
|
|
*
|
|
* * parameters match those of server certificate, use
|
|
* certificate key for key exchange
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
|
|
/* Generate session key */
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
|
|
(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
|
|
* * would be used
|
|
*/
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
|
|
* data
|
|
*/
|
|
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
|
EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
|
|
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
|
|
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
|
|
(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
|
|
shared_ukm) < 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encapsulate it into sequence
|
|
*/
|
|
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
|
|
msglen = 255;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
|
|
< 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (msglen >= 0x80) {
|
|
*(p++) = 0x81;
|
|
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
|
|
n = msglen + 3;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
|
|
n = msglen + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
|
|
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
|
|
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
|
|
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
|
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
premaster_secret,
|
|
32);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
|
|
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
|
|
/* send off the data */
|
|
n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
|
|
s2n(n, p);
|
|
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
|
|
n += 2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
|
|
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
|
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->session->master_key)) <
|
|
0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
|
|
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
|
|
* strnlen.
|
|
*/
|
|
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
|
|
size_t identity_len;
|
|
unsigned char *t = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
|
|
unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
|
|
int psk_err = 1;
|
|
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
|
|
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
|
|
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
|
|
psk_or_pre_ms,
|
|
sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
|
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
} else if (psk_len == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
|
|
identity_len = strlen(identity);
|
|
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
|
|
pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
|
|
t = psk_or_pre_ms;
|
|
memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
|
|
s2n(psk_len, t);
|
|
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
|
|
t += psk_len;
|
|
s2n(psk_len, t);
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
s->session->psk_identity_hint =
|
|
BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
|
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
|
|
&& s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
|
|
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
|
|
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto psk_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length =
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->
|
|
session->master_key,
|
|
psk_or_pre_ms,
|
|
pre_ms_len);
|
|
s2n(identity_len, p);
|
|
memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
|
|
n = 2 + identity_len;
|
|
psk_err = 0;
|
|
psk_err:
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
|
|
if (psk_err != 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
else {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
l2n3(n, d);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num = n + 4;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
|
|
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
err:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
|
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p, *d;
|
|
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
|
|
unsigned u = 0;
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
|
int j;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
|
|
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p = &(d[4]);
|
|
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
|
|
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
|
|
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
NID_sha1,
|
|
&(data
|
|
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
|
} else {
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
|
|
* digest and cached handshake records.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
long hdatalen = 0;
|
|
void *hdata;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
|
|
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
|
|
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
|
|
EVP_MD_name(md));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|
|
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
|
|
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(u, p);
|
|
n = u + 4;
|
|
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
} else
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
|
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
|
|
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
|
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(u, p);
|
|
n = u + 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
|
|
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(j, p);
|
|
n = j + 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
|
|
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(j, p);
|
|
n = j + 2;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
|
|
|| pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
|
|
unsigned char signbuf[64];
|
|
int i;
|
|
size_t sigsize = 64;
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
|
|
p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(j, p);
|
|
n = j + 2;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
l2n3(n, d);
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
|
|
s->init_num = (int)n + 4;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *x509 = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
int i;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
|
|
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We need to get a client cert */
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
* return(-1); We then get retied later
|
|
*/
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
|
|
if (i < 0) {
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
|
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
} else if (i == 1) {
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (x509 != NULL)
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
|
if (pkey != NULL)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
return (1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ok, we have a cert */
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
|
|
l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
|
|
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key->x509);
|
|
if (!l) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->init_num = (int)l;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
|
|
return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, idx;
|
|
long alg_k, alg_a;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
int pkey_bits;
|
|
SESS_CERT *sc;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh;
|
|
#endif
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
|
|
/* we don't have a certificate */
|
|
if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH | SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
sc = s->session->sess_cert;
|
|
if (sc == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* This is the passed certificate */
|
|
|
|
idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
|
|
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
|
|
/* check failed */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
|
|
pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
|
|
i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
|
|
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rsa != NULL) {
|
|
/* server key exchange is not allowed. */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
|
|
/* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
|
|
int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
|
|
if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
|
|
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
/* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
|
|
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
|
|
/* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
|
|
/* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
|
|
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (1);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
|
/*
|
|
* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
|
|
* the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
|
|
* message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
|
|
* Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
|
|
* ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
|
|
* pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
|
|
* is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
|
|
!s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
|
|
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
|
|
* so permit appropriate message length.
|
|
* We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
|
|
* and not its length.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
|
|
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int len, padding_len;
|
|
unsigned char *d;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
|
|
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
|
|
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
|
|
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
d[4] = len;
|
|
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
|
|
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
|
|
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
|
|
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
|
|
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
|
|
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
|
|
s->init_off = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
|
|
|
|
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
|
|
{
|
|
int i = 0;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
|
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
|
|
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
|
|
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
|
|
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (i != 0)
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
|
|
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|