When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL. We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things. This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc27d07187b59551e4fad3db4e52ea73f2c. Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.
CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a952e97d82eac6958c81ed1e256e6b8ca5)
Related to CVE-2014-3513
This fix was developed by the OpenSSL Team
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
util/ssleay.num
Conflicts:
util/mkdef.pl
CVE-2014-3513
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an original
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the issue
was performed by the OpenSSL team.
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Original commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65dfab0de51c9f67b3c909311770f2b3f801)
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.
(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc6dd7347750df2468c93e8c34bcb93a4b)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1
This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
ssl/s3_cbc.c
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed
from int to long in that commit
Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5ff559ff90124c6fd53bbb49dae5edb4e821e0a)
Also, I (rsalz) changed "#ifdef undef" to "#if 0"
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6b0dc6eff1a59274730802db923d55802378d011)
Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.
OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.
This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.
(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d851732bad7370640702bc9c4a33189ede287)
Fix comments in ssltest.c: return value of 0 now means extension is
omitted and add_cb is not called for servers if the corresponding
extension is absent in ClientHello.
Test add_cb is not called if extension is not received.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f47e203975133ddbae3cde20c8c3c0516f62066c)
Instead of SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_srv_ext
use SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext and SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8cafe9e8bfcc99d12adf083c61411955995668c4)
Support separate parse and add callback arguments.
Add new callback so an application can free extension data.
Change return value for send functions so < 0 is an error 0
omits extension and > 0 includes it. This is more consistent
with the behaviour of other functions in OpenSSL.
Modify parse_cb handling so <= 0 is an error.
Make SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext and SSL_CTX_set_custom_cli_ext argument
order consistent.
NOTE: these changes WILL break existing code.
Remove (now inaccurate) in line documentation.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33f653adf3bff5b0795e22de1f54b7c5472252d0)
Use "parse" and "add" for function and callback names instead of
"first" and "second".
Change arguments to callback so the extension type is unsigned int
and the buffer length is size_t. Note: this *will* break existing code.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit de2a9e38f39eacc2e052d694f5b5fa5b7e734abc)
Since sanity checks are performed for all custom extensions the
serverinfo checks are no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 707b026d7871eb12c23671c975e6a15a8c331785)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl3.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Reject attempts to use extensions handled internally.
Add flags to each extension structure to indicate if an extension
has been sent or received. Enforce RFC5246 compliance by rejecting
duplicate extensions and unsolicited extensions and only send a
server extension if we have sent the corresponding client extension.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 28ea0a0c6a5e4e217c405340fa22a8503c7a17db)
Use the same structure for client and server custom extensions.
Add utility functions in new file t1_ext.c.
Use new utility functions to handle custom server and client extensions
and remove a lot of code duplication.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ecf4d660902dcef6e0afc51d52926f00d409ee6b)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl_lib.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
Move custom extension structures from SSL_CTX to CERT structure.
This change means the form can be revised in future without binary
compatibility issues. Also since CERT is part of SSL structures
so per-SSL custom extensions could be supported in future as well as
per SSL_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b83294fe3022b9d5d525ccdcfeb53d39c25b05bd)
Conflicts:
ssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_cert.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5a3d21c0585064292bde5cd34089e120487ab687)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_cbc.c
test/Makefile
Extra SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile() declaration in ssl/srtp.h
causes -Werror builds to fail.
Cherry-picked from 3609b02305c3678525930ff9bacb566c0122ea2a
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.
Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:
A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-2970
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.
Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.
I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.
This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.
In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.
Fixes CVE-2014-3506
Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.
Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.
By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test".
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961c4fbd27577fb519d9aea2dc788742715)
Conflicts:
ssl/heartbeat_test.c
ssl/ssl.h
util/mkdef.pl
Use same logic when determining when to expect a client
certificate for both TLS and DTLS.
PR#3452
(cherry picked from commit c8d710dc5f83d69d802f941a4cc5895eb5fe3d65)
