of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_pkt.c
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_pkt.c
This fix ensures that
* A HelloRequest is retransmitted if not responded by a ClientHello
* The HelloRequest "consumes" the sequence number 0. The subsequent
ServerHello uses the sequence number 1.
* The client also expects the sequence number of the ServerHello to
be 1 if a HelloRequest was received earlier.
This patch fixes the RFC violation.
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_pkt.c
(cherry picked from commit 6f87807e629ee10ec0006b39d8851af8c5ade67b)
Reported by: Prashant Jaikumar <rmstar@gmail.com>
Fix handling of application data received before a handshake.
(cherry picked from commit 0c75eeacd3285b395dc75b65c3e6fe6ffbef59f0)
Kludge alert. This is arranged by passing padding length in unused
bits of SSL3_RECORD->type, so that orig_len can be reconstructed.
(cherry picked from commit 413cbfe68d83f9afc726b7234c49bd5ccddb97b4)
This change updates the DTLS code to match the constant-time CBC
behaviour in the TLS.
(cherry picked from commit 9f27de170d1b7bef3d46d41382dc4dafde8b3900)
(cherry picked from commit 5e4ca556e970edb8a7f364fcb6ee6818a965a60b)
Conflicts:
ssl/d1_enc.c
ssl/d1_pkt.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
The previous CBC patch was bugged in that there was a path through enc()
in s3_pkt.c/d1_pkt.c which didn't set orig_len. orig_len would be left
at the previous value which could suggest that the packet was a
sufficient length when it wasn't.
(cherry picked from commit 6cb19b7681f600b2f165e4adc57547b097b475fd)
(cherry picked from commit 2c948c1bb218f4ae126e14fd3453d42c62b93235)
Conflicts:
ssl/s3_enc.c
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)
Conflicts:
crypto/crypto.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
(cherry picked from commit dc406b59f3169fe191e58906df08dce97edb727c)
Conflicts:
crypto/crypto.h
ssl/d1_pkt.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
length, so a _single_ pair of packets getting switched around would
cause one of them to be 'dropped'.
Secondly, it wasn't even _dropping_ the offending packets, in the
non-blocking case. It was just returning garbage instead.
PR: #1752
Submitted by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
and PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM with the values 0 (for false) and 1 (for true),
depending on which is true. Use those flags everywhere else to provide
the correct implementation for handling certain operations in q PQ_64BIT.
have a uniform representation for those over all architectures, so a
little bit of hackery is needed.
Contributed by nagendra modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu>
