Thanks, folks!
348 Benjamin Kaduk
317 Christian Brueffer
254 Erik Tews
253 Erik Tews
219 Carl Mehner
155 (ghost)
95 mancha
51 DominikNeubauer
(Manually picked from 59c554b36e39256ac2cfc34dca052453e10c6d9c)
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.
With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.
With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.
Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
If BN_rand is called with |bits| set to 1 and |top| set to 1 then a 1 byte
buffer overflow can occur. There are no such instances within the OpenSSL at
the moment.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke, Filip Palian for
discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
The functions BN_rshift and BN_lshift shift their arguments to the right or
left by a specified number of bits. Unpredicatable results (including
crashes) can occur if a negative number is supplied for the shift value.
Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and Filip Palian
for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7cc18d8158b5fc2676393d99b51c30c135502107)
Conflicts:
crypto/bn/bn.h
crypto/bn/bn_err.c
Updates to include SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512. In particular note
the restriction on setting md to NULL with regards to thread safety.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f7812493a0da6b740274135ce340ff7505027057)
Specifically, an ASN.1 NumericString in the certificate CN will fail UTF-8 conversion
and result in a negative return value, which the "x509 -checkhost" command-line option
incorrectly interpreted as success.
Also update X509_check_host docs to reflect reality.
Thanks to Sean Burford (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0923e7df9eafec6db9c75405d7085ec8581f01bd)
Per discussion: should not exit. Should not print to stderr.
Errors are ignored. Updated doc to reflect that, and the fact
that this function is to be avoided.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit abdd677125f3a9e3082f8c5692203590fdb9b860)
MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 63eab8a620944a990ab3985620966ccd9f48d681)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 648495864513da788246f9b75dbbbce0614ed5e8)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f281b8df704ce0123fa2193f2890a25da1756528)
Minor changes made by Matt Caswell.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34890ac18eb5ee7bffe9d460480164e1546b491e)
Out is the buffer which needs to contain at least inl + cipher_block_size - 1 bytes. Outl
is just an int*.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5211e094dec9486a540ac480f345df1a8d2b2862)
If data is NULL, return the size needed to hold the
derived key. No other API to do this, so document
the behavior.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5aed169305941fb1eba15fd4bacc0f998b0e43f7)
i2d_re_X509_tbs re-encodes the TBS portion of the certificate.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 95b1752cc7531e4b609aea166f2db1c155ab5bdd)
The function returns 0 or 1, only.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b0e659cfaca9ff4a481cc63b7f6b6e97303ad8fe)
The doc says that port can be "*" to mean any port.
That's wrong.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07e3b31fae98b985d3d2aad7066144b11833f688)
When d2i_ECPrivateKey reads a private key with a missing (optional) public key,
generate one automatically from the group and private key.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed383f847156940e93f256fed78599873a4a9b28)
I also removed some trailing whitespace and cleaned
up the "see also" list.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3e11c54466f1da8b707c932e308d345fd61101)
The EXAMPLE that used FILE and RC2 doesn't compile due to a
few minor errors. Tweak to use IDEA and AES-128. Remove
examples about RC2 and RC5.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
This patch was submitted by user "Kox" via the wiki
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2dd8cb3b9593f528d9537aa6a003d5c93df1e3c5)
Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a207f7b6d86c3bc8ffb053e5f4d0c1ca0)
statement of opinion rather than a fact.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8d133e4b6f1ed1b7ad3c1a6d2c62f460e26c050)
PR#3456
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d48e78f0cf22aaddb563f4bcfccf25b1a45ac8a4)
Reduces number of silly casts in OpenSSL code and likely most
applications. Consistent with (char *) for "peername" value from
X509_check_host() and X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername().
(cherry picked from commit 297c67fcd817ea643de2fdeff4e434b050d571e2)
Pass address of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID peername to X509_check_host().
Document modified interface.
(cherry picked from commit ced3d9158a7a8c676be504bb6cd3b5ffb7cc7f13)
ERR_get_error(3) references the non-existent
ERR_get_last_error_line_data instead of the one that does exist,
ERR_peek_last_error_line_data.
PR#3283
(cherry picked from commit 5cc99c6cf5e908df6b00b04af7f08e99c0698c7b)
IN parameter.
Under the old docs, the only thing stated was "at most
EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes will be written". It was kind of misleading
since it appears EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) WILL be written regardless of the
signature's buffer size.
(cherry picked from commit 6e6ba36d980f67b6e5c7b139f78da7acbbf8ec76)
