This is a backport of commit e83ee04bb7de800cdb71d522fa562e99328003a3 from
the master branch (and this has also been applied to 1.0.2). In 1.0.2 this
was CVE-2015-0207. For other branches there is no known security issue, but
this is being backported as a precautionary measure.
The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes
the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to
loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received
with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen
means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invokation to the
next.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cce3e4adb78a8d3eeb6e0e4efe332fcc5d75f615)
work in SSLv3: initial handshake has no extensions but includes MCSV, if
server indicates RI support then renegotiation handshakes include RI.
NB: current MCSV value is bogus for testing only, will be updated when we
have an official value.
Change mismatch alerts to handshake_failure as required by spec.
Also have some debugging fprintfs so we can clearly see what is going on
if OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG is set.
length, so a _single_ pair of packets getting switched around would
cause one of them to be 'dropped'.
Secondly, it wasn't even _dropping_ the offending packets, in the
non-blocking case. It was just returning garbage instead.
PR: #1752
Submitted by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
have a uniform representation for those over all architectures, so a
little bit of hackery is needed.
Contributed by nagendra modadugu <nagendra@cs.stanford.edu>
