It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
If SSL_check_chain is called with a NULL X509 object or a NULL EVP_PKEY
or the type of the public key is unrecognised then the local variable
|cpk| in tls1_check_chain does not get initialised. Subsequently an
attempt is made to deref it (after the "end" label), and a seg fault will
result.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)
If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.
For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:
openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
CVE-2015-0285
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Since commit 741c9959 ("DTLS revision."), we put the wrong protocol
version into our ClientHello for DTLS1_BAD_VER. The old DTLS
code which used ssl->version was replaced by the more generic SSL3 code
which uses ssl->client_version. The Cisco ASA no longer likes our
ClientHello.
RT#3711
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Commit 9cf0f187 in HEAD, and 68039af3 in 1.0.2, removed a version check
from dtls1_buffer_message() which was needed to distinguish between DTLS
1.x and Cisco's pre-standard version of DTLS (DTLS1_BAD_VER).
Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3703
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
This patch uses warning/fatal constants instead of numbers with comments for
warning/alerts in d1_pkt.c and s3_pkt.c
RT#3725
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Miscellaneous unchecked malloc fixes. Also fixed some mem leaks on error
paths as I spotted them along the way.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
These ciphers are removed:
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
TLS1_CK_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA
TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
They were defined in a long-expired IETF internet-draft:
draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Some Cisco appliances use a pre-standard version number for DTLS. We support
this as DTLS1_BAD_VER within the code.
This change fixes d2i_SSL_SESSION for that DTLS version.
Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3704
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG is a workaround for a browser bug from many years ago
(2000).
It predates DTLS, so certainly has no place in d1_srvr.c.
In s3_srvr.c it forces the ServerDone to appear in the same record as the
CertificateRequest when doing client auth.
BoringSSL have already made the same commit:
79ae85e4f777f94d91b7be19e8a62016cb55b3c5
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
When writing out the hint, if the hint > 0, then we write it out otherwise
we skip it.
Previously when reading the hint back in, if were expecting to see one
(because the ticket length > 0), but it wasn't present then we set the hint
to -1, otherwise we set it to 0. This fails to set the hint to the same as
when it was written out.
The hint should never be negative because the RFC states the hint is
unsigned. It is valid for a server to set the hint to 0 (this means the
lifetime is unspecified according to the RFC). If the server set it to 0, it
should still be 0 when we read it back in.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
SSL_SESSION_get_ticket_lifetime_hint. The latter has been reported as
required to fix Qt for OpenSSL 1.1.0. I have also added the former in order
to determine whether a ticket is present or not - otherwise it is difficult
to know whether a zero lifetime hint is because the server set it to 0, or
because there is no ticket.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
From RFC4507:
"The ticket_lifetime_hint field contains a hint from the server about how
long the ticket should be stored. The value indicates the lifetime in
seconds as a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order."
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
There is no mechanism to do that at the moment - SSL_set_bio makes changes
to the wbio even if you pass in SSL_get_wbio().
This commit introduces two new API functions SSL_set_rbio() and
SSL_set_wbio(). These do the same job as SSL_set_bio() except they enable
you to manage the rbio and wbio individually.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
I left many "#if 0" lines, usually because I thought we would
probably want to revisit them later, or because they provided
some useful internal documentation tips.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
The mkstack.pl script now generates the entire safestack.h file.
It generates output that follows the coding style.
Also, removed all instances of the obsolete IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF
macro.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
This is an ancient bug workaround for Netscape clients. The documentation
talks about versions 3.x and 4.x beta.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Document SSL_get_extms_support().
Modify behaviour of SSL_get_extms_support() so it returns -1 if the
master secret support of the peer is not known (e.g. handshake in progress).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Update master secret calculation to support extended master secret.
TLS 1.2 client authentication adds a complication because we need to
cache the handshake messages. This is simpllified however because
the point at which the handshake hashes are calculated for extended
master secret is identical to that required for TLS 1.2 client
authentication (immediately after client key exchange which is also
immediately before certificate verify).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add and retrieve extended master secret extension, setting the flag
SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS appropriately.
Note: this just sets the flag and doesn't include the changes to
master secret generation.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Rewrite ssl3_send_client_key_exchange to retain the premaster secret
instead of using it immediately.
This is needed because the premaster secret is used after the client key
exchange message has been sent to compute the extended master secret.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Retrieve handshake hashes in a separate function. This tidies the existing
code and will be used for extended master secret generation.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add a "flags" field to SSL_SESSION. This will contain various flags
such as encrypt-then-mac and extended master secret support.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
catch up with the Unix build.
A number of new tests, among others test/tocsp.com
Define INTERNAL in ssl/ssl-lib.com to allow for '#include "internal/foo.h"'
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Add new symbols that are longer than 31 chars to symhacks.
VMS doesn't have <sys/un.h>, reflect that in e_os.h.
MS_CALLBACK has been removed, ssl_task.c needs adjustment.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
An expired IETF Internet-Draft (seven years old) that nobody
implements, and probably just as good as NSA DRBG work.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Not interested in helping the NSA in the slightest.
And anyway, it was never implemented, #if'd out.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Remove OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS. This was turned on by default,
so the work here is removing the 'maintain our own freelist' code.
Also removed a minor old Windows-multibyte/widechar conversion flag.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Remove support for SHA0 and DSS0 (they were broken), and remove
the ability to attempt to build without SHA (it didn't work).
For simplicity, remove the option of not building various SHA algorithms;
you could argue that SHA_224/256/384/512 should be kept, since they're
like crypto algorithms, but I decided to go the other way.
So these options are gone:
GENUINE_DSA OPENSSL_NO_SHA0
OPENSSL_NO_SHA OPENSSL_NO_SHA1
OPENSSL_NO_SHA224 OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
OPENSSL_NO_SHA384 OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
